Comment

In Name of the Disappeared

by Peter Speetjens
written by Peter Speetjens

With an eye on the fate of Alan Johnston, the BBCcorrespondent who disappeared in Gaza on March 12, 2007, CNNrecently interviewed Olaf Wiig. In August 2006, the Fox News journalist had been kidnapped at gunpoint by an obscure Islamist group that demanded the release of all Muslimprisoners in the United States.

Wiig related that he had not been mistreated and that hisbiggest torture was facing the uncertainty, the not knowingwhere he was, why he was there, and for how long he had tostay there before being released, if he was to be releasedat all. Wiig was eventually set free after two weeks incaptivity.

Uncertainty was also the word that constantly popped up ina series of interviews I did with Lebanese mothers whosesons and husbands had disappeared during or after the CivilWar. All of them said it was the uncertainty over the fateof their loved ones that tormented them the most. In fact,most of them said they preferred to know their son was dead,than to not know at all. At least, so they argued, theywould be able to turn the page and move on with their lives.

No doubt, the Argentinean Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo,whose children disappeared under the reign of the militaryjunta, would answer in similar fashion. And so would thefamilies of the thousands that disappeared in countries asvaried as Chile, Algeria and the former Soviet Union.

Although there are differences, Wiig and Johnston, and thechildren of Lebanon and Argentina, all fell victim to whatis known in the jargon as “forced disappearance,” whichapplies to an organization or state that kidnaps, illegallydetains and often tortures a person for political reasons.The victim is imprisoned without trial at a secret location,sometimes for years on end. At a certain point he or she maysuddenly be released, yet it will mostly end in murder,after which the body will be dumped in an unknown location.

For the families involved, the end result is the same, asin both cases the victim vanishes from the face of theearth, while the suspected perpetrators deny any involvementand make sure all physical evidence is destroyed. Seeing theexamples cited above, it is frightening to realize that theWest, lead by the self-proclaimed freedom champions in Washington, has embarked ona path not so entirely different.

On June 8, Swiss investigator Dick Marty submitted hissecond report to the Council of Europe which points at agrowing body of evidence that, ever since 9/11, the CIA haskidnapped hundreds of presumed terror suspects around theworld and flown them to secret prisons in countries such asPoland, Rumania, Morocco, Egypt and Afghanistan. Andapparently it did so with tacit support of its Europeanallies.

Thus, Maher Arar, a Canadian of Syrian descent, wasarrested at Kennedy Airport in New York City and deported toSyria where he stayed 10 months in jail. Khaled el-Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, was arrested inMacedonia and flown to Afghanistan where he was held forfive months. In 2003, Egyptian Abu Omar was snatched by ateam of CIA agents in Milan and flown to Egypt where heremained in jail until February 2007. All three claim tohave been tortured.

These cases are arguably but the tip of the metaphoricaliceberg. Marty’s report was issued one day after six humanrights organizations had published a list with 39 names ofpeople, who at some point were in US custody, yet today areunaccounted for. In other words, they disappeared. Despiterepeated requests by organizations such as Human RightsWatch and Amnesty International, the US government refusesto comment or provide information about their whereabouts.

Lack of transparency and disrespect for basic human rightsseems to be the norm for the Bush administration inconducting its War on Terror. So, most Guantanomo Bay “enemycombatants” have still no clue for how long they will remainimprisoned, as they have never even been charged with anywrongdoings. In fact, it was only in 2006 that a courtruling forced the US government to release their names.

Much less reported in the mainstream media is the factthat in the aftermath of 9/11, thousands of people werearrested in the United States on immigration law violations.Most were Muslims and had overstayed their visa. Of coursethe administration had a legal ground to arrest thesepeople, yet most of them were jailed for months on end andeventually deported without having seen a lawyer or judge.

Hence, Shakir Baloch, a Canadian of Pakistani descent,stayed seven months in a New York jail and was only releasedafter his wife had managed to somehow track him down andfind an attorney.

On August 30, the annual International Day of theDisappeared takes place to draw attention to all thosepeople around the world detained in places unknown to theirrelatives or legal representatives. Let us hope that by thenAlan Johnston has been set free and that the United States,as the self-proclaimed beacon of freedom, recalls thatuniversal human rights are exactly that: universal.

Peter Speetjens is a Dutch writer and freelance consultant

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Role of governments in energizing the future of ICT

by Karim Sabbagh & Eddy Skaff
written by Karim Sabbagh & Eddy Skaff

Most governments in the Middle East are increasingly supporting the idea that information and communication technologies (ICT) can be made available to all citizens to truly improve their lives. In the not-too-distant future, ICT will positively transform how we interact as consumers with services such as banking, shopping, healthcare,transportation and many other facets of our everyday lives.Leading ICT regions such as Western Europe, North America,and Southeast Asia are already experiencing this paradigm.

The Middle East region, however, is still far from realizingthe full benefits of ICT and the path to true advancementwill continue to be tortuous unless the topic receives fullattention. A number of challenges must be overcome to getICT development on a sustainable path.

“The importance in giving the populations of the Middle Eastaccess to ICT cannot be underestimated,” said Eddy Skaff,Senior Associate at Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH). “In order tobe competitive on the world stage, Middle East markets willhave to prevail over some current obstacles they face, whichthreaten to hinder the successful implementation of anenvironment that supports and sustains ICT and its benefits.Governments in this region can play a key role in makingthese benefits a reality to consumers.”

Singapore is the world leader

The latest Networked Readiness Index, published by theWorld Economic Forum in collaboration with INSEAD,highlights the pivotal role governments play in driving thenational ICT agenda. In this ranking, one countryoutperforms the rest of the world in more than one pillar:Singapore. This underscores the “Singaporean government’sclear vision for ICT and the subsequent leading roleundertaken by the latter in promoting ICT diffusion andpenetration.”

