• Donate
  • Our Purpose
  • Contact Us
Executive Magazine
  • ISSUES
    • Current Issue
    • Past issues
  • BUSINESS
  • ECONOMICS & POLICY
  • OPINION
  • SPECIAL REPORTS
  • EXECUTIVE TALKS
  • MOVEMENTS
    • Change the image
    • Cannes lions
    • Transparency & accountability
    • ECONOMIC ROADMAP
    • Say No to Corruption
    • The Lebanon media development initiative
    • LPSN Policy Asks
    • Advocating the preservation of deposits
  • JOIN US
    • Join our movement
    • Attend our events
    • Receive updates
    • Connect with us
  • DONATE
GCC

Building the new Karachi

by Executive Staff April 12, 2007
written by Executive Staff

Emirati developers want to build another Dubai on thousands of acres of land across Pakistan’s sprawling business capital, but some question whether their billion-dollar investments makes any sense.

Chundrigar Road, named after a former prime minister of Pakistan, is the heart of Karachi’s central business district. On it stand relics of British colonial architecture like the State Bank, the Karachi Port Trust and the Cotton Exchange, buildings from another age which sit uncomfortably alongside new corporate HQs.

But this is not your average CBD. Aging guards with bright henna in their hair and ammunition clips flung over their shoulders sit on plastic chairs inside dilapidated tower blocks. Darting through the traffic are flocks of multicolored rickshaws, driven by hunched men with skullcaps and beards down to their chests. There are wooden carts with donkeys, homeless beggars, open drains and even the occasional camel lying around.

Appearances notwithstanding, this is the financial hub of a metropolis of 15 million people, one of the developing world’s megacities and amongst the most dangerous places on the planet to be a US diplomat. The city is so run-down, disorganized and underdeveloped that many wonder how it actually manages to produce over a quarter of the Pakistani economy. But if some newly-arrived Gulf investors have their way, Karachi is about to get a Dubai-style facelift.

The developers enter the picture

On the back of some impressive economic growth and a gradual process of privatization, a wave of foreign investment has swept into Pakistan during the last two years. Most of it has been channeled into growing sectors like energy, pharmaceuticals, telecoms and IT.

Now, flush with capital and ambition, Emirati property giants looking eastwards towards the subcontinent have signed up for a string of high-profile and controversial projects in Karachi.

In spring 2006, Limitless, part of the state-owned Dubai World group which also controls the emirate’s port and free zone interests, signed a joint venture with the Pakistani authorities to develop the Karachi Waterfront project. When finished, this will be a 14-kilometer high-rise strip of commercial and residential towers, costing $1.5 billion in an initial stage and roughly $20 billion in total.

At around the same time, Emaar, the largest real estate developer in the Arab world by market share, announced it would lead a $2.5 billion project in Karachi called Crescent Bay. Covering 75 acres, the residential and commercial development is planned to occupy the beachfront of an upmarket housing district in the city.

This was followed in September 2006 by the announcement of a second, more controversial project in which Emaar would develop a brand-new city on two empty and half-submerged islands off the Karachi coast. Dubbed the “Diamond Bar Island”, the development is estimated to cost some $43 billion and will doubtless include many familiar Dubai-esque features such as a marina, shopping malls and luxury housing.

Then in February this year, Nakheel, the developer behind the perennially delayed ‘Palm’ projects in Dubai, joined the fray by signing up to construct a completely new district to the west of Karachi. With the provisional name of “Sugar Land City”, the project will reportedly cover no less than 60,000 acres and cost a staggering $63 billion.

If all goes to plan, the total cost of development in Karachi over the next 10-15 years, from these UAE firms alone, adds up to more than $100 billion. For many, this is an extraordinary sum to spend in an underdeveloped third-world city with a history of mismanagement, poverty and regular political unrest.

These Emirati developers are not averse to risk, having invested heavily in relatively unstable and untested markets like Algeria or Syria. But Karachi represents arguably the most hazardous venture that they have embarked upon so far, not just because these projects are amongst their largest, but because the political, social and economic environment in the country can at best be described as fragile.

At your own risk

Pakistan’s economy has performed well in the past few years, with GDP rising at 6-8% per annum since 2004 and the authorities earning plaudits from the IMF and the World Bank for implementing some much-needed reforms. An ongoing process of privatization has seen the government sell off stakes in assets such as the Pakistan Telecommunications Company, with foreign direct investment reaching all-time highs in 2006.

Middle-class incomes are on the rise, thanks to the wider economic growth and greater private-sector involvement, whilst the property market has rewarded investors with double-digit returns in recent years.

There are also growing ties between the UAE and Pakistan, largely in terms of labor force. Hoards of unskilled laborers are shipped in to work on construction sites in Dubai or Abu Dhabi, but many Pakistanis also find employment in better-paid jobs. Most send their earnings back home, contributing to record remittances of $4.5 billion in 2006, whilst wealthier expatriates, particularly in the UK and the US, are a large potential source of buyers for the property developers.

Yet the country still faces crippling economic problems, not least of which being outside perception. Transparency International rates Pakistan 144th out of 158 countries in the world in terms of corruption and bribery, which is generally believed to be endemic at most levels of decision-making.

Poverty still affects almost half of the population, crime is rife and according to some analysts, the gap between the rich and poor is only widening. Many analysts seriously question whether the Karachi market, or indeed any city, is capable of absorbing $100 billion of new developments aimed at a small elite, especially since foreign tourists are virtually non-existent and are likely to remain so in the foreseeable future.

Underlying all this are persistently high levels of social and political instability. In March 2006 a suicide bomber detonated himself outside the US Embassy in Karachi, killing several people. Another bomb went off outside the Islamabad Marriott hotel in February this year, just a few weeks before an attempt to blow up Islamabad airport was thwarted by police. Similar attempts are commonplace in other parts of the country, although most are fairly unsophisticated affairs.

This type of regular unrest is unlikely to abate, at least while the Afghanistan conflict continues to spill further across into the quasi-lawless mountain zones of northern Pakistan and then spreads onwards to the major centers of population.

For the past six years, President Musharraf’s secular regime has been forced to tread an increasingly narrow path between appeasing Washington, which has put intense pressure on Pakistan to support the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, and subduing the powerful, anti-American and increasingly radicalized Islamic currents within Pakistani society.

Musharraf is due for re-election later this year, and is expected to remain in power, but no-one is quite sure in what manner he will decide to do so. Most observers believe that the current president will lead the country for some time yet, although the forthcoming series of elections will turn the spotlight on the nature of his regime.

Cities for the rich?

On top of these various uncertainties is a sense that these Gulf mega-projects are not necessarily welcomed by local residents, especially given the chronic shortage of budget housing for the hundreds of thousands of poor rural immigrants. The Pakistani media, for one, has not been afraid to perceive these multi-billion dollar deals as a case of the authorities generously lining their own pockets by inviting in the Gulf investors.

Others fear that a massive new stock of luxury housing, aimed purely at high-earners, will push Pakistan’s already dangerous levels of inflation through the roof. Critics say that these new cities will widen the gap between rich and poor, worsen overall standards of living and simply provoke more anger and antagonism towards a regime which is already walking on thin ice.

Advocates of the new-look Karachi, on the other hand, claim that construction alone will create thousands of jobs for the local population, as well as later attract companies or investors who were previously put off by the lack of decent infrastructure.

The critical question is one of stability: if the uneasy status quo in Pakistan can be maintained or improved, then the economy will have the chance to grow even more rapidly and release some of its massive potential. There might even be enough people to afford all the houses and apartments that the Emaar, Nakheel and Limitless want to build. But if things deteriorate, then the grand plans for these new cities might turn into some very expensive white elephants.

