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Comment

Banks caught in Iranian propaganda war

by Maya Sioufi August 3, 2012
written by Maya Sioufi

"What else can go wrong?,” Lebanese bankers might ask these days as they flip through the news channels and jot down new additions to their “critical issues” list. When newscasts aren’t covering the civil war in neighboring Syria, commentators are wailing about volatile international markets and the European sovereign mess. What is more, record-low interest rates globally are limiting the range of investment options for Lebanon’s deposit-rich banks who are under intense international scrutiny, mainly spurred from Washington. Its all enough to keep a Lebanese bank manager up at night.

Tormenting their insomnia last month was the United States-based anti-Iranian lobby group, United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), which publicly accused Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank, and the country’s private banking sector of laundering massive amounts of cash for Hezbollah, Iran and Syria. “The LBS [Lebanese Banking System] is a fraud” and “the focal point of the fraudulent Lebanese banking centers on BDL,” were among UANI’s quotes in major international news outlets. As part of this campaign, UANI is pressuring Wall Street and European financial firms to divest of their holdings in Lebanese sovereign debt, requesting that credit rating agencies re-rate Lebanese debt to “no-rating,” and calling for Lebanon to be cut off from the US financial system, which would cripple the country’s highly dollarized economy. UANI is not inept either, having successfully lobbied the European Union to oblige Belgium’s Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (Swift) to remove blacklisted Iranian banks from its network and thus restrain their worldwide financial transfers.

UANI’s board just so happens to feature Zionist luminaries such as Meir Dagan, former director of Mossad until 2011, as well as James Woosley, former director of the US Central Intelligence Agency, August Hanning, former head of the German intelligence service, and Richard Dearlove, former head of the British MI6 intelligence service. Fancy that.

The evidence supporting UANI’s claim that “vast inflows of deposits” are being washed in Lebanese banks is scant, with the group’s conclusions extrapolated from tenuous correlations that would amount to libel in any American court. The actual deposit figures — calculated by BDL, Lebanon’s Ministry of Finance and concurrent with those of international institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund — paint a different picture. In 2011, deposits grew by just 8 percent, down from a 12 percent growth in 2010 and 23 percent in 2009, and for the first four months of this year, deposits grew by just 3 percent. In response to UANI’s allegation, BDL Governor Riad Salameh pointed out that Syrian deposits held by Lebanese banks operating in Syria or in Lebanon have actually decreased since the start of the uprising in 2011.

UANI also claims that, for Lebanon, “the obvious risk of default is great” unless Hezbollah, Iran and Syria are supporting the “economic house of cards.” Had these ‘intelligence’ chiefs bothered to pick up a copy of Executive from time-to-time, they would have known better. For starters, default is less likely now then it has been in a while, as Lebanon’s debt-to-gross domestic product ratio, while still staggeringly high at well over 130 percent, has actually dropped more than 30 percent in the last five years. More importantly, the vast majority of Lebanese sovereign debt is held by local banks and not international institutions, and thus UANI’s call for foreign divestment of Lebanese debt has more bark than bite. Lebanese banks have admittedly voiced concerns about continuing to fund the highly indebted nation but, lacking better investment opportunities in international markets, sovereign paper still looks attractive, as does keeping the government from default. And, whenever there has been any uncomfortable up-ticks in yields demanded by the market to purchase Lebanese debt, the central bank has stepped in instead and bought the debt at lower rates  — not Iran, Syria, nor any other state or non-state actor.

UANI’s indictments against Lebanon are baseless and its assessment of the country’s vulnerabilities flawed. It is unfortunate that these well-placed propagandists will likely never have to account for their deception, while Lebanon’s bankers are forced to defend their industry from yet another assault on its reputation. Given everything else they are dealing with these days, however, UANI is a speed bump rather than a roadblock, an annoyance amongst matters of actual substance.

MAYA SIOUFI is Executive's banking and finance editor

August 3, 2012 0 comments
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Syrian refugees leave schools struggling

by Nizar Ghanem August 3, 2012
written by Nizar Ghanem

Minister of Education Hassan Diab is probably not having easy days at the office. On top of the already decrepit state of public education, coupled with ongoing protests by teachers demanding higher wages and benefits, this year saw the student population grow by around 15,000 children, the majority of which lack proper shelter or families that can support them. We are of course not talking about the effects of a sudden baby boom, but rather the influx of Syrian students fleeing their alma maters for ours at a rate similar to the increase in violence.

Following various pressures by civil society organizations, Diab, presiding over thousands of employees, finally gave in. He issued a decree late last year instructing all schools operating within Lebanon to receive the incoming Syrian students regardless of their legal status and relieved the Syrian students of entrance fees. Problem solved?

If it were only about decrees, the Syrian students would have long been integrated in the Lebanese schools. With an enrollment rate estimated at 20 percent and a dropout rate approaching 30 percent (double the national average), the Syrian children are rare to be found in the Lebanese school system. Coming from a Baathist education, where Arabic is the main language of instruction, Syrian students in Lebanon face serious problems transitioning to curricula taught largely in French and English, not to mention the different teaching methods. The majority of students, nine years old and above, drop out of school because they cannot understand what is being spoken in class, and there has been no arrangement made between the Lebanese and Syrian governments to see that, if and when students return to Syria, they will be granted accreditation of equivalences.

While the minister’s decree requires schools to receive all Syrian students, many principals choose not to. For many in the border regions, the decree seems like a removed bureaucratic procedure that does not tackle the real problem. The Syrian students generally require intensive remedial classes, and/or a change in the curriculum that would account for their linguistic level in foreign languages — something public schools are not prepared to provide. Syrian students who attend higher classes are supposed to form complex phrase structures and read dense scientific passages in a language they can often only barely spell their name in. What’s more, in school Syrian students have been subjected to social isolation, discrimination and corporal punishment. With a teaching staff that was neither trained nor prepared to deal with this influx, the inevitable happens: Syrians drop out of school, or even worse, many do not even bother to enroll.

According to the decree, the principals should not charge Syrian students school fees as the ministry will reimburse them later. Knowing the state of affairs in the quasi-dysfunctional Lebanese government, the principals are unsurprisingly skeptical. Having to run their schools with tight budgets, they cannot afford delays in payment and so they do what any sane manager would: they cut their future losses by receiving a minimum number of Syrian students.

Other factors exacerbate the problem. With the majority of families suffering financially after leaving everything they had in Syria, many can barely afford a decent shelter, let alone education. Paying for transportation, stationery and other schooling requirements can exert a tremendous financial burden. The increasing insecurity in the North and Bekaa also adds to the feelings of uncertainty as families try to keep quiet and not take risks by sending their children to schools. It doesn’t help that Lebanon still refuses to classify incoming Syrians as refugees, or sign the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees that would protect them (and all the other refugees in the country).

Why should the Lebanese citizenry care? The overflowing problems of electricity and water cuts, inter-sectarian bickering, continuous political deadlocks and fear of a looming civil war seem to be sufficient reasons for them not to take notice of the implacable situation of Syrian refugees. However, as the Syrian influx to the country increases, the number of children between the ages of 12 and 18 is expected to grow. This age group is highly vulnerable to various social ailments such as child labor and militancy. Leaving thousands of desperate, poor and socially secluded teenagers on the streets does not seem a wise course of action.

 

NIZAR GHANEM is a policy consultant and researcher working with Syrian refugees in Lebanon and Turkey

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When resistance was simple

by Nicholas Blanford August 3, 2012
written by Nicholas Blanford

A few months ago, in a conversation with a Hezbollah official I said I could imagine Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the party’s leader, reminiscing about the good old days in the 1990s. Back then Hezbollah was engaged in resistance on a daily basis against the Israeli occupation, achieving ever greater feats on the battlefield, earning a consensus among Lebanese for its martial activities, and protected by Syria’s dominance of Lebanon. Other than a small but potent parliamentary presence, Hezbollah did not have to bother with the tangled and treacherous complexities of Lebanese politics but could concentrate on what it does best: resisting Israel.

