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Economics & Policy

Executive Insight – Making the most of Lebanon’s resources

by Malek Takieddine June 3, 2012
written by Malek Takieddine

In its drive to become an oil and/or gas producing country, Lebanon currently faces the challenges of establishing and implementing a sound regulatory framework and an effective Petroleum Administration, the sector’s (supposedly) independent regulatory body.

Some of the most crucial aspects of the required system include creating farsighted mechanisms that will first prevent the occurrence of a number of problems that are commonly encountered in hydrocarbon producing provinces, and second, equip the Lebanese government with sufficient powers to address such problems swiftly and efficiently as they arise throughout the development of the upstream oil and/or gas industry in the country.

National vs. IOC interests

Arguably one of the worst oversights that can be committed by the early drafters of oil and gas legislation is the assumption that International Oil Companies (IOCs) would be always seeking to diligently explore their acreages in search of hydrocarbons, and that once they have found oil and/or gas, they would be eager to exploit it effectively and quickly.
Experience around the world shows that not long after licenses are granted or discoveries are made, some areas are often left to lay fallow and national governments discover that they do not have adequate powers to impose work obligations on the IOCs. As a prominent observer of the United Kingdom offshore licensing regime once noted, “the idea that licensees might make significant discoveries but then not develop them does not appear to have occurred to those who first drafted the offshore licensing arrangements in 1964/1965”.

In the UK, for example, rigorous state action was needed to address this problem and the government had to undergo the complexities of enforcing a “voluntary” scheme in order to rectify the situation of fallow areas and discoveries. The result was a shy governmental process that raised some concerns about the legality of such measures.

The efforts undertaken so far by the Lebanese government in drafting the offshore hydrocarbon legal framework suggests that the country is slowly making steady progress in the right direction. It is imperative to continue along this positive trajectory by appointing a Petroleum Administration that can play an effective role in monitoring, at a close distance, the petroleum operations to be undertaken by the IOCs.

Foresight needed

It can be also predicted that, in light of the current position of the Lebanese economy, the mere discovery of commercial oil and/or gas reserves would  understandably be interpreted as a promising sign of future wealth, regardless of the quantities that would actually be produced.

Yet, once the initial joy of the first few barrels fades away, the Lebanese government must be well prepared to monitor the efficiency of its production and to make sure that its licensees are conducting their operations using the best practicable standards and methods to ensure acceptable recovery levels out of each reservoir.

The technical expertise and skills of the licensees (the operators) usually play a crucial role in determining the levels of recovery (i.e. how much oil and/or gas could be practicably produced).

For instance, a 70 percent oil recovery from an oil reservoir is considered to be a high percentage as it is almost impossible to extract entire reserves of any particular reservoir due to the constant reduction of pressure and the interference of other factors, such as oil density and depth of the reservoir, amongst others.

Countries such as Saudi Arabia are constantly aiming to increase their investments in enhanced recovery technologies, as they recognize how vital this is in order to boost recovery rates at their reservoirs from around 50 percent to 70 percent.

Once again, the Lebanese regulator must ensure that the government’s powers under any exploration and production agreement offer useful mechanisms for pushing the licensees towards more efficient recoveries, that is to say better stewardship.

In due course the government must put in place adequate mechanisms whereby field activities would be surveyed (preferably on a yearly basis) to determine the performance of each licensee (operator).

A process to deal with underperforming fields must also be decided. Such a process could, for example, include an initial consultation exercise between the government and the licensee (operator) to study possible ways to enhance stewardship. A set of targets could thereafter be agreed in conjunction with a clear and firm set of sanctions.

Failure to address certain crucial issues in the initial text of petroleum regulations and agreements could have disastrous consequences on the national interest and result in huge resources being lost or at least deferred.

Effective revenue management

In addition to operational efficiency, an important matter that Lebanon must consider is the efficient management of its hydrocarbon revenues. Hydrocarbon resources are known to inject considerable financial revenues into state accounts. These revenues would usually have two main characteristics: one, they are likely to constitute a large percentage of the total yearly revenues of the state; and two, they are temporary.

As a result, several unfavorable consequences could be noticed in the national economy:
(i) Inflation due to the sudden increase in money supply.
(ii) An occurrence of the Dutch Disease, meaning the depreciation of the productive sectors as they becomes less competitive due to the oil-related increases in exchange rates.
(iii) An unstable budget balance due to the volatility of oil prices.
(iv) A decrease in income when the resources of the province begin to decline.
As part of the economic strategies that governments undertake to surmount the above challenges, national oil funds are often created by governments to accumulate and manage part of, or the entirety of, the state’s oil and gas revenues. In total, close to 20 petroleum-producing countries are known to have established national oil funds.

The specific purposes of such funds varies between countries; for instance, Norway’s aim is to use its fund to stabilize of the economy and to secure a steady income for future generations, even after the resources dry-up. Russia, however, does not give priority to saving for future generations and the purpose of its oil fund is, according to Vasily Astrov, an economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies: “reduce the vulnerability of the state budget to the volatility of world oil prices,” and to sterilize “the impact of oil-related foreign exchange inflows on the money supply and inflation.”

To Lebanon’s credit, the Lebanese Offshore Hydrocarbon Resources Law provides a clear provision that state hydrocarbon proceeds shall be injected into a sovereign fund.

The strategy shall be to keep the capital and part of the proceeds in an “investment fund for future generations”, while using the remaining funds to “guarantee the rights of the state and avoid serious, short or long-term negative economic consequences”.

In theory this is an excellent provision, however, the practical benefits thereof shall be largely affected by the seriousness of the special law that needs to be enacted by the Lebanese parliament to define the management structure of the sovereign wealth fund, and its investment principles, not to mention the effective implementation of such law. A close eye should be kept at how the Lebanese authorities will perform in the coming years in this respect.

Worthless oil and gas?

Indeed, some critics may argue that Lebanon’s oil and gas resources would be worthless to the country if they are badly managed and exploited. As the coming decades will show, the true worth of these ‘valuable’ resources will come down to the ability of the Lebanese authorities to manage this industry with high technical capabilities, foresight and transparency.