The report shows the Middle East region remaining quitestable in network readiness and highlights several successstories with government-lead initiatives in the UAE (29thplace), Qatar (36th place) and Bahrain (50th place).

The single biggest hurdle is the lack of a holistic ICTdevelopment agenda at a national level. The definition of adevelopment plan at a market level is mostly non-existent in the region. This position does not undermine thesuccessful formulation and early implementations of sectorspecific ICT plans, such as e-government.

Saudi Arabia is a typical example where several governmentagencies are involved in different national IT initiativesand programs. The Communications and Information TechnologyCommission is championing Saudi’s e-government program aswell as several other IT sector initiatives such as theInternet Restructuring Project and Computer EmergencyResponse Team to name a few. The Saudi Arabian GeneralInvestment Authority has become a key player by launchingthe Knowledge Economic City in Madinah, establishing theIntel Capital Fund and signing an agreement with CiscoSystems to invest SR1 billion in the IT sector. Otheragencies have also contributed to the national ICTdevelopment.

Similarly, the UAE boasts several government-championedICT development projects. Dubai’s e-government program,launched in 2000, has been recognized as a success story bypractitioners. Dubai Internet City, Knowledge Village, andDubai Silicon Oasis are aiming to create and develop ICTclusters. The Abu Dhabi Systems and Information Committeelaunched earlier this year the Abu Dhabi Government’s portalalong with a very ambitious e-government project. TheTelecommunications Regulatory Authority, for its part,established an ICT Development Fund.

Such examples underscore the prevailing state offragmentation region-wide, albeit with a drive for increasedcoordination. The accumulation of these siloed initiativesmay be creating an inefficient allocation of resources andsubstantive delays in delivering meaningful services tousers.

How governments can promote ICT

Holistic ICT development agendas at the national levelshould be driven by governments through a complete SectorManagement Lifecycle. (1) Governments should begin bysetting national policies for the growth and development ofboth the telecommunications and IT sectors. (2) Thesepolicies would be translated into long-term master plansthat identify development priorities and programs. (3)Governments should also ensure the availability of adequateregulatory and legal environments to foster a faircompetitive market, regulate distribution of scarceresources, and protect consumers and businesses through aset of e-legislations. (4) Finally, government-ledinitiatives will create the right level of readiness amongthe country’s economic actors.

Telecom regulations are typically entrusted to astructurally and financially independent authority, whilesector development initiatives are usually overseen by anempowered cross-departmental program office reporting to thesenior program champion. However, some roles could also becombined within a single entity to accelerate theimplementation of the national ICT agenda.

“Governments implementing a highly structured program thatincorporates these approaches will more than likely seepositive results,” said Karim Sabbagh, BAH’s vice president.“ICT that is widely available will give Middle Easteconomies the very element they need to maintaincompetitiveness in the near- and long-term future withtechnologically advanced economies throughout the world.”

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Tapping into the GCC Infrastructure Boom

by Imad Ghandour
written by Imad Ghandour

Investing in a water desalination plant or a school was seenfor a long time to be a government’s job. Private companieswere usually interested to build such projects, but wererarely excited to own them. If seduced enough, a contractormight proceed to operate and finance them under a long-termcontract. But the general population of equity investors —not to mention the hyper private equiteers — were rarelyexcited about a business as stable as a toll road and neverhad the patience to wait 30 years to realize back theirinvestment.

But suddenly all that changed in 2006. Today infrastructurefunds are one of the hottest asset classes. Globalinvestment in infrastructure is rising exponentially, andglobal financial institutions like Macquarie Bank havediscovered how to convert infrastructure stability to a veryexciting investment. Private equiteers have hopped on thebandwagon, and creatively managed to make an asset classwith meager IRRs of 8-15% produce returns as high as 40%.Through creative financial engineering, private equiteershave pressed to put as little equity as possible and financemost of their investments through debt. Consequently,marginal improvements in asset value due to underestimatingdemand or improved margins significantly boosted the privateequity IRRs.

The developed world has build most of its infrastructureafter World War II, and such infrastructure is now comingtowards the end of its natural life. With most countries inthe developed world experiencing budget deficits, there isno appetite to fork out trillions of dollars over the nextdecade to replace the aging roads, ports, and bridges. TheUS, for example, needs between $2 and 3 trillion alone torehabilitate its road and transportation infrastructure.

On the other hand, the rising needs of the Chinese, theIndians, and other Asians for electricity, water, andtransportation, after decades of being satisfied withhumbler lifestyles, have put enormous stress on theinfrastructure of these countries. China is building in2006-7 more than 200,000 Megawatts of generation capacity —equivalent to the total generation capacity of the UK — ashundreds of millions of Chinese buy TVs, refrigerators, andwashing machines. In total, the World Bank estimates thataround $32 trillion is needed to be invested in the globalinfrastructure between 2005 and 2030.

In the GCC, the demand for capital to finance theinfrastructure needs has never been greater. By the end of2006, the GCC’s announced power, water, energy, real estate,and transportation projects financing requirements wereestimated to be around $723 billion according to MEEDProjects. Add to this amount a rough guesstimate for theunannounced infrastructure needs over the next decade, andit is easy to foresee the total crossing the trillion dollarmark. To put this in perspective, this amount is larger thanthe total GCC banking sector.

Despite the petrodollar windfall, GCC governments areasking the private sector to step in, and this is creatingsignificant opportunities for private equity players. Themost attractive opportunities will come from privatizinginefficient state companies, where private equity playerscan combine operational improvement to creative financialengineering to realize significant returns.

