When it comes to major political and economic policies in the Middle East, is the United States about to break a six decade-long habit?
That the question can be asked without provoking derision suggests that something is indeed changing in Washington and in the region. After World War II, a cornerstone of American policy in the Arab world was the protection of oil supplies. A quid pro quo was reached with Saudi Arabia: the US would militarily protect the kingdom and the Gulf in general, in exchange for which the Saudis would uphold stability in the oil markets, maintaining relatively cheap oil prices by using the kingdom’s enormous surplus capacity to regulate price and demand.
In recent years, however, particularly after the 9/11 attacks, Saudi Arabia’s image in the US has taken a dive. In the public eye, the kingdom was transformed from a long-term ally into a fount of Islamist fanaticism. This perception segued into a broader sense that the profits the Saudis reaped not only funded America’s enemies, but also confirmed how vulnerable the US was to fluctuations of an oil market in which Riyadh was a major player. This provoked American demands for “energy independence.”
Writing recently in Foreign Policy magazine, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faysal took issue with this mood. He described the “energy independence” slogan as “political posturing at its worst — a concept that is unrealistic, misguided, and ultimately harmful to energy-producing and consuming countries alike.” It was also shorthand “for arguing that the US has a dangerous reliance on… Saudi Arabia, which gets blamed for everything from global terrorism to high gasoline prices.”
Turki reminded his readers that Saudi Arabia holds about 25 percent of the world’s oil reserves and has the largest spare capacity globally, while no alternative energy source is available to run America’s economy. This situation only highlights the fact that “efforts spent proselytizing about energy independence should instead focus on acknowledging energy interdependence. Like it or not, the fates of the US and Saudi Arabia are connected and will remain so for decades to come.”
The prince was doubtless correct, but his protests only underlined how different the Saudi-American relationship is today, with politics as much a problem as economics. The Obama administration is preoccupied with disengagement from Iraq. This was Barack Obama’s priority as candidate, and little has changed since he took office. For the Saudis, whose priority is to contain a resurgent Iran, this American drawdown is worrisome.
The Saudi regime remembers that in 1990 and 1991, the US deployed hundreds of thousands of soldiers to the kingdom to push the Iraqis out of occupied Kuwait. At the time, George H. W. Bush’s administration briefly linked this to protecting oil supplies, before anti-war protesters replied that they refused to trade “blood for oil.” But Washington’s clumsiness concealed a legitimate aim: preventing Iraq from imposing its hegemony on the Gulf. Today, as the Saudis watch the US eager to pull out from Iraq, they wonder who will prevent Iran from succeeding where Saddam failed.
The Obama administration has failed to answer that question. But on the specific issue of oil, some have tried to downplay Saudi importance by suggesting that oil should be treated as a neutral commodity — divorced from political commitments as the US secures alternative sources. Oil producers need to sell their oil, after all, and America is the largest consumer. Arrangements can be made.
Turki, however, sees oil as a political as much as an economic good, given how essential cheap oil is to the wellbeing of Western governments. We are heading toward a serious disconnect between Saudi and American perceptions if the Obama administration’s departure from Iraq plays out in Iran’s favor. In that case, Saudi Arabia’s autonomy on oil policy may gradually be called into question, while its rising sense of insecurity and other worries, such as the future of the regime, might push it to take steps that will have a profound impact on regional politics.
Hence, the notion of “de-politicizing” oil seems illusory, as would an American assumption that breaking away from Saudi Arabia could be effected with minimal negative consequences.
The answer to this conundrum is not obvious. The American strategy in the Middle East today, which involves greater political involvement complemented by a physical reduction in its forces, displeases the Saudis because they are not sure what US intentions are with respect to Iran. That means the Obama administration must articulate an unambiguous strategy, one either restating or convincingly replacing the postwar US-Saudi understanding. But the last word may be Turki’s: the US and Saudi Arabia are likely to remain connected for decades to come.
Michael Young
