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GCC

The French Connection

by Executive Staff February 27, 2008
written by Executive Staff

When the American and French presidents visited the Gulf last month, both leaders received the same red-carpet treatment. Both met with their regional counterparts, both talked about politics and security, the need for finding peaceful solutions to the various crises troubling the Middle East and both called for stronger engagement and deeper ties between the two regions, their peoples and their economies.

But when it came to the business aspect of their respective visits, the differences could not have been greater.

As the main course, George W. Bush brought with him parts of a $20 billion arms deal with some GCC countries that had been announced in 2007. Saudi Arabia is to receive 900 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) satellite-guided bomb kits worth $123 million, Kuwait and the UAE will acquire Patriot missiles worth $1.63 billion and $1.9 billion respectively, and the US will share its Littoral Combat System technology with the GCC. Together with other, unspecified packages it all adds up to $11.5 billion or slightly over half of the whole arms deal.

This arms sale is just a parcel of current US military contracts with Middle Eastern governments. Just days before Bush’s tour of the Gulf, the Libyan foreign minister, Abd al-Rahman Shalgam, was given a personal tour of the White House, meetings on Capitol Hill and a luncheon with Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Occidental Petroleum and Raytheon, in a bid to convince his government to buy American hardware for the Libyan armed forces. This should increase the US-Libya trade volume from its 2006 level of $3 billion, 80% of which were oil exports to the US.

The only non-arms, private sector contract that was timed to coincide with Bush’s visit happened when indebted Gulf Air (solely owned by Bahrain since 2005), signed a $6 billion deal with Boeing for delivery of 16 Boeing 787 Dreamliners to begin in 2016. The deal also included an option for eight more planes as part of the airline’s plans to renew its current fleet of 25 aging aircraft and to grow to 45-50 planes by 2013. However, the airline is also in talks with Airbus to buy planes and thus Boeing will have to work hard to turn that option into a second sale.

Still, the Dubai-based American Business Group (ABG) is optimistic about US-Gulf economic ties, and especially about energy projects in the UAE. They are also excited about Emirati investments in the US, with hopes of bolstering the real estate sector after the sub-prime crisis. In 2007 the US-UAE Business Council, co-chaired by Joseph E. Robert Jr., chairman and CEO of JE Robert Companies, and Khaldoun al-Mubarak, CEO of Mubadala Development Company, was established in Washington, D.C. and is to become the main lobbying group to “resolve any misunderstandings regarding investments from the UAE,” according to Elias B. Sayah, vice-president of ABG.

Bush’s visit closes down Dubai

However, not everything went smoothly for Bush during his visit. After the American president’s remarks that $100 per barrel of oil is too high, the price did drop to $90 pb — mainly because of speculation that the US is going into a recession, but Gulf producers reacted coolly to, or even ignored, his demands that they increase production to lower oil prices permanently.

In the end, the big story during the American president’s visit to Dubai was not about business deals, or even politics, but about the emirate’s losses from the security measures put in place during Bush’s stay in Dubai that are said to have amounted to more than $118 million. And since the measures were done as an emergency shutdown, with businesses having had little to no time to prepare, lost opportunities add to that figure. DIFC and DIFX were closed, in addition to most businesses, except for neighborhood stores and restaurants.

Some analysts think that the long-term opportunities brought by the US president’s visit may outweigh the short-term losses, but in the short-term a lot of businessmen were very unhappy.

In contrast, Nicolas Sarkozy’s tour was a business tour par excellence. While his criticism of the high oil price — he said that “the realistic price for oil should be $70” — also did not result in any immediate policy shift of the Gulf producers, the answer he received — Qatar’s energy minister, Abdullah Bin Hamad al-Attiyah, responded to him by calling the $100 price a “fleeting development caused by the global market” — was a much more diplomatic response than the one his American counterpart got, and it exemplified Sarkozy’s reception and his visit as a whole.

On his first stop, in Saudi Arabia, he pushed for French companies to get a share of the kingdom’s $500 billion non-defense budget, especially in the energy, transport, and water distribution sectors. He also discussed $58.4 billion worth of contracts, among them a $15 billion security contract on monitoring KSA borders (previously known as MIKSA and now called “Saudi Border Guard Development Project”), $14.6 billion in railway and $2.25 billion in aviation contracts, as well as $9 billion worth of water and electricity contracts. The main companies to benefit are Alstom, Bouygues, EADS, Vinci, Veolia, Accor, Carrefour, Thales, Eurocopter, and Dassault Aviation. Among the projects under discussion are a high-speed rail link between Mecca and Madinah and a railway between Riyadh and Jiddah, the expansion of the French-built Jiddah airport, and an upgrade of the Saudi Airlines’ fleet. Saudi Airlines already concluded a deal in December 2007 with Airbus for twenty-two A320 aircraft, its first order with Airbus in two decades and at the Paris Air Show in June 2007, National Air Service (NAS) signed a deal for twenty A320s with an option for 18 more. Accor Hotels announced that it will be the first French hotel group to open in Makkah and Madinah and Total and Saudi Aramco join in a $13 billion project to build a 400,000 bpd heavy crude refinery in Jubayl.

In Qatar, the French president focused on energy, resulting in memoranda of understanding on cooperation on traditional energies and on nuclear/renewable energies and the announcement of major deals. Electricité de France (EDF) will cooperate on nuclear, solar and wind power for an initial feasibility study and Gaz de France (GDF), about to merge with Franco-Belgian Suez, signed deals with Qatar Petroleum International, the investment arm of Qatar Petroleum on international cooperation, whereby GDF will use Qatar as a focal point in Gulf.

French nuclear power contracts

Areva Transmission & Distribution, part of the world’s biggest producer of nuclear reactors, signed a $695 million electricity engineering project with Qatar’s Kahrama (Qatar General Electricity & Water Corporation) to supply 14 turnkey gas-insulated substations to develop and improve the electrical grid in the Doha region. These should be delivered in the first quarter of 2010. A second contract was also inked on technology in order to upgrade the National Control Center built by Areva in the late 1990s. Further accords, worth up to $9.3 billion were discussed but not specified.

By the time Nicolas Sarkozy made it to the UAE, the words “nuclear energy” had become the leitmotif of his trip. Having already offered French help in developing a civilian nuclear power industry in Saudi Arabia and including nuclear power in the French-Qatari feasibility study, before he touched down in Dubai rumors had been floated about a nuclear deal with the UAE. The ensuing results were not a disappointment.

In France’s third nuclear accord with an Arab country, after having signed the two others with Libya and Algeria, Areva, Suez and Total will possibly build two 1,600 MW EPR (European Pressurized Reactor) nuclear reactors and provide fuel-cycle products and services, Areva’s main product. Of course, the necessary groundwork — security, training and operational expertise — could take years. The current plan is to build the reactors by 2025. According to the agreement, Suez will hold equal shares with Total in the construction and operating consortium, at least 50% of which will be held by the Abu Dhabi Water & Electricity Authority (ADWEA). Total and Suez are already partners in the UAE’s Taweelah gas-fired power and desalination plant. The complete accord, including the training of local engineers in France and construction and other contracts bid for by French companies, could amount to up to $6 billion. As analysts have noted, this agreement could even provide the basis for a future nuclear accord with Iran, whereby nuclear material for Iranian nuclear power plants is enriched in the UAE under third-party supervision.

Concomitantly with the French president’s visit to the Emirates, Al-Yah Satellite Communications Company (Yahsat), a subsidiary of Mubadala Development Company, signed a letter of intent with Arianespace to launch the Yahsat 1A communications satellite, the UAE’s first satellite that is manufactured by EADS, Astrium and Thales Alenia Space. The satellite is due to be launched in the second half of 2010 from the Guiana Space Center — Europe’s spaceport — on an Ariane 5 rocket.