Private equity players will also tap into theinfrastructure boom through investing in the limitedinventory of private companies that design, build, operate,maintain, and finance infrastructure assets. These areprivate companies like Metito for building and runningdesalination plants, Madares for operating schools, and ACWAPower for building IWPPs. I will not be surprised to seestellar demand and exuberant valuation for such companiesfuelled by regional — and increasingly international —investors trying to tap into the upcoming GCC infrastructureboom.
 

Imad Ghandour is head of Strategy & Research — GulfCapital and Chairman of Information & Statistics Committee —Gulf Venture Capital Association

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Dancing around the International Monetary Fund

by Mounir Rached
written by Mounir Rached

Last March, Lebanon requested to use $77 million (25% of itsquota) of IMF financing as Emergency Post-ConflictAssistance (EPCA) for the first time since it joined thisinternational financial institution on April 14, 1947. TheIMF’s principal function is to provide balance of paymentssupport, particularly when reserves fall to a critical levelthat could jeopardize financial stability, and to monitorreform commitment that supports use of its resources.

The IMF Board in May approved the government’s request whichcoincided with a level of reserves close to $12 billion,equivalent to 20% of deposits; certainly one of the highestin the world in relation to the size of the economy. Thisamount can hardly make a dent in the above quantity ofreserves.

Clearly, the incentive for the arrangement is two-fold: tohave a solid commitment from the government toward itsreform agenda and to provide assurance to donors thatmacro-economic adjustment are adhered to and monitored bythe fund. EPCA then constitutes a catalytic part of ParisIII financing and (if implemented successfully) paves theway for future IMF financing under the standard and morestringent Stand-By arrangement.

Measures require prudence and governance

The risk to the government is that a failure to fulfillits commitment would engender doubt in donors and jeopardizetheir willingness to continue providing financial support aspart of their Paris III pledges of $7.6 billion in thecoming years. These risks for the duration of the programthrough 2007 are revealed in the quantitative programtargets: preserve foreign reserves at $11.5 billion, limitthe primary deficit to LP1.3 trillion ($870 million), anddebt accumulation to LP 2 trillion ($1.3 billion). All thesethree targets are inferior to the outcome of 2006. A fourthquantitative target is to repay LP 2 trillion ($1.3 billion)to the Central Bank. The other hurdle in the program is aset of administrative measures — “Monitorable Actions” —covering fiscal measures, electricity reform, andprivatization. None of these measures requires belttightening, but rather prudence and governance, and a timelydisbursement by donors of pledged resources. This isnormally the case of IMF EPCA programs, setting the pace forthe challenges ahead. The demanding reform will ensue in2008 and beyond. The monetary program is limited tomaintaining a high level of liquid foreign assets combinedwith a an exchange rate peg without creating an imbalancebetween the central bank’s liquidity injections — emanatingfrom its balance sheet cash losses — and money demand.

In the words of the IMF, “the authorities program for 2007 …focuses on maintaining financial stability and containingthe primary deficit while accommodating reconstruction andrelief spending. Keeping the excise rates on gasolineproducts at the levels prevailing in March will be a keymeasure to achieve the deficit objective. EPCA will thusprovide a transition to 2008, when the demanding fiscaladjustment is envisaged to commence. Then, it is perceivedthat the government will be able to embark on acomprehensive economic program that could be supported byfurther IMF financing in the context of upper credit tranchearrangement (Stand-By) arrangements.”

Problems fulfilling promises

What are the inherent risks then? Certainly, the politicalrisk, very well recognized by the IMF, remains the primeimpediment to government capacity to fulfill its commitmentunder EPCA. First, almost one year after the devastating warlast summer the economy remains in a recession. A nominalgrowth rate of 4.5% in economic activity envisaged in theprogram for this year is already beyond reach. While thegovernment met all end-March targets under EPCA, except forthe ceiling on government borrowing from the central bank,the outlook for the rest of the year is bleaker. June andSeptember targets are more foreboding in the ongoingpolitical stalemate and recurrent outbreak of violence.Attaining the revenue target (a 16% rise by the secondquarter) is very unlikely. And the government is alreadyburdened by rising spending to improve security. Failure tocontain the primary deficit to the set target in the secondquarter (by end-June) will in turn necessitate preaching theceiling on government borrowing from the central bank for asecond time. Commercial banks were hesitant to roll overmaturities in the first quarter, and a change in the banks’outlook is unforeseen. The deadline for fulfilling most(four out of six) monitored actions was due by the end ofJune as well, and with parliament not convening, these(including the budget) are yet to be approved. The reform isstumbling at the beginning of the race; to regain momentumit will need exceptionally favorable circumstances, and anend to the political stalemate.
 

Dr. Mounir Rached is a senior IMF economist and afounding member of the Lebanese Economic Association. The views in this article are those of theauthor and do not represent those of the IMF.

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Capitalist Culture

Summers of our discontent

by Michael Young
written by Michael Young

Many things can be said about the July-August 2006 war,whose first anniversary we will be commemorating later thismonth. However, for those who lived through it, a singleenduring image remains: that of sudden, irrevocable,traumatic collapse into chaos.

One minute the Lebanese were enjoying the start of whatlooked to be a prosperous summer, the country was awash withemigrants and visitors, and the football World Cup had hadcreated a sense of being hooked into the nodes of acelebrating world; the next minute, Lebanon was being bombedremorselessly, citizens had become refugees in their owncountry, tourists and visitors were taking to the sea, andthe link to the world had been brutally severed with thesudden closing of Beirut Rafik Hariri International Airport.

In what was an instant, Lebanon’s capitalist culture, aculture of openness, of the promotion of free minds and thefree pursuit of profit, had been overturned by one ofconflict and destruction. The country never recovered fromthat transformation, and to this day is paying the price forthe aftermath of that war, which profoundly divided Lebanesesociety.

