Executive Magazine

Beirut’s irrepressible optimism for property investors

by Priyan P. Khakhar June 1, 2008

written by Priyan P. Khakhar

From a distance, one observes the birth of a new skyline — sprouting towers of elegant bricks, mortar and concrete that will house an eclectic range of people who choose to live in Beirut, a city with a raw database of stories with even more plots and twists than the latest Hollywood movie. These flawlessly finished apartments, kaleidoscope designs and stainless kitchens do, however, also come with a somewhat jaw-dropping price tag for a non-utopian city. Apartments in the tower blocks facing the marina, for example, are $1 million plus, this being considered a modest figure by the many that have already sold “off-plan.” A recent report by Bank Audi on Lebanese real estate records over 35,000 property transactions in the third quarter of 2007 alone.

The political climate of the country is no secret, with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund rating the investment risk of the nation on par with states such as Chad and Sudan. In mid-May the country was on the brink of civil war when Hizbullah’s heavily armed fighting machine attacked and seized large parts of West Beirut and nearby Beirut suburbs. For six months Lebanon had remained without a president and the specter of confrontation and violence had loomed over the entire nation for the past three years. After the fighting in May, most business people in Lebanon’s hospitality and tourism sectors were convinced this would be another summer of dread, a third year with an abysmal tourism season and a degree of security risk that would scare even a speculators of George Soros’ ilk.

How then does one explain these property prices? Take for instance the prices in towns such as Marbella on the Mediterranean coast of Spain, a naturally luxurious and hedonistic playground of the rich and famous that can potentially be Beirut, once the “Paris of the Middle East.” Apartments and villas, in gated compounds, boast similar million dollar and above price tags, with a relative saving grace of EU membership, security, a stable and functioning government, absence of political bickering, lower investment risk rating and of course the Spanish siesta. From a stability point of view, comparing Marbella and Beirut can be like comparing chalk and cheese, and yet the latter demonstrates great resilience within the real estate sector.

Analysts could attempt to explain this, citing the strong Lebanese banking sector with its impressive levels of liquidity and credit availability, investment from the Middle East region in general, former Lebanese residents re-investing in their motherland and a social transformation of the younger generation irrespective of the political divisions and diversions that frustratingly prevail. The prices must therefore exist due to supply and demand side factors that have assimilated the political factor, combined with changing perceptions of the nation to both investors and home buyers. The supply-side factors may be explained two-dimensionally by the fact that key locations in the city, such as Hamra, are crowded with developments in a relatively small space; this is compounded with the needs of the local and growing student population at prestigious institutions such as the American University of Beirut delivering medium-term tenants for investors, all scrambling for limited good space locations.

Prices in Marbella, however, have long reached their peak, and the number of British residents and investors living in this southern gem of Spain is a known fact. In similar fashion, Beirut has lured investors from a variety of locations in the Middle East. The country boasted FDI stocks of $18.3 billion and inflows of $2.7 billion in 2006, this in a year Lebanon was at war with Israel. There is speculation further investments are yet to come, providing the political tensions dilute or at least don’t escalate to the previous historical levels. It is a question of risk taking, risk adverse or a laissez-faire attitude to risk in terms of investment, though it has to be noted that both Lebanese economics and politics exist in varying shades of grey. 2008 growth in 2008 is projected to be positive, with estimates from 4-8% depending on which local source is consulted. According to local research companies such as Infopro, “the prices have risen, though some are just gearing up for the boom that is to come in 2008.”

After several days of intense negotiations in Qatar, Lebanon’s opposing leaders elected a president and a new “united” government was expected to be formed by end of May. The Doha agreement has created hope for many Lebanese to lift the nation out of a state of violence and confrontation into peace and stability.
Within hours of the political sea of change on May 25, 2008, the Beirut city center was preparing for an abundant summer of returning visitors and countless festivities. This ability to return to form and celebrate life is what makes the place. Beirut offers that ‘something extra’ — an intangible and unquantifiable element — that is mainly driven by an unprecedented cosmopolitanism that refuses to exclude anyone or anything, an “x-factor” which other cities in the region lack.

A drive down the city center would awe the most critical of architects at the restoration of a once destroyed French style quarter. Retail spaces are plenty, with rents in the popular malls ranging from $2,000-$3,000 per square meter. One would expect the political factor to suppress prices, yet it appears that some defiance amongst buyers and sellers remains. Given that the political crisis subsides, in terms of real estate at least, the city seems set to become a Marbella of the Middle East.

Dr Priyan P. Khakhar is an assistant professor at the American University of Beirut’s Olayan School of Business.

June 1, 2008 0 comments

By Invitation

Arab sovereign wealth funds

by Sven Vehrendt June 1, 2008

written by Sven Vehrendt

The past months have witnessed an intensive debate about the relevance of SWFs in the global economic system and their role in global financial markets. Global Insight, the research firm, states that SWFs have grown a remarkable 24% annually in the past five years. Morgan Stanley, the investment bank, argued that the total size of the SWFs could increase from $3 trillion to $12 trillion by 2015.

Commentators have tried to put these stunning figures into perspective. Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, argues that if one wants SWFs to appear large then one would argue that hedge funds manage an estimated $1.5 trillion and that the current market capitalization of the S&P 500 is roughly $12 trillion. On the other hand $12 trillion is only a fraction of the estimated $190 trillion in total global financial assets. Assets managed by mature-market institutional investors (such as pension funds and endowments) are about $53 trillion. Pension funds manage over $15 trillion, insurance companies $16 trillion, investment companies $21 trillion. This is a small fraction of the global debt and equity securities, exceeding $100 trillion.

But an important element is missing in this assessment. First and foremost, Gulf Arab SWFs shall be of benefit to the citizens of their countries. How relevant are they then with regards to their own economies? An analysis arrives at some interesting findings.

The size of the assets managed by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority is estimated at $875 billion. This is equivalent to 675% of the GDP of the United Arab Emirates. The Reserve Fund for Future Generations managed by the Kuwait Investment Authority is estimated to manage assets valued at over $170 billion. This represents twice the GDP of Kuwait. The Qatar Investment Authority’s assets stand at over $60 billion or 141% of Qatar’s GDP. Only Saudi Arabia’s assets managed by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency are somewhat smaller at just below 100% of Saudi Arabia’s GDP.

