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Banking & Finance

Lebanese capital markets

by Executive Editors September 18, 2011
written by Executive Editors

BLOM Stock Index (BSI)

Weighted effective yield of eurobonds

Equity update

The slump in global equity markets, along with the new issue of $1.2 billion of Lebanese Sovereign debt on July 28, steered investor interest towards the Lebanese Eurobond market. Hence, the BLOM Stock Index (BSI) hovered between a lower level of 1,301 points and an upper level of 1,343 points between July 15 and August 12, 2011, before closing near its lowest level of 1,305 points. During the aforementioned period, the BSI shed 1.1 percent, further lowering its year-to-date performance to a negative 11.5 percent. As for the activity on the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE), it improved over the same period, as the daily average volume per month reached 153,424 shares, valued at $1.74 million, compared to 120,568 shares worth $1.56 million over the preceding four weeks between June 17 and July 15.

On a comparative scale, the BSI managed to outperform the S&P Pan Arab Composite LargeMidCap Index and the Morgan Stanley Emerging Index (MSCI), which were largely affected by concerns of a double-dip recession in the United States and continuing fears over a potential downgrade of French debt following S&P’s downgrade of the US Sovereign. The former lost 15 percent to settle at 107, while the latter fell 12.8 percent to 989.

With respect to the real estate sector, it dominated the four-week period of trades on the BSE, accounting for around 62.5 percent of the total value traded. Solidere stocks Class A and B rallied during the first week, adding 6.6 percent each, breaching its resistance level of $17, before reversing the trend throughout the next three weeks. Nevertheless, Solidere A and B managed to end the four-week period on a positive note, closing at $16.7 each on August 12.

On the other hand, despite the robust first-half financial results, most traded banking stocks ended on a negative note. BLOM stocks, GDR and listed, lost 1.5 percent and 5.08 percent, respectively, to close at $8.55 and $8.03. With respect to Audi Bank, its GDR and listed stocks fell as well by a respective 2.2 percent and 1.3 percent to settle at $7.19 and $6.88. Bank of Beirut followed suit as its listed stock declined 0.52 percent to $19, and its preferred Class E stock decreased 0.58 percent to $25.60. BEMO stock also ended in the red at $2.74, 0.72 percent lower than its previous close on July 15. As for Byblos Bank, its common stock fell 4.6 percent to $1.66, while its preferred stocks 2008 and 2009 rose 0.4 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively, to align at $100.5.

In the industrial sector, cement manufacturer, Holcim, saw its stock surge by 3% to 16.49, while Ciment Blancs B fell 3.3% to $2.97, its lowest level since mid-June.

Eurobond bulletin

The Eurobond market maintained its upward trend between July 15 and August 12, as investors’ appetites were lifted by the successful issuance (four times oversubscribed) of a $1.2 billion double tranche bond that was lead managed by BLOMINVEST Bank and Citigroup. Hence, the BLOM Bond Index (BBI) added 0.38 percent to settle at 110.9. Accordingly, the portfolio-weighted yield fell by 9 basis points (bps) to 4.91 percent, while the spread against the US benchmark yield widened 37bps to 411bps as investor demand for US Treasury Bonds increased following the plunge in global equity markets. Lebanon’s credit default swap (CDS) for 5 years increased to 361-391 bps, compared to 340-367 bps on July 15. In regional markets, Dubai and Saudi Arabia CDS were quoted at 350-365 bps and 105-111 bps, respectively.

September 18, 2011 0 comments
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Banking & Finance

Bankers In the hot seat

by Executive Editors September 18, 2011
written by Executive Editors

With the global economic recovery from the 2008 financial crisis stalled, wealth managers and high net worth individuals are wary of yet another credit crunch — and they would rather not make the same mistakes twice. Executive recently sat down with local and global players in the private banking industry to discuss the worldwide shift in wealth management industry dynamics and the changes in the client-private banker relationship post-2008, the unique challenges that relationship managers face in the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as the assessment and management of clients’ risk appetites in the region as a younger, more diversified generation of investors has emerged.

1 What mistakes did wealth managers, private bankers and clients make prior to the financial crisis in 2008? What lessons have they learned, if any?

Jean Riachi, chairman at FFA Private Bank: The [last] three years… were only the outcome of a decade of poor financial market performances. Unfortunately, for everybody the last decade was a lost decade due to many reasons. First, valuations in the market were very high, and second, there was no growth engine in the major economies to boost earnings enough to justify the level of capital gains and growth in the prices of stocks in global markets that we witnessed in the 1990s and in the 1980s. And still, in everybody’s mind, a good performance is a double-digit performance, and private bankers have struggled to achieve such performances sometimes by taking excessive risk, and very often by taking risks that were not obvious. So in a way it is the people’s expectations of high returns on their portfolios that have pushed banks, private banks and investment bankers to try to be creative in terms of their product offerings. And this, of course, ended up with a disaster in 2008. Today I wouldn’t say that everybody has learned the lessons.

Georges Abboud, head of private banking at BlomInvest Bank: The main lesson was on transparency on the kinds of instruments that customers were buying. People did not understand where they were putting their money. After 2008 they wanted to know exactly where they were investing. So we have to go into detail about every fund we want to invest into, each structured product — you need to know the underlying assets that are behind the product and this takes a lot of time to explain to the clients. They want to know everything. 

Reto Bartel, senior representative at UBS AG Representative Office Beirut: The recent financial crisis shook proponents of the classical investment approach out of their comfort zone. Investors perhaps believed they were in control, but in reality they were at the mercy of the markets. Credit markets failed to function and equity investors saw portfolio values decline to an extent previously deemed impossible. What went wrong? Was it just the market or did investors not fully appreciate the downside of their investment strategy? We think it was probably a mixture of both.

Raed el-Khoury, managing partner at Cedrus Invest Bank: I don’t think they learned a lot. [As for] lessons, mainly they have to really look into the risk. What are they selling to their clients? What are the embedded risks in every product? The profile of the bankers at that time before the crisis was focused on selling products. They didn’t look at the context of the client as a whole. There was wrong selling in many instances in the sense that bankers did not explain to the client the risks embedded in the product.

