Jeffrey Feltman was sworn in as US Ambassador to Lebanon on July 22, 2004 and took up his duties on August 20, 2004. Before that, he served in Iraq, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Tunisia. Mr. Feltman, who is from Ohio, speaks French, Arabic, and Hungarian. He spoke to Executive about the current crisis and US’s economic and political ambitions for Lebanon and the region.
E What signal do you think was sent by the extent of international community’s generosity in Stockholm yesterday?
My view is the fact that it doubled the amount pledged for Lebanon shows that the international community’s support for Lebanon remains strong. It is not often that you have a donor conference where the pledges were double what the goals were. It shows confidence in the Seniora government, but it goes beyond that; it shows the concerns that the international community has for Lebanon and its commitment to Lebanon. It shows the links between Lebanon and all the countries that participated. Look at the US for example: we have Lebanese- Americans everywhere and those Lebanese-Americans want to make sure that we do our part in reconstructing Lebanon after this awful conflict. We are proud that, of those commitments, about 25% was an American commitment to Lebanon.
E Representative Tom Lantos has vowed to block aid to Lebanon until Beirut agrees to the deployment of UNIFIL 2 troops along the Syrian border. Can one man make this kind of unilateral decision for the entire United States? How seriously should we take his initiative?
Tom Lantos is an important voice in Congress. I think you know our system. We have checks and balances between branches of government. The president has the lead on foreign policy making but Congress has the lead on appropriating funds and Tom Lantos is the leading democrat for the House of International Relations Committee, which means that he has a very important voice. All congressional representatives have voices but his is a particular voice because of his position and his long study of this part of the world, so we do have to consider Congressman Lantos’s concerns. But Lebanon should want to take them into account as well. His concerns, the specifics of his request, are less important than the issue he is talking about. Lebanon needs to secure its borders. This is not an infringement of Lebanon’s sovereignty; this should be an assertion of Lebanon’s sovereignty. Countries need to control their borders. Lebanon has an obligation under UN Resolution 1701 to stop arms smuggling. The world has an obligation under resolution 1701 to prevent arms smuggling into Lebanon. But this isn’t a gift from Lebanon to the international community. This is something Lebanon needs to do for Lebanon. It is something businesses need to be looking into as well. Businesses want to operate in countries where there is transparency, rule of law; and smuggling, be it arms or commercial smuggling, will not help Lebanon attract investors.
E The success of Stockholm could not have come a day too soon for Lebanon. Michel Aoun has again put pressure on the Seniora government. In whose interests would it be if the government collapsed?
In our view the prime minister and the cabinet did a very good job in managing Lebanon during the crisis. If you look at the development of 1701 and how it evolved … it is not a secret … look at the text and the various drafts that were floating around Lebanon and New York, and it is clear that the prime minister, the cabinet, the speaker of the parliament all worked to see that 1701 evolved in a form that the cabinet believed worked better for Lebanon. This shows the respect the international community has for the governing institutions of Lebanon, for the prime minister, the speaker and the cabinet that they were able to get a Security Council resolution to evolve in Lebanon’s favor. Now, who ultimately is the prime minister of Lebanon is a question for the Lebanese to answer and not the United States or the international community. But we do know that you have democratic institutions, you have a parliament, and while we all have recognized that the electoral law was not the best law you have, you do have a parliament and a cabinet and you have constitutional institutions. We hope that those constitutional institutions would be relied upon if you’re looking at a change in government.
E From what we understand the American government has specifically committed itself to backing the Seniora government.
We have confidence in the prime minister’s leadership of the country during the crisis. We have confidence in the goals that he has set out. Some of the goals are stated in the seven-point plan, some of the goals are the reform ideas he discussed before the crisis that broke out on July 12. He has won the confidence of the international community, whether we’re talking IMF, the World Bank, the [international Friends of Lebanon] Core Group, the United States, and the UN. This is an asset in Lebanon’s favor, but again, who is the prime minister of Lebanon is not a question for us. Yes, we have confidence in Prime Minister Seniora’s leadership. We have confidence in the cabinet. We have confidence in the way the speaker has played his role during the crisis, but who is the leader of Lebanon is not for us to decide.
