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GCC

New Saudi cities set to battle Dubai, UAE

by Executive Staff April 12, 2007
written by Executive Staff

Saudi Arabia, immersed in the process of using its oil wealth for building sustainable economic strength, has set its eyes on a business bonanza that could provide unending riches: becoming the host for a major international financial market. To tap into this permanently renewing resource, the kingdom is pouring billions into the creation of two financial hubs. 

The first of these finance centers is part of the King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC), which the Saudi king announced to the world in December 2005. The second is new. It is the King Abdullah Financial District (KAFD) project in the Saudi capital, Riyadh.

Investments into KAEC are slated in a dimension of more than $26 billion only in the first phase—which includes infrastructure development and industrial and residential structures, but not the financial island which will cover 14 hectares. The cost of developing the new metropolis’s financial center—a super-glitzy city-within-a-city, shining in the designer impressions with glass and high rise architecture—will be determined later, when the second phase of the KAEC project goes to construction around three years from now.

“We are in the first phase of the project and therefore there is not an exact amount of money for the financial district but the first phase will be completed in three years from now and will cost SAR100 billion,” said Mohammad Samman, the director of investor relations at Emaar the Economic City (EEC), a company formed for developing KAEC.

The cost of KAFD will be between SAR10 billion and SAR12 billion and the project will be developed on three stages, according to the KAFD master plan that was approved last month by the executive committee in charge of the project.

On paper, the rationale behind the mega-investments is compelling. Saudi Arabia has a rapidly growing economy that needs to secure future employment for its millions of young people, and this would be part of a move, since 2005, to set up of economic cities in four regions in the country.

In the past five years, the kingdom has issued new licenses for specialized banking and financial services providers that include leading international and regional banks from HSBC and Deutsche Bank to Lebanon’s Audi Saradar Group, UAE-based Al Mal Securities, and Egypt’s Beltone Investment Banking.

These institutions have been attracted by the growing needs for banking in the largest Arab economy and for financial intermediation on the expanding Saudi Stock Exchange. But to give further incentives to international financial firms and develop a center of excellence that can leverage the value of the Saudi market place into becoming a banking center of global weight, Saudi Arabia needs to develop its financial culture a lot further.

“The kingdom is growing at a huge potential and the number of companies that are being established is growing by 25% to 35% annually,” Samman told Executive.

The Financial District

“The Public Pension Agency is the main developer of the KAFD and it has started with the dredging works along with Capital Market Authority (CMA) which is its strategic partner,” Fahd Al Hussayen, general manager for real estate marketing at the Public Pension Agency, told Executive.

“The first phase will take four years to be completed and we are already signing memoranda of understanding with several banks which will have a presence in KAFD,” Hussayen said.

He added that the banks which signed the MoUs include Al Rajhi Bank, Arab National Bank, Audi Saudi Arabia, Samba Financial Group, Saudi Fransi Bank and Al Bilad Bank.

The KAFD will be constructed over 3 million m2 of land and will house the headquarters of the CMA and the Saudi Stock Exchange, along with an academy for finance professions. On the private sector side, the district aims to become the home of banks, brokerage services, law offices, accounting and auditing firms, analysts, rating agencies, consultants, IT providers, and other auxiliary enterprises. 

The master plan for the KAFD divides the new financial center into three areas—the Leaf, the northwest area, and the south area.

The Leaf will be the heart of the KAFD. It will be a mixed-use area, consisting of 23% residential, 5% retail and the rest high-quality office space.

Two-thirds of the area will be public realm, including major attractions such as an aquarium, a museum, hotels, an exhibition center, a conference center and, of course, mosques.

Support services, utilities and parking will be located in the northwest area. The south area will be residential and office accommodation.

The first excavation work is scheduled to begin within weeks and the first building is expected to open around the end of 2008. It is expected that KAFD will offer around 43,000 job opportunities. The site is 1.6 million m2 but the built-up area is around 3.3 million m2.

Because it is owned by the Public Pension Authority (PPA), the project will create revenue streams for public sector retirees and their dependents. 

“The whole Saudi economy will benefit—but especially the PPA’s pensioners, who will gain from the profit generated from our ownership and management of the KAFD project,” enthused Mohammed Bin Abdullah Al-Khrashi, governor of the Public Pension Authority.

The Economic City

To be built near the town of Rabigh on the Red Sea, the financial district of the KAEC may be a little away from the center of Saudi Arabia but the entire city aims at creating a new economic center right from the first phase, which includes an industrial city, a huge port and residential projects.

EEC had a net loss of 12.8 million Saudi riyals ($3.4 million) in its first three months of operation, ending December 2006, but reports said that the financial results were expected as the company did not close any sales deals in that period. Its marketing activities have commenced recently. 

Another noteworthy aspect of the KAEC project is that it is being developed with the private sector and with wide stakeholdership by Saudi citizens. EEC undertook an initial public offering in which more than 10 million people, approximately half of the kingdom’s citizens, subscribed to shares.

While the concept of stomping two new world-class financial districts out of the ground is appealing, the timeframe for the two cities may just a bit behind. In Dubai, Qatar, and Bahrain, three ambitious emirates are already a good piece of the way into shaping their versions of financial hubs, which will be established entities when KAFD inaugurates its first buildings in 2008-09; the KAEC financial center is only scheduled to begin construction at that time.

The size of the Saudi market is a strong selling point, and local banks will in any case make it a matter of pride to be present and very visible in KAFD and later on in KAEC financial center. That will widen the Saudi financial scene and elevate its profile, but it will not by itself fulfill the vision for the two huge projects. Then again, it must be true for new financial districts what is true for the whole world of finance: without risk, there can be no profit. 

April 12, 2007 0 comments
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GCC

Can EU-GCC sign a Free Trade Agreement this year?

by Executive Staff April 12, 2007
written by Executive Staff

Do you, per chance, remember what the next big things in 1990 were? The World Wide Web had just been born and the internet was still more of an academic playground than a ubiquitous communications universe. The European Community was a club of 12 nations and the euro was a concept waiting to be discussed in the 1991 negotiations of Maastricht. Introduction of the world’s first commercial GSM 900 mobile phone network was two years away.

It also was the time when Europe and the six member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council started talking about a free trade agreement (FTA). Seventeen dusty years after the beginning of negotiations in 1990, talks between the European Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council in the past few weeks seem to have regained momentum toward finally signing the long-awaited FTA this year.