Based on these numbers one arrives at the conclusion that although large, Arab Sovereign Wealth Funds might be not that overwhelming in size if one compares them against the assets of other players in global financial markets. But our numbers show that they are extremely important in the context of their own national economies.

Here some more examples: An optimistic 8% return that ADIA might manage to realize amounts to roughly $44,300 per UAE citizen (excluding expatriates), or roughly 63% of GDP per capita. This is substantial. The same is true for Kuwait. At 8% growth, the revenues realized by the KIA amount to $17,160 per every Kuwaiti citizen or 44% of Kuwait´s GDP per capita. Again, this is not trivial and illustrates the importance of SWFs’ role in maintaining the wealth of oil exporting Gulf countries.

A fundamental question is then if the SWFs will be able to maintain or even grow this wealth for future generations. The idea of SWFs is to enable governments to diversify away from their own national economies and searching for interesting return perspectives elsewhere. But if SWFs do not identify very attractive investment opportunities outside their economies, their purpose is challenged.

The economies of the Gulf are currently growing at a rapid speed, much stronger than most of economies elsewhere. It will therefore be quite difficult to identify investment opportunities that are on par with opportunities at home. If we see GDP per capita growth rates increase in the Gulf region as rapidly as in the past years and we assume that SWFs will invest elsewhere, that is in regions which are growing at a more slower pace, then the SWFs contributions to safeguarding the welfare of the citizens of Gulf states is negative. Only in case the economies in the Gulf region would calm down and other economies grow more rapidly will SWFs be able to meet their task to secure their standard of living for future generations beyond oil.

The importance of SWFs within their national economies and their exposure to global economic trends illustrates how important a broader debate about purpose and investment strategies of Arab SWFs has become. Not only have SWFs become a contentious issue for Western policy makers, but their risk/return profile should also be of major concern for the Arab public, since the future economic well-being of Arab societies is at stake.

Sven Vehrendt is an Associate Scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut

June 1, 2008 0 comments

Capitalist Culture

Diplomacy – Venice of the Gulf

by Michael Young June 1, 2008

written by Michael Young

One of the more interesting stories in the Gulf in the past decade or more has been the expanding, paradoxical role of Qatar. When the emirate hosted the Lebanese dialogue talks in May, this was only its latest demonstration of a policy of counterpoint that has either pleased or infuriated those used to more predictable behavior from Arab states.
The dialogue helped one understand Qatar’s strange ability to place itself at the nexus point of contradictory regional interests. Why, many observers wondered, had the March 14 parliamentary majority agreed to the interchange with the opposition under the auspices of a regime with close ties to Syria and Iran, which has financed reconstruction in Hizbullah-controlled areas? Simply put, there was no one else. Tension between Saudi Arabia and Egypt on one hand and Syria and Iran on the other meant that the Saudis, traditional mediators in inter-Arab affairs, were unable to play that role in Lebanon. Egypt, in turn, had its own problems with Damascus and was anyway represented more or less by the Arab League secretary general, Amr Moussa. Jordan and the North African states were too preoccupied with other matters to intervene. So Qatar filled the gap.
In many ways, Qatar is the Venice of the Middle East. Not for the picturesque waterways or singing gondoliers; but because Qatar, like the Venice of the Renaissance, is a place constantly juggling and preserving a balance between its most improbable relationships, all the while protecting itself, increasing its profits, and enhancing its regional role.
While Doha has good relations with Syria and Iran, as well as Hizbullah, it has managed to do this while hosting the largest American military base in the Middle East, maintaining contacts with Israel, preserving more ambiguous relationships with militant Sunni Islamists, protecting itself on both the Arab nationalist and Islamist sides through its Al-Jazeera satellite TV station, and, more recently, working to paper over its previous rivalry with Saudi Arabia (partly by toning down criticism of the kingdom on Al-Jazeera).
Before the Lebanese dialogue in Doha, Qatari policies in Lebanon provoked much anger from March 14. In some ways the reaction was justified: Qatar sided openly with those most opposed to the government. However, at a broader level, Qatar is interesting because it has taken the lead in shaping what can only be described as a post-ideological approach to Arab politics. Certainly, most Arab states long ago gave up on ideological consistency, and Arab nationalist or Islamist regimes have, mostly, turned their ideological pretensions into little more than instruments to buttress dictatorships. But Qatar has taken this a step further, so that the emirate can openly ignore the most fundamental of Arab benchmarks, the isolation of Israel, while providing political and financial sustenance to Israel’s bitterest foes.
Is this something positive? In one way it is. Pragmatism is an ingredient that has long been in short supply in the modern Arab world. The region is more often defined by polarization, by its stubborn divisions, than by efforts to transcend differences and deal with all sides simultaneously. Pragmatism can also be an essential element of capitalist culture, where the market, whether the market of politics, economics, or ideas, is basically allowed to develop unfettered, free of preconception.
But a capitalist culture, and the pragmatism underlining it, becomes self-defeating when it bolsters autocracy. Take the case of Iran or Hizbullah. That Qatar seeks to deal with both to its advantage is understandable; but if Iran or Hizbullah were ever to impose their will on Qatar, or on Arab states behaving like the emirate, the latitude for that pragmatism would collapse. Would a hegemonic Iran in the Gulf, for example, allow Qatar to continue to serve as a headquarters for U.S. power in the region? A Syrian return to Lebanon, while it might not disturb officials in Doha, could significantly strengthen those regional forces with an interest in obstructing Qatar’s open ways.
In other words, by basing its political actions purely on self-interest, a post-ideological state like Qatar might find itself helping unleash those forces in the Middle East that suffocate the interesting possibilities in a post-ideological state. The same would doubtless apply if pressure came from, let’s say, the United States, except that there are limits to what the U.S. can do. For example, despite its hostility to Al-Jazeera, Washington has understood that it cannot much change the station’s tone. In late 2001, the then-U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell, tried, and was promptly condemned at home for this.
Gulf politics are so personalized that it may be difficult to reach the conclusion that Qatar represents the way of the future — or a way of the future. The possibility always remains that when leaders change, so do a state’s policies. However, the tightrope act the emirate has pursued in recent years is working for the moment. Not everyone is happy, but it may be a model that Gulf states begin adopting, perhaps to their detriment. Perhaps not.