The mythology of Lebanon’s summer tourism season has beenworn to the bone. The country can be heading to hell in ahand basket, but people will react most sensitively to thefact “summer” is threatened. Somehow, the symbolism of thatthree-month moment cannot be underestimated: it is themoment of Lebanon’s communion with the outside, when a yearof sluggish business can be righted, when politicians take abreak and when people can take a break from politics. Moreominously, it’s also the time when Lebanon has usually beenhit by disaster: the mass entry of Syrian troops in 1976;the 1978 Israeli invasion, followed by that of 1982; thebeginning of the killings after the Syrian withdrawal in2005; the summer war of 2006. The Lebanese psyche seemsforever buffeted by this struggle between profitablenormalcy and debilitating conflict; and most of the timethat psyche is bathed in the hues of a single season:summer.

Today we’re back to the same worries again. Things startedearly this year. In fact, the summer season was the firstcasualty of Lebanon’s proliferating crises and bomb attacks.The bombings in Ashrafieh, Verdun and Aley were all, to alarge extent, designed to suffocate the tourist season itits egg. While not devastating on a human level, at least inlight of what Lebanon endured in the past, the bombings havebeen devastating to the economy. Travel agencies now reportmass cancellations of reservations; restaurants areoperating at well below their capacity, particularly inBeirut; and by 9 p.m., most streets are empty.

Hanoi or Hong Kong?

Once again, the symbolism is stark. In denying Lebanonnormalization, those who planted the bombs went after itsAchilles heel: summer. The pendulum is again swingingbetween a culture of destruction and a culture of opennessand free-wheeling profit. This dividing line has been apersistent one in postwar Lebanon. It was the Druze leaderWalid Jumblatt who summarized it best when he distinguishedbetween “Hanoi and Hong Kong” in the early 1990s. What hemeant, or what he asked, was whether Lebanon would become anemblem of militancy and armed struggle, particularly againstIsrael, as best represented by Hezbollah? Or would thecountry opt for the path laid out by the late Rafik Hariri,who sought to transform Lebanon into a business nexus forthe region, a bastion of liberal capitalism and ecumenicalpermissiveness?

To this day, Lebanon hasn’t found an answer to thatquestion, hence its dilemma as two vastly different projectscontinue to drive apart its political class and its society.Some months ago, after the summer war, a publicity campaignplayed on this perceived difference. The “I Love Life”billboard campaign, which was directed against mainly whatwas seen as Hezbollah’s ideology of war, provoked animmediate reaction from the opposition. In response, it toobegan an “I Love Life” campaign, falling into the trap ofdeploying a discourse shaped by its adversaries. However,more significant was that the opposition was destabilized bythe accusation that it did not love life. Maybe there wassome hope there.

But hope or no hope, for the foreseeable future Lebanonseems destined to remain a front line in the clash between acapitalist culture and a culture that aims to underminethis; between Hong Kong and Hanoi; between a country thatawaits summer impatiently, but then all too often findsitself dealing with an early winter.

Michael Young

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Ties across the river

by Riad Al-Khouri
written by Riad Al-Khouri

As reform bears fruit, Jordan’s economy may finally beready to take off into sustainable growth. Recentindications of this came at the Dead Sea World EconomicForum gathering in May, which witnessed the signature ofinvestment deals for Jordan totaling $2.5 billion. (Bycomparison, all of 2006’s direct foreign investment intoJordan totaled $3 billion) Given that and other strongeconomic signs, Jordanian GDP looks set to continueexpanding at 6% or more in 2007 and over the next few years;and with population growth decelerating, that means higherper capita incomes.

However, Jordan’s path towards sustainable prosperitywould undoubtedly be smoother without major problems inPalestine, given the symbiosis between the two sides of theJordan River. Most Jordanian citizens are originallyPalestinian; but beyond family ties, many East Bankindividuals and firms have business in or with Palestine.

The most notable example of investment by Jordan in theWest Bank or Gaza (where the Jordanian dinar is widely used)is in Jordanian banks, the branches of which do the lion’sshare of Palestine’s financial business. For example,Palestinian banks hold only 30% of Palestinians’ depositswhile the rest is in the eight Jordanian banks operating inPalestine (including Amman’s flagship Arab Bank).

On that score, things could also move in the oppositedirection, with Palestinian banks branching out into Jordan.As part of its trade liberalization, Jordan’s banking sectoris opening up to outsiders, and the Bank of Palestine isseeking to branch out east of the Jordan, pending a rise incapital and Jordanian central bank approval.

Merchandise trade however, is another matter: as thingsstand today, Jordan’s export of goods to the Palestinians ismeager (and vice versa), with Palestine not even figuringamong the top ten customers or markets of Jordan. On paper,the two sides are committed to expanding commerce, and thePalestine National Authority has an agreement with Jordan tobolster and liberalize trade. In 2003, Jordan exempted allPalestinian goods from duties and fees, in line with anearlier Arab Summit decision, and canceled quotas governingthe entry of Palestinian agricultural products into Jordan.However, four years later, even with the easing of tariffand non-tariff barriers, Palestinian–Jordanian merchandise trade isstill paltry, not having moved much beyond its pre-Oslo 1993level of $60 million annually.

The reasons for this lack of commerce between Palestine andJordan are various, some of them being purely economic. Forinstance, it is sometimes the case that adjacent developingeconomies do little business with each other because theirproducts are so similar. To take two examples, Jordanians donot export many tomatoes to the West Bank because the lattergrows so much of them; nor do Palestinians buy a lot ofbuilding stones from the East Bank, when the stuff isabundant at home anyway.