After laying the foundation stone of Paris-Sorbonne University Abu Dhabi, the first branch of the university outside France, built by Mubadala Development Company, Nicolas Sarkozy signed a defense cooperation agreement, following a 1995 defense accord, on the establishment of a permanent French military base in the UAE. On an invitation from the UAE, France will station 400 to 500 navy, army and air force personnel in the base. According to French sources, it is to have “a significant intelligence aspect” and will also serve as a maintenance station for French ships. An agreement on setting up a branch of the French military academy St. Cyr in Qatar, right next to the biggest US base in the region and coming on the heels of the France-KSA joint exercise accord, rounded up the French president’s checklist.

With this visit, part and parcel of Sarkozy’s activist foreign policy, the Gulf states are signaling a diversification, not only in matters of defense and security, but also in terms of energy policy and business. And France is on a path to move beyond its traditional regional spheres of interest — the Maghreb and Lebanon. The cultural/educational initiatives of the last years — bringing the Louvre to Abu Dhabi and dependencies of French universities to various Gulf countries — were only harbingers of a grander move by French companies and businessmen. The anecdotes about an increase of French-speakers in the lobbies of Dubai’s hotels and Abu Dhabi’s restaurants seem to confirm that perception. And the era of the Gulf as an anglosphere just may be over.

February 27, 2008 0 comments
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GCC

Probate headaches

by Executive Staff February 27, 2008
written by Executive Staff

In a country where East meets West and modernism mixes with tradition, a permanent dialogue between cultures has been established, increasingly blurring legal boundaries for business owners. Today, the United Arab Emirates seem to be oscillating between Islamic shari’a and Western jurisprudence, with a business often left in a haze upon the death of one of its owners. Executive talked to lawyers and specialists to help make sense of the UAE inheritance system.

In the UAE, the transfer of legal ownership of a deceased’s assets to his heirs is built primarily on Islamic law, based on religious texts, mainly the Qur’an and the Sunna. Far from being a codified law, shari’a is subject to various interpretations and is often the source of much controversy. While shari’a is applied to UAE nationals, the UAE Civil Code also rules that, “inheritance shall be governed by the law prevailing in the country of the deceased at the time of his death, in a reference to the large expatriate community established all over the United Arab Emirates,” according to Elias Hanna from Al-Quari, Hanna, Harfouch and Boulos, a legal firm.

New probate law for foreigners

In 2005, a new law was introduced, providing residents with the option to choose between the law of their home country or the national laws of the UAE regarding matters such as divorce and custody of minors. “This has led to much debate within the profession, but we still ignore the full repercussions of the law in matters of inheritance, and whether it will be contested or not by concerned parties,” explained Hanna.

Within this particular framework, lawyers advise foreign clients inheriting a business or personal property in the UAE to obtain from their home countries a probate to settle the estate of a deceased person and distribute it accordingly, which will be executed by UAE courts. “This solution is much simpler than going through the actual process of proving and applying foreign law in local courts. This option is also ideal for Lebanese, Turkish or Moroccan Muslim nationals who can revert to the law of their country of origin,” Hanna added. The process includes an application for representation to be filled in the deceased person’s country of domicile. Once the probate is obtained, it will be notarized and legalized before it is recognized and validated by UAE authorities, who will grant trustees the power to administer the deceased’s estate.

For Muslims, however, estates are always ruled by shari’a, which rules that any assets owned by the deceased, such as money, property, stocks, shares, bonds or jewelry, will be included in the estate. Pensions, however, are excluded from an inheritance, while debts and mortgages are always settled in full before any heirs may claim their share. Every Muslim is also allowed to donate one-third of his possessions to charitable causes, while the other two-thirds are earmarked for its rightful descendants as recognized by shari’a.

Other exceptions are also mentioned in UAE laws such as Article 17-5 in relation to real estate property. The text states that: “The law of the UAE shall apply to wills made by aliens disposing of their real property located in the State.” Hanna explained, “When real estate property is included in an estate, heirs have to submit a copy of the UAE court verdict to the developer for obtaining a change in ownership. Nonetheless, this can only be applied to property purchased in freehold projects, which allow for foreign ownership. Foreigners married to Muslim nationals can only inherit property located in such projects.”

In the UAE, only citizens or GCC nationals are allowed to own immovable property. However, recent developments with respect to foreign ownership of land in Dubai have altered this position. In 2003, the emirate’s ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, created 100% freehold ownership projects, made available to all nationalities.

As Karim Ghandour, managing director of Money Line, explains, regardless of the legal framework, the death of a shareholder holds three serious consequences for businesses: (1) the personal repercussions the death of a shareholder may have on the owning family, (2) the financial costs that dovetail such an occurrence, and (3) time-consuming administrative paperwork. When a family is involved, death of one of the shareholders weights heavily on a company and may often cause its demise when an amiable distribution of the deceased estate is impossible to achieve. As he pointed out, “It is a time bomb slowly ticking away,” adding, “The administrative costs incurred can also be massive. As an example, a widow of one of our foreign clients who owned a training company in Knowledge Village, had to allocate as much of her late husband’s company capital to insure ownership transfer.”

Foreign ownership structure

According to the specialists, most companies with foreign ownership in the UAE are structured following a simple 49/51 rule, whereby 49% of the company’s shares are owned by an expatriate while 51% are “owned” by a local partner. Two contracts consolidate the partnership: a power of attorney that grants full voting rights and managerial power to the foreign shareholder, and a loan agreement whereby the expatriate “lends” an amount of the capital’s money to the local, which “allows” him to set up the company. In this particular structure, two scenarios may take place depending on which shareholder — the foreign or local partner — will first pass away. In the first case, the power of attorney ends with the death of the foreign associate and his or her heirs have no other choice but to wait until completion of the estate’s probate. In the second case, when death of the local partner is somewhat expected, the foreign partner may be able to transfer the power of attorney to another local partner. “However, when death comes unexpectedly, the foreign associate has no other choice but to wait for the estate’s probate, which is always a lengthy process and has no quick solution,” said Ghandour.

Hanna advises business owners to set up an offshore company which will own 49% of the UAE company and will help circumvent the first scenario. “Perpetuity is one of the advantages offered by attributing ownership of a local company to an offshore mother company. In this case, the death of the foreign associate will not impact the company and its daily operations. In the UAE, offshore companies are also allowed to own property purchased in freehold projects such as ones developed by Emaar and Nakheel.” Ghandour concurred on the many advantages of owning an offshore company, which falls naturally under the jurisdiction of the country where the company has been established.

“Our advice to business owners is to establish an offshore company that will own UAE local operations, thus insuring perpetuity of the structure. This is one of our industry’s golden rules,” he said. The specialist also recommends taking the process one step further by creating a trust fund, which, in addition to safeguarding contracts underlying the company structure such as the power of attorney, the partnership and the loan agreement will also put an end to the question of asset distribution in case of death. “Well structured trust funds are bullet proof.”

February 27, 2008 0 comments
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GCC

Looks good on paper

by Executive Staff February 27, 2008
written by Executive Staff

There were no celebrations, media coverage was minimal, and border crossings weren’t noticeably busier than any other New Year’s Day. But there is a flag, there are plans for a common currency, and there is certainly much ambiguity in the air about the launch of the Gulf Cooperation Council Common Market, which, for the lack of an official abbreviation, will be referred to as the Gulf Common Market (GCM).

The GCM came into effect on January 1, 2008, after 27 years in the pipeline, with the lofty aim of becoming the region’s equivalent to the European Union. At present the common market resembles the European Economic Community (EEC), the forerunner of the EU, or for that matter other regional blocs, such as the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Union of South American Nations (Unasul).

The GCM has a structure, a secretariat, a Supreme Council, and free trade, but like other regional blocs the goal of greater economic and political unification appears to be years away despite this year’s development.

