Winners and Losers
Aspecter is haunting the Middle East. A little more than a quarter century after the Shah’s fall, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s wildest dreams seem to be coming true throughout the region, from the Gulf to the eastern Mediterranean. Where Iran has not engineered Washington’s failures, it has profited from them, and the regime means to ensure its role as the regional power and leader of the Muslim world with the bomb.
The momentum shifted too fast for the Bush administration. After all, just a year ago, the White House felt vindicated if not triumphant as it watched its democratization program on the march throughout the Middle East. Syrian troops had withdrawn from Lebanon, the Iraqi insurgency appeared manageable, and Cairo and Riyadh were slowly bending to Washington’s desire to reshape the region in its own liberal, pluralist and democratic image. But when the Palestinians voted for a party that the US State Department has designated a terrorist organization, the White House was left sucking wind.
Iran and Qatar were the winners this year (for entirely different reasons), while Syria, Hizbullah, Egypt and Jordan broke even. The United States was the big loser, along with pretty much anyone who was banking on Washington to push for pluralism, liberalism and democracy in the Middle East. Here’s how the region’s major players fared in 2006.
Lebanon: Loser
It is almost two years now since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and still no one has been indicted for the crime, even though the investigation into his death plunged the country into a dangerous spiral. Assassinations and bombings were less common this year than last, but Syrian allies threatened to bring down the government to stop the formation of an international tribunal that would hand down indictments. But if there is no real mechanism to arrest any regime figures named in Hariri’s death, why has Damascus allegedly killed again and again just to avoid being named a killer? Perhaps it is just a matter of a prestige, legitimacy and saving face. After all, it’s worth remembering that as Syrian troops left Lebanon at the behest of the international community, they would presumably like to return in the same fashion, invited in, just as they were 16 years ago. Meanwhile, the Siniora government seems to have finally realized that it is in an existential fight for the future of Lebanon.
After Hizbullah single-handedly dragged the country to war this summer, many of those same youth who took to the streets in spring 2005 to demand their freedom, sovereignty and independence are wondering if their beautiful, beloved country can escape the fate that its enemies, both foreign and domestic, have designed for it. Some of the rising generation is leaving, some have already apparently enlisted in what may be the next bloody round of conflict; others are hopeless. It is a dark hour for Lebanon.
Hizbullah: Even
Since their bookkeeping is a closed affair, only the party of God knows how many of its fighters were really killed in this summer’s war and how much Iranian money has really been handed out for reconstruction. But if Hassan Nasrallah says the victory was divine because he personally survived an onslaught that ravaged his community, then what’s several billions of dollars in damage and lost tourism receipts? Resistance is never having to say you’re sorry. To be sure, the muqawama is readying for the next round against Israel, but you don’t have to read biographies of Zionist officials past and present to know that Israel is preparing as well, and has no intention of being fooled again. On the domestic front, the country’s other confessional leaders assume that Nasrallah understands the price to be paid for violating Lebanon’s consensual system. Maybe he does and maybe he doesn’t care; after all, all his rivals have right now is each others’ word, while the resistance can count on two ascendant foreign powers happy to arm and rearm it.
Syria: Even
Surprisingly, Western diplomatic circles, policy-makers and journalists are still curious to know if Damascus can be pried loose from Tehran and forced back into the “Sunni fold.” It is a piece of speculation that fails to credit Bashar Assad for Syria’s strategic re-orientation, or revolution: He has bet the house on Tehran and can’t afford to walk away from the table. In tying his own fate to Iran’s, Bashar has indicated that he is not the calculating realist and balancer-of-powers that his father was, but rather an ideologue, a true believer and someone who chooses to work without a safety net. For years, Saudi Arabia virtually floated Damascus; and as an Alawi president of majority Sunni Syria, Hafez knew better than to burn such bridges. Could he have imagined his son’s daring gambit? Maybe not, but he surely reckoned the consequences of guessing wrong.
On closer inspection, it seems that Bashar himself is of two minds about the future of the Middle East. With the mayhem he has abetted in Iraq and Lebanon, young Assad argues that the region is best understood and manipulated through its inexorable sectarian issues. However, by siding with Iran and Co., he appears to believe that fighting Israel and the West can create heretofore unimagined alliances, a cross-sectarian culture of resistance. Well, it’s true that his regime became popular both at home and throughout the region through his steadfast support—and re-supply—of the Islamic resistance during its recent war. But he should perhaps recall Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s parting shot at Hizbullah, delivered a week before the al-Qaeda man’s death: the Shia are protecting the Zionists from the genuine Sunni resistance. Memories can be fungible in the Middle East, but history is long and that particular intra-Muslim fight is over a millennium old.