However, such factors only partially explain the weak tradeflows between the two countries, and this brings us back tothe overriding issue of peace. The lesson of the past decadeor so has been that token commercial deals may help to breakthe ice between protagonists and lead to a feelgoodatmosphere; but expecting a full-blown business relationshipto thrive among all sides on both banks of the Jordanwithout genuine peace is at best naïve.

Amman’s push for Palestinian-Israeli peace is thus a logicalmove to help expand business ties across the Jordan. Thelatest effort by Amman in that direction consists of sellingthe Beirut Arab Summit peace initiative to Israel. Jordanhas always supported the 2002 plan, but five years on, Ammanhas even more to gain from reaching a fair solution to thePalestine problem. For example, political disaffection onthe East Bank — more apparent under democratization — wouldease with a Palestinian-Israeli peace that gives all sidestheir own turf to play on. As things stand now, thePalestinian majority in Jordan can neither aspire to realauthority in a quasi-democracy east of the river, norcredibly hope to project power in the West Bank/Gazaquagmire. Thus, a just peace, whatever the formula, wouldhelp solve East Bank Palestinian problems and lead to a morerelaxed situation on both sides of the Jordan.

Economically, peace would also benefit Amman through a realopening up of Palestine to Jordanian exports and vice versa,unhindered by Israel. However, with the present USadministration playing tough, Israel stalls on peace, to thedetriment of all. That includes Jordanians who, for thefirst time can glimpse sustainable development, but notachieve it without a solution to the Palestinian issue thatmakes all on both sides of the Jordan feel part of abrighter future.

Riad El Khouri is Director, MEBA Amman and a Senior Associate, BNI Inc New York City

 

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‘Korea‘ solution means what?

by Claude Salhani
written by Claude Salhani

Mark it down as yet another more miscalculation by President George W. Bush — one of a slew of political gaffes committed by his administration in conducting the war in Iraq. This time the error lies in miscalculating the length of time US soldiers and Marines would have to remain in Iraq.

The grim reality four years into the conflict — and with no end in sight — is that American troops fighting in Iraq are likely to stay there for many more years to come. In a recent speech US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates said that American troops would be staying in Iraq for at least another decade. Gates, in fact, foresees a “Korea” type solution for Iraq.

The American secretary of defense did not elaborate as to what he meant by a Korea-type solution, leaving reporters to speculate if he meant that Iraq would become divided into a north and south, with a heavily fortified demilitarized zone separating the two regions, while one side tries to acquire nuclear weapons. Or is the secretary of defense referring,instead, to an unfinished “police action” as the Korean War came to be known?

In either case, it does not look as though American forces are to be withdrawn from Iraq anytime in the near future, in any case not until the administration begins to make some sense of the mess they created there. In recent months the president has started losing support even among his traditional base, the military.

“Bush will go down as the worst president since Grant. His leadership has been solely based on business, not on what is right or wrong, and certainly with no concern for human life on either side,” wrote a former US Marine — we shall call him Bill — in an e-mail to me.

In fact, the president’s policy on Iraq is leaving a huge number of serving soldiers as well s veterans frustrated because people they know in the Army are now preparing for third tours of duty in Iraq. Many soldiers have tried to get out of the Army when their enlistments ended, but have been held in active duty by the “stop-loss” that has been in effect for the past three years. This is a law Bush passed to prevent soldiers from leaving the Army in time of war.

“Three combat tours is inhuman!” says Bill. “You have seen combat. You know the stress. We who have been there, know full well the toll it takes,” he told me.

“One tour is more than enough and leaves life-long scars that take years to heal. Two tours in an outrage, but three tours is beyond belief.”

This comes at a time when the Pentagon admitted that it is unable to handle the medical strain placed on its personnel by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The numbers of traumatic brain injuries and post-traumatic stress disorder issues alone are overwhelming the defense department’s medical staff’s capabilities to care for wounded veterans. Military doctors and psychiatrists are leaving the service for jobs in the private sector.

Some are starting to say that President Bush must reinstitute the draft in order to give relief to the overworked and overstretched military. But that is unlikely to pass muster with Congress. Bill, the former U.S. Marine officer, says the president must send closer to one million troops if the situation in Iraq is to be fully controlled.This is more in line with the numbers called for in pre-war estimates, but which were turned down by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

The alternative, according to Bill, “is to pull out of Iraq and let the Iranians and Syrians fight over what is left.”

Regardless of how one looks at it American forces are unlikely to be withdrawn from Iraq anytime soon. Even with a Democratic president in the White House.

The Democrats are making the Iraq war a major issue in the2008 presidential elections, but the reality is very different from campaign promises. National Public Radio’spolitical analyst Ted Koppel pointed out that, during a recent debate among democratic presidential candidates,Hillary Clinton was asked what she would do if the war was still on when she became president.

According to Koppel, Clinton said she would bring the troops home. She never said she would bring “all” the troops home.There is a subtle difference between bringing some troops home and bringing all the troops home.

Still, according to Koppel, Hillary Clinton is reported to have told a retiring Pentagon official that she would not be surprised if American forces were still in Iraq at the end of her second term in office, if she were re-elected. That means nine years from now. Nine long years during which time many more American servicemen and women will lose their lives as will many Iraqis.

As Bill laments, “Not one [of those running for President]from either party is capable of the kind of courage and leadership that will be required of the American president to bring this fiasco to a close with any degree of success.

Claude Salhani is international editor and a senior political analyst with United Press International in Washington, DC.