Indeed, since the establishment in 1981 of the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States, to use its official title, the regional body has to a large degree failed in its objectives, which, much like the EEC, were initially not about economic unification but rather to act as a forum for conflict prevention. After all, the body was established following a proposal by Saudi Arabia for an internal security pact among the Gulf monarchies after the Iranian Revolution in early 1979 and the Mecca rebellion later that year, and given further impetus after the Iran-Iraq war erupted in 1980.

The objectives of the council were to coordinate internal security, procurement of arms and national economies of member states, and to settle border disputes under the leadership of the Supreme Council. Yet despite the creation of a Saudi-led Rapid Deployment Force in 1984, the GCC could not broker a ceasefire between Baghdad and Tehran, and failed to present a united front in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Even a committee to facilitate talks between Iran and the UAE over Iranian military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz in 1999 came to nothing.

However, this time the GCC’s objectives deal with economics and the free movement of people, aims the region has been moving towards following a customs union agreement in 2003, a condition set by the EU for a FTA between the two blocs. For the GCM that means GCC citizens are now able to: live in any of the GCC countries as well as work in either the private or public sectors; buy and sell real estate; freely move capital; access preferential taxation details; own stock and form corporations in any member state; and access education, health and social services.

This is all very commendable, and the GCM certainly has a lot going for it, with a population of 35.1 million people, a combined economy of $715 billion, and an estimated 484 billion barrels of oil, more than half of the oil reserves of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Furthermore, with booming economies on the back of high oil prices, in addition to massive government surpluses, the GCM has real potential to succeed, at least on paper. But as analysts and businessmen point out, there is a great deal of difference between rhetoric and the facts on the ground.

“The GCM is supposed to create more business, more movement, but so many things have to be leveled and if not enough awareness is created, will not leverage the benefits of a common market,” said Dr. Fadi Makki, senior associate with Booz Allen Hamilton.

Time to unite

The biggest stumbling block of the GCM was evident at the very meeting that decided on the market’s launch this year. The annual GCC summit in Doha, in December 2007, failed to provide any leadership on the challenges the Gulf is facing, namely a decline in currency values and rising inflation. For the GCC, Qatar and Dubai in particular, these dual issues are of major importance, making the region less competitive in attracting skilled foreign labor. Equally, the depreciation in the dollar has had an impact on unskilled workers, with laborers striking last year in the UAE over the greenback’s slump (two years ago the Indian Rupee was valued at 44 to the dollar, compared to the current 39 Rps).

What the summit did achieve was a controversial proposal, by Bahrain, for a six-year residency cap on unskilled expatriate workers, and a focus on rapprochement with Iran. Indeed, Iran attended the summit for the first time, a significant indicator of the current, and future, importance of solid relations between Tehran and its southern neighbors. Equally, with the Bush administration still keeping pressure on Tehran — the use of force, we are told, is still on the table — Iran’s attendance sent mixed signals from the Gulf, particularly at a time when the region is acquiring $20 billion in arms from the US.

Just as puzzling as the summit’s inability to tackle pressing financial issues were the statements about a common currency for the GCC, the “Gulf Riyal”. Although Gulf leaders issued a public communiqué at the summit that reaffirmed commitment to a 2010 deadline for a monetary union, a classified document leaked to UAE daily Emirates Business 24/7 showed that finance ministers had told heads of state that the GCC would not be ready by 2010. No deadline was given in the report, but if an interview given by the governor of the UAE Central Bank late last year is anything to go by, he said the GCC was unlikely to have a single currency by 2015.

This is not overly surprising, given Oman’s decision in 2006 to opt out of the common currency over concerns that spending targets would constrain economic growth, and last year’s decision by Kuwait to de-peg its currency from the greenback, citing inflationary pressure.

Therein lies the crux of the problems the GCM faces: Gulf countries are still acting independently of one another on economic and political policies.

“There is of course a large degree of liberalization, on tariffs (to zero), on services, establishing a business in another GCC country,” said Makki. “But now there is more work to be done, just as when the European market started, through stronger institutions, which have to be put in place. This will be essential to keep the momentum going, otherwise there is a tendency for capital protectionist initiatives. And a lot of things will have to be done differently, such as trade agreements being done separately, that will have to come to an end.”

Indeed, some developments currently underway in the region are at odds with the very aims of the GCM. Bahrain for instance has just proposed a dual price plan where non-nationals will be charged more for basic commodities than Bahrainis. Although aimed at expatriates, the proposal is for nationals only, not GCC citizens, flying in the face of the rights entitled to them under the GCM.

Then there is an issue that goes to the very heart of the GCM — the movement of people and goods, which was supposed to have been fast tracked when a customs union was introduced.

“They implemented GCC customs unification four years ago, and there are still hiccups,” said Ahmad Hammauda, assistant managing director of Global Logistics Services and Warehousing in Kuwait. “If we go to Dubai today, as a Kuwaiti company — a GCC company — we cannot have our own trucks in Dubai, you have to have an Emirati with you. The same was true for Saudi Arabia but the law was changed five months ago, now allowing GCC trucks into Saudi. We are building a depot in the Dubai World Center, but that is a free zone, whereas in Dubai we can’t — how free is that?”

Furthermore, the construction of barriers in the Gulf is presenting, quite literally, a physical obstacle for the GCM, with Saudi Arabia to spend between $10-$15 billion to secure its 6,500 kilometer border, which includes three GCC countries, the UAE, Kuwait and Oman, and potential future GCM members Yemen and Iraq.

“I’m pessimistic for security reasons. Saudi Arabia is building a wall with Iraq, Kuwait with Iraq and maybe there will be one between Syria and Lebanon. All this putting up of walls is not good for removing borders,” said Hammauda. “We hope that things will be easier. It would be great if goods can move freely within the GCC, but I don’t think that will happen anytime soon. In my book, the common market is similar to the EU or the US — a common market without borders,” he added.

Indeed, the postponement of the EU-GCC FTA is not only over the EU adding new conditions. Notably, the EU have pointed out a lack of coordination and uniformity among GCC countries as well as differences between governments in certain sectors such as labor laws, copyright and property rights.

As Eckart Woertz, program manager in economics at the Gulf Research Center, pointed out: “Legal codes and judicial regulations all need to be amended.”

Gulf Cooperation Council — quick facts

Source: AFP

Boom times ahead?

The need to amend GCM laws is crucial for the common market to flourish, particularly inter-regionally. Currently, trade between GCC states represents about 10% of overall foreign trade, which is expected to surge to 25% in the next two years, according to Bahrain’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry, bolstered by the new common market.

The GCM is also expected to be a boon for neighboring countries.

“It will encourage countries to go in the same direction,” said Makki.

“The GCM is symbolic, the first of its kind in the area, moving towards ever closer coordination and countries giving up some of their sovereign powers — that is very significant.”

But before this happens along the lines of the EU — with the potential for expansion of the bloc on the cards, as the EU has done in the past decade — the GCC will need to liberalize further.

Woertz thinks that cross-border mergers are likely to improve if capital markets get closer together, or even establish a GCC integrated stock market.

“It would help if there were some inter-linkages, trading platforms and so on. At the moment it’s pretty much fragmented. If they wanted to develop and attract international investment, the GCC would need to do something there,” he said.

Equally, the free movement of capital needs to be addressed by regulatory authorities, as a true common market would allow banks and financial services to set up in any GCC country.

The aim of giving GCC citizens equal rights in buying and selling property as well as shares also needs to be addressed. Currently, Dubai and Abu Dhabi allow international investors to buy combined stakes of 49% in listed companies, while certain companies are restricted to UAE citizens. Saudi Arabia, however, the seat of the GCM, has allowed GCC citizens to buy and sell shares since September last year, and Qatar allows foreign investors up to 25% of a company’s shares. But only four bourses allow cross-listing of shares — Bahrain, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait.