But look at Hezbollah today, I continued. To defend its “resistance priority” it has had to build complicated alliances with potentially untrustworthy and difficult allies, and has become the dominant influence in an unpopular and near stagnant government; it faces growing Sunni resentment; it is in the crosshairs of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in The Netherlands; its key ally Syria is mired in civil war with the durability of the pan-regional “axis of resistance” hanging by a thread.

“You’re right,” replied the Hezbollah official. “This is not where we want to be. Our cause flies with the angels above, but we find ourselves stuck in the political arena.”

Hezbollah has never been more powerful politically and militarily, but with the power of governance comes accountability. And in the Shia villages of the south and in the southern suburbs of Beirut it is easy to hear voices of discontent and frustration from those people who traditionally support and vote for Hezbollah. The reason for their anger is the chronic shortage of electricity. Parts of Dahiyah and the south barely receive three hours of electricity per day.

Not only do they have to deal with the sweltering heat of summer without air conditioning, more importantly they cannot store food and dairy products in fridges. One night in July, residents of Dahiyah were sleeping in chairs on the streets to try to cool themselves and were mouthing curses at Hezbollah, declaring it had been a mistake to vote for them in the 2009 elections and vowing not to do so next year. Many hoped that Nasrallah would tackle the electricity crisis in his July 18 speech and were dismayed when the Hezbollah chief made no mention of it.

Of course, the electricity crisis did not begin with the present government. But the perception is that the “Hezbollah  government” has failed to deliver and it is the party’s support base that is suffering the most.

Such is the paradox facing Hezbollah three decades after it emerged in the wake of Israel’s 1982 invasion. It is a mistake to assume that Hezbollah has always sought power in Lebanon for the sake of power. The party is essentially a jihadist Islamist organization dedicated to the struggle against Israel. In its earliest manifestation it railed against Lebanon’s sectarian political system and refused to participate in it. During the 1990s, it was content to limit its participation in the political system to parliament, neither asking nor being offered seats in the Rafik Hariri and Salim Hoss governments of that decade.

The first time Hezbollah took the step of joining government was in 2005 and it did so to better protect its resistance priority, after the loss of Syrian protection following the disengagement of Damascus in the wake of the assassination of Rafik Hariri.

The goal of defending its arms also compelled it to organize a parliamentary no-confidence motion against Saad Hariri’s government, chiefly because of its refusal to renounce the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Bringing down the Hariri government was relatively easy, but it was also a case of “you break it, you own it”. When the March 14 (now) opposition coalition refused to join a government of national unity under Prime Minister Najib Mikati, it meant that the cabinet was going to be dominated by Hezbollah and its allies, ergo the “Hezbollah government”.

Now Hezbollah finds itself diverting much of its energy to mollify and appease its numerous allies, especially the truculent Michel Aoun and the crafty Nabih Berri, neither of whom it particularly trusts but both of whom it needs in order to preserve the integrity of the government. But when the government fails to perform, regardless of the reason, Hezbollah is the one that will be blamed.

How Nasrallah must fondly reminisce of the golden years in the 1990s when life — and resistance — was so much simpler.

 

NICHOLAS BLANFORD is the Beirut-based correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor and the Times of London

August 3, 2012 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Vice: regulating Lebanon’s darker side

by Zak Brophy August 3, 2012
written by Zak Brophy

It is time to have a serious debate about the thriving industries of prostitution, gambling, weapons and drugs in Lebanon — that is the opinion of Lebanon’s straight talking Minister of Tourism, Fadi Abboud. In an interview with Executive in April the minister assailed the poor regulation, outdated laws and hypocritical divergence between policy and practice relating to these economies of vice. What is more, Abboud has his eye on the bottom line, smells a fast buck and wants the government to have a piece, or at least a bigger piece, of the action.

In this report Executive investigates the murkier corners of Lebanon’s economy from the hashish fields of the northern Bekaa valley to the strip clubs on the Jounieh highway to find out who is cashing in, who is covering whose back and who would be the winners and the losers in a shake up of the status quo.

Guns for all

It may be widely accepted that Lebanon is awash with arms but in reality nobody has a clue about who has what. This is hardly surprising considering the country’s protracted years of warfare, weak government and plethora of sectarian militia leaders-cum-politicians now running the show. The regulation and monitoring of the industry are laughable, and Abboud wants to shake up the system, both to bring clarity to the situation and to rake in some dollars for the state’s coffers.

“Nowadays we expect there are no less than 3 million light arms and small weapons in the country — everyone has arms here,” estimates Fadi Abi Allam, president of the Permanent Peace Movement, a non-governmental organization that works on disarmament. “This is a huge problem and there is the problem of arms trading through Lebanon.”

There is a native stock of weaponry in the country, much of which is a remnant from the civil war as the militias’ agreement to disarm in 1989 resulted in most of the small and medium sized weapons disappearing into the homes and under the beds.

What is more, Lebanon’s porous borders and fragile security have facilitated the country becoming a conduit for smuggling and trade in combat weapons to and from neighboring Syria. And yet while a discussion on the weaponry within Lebanon could not be complete without acknowledging the huge yet clandestine arsenal of Hezbollah, Abi Allam says, “We can see different districts of security made by different political leaders. The issue is not just that Hezbollah has arms. Of course Hezbollah has kinds of arms that the others don’t, but all Lebanese groups have arms to some extent.” 

What’s on the books?

The law is quite clear on the issue of arms in Lebanon, but its application and the processes of regulation are not. The decree that deals with arms and ammunition from June 12, 1959, amended in 1999, classifies arms into different categories and makes it illegal for anyone to deal in arms unless they have permission from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. Law 220 from May 1993 further stipulates the need to have a license to carry a hunting rifle, and under Article 3 of the law; if you have any kind of gun without a license you can be sentenced from six months to three years in prison and subject to a fine.

Arms are categorized into five categories in Lebanon and those permitted for hunting are all in the fifth bracket. “We can sell hunting guns to everybody but once they are bought from us they need to get a license or the police might catch them, confiscate the weapon and arrest them,” says Joseph Abi Saab, importer and exporter of arms and owner of Brescia Middle East hunting store in Jounieh.

Licenses range in price, with a single barrel costing some LL50,000 ($33), a double barrel LL100,000 ($66) and a semi automatic LL200,000 ($132). The state further benefits in this trade with each importer having to pay a license fee worth 1.5 percent of the import value, 5 percent customs duties on all imports and then importers and traders pay the same income and corporation taxes as any other business. Imports in arms and ammunition amounted to $28 million in 2011, which once import licenses, customs duties, VAT and corporation tax have been factored in amounts to a tidy little earner for the government.

The real money maker

However, it is the trade of weapons in categories one to four, meaning combat weapons, which is on Abboud’s radar. In theory, only the government, more precisely the Ministry of Defense, can import such weapons and even the trader who organizes the shipments never gets to see the weapons — he just works as the middleman and takes his commission while the army collects the goods.

There is, however, an inherent contradiction in the regulation of combat weapons, where people can be officially sanctioned to own firearms that could only have come from the black market. Basically, the Ministry of Defense offers licenses to owners of combat weapons — which must have been bought or imported illegally — without wanting to know how they were obtained or where they came from.

What is more, the licenses are often issued as mukhtalif, Arabic for ‘varied’, meaning that there is no specific gun type or number attached to the license, so the holder is permitted to handle any personal combat weapon from a handgun to an M16. A money exchanger, who has a license and spoke on condition of anonymity, said, “If you are an individual who is part of a political party or movement then you can easily get a license that says mukhtalif so you can own any kind of weapon… It completely depends on your connections. If you don’t have connections you don’t get a license.”

Despite numerous requests from Executive, the Ministry of Defense did not respond to requests for comment on the number of licenses issued, the registration process, the amount of money it makes from it, or the customs it pays on the weapons it imports.

Yet clearly, the supply of combat weapons is fed by a thriving black market that is much larger than the legitimate one.

“Lebanon is like a supermarket for weapons, I can get anything, anytime,” says Rifaat Ali Eid, leader of the Arab Democratic Party in the Jabal Mohsen neighborhood of Tripoli, whose militia regularly makes headlines on account of its armed clashes with the residents of Bab el Tabbeneh.

It is this supermarket of arms that Abboud wants to regulate and skim off the top of.