April 12, 2007 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
GCC

New Saudi cities set to battle Dubai, UAE

by Executive Staff April 12, 2007
written by Executive Staff

Saudi Arabia, immersed in the process of using its oil wealth for building sustainable economic strength, has set its eyes on a business bonanza that could provide unending riches: becoming the host for a major international financial market. To tap into this permanently renewing resource, the kingdom is pouring billions into the creation of two financial hubs. 

The first of these finance centers is part of the King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC), which the Saudi king announced to the world in December 2005. The second is new. It is the King Abdullah Financial District (KAFD) project in the Saudi capital, Riyadh.

Investments into KAEC are slated in a dimension of more than $26 billion only in the first phase—which includes infrastructure development and industrial and residential structures, but not the financial island which will cover 14 hectares. The cost of developing the new metropolis’s financial center—a super-glitzy city-within-a-city, shining in the designer impressions with glass and high rise architecture—will be determined later, when the second phase of the KAEC project goes to construction around three years from now.

“We are in the first phase of the project and therefore there is not an exact amount of money for the financial district but the first phase will be completed in three years from now and will cost SAR100 billion,” said Mohammad Samman, the director of investor relations at Emaar the Economic City (EEC), a company formed for developing KAEC.

The cost of KAFD will be between SAR10 billion and SAR12 billion and the project will be developed on three stages, according to the KAFD master plan that was approved last month by the executive committee in charge of the project.

On paper, the rationale behind the mega-investments is compelling. Saudi Arabia has a rapidly growing economy that needs to secure future employment for its millions of young people, and this would be part of a move, since 2005, to set up of economic cities in four regions in the country.

In the past five years, the kingdom has issued new licenses for specialized banking and financial services providers that include leading international and regional banks from HSBC and Deutsche Bank to Lebanon’s Audi Saradar Group, UAE-based Al Mal Securities, and Egypt’s Beltone Investment Banking.

These institutions have been attracted by the growing needs for banking in the largest Arab economy and for financial intermediation on the expanding Saudi Stock Exchange. But to give further incentives to international financial firms and develop a center of excellence that can leverage the value of the Saudi market place into becoming a banking center of global weight, Saudi Arabia needs to develop its financial culture a lot further.

“The kingdom is growing at a huge potential and the number of companies that are being established is growing by 25% to 35% annually,” Samman told Executive.

The Financial District

“The Public Pension Agency is the main developer of the KAFD and it has started with the dredging works along with Capital Market Authority (CMA) which is its strategic partner,” Fahd Al Hussayen, general manager for real estate marketing at the Public Pension Agency, told Executive.

“The first phase will take four years to be completed and we are already signing memoranda of understanding with several banks which will have a presence in KAFD,” Hussayen said.

He added that the banks which signed the MoUs include Al Rajhi Bank, Arab National Bank, Audi Saudi Arabia, Samba Financial Group, Saudi Fransi Bank and Al Bilad Bank.

The KAFD will be constructed over 3 million m2 of land and will house the headquarters of the CMA and the Saudi Stock Exchange, along with an academy for finance professions. On the private sector side, the district aims to become the home of banks, brokerage services, law offices, accounting and auditing firms, analysts, rating agencies, consultants, IT providers, and other auxiliary enterprises. 

The master plan for the KAFD divides the new financial center into three areas—the Leaf, the northwest area, and the south area.

The Leaf will be the heart of the KAFD. It will be a mixed-use area, consisting of 23% residential, 5% retail and the rest high-quality office space.

Two-thirds of the area will be public realm, including major attractions such as an aquarium, a museum, hotels, an exhibition center, a conference center and, of course, mosques.

Support services, utilities and parking will be located in the northwest area. The south area will be residential and office accommodation.

The first excavation work is scheduled to begin within weeks and the first building is expected to open around the end of 2008. It is expected that KAFD will offer around 43,000 job opportunities. The site is 1.6 million m2 but the built-up area is around 3.3 million m2.

Because it is owned by the Public Pension Authority (PPA), the project will create revenue streams for public sector retirees and their dependents. 

“The whole Saudi economy will benefit—but especially the PPA’s pensioners, who will gain from the profit generated from our ownership and management of the KAFD project,” enthused Mohammed Bin Abdullah Al-Khrashi, governor of the Public Pension Authority.

The Economic City

To be built near the town of Rabigh on the Red Sea, the financial district of the KAEC may be a little away from the center of Saudi Arabia but the entire city aims at creating a new economic center right from the first phase, which includes an industrial city, a huge port and residential projects.

EEC had a net loss of 12.8 million Saudi riyals ($3.4 million) in its first three months of operation, ending December 2006, but reports said that the financial results were expected as the company did not close any sales deals in that period. Its marketing activities have commenced recently. 

Another noteworthy aspect of the KAEC project is that it is being developed with the private sector and with wide stakeholdership by Saudi citizens. EEC undertook an initial public offering in which more than 10 million people, approximately half of the kingdom’s citizens, subscribed to shares.

While the concept of stomping two new world-class financial districts out of the ground is appealing, the timeframe for the two cities may just a bit behind. In Dubai, Qatar, and Bahrain, three ambitious emirates are already a good piece of the way into shaping their versions of financial hubs, which will be established entities when KAFD inaugurates its first buildings in 2008-09; the KAEC financial center is only scheduled to begin construction at that time.

The size of the Saudi market is a strong selling point, and local banks will in any case make it a matter of pride to be present and very visible in KAFD and later on in KAEC financial center. That will widen the Saudi financial scene and elevate its profile, but it will not by itself fulfill the vision for the two huge projects. Then again, it must be true for new financial districts what is true for the whole world of finance: without risk, there can be no profit. 

April 12, 2007 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
GCC

Can EU-GCC sign a Free Trade Agreement this year?

by Executive Staff April 12, 2007
written by Executive Staff

Do you, per chance, remember what the next big things in 1990 were? The World Wide Web had just been born and the internet was still more of an academic playground than a ubiquitous communications universe. The European Community was a club of 12 nations and the euro was a concept waiting to be discussed in the 1991 negotiations of Maastricht. Introduction of the world’s first commercial GSM 900 mobile phone network was two years away.

It also was the time when Europe and the six member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council started talking about a free trade agreement (FTA). Seventeen dusty years after the beginning of negotiations in 1990, talks between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council in the past few weeks seem to have regained momentum toward finally signing the long-awaited FTA this year.

Touring the region at the end of February in support of finalizing the agreement, EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson told the Jeddah Economic Forum that a completed FTA would make an important contribution to the greater diversification of Gulf economies by encouraging inward investment and boosting the competitiveness of Gulf exporters to Europe.

‘Very close to an agreement’

Mandelson said: “We are now very close to an agreement that will not only be the first ever region-to-region FTA in the global trading system, but which has the potential to open doors for new investment and new trade beyond what we offer each other through the WTO.”

A treaty between the two regional organizations would be the first of its kind, Mandelson enthused. But of course there are quite a range of reasons why European-Gulf negotiations have taken a modern eternity and were disrupted twice for long intervals, before the two sides last month publicly voiced confidence that signing ceremonies could be on the books sometime this year. 

Rewards of a successful treaty would be substantial by helping both communities strengthen their positions in the globalization game and, from the European perspective, by increasing stability in what the EU sees as a region of immense strategic importance but vulnerable to political and security risks. 

Obstacles

The business concepts and legal frameworks of the two blocks are far apart in many respects, but the points of real obstruction in past talks were European calls for liberalization of GCC economies and Gulf wishes to gain more direct access to European energy markets. Early in the negotiations (1990 and again in 1992), the European Parliament criticized the FTA talks for alleged repercussions on the European petrochemicals and fertilizer industries and employment in these sectors.

The considerable power of the US in the Gulf and the EU’s corresponding lack of power is one of the main structural features hindering real progress or even real interest in moving EU-GCC relations forward. The US is currently viewed as the only credible security guarantor by the Gulf monarchies, while the EU mainly is seen as a civilian and economic player.

