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Levant

Turkish export growth set to boom: Raft of FTAs to fuel growth

by Executive Staff March 12, 2007
written by Executive Staff

This year is expected to see considerable growth in Turkish exports. While the government has made bold growth projections on the outflow of Turkish goods, exporters remain concerned about a number of obstacles that hinder trade.

“We have set our year-end target at $100 billion,” said State Minister for Foreign Trade Kursad Tuzmen in a recent statement to the press. This is an impressive spike given that Turkey earned $86 billion in 2006, with 2009 expected to fetch as much as $125 billion, based on a report prepared by the Turkish Exporters’ Assembly. Germany, Britain and Italy take the lion’s share of Turkish products, which translate into $9.7 billion, $6.8 billion and $6.7 billion worth of goods respectively.

Diversification of exports constitutes one plank in the government initiative to achieving sustainable performance and increase Turkey’s share in world trade. Manufactured goods dominate exports, followed by agricultural goods and mining. According to official figures from the end of 2005, these three areas represented 84.8%, 13.2% and 2.1% of exports respectively. Textiles and ready-made-clothing currently stands at 22-23% of total exports, amounting to $5-6 billion. A shift in the composition of industrial exports towards more sophisticated, capital intensive and high-value-added sectors continues, with electrical machinery and transportation equipment on the rise. The white goods sector alone registered a 34% rise in exports in 2006. Chemicals, machinery and office equipment also continue to grow.

Turkey commits to trade ties

Turkey’s commitment to strengthen trade with regional and neighboring states, as well as with Africa, Asia and the US, will also play an indispensable role in ensuring significant export growth. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Palestine have been notable in this regard. The much-heralded FTA with Egypt came into force in February, while that with Syria went online in January. The Turkish parliament is expected to ratify the trade agreement that was signed with Albania in December some time around May.

The Turks in the meantime continue negotiating free trade deals with Algeria, Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Chile, Venezuela, Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina. Closer to home, Turkey is also working on FTAs with Lebanon, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and the Faroe Islands. The Foreign Trade Undersecretariat (DTM) is scheduled to initiate FTAs with Georgia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia in the first half of 2007.

Overvalued lira not helping matters

Still, Turkish exporters refer to a number of trade-related hurdles. An over-valued currency has hardly helped maximize Turkey’s export potential, as reflected in the country’s trade balance. The foreign trade deficit increased by 25.4% year-on-year between January and November 2005 and 2006, reaching $48.7 billion. Delays at Customs holding up trucks transporting perishable goods across to neighboring states are also bad for business. The inconsistent application of rules at Customs offices, combined with the short duration of the Schengen visas granted to Turkish truckers (currently 45 days) contribute to concern, as both cost time and money.

Meanwhile, the trade deficit remains a pressing issue for the government. Imports of capital and intermediate goods, high oil and raw material prices in 2006, along with substantial growth in private sector investments, have all weighed down on balances. Increasing exports is not only important for balancing the scales in trade, but is also part of the formula to raise national income per capita and reduce unemployment, which was placed at 9.3% between September and November 2006.

March 12, 2007 0 comments
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Levant

Syria looks to increase Indian trade: Delhi the No. 3 foreign investor

by Executive Staff March 9, 2007
written by Executive Staff

Having enjoyed considerable and profitable success with both Iran and China, Syria is now turning its attention to another of the emerging giants of Asia—India.

Like China, India has been increasing its profile in the Middle East, seeking new markets for exports and ramping up investments so as to gain a stake in the energy sector and to open trade doors. India’s booming information technology (IT) industry is also looking to the region, where countries such as Syria are just entering the next stage of the technology and communications revolution.

In 2006, India was one of the largest non-Arab investors in Syria. Though well behind front-runner Iran, which accounted for half of the $800 million of investments from non-Arab nations, India came in a respectable third with $84 million, just behind neighbor and rival China, which contributed $100 million to the total.

India’s contribution to Syrian foreign investment looks even more healthy when it is considered that fourth-ranked Germany directed just $24 million, while total European investments added up to $155 million.

Small-scale investments to date

Most of the Indian investments in Syria to date have been relatively small scale, mainly in the energy sector. However, this is something Damascus is seeking to change.

In mid-January, Fouad Issa al-Jouni, the Syrian industry minister, was in the Indian city of Bangalore to tout his country’s investment potential. Taking part in the annual Partnership Summit staged by the Confederation of Indian Industry, he said his country had much to offer Indian investors.

Syria is a good option for investment with its unique geographical location, diversified economy, ongoing trade liberalization process and good infrastructure base, al-Jouni said.

Al-Jouni also said that his visit would allow him and members of the accompanying delegation of Syrian businessmen to get acquainted with the latest technological and economic developments in India, and to promote Syria’s major industrial advancement and available investment potential.

Another prominent figure to recently give a sales pitch for Syria was India’s ambassador to Damascus, G. Mukhopadhyaya. Addressing the Federation of Andhra Pradesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the Indian city of Hyderabad on January 9, the ambassador described Syria as an untapped market for investors.

Immense potential for India in Syria

Saying that there had been a major liberalization of the Syrian banking and finance sectors, Mukhopadhyaya said these offered good business opportunities.

There was also immense business potential for Indian businesspeople in the country’s pharmaceutical sector, railways, information technology, education, tourism, construction, agro-processing, textiles and textile machinery industries.

