As true love goes, any declared affirmation of affection between Turkey and Europe will always be best seen as a brief encounter, which fades as the affair fizzles.
When observed from France, Germany or even Austria, the main and maybe only value of even considering Turkey as a member of the Christian Club of Europe known as the European Union is based on a thought that goes “better we have them than someone else gets them.” That someone else falls into a choice of two. Ankara could for years, if not decades, be drawn under the influence of the resurgent Russians under the continued guidance of Vladimir Putin, who is destined to continue running the country in one guise or another.
The alternative, as the French and the Austrians believe quite possible but dare not openly say, is that a country composed of 95% Muslims and led by a self-confessed (mildly) Islamist Party could easily show its “true colors” as an Islamist country. Encouraging and helping its entry into the European Union, this blinkered and bigoted argument runs, is equivalent to arming one’s own execution squad.
Not only would the Christians of Europe be “threatened” by more than 70 million Muslim members of their own club, there would be a risk they could bring in with them other non-EU Muslims through the ruptured defenses. Besides, the naysayers continue, European Istanbul is not even 10% of the Turkish story. On the eastern side of the Bosporus lies a whole different world; of stricter Islamic observance, educational backwardness, suppressed and illiterate woman and ethnic conflict.
And all that is without mentioning other significant numbers. Although hyperinflation in Turkey is a fading memory and the economy has been booming for the past few years, the country still has a sizeable under-educated and under-achieving rural population, which would make similar baggage brought into the EU by countries such as Romania and Bulgaria pale into insignificance.
Growth remains strong
Even so, Turkey enters 2008 with strong growth rates, led by a generally popular government with a strong mandate. The economy grew by around 4.8% in 2007, only a touch below the most optimistic forecasts. After an unseemly face-off with the avowedly secular army, the Islamic-oriented AK Party, (AKP) of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan won the July election by a landslide, which was followed by Parliament’s election of Erdogan’s ally and former Islamist Abdullah Gul as president. The elections gave the AKP a mandate to continue its business-friendly and fiscally conservative economic program, as well as to pursue the elusive membership of the EU, a cause passionately and very publicly espoused by the AKP hierarchy.
The news regarding pursuit of EU membership is less rosy. On December 14, a statement by EU foreign ministers referred to Turkey without using the words “accession” and “membership”. It is widely thought that French President Nicholas Sarkozy was behind the decision to exorcise the words from the communiqué, which was submitted to December’s EU summit.
Perhaps mindful of the strength of the Armenian lobby in France, Sarkozy is a vocal opponent of Turkish membership, favoring instead an ill-defined “privileged partnership”. In response, Prime Minister Erdogan launched a broadside at the French President, accusing him of “hypocrisy” — Erdogan has said on several occasions that Sarkozy has affirmed his support for Turkey’s membership in private. “Sarkozy says one thing in our bilateral meetings and says something else behind our back,” Erdogan said. “This is not a becoming attitude in politics.” Possibly not, but a deep and wide chasm between public words and private deeds is not a phenomenon confined to French politicians.
In response to the perceived slight, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan refused to meet his counterpart Bernard Kouchner for bilateral discussions when in Paris for a meeting of donors to the Palestinian territories. Nonetheless, Erdogan has said that nothing will stand in the way of Turkish accession. Whether these words can be matched by reality is open to question. Another question is also increasingly being asked. How long will the Turkish people retain their own enthusiasm for European accession in the face of insulting snubs, obstructions and delays? Erdogan could soon find himself championing a cause in which his citizens — and voters — have long since lost interest.
The omission in the communiqué of specific references to Turkey’s potential future EU membership may not have much significance in itself. The heat and light of this particular dispute with Sarkozy may well soon die down. Much more important are the practicalities dating from the previous year which left Turkey feeling ambushed.
Eight “chapters” or areas of negotiation and harmonization with the EU that Turkey must complete before it can become a member were suspended in December 2006 over Turkey’s refusal to allow ships from the Republic of Cyprus, an EU member, into its ports. The chapters remain suspended and the Turkish government still looks unlikely to budge — while the Cypriot government refuses to countenance reunification with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (recognized by Turkey alone), which was one of the preconditions for its own membership. As long as hardliner Tassos Papadopoulos remains president, the Cypriot government is also unlikely to seek rapprochement or compromise.
Furthermore, focusing on Sarkozy’s role in watering down the December communiqué is convenient but misses the bigger picture. He is, after all, not the only leader to question the wisdom of Turkish membership: German Chancellor Angela Merkel is, at best, deeply skeptical. Austria has long opposed membership, and current Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer said in 2005 that “Turkey in the EU would mean the end of the EU, if that does not happen before anyway,” and echoes Sarkozy’s “privileged partnership” line.
Invasion of northern Iraq receded
If there is a glimmer of good news, it is that the threat of a large-scale Turkish invasion of northern Iraq seems to have receded. Throughout the autumn, Turkish troops were massing on the border with Turkey’s neighbor, threatening to launch an attack to root out Kurdish fighters from the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) said to be sheltering in the Iraqi mountains. A full-scale incursion would have made the re-opening of negotiations with the EU an even more distant prospect. However, should the PKK decide to launch more attacks on Turkish targets to boost its profile, the pressure on Erdogan, who is thought to personally oppose a full-scale incursion, could become too heavy to fend off.
Finally, the opposition of European politicians to Turkey’s membership, explicit or otherwise, has to an extent become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The more the EU stalls and dissembles, for fair reasons or otherwise, the more the Turkish people turn against the idea of membership altogether. Retaining their support may become increasingly difficult. And while the AKP leadership appears genuinely determined to bring Turkey into the EU, the party as a whole may prefer closer ties with the Middle East. In fact, the government itself has been willing to look elsewhere for friends. It has made energy deals with Iran — a pariah in Western eyes — and made overtures to an increasingly assertive Russia.
Andrew Mango wrote almost a decade ago that, where Turkey was concerned, there was a need of “an enlargement of the European mind.” Not too much has changed since then and some European politicians should perhaps be careful what they wish for. Their vacillation towards Turkey may soon put them in the position of feeling damned if they do and being damned if they don’t.
Jason J. Nash is head of research at the Oxford Business Group.
