Is it fair to say that the port has been performing reasonably well in 2003?

Yes. Beirut Port has been performing well with regards to imports and total revenues, which increased from $71 million in 2002 to $75 million last year.

A much talked-about issue is the project of putting the port’s container terminal into business. Is the tender for finding an operator progressing?

It is ready. We have completed the tender documents, and they are now with the minister for final approval.

How long until an operator would be able to come in?

In the tender documents, we specified one-and-a-half months to receive responses from interested operators, but we think that we should extend that to perhaps two months. For the phase from awarding the contract, we have scheduled three to four months for the operator to mobilize and start operations. In total, we are talking about half a year.

For what duration will the contract be awarded?

It would be for 10 years, with a possible five-year extension.

A second big issue regarding the container terminal is necessary equipment, which you ordered from China. Are these gantry cranes ready for delivery?

Delivery of all the equipment we bought has already begun. I think the gantry cranes are on a boat and just left China. They require two-and-a-half months at sea because they have to go all the way around Africa. Then they require another two-and-a-half to three months of erection and testing, which, like the operator tender, brings us to the middle of the year.

Did you request a delay of delivery?

There was a delay by two months. Delivery was originally scheduled for end of March. However, we did not actually delay delivery. We pinpointed some issues in a punch list for modifications and we requested the manufacturer to change most of them in China.

Does this delivery provide all the equipment needed for the terminal?

Ideally, we should have four gantry cranes and not three, which means that ideally we should have eight Rubber-Tyred Gantry cranes [RTG] and not six. We opted to buy the strict minimum as an initial step and allow ourselves to buy more when need arises. In our contract, we have an option to buy one more fixed gantry crane and two more RTGs.

Steel prices have gone up. Could that alter prices under the contract option?

The option does not allow for a price hike due to steel price fluctuation. The only price hike is on the euro side. When we signed the option, 25% are to be rescheduled taking into regard euro appreciation.

Considering the total cost of $27 million for the equipment under delivery, you got a good deal?

We got an excellent deal.

As far as construction of the container terminal, is it correct that the total capital investment amounted to $200 million?

It was less than that and it was more than just the container terminal. The investment was closer to $180 million and it included rehabilitation of some of the old parts of the port.

Are the $27 million for the new cranes included in the $180 million or on top of that?

I believe, on top.

Did it incur specific costs for the terminal not to be operational for a period of several years?

Major cost would have been interest expenses, but the port self-financed this project and basically there were no interest-bearing loans involved. We have some maintenance costs, but those are peanuts.

But how would you assess the cost of lost opportunity from the delay?

I believe the cost of opportunity loss is in the extra services that we could have offered, mostly in transshipment, and in the quality of the service that we could have achieved. What the dollar figure for that is, who knows?

Do you consider attracting large carriers for transshipment to Beirut as a realistic vision?

I have been talking a lot with carriers, and the vision varies. There are those who think that it is absolutely impossible to have transshipment here, and then it ranges all the way to those who think that carriers will be lining up to transship out of Beirut. I think if we can sell that product at a good price we will have some transshipment but I don’t believe that we should aim at becoming a transshipment hub the way Dubai or some other ports are. Further expansion of Beirut Port would be very expensive and I do not believe that transshipment revenue would be able to cover such expenses.

Did the delay harm the concept of becoming a transshipment hub?

Today, we have very little, not to say no, transshipment cargo. The studies we have undertaken show that transshipment starts very slowly and tends to increase with time. So, a three year delay is costing some money, but not a lot.

Can you confirm that freight forwarders will be able to establish operations in the Port’s free zone?

Yes, we have been working very closely with customs on that issue and we just modified the rules for the free zone in order to allow logistics companies to operate inside the free zone. This is especially for re-packing, handling cargo for third parties, and to undertake stock control for major companies, in order to make Beirut a center of distribution for the entire Middle East area. This is much more interesting than transshipment alone.

Last month, the port saw disputes and compensation demands over termination of stevedore contracts with the equipment contractors that have been handling cargo at the port. Would you be able to comment on the validity of their demands?

While I understand their demands and might be sympathetic to some of them, legally speaking, I cannot resolve them from where I stand.

Could you give an estimate on the value of their equipment and what amounts these companies might have invested in the past five years?

Since we are not legally bound or allowed to provide any compensation, we didn’t look into this matter. Just as everyone, I have heard of astronomical amounts of money that are supposedly being demanded. I can only say that I think the numbers I heard are far exaggerated.

How do the Lebanese print media survive?