June 3, 2012 0 comments
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Finance

Forcasts: Lebanon’s new normal

by Nadim Kabbara June 3, 2012
written by Nadim Kabbara

Robust economic growth in Lebanon came to a halt last year as domestic political uncertainty and regional turmoil took their toll on key sectors such as trade, tourism and real estate.

This year is not shaping up to look much different as challenges translate into weaker bank profitability: slower capital inflows will moderate asset funding, softer trade and loan activity will impact fee generation, and regional unrest will drive loan loss provisions in subsidiaries that were meant to be the engine for growth.

This subdued level of profitability for Lebanese banks could represent a ‘new normal’ in the near term. Management teams are prudently placing their expansion plans on hold in order to preserve balance-sheet quality in the face of slower economic activity, heightened political uncertainty and an increase in regulatory capital.

This new normal contrasts with previous years during which the banking sector nearly doubled its profits, from $850 million in 2006 to $1.6 billion in 2010. This was possible by sidestepping the global financial crisis, attracting significant financial inflows and stockpiling record reserves at Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank, all of which boosted Lebanon’s reputation back to the forefront of regional financial centers.

However, slower profit growth could influence the lending behavior of commercial banks, as well as their participation in government debt auctions and their redeployment of capital aimed at maximizing shareholder returns. It is unlikely, though, that there will be a material shift away from the existing business model, which has worked well for years.

The public sector will continue to finance its fiscal deficits with more debt, outside of enacting much needed reforms. BDL will continue to influence deposit rates to ensure that Lebanon attracts financial inflows, and will seek to reduce its intervention at treasury auctions. And banks will continue to participate at government auctions, at the very least maintaining their concentrated sovereign exposure.

Ultimately, the banking sector needs an avenue in which to continuously invest its excess liquidity; with a near-zero international benchmark rate in the interbank market, moderate private-sector demand and regional turmoil seen impacting asset quality in related subsidiaries, they don’t have many options left on the table.

With several headwinds on the horizon, the case between the banking sector, the Ministry of Finance and BDL is likely to be strengthened further as each major party shares a responsibility to maintain a healthy economy and a resilient banking sector. We have seen a concerted effort earlier this year on shorter-term local currency treasuries, which were auctioned at higher rates to ensure bank subscription, following the International Monetary Fund’s recommendations, but these higher rates were not enough to make up for the reduction in profit growth.

With tighter bank regulations, slower banking deposits, higher provisions caused by regional unrest, and cautious management focused on preserving asset quality, profitability for the banking sector could remain lackluster for now.

Although investors may have over-penalized the banks, judging by their very weak stock market performance on account of turmoil in Syria and Egypt, they will need to contend with a lower growth profile and less appetizing dividend payouts once visibility improves and their growth plans are back on track.

This article was published as part of a special report in Executive's June 2012 issue
June 3, 2012 0 comments
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Society

A Passion for Adventure

by Executive Staff June 3, 2012
written by Executive Staff

The story of Kuwait-based telecommunications operator Zain is a corporate lesson worthy of attention. The company grew by leaps and bounds for seven years, until in  2009 it became an Arab model in profit building, branding and positioning in the top tier of telecoms operators worldwide. “A Passion for Adventure” narrates this story from the perspective of Saad al-Barrak, who led the Zain team during that time.

A fluid read, the book will be most rewarding for anyone fascinated with telecommunications in this region and for students — in a wide sense of the word — of the Arab management experience.

Parts of the book that convey details on the acquisition of African network Celtel and on the creation of the Zain identity out of boringly named predecessor Mobile Telecommunications Company (MTC) were page turners. It is information of record that MTC paid $3.36 billion for Celtel and that South African rival network MTN, feeling duped at being bested by MTC, tried to have the agreement revoked in the courts. But the narration on how MTC reevaluated their too-low bid and turned the table in their favor by making an unsolicited higher offer in the last minute, is fresh and certainly worth reading.

Some parts of Barrak’s rendition of the Zain story — such as recollections of how this or that capable individual joined the team — might appeal more to the people who were part of the journey. Where the narration covers Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and in a few other places in his book, the author cites sources for context that feel like alien additions sourced from a newspaper archive, rather than organic parts that belong.

More interesting to read was an earlier part of the tale in which Barrak recalls how he felt and responded when he was offered a position far beyond his experience and imagination by his first employer, International Turnkey Systems (ITS), a Kuwaiti ICT vendor and systems integrator for banks and other corporate clients. His recollection of how he was supported by the owners of ITS, whose company was bleeding money for needless expenses, offers worthwhile insights into Arab corporate culture.   

From his testimony about the rise of Zain, it is evident that Saad al Barrak is a fortunate man. He started his career in leadership at a moment of opportunity and his decisions of expansion, branding and community building came at the right moments, benefiting from an age when all circumstances favored an operator combining a rich war chest with a daring growth ambition.

Barrak’s perception of Zain’s acheivements was poignantly illustrated when he told Executive, “It was Zain that got all these people inspired to move and become international companies and as Zain has stopped, everybody else has stopped, right? That shows the leadership and pioneering and inspirational role that Zain played in the region.”

“These people” refers to Arab telecommunications operators like Saudi Arabia’s STC and the United Arab Emirates’ Etisalat, which indeed embarked on international expansions after the Kuwaiti operator. 

There is no payback chapter tearing into the details of Zain’s partial dismantlement, only a very positive interpretation of the process that saw the company’s top international assets sold to Indian operator Bharti in mid 2010. People looking for angry testimonials or hard forensic analysis of that part of the Zain story will not be satisfied. 

The inner core of Barrak’s tale, however, is not the growth and wane of Zain but his view on management, epitomized in his sentence: “The best of plans and strategies are the ones extracted from the hearts and minds of your people, or inculcated in the hearts and minds of your people.”

In narrating these views, he states his case for “preaching a new business and economic ideology… which is part and parcel of our universal, open philosophy — an all-encompassing philosophy considering the universe as our homeland and humanity as our tribe.”

