One of the most striking regional developments of 2009 has been the reemergence of Turkey as a major player within the greater Middle East. Since its establishment in 1923, the country followed the credo of its founding father, Kemal Ataturk, and oriented its foreign policy westward, showing a cold shoulder to eastern neighbors.
Today, however, under the “divine guidance” of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Ankara’s alignment is changing significantly. While mindful of not shutting the door on Europe or irking Washington, Ankara is increasingly looking east, which in 2009 produced a multitude of protocols and agreements with countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran and even Armenia.
One of the main architects of Turkey’s shift in foreign policy is the AKP’s Ahmet Davutoglu, a political scientist and former professor of international relations, who served as a special adviser to Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Erdogan before being appointed as Turkey’s Foreign Minister last May. It is his book “Strategic Depth” that lies at the heart of Ankara’s change in worldview.
Davutoglu argues, first of all, that Turkey lies at the heart of three geographical regions and should formulate a foreign policy accordingly, including the establishment of strategic relations with the Middle East, the Caucasus, Russia and Central Asia. Secondly, Ankara should pursue a policy of “Zero Problems” and “Maximum Engagement” with its neighbors, mainly by improving economic ties. Davutoglu’s views are part of a wider intellectual current known as “New Ottomanism” that aims to distinguish between the good, the bad and the ugly of Turkey’s Ottoman legacy.
This new mode of thinking is a sharp departure from the Kemalist military doctrine, which for decades defined the Ottoman past in strictly negative terms, while it saw Turkey as a “lone wolf” surrounded by a “ring of fire.” Naturally, Turkey’s change in foreign policy has not been an overnight affair. Some academics argue that its roots were planted shortly after the end of the Cold War. Still, it is beyond doubt that the AKP accelerated and firmly implemented the new doctrine.
Take relations with Syria. Since the 1998 Adana Agreement ended the all too real threat of war between the two nations, ties have gradually grown stronger, which culminated this year in the remarkable decision to lift all mutual visa requirements and establish a high-level council to enhance trade and cooperation.
“Turkey is the gateway for Syria to Europe just as Syria is the gateway for Turkey to the Arab world,” Davutoglu explained.
In addition, Turkey signed a historic agreement with Armenia to reopen the borders and restore diplomatic ties. Having previously normalized ties with the regional Iraqi government in Kurdistan, Ankara and Baghdad in October agreed on no less than 48 memorandums of understanding in the fields of energy, trade, transport, water and agriculture. And on October 26, Erdogan met with his Iranian counterpart and “friend” Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The two-day visit resulted in a flurry of agreements with the potential to propel bilateral trade from $11 billion to $30 billion.
Meanwhile, Turkish relations with Israel have soured since the latter’s 22-day onslaught on Gaza last winter. Turkey actively lobbied for an immediate ceasefire, while Erdogan became the “hero of Davos” after infamously marching off a stage he shared with Israeli President Shimon Perez during a World Economic Forum debate in January. In doing so, Erdogan and Turkey scored major points both at home and in the wider Middle East.
Still, although Turkey emphasizes that its “eastern face” does not come at the expense of its western one, its “Zero Problems” policy is likely to run into trouble sooner or later. First of all, notwithstanding its good intentions, Turkey should be cautious not to overplay its hand in a region where its Ottoman past remains a highly sensitive subject.
Secondly, criticizing Israel and improving ties with Iran will not go down well in most Western capitals. American diplomat Philip Gordon hinted as much on a recent visit to Ankara, saying there were “more points of disagreement than of agreement with Turkey.” Ankara’s “New Turks” wish to be friends with everyone, yet that may be impossible in a world where the enemy of my enemy is still my friend.
Finally there is the Turkish military, which has long seen itself as the guardian angel of Ataturk’s secular, pro-Western ideals and has a history of launching coup d’etats whenever it saw them threatened. It could do so again. Following the 2007 Ergenekon investigation, dozens of suspects, among them former generals, have been charged with attempting to bring down the government.
Regardless, no matter how events play out, one thing is certain: while long a spectator on the sideline, Turkey today is a regional player to be reckoned with.
PETER SPEETJENS is a Beirut-based journalist