Michael Young

June 1, 2008 0 comments

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The Horn of too many bulls

by Paul Cochrane June 1, 2008

written by Paul Cochrane

One word sums up the Horn of Africa’s regional importance: geostrategic. Over the last two months, several developments have highlighted how intricately linked the Middle East is, and wants to be, with the countries on the other side of the Red Sea. There are the usual three suspects: business, politics and the “war on terror,” plus a wildcard, piracy.

The big business news is that Osama bin Laden’s brother, Tawfik, wants to build a $22 billion Africa-Arab bridge to link Djibouti with Yemen. The 28.5-kilometer project would span the narrowest point across the Red Sea, at the Bab al Mandab, “the Gate of Tears” — an appropriate name, especially given the situation in the vicinity and all the piracy off the Somali coast.

Indeed, piracy has dramatically increased since the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was toppled by the US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006. Last year there were 31 attacks, and so far this year 23 attacks by Somali pirates on sea-going vessels, including the 47-day hijacking of a Russia bound icebreaker, the Svitzer Korsakov. A $1.6 million ransom was allegedly paid out.
Bin Laden’s Bridge, as it could be dubbed, will potentially bring more stability to the region and its sea routes — after all, an estimated 3.3 million barrels of oil are shipped through the Bab al Mandab every day. The bridge certainly intends to boost traffic between the two continents, and act as an entry point for pilgrims to Mecca. But the ongoing situation in Somalia presents concern for any parties involved in the troubled Horn, including Qatar.

This is the big international politics story: Ethiopia breaking diplomatic ties with Qatar over the emirate’s alleged funding of the al-Shebab movement in Somalia, the military wing of the ICU and a recent addition to the US State Department’s list of terrorist organizations.

Doha-based Al Jazeera’s sympathetic coverage of an anti-Ethiopian rebel group, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), also rankled Addis Ababa, especially given Qatar’s diplomatic ties with Ethiopia’s other nemesis and ONLF supporter, Eritrea.

A week after the diplomatic spat — Doha denies any involvement with Al-Shebab — a US air strike killed the top leader of the movement, Aden Hashi Ayro.

Whether Qatar has any involvement with these groups or not, Doha is not the only Middle Eastern player in the mix, with a UN arms embargo monitoring group reporting in late 2006 that Egypt, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and Lebanon’s Hizbullah were all supporting warring factions in Somalia. The US meanwhile has a military base in Djibouti, 100 military advisors in Ethiopia, recently donated $97 million to Ethiopia in recognition of its “strategic importance,” and Special Forces are reportedly operating within Somalia. This melee thus includes countries on side with the US-led “war on terror,” seemingly on side with the “war on terror’, and those that are on the complete other side against the war on terror.

Somalia is Africa’s equivalent of Lebanon.

The irony of all this is that the activities of the US and its allies in the region have made the situation worse than before the ICU was overthrown. Ethiopia, for its own ends as well as Washington’s, has waged a brutal war on Somalia. Half the population of Mogadishu has fled, a humanitarian crisis is underway and Amnesty International last month accused Ethiopian troops of widespread atrocities against Somalis, including slitting people’s throats, gouging out eyes and gang-raping women. Somalia’s disintegration is also generating further support for Islamic movements.

Furthermore, Somalia’s regression back to warlord-run days under the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is bad for regional business.
According to the Mombasa-based Seafarers’ Assistance Programme, most of the Somali pirates are linked to the TFG, which has little control of the country and its territorial waters. In the six months the ICU were in power, piracy on the Somali high seas was reportedly down, but from 2007 the distance vessels were advised to keep away from the coast was increased from 50 nautical miles to 200. Although that is not even enough, with a Spanish luxury yacht hijacked in international waters in early April, the second European vessel to be overrun by pirates in a fortnight.

For such an important shipping route it would be to the advantage of most players involved, and certainly for the free flow of goods and energy, to better police the area around the Gate of Tears.

One solution is to put African Union troops on the ground in Somalia instead of the 8,000 Ethiopians currently there, as called for in UN Resolution 1725, and international monitoring off the coast to ward off illegal fishing as well as piracy.
Construction of Bin Laden’s Bridge would certainly need plenty of security, and a more stable Horn would help this African theater of the “war on terror” from becoming yet another disasterous tragedy with far-reaching geostrategic implications.

PAUL COCHRANE is a Beirut-based freelance journalist. He was recently in Ethiopia.

June 1, 2008 0 comments

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The ‘Axis’ taking Bush for a spin

by Claude Salhani June 1, 2008

written by Claude Salhani

By now we are well familiar with what President George W. Bush labeled the new “Axis of Evil” — communist North Korea, socialist-leaning (Baathist) Syria and Islamist Iran. Each one has expansionist ambitions of varying degrees, though some are more grandiose in aspiration than others. North Korea and Iran want to dominate the world, while Syria will settle for considerably less.

The North Koreans want to turn the world into a vast Godless worker’s paradise, similar to the Stalinist Garden of Eden that is the northern part of the Korean peninsula — only perhaps one where the comrades aren’t starving half the time and trying to escape to South Korea or even to China the other half. However, Kim Jong-il, the megalomaniacal leader of the North, would probably be satisfied if he could occupy the South, thus reuniting the two Koreas and in the process double his clout, his ego and his people’s misery.

The ruling mullahs governing the Islamic Republic of Iran have somewhat of a similar philosophy: they too would like to dominate the world. However, the main difference with the non-believers in North Korea is that the Iranians want to impose their religious diktat on the rest of the world. The other major difference between the North Koreans and the Iranians is that the latter have been slightly more successful in exporting their revolution. The North Korean expansionist desire was stopped at the 38th parallel; in contrast, Iran’s mullahs have made inroads in the Gaza Strip by supplying Hamas with all the guns and money it needs to disrupt Bush’s efforts at peace-making in the Holy Land.

And in Lebanon, Iran’s and Syria’s proxy militia, Hezbollah, has demonstrated that it can, if it so wishes, take over the country by military force, or in any case, at least great swaths of the country. Of course whether the Shiite militia can then retain the territory it occupies is a completely different story. This Hezbollah found out the hard way when it tried to go after the Druze in the Chouf.

