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Putin’s gambit

by Claude Salhani August 1, 2007
written by Claude Salhani

The Cuban missile crisis began in 1961 when the US started to deploy 15 Jupiter IRBM — intermediate-range ballistic missiles — in Turkey, close to the Soviet border. With a range of 1,500 miles and a flight time of about 16 minutes, the missiles threatened several cities — including Moscow.

On October 14, 1962, photographs shot by US reconnaissance planes and shown to President John F. Kennedy revealed similar installations being erected in Cuba, as a response to the American threat. Days later, on October 28, after a dramatic confrontation threatened world peace, Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, with the intercession of the Secretary General of the United Nations, agreed both sides would dismantle their installations.

Now 46 years later US President George W. Bush wants to install a missile defense system in the Czech Republic and a radar tracking station in Poland. News of US missiles being positioned so close to Russia triggered a “mini-Cuban missile crisis.”

Russia’s initial reaction was not surprising. As soon as President Vladimir Putin managed to overcome his anger, he said he would direct Russian missiles at European cities in retaliation to the US plans to deploy in Central Europe.

But then the Russian president surprised Bush when the two men met a few weeks later, in June, at the G-8 Summit in Germany. Changing tactics once more and sidestepping his earlier threats to target European cities, Putin suggested that Russia joins the US initiative. Instead of the Czech Republic and Poland being used as bases for the defense system he recommended the use of a former-Soviet base in Azerbaijan. The Russian president had even gone to his Azeri counterpart and already obtained an agreement.

“Interesting,” was how Bush replied to Putin’s offer. That’s the diplomatic way of saying “thanks, but no.” Bush and his advisors probably never gave the Russian offer very serious thought. In any case it did not take very long for the United States to deem the Russian offer invalid on grounds that the Azeri station would not be acceptable from a technical point of view. The Americans said it was outdated.

But the Russian president, whose years in the KGB must have taught him how to remain cool under duress, was not so easily dissuaded.

In early July he flew to the United States and spent a weekend at the Bush family estate in Maine, in a relaxed atmosphere for what was, without a doubt, very stressful talks that even a fishing trip off the Atlantic coast on the Bush Sr.’s speedboat did little to smooth over.

And once again the Russian president came up with a new plan. This time Putin proposed to join the project as a partner and base the tracking station in Russia.

Meanwhile, Bush Jr. kept trying to convince the Russian president that his country has nothing to fear from those missiles. The US president stressed that the defensive missile system is needed to counter eventual threats emerging from Iran, if and when it reaches the point where it can produce its own nuclear weapons.

Why then is Putin so persistent in trying to get Bush to back away from the Czech/Polish project? So adamant is the Russian president to prevent this from becoming a reality that he keeps coming back with a new offer at every meeting. The answer to Putin’s opposition to the Czech/Polish defense plan can be found in two factors; one is of a strategic nature while the other is more emotional, combined with a brisk of nostalgia for the Soviet past.

Strategically, the Russians share the same fears the US has of a nuclear-armed Iran. In fact, Russia has probably far more reason to worry of an Iran with nukes than the US. First, Russia is geographically much closer, needing only short or intermediary range missiles, which Iran already has, should it ever wish to strike at Russia. On the other hand, Iran would need to deploy intercontinental missiles, which it does not yet have, should it wish to strike at the US.

Second, Russia, a federal state, also has its share of problems with Islamist extremists operating from its southern Muslim republics, like Chechnya, who are seeking to break away from the motherland. In that respect Moscow and Washington have equal trepidation that a nuclear weapon would fall into the hands of Islamist terrorists, the consequences of which would be catastrophic for both.

On the emotional level, call it even a level of national pride, Moscow is highly reluctant to see two former Warsaw Pact countries enter into a defense agreement which may be viewed by many Russians as ganging up on Russia. Moscow still has a hard time digesting the fact that its former satellites states are now members of the European Union and, to add insult to injury, also members of NATO.

Still, despite Putin’s ongoing objections Bush said after meeting his Russian counterpart, “I think the Czech Republic and Poland need to be an integral part of the system.”

If for the Russian president the week got off to a bad start with his failure to convince the American president to change his mind and back away from the Czech Republic and Poland, at least it ended on a positive note as he managed to convince the International Olympic Committee to designate the Russian city of Sochi as the site for the 2014 Winter Olympics. This is the first time in the history of the Winter Games that Russia is chosen as a host and the second time, after the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics, that Russia will host the Games.
 

Claude Salhani is International Editor and a political analyst with United Press International in Washington, DC. He can be reached at [email protected].

August 1, 2007 0 comments
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Roads to nowhere

by Alex Warren August 1, 2007
written by Alex Warren

DUBAI: “First Salik violator spotted,” read a prominent headline on one Gulf daily last month. It led into a description of how a renegade Nissan Altima driver had been caught on CCTV crossing one of Dubai’s new toll gates without the requisite badge, just minutes after the system came online at midnight on July 1.

Salik has been gripping the nation for some time — and not just due to the lack of more interesting local news. The new road toll system, which is the first in the Gulf and one of a handful in the Arab world, has found itself at the center of much controversy and criticism.