E But would the American government be prepared to accept an alternative now?
It’s a hypothetical question. The Lebanese need to calculate what’s best for Lebanon. Is it best for Lebanon right now to try to change the government? Is it best for Lebanon right now to be calling for a collapse or resignation of the prime minister? That’s not a question that I can answer. I can certainly give you our views but our views are less important than what the Lebanese think. I would hope the Lebanese would consider this question very, very carefully.
E Given then the implicit support America has for the current government, do you think the Americans are doing enough to encourage Israel to ease the economic blockade, which is one of the key pressures on the Seniora administration?
I assure you that whoever I meet with in Lebanon today – across the political spectrum, in the economic and commercial field – the air and sea blockade is the first topic that is raised. I assure you that this embassy has been playing its part to make sure that our government understands the cost, whether we’re talking economical, political or even psychological cost, so we are actively conveying Lebanon’s deep concern about this to Washington. Washington has an understanding of this. Washington is in a dialogue with Israel on this and I have to say it is linked to issues of securing borders and arms smuggling. The international community wants to see Lebanon prevent arm smuggling and, in terms of the air and sea embargo, Israel has linked that into the question.
E But it is not very helpful is it?
As I said, I understand the economical, political and psychological costs of this embargo and I would love to see it lifted as quickly as possible. I would like to have a better understanding as well of how Lebanon is dealing with the need to prevent the airports the sea ports and the land crossings from being used for smuggling.
E You served in Israel in 2001. Considering the strong US ties with Israel, how difficult is for America to play the genuine honest broker in this part of the world? I think the embargo highlights the difficulties involved.
Yes, the United States has strong friendship with Israel. No one can dispute that. By the way, in 2001 I was posted to our consulate in Jerusalem, which is our diplomatic mission to the Palestinians. It is different to our embassy in Tel Aviv, which is our diplomatic mission to Israel. In any case, we do have a strong friendship with Israel but that doesn’t mean we can’t have as strong friendships with others. I would argue that our friendship with Israel can be an asset for countries like Lebanon, who have a different relationship with Israel and also have friendship with us. The relationship is different. You do not have any relationship with Israel. In fact, you technically are still at war with Israel and it is criminal to have any contact with Israelis. We don’t think that it is a useful policy right now, but it is your policy. That means that you need people who do have channels to the Israelis. You need people who can talk to the Israelis, who the Israelis have confidence in. This is an asset to you. It should not be looked at with suspicion or negativity.
E Given the events of last month, there is a desperate need for confidence to return. There is a large Lebanese community in the United States and there are also emerging markets funds in the US. What do you think can be done to encourage foreign direct investment from America?
I think you will see, in the coming weeks, several groups from the private sector coming to Lebanon. For example, I know that the Arab American Chamber of Commerce is bringing a group of Lebanese-American executives to Lebanon sometime in the second half of September. It’s a private sector group so we’re not directly involved, but we certainly expect to meet and brief them and grant assistance. You’re going to see people come, either who have Lebanese-American ties or who want to be part of the reconstruction effort. When you’re talking about $3.6 billion or more of damages, there are people who want to come and see if they can help try and get business, and they will go back and talk to their colleagues. I see the reconstruction phase as actually providing a marketing tool for Lebanon as a destination. But when you start the reconstruction, will there be transparency? Will there be border controls? Will there be an easing of bureaucracy in order to assist in job creation? Those are questions we need to ask the government and parliament and others. We are going to have a lot of attention on Lebanon for the next few months. Are the people who are watching Lebanon over the next few months going to be impressed by what they see and going to continue to get involved in Lebanon and going to want to set up offices in Lebanon? It’s going to depend on how the next couple of months go. If you have things like big demonstrations calling for the downfall of the government or rhetoric about arms not coming under the control of the state, I would say that that is not going to encourage people to make long-term commitments to Lebanon. So I think that the atmosphere here in the coming few months, when so many people in the world are watching Lebanon, will determine the sort of long-term commitment you get in terms of investment and trade.