As for the third spoke in the new “Axis of Evil”, Syria, its territorial ambitions are far more modest than those of either North Korea or Iran: Syria only wants what is rightfully hers, the Golan Heights, the strategic plateau overlooking the northern Galilee which was taken militarily by Israel in the 1967 War and remains under Israeli occupation to this day.

Oh yes, Syria wants Lebanon too.

And here’s where the story begins to get somewhat complicated (if it wasn’t already) due to the fact that a great many Lebanese are opposed to the idea of Syrian domination. The Bush administration supports the notion of a free and independent Lebanon and has invested in backing Fouad Siniora’s government and the March 14 Movement. So the defeat of pro-government forces by the Syrian and Iranian-backed Hezbollah in early May in the fiercest exchange of internal violence Lebanon has experienced since the end of the civil war in 1990 can be seen as a defeat for Bush’s democracy spreading policy in the Middle East.

Hezbollah’s attempted coup also frightened Sunni powerhouses such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt who rightfully perceived the action as an attempt by Tehran to extend its political power base and influence in the region. Hezbollah’s victory comes as a second slap across the face of the U.S. president from his Iranian and Syrian foes. The first blow came when Hamas took over Gaza.

This leaves the U.S. administration pondering what course of action it can take. Part of the conundrum facing the administration is amplified by the fact that it continues to refuse to engage either Syria or Iran in talks, while these two countries seem to be pulling all the strings in Lebanon today.

This is where President Bush’s new counter-axis-of-evil comes into play with the American president turning to his Arab allies for assistance.

Enter Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, three moderate Muslim nations who are getting nervous over Iran’s rising influence. The recent successes of the Islamic republic in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon have revived fears particularly among the Saudis, prompting the Saudi king to assume greater responsibility in regional matters.

As one Saudi, who is well connected to the intelligence community in the desert kingdom, said to me when the fighting broke out in Beirut: “Don’t forget the critical Saudi role, which is now even more central than the role of the U.S. and France in the region!”

Saudi Arabia’s role in the Middle East will be all that more crucial as the November U.S. presidential elections approaches and American politicians become completely absorbed by domestic politics, turning a blind eye on the rest of the world.

Claude Salhani is editor of the Middle East Times

June 1, 2008 0 comments

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Do as I say, not as I nuke

by John Dagge June 1, 2008

written by John Dagge

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is under threat. We know this because the only country to have ever used nuclear weapons (twice) told us last month. The warning came at the end of a two-week meeting of the 106 NPT member nations in Geneva in early May. A statement from the five sanctioned nuclear powers — the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France and China — laid responsibility for the threat of increased nuclear proliferation squarely on Iran and North Korea. Yet a quick look at the record shows those most hysterically calling for an international effort to ‘shore-up’ the NPT have long worked to undermine the world’s premier weapons control agreement — at least when it comes to their own obligations.

Although the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is generally understood in the West as giving the United States the right to decide who can and who can not have nuclear technology, the document’s exact wording is a little more complicated. At the heart of the agreement is a quid pro quo arrangement, one the West (primarily the US) has long failed to uphold. In return for forgoing nuclear weapons, nuclear power for civilian use is to be made available to all non-nuclear signatories. And yes, this does include Iran.

On top of this, under Article VI of the NPT, the five recognized nuclear states are obligated “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” This requirement was strengthened via a 1996 International Court of Justice ruling which unequivocally stated nuclear powers must disarm. It was further reinforced at the NPT Five-Year-Review in 2000 when delegations from 180 countries (including the US, then under Bill Clinton) agreed on a 13-step program to implement Article VI.

Yet this most essential element for a workable NPT has been delayed, ignored and outright breeched by Western powers for years. The Bush administration in particular has demonstrated a unique determination to ensure NPT obligations apply to everyone but the United States. This was clearly displayed in 2002 with the release of the US Nuclear Posture Review. In that document America reaffirms the ongoing role nuclear weapons will play indefinitely in her defense policy, outlines the research and development of a number of new tactical nuclear weapons such as bunker busting bombs and, for the first time, shifts the use of nuclear weapons from deterrence to first use, a radical departure in military policy which received little press attention. All of which effectively ends a US commitment to the NPT.

Moves by the United States to reduce its nuclear arsenal also need to be taken with a large grain of salt. In another little publicized but extreme shift from convention thinking on disarmament, the Bush administration has done away with the principle of irreversibility in terms of reducing its nuclear weapons stockpile. While the average person may understand disarmament to mean actually destroying your nuclear weapons, the legal eagles of the Bush administration have ruled this clause simply means putting them on standby. Under the 2002 Moscow Treaty — a key agreement the White House cites as evidence it takes its Article VI obligations seriously — the US is not required to destroy its weapons. Rather, they simply must not be “operationally deployed”, meaning a large number will be maintained in a “responsive force” capable of redeployment within weeks or months.

Furthermore, the NPT is only one of many overlapping pieces of legislation which work together to control the world’s most destructive weapons. Its main supporting pillar is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, an agreement which prohibits nuclear test explosions (or any other) and one which America has steadfastly refused to ratify for more than 10 years. The other major piece of complementary legislation is the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of any further fissile material, the fuel for nuclear weapons. Again, the conclusion of such an agreement has been stymied by Washington. In November 2004, the UN Committee on Disarmament voted in favor of a verifiable fissile materials cut-off treaty. The result was 147 in favor and one against. No prizes for guessing who opposed. Likewise, US support for the nuclear programs of Pakistan, India and Israel makes its near daily hubris against Iran ridiculously hypocritical.

The US is right to assert the NPT is under threat. International Atomic Energy Agency director general Mohamed ElBaradei summed the treaty’s main challenges as follows: “We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use … We have come to a fork in the road: either there must be a demonstrated commitment to move toward nuclear disarmament, or we should resign ourselves to the fact that other countries will pursue a more dangerous parity through proliferation.”

John Dagge is a freelance journalist based in Syria.

June 1, 2008 0 comments

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America reaps seeds it sows

by Riad Al-Khouri June 1, 2008

written by Riad Al-Khouri

Political scientists, along with other specialists as well as laypersons, have spent the last seven years grappling with the implications for international relations of the attacks of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath. The impact of 9/11 around the world, and on the Middle East in particular, has been enormous. The effects on development, democracy, and human rights are vast, with sharp change and conflict increasingly characterizing Western relations with Muslim countries. As a subset of this phenomenon, ties between the Arab world and the West also shifted.