“We could put a license fee of 500,000LL ($330) every year for each gun and we could tax the purchase 200 percent. Today a Kalashnikov whose real price is $450 is selling for $2,500; why don’t we take this money, regulate the market and then we will know that every gun that is not registered is illegal.”

Just as the system of licensing combat weapons is maintained through a series of patronage networks linked to the political and military establishments, so too is the black market trade in arms. “Of course these traders are protected. No one can do this dangerous work without cover from people in power,” says legal importer Abi Saab. “If you are trading in combat weapons and the secret police catch you, and you are not backed up, then no one knows what could happen to you. They are all supported by politicians.”

For Abboud’s vision of Lebanon becoming a regulated and taxed trade hub for combat weapons to become a reality, he would have to find a way around those people in power who are profiteering from the status quo. Perhaps that explains why there is so much inertia against change.

“The government is not cooperative on this issue and they don’t have the intention to control this issue,” says Abi Allam. “The parliament has a lot of work in order to do something practical, but they are not doing anything at all.”   

Thank you Ma’am

Prostitution is illegal in Lebanon — well, on paper at least. The reality, however, is muddled by legal ambiguities and somewhat conflicting policies. The bottom line is that prostitution is rife and from the ghetto street corner to the 5-star penthouse suite women are selling their bodies. The price tag varies anywhere between $10 to $5,000, as surely, sex knows no class distinction.

Abboud harks back to the ‘heydays’ when prostitution was legal in Lebanon and the bordello was an acknowledged and legalized institution. He advocates a return to a similar system by bringing prostitution out of the dark and back into the open. The rationale he proffers is based on both concerns for the women involved and stone-cold profiteering. He argues that legalizing and regulating the ‘world’s oldest profession’ would offer increased protection and rights to the women, and at the same time, “could make $10 million a year or more for Lebanon.”

On February 6, 1931, while Lebanon was still being conceived, prostitution was legally acknowledged as a profession. This was only allowed in registered bordellos, which were regulated by the state and had to follow strict guidelines. The system persisted into the civil war by which time the majority of the bordellos were in downtown Beirut, where fighters would converge to forgo their internecine bloodletting and satisfy their sexual desires.

However, while this law has never been cancelled, prostitution within bordellos has become a thing of the past. “In Lebanon if you want to delete a law you need to issue another one but in this case that did not happen. They just stopped applying it,” explains Hiba Abou Chacra, social worker in the rehabilitation and reintegration center at the non-governmental organization Dar Al Amal. “Now prostitution is illegal in the eyes of the law, there is nothing known as legitimate prostitution.”

The end of the bordello certainly did not mean the end of prostitution, but rather what has come to exist is essentially the continuation of the trade within two sectors: The regulated and unregulated. Super nightclubs, certain licensed bars and massage parlors are not for prostitution per se, but in the vast majority of cases are involved in the sex trade in one way or another and are regulated and monitored by the state. On the other hand, to some extent, there are women working in street prostitution, illegal brothels, or those who are on call from certain phone numbers for ‘home delivery’, and this is all unregulated and unlicensed.

Quantifying the number of people involved in illicit industries is never an exact science, but, “It has been estimated that there are tens of thousands women in prostitution,” says Ghada Jabbour, head of the exploitation and trafficking in women unit at the women’s rights NGO Kafa. “There are around 6,000 to 7,000 ‘artists’ working in the country in the super nightclubs. It is incredibly difficult to know how many women are involved in street prostitution, apartment brothels, internet prostitution, massage parlors and so on.” Lebanon’s super nightclubs employ foreign women who enter the country on an ‘Artist’ visa system that permits them entry to the country for three months at a time.

Lt Colonel Elie Al Asmar leads a department of around 25 men within the Internal Security Forces (ISF) that deals with prostitution in Lebanon, and he takes exception to the suggestion that prostitution is in any way regulated in Lebanon: “Prostitution is not regulated. There is no regulated prostitution in Lebanon,” he says. “All prostitution is clandestine. There is no prostitution allowed.”

Yet while this may be true to the letter of the law it is not really true to the spirit of the law.  Ostensibly the super nightclubs are not in any way involved in prostitution but there is a ritual that everyone from the customer to the girls to the law enforcement officer knows all too well.

As the manager at a super night club in Jounieh told Executive, “It’s very simple, you come and choose a girl to sit with, you buy a bottle of champagne from us for $70, and the next day you take her and have sex with her. Of course you will pay her for that around $100 to $150. What more is there to say?”

The women are tightly controlled and regulated by rules, strictly enforced by the General Security, which confines them to the super nightclub or their hotel for the majority of the time. However, from 1pm to 8pm every day they are given ‘free time’ and it is in these few hours that the women can leave and go meet the customer to complete the deal that was sealed the night before with the bottle of champagne.

While the super nightclubs and authorities may wipe their hands of any responsibility once the women are out of the premises, the ceremony is well known and in practice amounts to a kind of regulated prostitution. “There is a two-faceted policy adopted by the authorities,” says Kafa’s Jabbour. “On one hand, the authorities say prostitution is banned in this country but then they are involved in regulating it. Everything goes through them. In practice it is kind of legalized without any legal text.”

Furthermore, the most recent United States State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report from last year stated that, “In 2010 5,595 women entered Lebanon on the Artiste three-month visa system, which serves to sustain a significant sex trade and enables forced prostitution through such acts as withholding passports and restriction on movement.”

The security forces keep close tabs on these activities but it is much harder to monitor the unregulated sector, in which nearly all Lebanese prostitutes work. A concierge at one of Beirut’s most prestigious hotels, speaking on condition of anonymity, tells of parties where groups of men would bring 30 to 40 prostitutes, all of whom would receive hundreds of dollars each. Serving the big spenders within the hotel affords the worker an inside track on their more illicit activities. He claims there are a number of pimps who service the super rich enjoying the seedier side of Lebanon’s reputation as the party capital of the Middle East. “People pay up to $5,000 a night for a prostitute,” he says.

While this kind of prostitution is prevalent in Lebanon it is not easy to police. General Michel Shakkour, ex-head of the ISF General Crime Directory, reasons, “Can you imagine me sending my people to the lobby of the Phoenicia or the Metropolitan and checking all the girls entering and leaving? It would not be possible. We are a touristic country.”

Legalizing love-for-sale

And here in lies the crux of the Abboud’s argument. Lebanon is highly dependent on the tourists’ dollar, which is estimated to constitute anywhere from a fifth to a third of the economy, and the prevalence and ease of access to prostitution is undoubtedly a draw for many cash-flashing men seeking illicit thrills. The minister argues in true profiteering style, “We are being pushed out of the market by other countries in the region already like the UAE [United Arab Emirates].”

Adding a humane veneer to his business logic Abboud reasons that proper regulation would end the “slave-like” conditions of the ‘artists’, while offering greater protection and ensuring healthier environments for all women in the sex industry. Abou Chacra from Dar al Amal may take exception to Abboud framing his reasoning in terms of financial gain, but acknowledges, “We imagine that the organization of this work within a legal framework may bring positive results. The current system is chaotic and unclear so it exposes the women to a number of dangers such as violence, exploitation and health problems.”

However Kafa’s Jabbour is unconvinced by the argument that legalizing prostitution offers greater protection and safety to women, and posits that legalizing the prostitution industry will provide a safe haven to pimps, human traffickers and others who profit from buying and selling women. She backs up her argument by pointing to evidence, which shows that legalizing prostitution in the Netherlands did not eradicate trafficking and exploitation of women, or eliminate underground prostitution. She espouses decriminalizing the women but criminalizing the industry, which would mean targeting the pimps, traffickers and clients, a policy that has shown some success in Sweden.

While Jabbour and Abou Chacra may differ regarding decriminalizing prostitution, they are both ardently against using it to promote tourism.

“What do we want to say? That we are a country where women can be bought and sold just to make some quick money,” asks Jabbour rhetorically. The temptation does seem to exist, however, to turn the state into the biggest pimp of them all.

