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Israel spins its ship storm

by Stephanie Dotzer July 3, 2010
written by Stephanie Dotzer

Anything we can do for you?” the Israeli intelligence officer inquired after 10 minutes of interrogation. Mohamed Vall, an Al Jazeera correspondent who had been on board the Mavi Marmara, was among the VIP detainees the Israelis were handling with care. His hands were cuffed in the front, unlike most activists whose wrists were bound behind their backs; and unlike others, he was allowed the luxury of using the toilet.

Were Mohamed not a friend of mine, I still would have no clue what actually happened after Israeli commandos stormed the Gaza-bound flotilla and cut communications with the outside world. Western media wouldn’t tell me. Sure, I read the newspapers and zapped from CNN to BBC and back again, but it felt like I’d heard it all many times before. The flotilla-part is new, the rest is a ritual: Israeli spokespeople say what they always say — “Any other country in the world would do the same!” — while journalists and politicians engage their conditioned reflex: if they’re Arab, they get carried away with emotions; if they’re Western, they get caught up in their own precautions and end up saying nothing.

While the world has gotten used to the killing of Palestinian civilians, a deadly raid on an aid ship with passengers from 40 different countries is much harder to ignore. But, by and large, the Western world managed quite well. Granted, the story made the headlines and even Israel’s best friends — such as the United States and Germany — showed an unusual degree of indignation that the attack occurred in international waters.

Nonetheless, Arab commentators who tried to transform the tragedy into triumph, arguing that the world is finally waking up to Israeli crimes, don’t seem to have read much of the Western press.

Contrary to what many analysts claim, Israel has not lost the public relations war. It can still rely on thousands of loyal journalists to steer the international debate into side streets before it ever gets to the point. For, if there is one thing more blockaded than Gaza, it’s human common sense when it comes to Middle Eastern politics.  How else can you explain that most international media got stuck in a dead-end debate over who had what weapons and who was provoking whom? If fully armed soldiers storm your vessel at 4 a.m., would you assume they’ve come to join morning prayer? Instead of focusing on the fundamentals (like if the blockade itself is illegal under international law, then an attempt to enforce it on a third party cannot be particularly lawful), many Western journalists concluded that “the facts are unclear” and all one can safely state is the need for an “impartial investigation.”

To quote the above mentioned Mohamed Vall: “You got the GPS parameters, you got 600 eye-witnesses, what else do you need?”  Eyewitnesses? Heck yes. But where are they? In most mainstream media (with noteworthy exceptions such as The Guardian), eyewitness accounts were scarce. The German press largely ignored even their own members of Parliament who had joined the flotilla, arguing that, if they were on that ship, they were obviously biased and anti-Israel. Instead of listening to passengers, many journalists bought the idea that they were either radical Islamists or crazy leftists “being used by Islamists.” The Western logic seems to be: if it’s a bunch of hippies with dreadlocks doing yoga on the deck, ok, let them reach Gaza. If they wear beards and pray five times a day, then it suddenly seems much more acceptable to stop them from… well, from bringing cement and medicine to a besieged population.

More and more people are not falling for the spin and are managing to think for themselves. But the closer the Western public comes to seeing what’s happening in Gaza, the quicker opinion-makers reassert that “Israel’s fears must be acknowledged” and that “a country that is so isolated urgently needs its friends.”

Israel doesn’t need sheepish friends. It needs to take advice from its critics — and listen to Mohamed’s answer to the question asked by his Israeli interrogators. Sadly, the right reply only came to his mind long after his deportation: “Anything you can do for me? Oh yes, you can. Lift the siege, stop mocking the world, consider Arab lives as precious as Jewish lives… and then, ahlan wa sahlan, live happily ever after.”

STEPHANIE DÖTZER has worked for Al Jazeera English and Germany’s ARD news network. She now freelances in the Middle East

July 3, 2010 0 comments
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Flotilla fallout docks in Ankara

by Peter Grimsditch July 3, 2010
written by Peter Grimsditch

The peripheral effects of the Mavi Marmara affair 100 kilometers off the Israeli coast on the last day of May have begun to remove some of the initial political glory that fell on Turkey.

Israeli commandos killed nine people when they stormed the former Bosphorus ferry to stop it from continuing to Gaza to deliver a cargo of humanitarian supplies. The nine victims were shot a total of 30 times and five were killed by gunshot wounds to the head, according to the Turkish council of forensic medicine. Ibrahim Bilgen, 60, was shot four times in the temple, chest, hip and back. Fulkan Dogan, a 19-year-old American of Turkish extraction, was shot five times from less that 45 centimeters in the face, in the back of the head, twice in the leg and once in the back. Five of the victims were shot either in the back of the head or in the back. 

 Ankara, justifiably angered by this disproportionate display of force, poured a tirade of vitriol upon Israel and appeared as a new and active champion of the Palestinian cause, which prompted outpourings of support for the government of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. While domestic political gains still abound, the fallout in various international arenas is spreading.