E Given the funds pledged in Stockholm, what are the Americans doing to help ensure a degree of transparency in the allocation of funds and to ensure that the reconstruction effort is being seen to be carried out by the official authority?
We hope to be able to take our cue from the government. The government has identified several projects and we picked up on one ourselves, the rebuilding of the bridge between Jbeil and Byblos. But in terms of how the government is going to manage the funds that are coming in, we’re waiting for details. I agree with the implicit philosophy of your question, which is they do need to be transparent. They do need to be accountable. There need to be assurances to donors and to the Lebanese people that this money is being used with the intention stated.
E And what about ensuring that it is seen to be channeled through the official authority?
The Prime Minster has taken an interesting approach on this. He has talked about several approaches: one is to put the monies into what would be set up as a fund by the government to manage in cooperation with other entities. He’s also talked about adopting, allowing people to adopt villages. Countries have adopted Khiam and Bint Jbeil to rebuild them. In essence, we’ve ‘adopted’ a bridge between Jbeil and Byblos, so the prime minister himself has set priorities but given different mechanisms by which Lebanon can meet those priorities. So I hesitate to say that everything must go through the government of Lebanon, when in fact you have private sector interests and the prime minister himself suggesting other options.
E Last year, after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Mr. Bush held Lebanon as a beacon of change. Does Lebanon still have that status as far as US Middle East policy is concerned, and is it still being used by the American administration as an example of a country that can embrace democratic values and move forward?
Lebanon has a long history of democracy. It’s not like democracy came to Lebanon 18 months ago. We are all very aware of Lebanon’s democratic traditions, like civil rights, freedom of speech freedom of the press, freedom of assembly. We see these as similar to our own values, similar to a European and American model of how civil society works. You have lots of checks and balances built into your system to prevent any one institution or one person from emerging as a dictator. Our commitment to Lebanon, I would say, is stronger now than it was a year ago. We see the fragility of the situation. We understand how regional concerns have played themselves out to a certain extent within Lebanon to the detriment of Lebanon. Our normal assistance budget to Lebanon is about $40-50 million a year when you put everything together. Even after last year’s March 14 demonstration, although we increased various activities, we are still talking about $40-50 million program. In Stockholm, people were talking about $230 million program. That’s a change and it shows how the tangible commitment we are making to Lebanon is greater than what it was a year ago. There is also a great understanding of what Lebanon needs. A year ago, we were talking about $2 million of assistance to Lebanon’s armed forces. Now we’re talking about over $40 million of assistance to the armed forces, just from the United States alone, because we recognized that you need a strong army that has the training and the equipment to serve Lebanon’s needs.
E But surely, Mr. Ambassador, these needs were apparent before July.
They were indeed apparent. There was an international effort to try to support Lebanon in its political reform program and re-equipping the army and the internal security forces through what we call the Core Group, the International Friends of Lebanon [United States, France, United Kingdom, Lebanon, European Union/European Commission, Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Italy, United Nations and World Bank] but the urgency became ever clearer because of what happened on July 12.
E Given that America could use a success story in the region, is Lebanon still being touted for this role?
Yes. Look at the increased of financial commitment and the number of delegations we’ve seen. Look at the congressional delegations alone. So far we’ve had four or five congressional delegations in the past month and this indicates that the United States is optimistic about Lebanon’s future. That’s why you have so many people coming – because we believe that with people as talented as the Lebanese, Lebanon has a bright future.
E In 2000, when Israel withdrew from its so-called security zone, there was talk about going into the South and throwing aid at the South and rebuilding its social infrastructure. Six years on, no one has touched the South and we saw how Hizbullah filled in the vacuum. Now that the dynamic of the South has again changed, what is the American government doing to help ensure that social welfare and education in the South becomes the responsibility of the government?