Another move to deepen cooperation came on December 18, 2006, when the Federation of Syrian Chambers of Commerce signed a memorandum of understanding with the Indian Merchants’ Chamber outlining plans for cooperation and promotion of bilateral business relations between the two groups.

March 9, 2007 0 comments
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Middle East coming out as top spot for emerging markets

by Fadi Chahine March 1, 2007
written by Fadi Chahine

So, you are an emerging markets investor, or concerned about the volatility in the US or European markets. If you have worries about a slowing of Chinese investments, or you believe a global financial bubble is about to burst, you may want to consider pouring some of your assets into the number one emerging market in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia.

Experts say the safest emerging markets are those which are flush with liquidity. This allows investors to keep investing and buying, even when an emerging market undergoes a correction.

Case in point: Saudi Arabia and the GCC. Although the Saudi stock market and its smaller neighbors experienced substantial corrections in 2006, their fundamentals have remained strong and analysts said the drop was softened by their abundant liquidity. We all know the story of the oil price boom of the past two years and how it swept billions of dollars in windfall revenues into GCC economies, driving their stock markets up.

Until February 2006, GCC bourse indices broadly mirrored the upward price movements of oil. But then the investors caught on to the notion that price-to-earnings ratios of 30 to 40 times have moved beyond reason. It has been well reported how retail investors, who jumped on the bourse bandwagon late, lost their (borrowed) shirts in the downturn.

However, the second half of the story is that the fundamentals of corporate health—at least for blue chip firms—in GCC markets are today better than recent stock prices suggest. This has a lot to do with the way in which the high GCC oil revenues have percolated into the economy and created growth potential.

Should you trust Gulf markets, especially the Saudi Stock Exchange? You may want to take a cue from the prince, and this is not Machiavellian talk. In early February, Al Waleed bin Talal, nicknamed by Time magazine as the Arabian Warren Buffett, announced that his company, Kingdom Holding Company (KHC), has approved a plan to invest around $2.5 billion in the Saudi stock market. The money will mainly go to the banking, media and real estate sectors.

Middle East markets trending upward despite volatility

Still concerned? It is true that some Saudi investors in spring 2006 tried to prop up the Saudi bourse through loudly-announced share buying that slowed the slide but could not stop it. But this is different.

Al Waleed’s modus operandi is to buy strategic stakes in global brand name companies during times of distress on the stock exchange, and to work closely with management to engineer a turnaround. Al Waleed sees the markets in the Middle East, where most of his money was being invested since 2004, as “trending” upward.

Al Waleed’s confidence appears to be well-placed, as the latest figures of corporate earnings for the listed companies have registered strong and consistent growth in the last five years. At $458 billion, the Tadawul Stock Exchange is the fifth-largest in market capitalization within the global emerging market universe, and the most liquid.

After a 32% drop in market capitalization as of early 2006, valuations improved and positive projections are expected for the next five years. SABIC, the petrochemical and construction company for example, is selling at 15 times the expected 2006 earnings, down from a peak of 40. American and European banks, which have long scoured GCC countries almost exclusively to reel in high net worth clients, are increasingly paying attention to the development of these markets. The analysts of these global banks now recommend bouquets of strong but undervalued Saudi companies.

Sound good? There’s just one catch: To invest you must be a Saudi resident. So start making friends in Riyadh.

FADI CHAHINE is the Managing Editor of Regional Press Network (RPN)

March 1, 2007 0 comments
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The battle for the South

by Nicholas Blanford March 1, 2007
written by Nicholas Blanford

The battle is on for hearts and minds in South Lebanon. Taking advantage of the devastating Hizbullah-Israel war last summer, the government of Prime Minister Fuad Saniora is hoping to undercut Hizbullah’s traditional dominance of the border district through a two-pronged approach of external financial assistance and international diplomacy.

The former is being conducted through a novel scheme of allowing nations to “sponsor” the reconstruction of southern villages. The purpose of direct funding is to bypass the state’s turgid bureaucracy and allow money to reach where it’s needed with minimum delay.

According to government-compiled statistics obtained by Executive, as of February 8, 2007, $145.5 million has been pledged to fund the reconstruction of 241 villages in South Lebanon and the western Bekaa; foreign direct funding accounts for $121.1 million of the total. The largest contributor is Saudi Arabia with $64.9 million for 42 villages, followed by the United Arab Emirates with $23.2 million for 16 villages and Kuwait with $19.2 million for 17 villages.

Gulf sheikhdoms rebuilding the South

Separately, Qatar is funding the reconstruction of four towns and villages in the border district—Bint Jbeil, Ainatta, Aitta Shaab and Khiam. Qatar has so far provided $34 million in housing assistance, according to the government figures. The Council of the South estimates total damage in the four towns at $124.5 million.

Apart from Syria, which is sponsoring two villages with a $3 million contribution and Indonesia which also is sponsoring two villages with $784,000, all the state sponsors are from the Gulf.

The political ramifications of the state sponsorship are not lost on Hizbullah. Indeed, it is especially ironic that Qatar—a country that houses the largest US base in the Middle East and has economic relations with Israel—is sponsoring the reconstruction of four towns in South Lebanon where Hizbullah fought its most stubborn defense against the Israeli onslaught last summer. Among the 42 towns and villages being sponsored by Saudi Arabia are Hizbullah strongholds such as Nabatieh and Zawtar Sharqiyeh.