This will all change though when institutions are created to unify the GCM, such as a central bank, courts of justice and a country chosen to represent, on a rotational basis, leadership of the GCM.

“Imagine how the GCM can negotiate with just one negotiator. They would have a lot of weight in a number of international institutions — the WTO, future trade negotiations with the EU and the US, and elsewhere,” said Makki. “Even in non-trade related institutions, the IMF, World Bank, OPEC. The GCC role in all these financial institutions is likely to grow, and grow significantly, but it all depends on how coordinated their stance is vis-à-vis the issues that are at stake, so really the sky is the limit.”

Ultimately, the GCM has a lot going for it — a common language, bourgeoning economies and the ability to act as powerful bloc on the world stage. But before the GCM can progress, the political will needs to be there, along with a clear vision for GCC citizens of what the common market is all about.

“What does this common market mean? I’ve not heard much,” admitted Hammauda. “I heard one currency, and moving goods without documentation, but that is not there. We haven‘t heard anything that this might change. To be frank, I don’t know what the GCM means.”

February 27, 2008 0 comments
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Special SectionSubprime Crisis

GCC banks sitting safe

by Executive Staff February 27, 2008
written by Executive Staff

A study of rated Gulf banks by Standard and Poor’s analysts Emmanuel Volland and Mohammed Damak shows that the region’s banking sector has had a limited exposure to US subprime mortgage-related instruments. Executive interviewed Volland to assess his opinion of the study’s results.

E Which banks did Standard and Poor’s select for the survey and what was their exposure to subprime mortgage-related instruments?

We selected 20 of the largest banks in the Gulf region. Among those were the ones that have the largest subprime exposure. We came out with a figure of total exposure to subprime of less than 1% of total assets. At the time we did the survey, we did not include exposure to structured investment vehicles (SIVs). If you added the SIVs, the exposure would be higher.

E How much higher?

I would say it’s still below 2% of assets. Comparing exposure to assets is useful, but probably not the best ratio one can use. It’s probably better to compare it with the size of their equity base or the size of their net profit. If you look at the total equity the figure would be less than 10%. Also, with total exposure it is meaningful to look at the details in terms of what is investment grade and non-investment grade and the way things are moving. The assets that were investment grade at the time may no longer be investment grade. Some have seen significant downgrades from our structured finance group.

E Is the exposure still investment grade?

I would argue that the majority is still investment grade but that the proportion is lower than at the beginning. So overall I think we keep our roughly positive message on the Gulf banks’ exposure to the US subprime market and other structured instruments. We don’t expect a significant downgrade or change in our ratings. According to the results of our more detailed survey, overall the exposure is manageable. Also, some banks may have larger exposure than others. And the profile of the banks with more exposure would be the wholesale banks, including Bahrain and probably also a few banks in the UAE.

E Some programs, like Eurobonds and shari’a-based bonds, have postponed issuing debt. Could you please discuss this dynamic?

Well, as you said, since the beginning of the meltdown we have rarely seen any banks going on the market for debt. We don’t suggest that they would not be able to do so. It’s just that the pricing has increased substantially. These banks are not in desperate need of liquidity. So they took the decision to wait for the market to calm down and hope the spreads will go down. I don’t think the spreads will ever come down to the very low level they reached in early 2007. There were many investors claiming that while the spreads reached something like LIBOR plus 20 business points it was not reflecting the real credit risk of these institutions.

E Will we see GCC banks getting involved in bailouts of Western banks echoing the recent activity of sovereign wealth funds?

We will not see GCC banks providing a significant amount of liquidity for the US and European markets. We are talking about small institutions. I think the largest bank in the Gulf region has total assets of $50 billion and total equity of $6-7 billion. So they might have an extra liquidity of $2-3 billion, which they would have already partially placed in US or European equities. So we are not talking about hundreds of billions sitting on their balance sheets, waiting to be invested. This is a different story for sovereign investment funds like the Kuwaiti Investment Authority, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and private individuals like Al-Waleed bin Talal.

E What do investments in Western banks by these sovereign wealth funds tell us about the future of the Middle East financial sector?

First, it is a structural trend that started before the problem. There is a clear willingness by these governments to take into account that oil resources will disappear at some point and they need to diversify their investments outside of the Gulf region. So we’ve seen mainly investments in Europe and the US before the crisis. But at the same time this is an opportunistic strategy where we see a very low valuation for banks and they will try to take advantage of that.

E Are these investments by sovereign wealth funds in the banking sector wise at this time of financial uncertainty? Is this a new trend?

That’s a good question. We don’t know where market prices will go. There is potential for more of a drop in equity prices. But the sovereign funds really have long-term strategies. So there might be a point when they are underwater in terms of price of longer-term investments, but if you really believe there is not critical risk of bankruptcy then the market price will likely come back to higher levels. But then again, there is an intermediary risk that the problems will increase up to the point where you lose your investments. Obviously, it is more risky than investing in US Treasury bills or government debt. I would not argue that this is a new trend. We have seen massive investments from the sovereign wealth funds even before the crisis. Not so much in the banking sector, but definitely in the corporate sector.

E What can you tell us about sovereign wealth fund exposure to mortgage backed securities and the subprime crisis?

We don’t rate the sovereign funds and the level of public disclosure is close to nil for most of them. They are well-kept secrets. It may be that they don’t have any exposure or they may have large exposure. We just don’t know.

E How will the subprime crisis affect Q4 2007 and 2008 numbers?

The Q3 impact has not been significant. Very few banks have taken positions that reflect a lower valuation on structured instruments. I think we will see slightly more of that in Q4 numbers and maybe more in 2008. I think the banks have been relatively slow to change the pricing on their books. GCC banks have some of the best performance in the world, so performance in Q4 and 2008 will be pretty solid regardless. A small number of banks, maybe two or three, might need to do a massive cleaning of their balance sheets with regard to these instruments. But the impact should be manageable and will not be big. Also, some of the banks are owned by the government so this will make things easier. And finally in terms of raising capital, there is currently tremendous liquidity in the Gulf. In closing, the region’s financial sector does not have too much to fear from the ongoing American subprime crisis.

February 27, 2008 0 comments
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Special SectionSubprime Crisis

The Subprime Crisis and the Middle East

by Executive Staff February 27, 2008
written by Executive Staff

The US subprime crisis is having little impact on the Middle East financial sector; in fact the crisis turned out to be quite an opportunity for the region’s financial institutions. To date, the only direct loss reported was by Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank (ADCB), which wrote down $19 million in assets during the third quarter of 2007. A few other firms took indirect hits. One such firm was Emaar Properties. In August 2007, the Dubai-based property developer explained that its US subsidiary unit John Laing Home’s (JLH) third quarter results were lower than expected due to the subprime mortgage crisis and a possible implosion of America’s housing bubble. Emaar was unable to comment on this development for Executive. In a previously conducted interview with Reuters, however, Emaar Property’s chief financial officer, Amit Jain, noted “third-quarter JLH results are going to be lower than earlier estimates — not incurring losses, but profits won’t be high.” News of lower returns for JLH hurt Emaar Properties, as it posted its first decline in profit in the last three years. Its share price dropped to a 28-month low as investors sought out less-exposed options.

This decline came in sharp contrast to the optimism felt by Emaar in 2006 when they purchased JLH for $1.05 billion. While it finalized the deal before mass subprime defaults occurred in the later half of 2006, some analysts did question the rationale behind the decisions to acquire JLH as talk of a US housing bubble made its way into the media. Although American real estate woes have ultimately taken a toll on Emaar Properties, other regional institutions have avoided the same fate because of different asset allocation abroad and a strong domestic market.