In short, it works by scanning vehicles at two toll gates on the city’s main drag, Sheikh Zayed Road, charging a little over $1 a time. If drivers want to use the tolled roads, they buy credit for a special badge which is fixed to the windscreen. If you don’t have a badge, you pay a $27 fine every time you go under a toll. You are a Salik violator.

The scheme is expected to generate annual revenues of about $160 million for its creators, the Road and Transportation Authority (RTA), although it is unclear what proportion of that will come from legitimate use and what proportion from fines.

But whatever its business model, the new system’s purported aim is an ambitious one: to tackle some world-class traffic problems in one of the most rapidly-growing cities on earth.

A recent survey found that the average commuter spends one hour and 45 minutes in traffic everyday, a statistic which made Dubai the most congested city in the Arab world. Cairo took second prize. Another study claims that $1.2 billion is lost from the Emirate’s economy every year due to traffic inefficiencies, and that the resulting stress is having a negative impact on the productivity of employees.

Something, then, needed to be done. But Salik has come under heavy fire from many quarters. Many say it has actually made congestion worse, cramming up smaller streets with queues of motorists unwilling to pay for the convenience of the main roads. Cynics say it is another stealth tax imposed by the authorities. Car rental agencies moan that they are losing business and suffering from a constant headache of administrative paperwork.

Others complain that Salik, like many other things in Dubai which sound very sophisticated, just doesn’t function properly. Irate drivers say that customer helplines are constantly busy, that they receive erroneous text messages about the amount of credit in their Salik accounts, and that some have been charged without ever using the tolls. The Salik website has apparently been receiving over a million hits a day, which could make it a fortune in advertising if its owners signed up to Google.

A lot of these issues are probably teething troubles which might iron themselves out over time. And, for now, the newly-tolled roads are less crowded than they used to be at the peak times of day. Yet it’s difficult to see how Salik, or indeed anything, can hope to permanently solve Dubai’s traffic problem.

This is a place where cars are cheap, petrol virtually costs less than water and having an expensive set of wheels is essential. Everyone is too busy making money to care about the environment, and the threat of global warming becomes slightly meaningless to those used to the climate in the Arabian Gulf.

But the real problem, and the reason why introducing Salik at this time makes so little sense, is that there is no practical alternative to driving. Taxis don’t solve anything. You can’t walk anywhere. And the few bus services that exist are unreliable, unpunctual and extremely hot. How can you hope to persuade the western expat to give up his Audi, the Lebanese housewife her Porsche Cayenne or the Emirati his Land Cruiser in favor of a sweaty communal cabin?

The Dubai Metro is currently under construction, and, once it comes into service in 2009, will surely be used widely. It would have been more sensible to postpone Salik until then, offering a practical alternative to driving, but even the metro’s appeal will be limited. It is difficult to imagine a suited executive walking to a metro station to commute to the office, as he would in London, for instance. Weather, the layout of the city, and inflated egos all preclude that in Dubai.

So if there is no way of reducing the number of cars on the roads, then maybe the answer is to build more roads. The RTA says that it is spending about $12 billion on trying to solve traffic problems, that a total of 100 lanes will run across Dubai’s creek by 2020 and that more bus routes will be launched.

Even so, all this will take time, and the never-ending population growth means that Dubai’s traffic woes aren’t going anywhere. As for Salik, it just seems to be one more thing for the city’s residents to moan about.

ALEX WARREN is a freelance journalist based in Dubai

August 1, 2007 0 comments
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Oslo’s secrets

by Riad Al-Khouri August 1, 2007
written by Riad Al-Khouri

Despite its title, The Secret Israel-Palestinian Negotiations in Oslo (Routledge, Oxford: 2007) is no potboiler, being a recent publication in the scholarly Durham Modern Middle East and Islamic World Series. Rather it looks at the topic against the background of negotiation concepts and strategies, focusing particularly on the timely issue of non-recognition. That was certainly a significant topic in the early 1990s when the book’s events are mainly set; but is an absolutely vital one today given the emergence of Hamas as a key political force and the soap opera currently playing in Palestine and world capitals, starring various forces and governments refusing to recognize each other.

The author Sven Behrendt studied politics and management before receiving a Ph.D. in International Relations. After the completion of his studies he joined the Bertelsmann Foundation and directed a project addressing Middle East issues. He has since 2000 been working for the World Economic Forum where he set up and directed numerous projects focusing on geopolitics and business strategy, including several in the Arab World.

Behrendt’s credentials are thus sound, on both theory and the real life issues of the region, and his description and analysis do not disappoint. The book starts by showing how Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization were facing challenges in the late 1980s and early 1990s that drove them to start talking to each other. Though Arab-Israeli diplomacy was always there, what made the Oslo negotiations different were direct, face-to-face talks between Israel and the PLO.

Oslo called for withdrawal of Israel from Gaza and parts of the West Bank, affirming a Palestinian right of self-government within those areas. After an interim period, the two sides would negotiate a permanent agreement on deliberately excluded “final status” issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, and Israeli settlements. However, with these core topics off the table, what did Oslo actually accomplish? Most importantly, the two sides had engaged in formal mutual recognition. The Israelis officially accepted the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people while the Palestinians recognized the right of the state of Israel to exist, and renounced terrorism and violence.