Hizbullah has decided to bite its tongue and say nothing about the sources of funding, although it is fully aware that the motives behind it are not purely altruistic. By allowing key Sunni Arab countries a stake in the villages of the South, the government is hoping to chip away at the district’s reliance on Iranian funds delivered through Hizbullah.

To that end, Seniora is promoting the idea of constructing community libraries in southern villages complete with internet access to potential sponsor countries. In a recent conversation, Seniora explained to me that he hoped to open up the villages to the outside world through the internet.

Seniora’s preoccupation with South Lebanon is evident from a military map he keeps on a stand in the corner of his office in the Grand Serail. The map is covered in a red rash of dots marking Israeli cluster bomb strikes during last summer’s war.

The prime minister has invested much of his diplomatic and political energy in trying to convince the international community, chiefly the Americans and leading European nations, of the wisdom of an Israeli withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms. His seven-point plan—drawn up during the war as part of the negotiations over what became UN Security Council Resolution 1701—recommends that the Farms be turned over to the jurisdiction of UNIFIL pending a formal agreement between Beirut and Damascus on the sovereignty of the 25-square kilometer mountainside.

Resolving Shebaa Farms a necessity

Resolving the “bleeding wound” of the Shebaa Farms has become a cornerstone of the government’s foreign policy, Seniora says, and he wastes no opportunity to raise the subject with his international interlocutors.

“I don’t think there is an official in the world that has not heard of the Shebaa Farms,” he told me recently in an interview.

In 2000, the UN ruled that the Shebaa Farms is Syrian territory occupied by Israel, and that the Jewish state was not required to abandon the mountainside to fulfill Resolution 425 which called for an Israeli pullout from all Lebanese land.

It is a mark of Seniora’s diplomatic tenacity that the UN has agreed to take another look at the sovereignty of the Farms and to assess whether a modus vivendi can be reached that is satisfactory to all parties.

UN cartographers are presently attempting to delineate the geographical perimeters of the Farms, after which it will be up to the UN to assess what do next. Seniora hopes that an Israeli withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms will remove the last raison d’etre for Hizbullah’s military wing. What is the need for a resistance if there is no longer any occupation to resist?

However, Hizbullah long ago finessed this argument by declaring that the resistance is required for as long as Israel remains a threat to Lebanon. Such a nebulous, open-ended condition means that Hizbullah would retain its arms until at least the conclusion of a comprehensive Middle East peace—far longer than Seniora and his political allies care to contemplate.

Seniora believes that the level of foreign support for his government will be measured by the international response to his Shebaa Farms initiative. “This is one of the very important tests of support for this government. Economic support is essential, but not sufficient. We need the political support as well,” he says. He added that he was seeing the “first signs of readiness” from the international community to support an Israeli withdrawal.

Seniora’s actions may be limited

But that readiness may not translate into action. The US is reluctant to give Israel the necessary coercive shove for a withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms because of the fragility of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s domestic standing. The Olmert government may well yet collapse due to the continuing political backlash from the Hizbullah-Israel war. That argument is heightened by the fact that Israel can be offered no guarantees that Hizbullah will disarm if the Shebaa Farms are liberated.

“Hizbullah’s arms are an obstacle to the [proposed Israeli withdrawal from the] Shebaa Farms rather than a solution,” one Western ambassador told me recently.

For now, Hizbullah has chosen to fight its battles on a political level against the government in Beirut rather than militarily against Israel from its traditional stomping ground south of the Litani river. But that may not last much longer. Hizbullah has indicated it is willing to mould some form of national resistance force—similar perhaps to the Hizbullah-trained and -directed multi-faith Lebanese Resistance Brigades, which participated in attacks against Israeli occupation forces in the late 1990s.

If the confrontation between the government and the opposition continues to stagnate, Hizbullah may begin to look anew at the military possibilities in the South—further complicating Seniora’s efforts to reach a peaceful solution.

NICHOKAS BLANFORD is a Beirut-based journalist and author of Killing Mr Lebanon – The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and its impact on the Middle East

March 1, 2007 0 comments
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US presidential race heats up

by Claude Salhani March 1, 2007
written by Claude Salhani

For the first time since 1952—since Dwight D. Eisenhower was in the White House—neither the incumbent president nor his vice president is in the running for the top job in the country. George W. Bush will have served two terms, making him constitutionally ineligible, and Vice President Dick Cheney? Well, realistically, his chances of being elected are about as good as his hunting skills.

The result is that the floor is wide-open and there is no shortage of candidates from both sides. But who would be most beneficial for the Middle East, especially as the Arab lobby in Washington is still light-years away from being able to influence a presidential election?

On the Democrat’s side, the leading contenders are Hillary Clinton, a senator for New York; Barak Obama, a senator from Illinois; and Sens. Joe Biden of Delaware and Chris Dodd of Connecticut. Another candidate outside of Congress is John Edwards, the former one-term senator from North Carolina and vice presidential candidate in the 2004 elections.

On the Republican side there is Sen. John McCain of Arizona; Sen. Sam Brownback from Kansas; former mayor of New York, Rudy Giuliani; Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney; and possibly even former House Speaker Newt Gingrich—to name just a few.