The jury is still out on the trite question of whether Turkey has killed off its chance of joining the European Union through currying favor with its eastern — and Muslim — neighbors. Politicians involved in the EU application deny any such policy shift. Indeed, friendly commentators in the United States and Europe point out that Turkey’s close relations with states like Syria and Iran make it a more attractive proposition for the EU.  It can boldly go for talks where few European politicians dare to venture.

Be that as it may, there are a number of areas where Turkey stands to lose out because of its public spat with Israel. Not least is in its campaign against the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), in which some 50 members of the Turkish armed forces have been killed since March. One of the most useful tools in spotting PKK bases in Northern Iraq is the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), or, more popularly, the drone. Six Israeli-made Heron UAVs stationed near the Iraq border have been providing surveillance data on PKK bases. The Israeli technicians present in Turkey to troubleshoot and give training are said to have pulled out two weeks after the battle of Mavi Marmara.

The Turks put a brave face on the withdrawal. Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul said Turkish personnel had been trained in Israel and would take over the task of operating the Herons. Other Turks say this is easier said than done.

But all may not be lost. In a triumph of pragmatism over principle, there is an unofficial agreement in Ankara that any decision to freeze military deals with Israel should be delegated to the defense ministry. Thus on June 22, as at a suspected PKK bombing of a military bus killed least five people in Istanbul, a Turkish delegation arrived in Tel Aviv to view the latest Heron tests and to take delivery of another four.

Meanwhile, Erdogan has claimed that “foreign elements” have been involved as a “subcontractor” in the escalation of PKK attacks on the Turkish army. It was left to acolytes lower down the line, speaking on convenient condition of anonymity, to point the finger at Israel. For good measure, there have been equally unlikely accusations that Israel was also behind the attack on a Turkish naval base at Iskenderun. This leaves a choice between believing that Israel is conspiring with the PKK to engineer attacks on the Turkish army, or it is cooperating with that same army to launch attacks on PKK bases. Turkey, like much of the Middle East, is replete with conspiracy theories.

Deteriorating relations with Israel could have another ill effect on Ankara. Israeli lobbies in the US have for decades taken up the cudgel on Turkey’s behalf to beat down attempts by the Armenian community to have the US Congress officially recognize the wholesale slaughter of 1915. Mike Spence, a Republican representative for Indiana, said if Turkey continued to become more antagonistic to Israel, he would reconsider his opposition to a resolution designating the events as genocide.

This has far-reaching financial implications. Congressional recognition of the genocide would make it possible for Armenian groups to sue for damages and seize Turkish assets in the US. The headline-grabbing flotilla unleashed a tide of events which could lead anywhere. Victory doesn’t appear to be one of the ports of call.

PETER GRIMSDITCH is Executive’s

Istanbul correspondent

July 3, 2010 0 comments
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Bill’s American dream

by Riad Al-Khouri July 3, 2010
written by Riad Al-Khouri

What do former American President Bill Clinton and the new Miss USA Rima Fakih have in common? Jokes about Clinton’s notorious womanizing aside, rather a lot, actually: Rima is a perfect example of Bill’s answer to America’s economic woes. 

Speaking in April about fiscal responsibility, Clinton said immigration was a key to United States central government budget deficit reduction, which in turn was vital for America’s future. He was quoted on the website of The Atlantic magazine as saying, “We [the US] need more immigrants. We need to reverse the age ratio. I see that as part of fiscal responsibility.”

Coming from the US president who will perhaps best be remembered for putting a long deficitary American federal budget into surplus, this is serious stuff. Expounding on his theme, he added that “the great virtue of this country, the thing we have over China and India, is that we have somebody from everywhere here, and they do well. This country still works for immigrants.”

He should have added that immigrants also work for their new country. Typically fleeing trouble spots or poverty pockets, of which there are more than a few in the modern Arab world, migrants from the Middle East tend to be hard working and — on the whole — economically successful. Only a short hop from my vantage point of Ann Arbor, Michigan, places like Rima Fakih’s hometown of Dearborn show the inspiring impacts of Arab immigration to the US.

The bustle of places like Dearborn allows Clinton to conclude that: “The changes we make will be less draconian if we get more people into the system. I don’t think there’s any alternative than to increase immigration. I don’t see any kind of way out of this [deficit] unless that’s part of the strategy.”

This brings us back to Ms Fakih. With his eye for the ladies, one wonders what Bill makes of Rima personally, but there is no doubt that he approves of what she represents: a young and successful migrant to America. Born in Lebanon but raised in the US, Rima Fakih is fairly typical of newly arrived Arab-Americans: from a modest background and flourishing in their new homeland in ways difficult to imagine had they never come to the US. These emigrants have been arriving in force from the Arab world for over a century, and they and their descendants are to be found in most communities around the US.