Readers may regard this new business ideology to represent an incremental enhancement of management concepts rather than a total reinvention of the art of management. But it is in any case a notable Arab contribution and perspective on leadership. There cannot be arguing that such contributions deserve to be heard. As Barrak said, “We need inspiring examples from our region and this is what we tried to do in Zain.”

June 3, 2012 0 comments
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Society

The Formula One family car

by Yasser Akkaoui June 3, 2012
written by Yasser Akkaoui

Ferrari has been on something of a new trajectory in recent years, and to get the word out on how things have been shaping up for the automaker, Executive was invited on an all-expenses-paid, one-day trip to the Modena province of Italy to sit with company officials, tour the Ferrari factory and test drive the new 2012 California model.

The company’s course of late could be seen as an assault on the turf of rival Porsche. In the 1990s, the German luxury carmaker made strategic decision to position itself as the manufacturer of the racecar one can also drive to the grocery store and pick up the kids with — magnificent engineering and performance potential paired with practical, everyday sensibilities.

First launched at the 2008 Paris Motor Show, Ferrari’s California was an offering of a similar genre, aiming to attract customers who might otherwise have been looking at a Porsche 911 Turbo, a Mercedes SL or even the Bentley GT. The four-seat, eight cylinder California was intended not only for those dazzled by the Ferrari brand, the curving lines of beauty and Formula One racing capabilities, but also those who want to throw their gym bag in the front and look good with the soft-top down on their commute to the office; the sort of versatility Porsche has made its hallmark.

If you’d fallen for the California in 2009, however, you might hardly think a square inch of her has aged in the 2012 model. Indeed, Ferrari has kept the appearance of the California almost exactly the same, instead focusing the evolutionary process on the DNA of the automobile, honing the mechanism inside the machine. The new model is 30 percent more fuel efficient, which helps to rebalance the environmentalist’s guilt-pleasure ratio when flying down the highway with 40 more horsepower and 30 less kilograms. That improved weight-to-power ratio has also trimmed 0.2 seconds off of the zero-to-100-kilometers-per-hour acceleration time — in the 2012 California, one can go from a dead stop at the lights to the highway speed in 3.8 seconds, bringing it equal to the Porsche 911 Turbo in the race to accumulate speeding tickets most rapidly.

Among the many other less apparent improvements are the software upgrades, new pistons and manifolds. A new body structure redistributes impact and shock absorption, improving one’s chances of walking away if, by chance, one were to blink or sneeze while rocketing towards the sound barrier and miss that hairpin turn. And while one’s insurance broker would likely have to cover the cost of removing your California from the crater in someone’s living room wall, for almost everything else, call Ferrari, as the company’s complimentary seven-year maintenance program will have you covered.

Why Executive was of particular interest to Ferrari is that the company sees Lebanon as a mature market and a trend setter for the region — cultivating a cool and sophisticated market positioned in fashion-conscious and notoriously fickle Beirut pays off in big money sales in Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Doha. And Ferrari’s strategy seems to be working. Not only did 70 percent of their new customers last year migrate from Porsche, Mercedes and Bentley, according to company officials, but of the 3,000 California’s manufactured last year, some 450 were sold in the Middle East and South Africa, with the United Arab Emirates being the top customer. Interestingly, the company has no part in the operations of Abu Dhabi’s Ferrari World theme park on Yas Island, but rather offers up its name and branding for the Emirate to use for the modest compensation of $40 million annually.     

Perhaps the most endearing aspect of the California is that Ferrari has made the design so enduring. When you pull up to the stoplight, no one watching could guess whether you bought it yesterday or four years ago; you’ve opted out of the race to catch up with the latest model. Rather, with Ferrari’s California there is a sense of elegant timelessness, and in that lies the making of an icon.

June 3, 2012 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Executive Insight – Doubts for Arab democracy

by Executive Contributor June 3, 2012
written by Executive Contributor

Several countries at the heart of the 2011 Arab uprisings have held parliamentary or presidential elections. While it seems more than fair that it should now be the Arab world’s turn at democratization, the question has to be raised if citizens of the region’s changeover countries are united in the belief that equitable social development under newly won political and economic freedoms is a realistic promise.

A dynamic and equitable market is a requirement for a democracy that works and the unified belief in a better economic future can make or break a successful transition from an uprising to a resilient democracy and a healthy, just and efficient, economy. It is a crucial need for Arab societies to achieve this democratic consolidation in order to avert dangers of new dictatorships or civil wars, and there are some legitimate doubts whether the Arab world is itself sufficiently prepared and equipped with enough international support to meet this condition.

For one, many Arab citizens today question their states’ legitimacy. They can point to good reasons for this, because at the formation of many of today’s countries stood colonial rulers who lumped different tribes into new countries in the space of a few years. However, when democratization swept over Latin America or over Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, states with strong national identities mastered the transition more easily than states with weak national identities; for example, the former Soviet States or the Balkan countries. As Arabs now question their heritages of nationalities construed by foreign powers, there are signs of suppressed identity-conflicts. As these have been breaking out in the past year, they could carry on with the same ferociousness as they have in the Balkans. And the Arab world has many Balkans: Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen.

Inequity’s undermining of democracy
The next barrier is engrained inequality. Equitable social development is the ultimate insurance for successful democratic consolidation. The thought that the middle class is the stabilizing element in a society goes back to ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, in whose mind a democracy was built upon a society with a strong middle class. The Arab world, on the other hand, has to transform unequal societies into equal ones. Relying on democracy as the means to achieve this transformation might be asking too much from democratization.

To have a chance for non-violent transition from ownership concentrated in the hands of a few to a society prospering peacefully under freedom, equal opportunities must be present, or as renowned Arab medieval philosopher Ibn Khaldun wrote: “Justice is a balance set up among mankind.”