Hashing it out

It was during the 1980s, with Lebanon verging on a failed state rife with war, kidnappings and chaos, that “Lebanese Blond” and “Red Leb” earned international notoriety. No, these were not references to the country’s beautiful fair haired ladies, but to varieties of hashish produced in the fertile Bekaa Valley and exported to international markets.

As the civil war drew to a close with the signing of the Taif accords in 1989, American authorities pressured both the Lebanese and Syrians to clamp down on the Bekaa’s hashish and heroin industries. Production subsequently plummeted, but in the not so hidden corners of the northern Bekaa farmers have continued to grow the marijuana plants (botanically referred to as ‘cannabis’) from which the resin is extracted to produce hashish. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s 2011 World Drug Report, Lebanon is “increasingly reported as a source of cannabis resin [hashish],” and is identified within the top five producers in global markets.

A combination of officials being paid to look away, politicians trying to secure their voting base and farmers willing to run the risk of having their crop eradicated to secure up to 10 times more revenue than they could from growing vegetables, means the state has failed to stamp out this illegal trade. Again, Minister Abboud suggests that perhaps it is time to face up to reality, accept this economy of vice and look into growing the crop for alternative uses such as medicinal byproducts.

Every year farmers in the impoverished northern Bekaa grow plots of marijuana plants with the knowledge that their crop may be uprooted and burnt. They continue to do so quite simply because if they manage to give the authorities the slip then the returns are so handsome then it will have been worth the gamble. Indeed, as Executive went to print clashes were erupting in the Bekaa between ISF soldiers and hashish farmers as the annual show down of crop eradication began.

“You are comparing gold and lead here,” says Dominique Choueiter, industrial hemp project coordinator at the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), when comparing hashish and normal produce.

Fields of green

As the wide flat plain of the northern Bekaa lifts up to hug the lower eastern slopes of the Mount Lebanon range, a farmer nicknamed Abou Elie runs his fingers through the potent smelling leaves of his cannabis bushes that are only a couple of months away from budding. The hot dry days and cold crisp nights are perfect for maximizing the content of the mind altering chemical in the plants, Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).

“I hedge my bets with what I grow,” he says. “If the market fails for my fruits and vegetables then I can compensate with hash or tobacco. On the flip side if the government comes and destroys my crop of hashish then I would sink if I don’t continue growing the potatoes, onions, carrots, garlic and so on.” Abou Elie is growing 10 dunums (10,000 square meters) of marijuana plants and if all goes well he should bring in about $12,000 gross, or $10,000 net, in profits this year. That is without irrigation, whereas farmers who irrigate can expect around $30,000 to $50,000 for the same sized plot, according to the ISF sources. Abou Elie calculates that if his crop survives, in a worst case scenario, his profits will be three times better than from alternative produce, but will most likely be “much, much more.”  The divergence in returns varies greatly year-to-year as fruit and vegetable markets are notoriously volatile in the face of global fluctuations. Furthermore, this year the Syrian crisis has put an extra squeeze on the markets of agricultural farmers, who are thus pinning even greater hopes on their hashish crops. A crude calculation of the value of the Lebanese hashish industry can be worked out from the eradication of 35,000 dunums last year. The UNDP’s Choueiter says few farmers escaped the cull, and if we assume half was irrigated and half was non-irrigated then that amounts to $87.5 million at the wholesale price between trader and farmer. This would increaseat least 10-fold in value by the time it gets to the street, amounting to $875 million. That’s no small fry.

In mid-July, Colonel Adel Mashmoushi, the man at the ISF charged with policing drugs in Lebanon, told Executive he believed the families and tribes controlling the hashish trade in the Northern Bekaa were preparing to ambush them. He was not mistaken. Within the week his men were under attack from gun and mortar fire. The eradication program is no easy pickings and takes about 1,000 ISF men, with the support of the army, two months to complete and Choueiter calculates that the cost to the ISF in 2011 was about LL500 million ($331,674).

Colonel Mashmoushi’s job is not only hindered by the lawlessness in the areas he has to work in, but also the complicity of elements from within the security forces and political establishment.

“There are officials and officers who profit handsomely from this,” explains Abou Elie. “Everyone involved has a partner among the authorities. They all take their cut at every step of the game. We will have to pay half of what we earn. If you pay you are fine, and if you don’t then they will simply arrest you.”

Colonel Mashmoushi is dependent on the intelligence from forces in the field, and sent around a memo in the weeks leading up to the eradication requesting tip-offs about where the cannabis crops were. Asked whether corruption and bribery could be squandering his efforts he replies, “In the ISF we are from the population, with relations to the people, and of course sometimes people take bribes, but this is not common. We have our morality and punish severely anyone caught doing this.” Statistics on investigations into corruption and bribery within the ISF are deemed “too sensitive” to be made public, according to Mashmoushi.

Society in the northern Bekaa is woven with tribal affiliations, and securing the loyalty of the families producing hashish can be a determining factor for the political parties in keeping large extended kin networks of voters on board. For the ISF teams being sent to uproot the marijuana plantations, a lack of political support on the ground makes the job a hell of a lot harder to execute. “I need support from all of the population and political cover but sometimes they need the votes, which means they won’t take the same position as me,” gripes Colonel Mashmoushi. Abou Elie goes a step further and claims that many of the local political parties are getting fat off the hashish trade by direct involvement. “Of course the parties make a lot of money off this — it is all about politics and the parties,” he says. “Everyone here belongs to parties. You don’t take your own decisions. If the party says yes, then it’s a yes, if the party says no then it’s a no.”

Few alternative crops

In such an environment it is little wonder the farmers continue to produce hashish. A 2007 report by the UNDP concluded that, “farmers will likely continue to cultivate illicit cannabis, and there is a danger of a return to illicit opium cultivation, unless appropriate measures and/or meaningful development alternatives are made available.”

Despite the fact several studies have illustrated therapeutic affects related to THC consumption, there is not a sufficient market in manufactured medicines that could substantiate legitimate exportation of cannabis grown in Lebanon, according to the UNDP. Another alternative is growing industrial hemp plants, which are varieties of the cannabis plant that contain less that 1 percent THC — compared to the normal 20 percent or higher found in marijuana plants — and thus are useless as narcotics. Once processed, hemp is among the strongest natural fibers in the world, while the plants also produce an oil whose many uses vary from fuel to medicine, and most importantly hemp has a growing international market. However, Choueiter’s study found that while hemp could provide an alternative for the hashish farmers, such a program would need strong government support in terms of implementation, policing and, at least initially, subsidies.

The reality is that there simply is not the will among the politicians or the strength and support within the security apparatus to bring this to fruition. The annual game of cat and mouse between the ISF and the hashish merchants will continue as politicians and policemen continue to fatten their wallets from the sidelines.

Raising the stakes

The Casino Du Liban (CDL) has for many a year been synonymous with the Lebanese high life, as dignitaries, VIPs and stars of the silver screen have graced its gaming tables. Ensconced on the near vertical slopes overlooking the Jounieh Bay, Lebanon’s betting hub is partly owned by the state and enjoys a legal monopoly on nearly all kinds of gambling within Lebanon. However, corruption and patronage maintain an illicit gambling economy outside the confines of the CDL from which the government is not getting its cut. In the eyes of Minister Abboud, it is time to open up the playing field and bring some diversity to the table.

Every night, officials from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) survey the floor of the casino and as the final chips are cashed they take a flat rate of 40 percent of all earnings. Last year alone the state profited LL168 billion ($112 million) from the dashed hopes of gamblers at the CDL. The government owns its stake in the casino through an investment body called Intra Investment in which the Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank, owns 38 percent of the shares. Intra Investment is the majority stakeholder in the CDL with 52.32 percent, while the Abela Tourism Development Company owns 14 percent and the remainder is held by unlisted ‘private investors’.

The legal hegemony afforded to the casino dates back to decree 6919 from June 29, 1995, which granted the CDL a monopoly for 30 years. This law essentially annulled the gambling law from 1959 that had previously applied to the sector. The annexes of the 1995 decree strictly outline the vast majority of gaming activities that are confined to the CDL while other gaming activities may be permitted elsewhere, but only with the appropriate permission.

“You even need permission for pin ball machines,” says lawyer Wassim Mansouri. “Poker machines? You need permission for that. You even need a license for playing cards without money.”