The word survive is very accurate. Before the war, the Lebanese media was flourished in terms of sales and advertising revenues. Unfortunately, during the war we had to spend all our reserves and now we are surviving. The print media market is depressed not just in Lebanon but worldwide has fallen by something like 25% to 30%, the broadsheet media and the dailies, that is. But because of the political and economic situation in Lebanon and the region, the advertising market has dropped – by something like 35% to 40% for television and 25% for the print media. We face a major problem with all our budgets, short-term, mid-term, and long-term. At the end of 2003, we had lost something like $1.5 million in advertising revenues. That’s a big amount in the print media.

How do you cover your losses?

Our first step, years ago, was to increase the price of the newspaper, from LL1,000 to LL2,000. Then, we increased the capital of the company that publishes An Nahar. We knocked on the door of people who were interested. We integrated them into our family. And of course, in buying the shares, they paid a different price than the normal price. We’ve been able to bring in something like $10 million, just to cover all the losses of the war, to ‘clean’ everything, and to prepare the budget for the next six years.

Has your dependence on investors interfered with the paper’s independence?

In our case, no, because in the charter of the company it is written very clearly that the policy of the paper is decided by the journalists and the Tueni family – because it’s a family business – based on the mission set out in 1948 by my grandfather, Gebran Tueni, concerning the role of An Nahar, the defense of press freedom, and the defense of the integrity of Lebanon. Anyone who buys shares in An Nahar must agree to this.

Is there an advertising monopoly?

I don’t oblige advertisers to advertise in An Nahar. And our prices are high. There is no monopoly of advertising. People can compare and choose.

Why has Prime Minister Rafik Hariri relinquished his 34.5% stake in An Nahar?

I don’t know but I’m happy. He has his own reasons. I had mine for buying back the shares. A lot of people told me I was stupid, but I said: No, no, no, when you want to pay for your freedom, it costs you a lot. I don’t think he was very happy to give them up. I was very happy, but you should know that the price was very high. I can’t tell you how high. But it was a very high price, a really high price. He did good business. But I think politically it was good for An Nahar. A long time ago, I asked him to sell me back the shares, but he didn’t want to at the time. Now I think he feels that the policy of An Nahar for the time being is very independent and maybe he thought that he cannot exert pressure to change that policy. Maybe he thought that it was too much for him to support.

Is there any truth to the suggestion that he relinquished the shares under pressure, indirect or otherwise, from Syria because An Nahar espouses an anti-Syria editorial line?

That is pure fantasy. That would mean that today, I can thank the people I attack in my newspaper for exerting pressure on someone to sell me shares, so that am now more independent. It was a very positive point for the readers also who wrote to congratulate me. Now I’m going to sell shares with the new philosophy that no one person can own more than 30% of An Nahar.

Why was it so important to you to get Hariri’s shares back?

It is very important for a journalist to feel that they are completely independent, that they are not dependent on the money of someone, that no one can say to them: I am a partner, especially when your partner is not always on the same political line.

Did Hariri ever try to exert pressure?

Frankly, yes and no. The relationship was comfortable, though. He endured much more from me than I endured from him, because he knew that he couldn’t exert pressure.

Does Antoine Choueiri have an unfair grip on media advertising?

How? Ok, he represents An Nahar, L’Orient Le Jour, As Safir, but I chose him, he didn’t choose me. Nobody obliged me to go to Choeuiri. I went to Choueiri because I think he is doing very good business. It’s a business contract between him and me. I chose him to manage my ads because I don’t want to create an advertising department in my newspaper. If someone has a newspaper or television station and cannot attract advertising, that’s not my fault. Let him improve his product, convince people that he is number one. Either we are in a free economic system, a free market, or not. This is not dumping. Before [we dealt with] Choueiri, we used to have our own in-house ad department, and it didn’t work. We had the problem then of going out into the market to collect payment. We need a cash flow.

Are the orders of the press and of journalists doing their job as they should?

They are doing the minimum and the minimum is never enough. In this business it’s never enough. With respect to major problems regarding press freedom, they are doing their job. We were able, through the Orders, to get the press law amended. Now, Lebanon’s press law – and I am against any press law – is a good press law. The government can no longer send someone to prison as they do with the audiovisual law, which is a very bad law. But none of the TV owners has presented an amendment of this stupid law, which allows the government to close down TV stations.

How did you feel about the arrest of New TV owner Tahseen Khayyat?

I’m against the arrest of any journalist, of any owner of a TV station or newspaper. I think the TV law in Lebanon is a very bad law. I can tomorrow morning say you are an Israeli agent and put you in jail for 24 hours.

So Tahseen Khayyat’s arrest constituted harassment?

I think it was a form of harassment.

Is this good for Lebanon’s image?

It is very bad for Lebanon’s image, for people to see, as well, that MTV is still closed because our government, our president, was upset with MTV’s policy. The government is trying to bring us back to the Middle Ages. It affects the credibility of the government, of the president, of the prime minister, of the general assembly.

Why is this happening?

