If there is one abiding image that symbolized the horrors of the Middle East in 2004, it had to be the harrowing videotaped pictures of doomed hostages in Iraq. The shots of terrified captives pleading for their lives are the antithesis of the optimism expressed by American officials at the beginning of the year that Iraq would become stable with the formal termination of the United States-led occupation in June and creation of an interim Iraqi government. Like other key areas of conflict in the Middle East in 2004, Iraq has dashed even the frailest of expectations.
At the beginning of the year, the Road Map unveiled in Spring 2003 by President George W. Bush was still considered a viable means of charting a peace between Israel and the Palestinians, despite the continued violence in the West Bank and Gaza. Libya announced it was abandoning its weapons of mass destruction program after tiring of its pariah status, setting a strong example to other countries with WMD ambitions, while Syrian President Bashar al-Assad signaled a willingness to resume peace talks with Israel after a four-year hiatus. Elsewhere, a democratic reform initiative from the Bush administration was spurring Arab governments to begin assessing political and social change in their countries.
Saudi Arabia is facing its worst unrest in years with a series of bombings and shootings carried out by Islamic militants seeking to overthrow the royal family.Yet the death in November of Yasser Arafat, the veteran Palestinian leader, spurred a flurry of international diplomatic activity amid hopes of a new beginning for the peace process. But a breakthrough appears remote given the Israeli government’s determination to proceed with a unilateralist agenda and the uncertainty surrounding the emergence of a new Palestinian leadership.
The Syrian-Israeli peace track remains frozen with Sharon clearly reluctant to resume negotiations, particularly at a time when Damascus is subject to a United Nations Security Council resolution and unprecedented international scrutiny. At end of 2004, the carnage in Iraq has developed an ineluctable momentum, which few see ending anytime soon, while Arab governments generally have been hesitant in embracing even minor reforms, despite mounting pressure from the West.
The Iraq debacle
The architects of the US-led invasion of Iraq had harbored ambitions that the overthrow of the Baathist regime and the introduction of democratic rule would engender a domino effect throughout the region, with dictatorships being replaced by budding democracies. The goal may have been noble, but the manner in which it was implemented was grounded in naivety and obtuseness, a fundamental failure to understand the ethnic, social and cultural realities of Iraq.
Early policy decisions, such as the disbandment of the Iraqi army and the de-“Baathification” process as well as questionable military tactics, fueled the budding insurgency in Iraq during the summer and autumn of 2003. From simple hit-and-run guerrilla tactics, the insurgency has evolved over the past year into a fluid multi-dimensional guerrilla war which shows little sign of diminishing despite – or even because of – the measures undertaken by the Iraqi authorities and their American allies.
The formal end of the American-led occupation in June and the hand-over to an interim Iraqi government did nothing to quell the insurgency. Ayad Allawi, the interim prime minister, is known as the “mayor of Baghdad,” an ironic term that still probably overstates the reach of his influence, which by the end of the year barely stretched further than the barricaded Green Zone in the heart of the capital.
Oil exports, the revenues of which were supposed to help fund reconstruction, have been decimated by the near daily attacks against Iraq’s oil infrastructure. US officials predicted before the war that Iraqi oil would generate $50 to $100 million in two to three years. But some 250 attacks since the end of the war have resulted in revenues of only $17 billion. The absence of Iraqi oil from the international market is a significant factor in the soaring oil prices of recent months which have reached in excess of $50 a barrel.
The violence is laying bare the country’s ethnic and sectarian seam lines, provoking concerns that Iraq may eventually splinter into three or more states. The Shiites are the most vocal champions of Iraq’s territorial integrity and have been at the forefront of the call for nationwide elections. Comprising some 60% of the population, the Shiites expect elections to transform their demographic advantage into real power after decades of being marginalized by the minority Sunni elite.
The Kurdish question
That ambition, however, causes unease among the Sunni and Kurdish communities which each represent 20% of the population. Despite Kurdish leaders’ stated allegiance to a united Iraq, separatist sentiments run deep among the Kurds, which the ongoing turmoil in the rest of Iraq is doing nothing to abate. Indeed, the Kurds have been steadily reasserting their authority over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, home to a volatile ethnic mix of Kurds, Turkmen and Sunni and Shiite Arabs.
The prospect of an independent Kurdistan continues to alarm neighboring Turkey, which has threatened to intervene militarily in such an event. Turkey and northern Iraq’s other neighbors, Syria and Iran, fear that their own sizeable Kurdish communities will begin agitating for greater rights if an independent Kurdish state emerges in Iraq. That concern hardened in March when Syrian Kurds rioted for several days in the Hasake region of north east Syria.
The Sunni minority
The Sunnis, who populate the mainly desert and agricultural heartland, fear marginalization in a future Iraq dominated by Shiites. A key element in neutralizing the insurgency is to encourage the emergence of a new Sunni polity to replace the outlawed Baath party, which can participate in the political process. As it is, the most popular Sunni representative gathering at present is the Muslim Clerics Association, a religio-political group of hard-line Sunni clerics, who are at odds with the interim Iraqi government, oppose the presence of foreign troops in Iraq and have called for a boycott of the nationwide elections scheduled for January 30.
In preparation for the January elections, the US military launched a number of operations in October and November to break the back of the insurgency. But the insurgents have generally avoided a direct confrontation with the Americans, choosing to regroup and stage attacks elsewhere in the time-honored fashion of guerrilla warfare. Under the present circumstances, a military solution to the insurgency appears remote because there are insufficient coalition troop numbers to police the country and the newly formed Iraqi security forces are proving unreliable.