While it is still far too early to draw any conclusions on the Republican side, early polls place McCain and Giuliani as the leaders of the pack, although the buzz around Republican circles predict the party’s nomination is likely to go to a more conservative candidate; Romney is a possibility, but his Mormonism might not play will with evangelical voters, who tend to be suspicious of the faith.

So far, most candidates have avoided touching on the morass that is Middle East politics, other than to weigh in on the war in Iraq, viewed from a domestic perspective; should the US stay the course, as President Bush advocates, or declare victory and bring the troops home? Without getting into too much detail, overall, Democrats favor a pullout while Republicans say the US cannot afford to abandon Iraq. Although the Democrats realize that quitting Iraq cold-turkey is unrealistic, many Republicans recognize that the war will not be won through military means alone.

Regardless of who grabs their party’s nomination as a first step in the battle for the ’08 presidency, and ultimately wins the hearts and minds of the American people, Iraq will remain a major player in the US presidential campaign.

From Hillary Clinton to John McCain, Iraq, and now Iran, are the top items of concern when it comes to foreign policy. As for the crux of the Middle East issue—the Arab-Israeli dispute—most presidential contenders are happy to steer clear of the thorny subject as long as possible. That is usually until the televised debates, when the front-runners have to demonstrate their understanding of world politics and how they would handle those issues.

So where does that leave the Middle East? Pretty much in the same mess it has been in, except maybe for Lebanon.

While most, if not all presidential contenders—Democrats and Republicans alike—are likely to come out in support of Israel in any Mideast dispute, they are also more likely to continue Washington’s support of pro-democracy movements, while mistrust of Damascus should play in Beirut’s favor and continue to ensure US support for a legitimate Lebanese government.

The bad news for Lebanon, however, might be in the new American president’s support of Israel. Again, from Hillary Clinton on the Democrat’s side to Rudy Giuliani or John McCain on the Republican’s, chances are they will show greater support for Israel than for Lebanon or the Arab world. Seeing that Israel is not about to forgive or forget its most recent entanglement with Hizbullah in Lebanon last August, there are good chances that the Jewish state will opt for a re-match, once a new occupant is in the White House.

Bush continues to back Lebanon’s government. In his State of the Union last January, Bush made a point of mentioning the assassination of Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel, stressing his administration’s support of a free and democratic Lebanon. In a private discussion with a group of journalists and think tank analysts in Washington in February, Amin Gemayel defended Bush, declaring: “Say what you want about Bush, it was thanks to his support that Syrian troops finally withdrew from Lebanon.”

CLAUDE SALHANI is International Editor and a senior political analyst with United Press International in Washington. 

March 1, 2007 0 comments
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Dollar not what it used to be

by Riad Al-Khouri March 1, 2007
written by Riad Al-Khouri

The US dollar may still be king in terms of foreign-exchange reserves and denomination of international transactions, but the American currency is no longer absolute monarch of the global economy. The yawning US trade deficit and a huge overhang of debt denominated in greenback are causing concern regarding its reserve currency status. Since the middle of the 20th century, most countries have held the majority of their foreign exchange reserves in dollars. This means that the greenback is constantly in demand, whatever the underlying need for US products; now, with massive trade and budget deficits to finance, Americans are increasingly reliant on that status. The unprecedented weight of US liabilities means that a threat to the dollar’s dominance could result in a currency collapse.

Under present conditions, can dollar hegemony last? The Russians for one don’t think so, having since last spring openly questioned the greenback’s pre-eminence as the world’s reserve currency. At that time, Russia’s central bank held 60% of its reserves in dollars, 33% in euros and 7% in British pounds, but has since been busily diversifying, including an increase in Japanese yen holdings to several percentage points. The share of the yen in global foreign exchange reserves had declined to under 4% by the end of 2005 from over 6% at end-1999. However, with the Japanese currency looking undervalued, Russia, among others, may be adding more of it to their reserves and end-2006 global figures for official yen holdings should see them rising closer to late 90s levels.

With the world’s third largest official foreign exchange holding, which grew over 50% last year, Russia’s challenge to the dollar’s supremacy has fuelled speculation that other central banks could increasingly diversify. That in particular includes China, which is shifting away from dollars, a highly significant move as Chinese have the world’s largest reserves, about a trillion dollars at the end of 2006 and growing at a rate of $30 million an hour. Other Asian central banks have lost their appetite for holding dollars, with Japan also moving out of US debt instruments. Elsewhere in the world, Sweden in 2006 cut its dollar holdings from 37% of central bank reserves to 20%, with the euro’s share rising to 50%. Some OPEC countries are unloading US Treasuries at the fastest pace in more than three years; in particular, Iran in 2006 pledged to move its reserves away from the US dollar and into currencies such as the euro. Closer to home, Syria has just announced that it replaced the dollar with the euro for half of its foreign currency reserves. Given the tension between Washington and Damascus, such a move had been foreseen for some time, especially as the Syrian government at the start of 2006 issued an official circular instructing all ministries and state companies to adopt the euro instead of the dollar for foreign transactions. However, decisions such as these are not made just on the strength of emotional or diplomatic considerations: it is economically and financially smart for Syria to shift into euros, irrespective of the political correctness of the move. By the same token, what should be interesting to watch in 2007 will be how the central banks of other Arab countries, including Lebanon and Jordan, with local currencies pegged to the dollar and strong political ties to Washington, are able to move away from over-reliance on greenback reserves.