Touring the region at the end of February in support of finalizing the agreement, EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson told the Jeddah Economic Forum that a completed FTA would make an important contribution to the greater diversification of Gulf economies by encouraging inward investment and boosting the competitiveness of Gulf exporters to Europe.

‘Very close to an agreement’

Mandelson said: “We are now very close to an agreement that will not only be the first ever region-to-region FTA in the global trading system, but which has the potential to open doors for new investment and new trade beyond what we offer each other through the WTO.”

A treaty between the two regional organizations would be the first of its kind, Mandelson enthused. But of course there are quite a range of reasons why European-Gulf negotiations have taken a modern eternity and were disrupted twice for long intervals, before the two sides last month publicly voiced confidence that signing ceremonies could be on the books sometime this year. 

Rewards of a successful treaty would be substantial by helping both communities strengthen their positions in the globalization game and, from the European perspective, by increasing stability in what the EU sees as a region of immense strategic importance but vulnerable to political and security risks. 

Obstacles

The business concepts and legal frameworks of the two blocks are far apart in many respects, but the points of real obstruction in past talks were European calls for liberalization of GCC economies and Gulf wishes to gain more direct access to European energy markets. Early in the negotiations (1990 and again in 1992), the European Parliament criticized the FTA talks for alleged repercussions on the European petrochemicals and fertilizer industries and employment in these sectors.

The considerable power of the US in the Gulf and the EU’s corresponding lack of power is one of the main structural features hindering real progress or even real interest in moving EU-GCC relations forward. The US is currently viewed as the only credible security guarantor by the Gulf monarchies, while the EU mainly is seen as a civilian and economic player.

Assessing the potential influence of the EU in the region, a Danish research institute wrote in late 2006 that “the Gulf monarchies are blessed with oil and natural gas resources, and equally cursed with domestic instability, war and foreign intervention. In this strategically important corner of the Middle East, bilateralism and hard security issues still dominate the agenda, and here the EU has only limited capacities.”

The report added that the EU also faces both barriers and divergences in term of assisting reform processes in the Gulf, and the European analysts saw it as open question if first steps towards political and social reforms were genuine or mere cosmetic changes. Post-Christian civil liberties concepts made in Europe have not found a large fan base in many Middle Eastern societies and when, for example, the European Parliament lambasted Bahrain in 1997 for its practices on human rights, the GCC rejected this as meddling. 

Limitations on foreign ownership of companies and restrictions on access to domestic markets, including equity markets, in several GCC countries are barriers that could also easily block European acceptance of the FTA this year. But on the other hand, the Europeans have to think about the heightened importance of Gulf oil producers in the globally growing demand scenario for black gold. The EU policy makers also have to grapple with the fact that today, beyond the US’s Middle Eastern goals and strategic interests, which have long caused headaches in many EU capitals, China is also flexing its increasingly toned geopolitical muscles in the region, with aspirations of securing supplies of oil and generating new economic partnership opportunities for its vast industry. 

EU a model of integration

While the EU playes a minor fiddle in the Middle East military and security realities to the US, and enjoys less shared affinity with the region’s cultural conservatism than the East Asian nations, Europe has one strong thing going for itself through the EU’s model function of regional economic integration. The GCC adopted many ideas from the processes of Maastricht and Europe’s Monetary and Economic Union building in its project to forge a similar cohesion among the six GCC member countries, including plans for a joint central bank and single currency for the realm.

As a matter of fact, the GCC governments’ 1999 decision to work towards an EU-like economic integration sparked new life into the FTA negotiations between the two regions, even though the verve was short lived. It is moreover also doubtful (to be friendly) that the GCC monetary union plans will be implemented in full by their 2010 target or even in a five-sixths solution of adopting a joint currency without Oman. Nonetheless, interaction between EU and GCC institutions in the context of the project has a relationship-building capacity for years of interaction, whether an FTA sees the light of the desert this year or not.   

For the business communities of both regions, any strengthening of information and cultural ties would nonetheless be poor replacements for an agreement that opens Gulf markets wider to European investors and European markets to Gulf petrochemicals and energy players.

The EU still is the Gulf’s biggest market and incurred a $22.4 billion trade deficit with the GCC in 2006, fundamentally because of Europe’s thirst for oil. In the other direction, the GCC is currently the sixth-largest export market for the EU, with machinery and transport materials accounting for over half of sales to the region. Beyond further growth in trade, direct investments in the GCC by European companies could see a sharp increase if an FTA comes into force.

Picking up the pace of talks

For the past few years, negotiations between EU and GCC moved at a rather leisurely pace of one round of talks per annum. However, following the discussions of the two sides in February, the EU emphasized that it will eliminate its 6% import tariffs on aluminum and also abolish tariffs on basic petrochemicals after the two regions reach an FTA. What the EU seeks in return, is an end to ceilings on foreign ownership of GCC companies. A new Gulf-EU meeting at the ministerial level is scheduled for May.

April 12, 2007 0 comments
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GCC

Garden of Eden for jobs?

by Executive Staff April 12, 2007
written by Executive Staff

The Gulf region is famed for enjoying surpluses of liquidity and jobs over the available human capital. This situation has created a hunger for blue and white collar labor that boosted the ratio of imported to indigenous population to at least four to one in the UAE and some neighboring emirates.

In the past two years, the influx of new people and continuing enormous demand for labor has also created pressures on a wide front, from housing and remuneration to cultural, social, and health issues. The private and public sector agencies dealing with human capital in the various GCC countries are being seriously put to the test by these growing imbalances.

Research into labor issues in the GCC is still in its infancy, driven mostly by a few job agencies that aim to establish their franchises as suppliers and intermediaries in the market for skilled employees. The hotbed of job creation in the GCC is the UAE, and private sector job companies focus their research there. Two such employment companies published reports on salary trends and cost of living in December 2006 (Gulf Talent) and in February 2007 (Bayt).

What’s my salary?

On the salary front, annual increases in the magnitude of 7-8% and more have been the norm in the past two years, the Gulf Talent online survey of professionals found, while Bayt reported an even higher jump in average salaries of 15% in 2006 and 21% over the two-year period of 2005 and 2006.

Bayt gathered responses from what it called a “cross-section of the labor force” around the GCC but did not disclose the sample size and methodology used in its study when publishing the results. It reported that average monthly salaries in the GCC last year, with the exclusion of Oman, ranged from $2,700 in Qatar and $2,750 in the UAE to $3,100 in Kuwait.