I dispute the underlying philosophy of the question. Over the past six years, 40% approximately of all the US spending in Lebanon has been in the South. We’re talking about the Litani and the far south. People in Akkar have not been happy with the US focus on the South because one could argue that the needs in the far north of Lebanon are also great, but because of the concerns you raised, we put around 40% of our funding in aid in the South since 2000. We work in a variety of areas, but we don’t wave the flag all the time. We’ve done a lot in bringing clean water to villages and in solid waste management. We’ve done a lot with income generation, setting up farmers’ co-ops, helping on high-value labor-intensive agriculture markets with organic products, such as rose petals and the production of rosewater. There are a lot of US-funded projects in the South based on economic development, job creation, and stuff like that. You are wrong in stating that there has been nothing done in the South. Hizbullah’s has also spent a lot of money in the South, and we recognize that, but the international community has not left a vacuum in the South and we will not leave a vacuum in the South now.
E After Hassan Nasrallah’s admission that July 12 was a miscalculation, his apology if you will, what message do you have for Hizbullah as it seeks to rebuild its sectarian infrastructure and its position within its community? What incentives are there for Hizbullah to join the political process and eventually disarm?
Hizbullah is part of the government; Hizbullah is part of the parliament and has a history of effective, targeted and efficient social programs. The question we have is why Hizbullah insists on the need for arms when all the parties in Lebanon are competing democratically for office, for power. Why is Hizbullah not willing to play on equal playing field in Lebanon with the others? It seems that Hizbullah has enough to offer its population without having arms that violate the very nature of democracy. I found Hassan Nasrallah’s comments, what you call his apology, quite strange because many of us when we watched the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier in Gaza and saw the Israeli reaction in Gaza, many Lebanese, referring to an incident in November, said, “can you imagine what would have happened if Hizbullah succeeded back in November when they tried to kidnap Israeli soldiers in the Ghajar area?” Surely Hassan Nasrallah, watching what happened in Gaza, knowing what his own plans were, had thought of this too. It can’t be that all the rest of us were watching the June 25 kidnapping and wondering what would have happened to Lebanon. He must have thought of this too. I don’t find it credible that he did not calculate a very tough Israeli response. But what is a democracy? Do you have publicly accountable institutions? Do you rely on your constitutional institutions? Hizbullah has arms that are not subject to any publicly accountable institution in this country. The decision of July 12 to kidnap Israeli soldiers was taken without any reference to Lebanese governing institutions and the cost of doing that was almost unbearably high for Lebanon.
E While the people in Lebanon may be divided on the issue of Hizbullah’s arms, Mr. Bush has tagged the party as part of his so-called Axis of Evil. This is not good for confidence in Lebanon. If Hizbullah were to disarm and throw themselves into the activities you just spoke so highly of, would they be detagged?
Our problem with Hizbullah is the arms. That’s our primary problem with Hizbullah. We’re talking about arms that were used, not only to kidnap Lebanon and drag it into war on July 12, but arms that were used against us. I would encourage you to walk by our memorial to the nearly 400 people who were killed in the service of the US government, including many Lebanese, by Hizbullah in its earlier incarnation. So we do have a real problem with Hizbullah in terms of the arms. However, we also recognize that the Shia of Lebanon need to feel that they are properly represented inside Lebanon. The requirement on Hizbullah from the international community in terms of the Security Council resolution is to disarm. In terms of our own bilateral relation with Hizbullah, we certainly will reevaluate them in line with Hizbullah’s compliance with international obligations, but I won’t speculate what they might be today.
E Can we have a workable peace with Israel?
I don’t think either country should have to go through what you went through over the last month. The pain to Lebanon and the physical damage on Lebanon was greater [than that in Israel] but there was pain on both sides, and for what? What did either side achieve? So I would hope that you would be able to find a way and maybe it’s too early to talk about this now, but the prime minister has talked about the need to define a destination where the two countries can move towards an armistice. If an armistice is credible and allows the Lebanese to live without fear, I think that’s a worthwhile destination. But it requires obligations on Lebanon’s part as well.
E Such as?
Not having armed groups that fall outside publicly accountable institutions and that can drag Lebanon into another conflict.