Assessing the potential influence of the EU in the region, a Danish research institute wrote in late 2006 that “the Gulf monarchies are blessed with oil and natural gas resources, and equally cursed with domestic instability, war and foreign intervention. In this strategically important corner of the Middle East, bilateralism and hard security issues still dominate the agenda, and here the EU has only limited capacities.”

The report added that the EU also faces both barriers and divergences in term of assisting reform processes in the Gulf, and the European analysts saw it as open question if first steps towards political and social reforms were genuine or mere cosmetic changes. Post-Christian civil liberties concepts made in Europe have not found a large fan base in many Middle Eastern societies and when, for example, the European Parliament lambasted Bahrain in 1997 for its practices on human rights, the GCC rejected this as meddling. 

Limitations on foreign ownership of companies and restrictions on access to domestic markets, including equity markets, in several GCC countries are barriers that could also easily block European acceptance of the FTA this year. But on the other hand, the Europeans have to think about the heightened importance of Gulf oil producers in the globally growing demand scenario for black gold. The EU policy makers also have to grapple with the fact that today, beyond the US’s Middle Eastern goals and strategic interests, which have long caused headaches in many EU capitals, China is also flexing its increasingly toned geopolitical muscles in the region, with aspirations of securing supplies of oil and generating new economic partnership opportunities for its vast industry. 

EU a model of integration

While the EU playes a minor fiddle in the Middle East military and security realities to the US, and enjoys less shared affinity with the region’s cultural conservatism than the East Asian nations, Europe has one strong thing going for itself through the EU’s model function of regional economic integration. The GCC adopted many ideas from the processes of Maastricht and Europe’s Monetary and Economic Union building in its project to forge a similar cohesion among the six GCC member countries, including plans for a joint central bank and single currency for the realm.

As a matter of fact, the GCC governments’ 1999 decision to work towards an EU-like economic integration sparked new life into the FTA negotiations between the two regions, even though the verve was short lived. It is moreover also doubtful (to be friendly) that the GCC monetary union plans will be implemented in full by their 2010 target or even in a five-sixths solution of adopting a joint currency without Oman. Nonetheless, interaction between EU and GCC institutions in the context of the project has a relationship-building capacity for years of interaction, whether an FTA sees the light of the desert this year or not.   

For the business communities of both regions, any strengthening of information and cultural ties would nonetheless be poor replacements for an agreement that opens Gulf markets wider to European investors and European markets to Gulf petrochemicals and energy players.

The EU still is the Gulf’s biggest market and incurred a $22.4 billion trade deficit with the GCC in 2006, fundamentally because of Europe’s thirst for oil. In the other direction, the GCC is currently the sixth-largest export market for the EU, with machinery and transport materials accounting for over half of sales to the region. Beyond further growth in trade, direct investments in the GCC by European companies could see a sharp increase if an FTA comes into force.

Picking up the pace of talks

For the past few years, negotiations between EU and GCC moved at a rather leisurely pace of one round of talks per annum. However, following the discussions of the two sides in February, the EU emphasized that it will eliminate its 6% import tariffs on aluminum and also abolish tariffs on basic petrochemicals after the two regions reach an FTA. What the EU seeks in return, is an end to ceilings on foreign ownership of GCC companies. A new Gulf-EU meeting at the ministerial level is scheduled for May.

April 12, 2007 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
GCC

Garden of Eden for jobs?

by Executive Staff April 12, 2007
written by Executive Staff

The Gulf region is famed for enjoying surpluses of liquidity and jobs over the available human capital. This situation has created a hunger for blue and white collar labor that boosted the ratio of imported to indigenous population to at least four to one in the UAE and some neighboring emirates.

In the past two years, the influx of new people and continuing enormous demand for labor has also created pressures on a wide front, from housing and remuneration to cultural, social, and health issues. The private and public sector agencies dealing with human capital in the various GCC countries are being seriously put to the test by these growing imbalances.

Research into labor issues in the GCC is still in its infancy, driven mostly by a few job agencies that aim to establish their franchises as suppliers and intermediaries in the market for skilled employees. The hotbed of job creation in the GCC is the UAE, and private sector job companies focus their research there. Two such employment companies published reports on salary trends and cost of living in December 2006 (Gulf Talent) and in February 2007 (Bayt).

What’s my salary?

On the salary front, annual increases in the magnitude of 7-8% and more have been the norm in the past two years, the Gulf Talent online survey of professionals found, while Bayt reported an even higher jump in average salaries of 15% in 2006 and 21% over the two-year period of 2005 and 2006.

Bayt gathered responses from what it called a “cross-section of the labor force” around the GCC but did not disclose the sample size and methodology used in its study when publishing the results. It reported that average monthly salaries in the GCC last year, with the exclusion of Oman, ranged from $2,700 in Qatar and $2,750 in the UAE to $3,100 in Kuwait.

In a breakdown by company type and sector, the survey found that multinational companies provided average monthly salaries of $2,222 and large regional companies similarly rewarded their employees (average $2,148/month) whereas public sector and small local companies forked out about $500 less per month.

By sector, earners in law firms sat on top of the Bayt survey, commanding an average of almost $5,900. The oil/gas/petrochemicals sector paid over $3,700, and jobs in advertising and banks were good for an average of $3,500. On the low end of the scale, hospitality, education, electronics (excluding IT), and health services (excluding MDs) offered average salaries ranging from $2,444 down to $1,926. 

Loving Dubai

While the three most recent Gulf Talent surveys gave no indication of average salaries per country and industry, the job agency stated that among some 11,000 queried professionals outside of the GCC, among those who wanted to work in the GCC, 73% named the UAE as their preferred place of employment in the region. Dubai was mentioned specifically by 38%. The survey’s number two and three targets of choice were Qatar and Saudi Arabia, with 9% and 8% positive responses.

By Bayt’s count, the preferred place of work in the GCC is Dubai, with 49% of answers from an overlay poll picking the city as their choice, followed by Saudi Arabia (16%), Kuwait (14%) and Qatar (11%). Although the methodologies and polled samples in the two surveys are hard to compare and results showed notable variations, findings of the two companies concurred strongly that the UAE is the preferred destination for foreign employees and job seekers who work or want to work in the GCC.

This highlights the UAE’s role as the center of the multi-national job market in the GCC, with the highest percentage share of expatriate employees. The most recent government research on employment and population figures tallied the UAE population in a census of population, housing, and establishments that was conducted in 2005. Released last month, preliminary results of the census said that the UAE’s seven emirates have a combined population of about 4.1 million—including nationals, registered expatriate workers and other expatriates—at the end of 2005. The census found that 78.1% of the total resident population included in the census were non-nationals.

The preliminary results did not provide a full data set on the numbers of people in each gender/age/nationality bracket and the composition of the labor force. However, it stated that of the registered population aged 20 to 64 years, almost 2.4 million are foreigners while the nationals in this group numbered less than 400,000. On top of that, the census assumes a presence of 335,000 foreigners (not included in the census tally) who work without permit, were on leave on the census date, or commute into the country. This hints that there could be as many as seven, eight or even nine expatriate employees and workers for every citizen in the national workforce, in line with estimates by some UAE academic leaders who have rung alarm bells over the country’s national identity.

Working the force

Regardless if the foreign workforce accounts for 80 or 90% of the UAE working population, the country’s 75% population growth between the last census in 1995 and end of 2005 relied greatly on inflow of foreigners, and the trend is estimated to have only accelerated since. Analysts at Global Investment House, a regional financial firm headquartered in Kuwait, estimated last month that the UAE population numbered 4.7 million in 2006 and will be above 5 million at the end of this year, suggesting further increases in the percentage of expatriates, despite the fact that more than half of the UAE nationals at the end of 2005 were younger than 20, meaning that the birth rate among citizens of the UAE has in recent years been high indeed for an affluent society.