In a breakdown by company type and sector, the survey found that multinational companies provided average monthly salaries of $2,222 and large regional companies similarly rewarded their employees (average $2,148/month) whereas public sector and small local companies forked out about $500 less per month.

By sector, earners in law firms sat on top of the Bayt survey, commanding an average of almost $5,900. The oil/gas/petrochemicals sector paid over $3,700, and jobs in advertising and banks were good for an average of $3,500. On the low end of the scale, hospitality, education, electronics (excluding IT), and health services (excluding MDs) offered average salaries ranging from $2,444 down to $1,926. 

Loving Dubai

While the three most recent Gulf Talent surveys gave no indication of average salaries per country and industry, the job agency stated that among some 11,000 queried professionals outside of the GCC, among those who wanted to work in the GCC, 73% named the UAE as their preferred place of employment in the region. Dubai was mentioned specifically by 38%. The survey’s number two and three targets of choice were Qatar and Saudi Arabia, with 9% and 8% positive responses.

By Bayt’s count, the preferred place of work in the GCC is Dubai, with 49% of answers from an overlay poll picking the city as their choice, followed by Saudi Arabia (16%), Kuwait (14%) and Qatar (11%). Although the methodologies and polled samples in the two surveys are hard to compare and results showed notable variations, findings of the two companies concurred strongly that the UAE is the preferred destination for foreign employees and job seekers who work or want to work in the GCC.

This highlights the UAE’s role as the center of the multi-national job market in the GCC, with the highest percentage share of expatriate employees. The most recent government research on employment and population figures tallied the UAE population in a census of population, housing, and establishments that was conducted in 2005. Released last month, preliminary results of the census said that the UAE’s seven emirates have a combined population of about 4.1 million—including nationals, registered expatriate workers and other expatriates—at the end of 2005. The census found that 78.1% of the total resident population included in the census were non-nationals.

The preliminary results did not provide a full data set on the numbers of people in each gender/age/nationality bracket and the composition of the labor force. However, it stated that of the registered population aged 20 to 64 years, almost 2.4 million are foreigners while the nationals in this group numbered less than 400,000. On top of that, the census assumes a presence of 335,000 foreigners (not included in the census tally) who work without permit, were on leave on the census date, or commute into the country. This hints that there could be as many as seven, eight or even nine expatriate employees and workers for every citizen in the national workforce, in line with estimates by some UAE academic leaders who have rung alarm bells over the country’s national identity.

Working the force

Regardless if the foreign workforce accounts for 80 or 90% of the UAE working population, the country’s 75% population growth between the last census in 1995 and end of 2005 relied greatly on inflow of foreigners, and the trend is estimated to have only accelerated since. Analysts at Global Investment House, a regional financial firm headquartered in Kuwait, estimated last month that the UAE population numbered 4.7 million in 2006 and will be above 5 million at the end of this year, suggesting further increases in the percentage of expatriates, despite the fact that more than half of the UAE nationals at the end of 2005 were younger than 20, meaning that the birth rate among citizens of the UAE has in recent years been high indeed for an affluent society.

The combination of high economic growth, the influx of new people, and extra liquidity from oil revenues in the GCC has taken an unavoidable expression in inflationary pressures that put a strong dash of vinegar into the lemonade of the UAE labor market. According to Bayt, the UAE in 2006 was the region’s “worst affected country in terms of erosion of consumers [sic] purchasing power with salaries being outpaced by cost of living increases to the tune of over 13%.”

This assumption is based on an estimate or perception that consumer price inflation in Dubai was 28% in 2006, based on responses by polled persons. The CPI estimate of the Economist Intelligence Unit for the UAE in 2006 was an increase of 13.5%.

Cost of housing is the main new burden on foreigners. Gulf Talent’s survey produced responses saying that rents in Dubai increased by 60% in the space of 24 months (November 2004-November 2006). The agency also reported that rent payments in Qatar and the UAE consumed 33% and 30% respectively of respondents’ household incomes, significantly above rent costs in Saudi Arabia (19% of incomes) which are closer to numbers for many developed countries.

Also, the savings rate among expatriate workers has gone down, a telltale sign that financially, the stay in the GCC is less attractive than it was 10 or even five years ago. Gulf Talent reported that 43% of expatriates working in the UAE are not putting money into savings and 7% even said that cost of living was not covered by their salaries and they had to rely on savings or support from family to sustain their lives.

However, the shrinkage of disposable or remittable income is no fundamental deterrent, as the job surveys showed significant shifts in the priorities and expectations of international job seekers in the GCC. First, people said that they were looking for a career more than for fast earnings. “Many of the newcomers are attracted by long-term aspirations and interesting career opportunities now available in the region, with short-term financial considerations playing a less dominant part in the overall value proposition,” Gulf Talent found.

Secondly, increasing percentages of the people relocating to the Gulf are doing so under a perspective of making the region their home in the long term and not just regard it an intermediary career step. This reorientation is an expression of both the region’s increasing depth of career choices and its broadening range of housing, entertainment, shopping, and cultural environments. And while the newcomers are not deeply rooted in local heritage, they appreciate the high mobility of their lives, characterized by the contemporary airports, hotels, shopping malls and recreation centers.

With careers and long-term living perspectives—according to Gulf Talent, 78% of professionals currently working in the UAE plan to stay; according to Bayt, a slightly larger 26% share of people intend to move away from the UAE—it fits together that people are not driven into other countries by cost of living changes as much as by other factors. Bahrain’s smaller cost of living increase did not cause expatriates there to consider moving away in larger percentages than their peers in the UAE, for example. The simple point is that it not only matters how much it costs to live in one locale of the Gulf, it matters equally or more what quality of life one gets in the cities of the region.

Of men & women

Salary surveys and census data are insufficient for describing the entire set of social and life options that determine personal satisfaction and integration of foreign workers into a new country. One census result that is of relevance in this regard is the immense overhang of the working-age male gender in the UAE population. Not only are some 49% of non-nationals between 25 and 40 years old, expatriate men in the three age categories—20 to 24, 25 to 29 and 30 to 39—outnumber expatriate women by factors increasing from 2:1 to 3:1 and then more than 4:1 for those in their thirties. 