Rima Fakih - Miss USA

The contribution of these Arab-Americans to the US economy has traditionally not been easily quantified in dollar terms or labor market participation. That is partly because so many of them change their names and turn their backs on their roots. Not so Rima Fakih: though she will represent the US in this summer’s Miss Universe competition, she has shown pride in her Arab heritage. Yet even if she doesn’t win the world crown, her camera-friendly credentials are assured and she will doubtless go on to parlay the Miss USA title into serious money. That way, Clinton’s beneficent fiscal loop happily closes, with migrants such as Fakih working their way up and enriching the American system. Young and successful, they pay more in taxes and don’t rely on state benefits.

On another level, Fakih underlines the positive moral and cultural importance of Arab Americans living in US society. OK, she’s easy on the eyes, and she and her successful immigrant community cheer up the American economy, but this sort of prominence is also playing another crucial role. Fakih has come as an antidote to the “Islamist terrorist” xenophobia that is unfortunately commonplace in the US press, both before and after 9/11. Long prior to the destruction of the Twin Towers in September 2001, this kind of sentiment was — and remains — widespread in America. And though Fakih has not been immune to the conspiratorial accusations of the right-wing media, the general praise of the mainstream — despite the minor pole-dancing distracter — has done well to marginalize her critics and better the image of Arab Americans.

Hopefully, the new Miss America’s rise will help a little to clear the air in that respect, even as Bill Clinton’s thinking on the economic role of immigrants reminds us of their strong positive contribution. 

RIAD AL-KHOURI is a senior economist at the William Davidson Institute of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor 

 

 

July 3, 2010 0 comments
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Wanton democracy

by Peter Speetjens July 3, 2010
written by Peter Speetjens

Words are like colors. They come and go with the seasons. Not so very long ago, words like “democratization” and “a new Middle East” were all the fashion in Washington and many a journalist, the trendy type, jumped on the bandwagon arguing that the Iraq war was about just that: democracy.

But the tune changed even under George Bush and today the “D-word” has largely fallen out of fashion. While it can still be used in criticizing such countries as Iran or Syria, it is generally avoided in reference to the rest of the region. Hence, we heard next to nothing about the democratic turns for the worse in Egypt and Jordan, which with Saudi Arabia, form America’s triangle of “moderate” Arab allies.

Despite a flood of promises not to, the Egyptian parliament on May 11 routinely and for the zillionth time extended the state of emergency that has continuously been in place since 1981, the year when Egypt’s former President Anwar Sadat was killed and his successor Hosni Mubarak took over.

While emergency rule per definition is a temporary solution to an extraordinary situation, a whole generation of Egyptians has come to accept as normal the suspension of their universal human rights. Members of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP), which has dominated Egypt’s political landscape since 1952, argue that the extra powers are needed to counter terrorism and drug trafficking. This hardly seems the ruling party’s only goal however. What’s more, the goal hardly justifies the means.  According to human rights advocates, many thousands of Egyptians spend their lives behind bars without charges and without a fair trial. Torture is widespread. Meanwhile, basic human rights such as the freedom of association and expression have been severely reduced. Censorship is everywhere.  It is no secret that the state’s extraordinary mandate has come in handy in the run-up to elections, when the NDP’s political opponents, especially members of the Muslim Brotherhood are arrested and locked up. Most of them are released once the elections are over, yet not everyone is that lucky.

When a civilian court in 2006 dismissed all charges against Khairat al-Shatir, the Brotherhood’s deputy supreme guide, and 15 other party members, Mubarak transferred their cases to a military tribunal, which in 2008 sentenced them to up to 10 years in jail. Naturally, the military court is no public affair, while the current emergency laws do not include the right to appeal.

Meanwhile, the ailing 82-year-old Mubarak continues to pave the way for his son Gamal to take over the presidential crown, while his second son, Alaa, keeps an eye on the family’s growing business empire.

The democratic barometer of Jordan does not peak much higher. Egypt’s eastern neighbor in May finally presented the long awaited new election law. King Abdullah II dissolved parliament late last year and parliamentary elections are set to take place by the end of this year.

While Jordan’s king publicly called for fair and free elections, he appointed Rajai Muasher, openly an opponent of political liberalization and reform, to take charge of formulating the new election law.

The end result is flawed, to say the least, and has been severely criticized by international human rights organizations. The main criticism concerns the fact that, while about half of Jordan’s population lives in Greater Amman, the new law has downsized constituencies and increased the number of seats in the lower house of Parliament to 120, which are spread all across the country. The obvious aim is to keep the “power of the people” firmly in the hands of the “true” Jordanian tribes, while Jordan’s capital remains underrepresented and with it the majority of Jordanians of Palestinian descent, as well as urban-based Islamic parties.

The color of the day is, therefore, not the “D-word” but “status quo,” and how to keep it no matter what. Having just returned from a trip to Egypt, the image that sticks in my mind as an epitome of the country’s politics is that of 40 elderly men protesting at the Ministry of Health against a cut in their benefits. They were faced by at least twice as many policemen in black, while around the corner two trucks filled with more uniforms awaited.

No image comes to mind regarding Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom generally forbids demonstrations.