Selim Chami, director of investment banking group at BSEC: The bankers don’t care about learning; they want to make money. If a client comes and says I have this subprime securitization transaction I’m working on, and I have this much tranching, and I’m Goldman Sachs or Lehman Brothers and I have 100 transactions queued in line, and I need you to give me a rating as soon as possible, they will negotiate the fees and the ratings and they will push for something that they’re expecting. Unconsciously, a manager at a rating agency has all this reasoning. They go to higher management and say there are some things that are not looking too good, and there’s something that they didn’t really look into, for example the impact of the economic outlook, but they consider themselves to have done their job. You have a mass of people thinking like this. They start thinking about fees and budgets and that half-a-million-dollar bonus at the end of the year.

2 How has the client-private banker relationship changed after 2008, if at all?

Reto Bartel, senior representative at UBS AG Representative Office Beirut: The last decades witnessed the development of new economic theories on investor behavior which UBS uses in order to enlighten clients about the “do’s” and “don’ts” of investing. The behavioral view appeals to private investors since it captures familiar patterns of behavior we experience when dealing with real-life investment decisions. We also note that our clients have become more sophisticated, on average, not least due to the rapid increase of available information on economic developments and financial markets, as well as views and recommendations on market developments. An increasing number of clients like to talk about specific topics or are looking for a sparring partner willing to challenge their own investment theses.

Heiner Weber, head of Geneva branch at Falcon Private Bank: If the private banker has learnt his lessons from the past financial crisis, and the client has not, the dialogue would be very difficult and the results would not be as good. So private banking is really a teamwork between client and banker.

Nael Raad, managing director at Al Ahli Investment Group: In these types of markets you have to be much more transparent and much closer to your clients, monitoring their investments and attending to their needs. But you have to be closer in these volatile markets because trust is very important, especially nowadays, especially after the 2008 crash. It became more about the relationship. The client wants to know about the banker and the banker nowadays wants to tell him more about the product and tell him more about the risks involved. It’s a mutual thing.

3 Many of those in the wealth management industry are talking of a shift from universal big banks to smaller investment boutiques and family offices. To what extent is that statement true?

Daniel Diemers, principal at Booz and Company: Overall, the Gulf region is an attractive market for private bankers, and the region’s quick recovery from the financial crisis — especially compared to some Western markets — increases its allure. Not surprisingly, we expect competition to heat up over the next few years as local and regional players upgrade offerings and the global players — the incumbent private banking powerhouses — reassert themselves to defend and pursue market share. Banks need to find the right strategic positioning and stake their claim quickly. In this highly competitive environment, smaller banks will surely find their niche, as they have in the past. But we don’t see any major shift in the fundamental economics of the wealth management business model that would favor smaller players over the bigger ones.

Jean Riachi, chairman at FFA Private Bank: I believe that when you are smaller, you can take better care of your clients. I understand that most of the private banks, the global ones, have problems in terms of their profitability and they’re trying to cut their cost. I can tell you that we are not doing this because we will sacrifice part of our profitability to invest in people. But maybe this is a stand that you can have when you are a small private bank. But for sure the industry in general needs some kind of reengineering, and expectations should be lowered at the level of the banks’ profitability, at the level of the clients and the profits and the performances of the portfolios.

Georges Abboud, head of private banking at BlomInvest Bank: It is true that a lot of family offices opened after 2008 and even before. There are lots of reasons; one of them is regulations. They are so tough that the bankers cannot do whatever they used to do before. When you have your own family offices it is easier to go around some of the regulations. The drawback is that when you have a small firm — an investment company — the bank has to make money to live, to make profits, so you have to invest a lot of your clients’ money, which creates a conflict of interest there. 

4 Private bankers in the Middle East have many critics. Some say they still lack the expertise and talent that is needed to do proper wealth management. What is your take on such criticism?

Jean Riachi, chairman at FFA Private Bank: I would say that it’s a question of organizational structure. For example, in our bank, a private banker takes care only of the relationship with the client, but he’s backed by a team of asset managers, capital market specialists and real estate specialists, which means that he never manages an account on his own. Actually, he’s never allowed to manage an account. And when people come and want to give us a discretionary portfolio to be managed, the private banker will not be involved in managing it at all. Now, when it is an account managed on an advisory basis, private bankers are not the ones who decide what kind of strategies or products they are going to push. And here there are two things that are important in my view in the organizational structure: first, you have to be independent, which means that you need to not have products that you need to push; and second, of course, everybody here is pushed to explain to the clients and convince them that diversification is very important.

Raed el-Khoury, managing partner at Cedrus Invest Bank: Private bankers used to be relationship managers rather than investment advisors [and] product sellers. They would get ideas from the banks they work with and then they would go and sell them blindly to the clients. Bankers need to be investment advisors to their clients. And clients are asking [for] more and more of that, and they’re differentiating between private bankers. Our approach is, we need to introduce more — and I’m not saying that it’s not there — to the Lebanese market the concept of wealth management, whereby we would look at the profile of the client, the whole spectrum of what is needed from our clients and investors. Our private bankers would be knowledgeable bankers, not just people who go socializing and sell products. They would be able to look at the risk profile of the client, detect the risks involved in each product they would be selling, and have their opinion in what they want and do not want to propose to their clients, because, after all, this is the added value of the bankers.

5 How much would you intervene to manage a client’s risk appetite, especially when it is in excess?

Georges Abboud, head of private banking at BlomInvest Bank: You have to differentiate between the very sophisticated client who has been trading for a long time and has made money and lost money and gone through it for the past 20 years. He knows the cycles; you cannot stop him. But some people, they hear something on the news about how some companies’ shares are at their lowest level ever and they come and ask to put $500,000 into it and also ask for a loan of another $500,000 to invest in it. I’m not doing my job if I don’t stop this massacre.