The towering discrepancy in the ratio of men to women in the UAE is a deterrent to the country’s ability to be the natural center of living and planning for the members of its expatriate population.

Another obstacle to balanced social development is the stratification of the workforce into nationalities, where citizens of some origins are automatically paid better than those of others, a factor that may be decreasing but is far from having disappeared. Their is also the economic rift between professionals and blue collar labor.

As Gulf Talent concluded in an October 2006 report on compensation trends in the GCC construction industry, only the managerial and professional workers benefited from the almost 13% hike in salaries observed by the agency last year for the sector. Laborers, which make up the majority of construction sector employees, “have experienced little or no rise” in their remuneration, the report wrote. A huge portion of the expatriate workforce is working poor in the GCC; they live and work under conditions of increasing costs with pay raises that do not cover inflation.     

These societal and socioeconomic imbalances apparently have led already to higher rates of social unrest, sexual abuse and other crimes, disease and suicide, evidenced daily by media reports. However, statistics for problems such as the number of expatriates who contract HIV are not available from UAE officials, who only said that the country immediately expels foreigners who test positive for the virus.

Finally, the UAE government has produced a draft for a revised labor law and stepped up efforts to address grievances by the expatriate workforce and violations of labor codes by employers. However, when Human Rights Watch published a press release at the end of last month that asked for further changes to the law and for affirming international labor rights such as unionization, UAE authorities avoided direct responses to the NGO’s challenges, but acted defensively by quickly circulating statements through the state’s media mouthpiece that the country has already made much progress in dealing with “these issues.”

April 12, 2007 0 comments
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Levant

Abdali: The future of Amman

by Executive Staff April 12, 2007
written by Executive Staff

Abdali represents the past, present and future of Amman. What once was the Jordanian intelligence headquarters is today an enormous hole in the earth, in which bulldozers prepare for the arrival of the future: a 21st century city center for the capital of the Hashemite Kingdom. With a price tag of $1.5 billion, and covering a total surface area of 350,000 m2, the Abdali Urban Regeneration Project is arguably the largest construction effort Jordan has witnessed to date. 

The Abdali area is located west of downtown Amman, adjacent to the banking district of Shmeisani, and is home to such landmark buildings as the parliament and King Abdullah Mosque. The Abdali regeneration project is a mixed-use development that aims to create a central business district, complete with both high-end residential and retail elements. In addition, and more ambitiously, the project hopes to relocate the “heart” of the city from what is today the rather run-down downtown area to Abdali when it is completed.

With a total built up area (BuA) of some 1.5 million m2, the Abdali project will drastically change the face of Amman, a predominantly “horizontal” city. The development will introduce the first cluster of high rises, among which is the country’s tallest tower, the 220-meter-high headquarters of the Capital Bank of Jordan. A 350-meter-long pedestrian shopping boulevard will connect the towers to the “Central Market” mall and residential parts of the project. (For details, see Box I.) 

“The Abdali Urban Regeneration project is ‘a story of firsts,’ which will drastically change living and working in Amman,” said Jamal Itani, general manager of Abdali Investment and Development (AID). “Abdali will create the city’s first central business district, in the sense of a homogenous area of fully equipped, technologically advanced, state-of-the-art commercial buildings. Centered around the boulevard, Abdali will become the first retail hub in the city.”

An interesting characteristic of urban Amman is that it has no genuine central districts. The traditional heart of the city is the downtown area near the King Hussein Mosque and Roman amphitheater. Yet this is a rather rundown—and heavily congested—area, with no international retail and, at best, some three-star hotels. Over the last decade, Amman has witnessed the emergence of hypermarkets and shopping malls, which are spread throughout the western suburbs. (For a brief history of Amman, see Box II.) 

Likewise, the business community is scattered around town. To a certain extent, the Shmeisani area can be defined as the financial and administrative center of the city, as it features 25 banks and financial institutions, 16 government institutions, as well as 12 hotels and nine hospitals. However, any company that aims to establish a presence in Amman will face great difficulty finding vacant office space in Shmeisani, which is why many international firms in recent years have converted villas and apartments throughout western Amman into workplaces. Embassies too are mainly located in villas between the 3rd and 5th circles in West Amman.

Private-public partnership

Founded in 2004, AID is a private shareholding company—initially, a private-public partnership between Mawared, an investment company owned by the Jordanian government, and Oger Jordan, a subsidiary of construction giant Saudi Oger. In 2007, however, Kuwait Projects Company (KIPCO), through its Jordanian branch, United Real Estate Corporation (URC-Jordan), came in as a third partner. It bought 12.5% of Abdali psc shares, which left Saudi Oger and Mawared with 43.75% each, respectively.

Essentially, Mawared brought in the land, while Saudi Oger had the know-how. It should be noted that the Abdali project is part of a wider government initiative to move military barracks and quarters to the outskirts of the city and use the land for urban development. AID is responsible for preparing terrain and infrastructure, as well as the project’s master plan. Saudi Oger will further develop and manage, in partnership with KIPCO, both the boulevard and mall, which represent about 25% of the total BUA.

The remaining 75% has been sold to private investors, including the Dubai Contracting Company, which is building a residential tower, the Capital Bank of Jordan, Rotana Hotels, Madaen Al Noor Real Estate Investment and Development, FCP Holdings, and Damac, the Dubai-based property developer. Damac is set to construct a 35-story high-end residential tower dubbed The Heights. 

While top residential sale prices in Amman amount to about $1,400 per m2, Damac’s starting price lies around the $1,500 mark for the first floor and increasing to $3,300 per m2 for the top floor apartments. The penthouse has a price tag of over $4,000 per m2. Following the success of The Heights, which according to the Damac sales department has been almost completely sold, the company last month announced it will also construct the 20-story Business Heights.

“We’ve completed the site’s infrastructure, which includes all amenities, such as fiber optic cabling and gas lines,” said Itani, an American-educated engineer who previously worked in Beirut when Lebanon’s former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri appointed him President of the National Council of Development and Reconstruction. “In addition, about 80% of investors had their architectural designs approved and have fenced their plots of land, while about half of them will start excavating in April.” 

Excavations have also started for the boulevard. Both the boulevard and city center are set to be completed by the end of 2009. To illustrate the sheer importance of the Abdali project, Itani pointed at a recent decision by the mayor of Amman, who designated four areas specifically for high rises, among which is the future central business district. 