The combination of high economic growth, the influx of new people, and extra liquidity from oil revenues in the GCC has taken an unavoidable expression in inflationary pressures that put a strong dash of vinegar into the lemonade of the UAE labor market. According to Bayt, the UAE in 2006 was the region’s “worst affected country in terms of erosion of consumers [sic] purchasing power with salaries being outpaced by cost of living increases to the tune of over 13%.”

This assumption is based on an estimate or perception that consumer price inflation in Dubai was 28% in 2006, based on responses by polled persons. The CPI estimate of the Economist Intelligence Unit for the UAE in 2006 was an increase of 13.5%.

Cost of housing is the main new burden on foreigners. Gulf Talent’s survey produced responses saying that rents in Dubai increased by 60% in the space of 24 months (November 2004-November 2006). The agency also reported that rent payments in Qatar and the UAE consumed 33% and 30% respectively of respondents’ household incomes, significantly above rent costs in Saudi Arabia (19% of incomes) which are closer to numbers for many developed countries.

Also, the savings rate among expatriate workers has gone down, a telltale sign that financially, the stay in the GCC is less attractive than it was 10 or even five years ago. Gulf Talent reported that 43% of expatriates working in the UAE are not putting money into savings and 7% even said that cost of living was not covered by their salaries and they had to rely on savings or support from family to sustain their lives.

However, the shrinkage of disposable or remittable income is no fundamental deterrent, as the job surveys showed significant shifts in the priorities and expectations of international job seekers in the GCC. First, people said that they were looking for a career more than for fast earnings. “Many of the newcomers are attracted by long-term aspirations and interesting career opportunities now available in the region, with short-term financial considerations playing a less dominant part in the overall value proposition,” Gulf Talent found.

Secondly, increasing percentages of the people relocating to the Gulf are doing so under a perspective of making the region their home in the long term and not just regard it an intermediary career step. This reorientation is an expression of both the region’s increasing depth of career choices and its broadening range of housing, entertainment, shopping, and cultural environments. And while the newcomers are not deeply rooted in local heritage, they appreciate the high mobility of their lives, characterized by the contemporary airports, hotels, shopping malls and recreation centers.

With careers and long-term living perspectives—according to Gulf Talent, 78% of professionals currently working in the UAE plan to stay; according to Bayt, a slightly larger 26% share of people intend to move away from the UAE—it fits together that people are not driven into other countries by cost of living changes as much as by other factors. Bahrain’s smaller cost of living increase did not cause expatriates there to consider moving away in larger percentages than their peers in the UAE, for example. The simple point is that it not only matters how much it costs to live in one locale of the Gulf, it matters equally or more what quality of life one gets in the cities of the region.

Of men & women

Salary surveys and census data are insufficient for describing the entire set of social and life options that determine personal satisfaction and integration of foreign workers into a new country. One census result that is of relevance in this regard is the immense overhang of the working-age male gender in the UAE population. Not only are some 49% of non-nationals between 25 and 40 years old, expatriate men in the three age categories—20 to 24, 25 to 29 and 30 to 39—outnumber expatriate women by factors increasing from 2:1 to 3:1 and then more than 4:1 for those in their thirties. 

The towering discrepancy in the ratio of men to women in the UAE is a deterrent to the country’s ability to be the natural center of living and planning for the members of its expatriate population.

Another obstacle to balanced social development is the stratification of the workforce into nationalities, where citizens of some origins are automatically paid better than those of others, a factor that may be decreasing but is far from having disappeared. Their is also the economic rift between professionals and blue collar labor.

As Gulf Talent concluded in an October 2006 report on compensation trends in the GCC construction industry, only the managerial and professional workers benefited from the almost 13% hike in salaries observed by the agency last year for the sector. Laborers, which make up the majority of construction sector employees, “have experienced little or no rise” in their remuneration, the report wrote. A huge portion of the expatriate workforce is working poor in the GCC; they live and work under conditions of increasing costs with pay raises that do not cover inflation.     

These societal and socioeconomic imbalances apparently have led already to higher rates of social unrest, sexual abuse and other crimes, disease and suicide, evidenced daily by media reports. However, statistics for problems such as the number of expatriates who contract HIV are not available from UAE officials, who only said that the country immediately expels foreigners who test positive for the virus.

Finally, the UAE government has produced a draft for a revised labor law and stepped up efforts to address grievances by the expatriate workforce and violations of labor codes by employers. However, when Human Rights Watch published a press release at the end of last month that asked for further changes to the law and for affirming international labor rights such as unionization, UAE authorities avoided direct responses to the NGO’s challenges, but acted defensively by quickly circulating statements through the state’s media mouthpiece that the country has already made much progress in dealing with “these issues.”

April 12, 2007 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Levant

Abdali: The future of Amman

by Executive Staff April 12, 2007
written by Executive Staff

Abdali represents the past, present and future of Amman. What once was the Jordanian intelligence headquarters is today an enormous hole in the earth, in which bulldozers prepare for the arrival of the future: a 21st century city center for the capital of the Hashemite Kingdom. With a price tag of $1.5 billion, and covering a total surface area of 350,000 m2, the Abdali Urban Regeneration Project is arguably the largest construction effort Jordan has witnessed to date. 

The Abdali area is located west of downtown Amman, adjacent to the banking district of Shmeisani, and is home to such landmark buildings as the parliament and King Abdullah Mosque. The Abdali regeneration project is a mixed-use development that aims to create a central business district, complete with both high-end residential and retail elements. In addition, and more ambitiously, the project hopes to relocate the “heart” of the city from what is today the rather run-down downtown area to Abdali when it is completed.

With a total built up area (BuA) of some 1.5 million m2, the Abdali project will drastically change the face of Amman, a predominantly “horizontal” city. The development will introduce the first cluster of high rises, among which is the country’s tallest tower, the 220-meter-high headquarters of the Capital Bank of Jordan. A 350-meter-long pedestrian shopping boulevard will connect the towers to the “Central Market” mall and residential parts of the project. (For details, see Box I.) 

“The Abdali Urban Regeneration project is ‘a story of firsts,’ which will drastically change living and working in Amman,” said Jamal Itani, general manager of Abdali Investment and Development (AID). “Abdali will create the city’s first central business district, in the sense of a homogenous area of fully equipped, technologically advanced, state-of-the-art commercial buildings. Centered around the boulevard, Abdali will become the first retail hub in the city.”

An interesting characteristic of urban Amman is that it has no genuine central districts. The traditional heart of the city is the downtown area near the King Hussein Mosque and Roman amphitheater. Yet this is a rather rundown—and heavily congested—area, with no international retail and, at best, some three-star hotels. Over the last decade, Amman has witnessed the emergence of hypermarkets and shopping malls, which are spread throughout the western suburbs. (For a brief history of Amman, see Box II.) 

Likewise, the business community is scattered around town. To a certain extent, the Shmeisani area can be defined as the financial and administrative center of the city, as it features 25 banks and financial institutions, 16 government institutions, as well as 12 hotels and nine hospitals. However, any company that aims to establish a presence in Amman will face great difficulty finding vacant office space in Shmeisani, which is why many international firms in recent years have converted villas and apartments throughout western Amman into workplaces. Embassies too are mainly located in villas between the 3rd and 5th circles in West Amman.

Private-public partnership

Founded in 2004, AID is a private shareholding company—initially, a private-public partnership between Mawared, an investment company owned by the Jordanian government, and Oger Jordan, a subsidiary of construction giant Saudi Oger. In 2007, however, Kuwait Projects Company (KIPCO), through its Jordanian branch, United Real Estate Corporation (URC-Jordan), came in as a third partner. It bought 12.5% of Abdali psc shares, which left Saudi Oger and Mawared with 43.75% each, respectively.

