With the hunt underway to replace the late head of the Association of Editors, Melhem Karam, and drafting set to begin on a new media law, Executive sat down with Minister of Information Tarek Mitri to discuss press associations, legal loopholes and the future of Lebanon’s media industry.

• We’re seeing a lot of new media associations, both local and international, setting up shop in Lebanon at the moment. Who is supervising the legitimacy of these groups, and what are your thoughts on them?

I don’t know them all, but some come and visit me and those I’ve seen have reported rather fairly. So I have no particular reason to be suspicious of any of them, or to raise the question ‘who are these people?’ I make the bona fide assumption that they’re legitimate, and I haven’t had any unpleasant surprises — I disagree with some of the things I’ve heard, but mostly minor incidences.

• What are some of the things you disagree with?

I think what I tend to disagree with is the way outsiders, if I may call them this, perceive freedom of press in Lebanon. They come with a number of criteria and end up with an assessment that in relative terms the press is free, but it’s not as free as the Lebanese claim it is. I’m not in full agreement with this; I think the problem is that you need to make a distinction between the freedom of media organizations and the freedom of journalists.

Media organizations are free, they’re probably more free [here] than anywhere else in the world. There is a law that is rarely enforced, so that makes them even more free than the law we have allows, and our law is [already] pretty liberal.

Where there is a deficit of freedom is the area of relationships between individual journalists and publishers or owners of media organizations… a more appropriate key to understanding the media scene in Lebanon is to look at independence rather than freedom. I think media in general is not that independent because media organizations are dependent on those that finance them, and more importantly dependent on the political forces that they support or they defend. And then individual journalists are not that independent; either they conform to what they consider to be the policy of their media organizations and therefore are into self-censorship, or they’re subject to pressure.

I always try and focus the attention of people to this problem. And the other focus that’s needed — and I’m still referring to those visitors that we have — is that in many countries where you have authoritarian regimes when you speak about freedom of press you talk about relations with state, the state is the repressive entity so to speak. In Lebanon that’s not the case; it’s non-state actors that [are repressive].

• Such as?

Political movements, armed groups, whoever — I mean, the journalists that have been assassinated, they’ve been assassinated by non-state actors that we don’t know of, I’m not accusing anyone in particular, but it’s not the secret police of Lebanon who kills journalists as in Argentina under dictatorship.

So, some of these people that come from Western countries to investigate freedom of press say ‘but you say press is free but journalists are being killed!’ and I say I know, but they’re not killed by our secret police.

• Why has there not been a professional association created for TV and radio journalists?

That’s a good question. There are two layers to the problem. One is that many of those who are into audiovisual media are also journalists in the written press. But the other fundamental problem is that there is a vacuum in the current law with respect to organizing the media profession, starting with a definition: ‘Who is a journalist?’ is not a question satisfactorily answered by the current law. I sign press cards for members of the union and every time I do this, I wonder what am I signing? What is this card about? And then the important question — why is it that it takes some people 10 years to get this [membership card], some people don’t get it at all, and some people get it who don’t seem to qualify as journalists… I have no proof but I’m tempted to think there are people who are members of the association who are not journalists and there are journalists who are not members of the association.

• Let’s talk about the replacement of Melhem Karam at the Association of Editors — there seems to be quite a heated debate at the moment between editors as to who should replace him, and rumors that you’ve also been involved in the discussion. What are your thoughts on this issue?

The important thing is to state unequivocally that I’m not interfering in this process, it’s none of my business and I’m not going to give anybody a reason to claim that political authorities are putting pressure on this. But as a minister and a private citizen I receive journalists, from the two sides let’s say, and it’s my duty to listen to them and from listening I realize there is a problem [at the Association of Editors]. One of them is what we’ve just said, that there are people who are members who should not be and people who are entitled to be members who are not.

The second, more specific issue is that according to the bylaws of the association, the members of the board should not be publishers or responsible editors. I’ve been told that six out of nine members of the board are either owners or publishers of magazines — non-political ones though — or are responsible editors, so they should not be where they are. My wish both as a minister and as a private citizen is to have an inclusive journalists association — that’s not the case now — in which all journalists who are entitled to be members of the association are members. And at the same time, I’m not pleased with the way the profession is organized now, which is why I’m trying to make a new law.