Though the accord aroused hope for an end to conflict, skepticism abounded. Subsequent negotiations were many, in Europe, the US and the Middle East, ending in the fiasco of the Camp David 2000 Summit, which failed to resolve final status issues. The al-Aqsa Intifada followed that, and the rest, as they say, is history.

In the final analysis, Oslo was an icebreaker. Not that ice breaking is not an honorable activity, or indeed a necessary one. The last chapter in the book is tellingly entitled “The Success of the Oslo Talks — and Why the Process Failed.” Behrendt correctly concludes that the lack of longer-term vision on both sides doomed Oslo, but which was in its own way a successful breaking of the ice.

Where are we today, 14 years later? James Wolfensohn summed it up by ending a recent interview on a note of exasperation: “Israelis and Palestinians really should get over thinking that they’re a show on Broadway. They are a show in the Village, off-off-off-off Broadway. I hope I don’t get into too much trouble for saying this, but what the hell, that’s what I believe, and I’m 73.” For those who may not get the thespian metaphor, “the Village” refers to downtown Manhattan’s Greenwich Village, where small audiences see obscure plays, as opposed to Broadway where big names star in grand shows.

Wolfie is a 21st century Old Testament Patriarch who will certainly not get into hot water over his outspokenness. I on the other hand, neither septuagenarian nor Jewish, hope I can stay out of trouble for repeating something I said, on the record, in late 1995 about Arab-Israeli rapprochement: “The ice has been broken but the temperature is still below zero. It could easily freeze over again.”

With Ehud Barak politically resurrected and Peres occupying the bully pulpit of the Israeli presidency, could we now be in for another, perhaps final, chapter of the Palestinian-Israeli show? Barak, the man who scuttled Camp David in 2000, is now presumably wiser; and Shimon Peres co-orchestrated the breaking of the ice at Oslo, so maybe… With the American position unraveling in the Middle East, and the majority of its inhabitants (including those of Israel/Palestine) fed up with the consequences of Zionism and its antitheses, it may be time for Israel to wind down its failed neo-colonialism. This would first involve real recognition of the Palestinians and their rights, instead of an Oslo-like public relations exercise. In any event, it will be interesting to see what the next phase of Arab-Israeli diplomacy looks like; and I for one would look forward to Behrendt’s sequel.

RIAD AL KHOURI is an economist who relaxes by reading books and sometimes reviewing them  

August 1, 2007 0 comments
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Petrol rationing in Iran

by Gareth Smith August 1, 2007
written by Gareth Smith

With Iranians’ view of unlimited cheap petrol as a birthright, rationing was never going to be easy. But the need for change grew as years of a pump price frozen at 9 cents a liter took the import bill to $5 billion with Iran’s refineries way behind increasing consumption.

Finally, the government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad bit the bullet, first with a price hike to 12 cents a liter and then with the introduction on June 27 of a ration of 100 liters a month per motorist.

The torching of some petrol stations in protest made great television but has obscured, at least internationally, the palpable fact that the policy is beginning to work.

Anecdotal evidence is clear. Tehran’s streets are less congested and the air quality improved. Hoteliers on the Caspian Sea coast complain of a lack of summer guests. “We’re struggling to get petrol for our tour buses,” said one tourist guide, “and motorists are saving their petrol allocation in case they need it later.”

And with all the usual caveats over government figures, the numbers are starting to add up. The Environment Ministry reported after two weeks of rationing there was a daily reduction of 8.7 million liters in consumption previously running at around 75 million a day. This would shave $1.7 billion from an import bill projected to reach $7 billion this year.

More recent figures suggest the reduction in consumption could be higher. Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi, the interior minister, told parliament in mid-July that between 11 and 16 million liters a day were being saved. And Ali Akbar Mehrabian of the government’s fuel committee put the saving at around 18 million liters, which he said would cut $4 billion from the import bill.

In the face of growing international pressure over its nuclear program, the Iranian government has long seen importing around 40% of petrol consumption as a dangerous vulnerability. Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert was among those arguing the volatile public reaction to rationing showed that existing sanctions against Iran were working and should be extended.

Hence Mr. Ahmadinejad wants the government to go further in reducing imports — shifting vehicles away from petrol to natural gas, improving public transport and increasing the output of Iran’s refineries.

Like many countries that failed to invest sufficiently in refineries in the 1980s, Iran’s capacity has struggled with rising demand. But Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh, managing director of the National Iranian Oil Refining and Distribution company, has said existing plans for improved refining would take production of petrol from today’s 1.6 million barrels a day to 3 million by 2012.

The government is also pushing for conversion of more vehicles to gas, already used by Tehran’s yellow taxis. Kazem Vazeri-Hameneh, the oil minister, said last month the number of gas fueling stations would reach 1000, from the current 250, by the end of the Iranian year, and the number of converted vehicles would rise from 115,000 to 500,000. The government would target Nissan vans, he said, of which there are 500,000 across the country and whose conversion could save 10 million liters of petrol a year.