However, although 9/11 is a turning point, there is no consensus on its roots or implications. As an antidote to the sterile contention shrouding the event, the rigorous work of Dan Tschirgi (pronounced as if combining the two French words “cher” and “guy”), professor of political science at the American University of Cairo, provides sober analysis.

Turning Point puts into a proper context the implications of 9/11. Flying in the face of the puerile shortcuts that so many in the West have taken during the past few years, Tschirgi’s book includes original insightful cases of the global challenge of asymmetric warfare. Applying his theory of “Marginalized Violent Internal Conflict” to three cases, Tschirgi elucidates the roots of insurgency through the struggles of underdogs to preserve their identities in an unfriendly world. He demonstrates the dynamics through which the oppressed in modern times struggle against tyrannical states by looking at Mexico’s Zapatista conflict, the struggle of Egypt’s authorities against the Gamaa al-Islamiyya, and the Nigerian government’s fight against the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta. In doing so, he raises many issues related to the Middle East and American policy toward the area.

Tschirgi’s thesis is that 9/11 was not unique, but an understandable — though deplorable — reaction to Arab marginalization and Western threats to regional identity. As a corollary, he debunks the “exceptionalist” approach to the Arab world (the presumption that Western social science fails to fathom the Arabs). Tschirgi also suggests two broad policy recommendations: that the US has no duty to support Israeli expansionism, and that an American withdrawal from Iraq must come as early as possible.

With a new US administration looming, we may now be looking at a post-post-9/11 era. It has become one of the clichés of the current American presidential election campaign that the economic crisis has replaced the Iraq war as a main issue. In fact, the two are indirectly related. Just as sloppy corporate governance in the banking sector caused the subprime crisis, poor governance in Washington unleashed American hubris and greed, which lead into the Iraqi swamp.

Harmony within and among societies suffers because of a resurgence of fundamentalism and its antithetical aggression, Western or otherwise. All are losers in this situation. The danger raised by the terrorist threat is as real today as it was in September 2001 and indeed before. However, the American rampage in Iraq and elsewhere around the world is equally dangerous, and indeed interacts with real or imagined threats of terrorism in a vicious circle. The solution would thus seem to lie in the re-engineering of America to allow it to regain the moral high ground it occupied during parts of the 20th century.

This is clearly a tall order; in any case, Tschirgi’s balanced scholarly work does not delve into such issues, nor does he have final answers — no serious social scientist ever has. However, he sets the stage for policymakers or laypersons to address important questions rationally: Where are the US and the Arab world going from here? Have the major challenges changed? Are new priorities emerging? In this way, Turning Point generates healthy debate about policy alternatives for other scholars to build on — and policy players to ponder: McCain, Obama, and Hillary, please take note. At a time when dabblers too often dominate the discussion of contemporary world affairs, this thoughtful work from an established American scholar with decades of experience in the complexities he analyzes is refreshing.

In this grim new world, our duty is to engage peacefully with potential or actual adversaries. Modern technology means that war and other forms of physical violence have become luxuries we can no longer afford. For example, for the US to talk to Iran or Syria, instead of blustering and vituperating, is literally a question of world war or peace. The alternative is to refuse to listen to the other side, a crime of which the Middle East is as guilty as the West. In such mess, works of the caliber of Turning Point are welcome.

Riad al Khouri is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center, and Senior Fellow of the William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan.

June 1, 2008 0 comments

GCC

Dubai’s global runway

by Executive Staff May 28, 2008

written by Executive Staff

In a bid to become the aviation capital of the world, Dubai is investing more than $13 billion in civil aviation and aerospace industry projects as part of a master plan that extends to 2050. Neighboring emirate Abu Dhabi is also moving to get in on the booming aviation sector, with plans to spend up to $50 billion, but with such lofty ambitions there are always additional problems, such as a serious shortage of pilots.

Dubai International Airport (DXB), the tenth busiest in the world in 2006 according to Airports Council International, is spending $4.5 billion on terminals and other facilities that will triple capacity by 2009 to 75 million, while the $33 billion Dubai World Central (DWC) will be centered around the world’s largest airport and cargo hub.

This heavy investment comes as the MENA region is set for the largest aviation growth globally between 2008-11, almost 40% higher than the world average, according to the International Air Transport Association (IATA). The region’s sector was also the fastest-growing in the world in terms of passenger movement in 2007, with a 18.6% growth rate, compared to 5% in Europe’s and the US’ 3% according to the Abu Dhabi Airport Company.

Spurring on Dubai’s decision two years ago to build the DWC, are rising passenger numbers, with 34.3 million at the DXB in 2007, up 19.3% on 2006 and the sixth consecutive year of growth above 15%.

Cargo has likewise spiked at Dubai Cargo Village, the freight facility for the DXB, handling 1.66 million tons in 2007, up 10.96% on 2006. Growth is attributed to the United Arab Emirate’s surging population, up 75% in a decade to 5.6 million, the 6.45 million tourists that visited Dubai last year — according to the Dubai Department of Civil Aviation — as well as the emirate’s growing position as a transport hub for the Gulf.

The DXB is extending Terminal 2 by 37,000 square feet to allow the terminal to handle 700 flights per week, of which 320 will be cargo. Terminal 3 is also under construction — several months behind schedule due to a shortage of raw materials — and is being laid out underground, some 20 meters below the apron and taxiways. Exclusively for Emirates Airlines, Terminal 3 will significantly ease congestion, with the DXB handling nearly a third more than its original capacity of 22 million passengers.

Fields upon fields of development

An estimated $33 billion is earmarked for infrastructure costs alone on the 140 square-kilometer DWC, a multi-phase development financed by the Dubai government, which incorporates the Al Maktoum International Airport (MIA), Dubai Logistics City, DWC Residential City, DWC Commercial City, DWC Aviation City and the DWC Golf City.

“It is geography that makes this vision possible with huge land availability in a prime location,” said Sheikh Ahmed Bin Saeed Al Maktoum, Chairman of Dubai City of Aviation Corporation-DWC. “The long-term benefits of DWC to the UAE, GCC countries and the wider region are phenomenal and will place this emirate firmly in ‘pole position’ for regional logistics, tourism and commerce.”

