As Gaza licks its wounds and starts to make up the balance of the latest Israeli assault, Lebanon’s Hizbullah has, since the end of the July 2006 War, worked on the reconstruction of Haret Hreik in Beirut’s southern suburbs. By the people, for the people and a quick return to what once was, seems to be the motto. While Hizbullah officials emphasize the reconstruction of the southern suburb has nothing to do with Solidere’s reconstruction of downtown Beirut, there are nevertheless some striking similarities.
“There is no ‘divine victory’ without reconstruction,” said Hassan Nasrallah in his speech on August 14, 2006, which marked the end of the July War with Israel. Although many Lebanese saw little divinity or victory, they did notice that Nasrallah kept his promise, as the reconstruction is in full swing, especially in Haret Hreik. With over 200 buildings under construction in an area of 0.8 square miles, the “capital of south Beirut” is arguably the largest construction site in Lebanon.
The toll of war
Home to Hizbullah’s former headquarters, the southern suburb was severely bombed in the 2006 war. According to the Lebanese army, 942 air strikes hit south Beirut. The Haret Hreik municipality reported that 265 residential, commercial and office buildings were partly or completely ruined, while a total of 3,119 housing and 1,610 commercial units were destroyed. Some 20,000 people lost their homes.
For the $400 million reconstruction of Haret Hreik, Hizbullah created a new organization, Waad al Sadiq (the faithful promise). The organization technically works under Jihad al Binaa, Hizbullah’s construction arm, yet in reality it works largely on its own. Situated opposite the church of Haret Hreik, Waad signed for the urban master plan and set the criteria for builders to abide by. At the start of 2009, 233 buildings in Haret Hreik were under construction, some 150 of which had their basic structure complete.
“Waad is the largest democratic collective reconstruction project ever undertaken anywhere in the world,” said Waad CEO Hassan Jeshi. “We did not impose Waad on the people. The people asked us,” he said. Waad gave Haret Hreik’s homeowners a choice: either to keep the state compensation of some $53,000 for war damages and rebuild their homes themselves or to hand over money (and responsibility) to Waad, which pledged to pay for all additional costs. Perhaps not surprisingly, most people chose the latter.
Jeshi declined to elaborate on Waad’s sources of funding. It is a public secret, however, that Hizbullah is partly financed by Iran. In addition, it receives donations from individuals in Lebanon and abroad. Jeshi emphasized that the reconstruction of Haret Hreik was not strictly a Hizbullah affair, as the master plan was drawn up with the help of an advisory board of eight leading Lebanese architects, while dozens of consultancy firms, from all segments of society, were involved in the process.
Still, the main themes for the reconstruction were set by Hizbullah, more precisely, by Hassan Nasrallah in his victory speech; a quick return of the internally displaced, to good quality buildings in a recognizable, yet more beautiful Haret Hreik. The return to “what was” is at times taken quite literally, as even buildings that suffer from a lack of natural light are to be rebuilt.
Improvements refer, among other things, to the alignment of buildings and the widening of streets and sidewalks. Most buildings will be painted in uniform (pastel) colors. Interesting novelties include the introduction of solar-powered street lighting and the use of double walls to save energy. Regarding individual preferences, inhabitants have a say in the design of their future home’s interior.
Some critics have claimed that the Waad Project only reinforces the image of Hizbullah operating as a state within the state. “We don’t aim to replace the government,” Jeshi countered. “One should know, however, that the government pays compensation, yet never re-built a single house. What’s more, civil society in Lebanon has always played an important role. Every community has its schools, hospitals and media. That is not a specific Hizbullah feature. That is Lebanon.”
Others ague that Waad is not solely interested in the comfort of Haret Hreik’s inhabitants, but as much in the well-being of Hizbullah’s armed wing. “Mao said that the resistance is like a fish in the sea of the people,” one Waad official said. “Israel knew very well that Haret Hreik was not a military area. It aimed to destroy the sea.”