• Tell us about the new law — what does it entail, what’s new about it, and how will it improve the situation?

We have two problems with the existing laws. First, there is no code of media, there are bits and pieces of legislation; there are laws that contradict each other and then there are those that are old and need to be updated in view of the changes that we’ve seen. There are areas in media that are in a ‘grey zone.’ Look at the electronic media, there’s no law that regulates electronic media, and cable services are also in a sort of grey zone.

Take television stations that rebroadcast from Lebanon using a satellite; they don’t have a license here, they’re registered in the Cayman Islands or Panama, or who knows where. [If I receive a complaint] I have no way of identifying them, and even if I do find them I have no juridical instrument to hold them accountable.

You need a law that covers these uncovered areas. I have to admit that legislating everywhere in the world takes time, but in Lebanon it takes more time than elsewhere; not just because of the political situation and the slowness of the decision making processes, but also because the technical work of drafting a law should be accompanied by a public debate. So, I’m listening and talking to people and hoping to start the process of drafting in the near future, maybe in early autumn.

There is a resistance in parliament to the drafting of a code for media — to have all the laws relating to media in one place — this is something that quite a few legislators don’t like.

• Why not?

I’ve not been able to really make sense of their arguments. They say it’s the ideal way of legislating, but this is not the way we do it in Lebanon. They’re happier drafting a law on media crimes, drafting a law on censorship, drafting a third law on something else, rather than saying look, media law is so interconnected and even the same people that write in print media work in broadcast media. There are so many problems in common, such as libel law and defamation.

• So in the draft law, you’ll be harmonizing all the different areas?

Harmonizing, updating and then adding what needs to be added. It will cover areas that still need to be covered — I’ve given you two examples, electronic media and the rebroadcasting channels. And when you update, it also means taking into consideration technical developments that we’ve had.

Ideas and information circulate more freely today, making censorship absurd. But I’m not sure everyone knows or accepts that it’s absurd, so it needs to be stated in the law that there won’t be any censorship, neither before or after [publication], but anyone who chooses to do so can take any journalist to court, or any media organization. So it’s the judiciary that looks at crimes, not the political authorities, nor the security services. So that’s one major change that needs to be confirmed in a new law.

Another example of some importance that I’ve not made up my mind on yet is that of licensing. If you want to start a daily political newspaper in Lebanon, you can’t. By law, the number of daily political newspapers is limited to 22, so we don’t give licenses any more. If you want to start a daily you have to buy an existing one, and it costs some half a million dollars to buy a license.

The Ministry of Information has given 1,900 licenses for non-political media, a huge number. These are very easy to give, but where do you draw a line between what is political and non-political? Suppose I have a license for an economic publication and I write an article about the economic vision of the government, is that political? This distinction is absurd, but if abolished, which is my intention, then those who have licenses to sell will protest, and they’re very influential.

• Lebanon has traditionally been considered to have the region’s leading media industry. What is the ministry doing to make sure Lebanon keeps this pioneering position and develop it further?

A new media law is a necessary though not sufficient condition for promoting the regional role that the Lebanese media has always had. But we’re losing that role, and we’re losing it for structural reasons, I think. Even in countries that have more repressive regimes than we have in Lebanon, because of new technology you can enjoy greater freedom [there] now.

In the Gulf countries, the need to read the Lebanese press or listen to the Lebanese media to know what is happening is not what it used to be. They now have their own television [stations], good publications and good access to information.

They are also investing more — there is probably an economic dimension to this. Think of Al Jazeera in Qatar, and the amount of public money that has been invested in it — no one in Lebanon or elsewhere for that matter can compete with this. Thirty years ago if a Qatari wanted to start Al Jazeera, he would have done it in Lebanon. But they were able to start it in Qatar, and then probably get some of the Lebanese to work for them. It’s easier now to disassociate between Lebanon and the Lebanese — you can use the Lebanese wherever you are without having to come to Lebanon.

It’s a question worth exploring more thoroughly, and we need to face the fact that we can no longer work on the assumption that most Lebanese made in the past — that this country is the hospital of the region, the university of the region, the bank of the region and the media organization of the region. It’s no longer the case, for all the sectors mentioned above, not only the media.