Rather than collapsing from internal dissent as a result of growing international pressure, the government of Mr. Ahmadinejad is developing a greater sense of purpose. Many of its members, including the president, spent their formative years in the trenches of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and seem to feel at home in a crisis demanding national unity.

Hence, contrary to expectation, the government decided not to allow motorists to purchase petrol above their allocation at a higher price. However unpopular among Toyota Prado drivers of north Tehran and those running unofficial taxis, the decision was not just counter-inflationary but in line with the government’s commitment to “social justice” and its skepticism about market economics.

Rationing is also a major challenge to the vested interests involved in smuggling petrol out of the country to Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the UAE. Some put the figure as high as 8 million liters a day and while some smugglers use mules others are well-connected enough to drive tankers.

It remains an open question whether Mr. Ahmadinejad will benefit politically from petrol rationing. It has certainly been a major jolt in popular feeling, even though some Iranians say the system is at least “fair.”

The government has asked parliament to allow three months before judging the success or otherwise of the move. Either way, the decision — which the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called “historic” — is surely one whose consequences, for good or bad, will play out for years to come.

GARETH SMYTH is the Financial Times Tehran correspondent

August 1, 2007 0 comments
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The Russians are coming

by Peter Speetjens August 1, 2007
written by Peter Speetjens

Founded by the controversial Russian-born billionaire Arkadi Gaydamak, the Social Welfare Party (SWP) is but the latest gladiator to enter Israel’s increasingly fragmented political arena. For decades the Knesset was dominated by eternal foes Labor and Likud, yet today it is home to a dozen small and medium-size parties, while tens of others failed to meet the minimum amount of votes required to enter parliament.

Within this widely varied political landscape, the distinct “Russian vote” is of growing importance. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, some 1.2 million immigrants of Jewish descent were welcomed in Israel. Note, however, that although a Jew is generally defined as someone born to a Jewish mother, the Israeli Law of Return grants anyone with a Jewish grandparent the right to live the Zionist dream. It is estimated that some 300,000 Russian immigrants are not Jews.

Note as well that not all immigrants are Russians. They are mainly referred to as such because of the language they speak, which today is a common feature of Israeli society. Representing at least 20 of the Knesset’s total of 120 seats, the Russians are also known as the “kingmakers” of Israeli politics, as they are able to make or break a coalition. Little wonder then that during the 2006 elections Israel’s leading political parties all ran Russian-language campaigns.

Like other Russian parties, the SWP appears to the right of the Israeli political spectrum. It aims to topple the Olmert government, because of its failures in the 2006 Lebanon war, and promises full integration and social justice for Russian immigrants, most of whom are secular, belong to lower and middle class income groups, and share a sentiment of being second-class citizens.

During past elections, Israel’s Russians have predominantly voted right-wing, and showed a preference for a strong charismatic leader most likely to deliver on the issues of security and stability. The self-made man Gaydamak seems to meet that demand.

Born in Russia in 1952, Gaydamak left for France at the age of 20. Having started as a day laborer, he worked his way up the business ladder by means of a translation and import-export firm working between France and Russia. Part of his fortune, worth an estimated $4 billion, may not have been earned legitimately, as French authorities are keen to interrogate Gaydamak about his role in “Angolagate,” in which hundreds of millions worth of arms were smuggled to the African nation.

Gaydamak expects the SWP to win no less than 40 seats, even though he himself will not run. He has also set his eyes on becoming the mayor of Jerusalem, banking on the fact he owns the Holy City’s leading football and basketball teams.

It remains to be seen if the SWP can indeed win up to 40 seats. Thus, Benyamin Netanyahu’s Russian-media strategist, Michael Falkov, told the Jerusalem Post that Gaydamak lost a lot of popularity trying to acquire the Russian pork-selling supermarket chain Tiv Ta’am and make it kosher. As the Russian vote is fiercely secular, that particular move was not appreciated.

What’s more, Gaydamak is not the first Russian to enter Israeli politics playing the immigrant card. In the mid-1990s, Natan Sharansky, a former Soviet dissident who spent years in the Gulag, founded Israel B’Aliya (Israel on the Rise), which promoted the rapid absorption of Soviet Jews and in 1996 won 7 seats. However, he failed to deliver and after a brief spell as minister under Ariel Sharon only managed to re-enter the Knesset as a Likud candidate.

Sharansky’s position as Israel’s leading Russian politician has now been taken by Avigdor Lieberman. Having previously worked as the Likud Party’s Director General, he participated in the 2006 elections with his Yisrael Baytenu (Israel – Our Home), which gained 11 seats. With the arrival of Lieberman, Israeli hard-line politics became a whole different ballgame.

Lieberman propagates positions considered radical even among the right wing. He was once quoted as saying that Palestinian prisoners should be drowned in the Dead Sea and that he himself would provide the buses. More recently, he called for a loyalty test for Arab-Israelis and for the execution of Israeli MPs who met with Hamas representatives. Despite these and other controversial remarks, Olmert appointed him as Minister of Strategic Affairs, a new cabinet position that solely deals with Iran.