The question remains, however, if there will be sufficient demand within Amman for such a significant amount of office and retail space. “We’ve done several feasibility studies both in Jordan and other countries, and believe Amman has potential as a significant regional business center. Several factors play a role: Jordan is a politically stable and secure country that has a sound legal framework, so investors know what to expect. What’s more, oil prices are likely to continue to soar, with Arab nations reluctant to invest in the West. And, last but not least, Jordan is close to Iraq.”

It is no exaggeration to state that demand for office space and high-end residential apartments since 2003 has been strongly linked with the situation in Iraq. First, many well-off Iraqis fled to Jordan following the American invasion and established themselves in western Amman. As a consequence, average prices doubled and even tripled. Second, due to the security situation in Iraq, most companies doing business with Iraq are based in Jordan. The same is true for UN staff and non-governmental organizations. 

Even though many malls have opened in the outskirts of Amman, Itani believes the Abdali project will offer an appealing edge to attract consumers, as it features the sole high street in the capital city, which will be characterized by international brand names similar to those found in Dubai and Beirut.

Beirut vs. Amman

Itani worked in Lebanon, and both Saudi Oger and Solidere are part of the late Rafik Hariri’s business empire: the obvious question is, to what extent can the regeneration of Amman and Beirut can be compared? According to Itani, there are both similarities and differences. 

“Both Amman and Beirut concern developments built around a central business district and both aim to offer a homogenous development in terms of working, shopping and living,” he said. “One difference is that the regeneration of Beirut was a much bigger project, with about 4 million m2 of BUA, while Abdali amounts to about 1.5 million m2 of BUA, which could be extended in the near future by a further 1 million m2.” Itani declined to give further details, yet it seems likely that future developments will take place on the edge of the current project site, where some military buildings remain.

“Another major difference between Amman and Beirut,” Itani continued, “is the limitations that were involved in the development of the city. Solidere had to take into account the restoration of historic buildings and the protection of archeological remains. Consequently, Solidere was limited in the number of underground parking lots it could create. Generally speaking, we had much more freedom in terms of planning and design with the Abdali project.”

“Another difference is the role of the government, especially in terms of accessibility,” Itani concluded. “The Jordanian government plays an active role in upgrading the roads and intersections around the project site. It speaks for itself that the Abdali project is not an island. You cannot have top notch roads and parking facilities inside the project and be surrounded by secondary roads. In that sense, it is very important we have the full and active support of the municipality that is upgrading the infrastructure in and around the Abdali project.”

April 12, 2007 0 comments
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Gulf airlines: Ego-trips or essential?

by Alex Warren April 1, 2007
written by Alex Warren

Is an industry, aviation has always attracted the wealthy.Tycoons rarely resist the chance to have their own airline, as Howard Hughes, Aristotle Onassis or Richard Branson are enough to prove, whilst virtually every country in the world proudly flies a national flag carrier, even if it makes a loss in doing so.

Little surprise, then, to observe the billions of dollars being poured by Gulf states into the expansion of airline sand airports. Thanks largely to this investment, the MiddleEast is now easily the fastest growing region in the world in terms of air traffic, which in 2006 rose by 16% compared to a global average of 5.1%.

But aren’t there just too many fish swimming in too small a pond? Despite the small size of the domestic market in theGulf, there are now at least eight airlines operating fromKuwait, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman alone, with more set to arrive.

Older players like Emirates continue to expand, marketing themselves ever more aggressively in new markets like the US or the far East. Meanwhile, the original stakeholders ofGulf Air—the governments of Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Qatar andOman—have gradually pulled out of the partnership to create new airlines.

Abu Dhabi launched its own carrier, Etihad, in 2005, whilstDoha has spent extravagantly on expanding Qatar Airways in the past few years. Low-cost carriers have also entered the market, and with great success. After its launch in 2003,Sharjah-based Air Arabia chalked up a $27.5 million profit in 2006 and offered a $700 million IPO last month. Jazeera Airways, a privately-owned Kuwaiti airline which began flying no-frills flights in 2005, already goes to 20destinations and says it also wants to list stocks.

Even more new airlines are on the way, including a fourthUAE carrier, the delayed RAK Airways, which will operate from the northern emirate of Ras al-Khaimah. Across the border, meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has said it will issue licenses for two low-cost domestic carriers in theKingdom.

On the surface of it, the preponderance of upstarts in such a tiny geographical area would seem to be nothing but an ego-trip, a publicity stunt designed to get names on the map and planes around the world. Yet whilst an element of that might be hard to deny, this lavish expense on aviation forms part of a longer-term, and fairly sensible, economic strategy for many of these countries.

Thus far, the growth of all these airlines can be attributed to a number of contributory factors. Most important is the wider economic boom in the region: the massive influx of immigrants to the Gulf, whether middle-managers from Europe or legions of construction workers from the subcontinent, has filled hundreds of thousands of plane seats, whilst long-haul tourism is developing quickly in places like Dubai and Oman.

Second, most airlines rely heavily on the so-called hub and spoke model for their business, bringing passengers in from a large number of cities around the world, connecting the mat the airport and then flying them out to their final destination. In some cases, like Qatar and Abu Dhabi, these kind of transit passengers make up more than 70% of total traffic.

With that in mind, it helps greatly that the Gulf lies between large centers of population with underdeveloped international airlines, namely Iran, the Indian subcontinent and Africa, as well as being a natural halfway point betweenEurope and the Far East.

The airlines can also benefit from airport investments whose size and cost seem to make no commercial sense. Over $40billion is earmarked for airports in the Gulf over the next10 years, with Dubai building what will be the largest airport in the world and Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait all spending combined billions on new infrastructure to support aviation growth.

Lastly, many suspect that these airlines are given an unfair leg-up from their government patrons. Some European carrier shave queried whether the Gulf airlines receive hidden subsidies, have access to cheap rates of borrowing or benefit from a privileged position at their hub airports—which are also owned by the state.

Whatever the case, though, this is missing the point. Even if they’re doing well now, these airlines don’t really need to make money in the short-term. Qatar Airways, for instance, doesn’t even expect to turn over a profit until2012. Instead, they should be seen as elements of a wider investment plan—which includes tourism, ports, media and finance—to sustain Gulf economies once the oil and gas dry up.