Nada Safa, executive manager at Audi Saradar Private Bank: You have people as part of their portfolio, who like to speculate on currencies all day long. As a private banker you have to know how to calm the game. This is a speculator at the end of the day but you don’t want him to cross the line because he will lose money. It’s your job to be a therapist at the same time and understand his profile. This takes maturity and experience. And with time bankers know how to choose their clients. Some private bankers don’t want to deal with speculative accounts, they want big wealthy customers, dormant clients. You have exotic private bankers who have different portfolios, different client profiles. This is tough but if you have enough experience you can follow that. But at the end of the day it is your job to temper, to keep your client balanced.

Stephen Evans, head of Standard Chartered Private Bank for Europe, Middle East Africa and the Americas: I have to tell you that one of the most important qualities of a private banker is the ability to stand up and say no to a client, [to tell them] ‘I don’t think this is right for you’. And interestingly, in my experience, clients who have experienced that speak very highly of the banker, because they respect him. This is a testament to a good banker.

6 What factors play into a client’s propensity to take risk?

Georges Abboud, head of private banking at BlomInvest Bank: It is very important to think first about preserving your capital. And then you look at the needs of the client. If you have someone retired, he is not working anymore. He can’t afford to lose anything. So you will look for something in which he cannot lose. If someone has a stream of income and has money to play with then you can take some risk into equities or hedge funds.

Khalid Zeidan, head of MedSecurities Investment: The Lebanese love that [risky trading] because it moves quickly and it is very highly leveraged so he picks up the phone and he brags to his friend, “I bought this and I sold that and I made $3,000, $5,000 and $10,000, and I did that yesterday”, and then in one night he loses $100,000. He goes back to his wife and says “sorry honey, you’re not going to get that car.”

Nada Safa, executive manager at Audi Saradar Private Bank: The females I manage don’t like to take risk. You would be surprised to know there are many women in the market who manage their own wealth, especially in Saudi Arabia. They are very smart, they know what they want and they have their own wealth to manage. There is a whole niche market for this in the region and it is growing. There are more women working in private banking because… in the region women feel more comfortable building this relationship with another woman. But they don’t like risk and they are good investors. They go into funds, real estate and especially gold.

Mohammed al-Hamidi, managing director at AM Financials: Usually, the second generation will spend the money, not make the money. So definitely the second generation, usually when they come from high net worth families, they are more educated. What I know is that usually a younger person would take more risk, especially when the older person made the money. So that’s why some second generation high net worth individuals will take the money and make multiples of it and some will lose it.

Heiner Weber, head of Geneva branch at Falcon Private Bank: Many of the sons went through financial studies so they are all aware of the latest academic news on investment and they often have a more academic approach to investment. That’s for sure. Second, they are often more active because young people’s time horizons are shorter and they are extremely well connected via the Internet.

Nael Raad, managing director at Al Ahli Investment Group: The younger generation is looking more into investments: they’re more educated. They want to know exactly what it’s all about; they have the background, the education. I find that the older generation worked more on the gut feeling but the younger generation is more methodical, definitely. But at the same time it’s not all one stereotype.

Raed el-Khoury, managing partner at Cedrus Invest Bank: It’s normal to involve the heirs in the investment process, especially as they will be in charge of the future wealth. It can be more dynamic because of the younger spirit. So we see it as an opportunity to become more dynamic in the investment decision-making process. But here comes our role to really stress our conservative approach. Definitely, they’re knowledgeable, exposed, educated and open-minded but at the same time they lack maturity. And this, they will acquire and they’re definitely on the right track but they need help, they need guidance. Somebody that understands their concerns, their parents’ concerns, and can bridge the gap.

September 18, 2011 0 comments
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Banking & Finance

For your information

by Executive Editors September 18, 2011
written by Executive Editors

Regulating the markets

Having been put on the backburner for the past five years, a draft law to regulate capital markets and insider trading was finally approved by Lebanon’s parliament early last month. Lebanese investors and brokers had urged previous governments to pass the law, a move which would allow for more transparency and activity on the Beirut Stock Exchange, according to Lebanese bankers. The law stipulates that an independent commission, dubbed “The National Council for Financial Markets in Lebanon”, headed by Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, overlook and regulate both Lebanese market trading activities and participants. According to BDL, the regulatory agency will consist of seven members, five of which will be private entities, and will be an independent watchdog both in policies and functions, similar to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. As of Executive going to print, the government had not set a timeframe for the implementation of the capital market law.

Kafalat demand shrinks

Loans extended to small and medium-sized companies under the guarantee of Kafalat Corporation dropped year-on-year 7.5 percent through July 2011, totaling $93.3 million for the first seven months of the year, down from $100.9 million during the same period a year earlier, according to figures released by the country’s state-sponsored credit guarantee scheme. The aggregate number of loan guarantees by Kafalat up until July 2011 reached 691, an 18.9 percent annual decrease from 852 a year earlier, indicating an enduring unfavorable business sentiment in the country due to domestic and regional instability. The average value per guarantee reached $134,992 for the same period, increasing by 14 percent from the previous year’s average of $118,413. The industry sector took the bulk of extended guarantees for the first seven months of 2011, constituting 41 percent of the total, followed closely by agriculture at 38.2 percent, tourism at 17.8 percent, specialized technologies at 1.7 percent and handicrafts at 1.3 percent.

Plastic pressure in Syria

Visa and MasterCard have blocked all credit cards issued by Syrian banks, in compliance with US sanctions imposed on the Syrian regime in the face of violence against protestors across the country. News of the ban first broke when Syrian visitors to the United Arab Emirates were sent SMS messages informing them that their credit cards were no longer valid. In response to an executive order issued on August 18 by the United States Treasury department prohibiting “the exportation, re-exportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of any services to Syria,” MasterCard started blocking all transactions originating in Syria and all MasterCard transactions on accounts issued in the country. Visa also announced the suspension of its payment card activity in Syria under the recent US sanctions, stating it is “required by law to comply with the US Department of the Treasury financial sanctions against Syria.” Meanwhile, Adib Mayala, governor of the central bank of Syria, announced that Syria stopped dealing with the US dollar and switched to the euro, a decision made effective as of August 23.