PETER SPEETJENS is a Beirut-based journalist

July 3, 2010 0 comments
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Beware the black swan

by Natacha Tannous July 3, 2010
written by Natacha Tannous

Forecast to reach an altitude of $55.4 billion by year’s end, the precarious flight of Lebanon’s arrears is ruffling far too few feathers among our policy makers. Instead, they’re counting on economic growth to dilute the debt by reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio, which differing sources currently place around 150 percent. In the words of Finance Minister Raya el-Hassan: “Don’t use economic textbooks to understand the Lebanese model.”

Is Lebanon somehow serendipitously always right on the money? Is the country some sort of economic maverick with a secret recipe for success?

True, Lebanon has never defaulted on its debt, but staking so much on our economic exceptionality to see us through can only help hasten the arrival of our ‘black swan’ — that unpredictable and improbable high-impact event left unaccounted for in the economic models, which could sink us into a debt deathtrap.

Prudence therefore calls for effectively managing the surging debt burden; we need to reduce the debt inventory and avoid renewing bonds at maturity while containing inflation amid excessive liquidity.  Our archaic infrastructure cannot maintain current growth rates indefinitely and only the gullible would believe the cyclical reduction in Lebanese bond yields are sustainable.

Financing long-term growth requires structural reforms. We must improve infrastructure and promptly implement, among other things, an energy policy to tackle the national power company’s $1.4 billion yearly losses; we must realize the potential of our natural resources and human capital, and create new initiatives in education. The government must quit beating around the cedar tree and properly address these issues to build a healthy economy.

In a modern country it is unacceptable that the 2010 budget, if endorsed by Parliament, will be the first budget passed in five years. And as it stands, this budget projects a $4 billion deficit, meaning debt issuance is unlikely to slow anytime soon. Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh admits he is “concerned about the growing deficit and we are incessantly calling for reforms to decrease [it].”

How though, is not clear-cut; in terms of expenditure, the quality and transparency of public spending must improve and the chronic leakages that plague the system need to be stemmed. On the revenue side, wages in Lebanon total approximately $20 billion; with direct income tax rate of 10 percent, government should be collecting some $2 billion annually, not the current $780 million. Closing the loopholes on tax dodgers will take time to implement; in the meantime, additional revenues could be mobilized through a 2 percent increase in value added tax, though this would likely spur social upheaval. Government officials have sung about privatization, public-private partnership (PPP) and securitization answering our debt woes, but none of these options can fully fix the problem.

In regard to privatization, between the telecom operators and the low value of the national airline, utilities companies, ports and airports, the government would be lucky to collect $10 billion and not sell at distressed prices, while it would also lose the revenue of telecom tariffs – currently a de facto form of taxation that earned government $1.36 billion last year. Privatization could help pay down the volatile part of the Lebanese debt — Eurobonds held by non-Lebanese — but it is no long-term solution. PPPs could help improve infrastructure without increasing the public debt, but require an autonomous capacity for the private sector to finance itself, and this is not self-evident. Such partnerships are complex, and potentially unsustainable. Ultimately, PPPs will not solve Lebanon’s debt bind.

Securitization is not the answer either, as future revenue streams from such a scheme must be proven viable before implementation. The fact is, the Lebanese market isn’t mature enough for it and the International Monetary Fund does not consider securitization proceeds as debt reduction, but rather an alternative type of debt. So as the government toys with wishful thinking on ways to balance the books and stalls on progress in substantive structural reform, our debt continues to take flight.

As long as the economic forecast stays bright and shiny, the country should be able to glide through debt refinancing by issuing more sovereign paper. The problem is the improbable — that black-winged bird which swoops down on us from above while we were gazing at how high we’d climbed. When our economic model begins its plummet toward reality, we will only have ourselves to blame.

NATACHA TANNOUS is EXECUTIVE’s financial correspondent

July 3, 2010 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Traditional airlines are caught in no man’s land

by Dward Clayton July 3, 2010
written by Dward Clayton

Two trends in the Middle East airline industry have dominated headlines in the last decade. The first is the launch of premium carriers — such as Emirates Airlines, Qatar Airways, and Etihad Airways — which have taken luxury to new levels to appeal to an international jet set. The second is the rise of low-cost carriers (LCCs) — such as Fly Dubai, NAS, SAMA, Air Arabia, Bahrain Air and Al Jazeera — which have used a no-frills approach to make flying affordable to a larger group of people.

 

As carriers at each end of the spectrum gain more and more market share, they are putting pressure on the players left in the middle: traditional, full-service airlines that are caught up in the impossible task of trying to be all things to all people. They rely on a single product to serve both premium business passengers and budget travelers: The same seats, meals, flight attendants, reservations staff, check-in processes, and loyalty programs are expected to do double duty for those seeking a top-level experience as well as those on a $10-a-day vacation.

In the Middle East, the traditional airlines at risk are often national flag carriers. For instance, Wataniya and Al Jazeera are fighting to capture share from Kuwait Air; NAS and SAMA have begun competing with Saudia; and Egypt Air will come under pressure this year as Air Arabia Egypt launches its operations.