Neighboring Abu Dhabi, however, intends to spend $40-$50 billion for the building of new airports, according to the Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation, and turn Abu Dhabi’s second international airport, Al Ain, into a hub for aviation and cargo. The plan will also slot into Abu Dhabi’s recent announcement to build a new Capital District to consolidate the emirate’s position as the administrative capital of the UAE.

As in the case with Dubai, the decision to invest so heavily in aviation is being motivated by strong growth, with Abu Dhabi’s Etihad Airways posting a 40% increase in passengers during the first quarter this year, from 1 million to 1.4 million compared to first quarter last year, while cargo traffic was also up by 20%. The Abu Dhabi International Airport (ADIA) saw a spike in passengers as well, up 33% this year over last, with aircraft activity rising 16.9% over the same period.

To cater to rising demand, the ADIA has embarked on a $6.8 billion expansion plan. The airport is currently investing $272 million to add five million more passengers to the terminal’s capacity, bringing total capacity to 12 million, and increasing cargo capacity to 500,000 tons by the end of 2008.

Building the worlds biggest airport

At Dubai World Central, some 15,000 workers toil away in the heat of the desert sun on 18 construction projects, a number set to increase over the next three years as some 40 tenders are awarded.

“Of the 30 tenders already awarded, 20 have been specifically for the airport’s infrastructure and the rest spread over DWC’s real estate and logistics components,” explained Abdulla Al Falasi, DWC’s Marketing and Corporate Communications Director.

Some $8.1 billion is to be spent on the MIA in Jebel Ali to become the world’s largest international airport with a designed capacity for 120 to 150 million passengers per year and able to handle over 12 million tons of cargo annually.

The airport is to cover 68 square-kilometers with six parallel runways and as many concourses. Work is already completed on the first CAT-III runway, which will be able to handle the new jumbo Airbus A380.

The MIA will have two mega-terminals, the first for airlines within the Emirates Group, the second for regional and international carriers, while a third terminal is earmarked for low-cost charter airlines. The third passenger terminal building, a 75,000 square meter single level terminal, is designed to cater to seven million passengers per year, and is being built through a joint venture between the UAE’s Arabtec and Germany’s Max Bogl. The final design of the mega-terminals is to be announced at the end of 2008, said Khalifa Al Zaffin, DWC’s Executive Chairman. An Executive Jet Centre will also be built.

The MIA is to be linked to the DXB by an express rail system, and eventually linked to the Dubai Metro when it is completed. Not satisfied with having, likely, the region’s biggest car park, with some 100,000 spaces, the MIA’s $39 million air traffic control tower will be the region’s tallest freestanding control tower at 92 meters.

Aviation all in one place

A central feature of the DWC will be the $1.36 billion Aviation City — covering 6.7 square kilometers — the aim of which, said Al Zaffin, is to merge all the various aviation related business within one centralized location. Individual developers will also be allowed to develop their own hangers and facilities within a free zone on a long-term leasing basis, with air and land access to the MIA.

Al Zaffin said that the facility would host all aviation manufacturing, maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) services, aviation support services, design and consultancy, research and development, product and parts, light manufacturing units and high-technology industries. The MRO, said Al Zaffin, will be able to service up to 100 aircraft, a figure set to rise as the multi-phase development expands through to 2050.

On-demand flight support company Palm Aviation has plans in the works to build the project’s first fixed-base operation (FBO) ground handling facility, which is to cover 80,000 square feet and is estimated to come in at a cost of $10.8 million.

To meet the Gulf’s surging imports, worth an estimated $320 billion in 2007 according to the Dubai Logistics City (DLC), the DWC will be able to handle up to 12 million tons of cargo a year.

The 21.5 square-kilometer DLC is being developed as an integrated multi-modal logistics platform with all transportation modes, logistics and value-added services, such as product manufacturing and assembly in a single-bonded free zone environment made up of the DLC, DWC-MIA and the Jebel Ali port. Sea-to-air times for transport of goods at the DWC are expected to be three to four hours as opposed to the current one to three days.

The Aviation City will also feature a heliport zone with 17 helipads in addition to fuel, lighting and hangar facilities. An academic zone will host several aviation colleges and training centers for aerospace and academic studies.

The need for such institutions has become particularly pressing following a recent report by global management consultancy A.T. Kearney which said the GCC faced a ‘serious shortage’ of pilots to cater to surging demand, with passenger traffic up 18.1% last year. The report said that with GCC passenger traffic expected to grow 8% between 2007 and 2015 — higher than the global average of 5% — the number of pilots required by the UAE’s five airlines alone would spike by 75% by 2020.

Build it and they may come, but an adequate number of pilots will be integral to getting them all there and helping to realize the success of the Gulf’s futuristic aviation metropolises, though the tens of thousands of people already involved in turning these lofty ambitions into reality.

May 28, 2008 0 comments

Levant

Ads that don’t add

by Executive Staff May 28, 2008

written by Executive Staff

The only way is up, or so it seems, for the Jordanian advertisement sector, which recorded stunning double digit growth figures over the past decade. A recent media survey, however, produced some uneasy literature for advertisers, ad agencies and media representatives alike, as readership ratios hardly match the way advertisement budgets are spent.

According to research firm Ipsos, total advertisement expenditure based on official rack rates increased by some 30% in 2007 to amount to $280 million. Since 2000, total ad spending grew by no less than 260%, making it one of the kingdom’s fastest growing industries. Still, Jordanian advertisement represents but 3% of the regional market, whereby it should be noted that all Ipsos figures are based on

official rack rates. In reality, ad spend could be more than 30% lower.

Jordan’s big spenders are the same as elsewhere, with the 30% increase in 2007 mainly fuelled by the re-branding campaigns of the Arab Bank and telecom firms Zain and Orange. Home to four national operators, the Jordan telecom sector remained the country’s biggest advertiser with some 20% of the market, followed by banking (12%), leisure and entertainment (12%), general services (11%) and real estate (8%).

While most countries spend the lion’s share of their budget on TV commercials, nearly 80% of Jordanian advertisement spending is in the country’s newspapers. The remaining 20% is divided, more or less equally, between television, magazines, radio and outdoors. The main reason television scores so badly is the fact Jordan has but one national broadcaster, state-owned Jordan TV, which is hardly watched.