Gulf property markets do not appear threatened

The subprime crisis does not appear to threaten Gulf real estate and Gulf investors remain confident in their domestic housing markets. In December 2007, the Khaleej Times noted that the subprime crisis would not hit the UAE’s property sector. The CEO of Rakaa Property, Abdulrahman al-Tassan, explained in the article that the Emirates’ property market has better standards than those in the US. To insure against defaults, the Gulf country makes sure underwriting standards are strict and borrowers undergo background checks before they are issued credit.

Banking on better days

Gulf banks also found themselves in safe waters. Banking institutions keep diverse portfolios in high-grade investments to mitigate risk, ensure positive returns and minimize the risk of defaults. They are also supported by high liquidity and government willingness to intervene if investments turn sour. Standard and Poor’s credit analysts Emmanuel Volland and Mohamed Damak found in a recent study only limited exposure by Gulf banks to US subprime mortgage-related instruments.

The study investigated 20 Gulf banks with the largest exposures to subprime mortgage-backed securities and found that less than 1% of total assets were exposed. Other indicators, such as total exposure to subprime mortgage-backed securities as a percentage of total equity were higher, nearing 10%, but the report took an optimistic tone, saying banks are not exposed enough to warrant any changes in policy, as long as all their subprime exposure remained in equities of high investment grade with ratings of ‘AA’ and ‘AAA’. In an interview with Executive, the analysts maintained that Middle East banks’ exposure to subprime securities is still investment grade.

Still, not all banks have had consistent performance during the subprime crisis. Bahrain’s Gulf International Bank (GIF) saw its Moody’s rating drop from stable to negative on its A2/prime – 1 deposit ratings and A3 subordinated debt ratings because of the bank’s holdings of US mortgage-backed securities. GIF can choose to either change its procedures to bring its ratings back to stable or it can ignore the rating and maintain this exposure to subprime-related securities. Moody’s decision is not likely to have a significant impact on Bahrain as most Gulf banks are supported by governments willing to bailout beleaguered firms and banks.

In step with the US Federal Reserve 

Although exposure remains low, Gulf banks and institutions are not moving forward as smoothly as they would in the absence of the subprime debacle and the ensuing credit crunch. The credit crunch is putting recessionary pressure on the US economy, which is currently being countered by the US Federal Reserve. All economies that peg their currencies to the dollar are affected by the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy. The list includes most Gulf countries, except Kuwait, which depegged its currency from the dollar in 2007. The six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have begun implementation of the Gulf Common Market (GCM) agreement and are preparing for a common currency to be minted in 2010.

The Federal Reserve’s main short-term worry since the apex of subprime defaults in October 2006, is that a recession in the US might follow resulting in far-reaching implications abroad. To preempt this, the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy is set to grow the economy through a series of interest rate cuts. The interest rate cuts are an attempt by policy makers to encourage lending by making money cheaper to borrow. Firms will, it is hoped, borrow rigorously and thereby promote economic growth. The Federal Reserve cut interest rates to the lowest level in two years when they hit 4.25 % in late 2007. Then on January 22, 2008, US Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke cut rates again to 3.5%.

The Gulf will have to follow suit, either by changing their pegs or by altering monetary policy to match the US changes. To maintain parity with the dollar and keep regional investors from engaging in interest-rate investment arbitrage on the US market, the central banks of the region must lower interest rates in turn. Although some of the greenback-pegged Gulf economies have revalued their currencies to the dollar, they will also continue to maintain the peg to keep parity with each other’s currencies until the GCC common currency begins.

According to chief economist and head of research at Jadwa Investment, Brad Bourland, Saudi Arabia’s currency peg to the dollar means that Saudi must echo US interest rates. If the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency allows too much divergence between interest rates, investors will capitalize on the widening spread. Bourland also noted the harm interest rate cuts may have in encouraging inflation in a region that does not need to see any more of it.

Keeping prices and currencies happy

Gulf countries are battling double-digit inflation, because  the Fed’s interest rate cuts are putting expansionary pressure on their economies. To counter the pressure, some Gulf central banks have decided to raise their reserve requirements, exercising one of the few sovereign moves the region’s central bankers have left. By raising reserve requirements, the central banks are constricting the economy by keeping more money in the vault and less in the hands of borrowers. Qatar, which is battling 15% inflation, raised its reserve requirement by 50 basis points to 3.25%, which will force banks to stash away more of their capital with the central bank, leading to a contraction in the economy. The move will counter growth without disrupting Qatar’s interest rate parity with the greenback.

Potential Bank Liabilities

Top bank sponsors of commercial paper, 2007

Source: Economist/Fitch Ratings

When can the bonds start?

As Middle East central banks follow the increasingly active moves by the Fed to lower interest rates, many firms waited to issue bonds, opting instead to do so once the spread narrows, because bond valuations based on current spreads are likely to be undercut by reactionary interest rate cuts.

According to Dr. Eckart Woertz, program manager of economics at the Gulf Research Center, the main impact of the subprime crisis in the Middle East “has been the widening spreads and assets [that] have been affected. The financing condition is deteriorating, even for companies and issuers.” Looking forward to 2008, he noted that, “There are a lot of potential [bond] issues in the pipeline. Should markets calm down, then they will come to market. It tells of confidence in a fledgling bond market.”

Recent moves include the UAE’s Dana Gas postponement of a $1 billion Islamic bond issuance (sukuk) and Bahrain’s Ithmaar, which delayed sales of their five year bonds valued at $300 million. Abu Dhabi First Gulf Bank also postponed issuing its $3.5 billion Eurobond. Those who went ahead during a market with high spreads lost big. Among them was the Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC), which had aimed at raising $2.7 billion from a bond issue. In the end, they were only able to obtain $1.5 billion.

Middle East money saves Wall Street

The major players in the Middle East, in particular the Gulf, are the government-owned and operated sovereign wealth funds (SWF). In terms of the subprime crisis, these SWFs may come out on top as willing and able financiers, providing much needed liquidity for Western firms and banks. In January 2008 both Citigroup and Merrill Lynch solicited the help of sovereign wealth funds from Asia, including the Gulf.

In total, these funds manage as much as $2.9 trillion and have invested in everything from telecoms to aerospace. However, their entrée into the banking world has been the most impressive. According to a January 2008 report in the Economist, since the start of the subprime mortgage meltdown Gulf-based SWFs have shifted almost $69 billion into Western investment banks. As the magazine notes, “They have deftly played the role of savior just when Western banks have been exposed as the Achilles heel of the global financial system.”

The largest SWFs include the the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority with $875 billion in assets, various Saudi Arabian funds at together $300 billion, Kuwait’s Reserve Fund for Future Generations ($250 billion), Libya’s Oil Reserve Funds and the Qatar Investment Authority (both $50 billion), and Algeria’s Fond de Regulation des Recettes ($42.6 billion).

The common thread among the MENA funds is that the controlling governments are rich in natural resources, whether petroleum or natural gas. With recent oil volatility working to the region’s benefit, sovereign wealth funds have excess liquidity to diversify long term investments abroad and to provide the credit needed in US markets.

In 1991 Saudi Arabia’s Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal bought $590 million worth of shares in Citicorp. Now those same shares would be worth $5.36 billion. With today’s Citigroup offering 7% dividends on shares bought by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and others, it is easy to understand why during fallout of the subprime crisis they did not have to go looking for investors. These appealing terms are coupled with the fact that potential investors were fully briefed on the group’s upcoming forth quarter announcements and share prices are half of what they were last summer. In fact, Citigroup is well positioned to raise even more money from SWFs in the region should upcoming earnings reports bring more bad news, as is expected.