Arab banks cutting back on dollar reserves

However, whatever the Arabs do, the trend against the dollar is clear and possibly permanent. There are now more euros banknotes and coins in circulation worldwide than dollars, but the greenback remains the world’s most important reserve currency, though less significant than in the ’90s. The dollar’s share of global reserves dropped to under 67% at the end of 2005 from 71% in 1999, while the euro’s portion increased during the same period to over 24% from under 18%. Today, it is estimated that about 65% of foreign central bank exchange reserves are held in dollars, versus around 25% in euros, with the dollar exchange rate weakening 10% against the euro over the past year. The rise of gold is yet another sign that the dollar is not what it used to be. After central banks in various countries unloaded the yellow metal back in the ’90s, it is now making a comeback.

As the rest of the world continues to abandon the dollar as the global reserve currency, Americans will find borrowing more expensive. The US can maintain a large trade deficit only if foreigners continue to hold large numbers of dollars as their reserve currency, and that looks increasingly unlikely. Though holding a drop in the ocean of world reserves, the Syrians seem to have got it right, but how long will America’s friends in other Arab capitals continue to prop up the US consumer by holding on to dollar reserves? What the Saudis and their neighbors do with their dollars will mean a lot to America in 2007 as other countries continue to abandon the greenback.

RIAD KHOURY is an economist director of MEBA Ltd Amman and a senior associate at BNI, Inc. New York. 

March 1, 2007 0 comments
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Banking & Finance

Banking on shariah finance: Islamic banks on rise

by Executive Staff March 1, 2007
written by Executive Staff

It happened at an international conference promoting Islamic real estate financing last month in Amman. After a session detailing product trends in real estate financing that meet the requirements of shariah, an American listener working in a real estate business in Jordan stood up and said, “I am completely confused about the products you have, but it sounds all very interesting.”

The man was not alone. Panelists presenting the latest models for Islamic real estate financing at the event said apologetically at several points that their explanations would “increase the confusion” of listeners, especially when questions ventured into the ethical underpinnings of specific Islamic products. Instead of trumpeting new flashy deals between Islamic bankers and regional real estate investors, speakers overall had their hands full with building awareness in a meeting that showed how the complexity of Islamic financial concepts in the past five years has grown faster than the corresponding knowledge base in the regional investor community.

As one example, sukuk—asset-backed securities that are employed in growing numbers for securitization operations with real estate as underlying assets—have ballooned into 17 different varietals on record with the Accounting & Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAIOFI). The first modern sukuk was issued as simple arrangement but five years ago by the government of Malaysia.

In the retail market, the contracts and models for Islamic real estate finance have sprouted from relatively simple mudaraba transactions (in which a bank purchases a property and resells it to its client at a fixed higher price payable in installments) to multi-layered deals that include leasing (ijara), diminishing joint ownership (diminishing musharaka), and parallel and mixed leasing agreements.

The United Kingdom has acted as center for developing these shariah-compliant products, said Tariq Hameed, a partner in British law firm Norton Rose. However, when pressed for numbers and the UK market size for the Islamic product marvels, he estimated the number of existing contracts at 5,000 home finance deals—out of 410,000 Muslim households in the country. “Many Muslim families in the UK don’t trust that the contracts really are shariah-compliant,” he offered as explanation.

Lots of room for growth

In Jordan, the size of the Islamic housing market also has a lot of room for optimists. Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB), one of two shariah-compliant banks in the Hashemite Kingdom, has records of $700 million worth of home finance agreements—but that is a lifetime achievement of the bank in the past quarter century. The numbers for 2006 are a modest $45 million for JIB out of an estimated $70 to $80 million in Islamic house finance deals by all Jordanian providers last year, an advisor to JIB told Executive.

And for sukuk, while the papers are growing impressively in issue size and total numbers, the majority of investors come from a conventional background, with interests that are not driven by the Islamic aspect of the complex structures.

Islamic finance is, by definition, a practice of business which adheres to rules that transcend the mere mechanisms of the markets. Drawing strength from its roots and the blessings of wealth in Muslim societies, Islamic finance took shape between the early 1960s and late 1980s and has gained greatly in international stature since the mid 1990s. As such, modern Islamic finance for the past decade or so has with increasing vigor addressed the formidable challenge of conducting business activity in a manner that is satisfactory through both its economic rewards and its religious purity.

A very big part of this process has been and still is to set standards that meet the requirements of two very complex and inherently demanding systems: shariah law and the latest economic science. Creating standards that fuse these two realms into a winning partnership is the chosen task of organizations such as the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), which was established in 2002 in Malaysia as international body of regulators and Islamic financial institutions.

The IFSB hosted a seminar on real estate financing standards back to back with the Amman conference last month and is generally very busy this year, with eight major event packages that discuss topics from legal issues to the “European challenge” for the industry.

This standard-setting and dissemination enthusiasm goes hand in hand with the growing awareness and expansion of Islamic financial services to highly developed conventional financial markets in Japan, where the central bank has shown interest in the specialty, and Europe, where the UK authorities have been taking steps to ease the facilitation of Islamic finance and where France recently has started considering a regulatory framework that will accommodate Islamic banking.