Still, seeing the overwhelming amount of ads in Jordan’s print media, the Jordan Media Survey (JMS) managed to raise some eyebrows, to say the least. Conducted by the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX) in late 2007, the survey did over 3,000 face-to-face interviews during a period of two weeks and found that only 57.9% of respondents had “read or flipped through” a newspaper during the previous month, while less than one third of people polled had read a weekly, and just 13.5% had opened a monthly.

Read your news today?

Funded by a $5 million USAID grant, IREX’ aim is to strengthen media independence in the kingdom. The aim of the survey was to help media outlets come to a better understanding of the market. Not surprisingly, it appeared that 30% of interviewees had read Al Rai, Jordan’s leading newspaper with a daily circulation of some 100,000 copies, followed by Al Ghad (15.2%), Al Dustour (12.9%) and Al Yawm (5%). On the question if they had read a newspaper “yesterday,” only 18.5% of interviewees responded positively.

The situation was not much better for weeklies and monthlies. From the some 30% of people who had read or flipped through a weekly, 21% responded that they had opened a free classified publication. The dozens of other, relatively small weeklies, divided the remaining 9% with readership percentages never exceeding 3%.

The leading monthly magazines were Arabic-language women’s magazines. Among the English language magazines, Jordan Business and Jo scored highest with 3.5% of respondents affirming they had read or flipped through the publication during the previous month. All other publications on the list scored well below 1%.

Two positive points need to be made. First, while the readership of newspapers was significantly lower than expected, a remarkable 80% to 90% of respondents said they have read a daily on the Internet, yet so far the worldwide web in Jordan hardly attracts any advertisement. Second, a separate poll among “opinion leaders,” concluded that 92% had read a newspaper during the previous month and 58% the previous day.

Without a doubt, the survey’s big winner was radio, as no less than 57% respondents replied they had listened to a channel during the previous 7 days, while 46% tuned in during the previous day. Radio has blossomed in Jordan since 2002, when the Audiovisual Media Law largely liberalized the air waves.

While before 2002, Jordan’s citizens could only listen to Radio Jordan in either Arabic or English, today there are over 25 channels. According to the JMS, Fann FM proved the most popular with a listenership of 32.3%, followed by Quran FM (20.6%), Rotana FM (15%), Jor FM (14.4%), Jor AM (11.3%) and Mazaj FM (7.6%).

More than they’re due?

“Print media has a penetration rate of but 42.8% for dailies, and much less for weeklies and monthlies, yet it receives more than 80% of the country’s ad expenditure,” said IREX’ Samuel Compton. “Radio has a penetration rate of 56.9%, yet receives but 8% of total ad spend.”

Seeing the success of Jordanian radio, one wonders why the Jordanian government has failed to allow for a private TV channel to compete with the country’s state-owned dinosaur JTV. It would no doubt be welcomed by viewers and advertisers alike, as an advertisement campaign ideally makes use of all media outlets. While print media the world over are confronted with shrinking budgets, Jordan’s own may hope that the status quo prevails, as long as they receive the lion share of ad spend.

May 28, 2008 0 comments

Levant

Dawn of the new Amman

by Executive Staff May 28, 2008

written by Executive Staff

With the exception of the city’s numerous minarets and a giant flag, Amman has always been a predominantly horizontal city. But this is about to change, since the Greater Amman Municipality (GAM) adopted an ambitious master plan in 2007 that allows for the construction of towers up to 200 meters tall. As urbanists, architects and property developers rub their hands to construct the future Amman skyline, critics wonder how the city’s infrastructure will cope, while Jordanian MPs in April raised questions regarding the way multi-billion dollar contracts are concluded in the kingdom. Last but not least, there is water or, more precisely, the lack of it.

From the hill-top remains of a Roman temple, Amman looks a bit like a giant beehive spread out over the rolling hills, a concrete sprawl of three and four-storey buildings. From here, one can perhaps understand the Jordanian capitals’ reputation for being dull and ugly. To most visitors it is but stopover. The city’s reputation however, no longer matches reality.

Gentrification of a capital

In recent years, a number of cafés, restaurants and clubs have opened, while malls and supermarkets offer the latest in food and fashion. In an attempt to beautify the city, the GAM has largely banned billboards, planted trees and made the city more pedestrian friendly. More importantly, from an urbanist point of view, Amman is simply fascinating, as it is one of the fastest growing cities in the region.

While in the early 1920s the city hosted some 25,000 people, today over 2 million live in Amman, which is expected to increase to some 6.4 million by 2025. In terms of size, by that date the Jordanian capital is to grow from today’s 700 square kilometers to some 1700 sq km. To streamline this massive growth, Jordan’s King Abdullah II in 2006 asked Amman mayor Omar Maani to formulate the urban master plan, which was presented in phases throughout 2007.

“We can’t afford to continue our current development trend because it will lead to unprecedented urban sprawl that will exacerbate our transportation problems and eat up some of Jordan’s most productive agricultural lands,” said Maani when presenting the masterplan’s first phase designating four areas of High Density Mixed Use (HDMU).

These four areas are the future Central Business District of Abdali, the Central Parkway between Jabal Abdun and Jabal Amman, as well as two areas located close to the city’s northern and southern gateways. For each cluster, a strict number of low, medium, high rise and landmark towers has been determined, each with exact measurements to preserve the city’s “view corridors.”

In February 2008 Dubai World’s property developing arm Limitless announced that it is to build two 200 meter-high residential towers at the Central Parkway. With a price tag of $300 million, the landmark twins will add some 600 luxury apartments to Amman’s housing market, which has recorded an unprecedented growth. Over the past four years, real estate trading increased by nearly 150%.

One of the main reasons for this growth is the fact that, since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Jordan absorbed a wave of Iraqi refugees, many of whom are quite well off. The sudden increase in demand for housing saw property prices soar, particularly in the more affluent western part of the capital. Experts estimate that prices in West Amman increased by some 300-400%. Furthermore, there is a growing demand for modern office space, especially from foreign organizations operating in Iraq. Add to that normal market drivers, such as a 2.3% population growth rate and a growing economy, and it should not come as a surprise that Arab nationals increasingly invest in Jordan.

“Jordan’s fast-growing economy, changing real estate requirements, convenient location and stability make it a firm favorite in our list of markets,” Limitless CEO Saeed Ahmed Saeed explained. “Limitless Towers is the first of several distinctive, sustainable projects currently being assessed by our Jordan team.”