Again there are many examples, such as the opportunities of American settlers to stake land claims out West and land reforms in East Asian economies after World War II, showing that developmental success of democratizing countries can be attributed to the creation of equal opportunities. Inversely, social conflict and entrenched economic inequality in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa can today still be traced to the lack of opportunities during and after colonialism. In many Arab countries fertile land is scarce and ownership of land and natural resources are presently concentrated in the hands of political elites. Democratization therefore is bound to generate many redistributive demands. It remains to be seen whether majority demands for reform of ownership will be democratically accepted by the privileged minority.

Societies without trust
One source of doubt in the mutual will of the voting majority and privileged minority is the high level of social mistrust in the Arab world. In 2007, the PEW Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project included six Arab countries in a survey of 46 countries: Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, as well as the West Bank and Gaza. Asked about the statement “Most people in this society are trustworthy,” 57 percent of the surveyed people in the Arab countries responded with “disagree” or “strongly disagree.” This mistrust does not bode well for economic growth by democratization. Democratic effectiveness originates in trust; it does not build it, and thus requires a cooperative platform for decision making.

Lebanon, which is the country with the greatest democratic legacy in the Arab world, can serve as a reference case for other countries. Like many other Arab countries, Lebanon has a long history of political and economic elitism and redistributive conflict that led to internal divides. These divides ultimately invited outside intervention and third-party meddling.

Internal conflict and third party meddling can also be observed now in Libya, Bahrain, Iraq, and Syria. The political and economic grievances that have built up over decades may pose greater challenges than today’s fledgling democratic practices can resolve.

Challenges to development
The Arab region’s economic development prospects are also unlikely to help promote and safeguard the advance of democratic consolidation. Where my home country, Germany, could make strong fiscal commitments to developing the eastern German states after national unification in 1989, and where the prospect of joining the European Union provided a strong tailwind for fast democratic consolidation to economies in Central and Eastern Europe, the outlook for economic development as a driver of successful democratic consolidation is by comparison dismal in the Arab world on at least three counts.

Firstly, Central and Eastern Europe’s reform movement was sustained by a collective memory of private farming and free entrepreneurship. In the absence of such a collective memory, it seems not yet convincing to me that entrepreneurship will emerge strongly and fast enough to accelerate economic growth to the needed levels. It is simply not yet clear what kind of economic development paradigm will eventually emerge after the Arab uprisings.

Secondly, economies in Central and Eastern Europe benefited from starting with a clean slate in parallel political and economic reforms. New political leaders in Prague or Warsaw also had strength in the knowledge that the West had come out in support of democracy-demanding protesters on the streets. By contrast, the Arab world has already experimented with top-down economic reforms since the 1990s and the results were mixed at best. Although the World Bank and International Organizations praised the efforts of the “Maghreb tigers”, these reforms failed to create jobs.

Nepotism and unequal socioeconomic development prevented economic reforms from reaching the youth, and instead economic liberalization bred new economic elites whose fortunes were not based on hard work and entrepreneurship, but on favoritism and tribalism. Additionally, the international community and so-called Western economic reforms have greatly lost credibility among Arab citizens, as the West has for a long time supported autocrats ruling from palaces in Tunis, Cairo, and even Tripoli.

Third, there is much reason to doubt that the West has a sincere interest in true economic reforms in the Arab world. When comparing the West’s economic gain potentials in Central and Eastern Europe with what it could stand to reap from the changes in the Arab world, the reform dividend from the fall of the Berlin Wall was much greater than any reform dividend in the Arab world.

Consequently, the West surely will not commit to the Arab world as it did to Central and Eastern Europe. All rhetoric aside, oil remains what primarily makes Arab economies attractive to the West. The international community is not so much interested in developing new economic opportunities in the Arab world, but in preserving the existing ones. 

What awaits
The Arab uprisings will hopefully be remembered as marking the end of dark chapters of the past, but until a bright new chapter is clearly written and the twin pillars of efficient democracy and healthy economy have been tested, smoke will likely continue to rise up and shroud the future of the Arab world.

June 3, 2012 0 comments
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Society

Worthy prince to the king

by Michael Karam June 3, 2012
written by Michael Karam

Last month saw the launch of the Tudor “Ducati” Fastrider chronograph in Lebanon. Tudor has a standard Fastrider, but as the brand is Ducati’s global timing partner, a special edition watch was created. The event was a building block in the positioning of Tudor in the Lebanese market and an opportunity to acquaint consumers with some of the most exciting sports watches to emerge in recent years.

That said, Tudor is not yet a permanent dot on Lebanon’s consumer radar. The nation’s watch aficionados are, by and large, swayed by the more obvious brands — Rolex, Audemars Piguet, Panerai and Cartier to name a few — and many models, no matter how prestigious, are bought more for what they stand for rather than discernment. Indeed, as far as I am concerned, Tudor’s build quality and mechanism would leave at least two of the previously mentioned brands in the dust.

Ziad Annan, exclusive Lebanese agent for Tudor, and its more exalted parent company Rolex, would like to see a shift in how we choose our watches. “We have to reach a point where people are buying watches for quality rather than on reputation,” he sighs. He is passionate about craftsmanship and wants to convince consumers that it’s okay to say, “I like it. It’s a brilliant watch. I like it for what it is and I don’t care what people think.” Tudor is arguably the brand to start this switch in mindset. It used to be, rather unfairly, perceived as the poor man’s Rolex by those who did not know what they were talking about. But if we bought watches like we bought our cars, the Lebanese would already covet Tudor. Take the Volkswagen Touareg and the Porsche Cayenne. Both built on the same platform, but the Touareg is the more affordable. Few are the people who will avoid buying one because it is perceived as a more affordable Porsche. Yet there are many who will buy it precisely for that reason.

Rolex founder Hans Wilsdorf, who created the Tudor brand in 1946, had the same idea. He wanted to make an affordable and functional watch that was underpinned with the same standards of reliability set by Rolex. It was a savvy move in a post-war Europe that was defined in part by austerity — just the right market for a no-nonsense, dependable watch. 

The positioning was subtle but it spoke volumes. Rolex may have made iconic sports watches, but the brand was undeniably associated with luxury at a time when Europe was rebuilding. Tudor owners saw themselves as practical, understated people who nonetheless appreciated     quality. Tudor fitted their profile perfectly.