At this point, it is unlikely that Gaydamak will be able to overtake the popular Lieberman as Israel’s leading Russian politician. Yet, whatever the face of the Russian vote may be, it is a vote that is here to stay and one that favors a hard line “safety first” approach in negotiations with the Palestinians and other Arab nations. What makes the Russians different from other right-wing voters is their as fervent disliking of the religious right.

And the latter is arguably the good news, as it is likely to prevent an ultra-right cocktail between Likud, the Russians and the Orthodox Jews to come into existence, for one need not be a genius to predict what that could mean for the future of the Middle East.

August 1, 2007 0 comments
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Buying a home in Beirut

by Rana Hanna August 1, 2007
written by Rana Hanna

Birds do it, bees do it, even educated fleas do it, let’s do it, let’s … buy a home!” So you’ve decided to do the grown-up thing and buy a house. Now what? Buying a newly built — or half built or even unbuilt — property is indeed a daunting task, not only because of the big sums of money involved (Can I afford it?) but also because of the commitment necessary (Will I still love it in the morning?) and the risk associated with it (Will the market go up or down? Will the building collapse on my head in 20 years?).

The obvious first step is to find the right property. Real estate agents in Lebanon may help, but if you are looking to buy new property, you can easily eschew agents’ fees (2.5% of the final price) as all new projects are advertised clearly, allowing you to contact the developer directly.

The earlier you commit in the project’s development, the bigger the discount you get. That is because developers are usually looking to recoup their investment costs as quickly as possible and are therefore more willing to negotiate prices. Once developers do recoup their costs, they look to maximize their profits. Although buying ‘on spec’ may reap its rewards financially, the risk is greater. You’re expected to pay 30% of the total price up-front upon signature of the contract, although sometimes legal and/or financial problems may hinder the developer from obtaining the necessary licenses and planning permissions, and in some cases you may end up without an ownership deed.

Another risk of buying on spec are the specs themselves. Always ask for a list and sign on it: some developers eager to sell may agree with you on many points such as number of parking spaces available to you or the size of the storage room although some may renege on these agreements. An easy way out of this is to make sure the developer is reputable (in a country this size, that is the easy part) and to check out some of their other projects. Don’t be shy to ask some of the residents how happy they are with their property. Also, visit the site with an architect or an engineer who may point out issues you may not have thought of: they tend to see the minutest details.

When it comes to negotiating the price, that’s when you need someone like my sister. Don’t be afraid to argue, most developers will negotiate between 10% and even 20% of the asking price. But think of the hidden or extra costs that can amount up to $50,000 depending on the property. Firstly, you need to factor in charges that you pay upon signature of the contract (0.3% the value of the property) and 5% of the total cost upon registration of the property (plus another 0.6% in fees and miscellaneous costs) — an extra $31,500 on a half- million dollar property. Extra costs may also be incurred through the building process as some developers will charge for any extras you will want to install (one extra plug in a room can cost $50, electric shutters $500) and can easily amount to around $15,000 in total.

Financing is a different thing altogether. Usually, in Lebanon you are expected to have paid up to 90% of the house price by the time you move in. So unless you can pay up cash, you’d need to get a housing loan. In Lebanon this puts you into a Catch-22 situation as you need a document proving ownership of the property which is usually only given to you by developers after you’ve already paid about 60% of the house price already. Also, there’s a limit to just how much the bank will give you. For example, a salaried employee earning around $4,000 a month can borrow up to a maximum of $115,000 over 15 years which is repaid at a current interest rate of between 8-9%. With current house prices in central Beirut averaging around $2,000 per square meter, you would either need to settle for a 100 m2 home in the city or for a bigger house in suburbia.

So, if you find the idea of buying a new house unnerving, perhaps it is best to do as the birds and the bees do and find a good tree somewhere else!

RANA HANNA has spent the better part of the last two years searching for property to purchase. She is sill looking

August 1, 2007 0 comments
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Who is Barak Obama?

by Lee Smith August 1, 2007
written by Lee Smith

The 47 year-old junior senator from Illinois emerged as a powerful figure after he delivered the keynote address at the 2004 Democratic Convention while he was still a state legislator. A charismatic speaker whose half-African half-American heritage seem to represent the reality of multi-racial America and the future of the Democratic Party, Obama’s current ascendancy appears to reside in the fact that not only did he not approve the Iraq War but he wasn’t even a member of the Senate when the 2003 vote was called. He was elected to the Senate in 2004.

Obama is where the fantasies of the left wing and the center of the Democratic Party seem to converge. The left never wanted the war to begin with and the center wishes it had never happened this way. Obama, the untainted one, is the candidate who allows them to imagine Iraq back into never-never-land. He is not the anti-war choice as much as he is the non-Iraq candidate.

Nonetheless, the Democratic front-runner is still New York Senator Hillary Clinton, whose most obvious liability is that she voted for the war, a mark on her record that Obama has been eager to exploit. Finally, after the latest debate between the Democratic candidates, Clinton struck back, targeting the principles of her opponent’s foreign policy. In the debate, Obama welcomed the opportunity to meet with world leaders hostile to the US, and Clinton later said that this strategy “was irresponsible and frankly naïve.”