Future trends for sovereign wealth funds

In a report on Sovereign Wealth Funds and Bond and Equity Prices Morgan Stanley’s chief UK economist David Miles explained the difference in the amount of risk sovereign wealth funds are willing to take when compared to more traditional strategies. He suggested that because SWFs have vast assets, their investment patterns display a high tolerance to risk. In comparison, the wealth of more traditional governments is invested in foreign exchange reserves and most of that is sunk into low-risk, low-return instruments like government bonds. Miles added that the unusual appetite for risk and the eminent growth of sovereign wealth funds will likely have an impact on the degree of risk tolerance for investors the world round. He noted that should this occur, there ought to be a resultant effect on asset prices.

GRC’s Woertz noted that sovereign wealth funds “… have a lot of money. They have a serious liquidity problem in the sense that they have too much money. They have problems finding investment opportunities for their liquidity, so they will buy in the US but also in other places. They are not satisfied with just buying treasuries anymore.”

Citigroup’s losses prompted a $12.5 billion cash infusion from SWFs like the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA). This large cash infusion had been preceded by one in November 2007 from the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority worth $7.5 billion. According to the International Herald Tribune, Citigroup Chairman Robert Rubin had made an eleventh-hour trip to secure the KIA funding. However, the bailout might work to the advantage of Gulf investors. If Citigroup’s shares are now at their low point, then its new Gulf investors will benefit in the long term. And the Citigroup deal is not the only one in the making right now. In December 2007 Zurich-based bank UBS received $1.8 billion from an anonymous Middle Eastern investor.

The following month Merrill Lynch saw share sales to the tune of $6.6 billion, bought by various entities in the region including Saudia Arabia’s Olayan Group, the Qatar Investment Authority and the Kuwait Investment Authority.

Where does the region go from here?

The subprime fallout has not caused any disruption on the Middle East markets, nor has it significantly damaged regional firms or banks. What the subprime crisis brought was a credit crunch desperate for foreign liquidity. Regional firms and banks are beginning to fill in the gap. Only in recent weeks have Western bankers begun to realize that Gulf liquidity is going to provide their cash-strapped markets with the funds needed to rejuvenate business projects and economic growth. Bailout by a mixture of institutional and personal investors for both Citigroup and Merril Lynch is just the beginning of a future trend by sovereign wealth funds and petrodollar beneficiaries to supply the capital demands of US and Western markets.

February 27, 2008 0 comments
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Remembering Benazir Bhutto

by Norbert Schiller February 27, 2008
written by Norbert Schiller

After news filtered out from Pakistan that Benazir Bhutto had survived a suicide attack on the day of her triumphant return last October, I knew deep down that if she were to continue her campaign to become prime minister, her chances of surviving until election day were minimal. Pakistan had changed since the last time she campaigned and now the world, and particularly her home country, was far more dangerous than when she began her political career almost 20 years ago. On December 27, 2007, a little over two months after the first attack, she was killed doing what she was good at, getting close to the people.

In the summer of 1988, while a young Benazir was preparing to accomplish what no Muslim woman had done in modern history, I was covering the last days of a brutal eight-year war that began with no warning and was about to end the same way. The day the Iran-Iraq War ended, the few journalists still covering the war, including myself, were caught completely off guard. After a year and a half of being totally immersed in the Gulf conflict, we found ourselves with nothing to do. The agency that I worked for was also at a loss and, after looking around for other news events in the region, decided to send me to Pakistan to cover the elections.

It was hard not to get swept up in the Benazir Bhutto craze. She was young, only 35, beautiful, warm and inviting. And the foreign media could not get enough of her. When she toured the country we camped out in the same places that she was staying and followed her relentlessly throughout her campaign. Her tactics were the same up until the day she died: get as close to the people as possible. Day in and day out we raced around the countryside in 4×4 Pajeros covering her every move. When she reached a village she would stop, open the sun roof and with a megaphone address the crowd gathered around her vehicle. And then she would close the sun roof and race on to the next village. Everywhere we went throngs of supporters would line the way. If someone wanted to kill her back then, there would have been ample opportunity.

Occasionally, I would follow the campaign of her arch rival, Nawaz Sharif, but that was nowhere near as exciting and it seemed that nobody abroad was really interested in him. However, my own lack of interest in him changed after an unusual incident that brought us closer together. While he was taking a walking tour through a part of Lahore and I was back-peddling in front of him, I suddenly fell through an open manhole on the street. He quickly reached down with some of his aides and pulled me out. Noticing that I was covered in blood he stopped his campaigning, summoned his medical team to attend to me and waited in a nearby residence until I was bandaged and fit to continue before he carried on. After that incident, I made it a point to cover his campaign as well.

When it was announced that Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) had swept the majority of seats in the National Assembly I was in Rawalpindi, just south of the capital Islamabad. The city erupted in celebrations and fireworks and it took me hours to get back and file my images at the office in Islamabad.

Shortly after Benazir Bhutto’s election victory I was sent back to Pakistan to cover the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit. This event was to be bigger than normal because the meeting not only brought together all the countries of the sub-continent, but more importantly it was the first time in 16 years that the leaders of Pakistan and India would meet one on one again. The sight of Benazir Bhutto walking alongside Rajiv Gandhi represented a chance for change and reconciliation. The last time such a high level meeting occurred was in 1972, at the signing of the Simla Agreement when Benazir’s father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Rajiv’s mother, Indira Gandhi, had met and agreed to settle all their differences peacefully.

Sixteen years later, a new generation of leaders, part of the same dynasty, was meeting yet again. As before, they agreed never to attack each other’s nuclear facilities, to promote cultural exchanges between the two countries and to eliminate double taxation on international civil aviation transactions. In the same spirit as their parents, Bhutto and Gandhi signed the same vows their parents had done years before.

After only 20 months Benazir Bhutto was removed from office by Pakistan’s then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan over an alleged corruption scandal.  She would, however, come back and hold the office a second time between 1993 and 1996.

In a weird twist of fate Benazir Bhutto’s death signals an end to a relationship between India and Pakistan that began in 1972 and was strengthened again in 1988. Benazir’s father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was executed in 1979 after a controversial trial where he was accused of being behind the murder of one of his opponents. Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984, and her son was killed in 1991. Sixteen years later Benazir Bhutto would suffer the same fate.

Norbert Schiller’s latest book Arak and Mezze: The Taste of Lebanon was published last month.

February 27, 2008 0 comments
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Financial Indicators

Global economic data

by Executive Staff February 7, 2008
written by Executive Staff

Part-time employment as a % of total employment

Source: OECD

In 2006 countries showed a mixed percent of their workforce employed as part-time employees. OECD data refers to part-time employment as persons who usually work less than 30 hours per week in the main job (35 hours for Japan). The split which separates those with a large chunk of part-time employees is not easily definable and countries do not share similar economies, policies, histories, or geographic locations. OECD countries oscillate around the group’s total of 16.1%. The Netherlands’ workforce is comprised of the most part-time employees at 35.5%, followed by Australia and Switzerland at 27.1% and 25.5%, respectively. The economy with the lowest percent of part-time labor compared to the total workforce is the Slovak Republic where only 2.5% of employees are considered part-time. Other performers at the low end of the ranking include Hungary, with 2.7%, the Czech Republic, at 3.3%, and Turkey, at 7.9%.

Women as a percent of total part-time employment

Source: OECD

Although the preceding graph of part-time employment as a percent of the total workforce did not show any direct trend, the data as it pertains to women is useful for economists, policy-knacks, and company directors as woman seem to overwhelming make up a country’s part-time labor. In fact, all OECD countries see woman as over 60% of their part-time labor. The OECD total of 72.1% is unnaturally high, but perhaps for good reason. Woman are indeed facing new struggles as the nature of employment changes and two people are often needed to support a family. To be there for their children, women must have more free time at home, but while their children are at school during the day, women are able to take on part-time work. Luxembourg’s place as a bustling banking center might likely show favorable employment plans for part-time female professionals, accounting for the European country’s high score of 93.1% for woman as a percent of total part-time employees. Korea, with 58.5% and Turkey, with 58.6%, might rank lower because of traditional values over the woman’s place in a household or at least the man’s place as an owner. The culture of employing women is undoubtably one of pragmatism, which might explain why OECD countries, considered the world’s strongest economies, show such high figures.