From Basel to Beirut

The current excitement surrounding Tudor stems from the brand’s decision to mine its vast sports legacy and alloy it with modern styling. The result is that Tudor has broken away from being a Rolex sub-brand. “The people at Rolex asked what the Tudor brand was all about,” explains Annan. “They opened the archives and they realized there was this enormous heritage.”

Indeed, the release of the Tudor Heritage Chrono at the annual Basel watch fair in 2010 was arguably the most significant milestone in the Tudor renaissance. Based on the 1970 Oysterdate Chronograph, and sold with a second strap made of tough seatbelt fabric, it sent a ripple of excitement through the watch world. Almost overnight, Oysterdates doubled in value, and the word on the street was that Tudor was taking chances that Rolex could not. The result was a brand that added a new and exhilarating dimension to the Rolex portfolio. Everyone was a winner.

So will the Lebanese consumer embrace Tudor? Well, it’s going up against the likes of Omega and Breitling, and some models will set the heart racing more than others. While the Pelagos still looks too much like a Rolex Submariner and the Advisor is a bit lost in terms of styling, I predict two models will lead the charge for Tudor this summer (Say you read it here first). The Heritage Chrono with its early 70s styling and the Black Bay Diver with a glorious garnet red bezel are surely contenders for retro design classics. Even the Fastrider, which is not my favorite, might become something of a must have for bikers.

Whatever happens, Tudor has moved out of the shadows and is a thrilling addition to the luxury watch constellation.

 

June 3, 2012 0 comments
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The Buzz

A town stands tall

by Sam Tarling June 3, 2012
written by Sam Tarling

There's no call to prayer in Al Qusayr these days. It is not that the townsfolk have forgotten their faith, but rather the mosques have been blown full of holes, rubble and dust. The daily dawn call is a smatter of machine gun fire from the government checkpoints and the occasional percussive bass of an artillery round landing.
    
Here, as in other restive Syrian towns such as Homs, Rastan and Idlib, residents say their peaceful protest movement turned to armed resistance after facing a lethal crackdown from government forces. Now, some 15 months after the first demonstrators took to the streets, Al Qusayr is a town cut in two. The heads of the town’s family groups have elected a local council that is backed by numerous brigades of soldiers claiming membership in the ‘Free Syrian Army’, control roughly half of Al Qusayr and most of the surrounding countryside.
    
‘Normal’ life has come to a halt: the schools are all closed and only a handful of stores are open. It is almost as if the town were on an extended public holiday, except one marred by frequent, sporadic moments of extreme terror and violence.
    
“We spend all our time with our children in our houses,” says Abbas Muhebeddin, head of the town’s recently elected local coordination committee. “Everything has changed. We spend a long time with a our families but we cannot think, we cannot do anything, we cannot even teach them because we are thinking always [about] what will happen. You are always worried.”
    
Of a town once home to 50,000 residents, just some 10,000 remain, and more are leaving everyday. Some half of those that are left are effectively trapped, however, according to Muhebeddin, with their names on a government blacklist. Leaving the protection of Al Qusayr would put them at risk of being picked up by the Syrian regime’s security forces.
    
Inside the town, fear, death and hardship are never far away.
    
In the ground floor of what was until recently a residential property, a busy team of medics poke around inside the 30-centimeter gash they have cut into the chest of a man, shot by snipers positioned atop of the town’s actual hospital. One holds a table lamp to accompany the jerry-rigged operating light that hangs above, as an aging pump sucks fluids from the patient, through tubes, to splash into a bucket.
    
This is one of the lucky ones; doctor Kasem al-Zeim and his team are able to save him, unlike the some 200 other residents who now occupy a small martyrs’ cemetery on the edge of town.
    
“They haven’t killed everybody but every two, three days they kill one person,” says Muhebeddin. “It is a difficult time, we are living like we are living in jail.”

The cost of living
    
Prices of everyday goods have soared, such as petrol, which has increased by 300 percent. Cigarettes, food and drinks have all taken similar hikes. “All the food gets more expensive, only [human life] gets cheaper in Syria,” says Hussein, previously a clerk in the family construction firm who now puts his language skills to use helping visiting foreign journalists.
    
The local council controls the only diesel in town. Deliveries come with a hefty add-on of a 50,000 Syrian pound ($870) bribe to the mukhabarat (government intelligence agents), and are used sparingly for baking bread and powering street cleaning and electricity maintenance vehicles.
    
The local council also coordinates donations of money and goods, be it from wealthier residents, those who have left, expats or aid organizations, and distributes them to the most needy. “We purchase sugar, rice, bulgur wheat,” explains Muhebeddin. “We have more than 1,500 families we are spending for, arranging food, medicine, milk… We arrange everything for these people, even bread.”
    
According to Muhebeddin, on the other side of the fence it’s a bonanza.
    
“[The government soldiers] steal everything from the houses. At any checkpoint it is like a supermarket: you want a fridge, you want a washer… you want a tractor, you want a car, you want a motorcycle, you want a cylinder of gas, fridge, chairs, blankets, everything, carpet, everything is for sale.”
    
Muhebeddin claims that the stolen goods are taken to pro-regime neighborhoods and villages where they are sold-off cheap to the party faithful. “There, in the streets you can find a fridge that would cost 30,000 SYP for 2,000 SYP,” he says.

Yet despite the constant fear of death or arrest, scarcity of food and rocketing prices, residents of ‘free’ Al Qusayr say they wouldn’t turn back the clock for a second.

“Now, in this bad condition we are glad and we are happier than before because now we respect ourselves. Before we hadn’t any respect for ourselves because one person from the mukhabarat could take all this city out, like animals,” says Muhebeddin.

But the fate of Qusayr lies in larger hands than the residents who fought for their freedom.
    