The weakening and even failure of a national airline has an impact far beyond its own operations. The citizens of a country that loses its national airline often lose many of their options for air travel, unless other carriers can profitably provide connectivity. National airlines act as global ambassadors to the customers they carry and a struggling national carrier can damage a nation’s reputation.

If traditional carriers are to succeed in the future, they will need to understand how to compete in an evolving industry.

Sizing up the competition

Premium carriers are the first threat to traditional carriers: In an effort to become global players, government-backed Gulf Cooperation Council luxury carriers are investing in new planes, expanding their networks, and intensifying their operations at a dizzying rate.

Gulf carriers Emirates Airlines, Qatar Airways and Etihad Airways are ranked among global leaders for high quality of service and expansive global networks: Qatar Airways is one of six airlines in the world with a five-star Skytrax rating; Emirates was nominated “Airline of the Year” twice; and Etihad has consistently ranked at par with Emirates and is considered a leading premier airline.

These three carriers have penetrated every major market in the world and grabbed market share from incumbents.

Government support has allowed these airlines to rapidly expand their fleets, forecasting their anticipated growth: The three combined have about 535 planned aircraft deliveries by 2015, and Dubai’s ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum said in a recent interview with CNN that Emirates would order further aircraft at Britain’s Farnborough Airshow later this month.

Filling these planes will require Gulf carriers to gain market share from competitors. In the short term, they will primarily target Europe-to-Asia routes, which will set the stage for fierce global competition. Airlines that can offer outstanding service, efficient operations, and superb reliability — rather than sheer market presence — will enjoy the upper hand.

At the other end of the market, LCCs are making inroads with low prices and high efficiency. Nine LCCs launched in the Middle East between 2003 and 2010, with their market share increasing rapidly from 1.6 percent in 2005 to 7.1 percent in 2009. These airlines generally offer short flights, averaging 1,100 kilometers and 1.5 hours, with a turnaround time of about 25 minutes. LCCs’ low prices have led to increases in demand, but have also eroded airlines’ yields. 

Not everyone wants to travel on a no-frills low-cost carrier, and so it is doubtful that they could survive simply by providing a cheap alternative for existing passengers. The beauty of the low-cost carrier model is that it has attracted new passengers, creating its own market.

Meanwhile, traditional carriers cannot make up the loss of passengers to low-cost carriers by creating new markets for travel. Rather, they rely on filling their aircraft with more connecting passengers, who are less profitable and ensure traditional carriers remain shackled to their costly connecting hubs and all the associated costs, such as baggage sorting and transfer lounges.

Getting out of no man’s land

The expense of maintaining the illusion of limitless service for full-price ticket holders makes it nearly impossible for traditional carriers to compete with LCCs’ low costs. And because there is a real limit to the service they can afford to offer, they also can’t extract the same price premium that high-end carriers enjoy.

 

Worse still, as traditional carriers’ profits evaporate, so does their ability to invest in the next generation of aircraft and systems, which might go some way to helping them out of their misery by providing lower running costs as well as a better experience for passengers.

Operating profit margins of network carriers have plummeted. Most large Middle Eastern airlines are simply not in a position to transform themselves into low-cost carriers or premium hub carriers.

National flag carriers, in particular, have a responsibility to act in the best interests of their countries, rather than merely considering what is best for their balance sheets.

But there are five steps that can help flag carriers to develop a new operating model that integrates some of the best elements of premium airlines, low-cost carriers, multiple-brand airlines, and multiple hub airlines.

1. Unmask the real network: point-to-point flying. Traditional carriers typically carry both connecting and point-to-point traffic. Although point-to-point traffic generally has better yields, traditional carriers configure their business for connecting passengers — for example, by building their schedule around their connections. More emphasis on larger point-to-point routes — such as intercity trunk routes, holiday destinations, and small regional services — would improve their competitive positioning.

2. Take pressure off the hub. A traditional hub-and-spoke network allows an airline to connect the largest number of cities with fewest flights, but suffers from two limitations: People generally end up going out of their way to travel via the hub, and arrivals and departures at the hub are arranged to maximize the number of connections, which leads to costly peaks in demand for ground services and severe congestion.

The solution is to use multiple hubs, which often reduces both problems by putting connections through the most convenient hub and reducing the distance of journeys.  Also, by better allocating the main connections between two hubs, peaks at each can be reduced, easing pressure on both of them.

3. Give customers only what they want. Premium airlines are masters at understanding what services their customers are willing to pay more for. Often national carriers can tailor their services to exploit cultural or behavioral idiosyncrasies in their passenger base that will increase loyalty.

4. Remember that less is more. LCCs’ ruthless cost-cutting highlights just how much excess costs most airlines carry.

Traditional airlines can mimic LCCs’ use of as few aircraft types as possible, reduced turnaround times and higher utilization, their simplified and automated ground services and their flexible labor arrangements.