Despite this there are a plethora of gaming centers in Lebanon, whose bright lights and promise of a “gambling paradise” are more often than not filled with rows of slot machines and despondent characters tapping away in silence in the vain hope that their chips will come in. Glamorous this is not.

The licensing and monitoring of these machines is littered with ambiguities and contradictions. According to a spokesperson at the Ministry of Finance, an annual license fee of LL1 million ($666.67) is collected for each poker machine, but this flies in the face of a 2008 agreement between the CDL and the MoF that all poker machines in Lebanon must be on the premises of the CDL. In its July 11 meeting the cabinet called on the Ministry of the Interior and the municipalities to clamp down on all gambling establishments operating outside of their licenses, and yet the MoF continues to collect the license fees.

With such inconsistencies between the authorities it is perhaps not surprising that the rules are bent and bastardized as standard practice. Khalil, a young man who manages the front house for one of the gaming centers on the Jounieh highway, claims illegal machines are imported, illicit poker nights are held, licensing hours are routinely flouted and machines are tampered with to charge higher playing fees. This is all possible because, “The police know the story, if you pay you can do whatever you want, but not in public.”

Colonel Ali Sheri is in charge of the department in the ISF responsible for policing gambling, and he denies corruption is a major problem but concedes that gambling violations are not a priority in the eyes of many of those applying the law. “You are happy if you catch people breaking the law but then the judge will say ‘what is this?’ and then let him go,” says Sheri. “The punishment needs to be stronger in terms of arrests and fines and closing places down.”

In addition to the abundance of small gaming centers routinely flouting their licenses, there are poker clubs that sprout up for a month of two, in which time they harvest their profits before shutting down and relocating. “Of course they have cover from political people and if they can stay open for several months then it is worth their while,” complains Lara Hafez, marketing manager at the CDL. As for the more well-heeled and well-connected high rollers that want to escape the regulations of the CDL and the taxes of the MoF, poker parties are organized in private homes, which almost always stay aloft from the meddling ways of the ISF.

Colonel Ali Sheri retells a recent bust, on a tip off from the CDL, in which he raided a large private villa in the mountains that was surrounded by top-of-the-range cars and filled with a banquet hall and a series of poker tables. “Of course there are important figures at such events and this makes things very difficult for us,” he says. “If they have lots of money and power what can we do?”

Abboud would like to open the market, regulate these clandestine gambling activities and allow Lebanon to become a gambling destination to rival its regional competitor; Turkish Controlled Northern Cyprus. However, the CDL’s monopoly has 12 years left to run and considering the fact it is part owned by the BDL and heavily taxed by the MoF, it is a long shot to imagine that a new law will be passed to overrule the 1995 decree.

The CDL’s Hafez was at best elusive when asked if there may be a conflict of interest with the government holding a major stake in the casino. “The management may have political connections, but they are not answerable to politicians and act independently,” she says. Back in 2006 Riad Salameh raised the idea of selling the bank’s shares in the CDL but that suggestion quickly slipped off the table and according to Hafez, “It does not seem to be an option for the time being.” 

What’s more, Abboud lambastes the CDL for not expanding its activities, opening new branches or reaching out to wider segments of the market. However, at the casino Hafez counters that they are confined by the law to their current location, but have plans for expansion on site, although details were patchy as “plans are still under review.”

The cozy set up between the casino, the bank and the politicians looks set to stay regardless of Abboud’s gripes. For the coming 12 years at least the challenge, including for Abboud’s tourism police, is simply to implement the law as is.

The profits of vice

Lebanon’s economies of vice are thriving. Weak security, rampant corruption and rackets within the corridors of power are making sure of that. It would appear protecting mini-fiefdoms is much easier than actually formulating, implementing and enforcing coherent national strategies or legislation that addresses reality.

When assessing how to tackle these problems the answers are rarely black and white. But that is exactly why the country is in such dire need of a straight-up debate about these issues that are so flippantly swept under the carpet. Minister Abboud is certainly right about that much at least.

August 3, 2012 0 comments
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Opportunity in crisis

by Yasser Akkaoui August 3, 2012
written by Yasser Akkaoui
The fruit of opportunity is rotting on the branch in the fertile Bekaa Valley, literally. The Syrian civil war has effectively closed the border to trucks carrying exports of Lebanese fruit and vegetables to markets in neighboring countries and beyond. 
 
Now imagine — and this will take some effort — a government responsive to crisis, innovative in plotting solutions and effective in carrying them out. There is the military airport at Rayak in the middle of the Bekaa; why not schedule flights — through the state-owned Middle East Airlines or mobilize Lebanon’s fleet of private jets sitting — to fly shipments of Bekaa-grown produce to Gulf markets for Ramadan? While it would be a form of subsidy and a short-term fix, it would maintain the continuity of supply chains, help farmers and communities over the hump of this current crisis, and generate massive kudos for the Lebanese state — there is no better way to build a cohesive nation than to create a sense in people that their government is looking out for them.
 
With tourism in decline, the economy stalling and the region in crisis, it is incumbent upon our so-called leaders to use the resources at their disposal to come up with these sorts of innovative solutions to steer the country into the clear. Or tap the entrepreneurial spirit of Lebanon’s private sector to develop creative detours around the country’s economic impasses.
 
Crisis is a time of opportunity — if only our leaders could lead. 
August 3, 2012 0 comments
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Finance

Getting off the ground

by Maya Sioufi August 3, 2012
written by Maya Sioufi

The ingredients for creating a successful technology hub in Lebanon are on the table: ambitious entrepreneurs, power hungry venture capitalists and enthusiastic accelerators and incubators. Along with this growing ecosystem, there are increasing opportunities to invest in startups and when opportunities arise, money usually follows.

In previous years, there were essentially two cards to play to fund a business in Lebanon: ask family and friends (the most commonly played card), or apply for a loan with Kafalat, the government-sponsored entity that helps provide small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with commercial bank funding by acting as a guarantor. The straight loan-from-a-bank card was, and still is, absent from the deck. “The environment is risky and startups are even riskier,” says Ibrahim Salibi, head of commercial and corporate banking at Bank Audi. “It might not be the right timing today [for banks] to finance startups.” 

 
So far, banks have predominantly provided funds to new businesses through their corporate social responsibility departments — by launching competitions for instance — and through providing Kafalat loans, with a total of $165 million in loans extended last year and another $71 million in the first six months of this year.  “I call Kafalat the Lebanese miracle,” says Walid Hanna, chief executive of Middle East Venture Partners (MEVP). “They are credited to having started and funded thousands of companies in Lebanon and created tens of thousands of jobs.” Guaranteeing at least 75 percent of the payment, Kafalat allows banks to confidently lend to entrepreneurs but those loans are not extended to all sectors; they cover the industry, agriculture, tourism, traditional crafts and high technology sectors, leaving some startups without access to these loans.
 
While stressing the “fantastic value” of the Kafalat program, Habib Haddad, chief executive of Wamda, a regional platform for entrepreneurs, does not recommend taking on such a loan at an early stage as he believes “the earlier the stage of the startup, the more value added it needs beyond cash in the form of mentorship, contacts, helping in hiring and in negotiating with clients etcetera. All this comes from venture capitalists.”

The ventures of capital
Venture capitalists (VCs) are a more recent card added to the funding deck. While only a handful of VCs are active in the local market, the increasing awareness of the value added provided by these experienced backers, combined with the growing need for capital, is making this avenue of financing one that is gaining more and more importance. Many banks are also supporting VC players by investing in their funds.

“The general attitude of local banks is ‘let someone else get the process right’, as the industry has not been streamlined yet. It will take some time and once we start to see real genuine long-term businesses, we will allocate resources to it; this a testing period,” says Khaled Zeidan, who wears both the hat of a banker as general manager of MedSecurities, a BankMed subsidiary, and of a venture capitalist as chairman of one of MEVP’s two funds.