While Dr Zeim says that the recent uprising in Syria’s industrial heartland of Aleppo is buying the town time, school teacher Fatima spells out the fragile nature of their situation: “[The regime] will not stop. The army is still here, we are surrounded. We can’t go out. All the men in our town are [wanted]. If they catch them they’ll be arrested and killed,” she says. “Now we’re coming to a more dangerous stage. Now we want to get rid of [Syrian President Bashar al-Assad]. We don’t want him, he is not our president.”
    
“We think that the time that is coming will be very dangerous,” says Fatima. “There is no safety in our town.”

June 3, 2012 0 comments
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Society

Drunk on Success

by Nabila Rahhal June 3, 2012
written by Nabila Rahhal

"Take me, bring me to Hamra Street, tonight the party’s in Hamra Street,” sang Lebanese Jazz pioneer Khaled el-Habber in years past, and yet nowadays, the tune somehow rings true again. In the past three years, some dozen new restaurants and cafes have opened on Hamra Street and 32 new bars have opened on the parallel Makdessi Street. The impact has been profound, both in terms of its effect on real estate prices and on local Hamra residents, but in terms of crime and violence as well.

Hamra’s roots

The proximity of major universities, and hotels usually preferred by tourists on a budget, has historically given Hamra a reputation for being a laid-back party street. According to Michel Bekhazi, the current mukhtar (or ‘neighborhood administrator’) of Hamra, the 1950s were Hamra’s glory days. Back then, “international celebrities such as Brigitte Bardot and major local celebrities such as Sabah cruised the coffee parlors and theatres there. Opening nights at the Piccadilly Theater were highly anticipated events and one dared not even enter the theater’s street unless decked in their finest attire.” 

Longtime local residents Sami Nasr and Adel Nassar speak of growing up in Hamra in the 1960s and early 1970s when they used to play darts in the Captain’s Cabin with their American and British professors from the American University of Beirut. According to Nasr, “even then, the Hamra crowd was different than anywhere else in Lebanon. There were many foreigners, laid-back foreigners. The older generation mixing with the younger one and all of us having fun together.”  

But the civil war in 1975 replaced the sounds of the Hamra crowd with the sounds of rifles. After the war ended in 1990, according to Bekhazi, “You could count on two hands the number of cars that were seen on the street after 10 p.m.”  Then, in 2005, De Prague, a cross concept between a coffee shop and a bar, opened, and brought more people to Makdessi Street at night. It was followed by Le Rouge restaurant in 2007 and, “people seemed to remember Hamra again, at least for lunch and calm dinners,” says Nasr. 

However, it was the opening of Danny’s pub in 2009 in the Eldorado Alley between Hamra and Makdessi that really heralded the flourish of a new scene. “Before Danny’s, the Eldorado alleyway (next to De Prague), was nothing but a shortcut to Hamra with a little rundown hotel,” says real estate agent Elias Haddad, who has brokered the rent for many of the pubs on Makdessi. “The whole street has changed now, and even that little hotel is going to reopen.”   

On that same alleyway, Cristobal Colon, a restaurant bar, opened later the same year. According to managing partner Toni Rizk, “The alleyway was already showing potential, and we were confident that it was a safe investment to open there.” With their group’s established reputation on Monot Street (with ‘37 degrees’) and Gemmayzeh (with ‘Spoon’), and with Danny’s success, it was vote of confidence for other investors to consider Makdessi. This “vote of confidence” is referred to among economists as the economics of proximity: when a successful establishment causes other establishments to open around it, with the idea that the consumers in search for a certain item will find it easier to head to that area where multiple establishments offer this item. In this case, when one feels like having a drink, one could head to Makdessi and choose from the many pubs there.
 
The other side

Farther west, in another alleyway that connects Hamra to Makdessi, the situation is similar. Ferdinand opened its doors in January 2009 on an empty road. Ferdinand’s owner Mark Mouraccade says he chose the place because it was cozy and had an open and wide space, just what he was looking for his new concept.  

“Gemmayzeh and Monot had become too saturated, there was a huge reliance on valets, and the rent had become too expensive,” he said. “In Hamra, the rent, and the place itself were just right. In all honesty, we had no guarantees that the location would be appropriate, but we liked that Ferdinand was away from other places, it sort of made its own crowd.”  

Saadi Hakim of Bricks, one of the first establishments on Ferdinand’s end of the street, says that they chose this location because the rent on the De Prague end of Makdessi Street was already on the rise. But three years later, economics of proximity is again filling the area with new bars. Mouraccade does not believe that this is a good thing: “The whole street is now too crowded, rent has almost tripled and valets have been introduced when the beauty of Makdessi was that people walked from pub to pub.”

From a real estate angle, rent has indeed risen significantly. “Before 2009, a 25-square-meter place would cost you $500 in rent per year for the whole place,” says Haddad. “Now, a square meter would cost you between $1,000 and $1,500 per year.”

Mouraccade says that in 2009 rent was $300 per square meter annually, while now in 2012 it is not less that $800 to $1,000. He adds that while rents in Monot and Gemmayzeh took years to reach the heights they are at now, many places in Makdessi are now already starting with those high rents. A local grocery store recently sold out for $65,000 a year in rent, much to the chagrin of his customers. According to the owner, however, had he worked every day of the year, he would not have been able to raise that amount of money. 

This story is not unique in Hamra, and Kamal Jeryes, owner of the gadgets and odd items store “It’s Here”, says he lives in fear of the day he will be evicted and his shop will be turned into the latest pub. His fears may not be that unfounded, according to Haddad, who says that landowners are aware that alcohol sells much more than groceries or clothes ever will, and are willing to pay the high eviction fees for their current renters in order to make double that amount in rent in the years to come. According to Bekhazi, this change is uncontrollable as the money offered is just too tempting for some. Haddad, however, says that some owners are being too greedy and asking for unreasonable fees; he gives the example of the owner of a 30-square-meter, low ceiling supermarket asking $140,000 per year in rent. 

Haddad says that Makdessi is now saturated in terms of stores and that investors are now turning to old houses which they can renovate, like the old mukhtar Rubeiz’s house off Bliss Street, and the current location of February, El Dorado alleyway’s latest addition to the Hamra craze. 