But there are signs suggesting that the course of Islamic finance is entering another phase of its development. In the past three years, more and more financial firms and general corporations in the Gulf region have been converting their operations to become shariah-compliant. However, as a survey by the IFSB showed last month, the growth rates of Islamic banks in many Muslim countries have dropped from exponential between 2003 and 2005 to more normal in 2006.

Islamic assets in the banking sectors of countries like Bahrain, Qatar, Jordan and Malaysia represent between 10% and 15% of total banking assets, with no significant increase in the percentage share in the first half of 2006. While Brunei was the only upward outlier with more than 40% of assets being Islamic, Lebanon joined Indonesia and Pakistan at the low end of the scale with no more than 2% of Islamic banking assets. According to the survey, Islamic finance is still growing in the Middle East but so is conventional banking, and the strongest growth rates are usually not on the side of Islamic banks.

For banks, specialization in Islamic real estate finance can be attractive in two ways, as facilitators of home or commercial property purchases by their customers, and as means for their own investments. While conventional banks are largely excluded from using real estate for profit-oriented own investments, the operating mandate of Islamic institutions has led regulators in several countries to allow these banks to include property in their investment portfolios.

Different jurisdictions, different regulations

However, the banks are facing different restrictions in different jurisdictions, as some regulators put limits on Islamic banks’ real estate investments and others don’t. In Europe, the practitioners also still face cost issues in home financing. These originate from tax laws that make no provisions for the special processes of Islamic finance, such as double transfer of deeds in a mudaraba structure. Only the UK has taken steps toward removing these cost barriers.

All this underpins the case made by the Islamic finance protagonists that the playing field for real estate finance by Islamic institutions should be made more level, beginning with continued standardization initiatives of central banks and regulators in Muslim countries.

Cost barriers and overly complex structures of Islamic products can be impediments for the growth of Islamic finance beyond sitting on a ledge as niche operators that address customers who will not enter the realm of conventional banking. While this target group is important, especially in developed countries, the ethics aspirations involved in the drive to expand Islamic finance extend into creating a humane economic realm, which will appeal to wide population groups—which as a larger aim underscores again the need for comprehensive standards.

And while the buzz of abundant liquidity by shariah-compliant investors and financial institutions in the Gulf certainly is no myth, the security and business convenience environment in the Levant has yet to infuse managers with more confidence. Take the example of Kuwait Finance House, a big player in channeling funds into real estate investments under observance of shariah, which has nearly $7.5 billion in property assets and funds.

KFH wants to expand in the Middle East, but for the time being, its property portfolio is invested in Europe, the Americas, and Asia. Said the manager of KFH’s international real estate department, Ali Al-Ghannam: “We have received many proposals for projects in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and North African countries, but so far we have no concrete projects.”

March 1, 2007 0 comments
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The so-called Iranian threat

by Lee Smith March 1, 2007
written by Lee Smith

According to a recent Zogby poll, George W. Bush jumped ahead of Ariel Sharon this year as the world leader Arabs like least. Perhaps Bush owes his remarkable surge to the fact that the former prime minister was in a coma for all but two weeks of 2006. This same poll that surveyed respondents on the popularity of an Israeli leader who for all practical purposes is dead, also reports that the majority of Middle Easterners do not fear Iran. It is the answer to what seems a very fuzzy question, indeed a much politicized one designed to challenge what has recently become the White House’s regional flow-chart: The Sunni Arab states are lined up with the US and Israel, against Tehran and its regional allies, Syria and Hizbullah.

You can’t entirely blame the Zogby pollsters for wanting all the traditional enmities to still hold water: Arabs hate Israel and Bush most of all, and they like—er, ok, they don’t fear Iran! What seems like a fundamental re-alignment of interests has come as a surprise to almost everyone, here in Washington and elsewhere. Sunni powers like Egypt and Jordan have been quite clear about their concerns over the Iranian threat, while the Saudi royal family has put up a noble front, perhaps because they have the most to lose if Iran becomes the regional hegemon. But the issue’s even more interesting within the Palestinian Authority.

Now that the Mecca Agreement has, temporarily at least, ended the discord between Hamas and Fatah, maybe the Palestinian Prime Minister can relax about his fashion choices. Ever since a Fatah crowd started chanting “Shia, Shia” against their Tehran-funded rivals, it seems Ismail Haniyeh will not be photographed without a red and white kafiyeh on his head. Maybe the color-scheme is to distinguish himself from the late Chairman Arafat—or perhaps he just wants to wrap himself in Arab garb to avoid seeming too Persian. So, then perhaps the more useful question is not whether Arabs fear Iran, but if some Arabs are very worried about seeming too Iranian.

The Iranians of course are also anxious, which is why unlike their clueless ally in Damascus, they seem to want very much to avoid a sectarian civil war in Lebanon. Another Sunni-Shia conflict in the Middle East is probably not to the Islamic Republic’s advantage, especially since the US military’s “surge” in Iraq seems so far mostly to involve rolling up Iranian assets in Baghdad. And if Bashar al-Assad keeps trying to bring down the Seniora government for the sake of sidelining an investigation into the murder of a popular Sunni zai’m and empowering a Shia militia, then Tehran will lose much of the region-wide credit it earned this past summer, outside Lebanon at any rate, as benefactor and grand sorcerer of the Islamo-nationalist resistance against Israel. The fact is that the Iranians may have already reached the limits of their ability to project power in a region that is majority Sunni Arab.