Because we don’t have politicians in Lebanon. This is not an independent state. These people have been designated to do a certain job, by the Syrians.

What is your reaction to Walid bin Talal’s purchase of a 49% stake in LBC International?

It’s good. It’s good to see that Lebanese television can attract the interest of foreign investors. If it was a bad TV station, bin Talal would not have invested in it. It’s good for the sector, of course, good for the brand name of Lebanon, good for the whole industry.

What is your evaluation of Walid bin Talal’s newly-formed 24-hour Rotana music channel?

It’s good because I think that Walid bin Talal will be able to help a lot of Arab artists, who do not have the money to produce clips. I hope that we will have real artists and not popcorn artists and video-clip artists.

In early December 2003, a Pentagon decision outraged a number of American allies. US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz issued a memo stating that several countries that had opposed America’s war in Iraq, including France, Germany, Canada, Russia and Mexico, would be barred from bidding for $18.6 billion in US-financed Iraqi reconstruction contracts. By January, the Bush administration’s mood had changed. It became clear that the stated rationale for the decision, namely that it would protect “the essential security interests of the United States”, somehow implied that countries historically close to the US, somehow threatened its national security. This was a bit too much even for noteworthy Bush administration unilateralists. At the Summit of the America’s in January, President George W. Bush rescinded the ban on Canadian companies, amid signs from the Defense Department that three or four states in all might be removed from the list of proscribed nations. If that’s the case, then it’s good news, because aside from the fact that the move was no more than petty payback, it undermined one of the key things that Bush and his acolytes claim to be trying to spread in Iraq: the benefits of the free market.

Writing in the New York Times, Nancy Birdsall and Todd Moss of the Center for Global Development in Washington noted: “All the fuss must seem rather strange to the more than four billion people in the developing world. After all, restricting overseas development contracts to domestic bidders – so called ‘tied aid’ – has been standard practice in the aid world for the past 40 years.” However, the authors didn’t defend the habit; they argued it led to one of the main problems in current aid spending practice -and in the Bush administration’s decision to bar non-American competitors: restricting bidders increases costs by limiting competition.

As Birdsall and Moss observed: “Advocates of improving aid effectiveness have long argued to eliminate the practice of tied aid – which, according to one economic study, reduces its value by 15% to 30%. Untying aid would allow poor countries to purchase the most efficient and cost-effective goods and services necessary for their development projects. That makes sense because the real point of aid is to help people escape from poverty. But old habits die hard.”

That may not matter much if American companies, particularly ones financing presidential election campaigns, benefit. However, as the post-war situation in Iraq has dragged on, and as American taxpayers have been compelled to pay tens of billions of dollars for Iraqi reconstruction, the matter of financial transparency has become highly sensitive politically. Very simply, voters are not keen to fatten the accounts of American multinationals like Halliburton, which recently overcharged the Pentagon by $61 million through a competition-free contract, even if the prevailing, and fallacious, wisdom in the administration is that what is good for American companies is good for America.

As writer Matt Welch observed in Beirut’s Daily Star, conflating companies with countries is “a marriage which the trade liberalization project has long been trying to de-couple.” The problem is that “where large companies are so intertwined with the identity of their countries […] their governments won’t allow them to fail.” This means that the pathologies of private firms instead of being filtered out by market forces are enhanced by them, so that mismanaged or corrupt companies survive.

A second problem is that it makes no sense to peddle the advantages of free minds and free markets to the Iraqis, if half of that equation (or indeed all of it) is ignored. From the outset, the American-led reconstruction process in Iraq has been dipped in controversy, some of it unjustified. And in a country like Iraq, where animosity to the U.S. presence is rising and where unemployment may be as high as 50 percent, according to a UN-World Bank report (including an estimated 400,000 soldiers), even the semblance of financial impropriety can be politically disastrous.

It is to avoid this that, for example, George Soros’ Open Society Institute instituted the Iraq Revenue Watch (IRW) project, to “monitor Iraq’s oil industry to ensure that it is managed with the highest standards of transparency and that the benefits of national oil wealth flow to the people of Iraq.” As IRW remarked on its website, implicitly linking transparency and political stability: “In many parts of the world, the lack of proper stewardship over oil resources has resulted in corruption, the continued impoverishment of populations, and abuses of political power… If Iraq is to become an open, democratic society it will need to develop transparent accountable institutions for ensuring honest management of oil revenues.”

Economic policies born of pique are rarely profitable, and the Pentagon’s intervention in limiting participants in Iraqi reconstruction was surely an example. The Bush administration has backtracked, and might console itself by recognizing that there are two beneficiaries: American taxpayers, who will get more aid for their money; and Iraqi citizens, who will get more money for their aid.

Michael Young is a contributing editor at Reason magazine in the US.