Yemen’s problems are myriad: the World Food Program estimates that one in three Yemenis cannot afford sufficient food, a level of malnourishment unmatched even in sub-Saharan Africa. Unemployment cripples 40 percent of the workforce. The currency of this import-dependant economy tumbled to record lows against the United States dollar last month and violent rebellions against the central government simmer in both the tribal north and secessionist south.

Yet for the international community, the only concern that has received significant attention is that Yemen could become “another Afghanistan.” While a 2006 conference of donor countries in London produced $4.7 billion in pledges for Yemeni development, barely a fraction of this was ever distributed.

World attention only turned to Yemen with urgency after the failed Christmas Day bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner, in which a Nigerian allegedly affiliated with the Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) tried to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight arriving from Amsterdam. Shortly thereafter the US devoted $150 million in military aid to try and prevent Yemen from becoming an Al Qaeda-sheltering failed state.

More recent international assistance came when the International Monetary Fund loaned $369 million for currency stabilization following the rial’s recent slide.

Yemen’s neighbors have been much more heavily invested in maintaining the country’s stability and security; in 2009, Yemen was the United Arab Emirates’ largest aid recipient, receiving more than $760 million, and last month Saudi Arabia pledged $1 billion in investments. Fears that the teetering Yemeni state will collapse completely seem to have spurred an international drive to try and pay its way out of instability.

The Yemeni government’s capacity to maintain control independent of international assistance has dwindled in proportion to its oil reserves: the World Bank estimates oil receipts constitute 75 percent of government income and 90 percent of exports, but production slowed considerably in 2007 and the World Bank predicts resource exhaustion by 2017.

The tenuous authority exerted by the central government over the network of tribal loyalties across the country depends on its ability to offer incentives to regional power brokers, yet an employee of a US-sponsored non-governmental organization says there is simply “no more juice in the machine” to fund such endeavors. Thus, as oil revenues shrink, Yemen depends ever more heavily on external aid for the state’s basic functions.

This creates the unhealthy equation in which the government actually benefits in proportion to international anxiety vis à vis Yemen’s stability. Although possible solutions exist for many of Yemen’s woes, the authorities have done little  to implement them in favor of economic and political brinksmanship.

For one, the American government has criticized Yemen for not doing enough to combat AQAP. Al Qaeda expert Saeed al-Jemhi says AQAP has become a political tool for Sana’a: “The government says the opposition party supports Al Qaeda, and vice versa… Al Qaeda becomes an insult, a tool to win elections. But the winner is Al Qaeda itself.”

The presence of AQAP in Yemen may bolster the government by eliciting military aid, he argues, but such dubious benefits “include a huge risk. It is like giving away your organs in order to buy a palace.”

AQAP’s presence in Yemen, compounded by economic hardship and military strikes that publicly appear to kill civilians as often as terrorists, increase the potential for revolt.

“The economic situation is threatening the government because it leads to joblessness and corruption. This gives Al Qaeda the chance to say the government is unworthy to lead the country, and that [a regime established by] Al Qaeda should be the replacement, because they will bring justice,” Al-Jemhi explains. “All of [Yemen’s] problems benefit Al Qaeda.”

“‘We’re talking about ‘to be or not to be.’ You can’t exchange water for jobs”

Running dry

Besides Yemen’s oil reserves drying up, Sana’a is expected to be the world’s first capital city to run out of water, likely within the next five to 15 years. The Ta’iz basin, south of Sana’a, has already collapsed, while 19 of the country’s 21 aquifers receive no replenishing groundwater. Citizens all over the Yemen are forced to rely on increasingly expensive water trucks as centralized water and wells run dry.

Yet agriculture uses water for free, pumped by government-subsidized fuel. Staple and cash crops, such as wheat, coffee and cotton, have been steadily replaced by the more profitable qat, a leaf chewed for its narcotic effect. Data from the Ministry of Agriculture shows that qat production increased 40 percent from 2004 to 2008, from some 118,000 tons to 167,000 tons, with thousands of wells dug for the specific purpose of irrigating qat fields.