Obama, whose inexperience at the national level means he has no foreign policy credentials to speak of, justified his position by favorably comparing his willingness to engage enemies with the ethos of the current White House. “The notion that somehow not talking to countries is punishment to them — and this is the guiding diplomatic principle of this administration — is ridiculous.”

Here Obama is not irresponsible and naïve, but ignorant. The Bush White House does not withhold diplomacy as a form of punishment, but rather contends that engagement with radical states legitimizes and rewards outlaw behavior. The actions, for example, of Syria and Iran offer sufficient evidence to justify the White House’s rationale.

Obama may be the non-Iraq candidate, but he also seems to have been in a deep sleep the last five plus years, snoring through not only 9/11, but everything else the region has revealed about itself since then. In addition to the timeless clichés of Washington foreign policy circles — like the signal importance of the Arab-Israeli crisis and trying to separate Syria from Iran — Obama also subscribes to the innocent realism of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group report. The junior senator calls for a “comprehensive regional and international diplomatic initiative to help broker an end to the civil war in Iraq.”

The international actors who might make a difference in Iraq — like France, Germany and Russia — have been transparently clear over the last several years they have no interest in tying themselves down in Iraq to suit US strategic goals. As for the significant regional players who could help, they have either distanced themselves from the project or have done everything in their power to subvert it. Saudi Arabia is uncomfortable being the meat squeezed between the ascendant Shia sandwich of Iran and Iraq and has no Iraq policy. And Iran and Syria obviously have no stake in a stable Iraq, or else they would not have nurtured chaos in the land of the two rivers so assiduously over the last four years. Tehran and Damascus want the US out of the Middle East and will understand any invitations to a US-led conference as a ceremony to accept Washington’s terms of surrender.

Elsewhere, Obama’s Iraq policy is being criticized not for its naiveté but rather its cynicism. In an interview with the Associated Press, Obama argued that, “preventing a potential genocide in Iraq isn’t a good enough reason to keep U.S. forces there. If genocide,” said Obama, is “the criteria by which we are making decisions on the deployment of U.S. forces, then by that argument you would have 300,000 troops in the Congo right now … We would be deploying unilaterally and occupying the Sudan, which we haven’t done. Those of us who care about Darfur don’t think it would be a good idea.”

Obama’s all-or-nothing interventionism as an excuse to ignore a potential full-blown civil war may seem amoral to some, but it illustrates an important development in US thinking. In a long essay outlining his foreign policy positions for the July/August Foreign Affairs, “Renewing American Leadership,” Obama writes, “After thousands of lives lost and billions of dollars spent, many Americans may be tempted to turn inward and cede our leadership in world affairs. But this is a mistake we must not make.”

Even if most of the candidates who have virtually talked themselves out of contention the 2008 elections will depend very much on what the electorate thinks about Iraq. And yet as Obama’s AP interview obliquely suggests, the real consequences of Iraq will not be understood for years to come. Obama’s Foreign Affairs essay essentially argues that liberal interventionism is the right idea, even if the Bush team got it wrong. The big question looming in America’s strategic future is: What if liberal interventionism is not the right idea, no matter who’s running the show?

LEE SMITH is a Hudson Institute visiting fellow and reporter on Middle East affairs 

August 1, 2007 0 comments
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Hooters, Tooters It’s a bad idea

by Executive Staff August 1, 2007
written by Executive Staff

The food franchising industry is doing well in the Middle East. Buying a tried-and-proven formula for a hospitality venture has allowed both small entrepreneurs and powerful investors to roll out restaurants in their markets while cutting down some of their development headaches and harvesting customer recognition from the strength of international brands. Examples range from lowbrow individual franchisees of sandwich and pizza delivery outlets to the full-scale regional multi-US-brand operations of Kuwait Food Corporation (TGIF, KFC, et al).

Although franchisees in the region had their problems with copycatting or brand disputes, the franchise concept has on the whole worked smoother than the nation’s consumer goods wrestling battles between exclusive agencies and overpriced import monopolies in one corner and product fakers and unethical traders in the other.

International food franchising formulas have been repeated by local conceptioneers who brought, for example, Lebanese restaurants like Caspar & Gambini or Crepaway to the Gulf. The process is also working in the opposite direction of bringing concepts from the GCC to the Levant.

But do people of the region want restaurants that openly offend conservatives? Would they accept franchise outlets that express an alien culture in highly intrusive manner? The issue arose newly this summer over marketing announcements by a Kuwaiti businessman who wanted to land a Hooters restaurant — trademark: only busty waitresses willing to wear tight orange shorts and dress totally down on top need apply — not in Kuwait but in Dubai.

The man’s announcement immediately drew disbelief and some consternation from readers and commentators. A Kuwaiti columnist suggested that Hooters should “keep their breasts in the West.” Officials in Dubai said there was no record of an application to register the venture there and that they would follow “very closely” any moves to establish the restaurant in the emirate.

Not always welcome

Bringing those international brands into your hometown is not everyone’s cup of tea. In pre-enlightened Syria, state representatives once forced eaters to abandon the Colonel’s coleslaw apparently because of a (later reversed) official aversion to Kentuckian chicken commercialism.