That is to say, Bashar has lit the torch at both ends—one way or another, he’ll get burnt. Maybe the Hariri tribunal will indict him and/or regime relatives, but the US and Europe have been reluctant to make him pay for his violence in Lebanon, Iraq, Israel and Palestine. The Israelis, however, may be a different matter. If there is another round in the Israel-Hizbullah war, the IDF may include Syria on its target list, and the regime’s survival could depend on whether it decides to fight or absorb the punishment. And then there is one other issue Bashar ought to be turning over in his head: Given Damascus’ apparent lack of concern for its Lebanese allies, it should entertain the possibility that Tehran regards his regime in the same fashion. Syria is an Iranian ally, not a vital interest and as such is expendable given the right circumstances.
Iran: Winner
Since the Bush administration never mustered a clear definition of its post-9/11 war, it missed the bigger picture taking shape since 1979. Sure, Tehran has been a major state sponsor of Islamic terror for a quarter century, but it is also playing old-time power politics, and the goal is what Washington feared the Soviets wanted in the Cold War—to drive the US out of the Persian Gulf. To achieve that, the Islamic Republic is pushing for a nuclear program that would fortify its position in the Gulf, if not make it unassailable.
Washington is wondering if it should engage Iran, while Tehran believes there is nothing to discuss, except the US’ terms of surrender. Given the regime’s various centers of power—the president, the supreme leader, the revolutionary guard—it is hard to know whether or not the Islamic Republic is fundamentally rational or stark-raving mad. Here’s a hint: when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expresses his desire for a world without Zionism, he is saying he does not know the red-lines of a Jewish state created three years after the Holocaust, or does not care. It is a rational regime insofar as it follows the messianic logic of a Mahdi who will redeem the world through blood.
Iraq: Loser
First the good news from the land of the two rivers: Zarqawi is still dead. The bad news is that his replacement is staying on message—kill the Shia. You know it’s bad when American policymakers in the so-called “Realist” camp argue that Iraq’s neighbors have an interest in stabilizing the country. If Iran and Syria wanted calm and tranquility in Iraq, then they wouldn’t be promoting chaos there. If the US believes it can show its enemies where their true interests really lie, then they are not doing diplomacy but missionary work. The standard Realist take, historically favored by the State Department and CIA, is to find a strong man. Iraq has no shortage of hard men, but the strongest one is likely to be hanged in the next year for crimes against his own people. The next strongest is Moqtada al-Sadr, who has opposed the US every step of the way and aligned himself with Tehran, Damascus and Hizbullah. Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi might be back in the picture—if the US does draw down troops, this might present a way to hand Iraq to Tehran with some qualifications, and not outright, which is what a triumphant Mahdi army means. The good news is that the Kurdish region is in good shape. The problem, however, is that as the rest of Iraq deteriorates, the Kurds will be more tempted to abandon the project altogether and opt for an independent Kurdish state, regardless of how much that puts them at odds with Turkey.
Saudi Arabia: Loser
A rising Iran has led to a strange year for Riyadh. The kingdom is finished talking to the Syrians, who weren’t listening anyway, and now even the American who is perhaps closest to the House of Saud seems to be ignoring the ruling family. Former Secretary of State James Baker wants to talk to Syria and Iran. What do the Saudis think about that? It is easier to guess what they said when they allegedly met with Israeli officials: Crush Hizbullah. Perhaps that Jewish-Muslim comity shouldn’t seem that odd, given that there is actually a Quranic precedent for such an alliance, and according to the Sunnis the Shia have no status as “people of the book.” Obviously, the kingdom’s major concern is whether or not the US intends to do something about that large and cocky Shia, Persian power in the Gulf. And if the US or Israel does go after Iran’s nuclear program, what effect might that have on Shia populations throughout the Gulf, especially Bahrain and Kuwait, and of course Saudi Arabia’s own Shia minority in the oil-rich eastern province? On the upside, the Saudis seem to have gotten their domestic jihadi problem in hand, partly, according to US intelligence sources, through better police work, and partly the old-fashioned way—by sending troublemakers abroad, to Iraq.
