It is popularly believed that when Najib Mikati’s new government takes office, one of its first priorities will be to separate Lebanon from the United Nations tribunal investigating the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. This, the reasoning goes, is the price Mikati will have to pay in recognition of the support he won for the premiership from Hezbollah and its allies in the former opposition. Such a move would risk a serious confrontation with the UN and Western powers, which would doubtless regard any attempt to cripple the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) as the work of Hezbollah, Syria and Iran, and would act accordingly. However, if Mikati plays his hand carefully, he might succeed in buying some time and possibly even neutralizing the tribunal altogether.
Mikati is not looking for a quarrel with the international community, and in return has been given the benefit of the doubt — for the time being — by the United States and Europe, based on his reputation as a moderate politician and an influential businessman.
The watershed moment for Hezbollah was the handing over of the first set of indictments from the tribunal’s prosecution to the pre-trial judge last month. The imminent transfer of the indictments and the evident reluctance of Saad Hariri to disavow the tribunal spurred Hezbollah’s move to topple the government.
Although speculation has centered on the release date falling some time in March, there are indications that the indictments may not appear for several months. In the meantime, Mikati could table a vote in government to re-open the debate over the protocol between Lebanon and the UN on which the tribunal was established.
The protocol was never approved by parliament nor ratified by the president because of the political deadlock in the months following the 2006 war. In the end, the tribunal was adopted by the UN Security Council under the Chapter Seven mandate, circumventing the need for formal Lebanese approval.But Mikati could argue to the international community that the tribunal is a deeply sensitive issue for the Lebanese, and given the lack of unanimity in the country on the issue, it deserves a re-examination. The government could establish a parliamentary committee to look into the protocol.
The tribunal, of course, will continue working, but Lebanon could stall a response to a release of the indictments by citing the parliamentary review. Alternatively, the Lebanese judges sitting on the tribunal may choose to resign, citing the intolerable pressure they face in such a politically charged case. It is entirely possible that the Mikati government won’t need to do anything if the judges independently tender the irresignations. Given the circumstances, who among Lebanon’s judiciary would volunteer to step into their shoes? If the judges quit and no replacements are found, or if Lebanon continues to stall or decides after a period of time to suspend its cooperation with the tribunal, eventually it will end up in the hands of the UN Security Council.
This is where the debate over the tribunal could become very interesting. If Lebanon chooses to halt cooperation with the tribunal or the Lebanese judges resign, the STL’s mandate will have to be amended from the current Lebanese-international hybrid into a purely international entity. Indeed, there has been talk that the tribunal could end up as a permanent international terrorism court. Yet, it is far from clear how many countries would support such a move.
Some may balk at extending the life of a highly controversial tribunal that owes its existence to the political interests of the US and France and was set up to investigate not acts of genocide or war crimes but essentially the murder of one man. China and Russia, in particular, must be aware that they could be setting a precedent that could backfire on them in the future if the tribunal was charged with investigating, say, human rights abuses in Tibet, or war crimes in Chechnya.
Critics within the Security Council could argue with some justification that it is impermissible to prolong such a tribunal, especially when even the Lebanese themselves appear to no longer want it. Bear in mind that UN Resolution 1757, which established the tribunal in May 2007, squeezed through by a margin of only one vote — 10 in favor and five abstentions (UN Security Council resolutions require at least nine votes for approval). You never know: if Mikati is patient, the UN Security Council may end up doing the dirty work for him.
Nicholas Blanford is the Beirut-based correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor and The Times of London