Perhaps that’s why here in Washington we are watching an extraordinary publicity campaign on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran unfold, waged by a host of journalists and policy specialists in articles like “Courting the Saudis, and Catastrophe,” and “Why America Must Throw in its Lot with the Shia.” In short, the argument is that the US cannot abandon the Shia revival at this stage and return to the policies that allowed Sunni fanaticism to blossom and eventually bear fruit on September 11. The problem however is that the White House interprets regional transformation very differently than the Shia do: Washington means making room for democracy, or power-sharing, while the Iranians and Arab Shia from Iraq to Lebanon have largely taken it as a cue that after 1,400 years, they get to ride the pony now. Sure, the Shia reaction is a very understandable human response to more than a millennium of repressive violence, but the Americans are not going to run roughshod over all their strategic interests just so that the Shia can get their pound of flesh out of the Sunnis.

Elsewhere recently, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman argues that Iranian civilization and the country’s well-educated and progressive populace make Iran a much more likely US ally than Riyadh. In an ideal world, Washington policymakers would very much like to have a relationship with Iran. Among other things, it would give the US some much-needed leverage over the Saudis to finally stop funding, inciting and staffing, if unwittingly, terror against Americans and American interests. Alas, it is not an ideal world, and the Iranian regime is a much bigger problem as it is openly fighting the US, its allies and interests across the Middle East, from Iraq to Lebanon.

Vali Nasr is one of the hot names in US policy circles these days, which is why just last month he was invited to testify before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. There, he explained that, “a policy that is focused on Iran rather than Iraq will escalate conflict in Iraq and across the Middle East, thereby deepening American involvement in the region with the potential for adversely impacting US interests.” In other words, let Iran go about its business of adversely impacting US interests.

In fact, it wasn’t until very recently that Washington recognized the significance of Iran’s campaign, an oversight that explains why the Americans were essentially conducting two Middle East policies—one to deal with Lebanon, Syria, the Gulf, etc. that saw Iran as the major strategic threat; and another for Iraq that ignored, as Nasr counseled, the extent of Iranian penetration there.

With Moqtada al-Sadr hiding himself away like another famous underground mullah, those days are gone. And now who knows what new alliances are yet in store—a Damascus isolated by Saudi Arabia and its anxious Iranian ally?

LEE SMITH is a Hudson Institute visiting fellow and reporter on Middle East affairs.

March 1, 2007 0 comments
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Yes, Iraq was all about the oil

by Peter Speetjens March 1, 2007
written by Peter Speetjens

We were told that the war in Iraq was waged for many reasons: Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, supported terrorism and nourished links with al Qaeda. Demonstrators holding up banners reading “No Blood for Oil” were dismissed as ignorant and naive.

All wars start way before the first bullet is fired, and the Iraqi war was no exception. A possible starting date might be January 26, 1998, when 18 members of the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), wrote to then-US President Bill Clinton, urging him to use military action to overthrow Saddam. If not, they warned, he would be jeopardizing a sizeable chunk of the world’s oil supply. PNAC’s clout was significant. Ten of its 28 founding members—including such neocon luminaries as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay Khalizad—would go on to serve in the Bush administration

Clinton did not act. He of course did not have the oil background of his successor, George Bush, who within two weeks of his inauguration in January 2001 appointed Cheney head of the Energy Task Force. The former Halliburton CEO went on to hold regular meetings with oil industry representatives and lobbyists and later declared that, “by any estimation, Middle East oil producers will remain central to world security. The Gulf will be a primary focus of US international energy policy.”

The activities of “Team Cheney” were not isolated. As Jane Mayer revealed in The New Yorker, a secret National Security Council memo directed its staff “to cooperate fully” with Cheney’s task force and, specifically, to join “the review of operational policies towards rogue states such as Iraq and actions regarding the capture of new and existing oil and gas fields.”

The US State Department too joined the party, launching the Future of Iraq Project (FIP) 18 months before the war began, a period during which the US administration denied it had any specific war plans for Iraq. Within the FIP, however, experts from Iraq and the US produced 2,000 pages on how to deal with post-war Iraq, stating that the country should be, “opened to international oil companies as quickly as possible after the war.”

Which it was—almost overnight, the US-lead Coalition Provisional Authority turned Iraq into one of the most privatized nations on earth. State-owned enterprises were put up for sale, corporate taxes slashed and foreign firms could enter the market and repatriate profits tax-free. According to the Center for Public Integrity, 15 American companies were awarded contracts worth $50 billion—but not to oil companies.

That might have made things too obvious. It would also have been a violation of the Iraqi constitution. So a new law was needed, a work in progress ever since. To the immense frustration of the Americans, the main Iraqi power brokers have so far been unable to agree on a framework. The Kurds want regional authorities to have the main say, the Sunnis want a strong national authority, and Shi’ites want something in between.

All parties, including the Americans, agree on one thing: the Iraqi oil sector will be open to foreign investors. Fair enough. The shattered Iraqi oil industry is in dire need of a cash injection, some $25 billion over the next five years. The trouble is that any new oil law appears to be heading towards Production Sharing Agreements or PSAs.

In exchange for investments in exploration and production, a PSA allows oil companies to keep revenues until its initial investments are covered. Fair enough … or is it? British oil watchdog Platform has warned how PSAs allow for extremely high profit margins, up to 13 times a company’s minimum target.