The dark side

As with any concentrated area of pubs in Lebanon, local residents are bound to have issues with the changes in their neighborhood, and it is not unheard of for late-night partygoers to be drenched by a bucket of water tossed from several stories above by local residents unable to sleep. Many Hamra residents, however, seem to take a certain pride in Makdessi’s comeback, as according to Nasr: “We were once young and loud like them, it’s part of the fun in a night out. Besides, even for us, it is nice to have restaurants and cafes so close by, we can enjoy them too.” 

Another complaint cited by many is the issue of security — a concern highlighted last month after one person was wounded in a shooting in Eldorado Alley. According to Beetz’s bartender who has been working the street for some time, “the brawls in Hamra aren’t like your typical bar trouble because they often revolve around politics and comments made from members of different political parties.” 

According to Bekhazi, Makdessi Street has traditionally been the turf of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP). When pubs started opening on the street, according to a Hamra pub owner, who wishes to remain anonymous for fear of having his business hurt, owners quickly learned that they had to buy their water reservoirs and electric power from SSNP-approved suppliers. All this was taken in stride by the bar owners at first, after all, such situations exist all over the world.

“It’s all part of the business and they do provide good services with little fuss,” said the source. According to Hakim, the situation escalated when “another local political party” tried to exert dominance on the street, wanting to start their own valet services there. In the meantime, clashes were occurring more frequently all over Makdessi.

Some like Haddad and Mouraccade say such ruckus is natural with the cheap and early ‘happy hours’, and so many students are drunk before dark. There are rumors, however, that the Amal Movement is looking to cause trouble for the SSNP on the street. Bekhazi confirmed that both parties were engaged in an altercation and spoke of how he was asked to intervene in a physical dispute between “local boys from the SSNP and Amal. I don’t usually interfere in such issues, but they are our boys.” 

The situation was dealt with quickly and SSNP now charges each bar $600 per month for ‘security services’. They have also started their own valet parking service at the beginning of Makdessi, according to the anonymous pub owner. The SSNP refuted any such claims, saying that it happened sometimes that a person hired for security purposes is an SSNP member, but that is merely a coincidence. A spokesperson for the SSNP also denied that there were ever any issues with the Amal Movement.

What’s next on tap

Forecasts regarding the future of Makdessi differ. Brick’s Hakim said that opportunist amatuer investments might be bitting off more than they can chew. “They miscalculated how much profit they can make, and are now being forced to shut down as they can’t afford the rent anymore. These turnovers will necessarily bring the rent down, which is good news for the more serious investors waiting to grow in Hamra,” he said. 

Mouraccade also believes Makdessi Street is in a period where these “amateurs” are somehow causing harm to the more serious establishments, through the customers they attract and their ways of competing, such as cherry-picking staff with offers of higher wages. He contends that in the long run, these pubs will be unable to keep up with the rent — especially with their higher staff costs — and will have to shut down eventually.

Haddad does not see rents dropping soon, saying that as long as there is high demand, costs will remain high. According to him, actual physical space in Makdessi is becoming a rare commodity but the turnover of the already opened bars keeps the investors interested. 

Whichever way the market goes, it is clear that the changes in Hamra are continuing. The neighborhood is singing a new tune at night — one that goes on well into the morning.

June 3, 2012 0 comments
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Finance

A tough road to cross

by Maya Sioufi June 3, 2012
written by Maya Sioufi

Expect more sparkling wine in plastic cups than champagne in crystal flutes at the year-end parties of Lebanese banks. What were once soaring profits have now taken a beating on a sluggish domestic economy, ongoing turmoil in neighboring Syria and increasing international scrutiny and regulations. Add to this the uncertainties of the global economy and the party planners might just opt for Almaza instead.

After reporting double-digit profit growth from 2005 to 2010, profits declined by three percent in 2011 to end the year at $1.6 billion. 2012 has not been any better: Bank profits were $356 million in the first quarter, a four percent drop relative to the first period last year. “The level of profitability has been adversely affected by the operating environment; net interest margins [the difference between interest gained and paid out] are under pressure” says Marwan Barakat, chief economist at Bank Audi.

It’s not all gloom though. Deposits stood at some $120 billion — roughly three times the size of Lebanon’s gross domestic product — as of the end of March this year. After growing by 8 percent in 2011, they added another $2.5 billion in the first three months of the year, equating to 2.2 percent year-on-year growth. While that is a drop from the double-digit growth enjoyed in previous years, given the domestic, regional and global uncertainties, many still consider it respectable. Assets held by the banks tell a similar story. As of the end of the first quarter they stood at $145 billion, after growing by nine percent in 2011 and three percent in the first three months of the year.

That Syrian feeling
Part of the reason for this fall in performance is the reduction in the balance sheets of subsidiaries of Lebanese banks in Syria. There are currently seven banks in Lebanon with affiliated branches in Syria and their total assets have shrunk by 17 percent in 2011 to end the year at $6 billion, though accounting for no more than 4 percent of the total assets of the Lebanese banking sector. The net income from their Syrian operations amounted to a meager $37 million in 2011, only 2 percent of the total net income of the sector. “The focus of Syrian affiliates now is on risk management. They are adopting a wait and see approach,” says Nassib Ghobril, chief economist at Byblos Bank. “All profits made in Syria are going towards provisions so that banks can be on the safe side.”

The impact from Syria on the banking sector is not limited to the affiliates of Lebanese banks. As Lebanon and Syria’s economies are strongly intertwined, the uprising in Syria has taken its toil on investment, tourism and the import and export industry in Lebanon, thus adding an indirect strain on the banks.

“The banking sector is the only one exposed to all sectors of the economy as the banks lend to all sectors of the economy,” adds Ghobril. “So if there is a slowdown or disruption in any of the sectors, let alone all them together, it will impact the banks.”