5. Share the pain. Many small or mid-sized airlines cannot generate the scale or cost benefits of large airlines; such carriers can save as much as 5 to 10 percent of their total costs by merging with a similar-sized airline.

There is no question that traditional carriers are squeezed by new competitive circumstances, as well as industry changes that have been difficult for everyone. But with the right strategy, they can find their way out of no man’s land.

July 3, 2010 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Bold reform – the gordian knot of prudent public finance

by Fabio Scacciavillani July 3, 2010
written by Fabio Scacciavillani

On the whole, the Middle East seems to have been quite resilient to the global financial crisis thus far. Both the energy commodities exporters and the countries that do not enjoy large oil reserves have mostly been able to maintain healthy annual growth rates, even though they suffered the inevitable setbacks, especially during the most acute phase of the credit market meltdown.

For the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, the performance was driven mainly by the public spending capacity accumulated during the years of climbing energy commodity prices, which has allowed governments to maintain an unabated flow of funds into infrastructure investments. But for the Middle Eastern countries that do not enjoy substantial commodity resources, the resilience came from a structural shift in economic policy.

In particular in the Levant (Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon), the economy was able to withstand the impact of the global crisis thanks to the long lasting effects of the structural reforms enacted during the past decade (and in some cases even earlier), plus the improvement of the security situation, notably in Lebanon.

Economic liberalization spurs enormous gains in efficiency and productivity when the dynamics of free markets spring powerfully back to life. Sectors dominated by inefficient public management or widespread red tape are swiped by performance gains and innovation. The results are often stunning: double digit growth, stronger exports, strong capital inflows, creation of small companies, improved services and so on.

This notable feat, however, cannot hide the fact that the effect of the reforms have been considerable for certain segments of the general population, but have rarely translated into a broad based improvement in living standards, especially for the lowest income brackets. The pattern we often observe in the Middle East has a familiar tinge, as it tracks the experience of many places where economic freedom sprouted after decades of repression, including Eastern Europe, China, India and parts of South-East Asia. The most blatant example was the so-called Russian oligarchs, who made exorbitant fortunes acquiring the crown jewels of the Soviet Union’s state-owned enterprises during the dismantling of the Soviet’s control and command system, benefiting from opaque procedures brought in by hasty privatization. 

The failure of the ‘trickle down’

But even where the excesses that characterized Boris Yeltsin’s time as the Russian premier were largely avoided, the process of liberalization tended to favor those with better connections to decision makers, family ties, the right professional skills (finance or engineering above all) and plenty of money, or simply those who happened to be in the right place at the right time.

The consequence is often that income disparities fuel resentment from those excluded or left at the margins. A middle class fails to emerge and actually, when buoyant growth leads to price increases, notably in real estate, the living standards of the salaried might even decline. Adding to the plight, with faster growth infrastructure becomes obsolete and overwhelmed, environmental problems are exacerbated, chaotic urbanization creates congestion and, at times, social tensions, while social services struggle to adjust.

The reaction to these woes is often a political backlash against the reforms and the reformists – in Eastern Europe and India, for example, governments that had pushed for liberalization ended up losing elections – but even where elections are not held resentment and cynicism can mount.

Hard to handle

Obviously, the authorities are not completely blind to these dynamics and effectively redistribute in some form the larger revenues resulting from additional tax collection and privatization receipts. Egypt doubled civil servant wages between 2005 and 2009, while Jordan and Syria also doubled public sector wages and pension outlays over the same period. Sometimes the tax windfall is channeled into less laudable areas; the doubling of defense expenditure in Jordan over the last five years, for example, is hardly justified by intensified security threats.

The redistribution of economic benefits through public expenditures, whether justified or not, carries two risks. On the one hand, expenditures and entitlements are politically difficult to undo, especially if exceptional economic growth is taken for granted – when it inevitably slows, governments are suddenly saddled by unsustainable deficits. Also, public expenditure tends to favor certain groups, resulting in patronage, dependency and complacency toward mismanagement of funds.

More generally, redistributive public policies represent a quick fix that might work in the short run but fail to address the key issue: why doesn’t the economic liberalization extend to the lower segments of the population through private sector mechanisms?

The reason, in my view, lies in the fact that liberalizing economic reforms are relatively easier to engineer, if only because extensive literature and widespread international experience outlines the practical steps to take. But liberalization is just the first step to extend opportunities and welfare.

The second, most critical and difficult task is to create a level playing field for all, not just for the privileged or canny few. A level playing field requires independent institutions that prevent special interests exerting an undue influence on the decision making process, assuming a dominant position in key sectors or hijacking resources for their own use. In short, it requires the establishment of an adequate system of economic governance hinging on three planks.

Foremost is a judicial system that carries justice without particular regard for the powerful and enforces property rights without being prone to external influences. Second are public bodies which are impartial and do not shy away from tough decisions, even when they upset the government or anyone in a prominent position. Third, since institutions are not abstract entities but result from the actions of men, it must be assured that those who perform public duties are shielded from political pressure and must not be penalized when they disappoint the rulers. Other policy actions ought to complement the governance framework, such as sound regulation, appropriate labor market laws, credible monetary and financial supervisory authorities, consumer protection and a business environment open to foreign investments.