Banks feel the stress

Lebanon was one of 28 countries whose banking sector fell under the “low strength” category of the Fitch Ratings’ Banking System Indicator (BSI), the agency’s annual risk assessment survey that includes 86 banking systems in advanced and emerging economies. Excluding potential support from shareholders and governments, the BSI measures banking systems’ intrinsic strength and quality, along with their systemic weakness. On a scale of “A” to “E”, from high to low quality, Lebanon came under the “D” category. Lebanon was also among eight banking systems that the ratings agency judged to have a high level of potential vulnerability, according to Fitch’s Macro-Prudential Indicator (MPI), which tries to determine the build-up of stress in banking systems. Lebanon was the only country to witness a decline in its MPI classification.

A trio of tech kick-starts

Lebanese business incubator Berytech announced a $1.05 million investment in three technology startup companies at a conference in early August, raising the number of its equity participations to eight since May 2009. Headed by young entrepreneur Hind Hobeika, “ButterflEye”, a company that has engineered swimming goggles that measure swimmers’ heart rates in real time via infrared technology, was the first to receive $100,000 of funding. Berytech also poured $600,000 into “Yalla play”, an online gaming platform founded by young businessmen Mahmoud Hajo and Karim Saddik, whose notoriety comes from the three-dimensional card game tarneeb.com. Berytech’s third investment went into “Wext”, a provider of a multi-platform web-texting software offering an instant messaging service adaptable to all mobile phones and all types of Internet connections. The Beirut-based seed capital fund Berytech has some $6 million under management, offering financing and consultancy services to young entrepreneurs in the technology field.

DP World profits surge

DP World, a Dubai World subsidiary, reported a 298 percent increase in first-half profits to $741 million [AED2.72 billion], buoyed by strong volume growth and a one-time gain from the partial disposal of its Australian terminals. The ports operator brought in $460 million [AED1.69 billion] from the monetization of 75 percent of DP World’s Australia terminals through a strategic partnership with Citi Infrastructure Investors. The world’s third largest ports operator rode a wave of global economic recovery during the first part of the year, supported by growth in newly-penetrated emerging markets of Latin America and Africa. As a result, gross volumes grew 11 percent year-on-year driving up revenues 3 percent to $1.5 billion [AED5.5 billion].  DP World also increased its cash and bank balances by 63.5 percent to $4.1 billion [AED15.1 billion], most likely in preparation for settling $3 billion [AED11 billion] of debt which will mature in October 2012.

Tourists flashing more cash

Total tourist spending in Lebanon increased 13 percent for the first seven months of 2011, relative to the same period of the previous year, according to figures released by Global Blue, the VAT refund operator for international shoppers. The majority of spenders in Lebanon were Arabs, making up 56 percent of total tourist spending in the country. By country of origin, nationals from Saudi Arabia accounted for 21 percent of overall tourist expenditures in Lebanon, followed by United Arab Emirates tourists at 11 percent, Kuwaiti nationals at 10 percent, Syrian visitors at 8 percent and Egyptian travelers at 6 percent. Fashion and clothing captured around 70 percent of total tourist shopping, watches 10 percent, and perfumes and cosmetics 5 percent. Beirut shops attracted 84 percent of total visitor spending in Lebanon, while the Metn, Keserwan and Baabda areas took away 12 percent, 2 percent and 1 percent of total spending, respectively.

Capital Trust buys into First National Bank

A Capital Trust Group private equity fund, the Euromena II, has acquired a 7 percent stake in Lebanese First National Bank, a deal valued at some $20.5 million. The stake is equivalent to 930,000 shares of the bank, making the FNB share price around $22. Press releases by both parties said that the transaction was aimed primarily at boosting FNB’s already accelerating growth, as the bank recorded balance sheet and customer deposits in March 2011 of $2.55 billion and $2.1 billion, respectively, while loans and advances amounted to $681.2 million for the same period. The Euromena II fund was launched back in June 2008 by Capital Trust Group with an initial capital ranging between $200 million and $250 million, and was the third generation fund — Menavest and Euromena I funds being the first two — for the global investment group aimed at investing in high growth companies in the Middle East and North Africa region, while excluding real estate and infrastructure projects. The Euromena I fund, which was set up in 2006 with $63 million in capital, had acquired a stake in Intercontinental Bank of Lebanon in January 2008, contributing to the bank’s $20 million capital increase at the time.

September 18, 2011 0 comments
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Feature

Game over

by Sam Tarling September 18, 2011
written by Sam Tarling

In the days following the libyan rebels’ push into tripoli, stubborn resistance by loyalist fighters continued in various areas of the capital. With the final battles raging and the fall of the city imminent, Executive was at the front lines documenting the fierce firefights, the surrender of soldiers and the casualties of war

1) After rebels routed loyalist forces during a day of skirmishes in the neighborhood of Abu Salim, one resident celebrates by ripping up a picturenof the fallen Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qadhafi with his teeth

2) A rebel patrol hunts for loyalist forces on the streets of Abu Salim, a staunchly pro-Qadhafi area that saw heavy house-to-house fighting after rebels took the city

3) A rebel soldier aims and fires through an opening in a wall at a loyalist gunman who, from a position in a residential building overlooking the Qadhafi compound of Bab Al Aziziya, had the rebels pinned

4) Rebel soldiers argue over the fate of a captured Qadhafi loyalist

5&6) A Qadhafi fighter pleads with his rebel captors before being struck in the head with a rifle butt 

7) A terrified resident is reassured by rebels who, after a vicious assault, had just captured four loyalist troops from her building 

8) A loyalist soldier has his hands tied behind his back after surrendering to rebel forces. With the discovery of what appeared to be executed loyalist prisoners, the rebel leadership urged fighters not to abuse detainees. However, with little coordination between the various rebel groups, the fate of their captives was far from assured. Executive saw one captive being shot in the leg and others being beaten, though most of those seen captured by rebel forces appeared to be treated humanely

9) A loyalist soldier is interrogated by rebel troops minutes after he and several of his comrades surrendered amid heavy fighting in Abu Salim

10) Rebels take cover from sniper fire inside a guard post at the Qadhafi compound of Bab Al Aziziya 