However, most failed franchise operations in developed countries as well as the Middle East arguably did not go down because of protests by gender activists or anxious culture guardians. They faltered because their concepts didn’t vie with customers — in Beirut alone, the list is quite long and includes donut makers, ice cream and frozen yogurt, and regional and international fried chicken vendors.

The apparently wishful-more-than-wistful Hooters impresario, a man by the name Jamal Shaheen, gave interviews in June, during which he said that he was looking for a location where he could open a first outlet in Dubai by the end of 2007 and add further outlets in the following year, also in the emirate. He did not elaborate on his investment into becoming a franchisee or if he had a motive other than money for wanting to set up the restaurant.

After his news sparked contrarian opinions, he was no longer available to answer interview requests on the economics of the projects. According to the information on the company’s website in the US, the firm charges a franchise fee of $75,000 per location; typical costs furthermore include an initial investment of between $800,000 and $1.5 million per restaurant.

Given Dubai’s spiraling rent and other costs, an outlet there is unlikely to require an initial investment at the low end of range cited by Hooters. And by the way, the plan to set up in Dubai was already Shaheen’s secondary roll-out plan. He wanted first to launch in Beirut but dropped the idea because of the difficult development outlook.

The reality test of trying if this particular skimpy waitress scheme will be allowed in Lebanon thus fell flat, although it might have caused less of a controversy here. Teasing attires and self-commercialization of women and men in Lebanon are nothing new.

Whereas regional online discussions on the restaurant project revealed many similarities to accusations and justifications that make the pros and cons in debates on sexist business ventures in the US, the wire to trip the attempt of letting Hooters loose in an Arab market may well be that the regional cultural paradigm enforces a public set of norms also when those norms come with a past of having been breached for centuries or millennia in the off.

Announcing raucous plans for a restaurant in open digression of the norms held up publicly in the region may have greatly impaired any chances that such a venture ever might have had in Dubai and any city of the region. Tooting about Hooters appears to have been a bad idea.

August 1, 2007 0 comments
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Editorial

This is Beirut!

by Yasser Akkaoui August 1, 2007
written by Yasser Akkaoui

It’s Saturday night at White, the rooftop bar on the edge of the beleaguered Beirut Central District. The affluent 30-something crowd, many of whom live and work in the GCC, dance to the beat pulsating from the huge speakers. At the refrain “This is Beirut! Not Dubai!

” they cheer loudly. They are on holiday and nothing is going to stop the fun.
 

The tourists have stayed away and the political storm clouds may be gathering. The country threatens to be torn apart by internal divisions but the vitality of the Lebanese remains undimmed. The country simmers on the hot plate of chaos but we can still get on down.

It’s a well worn cliché, but on paper Lebanon should never work. And yet in the midst of all the turmoil, the key sectors still perform. Property development marches on, luxury cars still roll out of the showrooms, banks still show healthy balance sheets, the port of Beirut is ranked in the world’s top 100 and the nightlife still throbs to Lebanon’s uniquely sweaty beat. Lebanon is a country that should not make sense, and yet, in its own weird way, it works.

Dubai, on the other hand, totally makes sense. It is organized and stable, its mega-developments tower into the azure Gulf sky. Dubai is wealth central, a Las-Vegas-eque pleasure dome predicated on a master plan and fuelled by blue chip entertainment, premiere sporting events, vibrant capital market and a real estate revolution with global ripples. All that glitters is gold and its there for the taking. The state-owned enterprises led the way — especially in real estate and private equity — and showed the obedient citizenry how it’s done.

In Lebanon, the opposite is true. It is shambolic, divisive and anarchic, but its hunger to work, to trade, to sell and to build is unstoppable. Whenever and wherever there is an opportunity the Lebanese entrepreneur will take it. Lebanon is a nation driven by its private sector initiative and strong merchant class. With this glorious and indomitable DNA, how can we not celebrate Beirut?

From Beirut,

August 1, 2007 0 comments
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Lebanon

Automotive – Wheels and deals

by Executive Staff August 1, 2007
written by Executive Staff

The Association of Car Importers in Lebanon (ACIL) has reported that total registered new cars are down by 20%, selling 7,909 cars in the first six months compared to the same period in 2006 whose sales reached 9,780. June’s drop alone was over 50% compared with June 2006, which has weighed down the average considerably. Mid-May through September is the car industry’s high season when dealers make nearly half of their yearly sales and, despite everything, July has shown promise of an upswing.

The car market is a traditionally important economic measure of consumer confidence. As the second largest investment for the average person, car sales can show how the economy is affecting individual lives. The industry has been hit by a number of factors — political uncertainty, a flaccid tourist season (the revenues from which would normally contribute 11% to Lebanon’s GDP) and a strengthening euro — all of which will contribute to what is expected to be a year of zero economic growth. The good news is that it’s a buyer’s market.

According to Farid Homsi, general manager of Impex Trading, the local agent of Chevrolet, Cadillac and Hummer, statistics show that over 70% of Lebanese buyers of new cars now choose from the $10,000 to $16,000 segment. He says that this change in consumer preferences is partly due to increasing petrol prices forcing most to search for more efficient and affordable cars. Not surprisingly, given the retail pinch, the mid-level luxury segment from $40,000-$50,000 has been most affected. The recession-proof luxury and SUV segment has remained unaffected by the dip.