Consumer price increases (as %)

Source: OECD

OECD annual inflation rates in 2007 remained relatively low, but some developing economies are nevertheless showing the expected hot flashes of a bustling market. The OECD total of 2.4% consumer price increase is dwarfed by Turkey, whose economy is heating up with 10.9%, a number they will need to cool down as they continue talks with EU negotiators over eventual accession talks. The Celtic Tiger Ireland is also showing economic growth’s effects on inflation, where consumer prices have jumped by 5.1%. Besides Japan, which in fact registered a deflation of 0.1%, Europe’s mature economies of France with 1.2%, Switzerland with 0.2%, and Norway with 1.1%, are reporting very stable price increases.

Trillion passenger-kilometers

Source: OECD

How mobile are citizens in OECD countries? Very, according to one composite score this accounts for passenger transport on rail, buses and coaches, and private cars. The scores, in trillions of passenger-kilometers, are indicative of how on the move some countries are and how they stack up against others. The US rises far above all other OECD members, with 7.4 trillion passenger-kilometers, perhaps because of the country’s close to 300 million population or because of the “go-go-go” nature of Americans. Japan, with 1.222 trillion passenger-kilometers and Germany with 1.0289 trillion rank second and third among OECD countries. The least mobile citizens come from Greece, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic, perhaps attributed to income, geographic location, availability of transport, or just being content with remaining still.

February 7, 2008 0 comments
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Overruling Ahmadinejad

by Gareth Smith February 3, 2008
written by Gareth Smith

In Iran — like anywhere else — political disagreements have a tendency of going upwards to be resolved. The more serious or bad-tempered the disagreement, the higher up it can go.

But in Iran, the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei officially has the religious, as well as the political, last word, and is hence loath to be seen as involved in daily politics. Ayatollah Khamenei prefers to remain aloof even if his office is involved in every branch of government.

Hence Tehran’s chattering classes have become agitated when Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, the parliamentary speaker, revealed he had brought Ayatollah Khamenei into a dispute between the parliament and president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad over heating supplies.

Ahmadinejad had refused to implement a bill passed by parliament offering relief to villages suffering gas cuts at a time of plunging temperatures. Parliament’s move was a response to many areas being left without heating in Iran’s coldest winter for years. At least 64 people were reported dead in a country with the world’s second-largest reserves of both natural gas and oil.

The publicity surrounding Ayatollah Khamenei’s intervention in overruling the president arose from tension between deputies about upcoming parliamentary elections. Elected politicians dislike volatility, and Iran has been politically energized since Ahmadinejad’s victory when he steamrolled the reformists’ agenda of social freedom by calling for a more egalitarian distribution of oil income.

Ahmadinejad elicited a wide expectation that politicians should provide a tangibly better life for ordinary folk. Iranians, well aware oil prices are at record levels, are in no mood to tighten their belts.

Bringing Ayatollah Khamenei to help freezing Iranians served a clear political purpose for Haddad-Adel, who topped the Tehran poll in the 2004 election.

With a new election looming, Haddad-Adel is not keen on being too close to Ahmadinejad’s government, especially with a wave of media criticisms of the president over rising prices. Inflation is officially at 17%, but in reality it is probably over 20%.

Haddad-Adel is relatively close ideologically to the president, but Ahmadinejad’s opponents are also firmly focused on the parliamentary elections.

The reformists in particular are looking for a parliament that will hem in the president for the final year of his first term. In the process, they hope for a shift in political advantage away from the president and his fundamentalist allies, perhaps even opening the door for a more productive relationship with the West.

With Iran’s near absence of parties, its electoral politics are hard to understand much less predict. But in the run-up to next month’s poll, there is a drift towards polarization between one camp of reformists, and some pragmatic conservatives, and another camp comprising the fundamentalists.

While it seems unlikely the reformists will agree to a single list, there will be an overlap of names on the two main lists, which some analysts suggest could be as much as 80% in common.

The reformists’ prospects will depend in the first instance on whether the Guardian Council, the constitutional vetting body, repeats the mass disqualifications — mainly of reformists — of the last parliamentary election in 2004.
Former reformist president Mohammad Khatami, former parliamentary speaker, Mehdi Karrubi, and to a lesser extent Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former president who heads the Expediency Council, have all spoken obliquely about the dangers of disqualification. Any public row could drag in Ayatollah Khamenei. While the leader allowed disqualifications in 2004, he did intervene in the 2005 presidential election to allow the two main reformist candidates to run.

Meanwhile, the United Front of Principle-ists (or fundamentalists) claims half of its election lists have been agreed. Their coalition comprises three currents, only one of which is closely identified with the president, that have established committees in all 30 provinces to organize lists.

But three important figures, Mohsen Rezaei, former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, Tehran’s mayor, and Ali Larijani, the former chief security official, have so far refused to join the coalition. They are keen to keep their distance from the government, despite the dangers of division in the conservative camp.

But it is far from clear the reformists are set for any electoral breakthrough. Their agenda of social freedoms and political reform has been overwhelmed recently by the conservatives’ concentration on day-to-day economic matters.

The conservatives have followed a deliberate strategy since 2002-3, based on an assessment of the aspirations of the baby-boomers born after the 1979 Revolution. Conservatives have judged, apparently correctly, that the baby-boomers would become less concerned with social freedom and more with the costs of marriage and having children.

Hence the most likely result of poll on March 14 remains a conservative majority, albeit a reduced one.

GARETH SMYTH was the former Financial Times Tehran correspondent between between 2004 and 2007

February 3, 2008 0 comments
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Fairouz in Damascus

by Nicholas Blanford February 3, 2008
written by Nicholas Blanford

For someone who has always abjured the political fray, the much beloved Lebanese diva, Fairouz, recently found herself inadvertently embroiled in the poisonous rift between Lebanon and Syria.

It is sadly inevitable that art and sport have a tendency to become the chattels of feuding politicians, and given the iconic status of Fairouz, there was little surprise that her decision to sing in Damascus would evoke condemnation, feelings of betrayal, sympathy and Schadenfreude on either side of the border in roughly equal measure.

The 73-year-old diva performed her classic 1970 musical “Sah al-Nom” in a six-day run, as part of a year-long series of events to mark UNESCO designating Damascus the 2008 Arab capital of culture.

Her decision to sing in Damascus, however, split her fan base in Lebanon between those arguing that Fairouz should not sing before the rulers of a country blamed for a string of assassinations in Lebanon over the past three years, and others who maintain that the Lebanese diva is above petty politics and should be allowed to sing wherever she wishes.

Still, the timing of her first concert in Syria since 1982 was awkward. A day after she traveled to Syria, Captain Wissam Eid, a top investigator in the intelligence bureau of the Internal Security Forces was killed along with four other people in the largest car bomb explosion since the assassination of Rafik Hariri almost three years earlier.

“Those who love Lebanon do not sing for its jailers,” said March 14 MP Akram Shehayeb. “Our ambassador to the stars, you painted for us the dream nation, so don’t scatter that dream like the dictators of Damascus scattered our dreams of a democratic free country.”

A poll conducted by the “Now Lebanon” web portal, which is sympathetic to the March 14 coalition, found that 67% of respondents were against Fairouz in Damascus.

“Simply, this is not the moment for a musical love-in,” a Now Lebanon editorial said. “Fairouz must decide. She is a Lebanese icon, and, as such she must repay the people who have backed her and who love her with a modicum of solidarity.”