11) Opposition soldiers fire at loyalist gunmen in a residential area of the Abu Salim neighborhood in Tripoli 

12) Some rebel divisions have taken to wearing uniforms and have developed formal structures of command, though for the most part remain loosely organized and use an informal assortment of arms and apparel 

13) The body of a soldier lies dead in a corner after heavy fighting in Abu Salim

14) A rebel fighter escorts an Abu Salim resident from his home. Given the urban nature of the warfare and that fighters were often informally dressed, distinguishing civilians from soldiers was often difficult

15) A family flees after rebel troops surrounded their building in Abu Salim. As loyalist gunmen took up positions in residential housing blocks, civilians found themselves in the middle of heavy exchanges of fire from rifles, anti-aircraft weapons and rocket propelled grenades

16) Rebels dash toward the outer wall of the Bab Al Aziziya compound, keeping low to avoid Qadhafi gunmen who had been firing at them

17) Leaving no stone unturned, rebels search a giant stuffed bear found in the Bab Al Aziziya compound

18) Rebel soldiers patrol the streets of Abu Salim near sunset after a day of heavy house-to-house fighting 

19) Children collect bullet shell casings in what was formely called Green Square in Tripoli, now renamed Martyrs’ Square. The square saw little actual fighting but much celebratory gunfire 

20) As fighting ceased and quiet descended with the night, a resident walked through Tripoli’s old city, El Madina El Kadima

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Feature

Oil’s return from turmoil

by Executive Editors September 18, 2011
written by Executive Editors

As Libyan rebel fighters began routing government forces and advancing on the capital city of Tripoli in August, international oil and gas companies with interests in Libya (including five European and five North American hydrocarbon multinationals) began aggressively vying for the resumption or possible expansion of their roles in the country.

Italian oil firm, Eni, Libya’s most significant partner in hydrocarbons, said it expects a sub-Mediterranean gas pipeline between Libya and Italy to resume operations by mid-October. The company signed a memorandum with the National Transitional Council (NTC) — the rebels’ de facto government based in the eastern city of Benghazi — by which “Eni and NTC are committed to creating the conditions for a rapid and complete recovery of Eni’s activities in Libya and to doing all that is necessary to restart operations on the Greenstream pipeline, bringing gas from the Libyan coast to Italy”, the Italian company said in an August 29 press statement. The full restoration of oil output and exports, however, will be enormously complicated. Three factors will determine the speed of recovery of Libyan oil and gas production.

First, damages to the existing facilities will need to be examined and capacities restored. According to statements from NTC and Libyan oil officials at the end of August, direct conflict damages from the past six months to facilities have been limited and repairs have already begun. However, the restoration of facilities also includes dealing with the impacts of the shutdown process and inactivity of oil fields and pipelines.  

Second, oil sector workers will have to return to their jobs, which will require a rapprochement between the National Oil Company (NOC) and the NTC, as well as the return of foreign companies and their staff, which is heavily contingent upon an improvement in the security situation. The third and most crucial precondition for resumption of Libya’s oil economy, therefore, is a return to stability and internal security in the country. Reliable security structures have to be in place before the restoration of hydrocarbon facilities and the redeployment of the workforce can be meaningfully expected.

The nitty-gritty of Libyan oil

The oil and gas industry accounts for about 25 percent of Libyan gross domestic product, 80 percent of government revenues, and approximately 95 percent of export earnings. The 2011 BP Statistical Review of World Energy ranks the country as having the 11th largest oil reserves in the world, at 46.4 billion barrels, though it had been ranked at 19th in terms of production, at 1.6 million barrels per day, before the revolution. The equivalent figures for Libya’s natural gas reserves put it at 15th largest in the world at 1.5 trillion cubic meters, with its annual production at 32nd globally, with 15.9 billion cubic meters per year (cum/yr).

The sector is dominated by the NOC, which exploits and exports the country’s hydrocarbon reserves — both onshore and offshore — via a number of wholly-owned subsidiaries and international oil companies licensed by special agreements. The company owns the country’s refining and oil and gas-processing facilities, which include refineries at Mersa El Brega, Zawiya, Ras Lanuf, Tobruk and Sarir; the Ras Lanuf petrochemical complex and gas-processing plant is the country’s largest, also producing ammonia, urea, methanol, ethylene and low and high-density polyethylene.

Before the revolution, the NOC refined close to 380,000 barrels per day of the country’s crude oil in its refineries, with approximately 60 percent of the refined product output being exported. Libya’s oil and gas is sent to Europe, the country’s biggest export market, both by sea and a 540-kilometer, 11-billion cum/yr capacity subsea pipeline, dubbed ‘Greenstream’, across the  the Mediterranean to Gela in Sicily.

Within the country, Libya has a network of more than 8,700 km of onshore oil, gas and product pipelines.  Following the current unrest, most of the country’s oil and gas production and refinery capacity has been shut down. While refineries can be relatively easily restarted, damage notwithstanding, the crude oil pipeline network will have problems in starting up due to the waxy nature of the high-quality and relatively ‘light’ crude oil the Libyan oilfields produce. Once flow has halted for any appreciable time, the wax separates out and gradually blocks the pipeline. This material, similar to candle-wax, then becomes difficult to remove in order to restart the system, and it is foreseen that a considerable investment in technology and effort will be required to bring the system back to full operating capacity.

Looking ahead

UK-based energy and mining consultants Wood Mackenzie said in an August 25 statement that it expects resumption of full oil production capacities in Libya to require 36 months from “from whenever the current crisis reaches a resolution.” According to the analysts, the recovery of oil production capacities is likely to take longer for the mature Sirte basin in eastern Libya but will be faster in the newer Murzuk and Pelagian Shelf basins of western Libya.

For the longer term, “Libya has the potential to produce up to 3 million barrels per day of oil and become a major gas exporter through partnering with the international industry,” Wood Mackenzie noted, with the caveat that this future remains “on hold until military operations are concluded.”