Essentially, Mawared brought in the land, while Saudi Oger had the know-how. It should be noted that the Abdali project is part of a wider government initiative to move military barracks and quarters to the outskirts of the city and use the land for urban development. AID is responsible for preparing terrain and infrastructure, as well as the project’s master plan. Saudi Oger will further develop and manage, in partnership with KIPCO, both the boulevard and mall, which represent about 25% of the total BUA.

The remaining 75% has been sold to private investors, including the Dubai Contracting Company, which is building a residential tower, the Capital Bank of Jordan, Rotana Hotels, Madaen Al Noor Real Estate Investment and Development, FCP Holdings, and Damac, the Dubai-based property developer. Damac is set to construct a 35-story high-end residential tower dubbed The Heights. 

While top residential sale prices in Amman amount to about $1,400 per m2, Damac’s starting price lies around the $1,500 mark for the first floor and increasing to $3,300 per m2 for the top floor apartments. The penthouse has a price tag of over $4,000 per m2. Following the success of The Heights, which according to the Damac sales department has been almost completely sold, the company last month announced it will also construct the 20-story Business Heights.

“We’ve completed the site’s infrastructure, which includes all amenities, such as fiber optic cabling and gas lines,” said Itani, an American-educated engineer who previously worked in Beirut when Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri appointed him President of the National Council of Development and Reconstruction. “In addition, about 80% of investors had their architectural designs approved and have fenced their plots of land, while about half of them will start excavating in April.” 

Excavations have also started for the boulevard. Both the boulevard and city center are set to be completed by the end of 2009. To illustrate the sheer importance of the Abdali project, Itani pointed at a recent decision by the mayor of Amman, who designated four areas specifically for high rises, among which is the future central business district. 

The question remains, however, if there will be sufficient demand within Amman for such a significant amount of office and retail space. “We’ve done several feasibility studies both in Jordan and other countries, and believe Amman has potential as a significant regional business center. Several factors play a role: Jordan is a politically stable and secure country that has a sound legal framework, so investors know what to expect. What’s more, oil prices are likely to continue to soar, with Arab nations reluctant to invest in the West. And, last but not least, Jordan is close to Iraq.”

It is no exaggeration to state that demand for office space and high-end residential apartments since 2003 has been strongly linked with the situation in Iraq. First, many well-off Iraqis fled to Jordan following the American invasion and established themselves in western Amman. As a consequence, average prices doubled and even tripled. Second, due to the security situation in Iraq, most companies doing business with Iraq are based in Jordan. The same is true for UN staff and non-governmental organizations. 

Even though many malls have opened in the outskirts of Amman, Itani believes the Abdali project will offer an appealing edge to attract consumers, as it features the sole high street in the capital city, which will be characterized by international brand names similar to those found in Dubai and Beirut.

Beirut vs. Amman

Itani worked in Lebanon, and both Saudi Oger and Solidere are part of the late Rafik Hariri’s business empire: the obvious question is, to what extent can the regeneration of Amman and Beirut can be compared? According to Itani, there are both similarities and differences. 

“Both Amman and Beirut concern developments built around a central business district and both aim to offer a homogenous development in terms of working, shopping and living,” he said. “One difference is that the regeneration of Beirut was a much bigger project, with about 4 million m2 of BUA, while Abdali amounts to about 1.5 million m2 of BUA, which could be extended in the near future by a further 1 million m2.” Itani declined to give further details, yet it seems likely that future developments will take place on the edge of the current project site, where some military buildings remain.

“Another major difference between Amman and Beirut,” Itani continued, “is the limitations that were involved in the development of the city. Solidere had to take into account the restoration of historic buildings and the protection of archeological remains. Consequently, Solidere was limited in the number of underground parking lots it could create. Generally speaking, we had much more freedom in terms of planning and design with the Abdali project.”

“Another difference is the role of the government, especially in terms of accessibility,” Itani concluded. “The Jordanian government plays an active role in upgrading the roads and intersections around the project site. It speaks for itself that the Abdali project is not an island. You cannot have top notch roads and parking facilities inside the project and be surrounded by secondary roads. In that sense, it is very important we have the full and active support of the municipality that is upgrading the infrastructure in and around the Abdali project.”

April 12, 2007 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Bush understands Lebanon

by Lee Smith April 1, 2007
written by Lee Smith

The US’s former ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, recentlyconfirmed that Washington rejected calls for a ceasefirethis past summer and let Lebanon wither under Israeli attackfor several more weeks. An early cessation of hostilitieswould have been “dangerous and misguided,” said Bolton, whowas “damned proud of what we did.” So, maybe it’s worthwhileasking, with friends like the Bush administration, who needsenemies?

And yet strange as it may seem, certainly to thoseunfamiliar with the tangled relationships that constituteMiddle Eastern politics, this White House, having sponsoredor backed a series of UN resolutions supporting Lebaneseindependence and pledging almost $1 billion in foreign aid,is probably the most pro-Lebanese US administration inhistory. And that’s no small feat, since the US has had astake in Lebanese affairs ever since it became thepre-eminent Western power in the region shortly after theend of World War II.

The key date is 1956, after the Suez crisis, leaving the USwith the primary responsibility for containing Sovietinfluence in the Middle East. Eisenhower’s sending troops toBeirut to shore up the Chamoun government suggests that forWashington, clarity in Lebanon has tended to look like twosharply polarized sides, with one clearly pro-Western, andthe other decisively not. When the internal Lebanesesituation is muddier, as it was during the fifteen-year-long civil wars, US officials have had a much harder timefiguring out where American interests lie—and hence whataction to take. Indeed, when Ronald Reagan dispatched theMarines in 1982, the only clear divide was in theadministration itself, which debated the wisdom of gettinginvolved for as long as US troops were based here.

It was partly because American blood was shed in Lebanonduring the ’80s for no apparent reason, as well as placatingHafez al-Assad, that the current president’s father showedvirtually no interest in Lebanon, a state of affairs thatcontinued through the Clinton years. And without aremarkable chain of events these last seven years, thingsprobably would’ve remained the same during the tenure ofthis administration.

It may seem paradoxical in light of last summer’s war withIsrael, but as I was reminded recently during the annualAmerican-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) PolicyConference, it was largely the power of the Israeli lobbythat kept Lebanon a live issue here in Washington when noone else was paying attention. In 2003, the US House ofRepresentatives passed the Syria Accountability and LebaneseSovereignty Act, largely meant to force the Executive branchto reconsider its dubious policy of constructive engagementwith Damascus.

Still, it wasn’t until the Iraq war that Washington realizedwhat it had in Lebanon—not just a staging ground to rollback a confrontational Syrian regime and a fight aregion-wide Iranian agenda, but a high-profile showcase forthe keystone of the administration’s new national securitystrategy: Middle Eastern democracy. It is hardly lost onthe White House that to date, Lebanon, for all its problems,is the most successful part of its regional portfolio.

What’s bizarre is not Washington’s support of Lebanesedemocracy, but that so much of the rest of popular USopinion seems to have turned its back on Beirut. Ever sincethe formation of James Baker’s Iraq Study Group, there hasbeen intense domestic pressure on the White House tonegotiate with Damascus. Though seriously weakened with itsfailing position in Iraq, the Bush administration does notbelieve that solving Baghdad means acquiescing to Bashar in Beirut.

And then there’s the American media. Bush, explains theclueless Seymour Hersh in a recent New Yorker article, isbacking Al-Qaeda militants through the offices of theSeniora government. Other media reports also contend that USfunds used to shore up the Internal Security Forces areessentially being used to create Sunni death squads to waragainst the Shia.