“Even if you do not like Hizbullah, you have to admit that, in some ways, it has done the inhabitants of Haret Hreik a huge favor by allowing them to rebuild their homes, which otherwise would have been impossible in the current legal and institutional framework,” said architect and urbanist Mona Fawaz. “While on the other hand, the Lebanese state missed a huge opportunity to re-establish a positive presence in south Beirut. The one complaint you hear again and again when talking to the people of Haret Hreik is, ‘no one from the government came to see us.’”
Why not rebuild better than before?
“What I find a pity is that there has been so little debate about the future of Haret Hreik,” Fawaz added. Shortly after the 2006 war, Fawaz and a number of colleagues at the American University of Beirut established the Task Team Haret Hreik (TTHH) with the aim to improve living conditions in the densely populated suburb. In January 2007, it developed a proposal that was eventually published as a booklet with recommendations, including an emphasis on public space and greenery, and improving traffic circulation. This was preceded by three months of trying to initiate a call for an international design competition.
Although Fawaz had never expected that Hizbullah would share the responsibility for reconstructing its “home” with outsiders, she hoped to at least initiate some sort of debate. Hizbullah at first welcomed the TTHH’s work, yet quickly dismissed the call for an international competition. “For several reasons,” Fawaz said. “Most importantly, it argued that a design competition would require too much time, as it aimed for the rapid return of the internally displaced. Furthermore, Hizbullah feared that outside intervention would seek to (partly) depopulate Haret Hreik.”
When talking about the future of Haret Hreik, Waad officials like to emphasize that the reconstruction of the southern suburb is nothing like Solidere’s facelift of downtown Beirut. Echoing traditional left-wing criticism of Solidere, they argue that the heart of Beirut has become a city that is unrecognizable and unaffordable for its former inhabitants. Yet despite the obvious differences in approach, there are some striking similarities as well.
In both cases a private entity supervises the reconstruction process, aided by a board of well-known architects to produce what Fawaz called “an air of credibility and legitimacy.” Meanwhile, according to Fawaz, both boards worked largely behind closed doors and allowed for little input from third parties. Also, both have redesigned the city in enclaves that seem disconnected from the rest of the city. Both Solidere and Waad have mastered the art of public relations and, finally, both often work with “legal exceptions.”
Solidere has been severely criticized for demolishing buildings of historical or cultural value in downtown Beirut under the pretext that they no longer met minimum safety regulations. In its aim to resurrect Haret Hreik as it once was, according to Fawaz, Waad is reconstructing buildings that were in violation of urban zoning laws (floor regulation ratios, maximum heights, etc.) and the building law (natural light, ventilation).
Large parts of South Beirut consist of “informal” and often poorly constructed settlements, especially in areas such as Uzai or Hayy el Sellom, mainly as a result of years of civil war and Israeli occupation in South Lebanon, which forced many inhabitants to flee to the Lebanese capital. At the same time, as Haret Hreik during the Civil War was the domain of Muslim militias, the once predominantly Christian population left, selling lands and possessions to property developers.
“When constructing, especially in the early 1990s, most developers found legal loopholes to avoid, for example, the minimum of 25 percent of public space that is required when large lots are subdivided in commercial units,” said Fawaz. “As a result, Haret Hreik and South Beirut have become the densely populated areas we know today. Yet, if I as an individual rebuild my home, public officials can prevent me on the basis of the building law and 1994 Regulation Law. Yet, if Hizbullah collectively rebuilds, no one will stop them.”
“What is more alarming, however, is that the pre-war urban fabric badly needed interventions to improve livability and, in that context, Waad does very little, since it has committed itself to replicate the pre-war fabric,” Fawaz added.
Building “terrorist infrastructure”
Finally, on a rather different note, the US administration regards Hizbullah as a terrorist organization and in early January it included Waad on a blacklist of organizations that support terrorism. Jihad al Binaa had already been listed. According to US authorities, Waad has rebuilt the Hizbullah “command center” and underground weapons storage facilities. Waad officials dismissed the notion that Hizbullah is a “terrorist” group, denying the allegations.
Fawaz called the allegations unreasonable. “After the destruction of the 2006 war, everyone was free to walk around Haret Hreik to see there was no military infrastructure (such as bunkers and tunnels), as had been alleged,” Fawaz said. “And today too, everyone can go to Haret Hreik to see what is being rebuilt.”