Many argue that everything epitomized by the Gulf boom is built on hydrocarbons and hyperbole. That may be true. But for now, there is more than enough money being spent to ensure that by the time economic growth slows down, the new arrivals become fewer and energy resources dwindle, these carriers will have been able to establish a global marketshare that will both sustain their businesses and, more importantly, keep bringing people into and through theGulf.

Perhaps not all of them will manage to be successful in the long-term, but there is at least some justification—apart from national pride—for so many apparently nonsensical airlines in such a small area.

ALEX WARREN is a freelance journalist based in Dubai

April 1, 2007 0 comments
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Capitalist Culture

The battle for downtown: Solidere symbolizes much

by Michael Young April 1, 2007
written by Michael Young

Little has excited the Lebanese in recent months, thoughmuch has contributed to their anxiety. However, it was onenews item in February that seemed to hit public moralehardest. From an initial figure of around 250 establishmentsin the downtown area, we learned that around 80 had closeddue to the ongoing sit-in by opposition supporters. A 30%closure rate in three months is ominous by any standard.

A few years ago, I was chatting with the late SamirKassir, when he remarked about an odd habit he had noticedin the Solidere area, particularly its mostly emptynorthernmost quadrant: drivers stopped at red lights, thoughthere was little traffic, and even fewer pedestrians, tomandate such discipline. Why were Lebanese who would havebarreled through red lights in any another part of Beirut solaw-abiding?

Kassir wasn’t sure, but he was toying with the idea thatdrivers were somehow intimidated by Solidere’s modernity.Here was an area of town that imposed esteem, he speculated,that commanded respect.

Was that the case? Maybe it was, maybe it wasn’t, but onething is certain: very few Lebanese fail these days tomention the deep resentment they feel at what has happenedto the downtown area; and the vast majority of them reactnot from a political standpoint, but from the standpoint ofpeople proud of a part of town that had symbolized Lebanon’sbest qualities and its genuine emergence from civil warafter 1990.

This is not the place to discuss the opposition’smotivations in suffocating the downtown area. However, itmakes sense to ask why an action directed against thegovernment has ended up punishing the private sector. Partof the reason—and there are numerous examples of oppositionprotesters arguing precisely this line—is that thegovernment and Solidere have been regarded as synonymous byprotesters. Certainly, the company’s close and ongoingassociation with the state; certainly, too, the hazy barrierbetween what belongs to Solidere and what belongs to theHariri family, have helped reinforce this conviction.However, that doesn’t make it any less fallacious. Inturning Solidere into a hostage to politics, the oppositionhas, intentionally or not, widened its dispute so that it isnow one directed against the Lebanese economy, and moreparticularly against the better outgrowths of free-marketcapitalism.

Downtown once again a battlezone

It doesn’t take much to capture the symbolism of themoment—on either side of the political spectrum. For themajority, a part of town that for a long time embodiedLebanon’s ability to transgress war, has again become afront line in a domestic crisis. Where the late Rafik Haririsought, perhaps excessively, to banish war from the downtownarea (recall that a war memorial planned for the city centerwas, instead, trucked off to the Defense Ministry inYarzeh), those contesting Hariri’s legacy have never broughtLebanon closer to civil war. To borrow from sociologistSamir Khalaf, the reclaimed heart of Beirut may soon be incardiac arrest.

The narrative of the other side is no less evocative, andunconditional. Hariri’s Beirut, because of its exclusivity,was never a valid Lebanese symbol. It was perhaps a symbolof the bourgeoisie and entrepreneurial skill, but one whoseimpact most Lebanese never felt. Far from being therepresentation of a Beirut at peace, it personified acallous, unjust city. How could there be true harmony andserenity if a part of the population was not invited topartake of its postwar pleasures?

Whatever one thinks of either argument, neither reallyaddresses the much more mundane matter that cities are, inone way or another, reclaimed by businesses. Ideas count fora great deal, urban policies and politics the same, butultimately it is money that keeps cities going, and anability to use that money to develop. And neither narrative,as it has played out today, is satisfactorily keeping themoney circulating, even if the Hariri vision was always muchfriendlier to businesses.

Those who saw the Solidere area as the symbol of aresurrected Beirut never paused to wonder whether it wasalso an island that had merely kept Lebanon’s divisionsoutside its boundaries. Why does this matter? Because noprosperous free market can last if it is built on shakyfoundations nationally. If Lebanon is to thrive, then itsdifferent political forces will have to agree to a commonvision for the country’s economic future. The Lebanese arenot there yet. The downtown area may have epitomized postwarpeace, but not everyone bought into this, and that’s afailing that can be put at the door of the policymakers.

On the other side, the opposition seems to have little senseof the advantages of the free market, which doesn’tdifferentiate between political forces. If Solidere loses,so does Lebanon’s economy, and so do all Lebanese. Povertyand unemployment play no favorites. That’s why both sideshave a duty: the opposition should end to its protests inthe downtown area; and the government should oversee aprocess leading to a national consensus on Lebanon’ssocial-economic priorities, by spreading that concernoutside the boundaries of a contested Solidere.

April 1, 2007 0 comments
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Lebanon: Privatization and its fiscal implications

by Mounir Rached April 1, 2007
written by Mounir Rached

The Lebanese government has proudly outlined itsprivatization program in the recovery paper presented toParis III donors, underscoring its crucial role in promotinggrowth, reducing public debt and fiscal deficits. The focusis on the most profitable privatization, the mobile sector,while electricity, the most destitute, is deferred to anundetermined future date.

Contrary to the general perception, these so-calleddinosaurs—or the non-financial public enterprise sector, togive it the boffin name—actually make money for thegovernment in the form of revenues from no-tax revenuetransfers to the treasury and VAT. Income transfers totaledLL8.2 trillion ($5.5 billion) during 2000-2006, mostly fromthe telecom sector. VAT contributions are not separatelycalculated but, at 10% since 2002, should have added sizableamounts to government coffers. EDL contribution has beenlimited only to VAT, due to its perennial losses.

During the same period, government expenditure, in the formof transfers to PES, to EDL in particular, amounted to LL3.5trillion ($2.3 billion). Even without taking VAT intoaccount, the net receipts accruing to the treasury during2000-2006 reached $ 3.2 billion ($5.5 less $2.3 billion).Thus, PES has had a mitigating effect on public finances.

This is not to say that this state of affairs should beapplauded, as the sector has been plagued by a combinationof poor quality, high operating costs and slowing growth,prompting consumers and businesses to call for its drasticreform. EDL alone has been suffering losses close to 40% ofits power generation and MEA (which is much better managed)has yet to make recurrent profits.