Lebanon’s economy, which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pegged at $39 billion for 2011, grew by just 1.5 percent last year, and is forecasted to grow 3 percent this year, according to the IMF. The prediction for 2012 seems optimistic, however, given that it relies on “strong domestic policies and an improved regional environment.” The lack of government reforms, the ongoing Syrian trouble and the spillover into Lebanon, as well as the summer tourism season at risk due to Gulf Arab countries issuing warnings to avoid travel to the country, will do little to inspire confidence that the IMF’s assumption will become reality.

Inside the vault
While the economy is still growing, the rate is anemic relative to the high single digit growth witnessed in previous years. Thus traditional banking is also being placed in a challenging position.

Loans to customers, while still at healthy levels — growing by 13 percent last year and another 4 percent in the first quarter of this year to hit just over $40 billion — have not been witnessing the same growth rate as in the boom years of 2009/2010, thus decreasing the net interest income of banks. Another source of banking income, the rates earned on their significant holding of treasury bills, are lower than in years past. However, they have seen their first rise in more than three years this year, moving up 50 basis points. The increase “has alleviated some pressure on operating conditions but not much,” says Barakat. The rates on Eurobonds increased slightly in 2011 — average yield increasing thirty basis points to 4.4 percent — but dropped again in the first quarter of the year to stand at 4.3 percent and remain at attractive levels for the government. International money markets are also extending record low rates, further constraining banks revenues. “We are highly liquid and our liquidity is primarily employed in OECD banks in advanced countries, which are offering record low rates putting pressure on spreads,” says Barakat.

Alpha Banks ranking
To maintain their margins, banks have had to gradually drop interest rates on deposits in the past couple of years. The monthly average rate reached 5.6 percent in December 2011, down from 7.2 percent in December 2008 on new or renewable Lebanese lira deposits, and 2.8 percent down from 3.3 percent in 2008 on US dollar deposits.

One example of an additional cost burden imposed by international regulators would be the compliance with the United States’ upcoming Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), which requires all foreign banks to disclose the balances of their American account holders to the US’s Internal Revenue Services (IRS) to allow the latter to impose global income taxes. This move will be the first of its kind in a sector that allows a foreign government to effectively break Lebanon’s long-standing banking secrecy. That will add a significant operations cost to banks, not to mention a possible withdrawal of some tax-dodgers who hid their cash behind Lebanon’s soon to be penetrated wall of secrecy.

“In the last few years, we invested heavily in software, people and training as the requirements [from regulators] increased substantially and this cost the bank significantly,” says Walid Raphael, chairman of Banque Libano Française. These additional overheads have both increased the cost of doing business  and stalled increase in income, thus bank profits are suffering.

“Lebanese banks are in a challenging environment because of the narrowing of margins and this will continue,” says Jean Riachi, chairman of FFA Private Bank. “It is the new normal and we need to get used to it. We can’t expect to have high returns on equity anymore.”

This article was published as a part of a special report in Executive’s June 2012 issue.

June 3, 2012 0 comments
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Comment

Please General, do your job

by Sami Halabi June 3, 2012
written by Sami Halabi

In most nations civilian rule of the army is hallowed political ground; it ensures that the power of the gun cannot be used to overcome that of the ballot box. Yet in a country such as ours, where the army is neutered by the executive, our parliament holds virtually no power to implement the laws it rarely passes, citizens are detained and released on a whim from a zaim while those convicted of working for Israel are set free, the prospect of independent decision making by the army would seem ideal. 

As the Syrian situation spills over into Lebanon this summer (and probably the next), the issue of whether the army should act to preserve the ‘interests of national security’ without the meddling of politicians will likely come up again and again. Our official policy of ‘disassociation’ from that conflict is an obvious self defense mechanism that has, until recently, served the country relatively well (considering the alternative of getting caught up in what is probably already a civil war). 

But disassociation cannot be an exclusive concept; rather it need be an inclusive one. It must extend to internal actors on both sides that would use Syria as the fire to fuel their extremist interests if it is to have any chance of effectiveness in the months (and perhaps years) that we will have to deal with trouble across the border. Instead of retreating to the barracks when fighting breaks out, the military must act as it is legally mandated to and ‘disassociate’ itself from those who would see us dragged into the sectarian strife  across the border. 

Yet a rush to the militarization of decision-making sets a dangerous precedent that we need consider before we call for the army to set itself to purpose. The history of nations, including ours, is rife with examples of how a rush to ‘preserve the republic’ leads to an oppressive military state, something that will not provide an answer to the problems ailing the country.

Take for example of how military men cannot be counted upon to uphold civil rights. Our presidents that ascended from the ranks and file have done practically nothing to keep their oath to uphold the constitution, as it is breached almost as a matter of habit by the governments they preside over. Those ex-commanders who are regarded as pallbearers of the state, such as former president Fouad Chehab, can easily be singled out for creating the conditions (such as discrimination against Palestinians) that led to the civil war itself. 

Yet every so often those chief consensus commanders do serve a purpose. President Suleiman’s call for a resumption of National Dialogue to deal with the issue of arms, and specifically (but not exclusively) those of the resistance, represents a tilt toward reform. But it is still early days. 

We should not forget that by the end of the last National Dialogue sessions in 2010, the country was rife with jokes about what a sham the whole affair was, precisely because Hezbollah rejected the issue of a national defense strategy that encapsulated its arms. But now that Syria could go either way, or no way at all, Hezbollah seems ready to hedge its bets, otherwise Suleiman would not have announced his plea. 

And since the last dialogue sessions it has become blatantly obvious that the political class in Lebanon cannot deal with the everyday issues that plague the country because of their obsession with the issue of weapons, as if they are the reason the lights go out or outbound planes are filled with our brightest young minds. 

So amidst all that we are faced with today, the convergence of both internal and external factors presents us with a rare opportunity to overcome the hurdle of arms that has divided us. Any attempts to set preconditions by the opposition are merely play for time, something we are running out of fast. If the army can do its job without overstepping its boundaries and the resistance is truly genuine in its commitment to real dialogue, the Arab uprisings could, perhaps, finally have reached our shores. 

The only other option is to continue to slip into an increasingly sectarian conflict, and we all know what happened the last time we tried that.   

June 3, 2012 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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