Qatar: Winner
Doha put its money where Aljazeera’s mouth is and showed it was much more than just another glossy Gulf sheikhdom. Holding a seat on the UN Security Council until the end of next year, the Al Thani clan tried their hand at diplomacy and reached out to the Palestinians and Damascus. While nothing came of it, Qatar managed to project more power than the size of its population or economy seems to warrant and in the process annoyed several Arab rivals, especially Saudi Arabia. What looked merely like a Dubai knockoff is poised to become a Gulf spoiler: Qatar is the new Syria.
Israel: Loser
In the first week of January, a stroke left then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in a coma, and the year never got any better. Ehud Olmert inherited control of the ideologically incoherent Kadima party as well as two major problems, one that his predecessor had set in motion, and another that Sharon had ignored: disengagement in Gaza, and Hizbullah in the north. Thus there was fighting on two pre-’67 borders and Israelis across the ideological spectrum agreed that both wars were just, given that they were started from territories Israel no longer occupied. However, when a cabinet with thin military and security credentials showed they were incapable of drawing conclusive victories against either Arab resistance front, the nation turned on its leadership. Olmert, whose history of alleged corruption has come to the fore, is especially vulnerable given Likud’s surge in the polls as Bibi Netanyahu waits in the wings. While Iran threatens, Hizbullah re-arms, Syria preens and a cast of Arab ideologues boast of defeating the Jewish state once and for all, Israel is quietly assimilating the lessons of the past year. That the Jewish state is anxious to re-establish its deterrence might be disquieting news for everyone in the region.
Palestinians: Loser
In trying to save face after the disastrous elections that brought Hamas to power, the Bush administration explained that the Palestinians had really voted against a corrupt Fatah leadership. No doubt the keepers of Arafat’s flame are inept when they are not criminal, but the Palestinians did not elect a reform ticket. At the very least, “good government” means not seeking war against the largest economy and most powerful military in the region, but this electorate opted not for liberals or technocrats, but rather the outfit they think has the best chance of winning such a war. In response, Washington cut off aid to make the Palestinians accountable for their democratic choice. The exercise was pointless given that, one, the strategic goal was to hand the reins back to weakling President Mahmoud Abbas; and, two, PA officials smuggled in millions of dollars earmarked for arms. And so this year at least, the Palestinians and their leaders made it clear they prefer guns to butter, never mind a negotiated settlement. The peace process, effectively over since 2000, has become a parody of itself, a way for the Europeans to puff their chest, and a file for the Iranians and Saudis to fight over. Still, it could be worse—and will be if Hamas and Fatah wage war in earnest.
Egypt: Even
The Bush administration’s stalled democratization program was meant to give Arabs a voice in their own government, but Egypt represents a conundrum: is it an index of Washington’s failure or success that there is still a huge gap between the masses of ordinary Egyptians and the few who rule them? For instance, the opposition group Kifaya launched a petition demanding an end to the peace treaty with Israel and hoped to get a million signatures. That treaty is one of the US’s singular accomplishments in the Middle East and its annulment one of Washington’s recurrent nightmares. And so the White House will almost surely bless Cairo’s most important, perhaps only, strategic goal—to pass the regime on to Mubarak’s second son. The State Department likes the ostensibly reform-minded and US-friendly Gamal, which might be a problem. Not only is the future rayess lacking security and military experience, he has none of the organic, populist roots this regime has cultivated since Nasser’s 1952 coup d’état. That is, the “Westernized” Gamal has all the drawbacks of an Arab liberal, without any obviously liberal inclinations. Even if the succession comes off smoothly, in several years the most populous Arab nation of almost 80 million will likely become the region’s most daunting concern.
Jordan: Even
The Shia crescent that King Abdullah II warned of two years ago has come to fruition and a government that he never could have imagined has come to power next door in the West Bank and Gaza. Still, predictions of the Hashemites’ imminent loss of influence are one of the few constants in the region’s political climate, and the fact is that relative to the tenure of his father and great-grandfather, Abdullah is on much surer ground. What may complicate the kingdom’s future is if a Jordanian solution becomes the key to a Palestinian-Israeli settlement, as many observers—Arab, Israeli and American—are now suggesting. In the meantime, “Jordan First” is still the operative principle as construction continues apace in West Amman, which war in Iraq has paved with gold and primed as a less glamorous Beirut, an option that will turn more profitable should Lebanon succumb to its furies.