The Dubai company is not alone. Billions of dollars are being poured into the kingdom, with Amman seeing most of the action, followed by Aqaba and the Dead Sea. Thus, the Gulf Finance House has invested some $1.5 billion in three projects, including the Amman Gate towers, while Emaar is building a handful of luxury resorts popping up along the Dead Sea. In Aqaba, the $1 billion Saraya Aqaba project and the $1.5 billion Ayla Oasis are under construction, while in April 2008 Abu Dhabi-based property developer Al Maabar signed a $5 billion contract to relocate Aqaba port and develop a new city center.

Other real estate firms have targeted the enormous market for low- and middle-class housing. Tameer International is constructing a city of some 16,000 units in Zarqa. Last but not least, there is the $1.5 billion Abdali Urban Regeneration in the heart of Amman, one of the city’s four areas designated for high rise buildings.

Heart of the city

Today, between Shmeisani and downtown Amman, the area has been fenced off as the foundations are laid for what is set to become the new heart of the city. The project is an initiative of Abdali Investment and Development (AID), the main shareholders in which are Oger Jordan, part of the Hariri group, and the National Investment and Development Corporation (Mawared), the property development arm of the Jordanian armed forces.

Much like the role Solidere played in the reconstruction of downtown Beirut, AID has developed the Abdali master plan and is responsible for the construction and exploitation of the project’s main artery, a 320-meter-long shopping boulevard. The remaining 75% of the project, with a total built-up area of one million square meters, has been sold to private developers, such as Damac and the Capital Bank of Jordan, which is to construct its 220-meter-high headquarters there.

After the initial presentation of the four hubs, the GAM later presented the remaining chapters of the masterplan, dealing with the improvement of the city’s main access roads and corridors, the preservation of rural areas and continued development of industrial sites, among other projects. As Jordan’s population is to more than triple, the GAM estimates one million extra jobs are needed, about a third of which is to be provided by industry.

Finally, in December 2007 the municipality presented the long-awaited plans for the largely vacant lands along the Airport Road, one of Amman’s most prospective areas and the subject of intense speculation. Contrary to what many had expected, the road will not be home to major highrises, but to a mix of land use. Seeing the close proximity of the airport, as well as several universities, the GAM hopes to attract smart business and research centers, while preserving the existing forest and (some) agricultural lands.

The Amman master plan is a balanced blueprint for future growth and was overall well-received. However, one often-heard concern is that the strategic decision “to go vertical,” will lead to a congestion of the capital’s infrastructure. So far, Amman has been largely spared from the daily traffic jams all too familiar in most Arab cities. The city is largely blessed with multi-lane roads and modern traffic regulation systems, yet the first signs of congestion are starting to become apparent.

“We have been closely collaborating with the GAM to ensure that sound traffic solutions are implemented, especially since the new downtown Amman will be a high density area with over 90,000 people residing, commuting and visiting on a daily basis,” said AID Marketing Director Luna Madi. “Therefore, we have incorporated parking facilities which will hold over 25,000 vehicles. In addition, the inroads were especially designed to calibrate offsite traffic flow and check overall congestion.”

According to Amman Mayor Maani, the year 2008 is all about transport. “Money tends to park itself in buildings these days, but we believe that is insufficient for sustainable growth,” he said. “Other factors must be taken into consideration, such as livability, infrastructure and public transport. There are currently some 750,000 cars in the GAM area. So, providing decent public transport is very important, as well as promoting pedestrian-friendly areas.”

Privatizing development

The privatization Amman’s formerly state-owned bus company and the arrival of over 100 new busses was a first step in improving public transport. Meanwhile, the GAM started construction of the 120-km long Amman ring road, which aims to decrease traffic flows within the city, while in June 2008 construction will start of a $250 million light rail connection between Amman and the neighboring city of Zarqa, home to many who commute to the capital on a daily basis.

According to Maani, the light rail is to halve commuter traffic between the two cities and will be extended to the airport and other parts of Amman if proven a success. The mayor caused some controversy when in mid-April he announced plans to sell 55 hectares in the heart of the capital to the Lebanese billionaire and former Prime Minister Najib Mikati for $1.5 billion. Mikati is to build a complex of government buildings, which then will be leased to the state. This proposal, and especially the $5 billion port deal with Al Maabar in Aqaba, provoked Jordanian MPs to raise a number of critical questions.

“The problem is the lack of transparency. Such contracts are required to be made public,” said senator and former Prime Minister Taher Masri. “The government must explain the circumstances of these investments, which happen in the dark. The Jordanian people might not feel the positive effects of privatization plans which will only benefit a small group of the rich.”

“Past experiences in Jordan have unfortunately proved that secret deals were designed to hide paid commission,” political analyst Fahd Khitan told AFP, criticizing the under-the-table agreements reached without the knowledge of the council of ministers. “Negotiations on privatization plans, including tenders, should be subject to public debate, particularly projects that are related to national or historical values.”

However, a lack of transparency regarding multi-billion investments and privatizations schemes is not Jordan’s only worry. On the long term, a much more frightening scenario could disrupt the kingdom and Amman’s sustainable growth: a drastic lack of water. Already one of the water-poorest countries on earth, by 2025 Jordan may be able to offer the perfect home to its citizens and tourists alike, yet arguably not a weekly shower.

Admittedly, the government has made a head start in saving and reusing water while Amman’s ageing network is under repair. However, seeing the fact that the city’s 2 million inhabitants already need to ration water use to make it to next week’s delivery, more drastic measures will be required to accommodate a city of over 6 million people.

Generally, government points at two solutions: the Diseh pipeline and the Red-Dead Canal. Diseh, a natural aquifer, has water, yet it is a non-renewable source near Wadi Rum in Jordan’s deep South. Inexplicably, it is today used for agriculture, while at the same time fueling Aqaba’s rapid expansion.

Critics wonder, therefore, just for how long a $750 million pipeline from this non-renewable source could benefit Amman. The $3 billion Red Dead Canal, combined with a desalinization facility, could be a way to help Jordan quench its thirst and save the Dead Sea from completely evaporating. One thing is certain however: the next Amman urban master plan will have to deal with water as an integral part of the city’s infrastructure.

May 28, 2008 0 comments