The early release of convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi from a Scottish prison this summer sparked new scrutiny of Libya’s global economic clout. Megrahi was the only man convicted of the bombing of PanAm flight 103 in 1988 that killed some 270 people, mostly Americans. After it was discovered that Megrahi, who has always maintained his innocence, was terminally ill with prostate cancer earlier this year, the Scottish Justice Ministry officially released the prisoner on grounds of “conscience,” sparking international furor, as well as British and American calls for an inquiry into how the decision was reached.
While the British government called Megrahi’s release an “independent step,” British Foreign Secretary David Miliband seemed to contradict this claim in a Commons statement, where he highlighted Megrahi’s relevance to British-Libyan relations: “Although the decision [to release Megrahi early] was not one for the United Kingdom government, British interests — including those of UK nationals, British business and possibly security cooperation — would be damaged… if Megrahi were to die in a Scottish prison.”
Whether or not Britain pawned Megrahi off in a backdoor business deal, his early release and hero’s welcome in Tripoli were something of a diplomatic coup for Libya, a country considered a rogue, terrorist state by Western powers up until the current decade. Since the lifting of UN sanctions in 2003 and its removal from the US state sponsors of terrorism list in 2006, Libya has rapidly remade itself from being the West’s antagonist to its unbowed trading partner.
Now poised to deepen its economic ties through strategic foreign investments, Libya’s sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), is channeling the country’s oil-fed surpluses into a portfolio that includes energy sector assets, real estate and foreign exchange. Launched in 2006 by a merger of six investment entities belonging to the Libyan government, the LIA is finding international trading partners open for business for the first time, especially as the financial crisis fuels a search for new sources of liquidity.
“If you wanted to invest in the past, no one would take your calls,” Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) Executive Director Mohamed Layas said at the fund’s launch. “Now bankers fly on their private jets to see us.”
Transparent figures are hard to come by, but the LIA is thought to manage some $65 billion worth of assets, earmarked to diversify the country’s economy and lessen its dependence on oil exports. LIA executives have stated that Libya’s intentions are purely commercial. Analysts say, however, that while recent trends in LIA foreign investment reveal a cautious, long-term approach to investing, new energy deals and foreign alliances are telling of Libya’s willingness to mix political maneuvering with business interests
The revival of resource nationalism
On September 18, Verenex Energy Inc. gave in. The small Canadian oil exploration company with stakes in Libya was forced to agree to a buyout by the LIA for about $293.7 million, after the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) vetoed a $482 million bid for the Calgary-based firm by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). Libya’s state-run NOC used its right of first refusal to block the bid by CNPC; when Verenex protested the veto, the NOC threatened to investigate “improper bidding” in Verenex’s acquisition of Libya’s Area 47. Faced with the risk of losing a region with roughly 2.15 billion barrels in crude oil reserves, the Canadian company resigned itself to its fate and recommended the deal to shareholders.
Although the LIA had agreed in March to match the CNPC’s bid of $9.35 per share, it later announced it was helping itself to a 30 percent discount, paying $6.63 per share.
Senior analyst at global research firm Roubini Global Economics, Rachel Ziemba, said that in addition to laying bare the close ties between the Libyan government and the LIA, the deal could signal “a revival of resource nationalism in Libya, with a reluctance for some foreign investment.”
Foreign investors are liable to find themselves on shaky ground in Libya. “They’ve made it easy to get in, but it seems to be difficult to exit, at least in our case, under normal business terms,” Verenex CEO James McFarland said last month. The US Embassy in Tripoli warns potential investors about the “great deal of confusion, particularly among foreign investors” created by the reform process, “as shifting regulations and a weak regulatory environment have not inspired confidence in the market.”
“The decision not to sell to the Chinese was a political one,” said John Hamilton, contributing editor at African Energy, adding that, generally, the LIA avoids serving a political agenda. “Libya has a handful of other funds, some of which are nominally associated or subsidiary to the LIA, but which are autonomously run, [such as the] Libyan African Investment Portfolio (LAIP). These funds are more political. In the LAIP’s case, it supports Colonel Muammar al Qaddafi’s political ambitions for the United States of Africa,” he said.
London panders while Rome bows
Now that Europe is “biting for the chance to invest in Libya, particularly its oil and gas sector,” according to Ziemba, the LIA is sending a scratch-my-back message: companies receiving Libyan foreign investments are to be granted access to coveted Libyan markets. The LIA’s Layas said as much in a 2007 interview with the Financial Times: “If we buy shares in a construction company abroad, the other benefit is that we will generate business for them in Libya, where we have a huge development plan,” he said.
Critics of the Megrahi affair recalled this summer that British companies had recently signed a number of significant contracts with Libya, including BP’s $900 million oil exploration and production contract in the Ghadames basin, hailed by BP group executive Tony Hayward as “a welcome return to the country for BP after more than 30 years…It is BP’s single biggest exploration commitment.”
At least 150 British companies now operate in Libya, including BP, HSBC, Marks & Spencer and Rentokil.
The LIA is also making acquisitions in top-shelf London real estate. Last December, the fund acquired a prestigious office building opposite the Bank of England for $200 million. In July, it bought a sleek commercial property on Oxford Street, called Portman House, for $258 million. London representatives of the LIA say they are looking for more acquisitions and plan to open the LIA’s first field branch in London.
Italy, on the other hand, ushered in a new era of bilateral economic relations with a historic reparations treaty that commits Rome to paying an astonishing $5 billion over the next 20 years to its former North African colony for key infrastructure projects. Berlusconi humbled himself at the signing ceremony in a Libyan tent last year.
“It is my duty to express to you, in the name of the Italian people, our regret and apologies for the deep wounds that we have caused you,” said the Italian premier.
Libya had sought for more than 30 years to expose and shame Italy’s tragic colonial blunders on its soil, but analysts say it was the heavy pressure the Italian business and political establishment brought to bear on Italy’s government that produced an agreement with such highly desirable business provisions for Italian companies. In addition to infrastructure development, the treaty envisages bilateral cooperation in the energy sector and intensifying efforts to combat illegal immigration and terrorism. In a less humble moment of candor with an Italian journalist, Berlusconi described his understanding of the treaty’s objectives: “less illegal immigrants and more oil.”
Italian aerospace and defense group Finmeccanica said in July it had signed a memorandum of understanding for strategic cooperation in the Middle East and Africa with the LIA, which now also holds minor shares in Italy’s Fiat, Eni, Banca di Roma and football team Juventus. Two months before the signing of the reparations treaty, Libya’s NOC and Eni renewed their oil and gas contracts for 25 years, setting new expiration dates of 2042 for oil and 2047 for gas. The six exploration and production sharing (EPSA IV) contracts “ensure greater energy security for Italy,” according to a statement by Eni, and they contain technology transfer provisions that favor the Libyan side.
Western politicians and executives seem to be cozying up to Qaddafi with firm offers for long-term partnerships — a sure sign that Libyan shrewdness in playing its post-rogue status has clearly paid off. With key domestic infrastructure investments assured and foreign investment deepening its economic and political influence in recession-hit Europe, horizons look bright for North Africa’s largest oil producer.