Although she and the Rahbani brothers, her long-time musical collaborators, apparently were sympathetic to the ideology of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Fairouz has consistently kept her art detached from politics, saying her music was for the people only. Her songs were banned for six months in 1969 by the Lebanese government when she refused to give a private concert for the then Algerian President Houari Boumedienne. And apart from a single concert in 1978, she famously refused to sing in Lebanon during the 1975-1990 civil war in disgust at the warring militias, whose gunmen continued to adore her anyway.

For an older generation of Lebanese, Fairouz’ hauntingly beautiful voice evokes a nostalgia for Lebanon’s golden years in the 1950s and 1960s. For a younger generation, more accustomed to the scantily-clad sirens of the contemporary Arab music scene, Fairouz’ lack of stage charisma — standing ramrod erect at the microphone, unsmiling and disdaining banter with the audience — has done little to dent their adoration for the legendary singer.

Fairouz’ first post-civil war concert in Lebanon was in September 1994 when she sang in Martyrs’ Square before a crowd of thousands of Lebanese and a host of officials, including the late former president, Elias Hrawi, and then-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, an event that for many Lebanese signaled that the war was really over.

Eleven years later, Martyrs’ Square became the final resting place for Hariri and the venue for the Beirut spring protests that led to Syria’s troop withdrawal and to the current political impasse.

A renowned recluse who has only given a handful of interviews in her five-decade career, Fairouz remained silent toward the criticism surrounding her decision to perform in Damascus. However, her former musical partner Mansour Rahbani said her decision was “a message of love and peace from Lebanon to Syria. A message of friendship not subservience.”

Elias Harfoush, writing in Al-Hayat, said “Fairouz on her way to Syria during the worst moment in the history of relations between the two states and nations is probably the best ambassador to the Syrians, bearing the message that whatever link has been broken by political and state interests should not entail a rift between [the peoples] in both countries.”

Certainly, Syrians were delighted that Fairouz was back in Damascus. “The Syrians are thrilled, especially the Damascenes,” said Sami Moubayed, a historian of Syria’s post-independence period in the 1950s. “She reminds them of the ‘good old days’,” adding that apart from “nostalgia, talent, her gigantic standing [and] heavenly voice … everybody is pleased that she is defying the anti-Syrian team in Lebanon and coming.”

Still, for most ardent fans, Fairouz is a symbol of unity rather than division and her standing will long outlast the current quarrel.

Nicholas Blanford is a aBeirut-based journalist and author of “Killing Mr Lebanon: The Assassination of Rafik Hariri and its Impact on the Middle East”, IB Tauris, 2006.

February 3, 2008 0 comments
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By Invitation

Lebanon – Saade wineries

by Executive Staff February 3, 2008
written by Executive Staff

A new winery is taking shape in the Bekaa valley. Owners of Wild Discovery travel agency, Karim and Sandro Saadé have engaged in this new venture, after launching “Domaine de Bargylus” in Syria in 2004.

“We intend to produce the first real Syrian wine: a high-end product positioned internationally, targeting the Syrian Diaspora and seducing Syrian consumers,” said Karim. He reckons that the Syrian project might prove to be a more challenging one, as it requires nurturing a nascent wine culture.

The Saadé venture is not the first of its kind. Over the years, the family’s mercantile past morphed into the Johnny R. Saadé Group, also known for its international shipping company CMA (Compagnie Maritime d’Affrêtement). The group currently includes a tourism arm and a real estate company, the winery project being the most recent addition to its core activities. The two young brothers have succeeded in carving a name for themselves in the tourism sector with Wild Discovery, the group’s first Lebanese venture that also operates in Syria and Dubai, with almost 100 employees. Founded in 1997, with its head offices in Beirut, Wild Discovery boasts a regional network of travel agencies, offering services ranging from ticket issuance to comprehensive holiday packages. The Saadé company’s second arm is Greenstones, a real estate company currently developing a project in Beirut’s picturesque Abdel Wahab Al-Inglizi Street.
 

Two new wine ventures

The third and most recent project includes two vineyards in northwestern Syria and the Bekaa Valley. Bargylus, the Syrian estate, is located in Jebel al-Ansariyeh, in antiquity known as Mount Bargylus. On the outskirts of Lattakia, the port city on the Mediterranean it comprises 20 hectares of argilo-calcareous soil. The Lebanese estate is situated in the widely-recognized wine region of the Bekaa Valley, near the villages of Kefraya and Tell-

Denoub, covering 50 hectares.

Sandro Saadé recounts the brothers’ passionate love story with wine that began in 1997. “We initially considered investing in a Bordeaux châteaux,” he recalled. Instead, the brothers decided to jump-start their own winery project in Syria, where their family originated. The Domaine de Bargylus came to life in Lattakia in 2003. “Besides the common history we share with the Lattakia region, we opted for this particular location because of its excellent soil and weather conditions, after extensive testing and analysis.” In 2004, the brothers decided to replicate the winery project in Lebanon on a grander scale.

According to Sandro, “Both projects are completely different. After all, we are discussing two types of wines born from very particular and special terroirs. The Syrian Domaine de Bargylus will be available for sale in the next few months, while our Lebanese brand, which has yet to be named, will be released in 2009. Both will boast a wine of premium quality and will be positioned on the higher end of the product spectrum.” His brother Karim insists, however, that they will share the same concern for quality control processes.

Both vineyards have planted different cépages (grape varieties) such as Cabernet Sauvignon, Merlot, Syrah, Sauvignon Blanc and Chardonnay. However, the percentages will vary from one winery to the other, allowing the brothers to adapt the vines to regional climate and soil conditions. In addition, production processes will be closely monitored with the help of a French consultant, Stephane Derenancourt.

The Johny R Saadé family, which fully owns the Syrian Domaine de Bargylus and the Saadé Lebanese winery, has invested over $25 million into the project already. The Syrian part is estimated at $4 million while the Lebanese project will eventually require as much as $25 million on its own. The Syrian Domaine de Bargylus will, on its 20 hectares of land, employ around 20 people on a permanent basis, while the Lebanese project is going to employ some 50 people for the time being. “Naturally, these figures do not account for seasonal workers who will evidently contribute to our operations. In addition to its original winery structure, the Lebanon venture will also integrate two other complementary projects, namely a wine museum and a boutique hotel with 30 to 35 rooms,” explained Karim.

For the Saadé brothers, the main rationale behind the wine museum is the added value it will bring to the wine industry in Lebanon, one that can be further complemented by the creation of a “Route du Vin” — a wine tour — of the Bekaa, which will help integrate further the Bekaa valley into the overall Lebanese tourist map.

As Sandro pointed out, “Both projects have been in the pipeline for quite some time. Contrary to popular belief, the wine industry does not generate quick money but is built on a long-term and well-planned approach. This particular sector offers huge potential in Lebanon.”

Targeting the high-end consumers

Both wines produced by the Saadé brothers will target high-end consumers and be marketed away from the traditional supermarket distribution network. “Our wines will be available in restaurants, hotels and specialty stores. We are not relying on the local market, but focusing more on developing a European and international one,” Sandro said. The Saadé brothers are targeting French wine aficionados as they believe France is key in opening the doors of European markets.

While both wineries will include the usual state of the art machineries and equipment as well as the use of stainless steel tanks imported from France, Sandro pointed out that, “we will focus principally on production processes and more particularly on the quality of the grapes used.”

In the end, he knows that despite Lebanon’s wine culture, marketing Lebanese wines might not be an easy task. The young entrepreneur believes that given the relatively small quantity exported by Lebanon, any mishap will affect the industry as a whole and badly reflect on it. An entity that will accredit producers and grant them an equivalent of the French AOC, which late last year the Lebanese government has decided to establish, will provide Lebanese wines with a greater credibility on international markets and facilitate the export process. “Each Lebanese wine is distinctive in its own way. We fully intend on capitalizing on our wine culture to introduce our brands to the world.”

 

 

February 3, 2008 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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