After the decision of Turkey’s constitutional court to close down the Islamic AKP party due to allegations of promoting certain virtues in society, analysts and policy-makers have expressed concern about increasing tension in the already politically turbulent country. Political analysts may argue that the move, initiated by certain elements within influential circles of the Turkish state, is meant to maneuver the growth of the AKP.
Ever since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, secularism has been a red line in their politics, although today the secular establishment deemed it obligatory to allow the AKP greater representation, compared to thirty to forty years ago where any attempt by Islamists to capture power was foiled and deterred.
Due to the developments which have taken place in the past few decades in Turkey and the region, the military, which is the most influential source of the secular establishment, has not been at liberty to dictate the political culture of the country according to their visions. With the growth of Islamic movements, both philanthropic and political, along with leftist currents and Kurdish insurgency, the stance of Turkey’s military was forced to be moderated.
The question of which side in the political arena is following the just cause is a matter of deeper political analysis. What is meant to be addressed here, however, is whether the cohesion predicted could take shape through embracing pluralism in a society where many remain disillusioned or intolerant. The positive aspect of the AKP leading the government was that the main Islamic current moved closer to a line of moderation, meaning that the compatibility of Islam and democracy could have been demonstrated.
Furthermore, the presence of two main political trends, a secular and a religiously oriented one, gave the impression to many observers and politicians in the European Union that Turkey is moving closer to viable democracy and upping its chances of entering the EU, ignoring the French opinion on the matter.
It is evident that the secular republicans have acknowledged the importance of adopting a more pragmatic policy, provided that the AKP, once in power, assures the rest of the Turkish population that they will be free of schemes to gradually transform Turkey into a Islamic Republic.
The secular Kemalists, on the other hand, might have to use more progressive methods in promoting their culture. This may be achieved first through reforms within their circles, which would work to preserve the presence and importance of the military while being less reliant upon them; second, by acknowledging humanitarian issues like the Armenian genocide and the Kurdish question, without compromising Turkey’s core values and sovereignty.
The Islamists, on their part, are being tested in this era like never before since even the president is from the AKP, which is a precedent. The AKP is in a position whereby they are responsible for the later developments, and may have to demonstrate their dedication of preserving the secular establishment, which has proven, regardless of its flaws, to be the most successful Muslim country to modernize its society and gain a strategic position in a region troubled by war and ethnic conflicts.
A cohesion would only be feasible if both sides compromised their positions on marginal issues, while guarding Turkey’s status as the only modern Muslim nation-state. It seems evident that the military, the constitutional court, and their proxy institutions are more concerned with protecting Turkey’s identity as a secular nation-state prior to potentially entering the EU, contrary to the view that they are not interested in the EU.
Moreover, the recognition of more minority rights may also enable Turkish immigrants in the West, particularly Germany, to be more accepted and vibrant in the cultural and commercial spheres. The AKP could leave a legacy behind if they succeed in entering the EU while consolidating Turkey’s various factions by endorsing national liberal reforms, ensuring the right for every party to participate rather than for each party to function in a revolutionary (AKP, Kurdish parties) and the other in a counter-revolutionary (Republican People’s Party) way and realize the crucial issues facing the country.
The core issue to be resolved at this stage is for both parties to realize the supreme interests of Turkey, both politically and economically, regardless of the difficulties the country has been facing.
The secular establishment should recognize the economic progress that the AKP-led government has been able to shape, while at the same time ensuring the rest of the Turkish population that it is concerned with preserving the secular values modern Turkey is based on. This could be achieved by proving the state institutions, including the military, to be competent in promoting a culture of liberality and tolerance where the AKP can be assimilated and brought closer to moderation, and to tone down the Jacobin rhetoric and practices upon which they have been reliant on for decades.
Having said the latter, the secular republicans could be seen as a credible force by the European Union and may eventually widen the umbrella of the Western powers (NATO, EU) over Turkey where culture and economics are interchanged freely and constructively.
By Dr. Priyan P. Khakhar is assistant Professor MME Track Olayan School of Business