Through it all, the Bush administration has brought Lebanoneven further within the fold. To date, in addition todiplomatic support and financial aid, Washington has devotedan unprecedented amount of White House prestige to Beirut. And as for Lebanese officials making their way toWashington, the State Department, Pentagon and White Househave all thrown open their doors to leaders from every sect,including a host of younger Shia hopefuls who seek anotheroption for their community other than that articulated bythe grim Islamic resistance.

And now with Bush having only a little more than a year leftin office, the natural question is, what happens to the Washington-Beirut relationship when the most pro-Lebanese president in the shared history of the twocountries leaves the White House? As today, Washington’sinterest will be determined by circumstances, and mostimportant among them, it is the will of the Lebanese peoplethat will decide if in, say, 20 years time, we will lookback on the beginning of the 21st century as the goldenyears of the US-Lebanon alliance, or as merely the start ofa beautiful friendship.

LEE SMITH is a Hudson Institute visiting fellow and reporter on Middle East affairs. 

April 1, 2007 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Banking & Finance

Nixing GCC monetary union, Oman charts own way

by Jason J. Nash April 1, 2007
written by Jason J. Nash

Oman’s decision in early 2007 to opt out of the GCCmonetary union project has come as a blow to efforts by GCCstates to establish closer economic relations. However, thedecision was not necessarily based on a complete rejectionof the scheme. Rather, it is a reassertion of Oman’s need tofollow a different path until a more solid set of monetaryunion objectives is implemented by the other GCC states. Ithas also put under the microscope the GCC’s level ofpreparedness in dealing with its 2010 deadline for theproject.

Prime candidate to join… on paper

With the most conservative GDP growth of the GCC memberstates, Oman seemed likely to benefit from the much-vaunted ‘catch-up effect’ of monetary union, as seenfollowing the introduction of the euro. Oman was certainlynot struggling to meet the negotiated requirements in termsof fiscal policy: budget deficits are required to be cappedat 3%, while Oman had a fiscal surplus in 2005 of over 11%;public debt was well below the limit the GCC imposed onitself; and Oman’s foreign exchange reserves could easilyfinance four months of imports. Although Oman was meetingthe initial entry criteria, Ahmed bin Abdulnabi Macki, theminister of national economy, announced in January that thesultanate had decided to withdraw from the monetary unionproject.

He affirmed that Oman had reservations, both with the lackof progress made on obtaining prerequisites for successfulunion by 2010 (no agreed regional headquarters or commonmarket) and also cited Oman’s aversion to surrenderingeconomic sovereignty. He stated to Reuters that, “Thesultanate has its own economic and financial compulsionswhich do not offer room for meeting the criteria set for thesingle GCC currency.”

Oman has always sought to distinguish itself from its GCCpartners, both in its approach to oil and industry, and howit is now marketing itself as a tourism destination. Thegovernment is aware that the country does not have the samedepth of oil and gas reserves that most other GCC stateshave, and that the sultanate’s economic diversificationefforts could perhaps lose market competitiveness under aunified regional currency. The slowness of the other GCCstates to move on readjusting their currencies in step withone another to help fight dollar-inspired inflation wouldseem to validate its approach.

Interestingly, the other GCC state not flush with oil andgas reserves, Bahrain, is also now beginning to voice itsown concerns over the prospect of monetary union. Commonthemes of discontent include a lack of preparedness and theincomplete implementation of a common economic marketbetween the member states. At the same time, Kuwait ishoping its fellow GCC members will move faster onreadjusting the currency peg with the US dollar to helpstave off inflation.

Oman’s voice speaks strongly of independent economicconsiderations, and this is also reflected by itsindependent partnerships outside of the regional bloc.Recent bilateral developments have given Oman a new platformfor trade and investment. Whilst this may have not beenwell-received by some GCC member states, it has opened up anumber of opportunities for the sultanate’s economy.

The Oman-US FTA has so far generated large bilateral tradereturns for Oman (45% increase in export revenues from theUS over the last 12 months). This agreement also gives Omanunrestricted access to the US market, and eliminates the 5%tariffs previously in place. This is particularly useful asthe US is Oman’s fourth-largest import partner, responsiblefor $538.7 million worth of imported goods in 2005,according to the central bank of Oman.

Ties beyond the Gulf

The so-called “FTA effect” is evident across the region,with Bahrain also entering bilateral agreements earlier lastyear. FTA countries in the MENA region have experienced anaverage 33.5% increase in trade with the US during2005-2006. Although the FTA effect may well slow down incoming years, the extra trade created will remain. However,revenue is not the only factor to be considered in Oman’scase, as strategic partnerships with the US would stand tobenefit diversification options in the country.

Oman’s intra-regional trade ties should not be forgotten.The sultanate has significant trading interests with its GCCpartners, accounting for 18% total imports and 10.7% totalexports. The UAE is Oman’s fourth largest trading partnerand still a key part of the GCC market area. Should themonetary union continue without Omani membership, thesultanate may well find itself facing higher transactioncosts to deal with the Gulf Dinar.

Oman has managed to create new space for itself in theglobal trading network, establishing bilateral agreementsand partnerships promptly and efficiently which fulfill itsdevelopment criteria. Comparatively, the GCC as anorganization has repeatedly prolonged negotiations to forgeUS-GCC arrangements and has encountered many points ofcontention in aligning members’ independent economicpolicies. Bahrain was the first to observe that going italone on a trade deal with the US might better serve itseconomic need to generate growth and jobs, and Oman’s FTAreiterated the concern that the differing priorities of GCCmember states may be hampering the growth of the smallerplayers.

Oman also seems to be bearing its Asian priorities inmind, since its three major trading partners are Japan,China and Korea, who account for a collective 44.5% of totaltrade (21.5% total imports and 58.0% total exports). This isa regional alliance that Oman has successfully enticed andis continuing to pursue. Sinopec is the sultanate’s largestexporter of crude oil (30%) and has recently announced aproposal to increase term purchases by up to 20% for thisyear. China is also bidding on industrial contracts in thecountry and is seemingly paving the way for a longrelationship with Oman.

Asian loans have proved crucial to financing governmentprojects: the Japan Bank for International Cooperation(JBIC) loaned $150 million to Oman as contribution tofinancing part of the project of the second phase of Soharport, financing construction as well as infrastructure.Japan also participates in a “human resources transfer”program, dispatching ‘experts’ in response to requests madeby the government. The Omani-Asian links continue tostrengthen and Oman is taking care to ensure that thispartnership does not become neglected at the expense ofregional economic cooperation. The GCC priority is inestablishing a trade agreement with the EU, something whichhas moved very slowly since the opening of negotiations in1990. Despite the EU being Oman’s fifth-largest trading partner, the essential composition of theGCC presents many institutional barriers to trade alliances,and Oman’s branching out may indicate its lack ofwillingness to keep on waiting.

Although there has been criticism of Oman’s decision towithdraw from the monetary union process, the move may cometo be seen as very sensible regarding the sultanate’seconomic position. Oman has sent a clear message to the GCCthat it will not marginalize its domestic concerns for thesake of regional unity. This decision has already encouragedGCC scrutiny of what many now agree are unrealisticdeadlines and criteria. The concept of a fully operationalGulf Dinar by 2010 looks unlikely, though an ECU-styleaccounting unit used as a precursor is one course now leftopen for the GCC partners. As for Oman, it seems more intenton developing on its links with the US and Asia, increasingits competitiveness to benefit from more diverse foreigninvestment and partnerships. And just perhaps, through theOmani move, the other GCC states may take a long look at themonetary union plan and revise the steps needed to achieveit.

Jason J. Nash is Head of Research at the Oxford Business Group

April 1, 2007 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Syria not yet folding its cards

by Nicholas Blanford April 1, 2007
written by Nicholas Blanford

Like it or not, Syria’s leaders have no desire it seems toimitate Longfellow’s “Arabs” and “fold up their tents andquietly steal away into the night.”