September 18, 2011 0 comments
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Feature

The fall of Tripoli

by Executive Editors September 18, 2011
written by Executive Editors

Tuesday, August 23 

Abdallah slides his finger across the map of Tripoli. “They’re still fighting here, in Abu Salim. And in Bab Al Aziziya, of course: that’s Qadhafi’s stronghold. And over there, around the airport. Oh, and I was just talking to a friend in Sidi Khalifa yesterday; she said there was heavy shooting in her neighborhood.”

It has been three days since rebels entered Tripoli but intense fighting persists in the capital, while outside of it Qadhafi soldiers continue to stalk Western Libya. At the Tunisian border, nearly every car is heading out of the war-torn country. Apart from a Red Cross truck and a few dozen journalists busy filming each other, only a few Libyans are heading the other way. One of these is Abdallah, who says that, after having been involved in the Egyptian revolution, he would not miss this one for the world: “It’s my country now. I want to be there when Tripoli falls.”

In Nalut, the first city on the road from Tunisia, the shelling ended more than a month ago but schools and businesses are still closed. The few open shops have half-empty shelves and petrol is in short supply — a liter now costs $2.50, whereas before the war it was cheaper than water. Like the capital, this city is still living the war and so are its people.

“There must be war,” affirms Khamis Birgig, a 35-year-old rebel who garnishes every other sentence with a “boom-boom!” and skillfully maneuvers the gearshift with what remains of his right arm. “Just a few more days and we’ll be rid of Qadhafi,” he says, as the car heads towards the capital.

Khamis clearly took some psychological hits when he lost his right arm, eye and part of his knee to a Qadhafi rocket early in the uprising, though he does not seem overly fazed about his physical disabilities: he can still shoot with his good arm and is confident that when the new government arrives his sacrifices will be rewarded. “They will respect human rights and take care of me. But first we have to catch Qadhafi, so that we can put him in front of the international court, where he has to tell the world what he has done.”

Khamis, like most of the rebels, speaks about freedom and democracy when asked why he rose up. But when pressed, out come the complaints about a lack of work, income and opportunities. “Under Qadhafi there was nothing,” he says. “Just poverty.”

With the sun setting over the Libyan desert, Khamis is asked how long the ride will be. “I have no idea,” he replies cheerfully to Executive. “It depends on whether or not we run into Qadhafi soldiers.” He looks to the side with his one eye, points to the Kalashnikov on the seat and smiles hopefully. “Boom-boom!”

Wednesday, August 24

The capital of a disintegrating state is a strange place to be. Since the rebels entered Tripoli a few days ago, the city has been alternating between sounds of celebration and the booms of Qadhafi soldiers’ last-ditch efforts to stave off their own impending demise. Car horns honk incessantly while bored rebels light up the night sky with tracer fire. The streets are strewn with the burnt-out wreckage of cars and dumpsters, improvised roadblocks set up by the new authorities, most of whom are younger than 20.

Some residents have a hard time getting used to the new status quo. In one incident in the neighborhood of Dahra, young fighters pounce on a taxi driver after he takes exception, with a swing, to their demands to open the trunk. As the struggling man is dragged away from his car, one rebel lands a punch squarely on his face before elderly residents intervene and the driver is allowed to leave. “Idiot. Should have opened the boot when I told him to,” the boxing rebel shrugs, before turning his attention to the next car.

Incidents like this one are rife within the city, but thus far the local councils secretly put in place to take over the day-to-day running of the city after Qadhafi’s departure have done well: looting has been kept to a minimum and, apart from the occasional resident happily jogging through Qadhafi’s former stronghold with a painting under his arm, very little plundering has been reported. No stores ransacked of flatscreen televisions, no looting of abandoned homes. But their control is slipping.

“No government, so no water,” says a smiling teenager to a foreign journalist scavenging the city for food and drink. A few days after the rebels all but took over the city, it has begun to break down. A lack of milk, vegetables and petrol may be manageable for the moment, but with drinking water increasingly scarce and tap water and electricity on the cusp of running out, one cannot help but wonder how long until the residents of Tripoli start pining for the good old days.

Thursday, August 25

“Watch out, sniper!” yells a rebel, before a deafening firefight explodes in the streets of Abu Salim. Through the black smoke tears a truck with thundering anti-aircraft guns on the back. From the besieged building, snipers open fire on the rebels. A wooden garden door is shredded on impact. Two rebels drop while their comrades in full sprint empty their Kalashnikovs at the flashes from the building down the road. The sharp smell of cordite and burning asbestos drifts over the streets. While the rest of the city has been enjoying relative calm, rebel fighters have been trying to clear this working-class neighborhood of the remaining Qadhafi loyalists for several days now. When a rumor that Qadhafi may be hiding in one of the buildings starts to buzz, Abu Salim turns into a full-fledged war zone.

After the dust settles, three bloodied corpses lie on the streets: two rebels, one loyalist. No Qadhafi. The deposed dictator’s location is still a mystery, and the search continues.

“When we finally get Qadhafi, the resistance will die out by itself,” says 25-year-old Abdallah Masoud, still shaking from narrowly escaping a sniper’s volley. “But as long as he’s free, the fighting will continue.”

In a few days, Abu Salim will be cleared of Qadhafi loyalists, while the fighting will go on in other neighborhoods. Some parts of Libya, notably the cities Sirte and Sabha, are still under Qadhafi control.

But a return of the dictator is now out of the question. It is “game over” for him, says Majid Fituri, a 47-year-old rebel leader from Misrata, while wandering around the rubble of Qadhafi’s former stronghold of Bab Al Aziziya.

He looks back at the ruins behind the famous statue of the clenched fist crushing an American fighter jet. Qadhafi left intact the concrete skeleton of the building, destroyed by American bombs in 1986, to serve as a reminder of the West’s wickedness. 

“Look at that,” Fituri says. “That used to be a museum in the form of a ruined building: a propaganda tool for Qadhafi.” He turns around and smiles. “Now, it’s just another ruined building.”

September 18, 2011 0 comments
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Editorial

The fortunes of upheaval

by Yasser Akkaoui September 18, 2011
written by Yasser Akkaoui

The Libyan rebel forces’ rout of government troops from Tripoli last month heralded a pivotal moment in history, with the toppling of Muammar al-Qadhafi’s regime marking the third North African autocrat to fall to popular uprisings this year. Even while the security situation remains perilous, world powers and multinational companies are climbing over each other for a chance to reap their slice of the spoils of war: Libya’s fabulous resource wealth of oil and gas.