Berytech Fund, MEVP, Cedrus Ventures and more recently Wamda are all looking to invest in early stage startups. Accelerator Seeqnce has also jumped on the bandwagon through a different proposal: a competition in which anyone with an idea within the tech space can apply and the founding members will eventually create eight startups — each receiving $100,000 of which $38,000 is in cash and the rest in services — in exchange for a 30 percent equity in their newly founded startup.

Lack of upstream support 
Fadi Bizri, one of the founders of Seeqnce, said the idea to start this competition came because of the lack of upstream support for start-ups in Lebanon. Entrepreneurs at an early stage often struggle to find enough support — regarding things such as developing a business plan or finding missing talent in the team — to turn their ideas into viable businesses that would eventually become interesting investment opportunities.

Hanna believes that what is missing within the ecosystem is “more of the like of Seeqnce and Berytech”, providers of upstream support for early stage entrepreneurs. Michel Nehme of Cedrus Ventures agrees on this shortfall and believes that all venture capitalists should provide a “shove” to entrepreneurs through mentorship on a voluntary basis.

Targeting that lack of upstream support, Ideaz Factory has made a call for business ideas from Lebanese between the age of 16 and 30, to be submitted to a high profile jury made up of established entrepreneurs who will select eight ideas and help develop them into viable businesses. The whole process, which ends with the selection of a winner, will be broadcast on national television from mid-September and provide an opportunity for the public to invest in the ideas too. Many believe the lack of upstream support curtails the development of quality start-ups and investment opportunities. Zeidan notes, “There are very few quality companies and quality entrepreneurs in Lebanon.” Hanna concurs, saying “there are only one or two crème de la crème start ups in Lebanon."

Collaboration vs. competition

With only a few quality startups to pick from, one might think there would be tight competition between VCs to scoop up the best pickings, but, running small funds — no larger than $15 million in size — they are actually more likely to cooperate and share the meals. For instance, Berytech’s fund and MEVP invested together this year in Wixel Studios, a provider of gaming applications, for an undisclosed amount. Hanna says that VCs go “clubbing together” and share investment ideas.

A celebration for innovation
Large scale competitions, networking activities, opportunities to meet investors, chances to add talent to a team — these are some examples of the activities organized by Global Entrepreneurship Week (GEW), a worldwide event, launched in 2008 and held annually in November. Starting initially with 37 countries, GEW now takes place in 115 countries, including Lebanon. With more than 24,000 partner organizations on board, GEW aims to honor innovators and helping startups reach their full potential through organizing more than 37,000 activities globally. This year GEW is being held between November 12 and 18, and eight countries from the Middle East will be participating: Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Lebanon will be hosting its fourth GEW and the number of participating partners has more than doubled in just one year, from 27 in 2011 up to 59 this year. Incubators, venture capital firms, governmental and non-governmental organizations are all hopping on the bandwagon. 45 activities were organized during the week last year and more than double are expected this year with several partners organizing joint events. Expect a lot of noise both online and offline in the build up of these activities.

Cooperation can spoil the meal though, as hungry VCs can turn into “vulture capitalists” by taking control of the venture from the entrepreneurs. “Asshole VCs that team up together can come up with very harsh terms,” complains Haddad. Bizri adds that “a lot of entrepreneurs know very little about raising funds, don’t know what their options are and they get massively ripped off by people.”

Infrastructure issues

The workshop, however, for building any sort of hub for innovation in Lebanon is lacking some tools, among them proper Internet and telecommunication connections, online payments facilitated by local banks and talent mobility, to name a few.

“If you want to use Lebanon as a test bed for your e-commerce company it is very tough to do that,” says Haddad of Wamda. Stephane Abi Chaker, head of investment banking at Blom Bank also notes that, “information technology (IT) infrastructure is much more important than financing for technology and telecommunication start-ups.”

Talent mobility is another issue. “In the United States, a country of 300 million people, there is lack of talent as Google and Facebook hire from all over world,” says Haddad. “So in a country of four million people, of course there is a lack of talent and we need to open up to allow that talent to come in.” He points to Jordan’s more advanced web space and to companies such as Maktoob Yahoo as sources of potential talent.

In the end, however, “If you are a real entrepreneur, nothing will stop you,” says Nehme of Cedrus Ventures. Financing issues seem to be less of a challenge, as most of the players of the ecosystem tend to agree that when there is a good deal, there is the money. Getting more of the deals “investment ready” seems to be the key obstacle for now. “Entrepreneurs in Lebanon are not mature enough and not trained well enough to become investment ready but once they are investment ready, they could find money” adds Hanna.

August 3, 2012 0 comments
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Finance

Mena stock tips, August 2012

by Executive Staff August 3, 2012
written by Executive Staff

Last month new banking scandals came to the forefront. JP Morgan announced  first-half trading losses of $5.8 billion amidst intensifying fraud investigations, while Barclays was engulfed in a rigging scandal regarding the London Interbank Offered Rate, which saw heads roll — including that of CEO Bob Diamond — with investigations potentially expanding to nearly two dozen banks. The European sovereign debt crisis is still heated, with Spain approving yet another austerity package — its fourth in seven months — and receiving a 100 billion euro bank bailout. For investment recommendations, Executive sits again with Khaled Zeidan, general manager of MedSecurities, a BankMed subsidiary and Ammar Bakheet, head of asset management at Bank Audi.   

Khaled Zeidan

General market thoughts? Zeidan is somewhat bullish and expects stock indices to end the year on a positive note. “Maybe up between 9 to 12 percent but in the meantime it could be choppy,” he says. He believes that there will be further stimulus from the United States because “the economy needs this.” He would avoid investing in Europe as he believes that we have not seen the worst yet. “I think there is no political will today to resolve this issue,” he adds.

Favorite asset classes? Last September, Zeidan recommended investing in both equities and bonds and now he recommends keeping a balance between asset classes with a slight preference for equities over bonds. With risk premiums up and with a positive correlation between the two asset classes, choosing one asset over another becomes “sort of insignificant” according to Zeidan. The only asset class which remains unhurt is cash but its “problem is that it is experiencing slow death which you don’t see; it’s like aging. You don’t feel it; then you see a friend you haven’t seen for 10 years and you realize that this is how they probably view me; that’s the problem with cash.”

Thoughts on the MENA region? His view on the region’s top markets  have not changed from last September as he still likes Saudi Arabia and Turkey, but he is also adding Egypt now as he expects the markets in this country to recover as “ultimately the Muslim Brotherhood are red-blooded capitalists. One of the main figures is Khairat al-Shater, one of the wealthiest men in Egypt.” Another MENA market he finds interesting is Iraq and he wouldn’t be surprised to see an “astounding performance” once the proper structure for equity markets is in place. 

Thoughts on Lebanese securities? He would only buy Solidere as he believes it is cheap and undervalued (to keep everything above board, it should be noted here that BankMed is one of Solidere’s largest shareholders). Once there is a resolution in Syria, “Solidere will be limit up [limit on the shareprice] for three to four days. You need to be willing to make that bet and I think its reasonable given that your downside is limited,” adds Zeidan. 

Ammar Bakheet

General market thoughts? Bakheet is risk averse and says investors generally are not excited about risky investments either, such as equities, due to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe, the slowdown in the economy of China and emerging markets. He would prefer being exposed to the US markets over Europe as he believes “Europe will be in a mess for a while.” Within Europe he would favor safe companies with solid earnings, good balance sheets and high dividend yields such as food manufacturer Nestle or pharmaceutical company Roche.

Favorite asset classes? In September, Bakheet recommended high quality fixed income bonds and blue chip companies. Now he recommends starting to gradually add exposure to the equity markets as they are at “very attractive levels.” He favors high quality stocks with solid dividends.

Thoughts on MENA markets? Bakheet is still sticking to the same countries he recommended last year: Saudi Arabia (SA) and Qatar because of their solid fundamentals, attractive valuations and dividend yields. As for Egypt, he prefers to see signs of stability before stepping into this market. He would invest in the telecommunications, banking, food and beverages, retail and cement sectors both in SA and Qatar. His top picks are Saudi Arabian telecommunications company Mobily — which he recommended back in September and is up 20 percent since — Al Rajhi Bank in SA and Qatar National Bank.