Two years of diplomatic isolation and unrelentinginternational pressure have failed to persuade Damascus tosignificantly alter its course regarding key regionalissues: Lebanon, the Palestinians and Iraq. On the contrary,marginalization by the international community has had theeffect of drawing Damascus closer to Tehran. TheSyrian-Iranian relationship, one of the most unlikely andenduring alliances in the Middle East, has only grownstronger since the election of Iranian President MahmoudAhmadinejad in August 2005.

Both countries need each other. Syria allows Iran a toeholdinto the Arab-Israeli arena and serves as a vital conduit toHizbullah. In exchange, Syria has a powerful military andfinancial ally in Iran with which to face the cold shoulderof the West and the unease of other Arab nations.

The US effectively severed relations with Syria in the wakeof the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.By February 2005, the Bush administration’s patience withDamascus had waned considerably over a number of issuesincluding Syria’s support for Palestinian militant groupsand foot-dragging over a troop withdrawal from Lebanon, butchiefly over its unrelenting opposition to theAnglo-American invasion and occupation of Iraq.

The European Union, following the US lead, also distanceditself from Damascus, influenced by French President JacquesChirac who does not even try to hide his antipathy towardthe regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

The US told Syria that it must change its behavior beforethe Bush administration would consider re-engaging with it.An uncowed Syria instead turned toward Iran and embraced animage of Arab steadfastness against the bullying dictats ofthe West, a stance that resonated among many Arabs.

But the cracks in the edifice of isolation began to emergeat the end of last year with the release of the Baker-Hamilton commission’s report on Iraq, which recommended aresumption of dialogue with Syria and Iran. The Bushadministration initially dismissed the commission’s advice,insisting on its demand that Syria must take the first stepby changing its behavior. But several US senators,emboldened by the Democrats’ success in the mid-term US elections in November and by the findings of theBaker-Hamilton commission, traveled to Damascus, the firstsuch visits in two years. In November, Syrian ForeignMinister Walid Muallem visited Baghdad, which paved the wayfor a restoration of formal diplomatic relations betweenSyria and Iraq in December and the signing of a jointsecurity agreement. In January, Jalal Talabani visitedDamascus for the first time in his capacity as president ofIraq. The biggest indication that Syria could be coming infrom the cold was its invitation in February to attend—alongwith Iraq’s other neighbors—a conference in Baghdad todiscuss how to help stabilize Iraq.

The Europeans also have begun retreading the path toDamascus, most notably Javier Solana, the EU’s foreignminister.

A general rapprochement between Damascus and the West stillseems a long way off and will probably depend on the outcomeof the United Nations investigation into Hariri’s murder.But the tentative steps toward re-engagement has revived thedebate between those that believe that jaw-jaw is alwaysbetter than war-war and those who argue that talking toDamascus is futile. Both arguments have somejustification.

Syria’s critics maintain that the Syrian leadership has ahistory of frustrating and infuriating its internationalinterlocutors by making promises that go unfulfilled.Recommencing a dialogue with the Syrians, they argue, willbe taken as a sign of Western weakness and suggest thatDamascus has no need to change its policies. Much better,they say, to at least maintain and possibly increase thepressure on Syria in a bid to break the will of the Syrianleadership.

Supporters of dialogue, however, argue that the policy ofisolation over the past two years has not only failed topersuade Syria to yield to Western demands, it has had theopposite effect of helping cement the Syrian-Iranianrelationship. That strengthened bond forms the backbone ofthe anti-Western alliance spanning the Middle East fromTehran to Beirut’s southern suburbs. The alliance isdetermined to check the regional ambitions of the US andlies at the root of mounting Sunni Arab alarm at Iran’sgrowing reach into the Middle East.

A serious re-engagement with Damascus, they argue, wouldhelp pry Syria away from Iran, breaking the anti-Westernalliance and weakening Tehran’s ability to influence theArab-Israeli conflict. The bottom line, they say, is thatSyria cannot be expected to dance to the Western tune ifnothing serious is offered in exchange.

The debate over how to handle Syria remains heated andunresolved. But there is little doubt that it is hard toignore a country that lies at the nexus of so many of theregion’s conundrums.

NICHOLAS BLANFORD is a Beirut-based journalist and author of “Killing Mr Lebanon: – The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and its impact on the Middle East

April 1, 2007 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Consumer Society

High-end watches prove time is money

by Executive Staff April 1, 2007
written by Executive Staff

The actor Daniel Craig made one of the most shamelessproduct plugs in the history of cinema when he flashed andthen further name-checked his Omega Seamaster mid-waythrough his debut as the new James Bond in Casino Royale.The Omega has been the standard issue timepiece for thelatter-day Bonds (though in the early films, and in the IanFleming novels on which the 007 film franchise is based,Bond never wore an Omega but rather a Rolex Oyster Perpetualor a Rolex Submariner). Still, whatever the watch, themessage remains the same—nothing bespeaks style and statuslike a wrist thrust from beneath a cuff to flash a majorpiece of high-end Swiss precision.

Watches dominate luxury goods sales

The wannabe Bonds of the world—and in the current globaleconomic climate there are many, both aspirers and oldmoney—are likely to start with the tailored suit and endwith the Aston Martin. But in between they will have toshell out for the watch. Perhaps as a result, within thegreater luxury goods market, the watches and jewelrycategory is surging, particularly in emerging markets suchas Russia, China, India and the Middle East.

“We have witnessed huge growth in the market for luxurytimepieces in the last three years, and it is clearlyshowing in Swiss exports to the region,” says George Becharaof Zenith, the high-end and venerable watchmaker now ownedby LVMH (Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy) and which arrived inthe Middle East market early in 2004.

Regionally, says Bechara, who is based in the booming UAE,“Dubai is our … biggest market in terms of presence. Thegrowth in Dubai in units between 2005 and 2006 was up 78%,and in terms of turnover it was up 33%.”

Zenith’s parent company, LVMH, is widely considered theindustry leader in the global market for luxury goods. Withscores of brands under its name, LVMH holds a diverseportfolio that ranges from wines and spirits (Moet Chandon,Veuve Clicquot) to high-end fashion (Louis Vuitton, MarcJacobs) to fragrances and cosmetics (Christian Dior,Guerlain) to watches and jewelry (Zenith, Tag Heuer,Chaumet).

In 2000, watches and jewelry contributed only 5% of LVMH’soverall sales. By 2006, however, the category trumped allothers in terms of growth as sales increased 26% on theprevious year. A joint venture between LVMH and De Beers,the largest diamond supplier in the world, has no doubtcontributed to the category’s newfound muscle. Notcoincidentally, De Beers opened its first boutique in Dubailast year.

The market for luxury watches—defined as timepieces thatretail for upwards of $2,000—moved into the Gulf en massearound 2002. That year, Dubai imported some 700,000premium-quality Swiss watches, which at the time was roughlyequivalent to the size of the city’s population.

All major players make it to Dubai ontime

All the major players in the luxury watch market are nowpresent in Dubai—Rolex, Cartier, Chopard, Omega, Cartier,Patek Philippe and the Richemont Group—another global luxurygoods powerhouse, with its regional headquarters in theHazel W. S. Wong-designed Emirates Towers. Richemontincludes IWC, Piaget, Jaeger-LeCoultre, A. Lange & Sohne,Vacheron Constantin, Officine Panerai, and Baume & Mercier.

Dubai’s phenomenal growth is certainly fueling the market.According to a recent—and notably critical—article on Dubaiin the German newspaper Der Spiegel, there were just fourcompanies operating in Dubai 20 years ago. Now there are6,300 from more than 100 countries. The ruling Maktoumfamily expects the local population to grow from two millionto 10 million, and wants 20 million tourists to pass throughDubai every year. Given the potential for triggeringconspicuous consumption, it’s no wonder watchmakers havebeen flooding money into establishing headquarters andboutiques for themselves in Dubai, and then embarking uponan aggressive ad campaign.