The Libyan revolution and its impact on global energy prices have been among the factors playing into the economic turmoil of late, where the sovereign debt crises in the United States and Eurozone have raised fears of a double-dip recession, sending markets into a flailing panic and rendering them near untradeable at times. In this environment, protecting one’s wealth becomes an anxious business. Executive has sought out the brightest minds in the business, locally, regionally and globally, for their take on how to navigate the storm.

Much of the world’s attention this month will also be focused on the 10-year anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. How much does this event, and the reactions it was used to justify, still impact the world we live in today? And is the so-called ‘clash of civilizations’ as clear-cut as its proponents would have us believe?

Despite all the turmoil, however, one must not forget to always look for opportunity. Perhaps that is a thought to ponder as one cruises what just recently became a long, open highway from the Gaza border to the doorstep of Algeria.

September 18, 2011 0 comments
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Nokia’s got your number

by Paul Cochrane September 3, 2011
written by Paul Cochrane

Nokia’s brand image is of two hands — one a child’s and one adult — reaching towards each other with the slogan: “Connecting People”; a nice image for a mobile phone manufacturer and service provider. But in a dozen countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the Finnish mobile phonegiant’s joint subsidiary with the German company Siemens, Nokia Siemens Network (NSN), has been connecting people in a way that consumers were not expecting: with the mukhabarat, or secret police.

Dozens of pro-democracy activists arrested in Bahrain by mukhabarat following the uprising that began in February were presented with transcripts of text messages and phone calls that they had made. Detainees were puzzled as to how their communications had been intercepted and were being used as evidence against them. They were not aware of the monitoring systems that 12 countries in the MENA, according to a report by Bloomberg published last month, had bought software from NSN and its subsidiary, Trovicor, that enables governments to intercept phone calls, emails and text messages. Such surveillance software also allows the powers that be to create disinformation by changing the contents of written communications and to scan phone networks through voice-recognition and keyword-search software, in addition to remotely activating laptop webcams and microphones on mobile phones, according to Wired magazine.

The Bloomberg exposé of the usage of such technologies in Bahrain is a first during the MENA uprisings of this year. That websites were being monitored was well known, and people in Syria, Libya, Egypt, Yemen and elsewhere have long been wary of what they said on the phone in case of a third, unwanted listener. But the level of interception and its usage by secret police is a concern not only for activists, protesters and the like but also for the very privacy of all people.

Furthermore, it is not an issue confined to Bahrain or the MENA. This follows the phone hacking scandal in Britain in July that reached the highest echelons of the police force, the offices of the prime minister as well as dozens of print publications, and add to this the news of Google’s cozy relations with not only Washington DC but also Beijing. This all comes on top of the revelations over the last decade about the joint American-British global surveillance system Echelon.

Such phone hacking and monitoring is a growing concern reminiscent of George Orwell’s dystopian novel 1984, which depicts a society under the hyper-surveillance of “Big Brother”. The arguments given for such surveillance software in the hands of the state are acceptable when it comes to tracking terrorists, organized criminals and other deemed baddies, but, as always, it is how such technology is used, for what purpose and how you classify a “bad guy”. Inflicting human rights abuses on Bahraini activists for what they wrote and said via their mobile phone is not a shining example of what Trovicor calls in its website: “Making the world a safer place.” Safer for the Bahraini ruling elite perhaps, but not for its citizens.

Telling in the unveiling of Bahrain’s usage of Trovicor’s systems is the fact that it will most likely not cause the same outcry as when NSN was hauled over the coals in 2009 in the United States for providing the same technology to the Iranian government to snoop on protesters in the wake of the disputed presidential elections. What has become very clear this year in the region is that there are halal and haram revolutions, depending on the country’s relations with the US. Bahrain is of course in the latter category.

Conversely, Tehran’s usage of Trovicor’s systems and a “Noto Nokia” international boycott for its indirect role in human rights abuses resulted in NSN selling Trovicor to Germany’s Perusa Partners Fund in 2009, although management, staff and equipment have remained largely the same. Meanwhile, NSN sales teams have been instrumental in the continued roll out of the service in the MENA.

By connecting and informing protestors and by distributing news and video updates from the streets, technology and social media have been key components in the successes of some of the uprisings throughout the region. Unfortunately, these same mediums are being used as a tool of autocracy. Just as governments should be held accountable for repressing their people, so too should corporations who facilitate such brutality.

PAUL COCHRANE is the Middle East correspondent for International News Services

 

September 3, 2011 0 comments
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In search of deus ex machina

by Peter Grimsditch September 3, 2011
written by Peter Grimsditch

If events in Syria are a tragedy, its monumental regional and international cast combines to weave an intriguing plot rivaling incomplexity the tales of Greek playwright Euripides. Their public utterances areas striking as some lines in, say, Medea, and never was the need for a Euripidean deus ex machina — an unlikely intervention by a higher power to resolve a conflict — more urgent. Some 2,500 years ago, the mythical Medea shocked audiences by slaughtering her children off stage. She justified the infanticide as retribution for her philandering husband’s unfaithfulness. Nowadays, it is the mother country torturing and mowing down its children in a remorseless fight against subversive minors.

Meanwhile, political actors on the global stage gravely offer advice that to many in the audience must sound like — well, Greek. Syria’s western neighbor dispatched its courier (many times) to urge an immediate end to the violence. “Our initiatives had positive results,” said Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in an aside to that portion of the auditorium containing his supporters; “The important thing is that Damascus took the first step less than 24 hours after I visited the country,” added Ahmet Davutoglu, his trusty sidekick and main emissary to foreign lands. Yet even as the oppressors were promising to mend their ways and introduce democratic family counseling, their tanks were racing from Hama to continue target practice in another town. Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad put those “positive results” in a different light. “In general, we meet with officials from other countries, take advice, and discuss their experiences, especially countries whose societies resemble ours, but when it comes to a decision, we don’t allow any country, near or far, to interfere.”