Currently just 12% of the world’s oil is governed by PSAs, as they are only used in countries with small or difficult to reach oilfields, or in case of high-risk exploration. In Iraq, however, most fields have been very well documented, oil lies close to the surface and is cheap to extract.

When current Iraqi Vice-President Adel Mahdi first announced the liberalization of the Iraqi oil sector in Washington in 2004, he proclaimed it “very promising to American investors and American enterprise, certainly to oil companies.”

And yet, just days before the first tanks rolled over the Iraqi border, British Prime Minister Tony Blair assured a baying British public that, “Iraqi oil revenues, which people falsely claim we want to seize, should be put in a trust fund for the Iraqi people.” Who was being ignorant and naive?
 

PETER SPEETJENS is a Dutch writer and freelance consultant

March 1, 2007 0 comments
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Saudis moving to block Iranians

by Gareth Smith March 1, 2007
written by Gareth Smith

While many analysts have in recent weeks trumpeted the role of Iran as an emerging regional power, the more astute have pointed to the remarkable role of Saudi Arabia in shaping the regional agenda across both the Persian Gulf and the Levant.

The two key developments were February’s Saudi-brokered Mecca agreement between Hamas and Fatah, and Saudi Arabia’s series of meetings with Iran’s top security official, Ali Larijani, over both Lebanon and Tehran’s nuclear program. But there was also huge significance in February’s visit to Saudi by Vladimir Putin, the first by a Russian leader to any country of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Riyadh’s relationship with Tehran remains delicate. The persisting political vacuum in Iraq, where the Shia-led government is struggling to establish any effective authority, inevitably sucks in neighbors, with the Persian Gulf’s two leading powers having opposing visions of Iraq’s future.

“Iran would like a strong Shia state whereas the Saudis want a Sunni state,” says one insider in Tehran. “But it’s all been complicated by the naive vision of the US, Iraq’s third important player, which sought a quiet, ‘democratic’ Iraq with US military bases for at least 20 years. I don’t see the Americans being successful in reconciling these three visions, whether or not they send more troops.”

Riyadh-Tehran jousting

While both Tehran and the Saudis—officially or unofficially—pour resources into intelligence operations in Iraq, both governments are concerned at the dangers of sectarian conflict between Shia and Sunni, which can embolden extremists in Iraq and elsewhere. Pragmatists in both Saudi Arabia and Iran would like to get back to the growing realism of their relationship under former Iranian presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami.

“Even if Iran has more influence than the Saudis in Iraq, Saudi Arabia has more influence across the Islamic world, and this can genuinely harm Iran,” an official in Tehran says.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, has warned publicly of differences among Muslims being fueled by “those who, for the happiness of US and Zionists, talk about an imagined … ‘Shia crescent’ and those who stir up insecurity and brother-killings in Iraq to make the Islamic and popular [Iraqi] government fail.”

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s “cautious welcome” of the new US Iraq policy reflected relief at the easing of earlier fears that Washington was contemplating a pull-out, even though the strategy had been agreed upon during Vice-President Dick Cheney’s visit to Riyadh in November.

Tehran is also concerned over Saudi influence in Lebanon, growing since the Syrian withdrawal and cemented by the donation of $1 billion to the central bank during the summer’s Israeli onslaught and the Gulf kingdom’s sponsorship of reconstruction in mainly Shi’a South Lebanon. Conservatives in Tehran also charge the Saudis with encouraging Hamas, the militant Palestinian group, to keep a distance from Tehran, and fostering anti-Shi’a sentiment among Sunni clerics in Pakistan.

The Saudis are wary both of Iran’s nuclear program and of the popularity of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the Arab and Islamic worlds, and are well aware of the wave of sympathy likely to be generated for Iran should it be attacked by the US or Israel.

An opinion poll released last month by Zogby International found that 61% of Arabs backed Iran’s nuclear program, even if it led to the acquisition of weapons. Nearly 80% identified the US and Israel as the main threats to regional security with only 6% naming Iran.

Hence the Saudis have opted for subtle economic pressure on Iran in the hope this will lead Tehran to compromise. Riyadh moved in January to keep oil prices at a relatively low level, vetoing a proposed emergency OPEC meeting when the price dipped below $50 a barrel. The move constrained Iran’s oil income, which generates around 60% of government revenue, at a time when US-encouraged banking sanctions are squeezing Tehran’s access to capital badly needed for oil and gas projects.

Blocking Iran

The Mecca accord, which went down badly in Washington, but has also done something to neutralize Tehran’s appeal as the “true” defender of Palestinian rights and remind the region that the 2002 “Arab peace plan,” agreed at the Beirut Arab League summit and still on the table, was essentially a Saudi proposal.

And hence the Saudis’ desire to agree a minimum framework with Tehran over Lebanon—including the acceptance of the UN enquiry into the murder of Rafik Hariri—and reduce the possibility that the persisting stand-off between the government of Fuad Seniora and the Hizbullah-led opposition could get out of hand.

The end-game of the Saudi strategy is probably both the halting of the Iranian nuclear program and the beginnings of strategic dialogue between Washington and Tehran. That neither will be easily accomplished should not detract from the real progress that has already been made.

GARETH SMYTH is the Financial Times Tehran correspondent.

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