August 3, 2012 0 comments
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Society

A motley affair

by Kate Marris August 3, 2012
written by Kate Marris

"What do you get in an Italian restaurant in Beirut? Sashimi and a hamburger,” and perhaps some of the best Italian cooking outside Italy. This is how one member of the Arts Faculty at the American University of Beirut described the Beirut Art Fair 2012. In the aftermath of the third edition of Lebanon’s first art fair, Executive spoke to a wide range of participants: gallerists, critics, collectors, first-time buyers, sponsors, artists and the fair’s organizers Laure d’Hauteville and Pascal Odille. Each had something to say about an art fair exhibiting art of wildly varying calibre side by side. Yet for every word of criticism, of both the art itself and the conception of the fair, there has been levelheaded enthusiasm and support for the determination of Laure d’Hauteville and her tiny team — with its tiny budget — to put Beirut on the art world map.

The gamble

And it is in spite of everything. Imagine persuading galleries, particularly those outside of the region, to ship in millions of dollars worth of work to a country that is beginning to feel like a pressure cooker. There were huge questions facing local and international gallerists about insurance, how many big spending Gulf Arab tourists would come and whether people would buy art at a time when many Lebanese are considering an exit plan from a country increasingly under threat of a wide ranging regional conflict.

Gallerists’ fears were justified when only 12 of the 52 Gulf collectors invited showed up. Once again Lebanon felt the power of the media: “[It was] when I saw what’s happening in Tripoli,” explained a representative from ABK Gallery in Metz in France, which pulled out at the last moment because they deemed the risks greater than the rewards, and the fact that the artists simply wouldn’t allow their work to travel to Lebanon. And yet, the organizers still convinced 14 galleries to travel from abroad, among them Portugal’s Cordeiros Galeriad that showed, for the first time in the region, its Andy Warhol portrait of 1970s American starlet Barbara Molasky — a piece whose import to Beirut was felt to be a measure of the fair’s credibility.

“Convincing galleries and collectors to come was the biggest challenge,” said Odille, who also devised the fair’s three-day cultural program. Yet some came here not to make sales, at least not immediately. For Bruno Simpelaere, director of ChinaToday Gallery in Belgium, the object of exhibiting in Beirut was to develop a new Middle East client base and scout artists from the region. Why doesn’t he do this in Dubai? A big factor is cost: there is nowhere else in the region, or globally, where he said he can run an exhibition for just $10,000 to $12,000, including the hire of a 20-square meter booth for $7,200. Organizer d’Hauteville cites the size of Art Dubai, which hosted 75 exhibitors this year, as a reason relatively small Beirut appeals to some exhibitors who she says feel lost in the vastness of Dubai; an equivalent. 20-square-meter booth, depending on location and other marketing factors, costs double that of Beirut at approximately $15,000. A similarly small booth at an established fair like Art Basel can easily cost $30,000 and galleries have to sell hard to make back their costs.

Artful adolescence

But fair comparisons, says Simpelaere, only go so far. “Beirut Art Fair needs time. It is young, let the market evolve,” he said. “In the 90s no one paid attention to Hong Kong; now it’s been bought by Art Basel.” Incidentally, China Today no longer exhibits in Miami and other fairs in the United States, which Simpelaere says are an “organizational disaster”. On that front he had no complaints about Beirut, which he said provides attractive practical services available in a city where artists have been working for centuries: “Where else do you find a framer who turns around five to six works overnight and does an impeccable job?” asks Simpelaere, answering: “Not in Dubai.”

Corporate backing

Indeed, unlike the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Beirut’s own art community has grown organically over time; it is for this reason that local partners were lining up to support a commercial art fair that presents an opportunity for both the private and public sectors to cash in on spending from cultural tourism. While the three major international sponsors of the 2011 fair — Ferrari, luxury watch maker Girard Perregaux and Merrill Lynch — were feeling the pinch of declining budgets and withdrew their support, Mini Cooper Lebanon, Air France and major Lebanese banks and hotels provided significant financial and operational backup. For Rita Saad, public relations manager at Le Gray Hotel, the fair was an opportunity “to put Beirut in the limelight”. The downtown hotel opened its luxury suites to international visitors, threw a party and capitalized on an event which, said Saad, takes the city beyond its traditional tourist realms of “history, heritage and gastronomy."

BankMed was the biggest financial backer and hosted the opening party at the Phoenicia Hotel, while Byblos Bank launched its first event to support Lebanon’s young creative scene in conjunction with the art fair. In an award not unlike Deutsche Boerse’s annual photography prize (Lebanese photographer Walid Raad was the winner in 2007) Byblos short-listed 15 young Lebanese photographers who were given a collective exhibition space at the fair. Now the bank is giving the winner, Dora Younes, a student in Beirut, an exhibition, a catalogue and the kind of first break-through package every young artist looks for.

For Byblos Bank, the Beirut Art Fair “answered a specific CSR strategy in Lebanon,” said Nada Tawil, head of communications at Byblos, namely “a brand strategy to support contemporary art.” She said the bank perceives Lebanon as “an incubator of talent”, and wants to play an active part in that story.

So too does the public sector, even if funding is limited. For the first time since the fair’s inception, both the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Culture were a visible part of the fair’s proceedings. When Executive spoke to Michel de Chedarevian, advisor to Culture Minister Gaby Layoun, he reiterated the sense that the public sector is waking up to the value of Lebanon’s artistic contribution in the international arena and there are plans to take Lebanon to next year’s Venice Biennale. (Last year the official Lebanese pavilion was withdrawn for reasons which are still unclear.) When asked what the ministry thought about the fair organizers flying in from France, de Chedarevian had no reservations: “Lebanon is a Francophone country — it’s not an issue.”

Too little Lebanese?

But for some it was. Local and foreign observers expressed dismay that this was not a locally conceived event. “But it is not my Beirut Art Fair,” repeats the French organizer d’Hauteville . In a country where debates surrounding national identity and power wielding inform every aspect of life, it should come as no surprise that an art fair in Lebanon is not immune from politics. But that is exactly the hope of Jean Doummar, a Lebanese businessman and collector whose views represent the many who are sick of Lebanon’s reputation for “cheap tourism and violence”.

“There is so much more,” he said, adding that he believed that whatever the shortcomings of some of the exhibits the organizers proved themselves first of all by managing to assemble 40-plus galleries, almost doubling the size of last year, and no less significantly by attracting wide coverage from the international press whose attention usually falls on political turmoil and Lebanon’s flailing economy.

At a time when the air was thick with the smell of burning tires, Paris Match, Le Figaro and art market publications such as Art Price cared more about revealing this new institution as a major success story for the country. But while galleries like Agial echoed this sentiment, achieving greater sales than expected (only five of the fair’s 43 galleries did not sell at all), and Mark Hachem’s works by autistic artists sold to both Christie’s and Sotheby’s on the back of the fair, many like Saleh Barakat, the director of Agial, were concerned about the quality of the art, the mixed-up souk effect of jewelry and design, and most of all, that this did not reflect the Lebanese art scene at its best.

“Its embarrassing,” said Kristine Khoury, an art writer based in Lebanon, who felt the overall “mishmash” impression and some of the embellishments of the fair overshadowed the stronger work represented in some of the booths.  Rafiz Majzoub, an artist who exhibited at the fair (his studio is based in Beirut’s Dora neighborhood) told Executive that the fair was “simply not art in Lebanon.” Some of Lebanon’s most prominent galleries, including Sfeir Semmler, also choose not to exhibit.

Looking ahead

Organizers, and many of those who care about this fledgling institution, want expansion. And not just in size. Art collector Doummar believes the regional MENASA criteria – Middle East North Africa South Asia – is limiting. “Why limit yourself when there are 10 million Lebanese living all over the world?” Real Diaspora figures aside, he’s got a point, and added that the fair has the potential to mobilize Lebanese populations in, say, South America, where artists relatively new to the international market are fetching high prices.

The touch-and-go regional political situation aside, many factors are at play in the search for institutional identity. Local audiences want to see what is being produced in the rest of the world, while international — specifically Western collectors — are often interested in artists responding to the political conditions of the MENASA region.