“The growth of Dubai [has been] tremendous and crucial inbenefiting Zenith’s business,” says Bechara. “The hugeinvestments that are taking place here, the most importantcompanies setting [up] their regional offices here, the fuelprices, the attraction of tourists throughout the year—allthis brought us good business.”

Regionally speaking, the market for luxury timepiecesremains strongest in Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates, though Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the Levant offersizable room to grow. Rolex still leads the pack in terms ofmarket share (with 15% of the Saudi market alone). But whenit comes to the highest of high-end watches, market successisn’t always a matter of volume. Often it is a matter ofvalue.

Ziad Annan of Rolex in Lebanon says sales figures have beenimpacted by the political situation in the country, whetherthe war with Israel in the summer of 2006 or the oppositiondemonstrations that have, for four months and counting, madea ghost town of Beirut’s central district, where the upscaleRolex boutique is located.

Despite such extenuating circumstances, Annan notes that twonew Rolex timepieces have been particularly successful oflate—a Rolex Rolesor that was fashionable in the 1970s andre-launched last year and a new Rolex GMT Master II. Bothproducts have proven remarkably popular in the Lebanesemarket.

So where will the sector for exquisite watches—and bejeweledmobile phones—go from here? After five years of surginggrowth and breakneck expansion fueled by the outrageous paceof development in Dubai, it seems likely that the majorplayers in the region will turn their attention toconsolidating brand loyalties.

In 2006, says Zenith’s George Bechara, “we had a huge yearin terms of launching new products. This year we are morefocused on strengthening the existing collections, with somenovelties that will give a push to the brand.”

One factor that may contribute favorably to a period ofmarket consolidation is the arrival in the UAE of theauction houses Christie’s and Sotheby’s. Certainly much inkhas been spilled over the sales of international modern andcontemporary art staged by Christie’s in May 2006 andFebruary 2007. But it is worth noting that on Jan. 31,Christie’s held a major auction of jewels and watches in theEmirates Towers Hotel, a sale that trounced the totals ofboth art auctions by raking in $11.8 million. They were nomillion-dollar paintings on the bloc, but a marquise-cutdiamond ring by Van Cleef & Arpels went under the hammer for$1.2 million. The sale also featured watches by PatekPhilippe, Rolex, Cartier, Piaget, Chopard, and a limitededition Corum in 18-carat white gold, 20 jewels, and a whitedial with verses from “The Thousand and One Nights” in blackenameled Arabic script.

According to Michael Jeha, managing director of Christie’sDubai, there are 45 to 50 people working on the Dubai marketfor Christie’s. All the watches and jewels to be sold attwice yearly auctions will, for the time being, be sourcedfrom Europe to keep the material fresh. As a result, theauction houses could either edify Dubai-based enthusiasts ofluxury timepieces—or snag competition away from thetraditional watchmakers themselves.

April 1, 2007 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Jordan-US QIZ could be better

by Riad Al-Khouri April 1, 2007
written by Riad Al-Khouri

The Jordanian economy has done pretty well recently, boasting high growth rates, attracting attention from regional investors, and enjoying increasing exports.Regarding the latter, the kingdom chalked up close to $4.1billion in national merchandise exports last year, up by almost 13% on 2005. Traditional Jordanian production such as fertilizers (the country’s second most important good sold abroad) still accounted for almost 8% of exports in 2006, with potash, another mainstay of the old Jordan economy, constituting over 6%. However, other products with a higher value added have become more prominent in the past few years. These include pharmaceuticals, currently the country’s third most important export, with a share of over7% last year, and most notably clothing, which has been number one for much of the present decade. Growing steadily from a very modest share in the late 90s, the clothing industry was responsible in 2006 for just over 30% of totalJordanian merchandise exports, a proportion roughly maintained since 2003, with the value of Jordanian clothing exported last year expanding by 18% compared to a rise of just over 5% in 2005.

So where are all these clothes sold? You’d think that shoppers in Lebanon, Iraq, or the GCC countries, traditional outlets for Jordan’s products, would see Jordanian garments in their local stores, but that is rarely the case.Actually, you would have to go to New York or LA to find most of these clothes. Is that a bizarre situation? Not at all, if you consider the importance of Middle East diplomacy to Jordan’s economy. In fact, Jordan’s success in this business rests on a break it got over a decade ago from its favorite uncle, a person with a red, white and blue top hat called Sam, with so-called Qualifying Industrial Zones(QIZs).

In the Zone

Under the QIZ—blatantly designed to reward Jordan for its pro-American stance and nudge the kingdom even closer toIsrael—a product with 11.7% added value from Jordanian, 7-8%from Israeli, and the balance of 35% from either country, the US or Palestine, enjoys duty-free entry into theAmerican market. For example, if a skirt costing $10 is imported into Jordan from India and dyed in Amman to raiseits value to $11.17, it cannot by such a transformation alone enter the US market free of duty under currentJordanian-American trade rules. However, if that same garment also gets, for example, Israeli zippers worth $0.80and American trim costing $1.53, then the finished product has added the necessary amount of value (in this case stipulated at a minimum of 35%) in the correct proportions to qualify for duty- free entry into the US market.

The roaring success of this arrangement has left the US as the main importer of Jordanian products last year, buying more than 31% of the kingdom’s exports, up from a derisory amount in the mid-90s. For various reasons, clothing has turned out to be the major exported QIZ item, with garments(most of which are produced in QIZs) amounting to almost 91%of Jordanian sales to the US in 2006.

Not that the QIZ deal has done that much for Jordan’s economy: for a start, most of the capital and many of the workers at QIZ factories are not Jordanian—as a lot of profits and wages are sent home outside the kingdom, Jordan gets that much less benefit. The other problem is that UncleSam in December 2004 also “rewarded” Egypt with a QIZ deal; as the Egyptians can more cost-effectively produce garments(and for that matter, other products) wanted by US consumers, Jordan QIZs had better watch out. Under theAmerican policy of “competitive liberalization” grantingQIZs to both neighbors seeks to make them more competitive, which is probably a good thing—if the Jordanians are up to it.

QIZ helps plug trade gap

Meanwhile, QIZ has helped Jordan to strengthen what would otherwise be anemic exports of goods, partially plugging a massive trade gap. In 2005, exports of Jordanian goods covered a mere 41% of the kingdom’s merchandise imports, but higher sales abroad from Jordan’s QIZs last year helped bring up the coverage to a little over 45%. The shortfall is partly made up by better figures in Jordan’s services trade balance, but in the end the kingdom regularly consumes more from abroad than it sells to the outside world, with the gap being made up by foreign largesse.

RIAD AL KHOURI is an economist, and Director MEBA Ltd Amman/Senior Associate BNI Inc New York; He can be contacted at [email protected]

April 1, 2007 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
  • 1
  • …
  • 588
  • 589
  • 590
  • 591
  • 592
  • …
  • 705

Latest Cover

About us

Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

  • Donate
  • Our Purpose
  • Contact Us

Sign up for our newsletter

    • Facebook
    • Twitter
    • Instagram
    • Linkedin
    • Youtube
    Executive Magazine
    • ISSUES
      • Current Issue
      • Past issues
    • BUSINESS
    • ECONOMICS & POLICY
    • OPINION
    • SPECIAL REPORTS
    • EXECUTIVE TALKS
    • MOVEMENTS
      • Change the image
      • Cannes lions
      • Transparency & accountability
      • ECONOMIC ROADMAP
      • Say No to Corruption
      • The Lebanon media development initiative
      • LPSN Policy Asks
      • Advocating the preservation of deposits
    • JOIN US
      • Join our movement
      • Attend our events
      • Receive updates
      • Connect with us
    • DONATE