In an article earlier this year for Foreign Affairs magazine, the British historian Niall Ferguson discussed how quickly empires collapse. He noted that while many observers have tended to assume long cycles of imperial decline, a breakdown could come suddenly, “like a thief in the night.”
Ferguson has argued that the American empire is more likely to disintegrate for reasons related to the domestic economy than foreign policy. In his book ‘Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire,’ he argued that imperial America faced a ballooning fiscal crisis brought on by a propensity to consume much and save little, as well as an impending social security crisis caused by Americans living longer and overburdening the fiscal system.
In the Foreign Affairs article, Ferguson focused on the vital matter of perceptions of decline. Even if fiscal shortcomings were not enough to erode American strength, he pointed out, “they can work to weaken a long-assumed faith in the United States’ ability to weather any crisis.” Just look at the relatively minor sub-prime defaults that spread through the global financial system by “blowing huge holes in the business models of thousands of highly leveraged financial institutions.”
Another scholar, Michael Mandelbaum, recently examined the implications of the financial crisis on American foreign policy in his ‘The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era.’ He argued that America’s debt obligations following the 2008 financial crisis, as well as its fiscal structure and entitlement programs such as social security and Medicare, prevented the country from continuing to play the leading international role it has for decades.
“[T]he public will no longer feel able to afford, and so will not support, operations to rescue people oppressed by their own governments and to build the structures of governance where none exist,” Mandelbaum wrote. “Interventions of this kind, which the United States has undertaken in the last two decades in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, will not be repeated. The American defense budget will come under pressure, and so, too, therefore, will the missions that the defense budget supports.”
All this raises an interesting question. If, as Mandelbaum affirms, the United States becomes more frugal abroad, will that not undermine America’s long-assumed faith in its ability to weather any crisis, as Ferguson pointed out? In other words: too much realism about American limitations may actually accelerate America’s waning.
Certainly that is true in the Middle East, where, under President Barack Obama, the US has visibly downgraded its commitments. Obama has withdrawn American combat forces from Iraq. He has overseen a significant tightening of sanctions on Iran, in part to better avoid being sucked into an expensive, hazardous war with the country over its nuclear program. Obama’s support for Palestinian-Israeli peace, while it fulfills a campaign promise, may be viewed as an effort to stabilize a region that might cost the US dearly in the event of new conflicts. Even in Afghanistan, where Obama has deployed 30,000 additional soldiers, information recently published by the journalist Bob Woodward indicates that at the heart of Obama’s thinking were a clear-cut exit strategy and financial worries. “I’m not doing 10 years. I’m not doing long-term nation-building. I am not spending a trillion dollars,” the president told Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in October 2009.
That is sensible. However, America’s view of itself has always pushed in a contrary direction. It was John F. Kennedy who stated in his inaugural address that America would “pay any price, bear any burden, [and] meet any hardship… to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” For Obama to challenge that premise on financial grounds effectively denies Americans the self-assurance — some would say the egotism — a higher sense of purpose invariably brings with it. This in turn could hasten the demise of the American empire that Ferguson discusses. Balancing national values with national accounts will remain a major difficulty for American leaders. But the process of change may be quicker than some imagine, as Ferguson believes. America may not be able to afford high ambition, nor might it long outlast excessive modesty.