Cue the passionate public pleas from myriad actors, none of whom seem to be listening to the others.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said he was grateful to Erdogan for opposing, as the Iranian news agency IRNA reported, “the US-led Western alliance of NATO’s military invasions,” saying that “foreign meddling in regional matters only exacerbates the state of affairs.” The audience may have scratched its collective head at this. NATO has led aerial strikes in Libya while military action against Syria is an idea few have taken seriously. Turkey supplied the Libyan rebels with several hundred million dollars, all the while simultaneously trying to convince Muammar al-Qadhafi, to be more accommodating.

That policy of pragmatism was also demonstrated by Davutoglu’s pleas to Assad in Damascus being accompanied by two separate conferences on Turkish soil of the so-called Syrian opposition. Meanwhile, further complicating the twisted plot, as Ahmadinejad was expressing gratitude to Erdogan, the Ankara-based Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) claimed Iran had been spreading anti-Turkish propaganda, accusing it of supplying arms to Syrian opposition groups. And the Tehran Times wondered how Erdogan could wag his finger at Syria for “attacking armed terrorist groups” when his own military forces had launched a massive operation against “a few attacks” by Kurdish insurgents. Enter the United States and Russia. After some considered indecision, President Barack Obama announced that Assad had to go and said he and Erdogan had agreed to “consult closely” over the ongoing violence; Erdogan’s people say in public they do not support denying Assad his right to rule, while a few admit in private that it may come to that. Meanwhile, Russia said that it vehemently opposes military action against Syria, while declining comment on the possibility of Turkish support for armed intervention. Ankara has never said openly it was considering using its army on Syrian soil, although it has done little to squash analysts’ publicly aired speculation on the various forms in which this could happen.  So how will the drama end? Euripides would have stuck a character in a crude crane on the corner of the stage and raised him aloft to explain, in some of the more unremarkable passages of Greek verse, how everything would be resolved.

The deus ex machina to provide a solution for Syria, and a good few other countries in the region, could well be an international conference to seek a comprehensive Middle East settlement. And if curbing human rights abuses and extending freedoms make the agenda as well, so much the better — indeed, these ideas seems almost as old as Euripides. But the convenient final scene in which all problems were resolved was one reason the author of Medea won very few prizes; I’d hold the cigars for the conference’s prospects as well.

PETER GRIMSDITCH is EXECUTIVE’s Turkey correspondent

September 3, 2011 0 comments
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Rivalries wrack Yemen’s opposition

by Farea al-Muslimi September 3, 2011
written by Farea al-Muslimi

Embattled Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, still in Saudi Arabia recovering from a June bomb attack in Sanaa, has been delivering speeches to his supporters back home promising a swift return to Yemen. His messages have raised fears that his return will lead the country to a civil war— a justifiable concern. In reality, whether Saleh comes back or not is not Yemen’s biggest question today. Even if he returns and refuses to relinquishpower, the post-Saleh period is imminent.

With this is in mind, the country’s opposition groups have been piecing together differing frameworks for a transfer of power. On July 16, coalitions of Yemeni youth in “change square” in Sanaa — groups created amid months of daily protests and sit-ins against the Saleh regime — established a Transition Council of 17 national figures from various groups to rule the country and “[put] an end to Saleh’s regime”.

The youths’ measure was followed by the formation of a“National Council” a few days later by the Joint Meeting Parties (or JMP, established in 2006 by the main opposition political parties in the country), which declared that discussions were taking place between the JMP and other opposition actors to establish a comprehensive transition council representative of the different actors in the opposition and political movements from around the country.

Thus, “The National Council for Peaceful Revolution Forces” was formed after some debate and was originally comprised of 143 members from different political groups: the JMP, opposition actors abroad, al-Houthis, the Southern movement, and religious, military, tribal and civil society leaders. As comprehensive as its intentions may have been, the council quickly ran into discord. The Houthi movement declined to participate, citing a lack of representation, while 23 high-profile members from the South withdrew, namely because they wanted seats on the national transitional council to be split 50-50 between the southern and the northern provinces — this, despite the overwhelming population majority in the north. They also griped at having been named to the council without first being consulted, a common refrain indicative of the larger criticism of the opposition: the lack of strategic planning and coordination. The councils have put the opposition’s boot to Saleh’s neck and begun the process of transitional dialogue, but they have failed to put forward a viable plan for a transfer of power or to reconcile differences between opposition groups.

Since the establishment of the councils by the “youth”, and the JMP and its alliances, nothing has really changed on the ground. The regime still holds power, the security forces continue to attack protesters and the political and economic crises worsen by the day. More importantly, the councils do not enjoy any international recognition; at least not yet.

Whether an interim government will be in power for months, a year or longer, at some point elections will have to be held and new actors will come to power in Yemen. Of principal concern on this matter is the real chance that it would be the Islamists who emerge on top, and, if this does happen, what their makeup might be.

The Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islah Party, would be most likely to attract popular support, as the strongest political party in the country. But it is a divided congregation, with three groups making up its core: the Salafists, a smattering of tribes, and the Ikhwan, with the latter known to be the most pragmatic and least ideologically driven. The main concerns are regarding Salafists, led by Abdul Majeedal-Zandani, an extremist religious leader once classified as a “specially designated global terrorist” by the US Treasury Department. Zandani announced more than a month ago that he is pro-Islamic Caliphate, while declaring a“government by the people and for the people is a concept for infidels”. And in 2007, he opposed the appointing of a woman to the Shura Council.

The Islah party has been increasingly realizing that Zandaniis costing the party more than he is helping it, and had already begun minimizing his role, albeit unofficially, even before the uprisings started. The fear of Zandani’s role and the Islamists in general is more an exaggerated phobia than reality; it is anathema for Yemenis to accept a new dictatorship under any justification, even a religious one.

Still, without a better organized, more unified effort from opposition parties to replace Saleh via political means, the question will remain: a transition council to what?

FAREA AL-MUSLIMI is a Yemeni activist and writer for Almasdar

September 3, 2011 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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