In essence, the journey toward full economic freedom requires impartial institutions whose decisions cannot be subjected to the interests of individual or groups, however prominent they might happen to be. In the absence of these basic rules, reforms risk a dire destiny. They will end up substituting an old oligarchy with a new one, though not necessarily a better one.

 

July 3, 2010 0 comments
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Last Word

Free market football

by Michael Young June 5, 2010
written by Michael Young

The World Cup is upon us, and for a few weeks the language of amity and unity will be pushed aside by rants and rumbles of nationalistic exclusivity. In the wake of the Greek financial crisis, European national amity and unity have also been severely tested, which leads one to wonder whether the future of capitalism will resemble the beautiful game.

 Whether in football or Europe, don’t be fooled, the integrative forces of the market will overcome the divisive dynamics in both. Football has long been an advanced manifestation of what open markets are supposed to be about: players move with little difficulty across national borders; a great deal of money liberally exchanges hands as a consequence, in no small part greased by highly profitable television contracts; marketing and appeal is global; and the most talented players and managers usually come out of the maelstrom far richer.

Some might protest that football in general, and European football in particular, works more like an oligopoly. The wealthy clubs are the most powerful; they are able to buy the best players, which allows them to win more games and gain more lucrative television contracts and advertising revenue, especially in European championship play. This earns them even more money and resumes the cycle.

But the power of some clubs is also what transforms them into truly global, unifying phenomena. If a club has the means to pick and choose players from an international menu, it will do so. Let’s say you’re an Italian club like Inter Milan; why select a majority Italian team when you have the money to mix things up and import even better players from Brazil, Argentina, Holland, and anywhere else?

 The irony is that football remains an unfettered outlet for fans’ allegiance to a particular city, country, region, or even in some cases social stratum. Yet capitalism has made such identities less and less meaningful. Inter was once regarded as the working class team of Milan, but the notion is almost laughable today, with the team a major financial powerhouse enjoying international appeal. The market has fundamentally altered Inter’s image, so that while this was once defined by what the team stood against (above all, its rival AC Milan), today it is defined even more by all that the team embraces through its expanding fan base. 

Which brings us to Europe after the Greek financial crisis. There too there has been much talk recently of nationalism and the emergence of a two-tiered European economy. The Germans didn’t initially want to pay for the profligate Greeks, and for a moment the European experiment looked like it might collapse. A deal was done, but the European Union is not out of the woods yet. What is emerging is a sometimes disturbing form of “cultural” differentiation, whereby the burden on Europe is said to come from the “southern” states, most on the Mediterranean, who take a very different view of taxes and public finances than their parsimonious brethren in the north.

 We might even go further to say that Europe has gone the way of football in allowing hubris to get the better of prudent accounting. Neither in Europe nor in football is the sky the limit anymore. And when that happens populist instincts return, as do doubts about the cosmopolitan advantages of the whole. But then reality somehow kicks in.

A sport defined by antagonism, but that has seen the relative dissolution of that antagonism thanks to the integrative dynamics of capitalism, finds itself in not so different a place as the project of European integration. This too faces antagonism, but capitalism was instrumental in the creation of a unified Europe and will continue to sustain it.

 And that place, quite simply, is the broad realization that retrenchment and divorce is not an option either for Europe or football, at least if both are to prosper. The market is a cruel leveler, but it takes enormous effort and time to restructure things when it is flawed. The penalties in participating may be damaging, fouls are common, but then, making it all worthwhile, come the goals.

June 5, 2010 0 comments
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Consumer Society

Title take-back for the hummus heavyweight

by Executive Editors June 5, 2010
written by Executive Editors

Some competitions are won by a narrow margin. If the last six months are any precedent, the contest over hummus won’t be one of them.

On May 8th, Lebanon carved its initials into the immortal Guinness Book of World Records for the second time in less than a year with the most hummus ever assembled in a single place.

The record amount, initially claimed by Lebanon last October but snatched across the border by Israel in December, has grown exponentially as the competition between the two countries has escalated.

Israel’s December record of 4,090 kilos more than doubled Lebanon’s initial amount of two tons, and Lebanon’s May rebuttal sets the figure at 10,453 kilos. 

A day later, on May 9, Lebanon set the record for most falafel assembled, weighing 5173 kilos, which equals approximately 10452 dozens.

“We could have done 12 tons,” said Chef Ramsi Choueiry, who presided over both of Lebanon’s record-setting events, “but the specific amount [10,452 kilometers is the square-area of Lebanon] reflects the core philosophy of this event: that hummus is quintessentially Lebanese.”

The contest has been part of an aggressive bid by Lebanon to win international recognition for what the Association of Lebanese Industrialists call a “misappropriation” of the dish by other Mediterranean countries — and by Israel in particular — which export billions of dollars worth of the dish under the name hummus, the Arabic word for chickpeas, first used by a Lebanese manufacturer in the 1950s.