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Gaza’s not the only battlefield

by Lee Smith
written by Lee Smith

In most of Washington, the Palestinian civil war in Gaza hasbeen understood as yet another setback for the Bush WhiteHouse and yet another sign of an ascendant Iran. As if Washington policymakers vying for a job in the nextadministration didn’t already know it, Gaza is a sharpreminder that the peace process is dead. At this stage at least, it is nothing more than a jobs program for deeplycynical American officials past and present who do not givea damn that Arab and Israeli lives are being thrown away, aswell as US money and prestige, all for the privilege of beating a dead horse.

But all is not what it seems in the Middle East, where chaos in Gaza is perhaps less dramatic than it appears and the Lebanese Army’s battle in Tripoli is an unheralded achievement for Washington and its regional allies.

The Americans are all but oblivious to the fact that whathappened in Gaza is the continuation of a Palestinian civilwar that began more than 70 years ago with Hajj Aminal-Husseini’s Arab Revolt. He assassinated rivals whileestablishing the basis of Palestinian political culture —extremism is rewarded and moderation is futile if notsuicidal.

Yasser Arafat is the father of Palestinian nationalismprecisely because he was able to quell the Palestinian civilwar. In doing so, he also rescued the Palestinian file fromregional players, namely Gamal Abd el-Nasser and Hafezal-Asad. Arafat established his own power and consolidatedwarring clans and rival centers of power into one entitythrough a simple tactic — waging war against Israel, acommon enemy that all Palestinians could safely agree to fight.

When the Palestinians elected Hamas in 2005, they voted against Fatah corruption, but they did not vote for good governance — or, in President Bush’s formula, “fixing streetlights.” A vote for Hamas was a vote for the politicalinstitution most likely to prosecute a successful waragainst Israel. Except for Islamist domestic policies, Hamaschampions exactly the same causes as Fatah, just moreintransigently.

The US is allied with Mahmoud Abbas but should be under noillusions as to his political orientation or, moreimportantly, his ability to win the Palestinian civil war.Abbas’ choice for new PA Prime Minister is telling. He choseSalam Fayyad, former PA finance minister. Obviously Abbas isnot interested in winning this fight; rather he isinterested in making sure the money keeps flowing to himselfand Fatah.

The major point that the Americans need to recognize is thatGaza is not the only Palestinian battlefield in the regionright now, and so we should put it in its regional contextand look elsewhere for clues to which way the region isheading. If the fighting is Gaza is about something old,developments in Lebanon are pointing to something very newindeed.

Perhaps we will never know who fired rockets from southernLebanon into Israel, but it is useful to remember ithappened just as the Lebanese Army seemed on the verge offinishing off Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Bared refugeecamp.

Lebanese readers may be surprised to know that neither theAmerican press (like Seymour Hersh), nor the US intelligencecommunity (especially the CIA) are willing to admit thatFatah al-Islam is a function of the Syrian regime, one ledby a man described in the Arab press as a Syrianintelligence asset, Shaker al-Absi. With defeat on thehorizon, it seemed Damascus was looking to open up anotherfront to attack the Lebanese government. However, the keyfactor in the equation is the Palestinians.

In 1975, Lebanon’s Christian community wanted to put down the PLO and other Palestinian factions that sought to turn Lebanon into a garrison state. However, the Christians were blocked by the Sunnis, both within Lebanon and in the region. Today the situation is reversed. The Syrians have lined up with Iran to challenge Sunni primacy throughout the Middle East, and the Sunni response has been unequivocal. Fouad Siniora has the support of the Gulf States and other Sunni powers, like Egypt and Jordan, to take on an armed Palestinian group manipulated by the Alawi regime in Damascus.

And so with Arafat gone, foreign actors are once againtrying to use the Palestinian file to their own advantage — namely, Iran, through Hamas in Gaza, and Syria, throughFatah al-Islam and others in Lebanon. This Iranian-Syrian attack against the Sunni order is also a directchallenge to Washington, for whether the Americans, stillangry at Saudi and Egypt after 9/11, like it or not, theSunnis as it turns out are allies. The Shia emancipationprogram in Iraq did not turn out as the US had hoped, butthe Middle East will continue to shift under the White Houseeven as it is tottering astride it.

And some of that movement is to Washington’s advantage —Sunni support for putting down an armed Palestinianinsurgency in Lebanon represents a significant sea change inthe regional order. Moreover, the Lebanese Army’s fight is atentative sign that the government is able to assert itssovereignty, a fact that can only make Hezbollah uneasy,while the Islamic resistance’s Syrian sponsors have suffereda very palpable setback.

Lee Smith is a Hudson Institute visiting fellow and reporter on Middle East affairs.

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Financial Indicators

Global economic data

by Executive Staff
written by Executive Staff

Journalists killed on duty 1992-2007

The Committee to Protect Journalists applies strict journalistic standards when investigating a death. It considers a case “confirmed” only if it is reasonably certain that a journalist was killed in direct reprisal for his or her work; in crossfire; or while carrying out a dangerous assignment. It does not include journalists who are killed in accidents – such as car or plane crashes – unless the crash was caused by hostile action (for example, if a plane were shot down or a car crashed trying to avoid gunfire).

It includes only confirmed cases in our database and in the statistical analysis above. If the motives are unclear, but it is possible that a journalist was killed because of his or her work, the Committee to Protect Journalists classifies the case as “unconfirmed” and continues to investigate to determine the motive for the murder. 

*Adds up to more than 100 percent because more than one category applies in some cases.

**CPJ considers justice fully served when both the perpetrators and masterminds are convicted. If perpetrators are convicted, but the intellectual authors are not, CPJ classifies the case as partial justice.

