Would a naval blockade by the United States, France and Britain on the Islamic Republic of Iran succeed in forcing the mullahs in Tehran to abandon their nuclear dream and turn the population against the ruling theocracy, and maybe with a little bit of luck and a discreet nudge from the West, help bring about regime change in the country? That is what the Bush administration is betting on. It would be Bush’s final hurrah before leaving the White House in about five months. Five months during which the oil markets — and Iran — will remain jittery.
Or instead, would an intervention by the Western powers have the opposite effect by uniting the population against the “foreign invaders,” giving the mullahs and their maverick President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad unexpected support they might otherwise never dream to win?
Indeed, as one observer pointed out, sanctions could have a positive effect with the government mandating that domestically produced cars migrate towards compressed natural gas.
Iran ranks fifth on the list of the world’s top producers of crude oil and second in the Middle East, pumping 4.15 million barrels a day (behind Saudi Arabia, the world’s top producer, at 11 million barrels a day). But Iran’s problem, dating back to the days of the shah, is that it never invested enough in developing its refining capacity, electing instead to ship its crude oil to other countries, principally India, and then re-importing the refined product.
If it made sense at the time, that decision is now coming back to haunt the Iranians because it is that very dependence on importing oil that renders Iran so vulnerable to potential foreign naval interventions and blockades.
In the event that US and allied fleets elect to impose a military blockade on the Islamic republic, it would cripple the country’s economy, though perhaps not entirely to the degree the foreign powers might expect. There are several reasons for that.
First, as mentioned above, the knee-jerk reaction from the Iranian people to foreign interference in their internal affairs might well be the catalyst which ends up uniting Iranians around the country’s leadership, thus producing the reverse effect that Washington, London and Paris (and Jerusalem) wish for.
Thus such a move would re-enforce the mullahs’ position and raise the level of anti-Americanism in the region. This would not be good news for US troops currently serving in Iraq, and one must not forget Iran’s proxy militia in Lebanon, Hizbullah, which could be directed to launch hostilities against Israel from southern Lebanon.
Second, no blockade could really be effective against Iran given its advantageous geographic position. The only possible scenario under which US/EU sanctions and a blockade could truly affect Iran would be if it was total: meaning that not only the shoreline along the Persian Gulf would need to be monitored, but the thousands of miles of border separating Iran from its neighbors through some of the planet’s most inhospitable terrain.
Additionally, sanctions against Iran would never work as long as Iran keeps its umbilical cord linking it to its century-old trading partner, Dubai. Imposing a trade ban on the UAE and policing the 250 miles of coastal waters between Iran and the United Arab Emirates, including all the coves the region’s dhows can sneak in and out of undetected by larger Western gunboats, will be close to impossible.
Also, given the fact that the UAE is a close US ally, it would be unthinkable to impose a ban on the Emirates.
Furthermore, an international military force would have to police — and prevent — contraband trade from finding its way across the 550-mile Iraq-Iran border. We have seen the inability of Iraqi, US and coalition forces in preventing anti-US jihadists from entering Iraq across the Syrian border since the US invasion. Why should things be any different on Iraq’s eastern border?
That same international police force would also be tasked with controlling the 560 miles of border between Iran and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey and across the 500-mile border between Iran and Turkmenistan. Add to the list another 275 miles shoreline of the Caspian Sea; and the 400-mile border Iran shares with Afghanistan and another 400 miles or so shared with Pakistan. That represents close to 3,000 miles of land borders and 900 miles of shoreline.
So, would diplomacy stand a better chance? It has been tried, argue those hawks in favor of an aggressive response, and without result. In the meantime, no doubt Iran’s leadership is keeping eyes out on two fateful dates, probably marked in large red circles on their calendars: November 4, the day the United States votes for a new president, and January 20, the day the new president moves into the White House. If Iran’s leadership manages to deter any intervention until then, they win this match in the great Middle East chess game.
How these developments affect the markets remains to be seen.
Claude Salhani is editor of the Middle East Times and a political analyst in Washington, DC.