Commericial sales are down

Another factor that has hit the car industry is the drop of commercial sales of cars for business fleets and car rental companies which account for 30 to 35% of overall sales. “We knew they were going to suffer,” said Abdo Sweidan, chief operating officer at Rasamny-Younis Motor Co. (Rymco), which represents Nissan. Most dealers expected corporate fleets would not be replaced this year and the same for car rental companies that would reuse the same cars. Despite this, year-to-date figures in June showed that 634 commercial cars — vans and the like — have been sold, compared to 726 for the same time last year.

“We are crisis managers more than marketing managers,” explains Bazerji. In his experience, “all cars which have a selling price of at least $35,000 are more heavily affected by the currency exchange.” Maserati has been negatively impacted by the rising euro forcing his company to improvise and find solutions.

For most dealerships of European cars — which make up nearly a third of the market — management have found ways to soften the blow of currency fluctuations relating to the euro. Christian Nehme, commercial manager at Kattaneh, representative for Audi and Volkswagen, said that his company has received its stock through their regional office in Dubai to hedge against the rising currency.

Luxury still sells

“High-end luxury buyers are unpredictable,” said Charles Tarazi, brand manager and partner at Porsche. While sales deliveries are down around 10% for Porsche, the ultra luxury segment priced around $190,000, such as GR3RS, the Cayenne Turbo SUV, and the 911 Turbo, are not only selling but even carrying with them a waiting list running until February 2008. What most impacted Porsche has been the used models which range in price between $30,000 to $80,000 and make up at least 40% of sales.

Other European brands have steadily lost ground from 47% of the market share three years ago to 29% today. Most brands are down for the first half-year compared with that of last year, except for Porsche — propped up by the best selling Cayenne — and the competitive Skoda both showing healthy sales. Peugeot remains the top selling European brand selling 607 units and making up 7% of the European market.

The combination of the trend toward compact and efficient cars in the last two years and the exchange rate for the yen has had a positive impact on Japanese models. This year, Japanese models captured almost 47% of the market share with Nissan and Toyota taking the lead. Nissan’s Tilda takes the lead as Rymco’s most popular model. Korean brands have also continued to increase their market share to just over 16%.

The impact of the weakening dollar has also helped to push American cars according to Homsi. American brands have a market share of 7%. Compact cars such as the Chevrolet Aveo have been his company’s most popular. Going up the scale, the Cadillac’s compact model BLS has been aimed at the younger clientele as well as Hummer’s H3 which is smaller and more compact, Homsi said. Known for their gas-guzzling engines and large bodies, American manufacturers have shifted to greater fuel efficiency and compact sizes.

Deals are to be had during these times as car dealers are forced to find creative ways to attract customers. “Buyers right now are very prudent, they want to wait and see,” said Nabil Bazerji, managing directory of GA Bazerji and Sons, representative for Maserati, Lancia and Suzuki. “We are advertising to motivate the market and improvising to reduce the price burden,” he continued. While many in the industry cite consumer tastes changing to affordability, Bazerji maintains that “Lebanese are still trendy, they focus on the brands and then look for affordable models of the brands they want.”

The car industry is capital intensive with high overhead. With import duties beginning at 20% for the first $13,000 of a car invoice and then 50% for the value over that, not to mention the 10% VAT, dealers must make a considerable investment to import their stock. The industry has lobbied for the duty to be replaced by a flat rate similar to those used in Europe and Dubai, according to Homsi, adding that sales would be higher if the duty was lifted. These fees are paid before the cars are sold on the market forcing dealers to recoup them in the sticker price and leaving little wiggle room for negotiations on prices. Taxes, registration and insurance tack on several thousand dollars to the price of a car.

Creative financing

Rymco came up with a campaign to remedy this whereby the sticker price was inclusive of all fees leaving off those last minute “surprises” like the 7% registration fee. Additionally, they provided a financial package with no down payment and free insurance for a year. “We had to think outside the box,” said Sweidan, adding that the campaign was so successful in the spring that their inventory vanished in less than a month. While most dealers are reporting decreasing sales, Rymco was able to report growth of 30% according to Sweidan. “The summer campaign has also been successful, I wish that I had ordered more cars,” he said. The success of their campaign is also due in part to their aggressive advertising campaign from newspaper advertisements to SMS messages, leaving only very few unaware of the offer.

Other dealers have followed suit by providing financing programs up to five years to lower the monthly payment as well as financing packages that include all fees and taxes to ease the financial burden as well as aftersales services, filling in the void between consumers’ wants and their financial means. Low interest rates have also helped to financing packages. Attractive leasing options are also gained much ground for consumers who are wary of long-term commitments.

Sweidan said the two most important lessons for Rymco in the last year after the Summer War and this year’s continued economic uncertainty has been that “there is never no market, there are always segments within the market that have growth potential. Once you have identified them, focus all of your resources on the target segment you want to attract and find a match between consumer wants and their means.”

 

August 1, 2007 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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