With the right consideration these demands are not necessarily incompatible — as the graffiti tour this year showed — and the organizer d’Hauteville stresses that Beirut Art Fair can be a commerical exchange as much as it is a cultural forum. If the fair can successfully incorporate the pluralism that defines this country it may have the potential to sell to a uniquely multifaceted audience. And yet however uncontrollable political insecurities may be, one thing is certain: the quality of the art will determine if this new institution flourishes or whether ultimately Beirut Art becomes synonymous with Beirut Art Supermarket and simply fades away.

The initial version of this article included factual errors. They have been amended as of 24 September 2012

 

August 3, 2012 0 comments
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Society

Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil

by Executive Staff August 3, 2012
written by Executive Staff

The oil industry’s manipulation of governments and the economies of countries to secure and increase profits has been happening almost since there was an industry to speak of. In Timothy Mitchell’s book “Carbon Democracy,” he highlights how through much of the early 20th century big oil companies worked to contain supply — in particular by preventing the emergence of an oil industry in the Middle East — to keep oil prices up, and consequently bolster profit margins.

Last year, the profits of the Big Five international oil companies (IOCs) — BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil and Shell — were up 75 percent on 2010, at a record $137 billion, yet production was down by 4 percent. And rather than invest heavily in production or job creation, these companies sunk $38 billion, or 28 percent of annual net income, in repurchasing their own stock, therefore boosting investor returns.

However, a major difference from the first half of last century is that IOCs are not able to negotiate quite the same profitable agreements with oil producing countries, or delay development, as before. This is reflected in the 2011 oil export revenues earned by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which for the first time exceeded $1 trillion. At the same time the OPEC results were announced last month, the Fraser Institute’s 2012 Global Petroleum Survey indicated that Middle Eastern countries have higher barriers to investment in hydrocarbon exploration and production than anywhere else in the world. There is a clear correlation here, as OPEC members have had to learn the hard way about who takes what for the extraction of underground riches; the IOCs have responded to this through the modes they still have influence over to retain profits.

In Carbon Democracy, Mitchell’s focus is the relationship between hydrocarbons and political institutions, tracking the changes from the industrial revolution all the way up to the so-called “Arab Spring” and how revenues from hydrocarbons are connected to democracy and economic development. Without oil, Mitchell argues, the current economic model of unlimited growth would not be possible, while the management of economic growth provided modes of regulation to govern carbon democracy.

Controlling supply is clearly a way of influencing prices and means of governing. This is one reason why there is a distinct lack of refineries in some oil producing countries, as delaying refining can artificially restrict the amount of oil that flows to the markets. But another reason is to drive a wedge between production and transportation, which helps prevent strikes and disruptions to the flow of oil by not overly centralizing the value chain and thus not have large concentrations of workers. This is a crucial point in Mitchell’s revealing book, as it was a deliberate government policy in the West in the lead up to World War One to switch from coal to oil to nip-in-the-bud further strikes by miners that had brought economies to a standstill. After all, miners’ strikes had led to the adoption of better working hours and conditions, welfare, healthcare and more democratic rights.

The chapters on the Middle East are particularly revealing, along with his debunking of conventional historical accounts — namely the discovery of oil and delayed exploitation — and what is misleadingly called the “oil crisis” of 1973, which was a pivotal event in transforming international finance, national economies, flows of energy and in placing the weakened carbon democracy of the West into a new relationship with the oil states of the Middle East.

Rather than being a black and white textbook case of supply and demand at work, of OPEC members cutting oil supply to pressure the United States over its unequivocal support for Israel during the October 1973 war, Mitchell shows that it was difficult to know how much oil prices went up due to a cut in supply or even how much supply was actually cut. For while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reduced exports, other countries increased production. Furthermore, unlike today, there was no ‘market price’ for crude oil, so no one could know what ‘the market’ actually was, while OPEC’s decision to raise tax on oil production by 70 percent at the time was somewhat coincidental, having been decided before the war broke out.

Mitchell’s book ends by considering the impact of supply constraints due to the rising demand for oil, and how climate change impacts market conditions in a post-oil world where alternative forms of energy will affect how people and economies are governed. How and when we might emerge into the post-oil world is, however, a question that remains to be answered.

August 3, 2012 0 comments
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Real Estate

More Bling on the beach

by Jeff Neumann August 3, 2012
written by Jeff Neumann

To the more timid businessman, breaking ground on another exclusive beach club in Lebanon might not seem like a sound investment at the moment — given this summer’s grim tourism receipts and the grimmer questions over the civil war next door and how long that will go on. But the doom has done little to gloom the enthusiasm of another breed of developers who see so much long-term profit potential on Lebanon’s beaches that they won’t be deterred by a bit of war.

Among the new investment destinations is Nikki Beach, a project for a 46-villa seaside resort with hotel and club south of Beirut that is being developed as collaboration between local property company Zardman and Nikki Beach EMEA Hotels and Resorts, a unit of the Miami-based brand that specializes in glamour hospitality.

Forget your troubles in luxury
The chief underlying asset for the project is a 42,000-square meter seafront property in Damour and Zardman touts the location and accessibility from Beirut as selling points sure to attract investors when sales open later this month.

According to the developer, the project will entail a boutique hotel on the property, as well as amenities that five-star resort patrons would expect: spas, multiple swimming pools, restaurants, water sports, a fitness center and more.

However the resort's biggest asset, according to general manager of Zardman, Makram Zard, is its very limited capacity. “We are being very exclusive with sales,” he says, adding that, “If a client comes in with no background or familiarity with us we simply will not give them information. You will not see billboards advertising the sale [of our villas], we know who we want to attract.”

But another key selling point will be the Nikki Beach moniker aiming to brand the resort with global glitterati appeal. “We will operate the hotel and Zardman will sell villas. We will focus on quality of service and invest heavily in staff training,” Jihad Khoury, the chief executive of Nikki Beach EMEA Hotels and Resorts, tells Executive.

Set for delivery in 2014, the resort would be the third Nikki Beach in the Middle East and North Africa region, after resorts that are scheduled to open (with different partners) in Qatar this year and Cyprus in 2013. Plans for expansion of the Nikki Beach brand in the Middle East date back a few more years but did not pan out either in Lebanon or in Aqaba, Jordan.

Lebanon's 225-kilometers long coastline is dotted with many clubs and resorts in every price range and type, from the low-key bohemian to the techno-blasting beach party. Offering a glimpse on what Nikki Beach will use as lure for its clientele in Lebanon, the group eagerly flashes that it was once called the “Sexiest Place on Earth" in a British newspaper and voted the “World's #1 Sexiest Beach Bar” by international media outlets.

“When we met with the people from Nikki Beach we clicked right away,” says Zard. “We had the same vision for the project and knew this is something we would both benefit from.” Most of Zardman’s staff are in their 20s and early 30s — "a very young company,” according to Zard — and are tapped into what the mostly young and affluent clientele that Nikki Beach attracts worldwide are looking for in a beach destination.

Villas will start at around $320,000 and reach up to $600,000, and are offered in three sizes: 105, 125 and 155 square meters. Payment plans for the villas start at 15 percent down with the remaining balance to be paid over a four-year period. For the overall design, the Beirut office of US-based Soma Architects was tapped to lay out the villas, with Gatserelia Nawar & Associates handling the interiors. 

A sunny (and sandy) future
The Damour project will be Zardman’s first resort and while eager to disclose the price range for the villas the company would not disclose the cost of the entire planned development or the value of the assets it brings to the beach. Zardman holds a 27-year renewable lease on the land but would divulge in an interview with Executive only that the deed is held by its founder, and former Lebanese Canadian Bank chairman, Georges Zard Abou Jaoude.

According to Khoury, Nikki Beach EMEA Hotels and Resorts came aboard the project in 2011 after all licenses and planning for building structures had been completed. His rationale for getting involved is that Lebanon will remain a regional reference in hospitality and high-level entertainment and Nikki Beach would be seen as missing out if it did not open a branded resort here.

Khoury radiates confidence that the new project will be a winner even as the current wind is blowing tourism straight in the face. “It is an act of faith and as Lebanese, we have to have courage. The good years will more than make up for the bad ones," he says.

August 3, 2012 0 comments
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