Older workers

Persons aged 55-64 in employment as % of the population of same age group

OECD countries must get more people into employment if they are to boost living standards and maintain welfare services. That is the message from the OECD Jobs Strategy 2006. Some population groups merit particular policy attention. For instance, only 65% of women of working age are employed in the OECD, versus 87% of prime-age men. Meanwhile, premature retirement and barriers to getting a job affect older people that wish to work. In several countries, including Italy, less than a third of 55 to 64 year olds were in employment in 2005, compared with over 60% in the US and Japan, and nearly 85% in Iceland. The Jobs Strategy sees four pillars to effective employment policymaking:

A: Setting appropriate macroeconomic policy

B: Removing impediments to labor-market participation and job-search

C: Tackling obstacles to labor demand

D: Facilitating the development of labor-force skills and competencies

Healthcare spending

Public and private spending, per capital

Healthcare spending has grown faster than GDP in every OECD country except Finland between 1990 and 2004. It accounted for 7% of GDP on average across OECD countries in 1990, but reached 8.9% in 2004. Spending is projected to increase as a share of GDP due to costly new medical technologies and population ageing. The public share of health spending – 73% on average in 2004 – has fallen in some countries, but has risen in others. This includes the US – 40% to 45% in 1990-2004 – where, despite a dominant private sector, US public spending per capita in health remains higher than in most other OECD countries.

Some workers will inevitably be in jobs for which they are overqualified, but the rate of overqualification is higher among foreign-born populations. In Italy and Greece, immigrant overqualification is particularly high compared with native populations. Immigrant overqualification is also relatively high in Norway and Sweden, though this reflects refugees rather than economic migrants. While the native/ foreign gap in overqualification rates is narrower in the UK and US, these countries have respectively the fifth and seventh highest overqualification rates for native-born workers of the 21 countries in

Youth and traffic fatalities

OECD countries

Proportion of youth in the population: 10%

Proportion of youth in driver fatalities: 27%

Traffic crashes are the single greatest killer of 15 to 24 year-olds in OECD countries. These drivers pose a greater risk than other drivers to themselves, their passengers and other road users. The problem also imposes great social and economic costs on individuals, families and societies. In the US alone, government estimates put crashes involving 15 to 20 year-old drivers at $40.8 billion in 2002. Some 8,500 young drivers of passenger vehicles were killed in OECD countries in 2004. Death rates for 18 to 24 year-old drivers are more than double those of older drivers. Moreover, death rates for young men are consistently higher than those of young women, often by a factor of three. In other words, even where overall road safety is improving, young driver risk is not.

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Financial Indicators

Regional equity markets

by Executive Staff
written by Executive Staff

Beirut SE: Blom  (1 month)

Current Year High: 1,550.85       Current Year Low: 1,168.36

 What some analysts camouflaged as “the events in North Lebanon” in the last third of May wiped out modest gains, which the BLOM index had made in the first part of the month. But owing to its resilience and apparent long breath of many investors, the index closed at 1,223.01 points on May 24, within half a point of its close on April 30. The mid-month top mark was 1,248.81 points on May 17. Solidere accounted for the bulk of trading volume in the nervous fourth week of the month but held its ground, all things considered. Main banking stocks Audi and BLOM also fared respectably, with Audi trading above $63 and BLOM at $70 and higher throughout the month. Byblos Bank confirmed that it bought 6.6% of Jordan Ahli Bank.

Amman SE  (1 month)

Current Year High: 6,920.89       Current Year Low: 5,267.27

The Amman Stock Exchange trailed its peers with a drop from 5,992.10 points on May 1 to 5,753.89 points on May 27, a 4% weakening. Although government officials and several companies used the World Economic Forum to announce investment initiatives, the ASE was listless because of the troubles in Palestine and Lebanon. Among the announced deals, Jordan Phosphate Mines teamed up with Bahrain’s Venture Capital Bank for a new $65 million chemicals complex. Kuwait Finance House-Bahrain will establish a new investment bank in Jordan with $50 million capital while Bank of Jordan got its license for Syria. According to an ASE publication, first-quarter earnings for 95 listed companies were up 50.4% from a year earlier and the banking sector reaped 65% of the total earnings.

Abu Dhabi SM  (1 month)

Current Year High: 3,833.94       Current Year Low: 2,839.16

The Abu Dhabi Securities Market shot up almost 600 points, or some 20%, between May 1 and May 27. This rally has lasted for two months and made the ADSM the top gainer among GCC bourses for the year to date. On May 27, the ADSM jumped 4.4% and closed at 3634.93 points, an eight-month high. Energy, real estate, and banking stocks had the most pizzazz with Taqa and Aabar Petroleum among the stocks in demand. The two energy stocks went up 33% and 37%, respectively, in May but were still outdone by real estate stocks Aldar and Sorouh, which climbed 45% and 53%. Fujairah National Insurance made its debut. At the end of the month, ADSM and the Bahrain Stock Exchange signed a memorandum of understanding.  

Dubai FM  (1 month)

Current Year High: 4,985.39       Current Year Low: 3,658.13

The Dubai Financial Market’s general index rose from 3,670.47 points on May 1 to 4,480.80 points on May 27. The gain of more than 20% mirrored that of the ADSM this month, but due to the DFM, ended the reporting period only 6.9% up for the year to date. Dubai saw the UAE’s second largest initial public offering for 2007, from real estate firm Deyaar. Retail investors pushed demand up to over $12 billion, or 14 times the $880 million share offering. Good performers on the DFM included Dubai Islamic Bank (up 31%), and the DFM stock (up 20%) in May. Emaar Properties  closed at AED12.35 on May 27. The UAE market regulator noted approvingly that for the first time, all listed companies met their results reporting deadlines for the first quarter.