On May 8, under the direction of Chef Choueiry, 300 apprentice chefs attacked vats of chickpeas, tanks of olive oil and crates of lemons in an industrial fervor that would have brought a tear to Henry Ford’s eye. One by one, teams of apprentices dumped their brimming tubs into an enormous ceramic bowl — the world’s largest, designed by architect Joe Kabalan, earning the country another world record — while the numbers on a giant digital scale climbed skyward.

“This is really fantastic,” said Jack Brockbank, Guinness’s representative adjudicator who witnessed the record. “Lebanon has well and truly re-earned its place in Guinness.”

Whether reclaiming the Guinness record plays into Lebanon’s hands in its bid to register ‘hummus’ as a protected food — marketable under that title only if it is manufactured in Lebanon — the stunt has caught the world’s attention, with international news services from Britain’s BBC to the China-based Xinhua running the story over the course of last month.

June 5, 2010 0 comments
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Consumer Society

The Struggle for Arab Independence

by Executive Editors June 5, 2010
written by Executive Editors

Albert Hourani, the late Lebanese-British historian once wrote: “All states are artificial… they have been formed by specific historical processes, by human acts within a given physical environment over a period of time.” It is precisely those processes and acts that are laid out in great detail by Middle Eastern historian Patrick Seale in his latest book on the region, “The Struggle for Arab Independence.”

This 730-page history book reads more like a gripping novel, with its protagonist carrying the tale from start to finish. In addition to plotting the course of how myriad Arab provinces came to become the rigid collection of states that we today call the Middle East, Seale also chronicles the life of Lebanon’s prodigal, yet perhaps most important, son: Riad el-Solh.

The life of Lebanon’s first prime minister is recounted from the days of his grandfather Ahmad to his untimely death in Amman in 1951.

Seale, who spent six years researching material for the book, describes a dark and tumultuous period of Arab history, jumping back and forth between the life of his protagonist and the broader events happening at the time, to offer one of the most comprehensive books in English on Arab struggles against Ottoman, Western and now Zionist occupiers.

The book cites countless sources from historical works, intelligence documents and personal accounts to paint what is, at times, a rose-tinted picture of Riad el-Solh’s political life and the role he played in shaping Lebanon and the wider Middle East. Seale portrays Solh as an internationalist, an Arabist, a working class sympathizer, an anti-colonialist, a journalist and a lawyer all in one.

The only criticism he seems to have of Solh — which by the end of the book seems to be a veiled compliment of sorts — is that he was no accountant, as he squandered a large portion of his family’s fortune on his political career and the fight to free the Arab world from its occupiers. But as any journalist, including Seale, knows, there are always at least two sides to every story, and indeed to every person.

Seale also goes to great lengths to give credit to others who fought for Arab “independence.” A laundry list of Arab notables, politicians, kings, imams, and thinkers are mentioned, leaving the reader with the impression that each of these men could have their own 700-page tome.

Meanwhile, Seale gives special attention to the calculations of the Zionists and their collusion with the British in such detail that it is perhaps only topped by Ilan Pappe’s “The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine.”

Interestingly, he describes Solh’s repeated meetings with notable Zionists such as Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s first president; David Ben-Gurion, its first prime minster; and Moshe Sharett, Israel’s second prime minister, who he first met as a young boy when the latter’s father was employed as a smallholder at one of the Solh family friend’s estates in Jericho.

Solh naively offered these men a pact with the Arabs, a fact which Seale admits, but again paints it as a politically astute calculation during the 1920s and early 1930s, despite the disastrous affects of Israel’s creation.

However, it is details such as Solh’s childhood meetings with Sharett that makes the book stand out as a work of both exhaustive research and refined story-telling. It gives due credit to a man who is described in the first half of the book as a bastion of the wider Arab, and to a greater degree Syrian, struggle — a Greater Syria which included Le Grand Liban, which became the Lebanon we know today.

Midway through the book, Seale describes Solh’s most significant change of heart, when he started to believe in an independent Lebanon, something that set him apart from his fellow Arab nationalists. From that point onward, the reader follows Solh’s every political maneuver to become the first premier of the country, as he navigates his way past colonial French occupation, hostile Maronite opponents and even his own family members. The chapter describing how he and Bishara el-Khoury, the British-backed first president of Lebanon, battled with the French in the final throws of their colonial project, is separated into rounds — 14 of them, each a page or two long.

Finally, Seale describes how King Abdullah I of Jordan, the great grandfather of the current king, who sought to end the fight with the Zionists, tricked Solh into coming to Amman to mend ties that had deteriorated, only to be assassinated in what Seale suggests was an Israeli plot.

Seale may at times overstate the importance or relevance of Solh, but he does give him more of the genuine credit he is due than the Lebanese seem to today.

Tellingly, his book ends with the commissioning of Solh’s statue in the heart of downtown Beirut — today, the statue serves as little more than an adjunct to a construction site.   

June 5, 2010 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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