High revenues from PES, 28% of the total in 2006, are due tothe high rates (over pricing/taxing). Mobile telephonecompanies charge $0.13 per minute, compared to internationalrates of $0.4-0.5, while EDL’s rates are also high byinternational standards. Public sector privatization wouldlead to a restructuring of revenues in favor of tax receiptsand both would be expected to rise with a growing economy.

A third lump sum source of income would accrue from sale ofexisting PES assets and from licensing. The prime candidatesare telecommunications, electricity and Middle EastAirlines. Licensing, particularly the telecom sector, isexpected to generate most receipts. (The net worth of MTCTouch and Alfa, the two government-owned mobile companies,are not believed to exceed $100 million, as most of theirassets date back to 1994. EDL and Ogero have yet to beaudited, and MEA is burdened with debt.)

According to government sources, mobile licensing couldbring in $2.5-$3.5 billion per license. Two additionallicenses should bring in the same amount. Such high feeswill only be recuperated through high service charges—mobile or kilowatt use—and this will probably have astifling instead of rejuvenating impact on the economy.

An internationally competitive price should guide thedetermination of licensing value. The overriding objectiveof the privatization drive should not be to extract thehighest possible revenue (from sale of assets and licensing)in order to reduce public debt, but rather to provide themost efficient and competitive service to contribute togrowth and eventually enhance government revenue.

A simple proportional adjustment, for instance, in mobilelicensing proceeds, to reflect a reduction in its servicecharge to an international level (to 4 cents from 13 centsat present) could bring down a license value by severalfolds to few hundred million dollars—and rates would stillbe higher than what many countries, determined to providecompetitive service, charge. Furthermore, a priority inprivatization should be to concurrently address the leastprofitable enterprises. Sinking more funds in EDL beforeprivatization could defeat the purpose of reform.

In reality, only reaching a fiscal surplus will reduce debt.Privatization proceeds alone won’t cover cumulative publicfinance deficits—estimated at $11.8 billion—through 2011(see Executive March 2007). Proper accounting stipulatesthat privatization receipts be classified as a fiscalfinancing item, making the that law stipulates theirallocation to debt reduction redundant. The governmentshould focus on improving its public finances throughrecurrent receipts and continued streamlining ofexpenditure, and by seeking to raise the grant element andfiscal support of donors’ pledges. To use privatization as atool to reduce debt and fiscal deficits is a misguidedapproach to reform.

DR. MOUNIR RACHED is a senior IMF economist, and a founding member of the Lebanese Economic Association. The views in this article are those of the author and don’t represent those of the IMF

April 1, 2007 0 comments
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Editorial

The new realpolitik

by Yasser Akkaoui April 1, 2007
written by Yasser Akkaoui

And so to another Arab summit. There was a time when the Arab street would shrug and say “so what?” The most we hoped for was that our leaders would not embarrass us, especially those who used the occasion to showboat and who would leave any feelings of national duty—assuming they had any in the first place—at home.

2002 changed all that. Saudi Arabia, already beginning to feel they had a new, more robust role to play in the region, put forward a peace plan that gave a patina of credibility to an occasion whose high point used to be the arrival of President Khadafy’s female bodyguards. The plan was rejected by the Israelis but five years on, we detect a political change in the wind and the initiative, while not embraced, has not been rejected out of hand.

There are reasons for this. There is Iraq; Saudi Arabia has a new king and new wealth through oil, capital markets and real estate. Because of the terrible outcome of the Iraq war and the American need for regional chums, the Saudis today are closer to the Americans and no doubt feel that the way forward in regaining Arab prestige and dignity, not to mention being taken more seriously by the international community, is through leveraging economic success and consolidating alliances. It is the new regional realpolitik.

That the Arabs are re-submitting a peace plan also restores another important dynamic: Arabs are reclaiming ownership of Arab issues. Palestine is an Arab problem not an Iranian problem and Saudi Arabia, along with the other gulf powerhouses, Qatar, UAE and Kuwait and Jordan can make a difference. They are credible nations that have made economic growth a priority.

And finally we have Syria, the current enfant terrible of the region and a country on whom the international jury is still out. Should the world cozy-up to Damascus or watch the regime wither on the bow? Here Saudi Arabia can also help. As we pointed out in our last issue, Saudi businessmen are already investing in Syria; the next step should be to warn Damascus of the dangers of isolation and the price it may have to pay for its outrageous insolence in Lebanon. It should also remind the regime that the international community will not tolerate its bull-headed belligerence forever.

But can Syria ever be a positive force for good in the region under the current regime?

Sadly, as history has demonstrated, it has yet to prove it can.

April 1, 2007 0 comments
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Formerly a haven of small-town trust, UAE sees rise in crime

by Norbert Schiller April 1, 2007
written by Norbert Schiller

I recently stepped out of my apartment in Sharjah and absentmindedly forgot to lock the door behind me. I have always lived in places where doors lock automatically. I wasn’t gone for very long, but long enough for someone to enter and rifle through all the drawers and take any money that was lying loose. Fortunately, the burglar only got away a bunch of spare change left on a table and both my children’s wallets

We live in a big complex—33 floors with over 100apartments—lived in by relatively well-to-do, conservative expatriate families from the Arab world and Indian sub-continent. I thought the building was secure, but what surprised me the most was that someone would risk being caught in a country that comes down hard on crime. I’m sure that after serving the sentence, the perpetrator (if he were a foreigner) would never be let back into the country again—a serious consideration when so many guest workers are dependent on the Emirates for their livelihood.

Twenty years ago, when I lived here before, there was virtually no crime. There were times where I would be in a rush to get to the bank before it closed and I would unconsciously leave the car doors unlocked with thousands of dollars worth of camera equipment lying on the back seat.Back then, the cops were everywhere. They were bored—it was a time when a small dent on the side of your car would warrant a fine—and we had to be on the lookout. Now, with so many cars on the roads, police have their hands full with real traffic problems. Gone are the days of cruising for dents, or burglars for that matter.

Part of the problem is that the UAE, and in particularDubai, is growing at such an alarming rate that the locals represent less than 20% of the population. Background checks on cheap immigrant workers—from Pakistan, India, andBangladesh—are not as thorough as before. Once inside, if a person then wants to quit his job, it’s harder to keep track of them. They can just disappear, blending into the migrant population. Then there is the criminal element—the pimps, the drug dealers and the human traffickers. Crime breeds crime.