Kuwait SE  (1 month)

Current Year High: 11,403.40     Current Year Low: 9,164.30

The Kuwait Stock Exchange ranked second among GCC bourses in 2007 index performance at the end of May, with a 13.27% increase for the year to date. Achieving its climb more steadily than the meteoric Abu Dhabi exchange, the KSE index moved from 10,776.40 points on May 1 to 11.403.40 points on May 27 – its highest stand since end of February 2006. Shares of MTC were in the limelight with rumors of strategic share buying by regional investors. The company formally denied that there was any buying or selling of strategic stakes in MTC or its African subsidiary, Celtel. Kuwait Finance House saw good demand and its shares went up 30% in May. In macro news, Kuwait stirred up the GCC by announcing its switch from a dollar peg to a basket of currencies, which was read as nay to the intended GCC currency union.  

Saudi Arabia SE  (1 month)

Current Year High: 13,509.09     Current Year Low: 6,916.85

The Saudi Stock Exchange remained volatile compared to its peers. From 7,574.48 points on May 1, the TASI moved lower in the first week and closed at 7,667.92 points on May 27. Sabic made headlines by purchasing the plastics business of US manufacturer GE for $11.6 billion. Saudi Kayan Petrochemicals, a Sabic affiliate, was the biggest IPO catch last month with a SR6.75 billion offering that was subscribed almost five times over. A bundle of five insurance firms offered between 31% and 40% of their capital and met good demand. The cement sector was the strongest gainer in the third week of May, after producers hiked their prices. Although the government mandated revocation of the price increases after a week, the companies’ outlook remains good. Agriculture was the most volatile sector in May.

Muscat SM  (1 month)

Current Year High: 5,956.46       Current Year Low: 4,657.16

The Muscat Securities Market showed further bullish sentiments in May and climbed from 5,807.53 points on May 1 to 6,092.65 points on May 27, giving the MSM a 6.7% gain since the start of 2007. BankMuscat continued to push for negotiations over an acquisition offer it made for Alliance Housing Bank (AHB), a bank with market capitalization of $205 million. The AHB board rejected the offer by BankMuscat, Oman’s largest bank with $2.95 billion market cap, citing other regional suitors. BankMuscat offered a 34% premium on the share price of AHB as of early May and the stock has since gone up by about one third. Oman United Insurance Company and privately owned Al Ahlia Insurance, however, called off a merger plan.

Bahrain SE  (1 month)

Current Year High: 2,298.67       Current Year Low: 1,996.68

The Bahrain Stock Exchange was the fourth GCC bourse with a steep ascent during the merry month of May. In a 9% gain, its index rose from 2106.70 points on April 30 to 2,298.67 points on May 27 – making good for losses in the first four months of the year and ending the month on a high note. The kingdom had its share in the month’s primary market glee through the successful initial public offering of Seef Properties, which met strong subscription demand from institutional investors. After announcing management changes and expansion plans, shares in Batelco moved up in May but the Bahraini operator denied rumors that it was talking with an international sector firm over selling it a 20% stake.

Doha SM: Qatar  (1 month)

Current Year High: 8,276.65       Current Year Low: 5,825.80

Continuing on its upward path from April, the Doha Securities Market took May in stride with an 18% gain from 6571.13 points at the start of the month to 7,749.37 points on May 27. With the concentration of gains in the second half of the month, the market’s main movers included Barwa Real Estate, Nakilat, Industries Qatar, and banking shares, including Doha, Rayyan, and International Islamic banks which all advanced by margins of more than 20%. Some investors cashed in on gains with profit taking at the end of the month.  Barwa Real Estate made news with a $1.1 billion Egyptian land purchase for a new super-sized residential project in New Cairo. Qatar Islamic Bank said it will set up a sharia-compliant subsidiary in London.

Tunis SE  (1 month)

Current Year High: 2,712.33       Current Year Low: 1,861.15

 After a third consecutive month of moving sideways, the Tunindex closed at 2,568.90 points on May 25, down 30 points from its close on April 30. This made the small Tunisian bourse the month’s most unspectacular performer among the three North African exchanges but kept it up by 9.68% when compared with the start of the year. Market cap leader SFBT saw its stock drop by 4% to TD79.98, while Banque de Tunisie lost 3% and Tunisair share prices weakened by 7% between May 1 and May 25.

Casablanca SE All Shares  (1 month)

Current Year High: 12,723.23     Current Year Low: 6,563.27

The Casablanca All Shares Index started the month with a week of gains to a pinnacle of 12,723.23 points on May 8 but then selling set in and the index shed 14% in a week’s trading that saw it briefly dip below 11,000 points on May 15. To the end of the month, the index picked up another 500 points and closed at 11,464.60 on May 25. Despite its downward fluctuation, the Moroccan bourse is still the best performer, index-wise, in North Africa for the year to date, with a gain of 19.4% from the start of 2007. Maroc Telecom dropped 10% and leading bank Attijariwafa Bank shed 18% of its market value in the middle of the month in the downtrend that showed across several sectors before the bourse’s slight recovery in the fourth week of May. Local brokers described the market’s dip as expectable profit taking. 

Cairo SE: Hermes  (1 month)

Current Year High: 68,274.93     Current Year Low: 41,965.37

The Hermes index for the Cairo & Alexandria Exchanges was 9.39% up for the year on May 27. Entering the month at 65,582.80 points, the index climbed to 68,274.93 points on May 27. Analysts were less ebullient about CASE than about the GCC markets last month but said that telecom and banking shares did reasonably well, the latter with expectations that several regional banks will compete to buy a significant stake in Al Watany Bank. Piraeus Bank Egypt launched a $53 million rights issue. Sodic, the real estate investment company that signed an urban development contract for Sodic land with Lebanon’s Solidere, had to acknowledge that merger talks with another company failed. Sodic’s stock dropped 13% in May.

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