Abdullah al-Thary, deputy chairman of the National Water Reserves Authority, explains that for agriculture to represent a viable percentage of GDP, water resources must exceed the water poverty level of 1,000 cubic meters per capita per year; in Yemen, water resources come to only 130 cubic meters per capita.

“We now have a satellite to detect where someone drills illegally [for water]… But people do not understand that it’s not allowed. They have this idea of ‘Yemen the fertile’, they talk about how Yemen should become agriculturally self-sufficient,” Thary sighs and points out that agriculture — about 60 percent of it qat — currently consumes 90 percent of annual water usage.

Thary suggests importing agricultural products in order to preserve Yemen’s water for human consumption. Importing qat from Ethiopia, for example, would also ameliorate the health problems caused by pesticide-laden Yemeni qat and conserve water for drinking. However, reducing qat production would anger the wealthy landowners who cultivate it and weaken their loyalty to the regime.

Cutting fuel subsidies — one of the primary conditions of the recent IMF loan — would reduce the $700 million spent annually, but would further antagonize landowners. When qat reductions are discussed, those opposed point out that many Yemenis are employed in its cultivation, and reducing qat production would harm the country’s economy.

“We’re talking about ‘to be or not to be,’” says Thary. “You can’t exchange water for jobs.” In his opinion, although Yemen will always have to monitor its water supply, the needs of citizens could be met if they were given priority over other, more parochial considerations.

US military aid to Yemen ($millions)

No grease for the wheels

Oil, on the other hand, will run out regardless of improved management and alternative sources of income are underdeveloped: last year Yemen LNG began exporting liquefied natural gas but production capacity is limited to one facility. Energy investment in Yemen remains minimal, given the absence of security and rule of law. Low prices per barrel of oil on the international market coupled with overspending caused Yemen’s fiscal deficit to reach 10 percent of GDP in 2009.

Although efforts to attract investors include the establishment of the General Investment Authority in 1992, investment has a history of being intentionally de-prioritized. Examples of governmental restrictions, such as the aborted attempts by Hyundai and Toyota to establish factories in Yemen in 1990, demonstrate reluctance to welcome investors.

The implementation of policies to encourage investment would help enhance Yemen’s stability by creating employment and spreading wealth; yet greater stability would weaken the impression that the Yemeni government is the sole defence against complete chaos. By allowing, and even fostering, insecurity in Yemen, the regime secures its own necessity, both domestically and in the eyes of the international community.

Economic brinksmanship, however, cannot last forever. The recent depreciation of the rial illustrated the gravity of the economic condition. A senior official at the finance ministry said that 60 percent of the government’s budget consists of two items: fuel subsidies and government salaries.

“Expenditure exceeds revenue, a gap that we used to cover with treasury bills. But we have reached saturation of the market, there isn’t enough money in the economy to buy treasury bills,” he said. “Now we have a problem because we’ve been borrowing from the central bank… and issuing new currency.”

This influx of rials — coupled with dire and disastrous developments on various other fronts — has caused the currency to shed value this year. At currency exchange offices in Sana’a $1 at the beginning of January bought about 200 rials; when the rial slipped again in early August that same $1 bought 280 rials, before the announcement of the IMF loan calmed panic and allowed it to regain some strength.

The Central Bank has also been hemorrhaging foreign currency reserves trying to keep the rial afloat. In statements to the media, Central Bank Governor Mohammad Awad bin Hammam has said the bank has expended nearly $1 billion so far in 2010 fighting currency deflation, however, the senior official at the Ministry of Finance told Executive that propping up the rial has actually cost closer to $3 billion this year, and that the Central Bank’s coffers now hold no more than $5.5 billion in reserves.

“I’m not very optimistic about the near future if the rial starts sliding down again,” the finance ministry official said. “The Houthi [rebel] problem, the Southern thing, Al Qaeda, water… the economic situation is more important than all of these. Because when the rial starts dropping, that is felt by 23 million people.” Especially given that Yemen, already one of the poorest countries in the world, imports nearly everything it consumes and so a devaluing currency puts the price of things like food and other life staples further beyond the reach of ever-larger portions of the population.