The unrelenting diet of suicide car bomb attacks, kidnappings, roadside ambushes and the brutally effective tactic of beheading hostages has forced aid agencies, charities and foreign businesses to abandon the country, undermining the ability of the international community to help in the reconstruction process.
Although Iraq has become synonymous with the decapitations of foreign hostages, the practice began this year in neighboring Saudi Arabia with the videotaped execution of an American, Paul Johnson, by extremist militants, who have seen to it that Saudi Arabia has been rocked by a wave of kidnappings, shootings and bombings since May 2003. The Saudi security forces have launched a crackdown on the militants, arresting hundreds of suspects, often during bloody shootouts.
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict
For most of the year, peace between Israel and the Palestinians has rarely looked more remote. The much heralded Road Map was essentially ignored by Israel and the Palestinians, while the US was too preoccupied with Iraq and the presidential election to actively coax the two sides back to the peace table.
Sharon, supported by Washington, refused to deal with the Palestinians while Yasser Arafat remained head of the Palestinian Authority. The veteran Palestinian leader was pronounced “irrelevant,” threatened with assassination and confined to his crumbling headquarters in Ramallah. Four years of fighting have left the PA and its security apparatus in tatters and in no position to rein in the numerous autonomous militant groups that have filled the vacuum. Israel continued its policy of assassinations, killing in March Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the blind and crippled spiritual leader of the Hamas movement, and a month later Abdel Aziz Rantissi, the head of the Hamas politburo.
The absence of a negotiating partner to suite Sharon’s requirements left him free to pursue his unilateralist agenda of building a concrete barrier separating the West Bank from Israel and preparing for a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Sharon’s plan to abandon the Gaza Strip along with four settlements in the northern West Bank has caused considerable controversy in Israel. The right wing strongly opposes any dismembering of Jewish-only settlements. The left wing found themselves in the awkward position of being obliged to support a plan that reduces the level of occupation while still not fully trusting Sharon’s motives.
With his government divided over the plan, Sharon traveled to Washington in April to seek the support of his ally, George W. Bush. The Israeli premier was rewarded with a commitment from Bush that there would be no right of return for millions of Palestinian refugees that Israel could keep some of the settlements in the West Bank and would not have to withdraw to the 1967 “Green Line” border. It was an unprecedented public concession to Israel from an American president, legitimizing the illegal colonization of an occupied land and prejudicing the final status talks in Israel’s favor.
Arafat’s death encouraged speculation of a potential new beginning to the peace process. But given the fragmented nature of the Palestinian polity, the transition to a new leadership could be marked by intra-Palestinian violence, which would delay any resumption of negotiations with Israel.
As for Sharon, he remains committed to his Gaza withdrawal plan and is in no hurry to resume peace talks with the Palestinians. That much was clear from a revealing interview given by Sharon’s senior advisor, Dov Weisglass, to Israel’s Haaretz newspaper in October. Weisglass admitted that the Gaza disengagement plan was “formaldehyde” to freeze the peace process with the Palestinians, “all with a [US] presidential blessing.”
Road to Damascus
Sharon’s reluctance to discuss peace with the Palestinians extends to the Syrian track. From December 2003, Bashar al-Assad has been dropping hints with increasing frequency that he is willing to resume unconditional negotiations with the Israelis. Assad’s interlocutors believe the Syrian president is genuine and Israeli military commanders have recommended taking advantage of Syria’s diplomatic isolation to cut the best possible deal. But Sharon, so far, has refused, saying that Damascus must first curtail its support for militant Palestinian groups and Lebanon’s Hizbullah.
Syria’s bargaining position has rarely been weaker. The US slapped limited sanctions on Damascus at the beginning of the year as part of the Syria Accountability Act, which calls for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, cooperation on stabilizing Iraq, abandoning its alleged WMD program and ending its support for “terrorist” groups. Terminating Syria’s influence over Lebanon was elevated from a fringe issue in Washington to a stated policy goal of the Bush administration in 2004.
Syria’s approval for an extension to Lebanese President Emile Lahoud’s mandate led in September to the US and France co-sponsoring a UN Security Council resolution demanding Damascus cease interfering in Lebanese affairs. Resolution 1559 also demands a withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, the disarming of Hizbullah and Palestinian militias and the deployment of Lebanese troops to the southern border with Israel.
Damascus has made a greater effort to beef up security measures along its 600-kilometer desert border with Iraq to prevent infiltrators joining the insurgency. But the US has ruled out granting Damascus leeway in Lebanon in exchange for greater cooperation over Iraq.
Diplomacy and democracy
The unrelenting violence in Iraq and the Palestinian territories has overshadowed faltering attempts in early 2004 to promote political, economic and social reform in the Arab world. The Bush administration’s Greater Middle East Initiative, a framework for Arab reform, was widely criticized as an unwarranted meddling in Arab domestic affairs. It was also derided for failing to cite the Arab-Israeli conflict as a root cause for the region’s ills. The adverse reaction of Arab governments led to a revised and diluted version of the initiative being unveiled at the Group of Eight (G-8) summit in June.
Still, Arab regimes felt compelled to address the subject of democracy at the Arab League summit in May. The gathering produced the Tunis Declaration, a lukewarm pledge to promote human rights, freedom of expression, judicial independence and widen the role of women in society. Some countries are tinkering with minor democratic measures: Saudi Arabia is planning to hold its first municipal elections in February, and Kuwait is close to finishing a publications bill abolishing censorship in the local press.
The process of democratizing the Arab world received another boost in December when Arab foreign and finance ministers and G-8 representatives met in Morocco to further the Bush administration’s reform project.