Near my home, they recently opened a Carrefour mega-market. To get there, I need to cross a few streets, one of which is a busy highway. In order to make it safe for pedestrians, an underpass was built; a very good idea in a country where so many pedestrians are lost to traffic accidents each year. However, I was shocked to see women with babies at either end of the pedestrian underpass—In the years before, I had never seen a single beggar. Begging is against the law and punishable by prison and deportation.And then if you think about it, why would anyone have a need to beg in a country that is so prosperous with a foolproof system? Emiratis are looked after, while foreigners are hereto work and therefore have a sponsor that looks after them.

Like Beirut and Cairo, the beggars are not begging for their own well-being; rather they are taken advantage of to make money for small time gangs that protect them in return for a cut of the proceeds. It appears the underworld is moving in.

The bottom line is that as Dubai and all the otherEmirates grow, the small-town feel that once made living here so attractive is all but disappearing; now suddenly, the Emirates are beginning to suffer from the big time problems that plague large cities around the world. Now the talk at dinner parties never drifts too far from the subject of crime—not the lack of it, as was the case in the ’80s.And even though the authorities do not publish figures, it is obvious that crime is on the rise. Everyone seems to have a horror story to tell, from gang rape to petty theft. Even the locals have been arrested and convicted of crimes, ranging from theft to murder. Dubai, it seems, offers more than just tourism and duty free shopping.

Maybe I protest too much. Maybe I’m just getting old. Yes, the UAE is still one of the safest places on earth to live.But my question is—for how much longer?

NORBERT SCHILLER is a photo editor and photographer at large with United Press International (UPI)

April 1, 2007 0 comments
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Arab states ignore climate change

by Fouad Hamdan April 1, 2007
written by Fouad Hamdan

“Climate change? What climate change?” These are the twoquestions I often hear when I mention this issue to Arabofficials. If I insist, they get irritated and change thesubject. Others try to play it smart and argue like some USoil corporates, claiming current climate changes are naturalphenomena and not connected to any human activity. Thisdefensive approach is understandable in a region that hasenough political and economic problems, ranging from thePalestinian-Israeli conflict to civil wars in Iraq andSudan, huge discrepancies between poor and rich in mostsocieties and visible pollution in the air of cities as wellas along rivers and coastlines.

But the longer Arab leaders ignore the issue of climatechange, the higher the price Arab societies will pay in thefuture. And this price will be paid with money and humanlives. Sadly, environmental protection is not high on theagenda of Arab governments, the 2005 EnvironmentalSustainability Index found out. Its scores, given to 146countries, are attributed to substantial natural resourceendowments, low population density, and successfulmanagement of environment and development issues. Finlandranked first, followed by Norway, Uruguay, Sweden andIceland. The index put Iraq at 143, Kuwait at 138, SaudiArabia at 136, Lebanon at 129 and the UAE at 110. The threebest Arab states were Tunisia (55), Oman (83) and Jordan(84). Israel landed at 62.

But what strikes me most is the lack of knowledge among Arabdecision-makers about the main causes of climate change, andwhat could be done to stop it. A United Nations scientificpanel agrees that climate change is one of the biggestthreats facing our planet. The main reason is the globalrapid growth in energy production and consumption since the1950s—by burning fossil fuels like coal, gas and oil.Intensive agriculture and the cutting of forests also emitscarbon dioxide (CO2) emissions that heat up the Earth. Theresult is more devastating freak weather events such asflash floods, storms, heat waves, mudslides or droughts.This greenhouse effect also leads to the melting of icepacksin the North and South poles, causing sea levels to rise.

We are heading into global average temperature increases of2 to 3 C°, with rising sea levels wiping countries off themap. Developing nations will be hit first and worst.Meanwhile, the World Health Organization said 150,000 peopledie every year as a result of climate change. In theMediterranean region, climate change has started toundermine efforts for sustainable development.

Last January, the European Union published a report dealingwith the disasters that will take place along the northernshores of the Mediterranean. Assuming a global 3 C° rise,the basin would face crippling shortages of both water andtourists by 2050, and tens of thousands will die of heat insouthern Europe. The annual migration of rich northernEuropeans to the south could stop—with dramatic consequencesfor the economies of Spain, Greece and Italy. If southernEurope will be hit so badly, one can imagine the economicand health impacts climate change will have on the Maghrebstates, Egypt, Palestine/Israel, Lebanon and Syria.

Cairo is among the 22 cities that the UK government’s recentStern report tipped to face increasing risks of coastalsurges and flooding, as the Earth warms by about 3° from the2050s. Floods from rising sea levels could displace up to200 million people worldwide. For Egypt, this means that theNile Delta is under threat.

Arab states need to face that climate change is alreadyhitting them and that they must deal with it. No one issaying that oil and gas should be left untouchedunderground. But to help avert the crisis, a serious globalcut of CO2 emissions should go hand in hand with much lessoil, gas and coal burnt. This does not have to mean aneconomic disaster for Arab oil-producing countries. It couldbe a historic chance to produce hydrogen in a sustainableway with solar power.

Let us imagine all over the Arab world, millions of squarekilometers of solar panels producing hydrogen. This wouldcreate a hydrogen economy, in which energy is stored andtransported by pipelines or tankers. When burning hydrogenin heating systems, energy plants, vehicles or aircraft theexhaust pipes and chimneys will only release water in theatmosphere. Such an energy revolution needs decades ofmassive investments in this technology and in a new globalinfrastructure. Under this strategy, oil countries wouldslowly reduce their oil output while exporting more and morehydrogen. Oil reserves would last longer.

One would assume that hydrogen would be difficult to sell inthe Gulf, the world’s main source of oil. But this isanything but paradoxical. It is a matter of survival,because the cry for sustainability is becoming increasinglyurgent. From Morocco to Iraq and from Syria to Yemen, largeunpopulated and desert areas could be used to producehydrogen from solar energy. Clean hydrogen made there could both save the planet and secure the economic survival of theArab world in the post-oil era.

FOUAD HAMDAN set up Greenpeace in Lebanon in 1994-1999. He is now executive director of Friends of the Earth Europe, a campaign and lobby organization in Brussels influencing the environmental policies of the European Union. He wrote this article for EXECUTIVE.

April 1, 2007 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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