Should the rial fall again, “more instability could happen, and then things could get out of control”

Refusing to reform

In conjunction with the IMF’s assistance program, the Yemeni government has pledged to reduce fuel subsidies, implement a general sales tax and control nonessential expenditures. Yet the finance ministry official remains skeptical: “I don’t think we’ll be capable [of implementing reforms]. We are trying, but I think that the fiscal situation is quite serious and we lack the capacity to implement many of these components.”

In early 2010 the government announced a 10 point plan to address key issues paralyzing development, beginning with the removal of 100 ineffective government officials. However, according to the Ministry of Finance source, the plan has failed.

“Maybe we can’t handle 10 points, maybe we can only a handle a one point plan… Say we promise to create 2,000 jobs next year by taking advantage of the Aden Free Zone,” he said. “We need big signs of hope, we need the leadership to make a promise and deliver.” Yet the government has consistently demonstrated that the improvement of economic and security conditions do not rank as top priorities, and donors are losing patience. Concern is mounting over Yemen’s ability to remain on the brink; if the government fails to keep promises, it may lose its balance.

The finance ministry official warned that, should the rial fall again, “more instability could happen, and then things could get out of control. Nothing can stop this eventual slide [of the rial’s value], and even if we could, it wouldn’t last too long… If people start panicking, that’s it; we can’t stop it.”

As the world’s largest wheat importer, Egypt has been hit hard by Russian’s export ban on grain [see A cruel, hot summer]. The North African nation relies heavily on Russia for its wheat imports, as Egyptians consumed roughly 9 million tons more wheat than they produced last year.

The ban, which is to run until the end of December, canceled 540,000-tons in Russian deliveries between August 1 and September 10. Egypt then rushed to secure contracts with France and Canada totaling some 600,000 tons, at an average price of $280 per ton, compared to the $183 per ton it paid Russia in July.

Egyptian Trade Minister Rachid Mohamed Rachid said the ban on Russian wheat imports would cost the state up to $877 million. He also said that Egypt has wheat stockpiles which will last up to five months, even factoring in the increased bread consumption typically seen during Ramadan. Still, a long-term international price hike would eventually trickle down to consumers and affect the prices of other staples, such as corn and rice.

“[Higher wheat prices] would greatly impact the urban poor, so [governments] will be very careful,” said Abdolreza Abbassian, senior grain economist at the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization.

The memory of the 2007-2008 global food crisis is still fresh in Egypt, when bread prices doubled after the price of wheat tripled on the global market, leading to social unrest and violence in some areas. Up to a quarter of Egypt’s 80 million people survive on less than $1 per day, and any upward motion in prices is hard-felt.

The Egyptian government subsidizes some basic food items, including bread, to the tune of 8.5 percent of GDP, but aims to scale this spending back in favor of health, education and other social services. However, in August, when an impending wheat crisis became apparent, Solidarity Minister Ali Musailhi announced: “We have no intention of raising the prices of subsidized commodities.”

Though not as dire as the crisis of two years ago, the current wheat shortage should hammer home the need for Egypt to increase its food security measures. On August 15, Russian press reported Egyptian Agricultural Minister Amin Abaza as saying that “Egypt will follow a strategy of reducing bread consumption and increasing [grain] production.” He added that Egypt aims to meet 70 to 75 percent of its consumption needs by domestic production.

In recent years, the country has focused on growing high-value crops such as figs, green beans, spring onions and melons for European markets, while importing the commodities it lacks a competitive advantage in producing. Russia, for example, can produce wheat far more cheaply due to Egypt’s water constraints. But this model has proved unviable, as it leaves the population hurting for staple foods in times of global shortages.

For now, Egypt is said to be in talks with the United States, Canada and France to diversify its import sources away from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan for the remainder of the year. Additionally, a free-trade agreement signed in August with the South American trade bloc Mercosur should enable Egypt to import from Argentina, another major wheat producer.

In the long term however, increasing overall agricultural production, especially of grains, is needed for Egypt to become less reliant on food imports and more resilient to price shocks. This is easier said than done in a desert nation, but a large-scale land reclamation program is in the works to create more arable land. With explosive population growth in the developing world, global food supply is only going to contract in the coming years, and Egypt would be well-served to speed up investment in its agricultural future.