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GCC

Saudi Arabia Making the grade

by Executive Contributor December 30, 2007
written by Executive Contributor

Barring an unprecedented and wholly non-expectable immense natural catastrophe and the slightly greater probabilities of another Middle East war or massive occurrences of domestic or imported terrorism, the outlook for Saudi Arabia’s development in 2008 is for another year of very significant growth. 

It is an absolute no-brainer that a country that derives about half of its GDP and four-fifths of its government revenues from oil and is the world’s leading producer of the commodity will thrive at a time when the barrel sells at close to double what this country needs for its fiscal sustenance — and the oil price outlook for the next few years is for no drop below this break-even point.

Tasks for 2008

That is not to say that Saudi Arabia won’t see a surge in challenges, which in the next 12 months could expand beyond the habitual challenges of properly managing oil production, diversifying the economy and creating employment to meet the needs of the kingdom’s young populace. Tasks which the Saudi decision makers will have to succeed in are: Making good on regulatory improvements, opening the enigmatic market, and controlling the dollar trap. The investment buzz words include petrochemicals, railroads, utilities, telecommunications, industrial cities, general construction, tourism, and education; add question marks under the headers environment, Saudization, regional politics, and international reputation.

In the second year after the kingdom’s accession to the World Trade Organization, Saudi Arabia got an exceedingly positive grade from the World Bank Group’s lectern in the master class on the right way of conducting business on the global playing field. According to the Doing Business 2008 score card by World Bank and International Finance Corporation, Saudi Arabia was among the world’s top 10 achievers for improvements of their business climate in 2007 and now is one of the 25 countries with the most business-friendly regulations on issues such as starting and operating an enterprise, trade and taxation, dispute settlements, and also the ease of winding down a business.   

Reforms cited by the World Bank and IFC as reasons for the improvement in the Saudi business climate included a reduction in the time for setting up a business to 15 days from 39 days, the establishment of a credit bureau for the commercial sector, abolition of a minimum capital requirement as multiple of per-capita GDP, and improvements in import/export procedures.

Saudi Arabia has initiated or announced further reform steps including plans to professionalize and partly privatize its stock market and revamp its index structures. In longer term moves, King Abdullah also recently took forward reforms of the judiciary and stipulated important details of the kingdom’s new succession planning procedures.  

The innovations and reforms notwithstanding, the existential wheels of the Saudi economy are the same that they were in 1998 when then Crown Prince Abdullah made the first bold public statements on the kingdom’s need to diversify away from oil dependency.

The two main wheels in the national assets chamber are hydrocarbons and population growth. However, where these wheels had been spinning in a rather contradictory motion in the last phase of the 20th century under conditions of slow oil revenues and high population growth, the increased speed of the oil wheel in the past seven years has reversed the deficit tendency of the kingdom’s finances and is advancing the probability of turning Saudi Arabia’s domestic labor pool into the long-term resource that it ought to be instead of a cost factor weighing heavy on fiscal situation. The success of this economic sea change will depend on the success of the education and economic reform steps that are ranked top on the current Saudi agenda. 

Shrinking debt burden

The magnitude of the virtuous collaboration of the two economic wheels in Saudi Arabia emerges in the correlation of revenues and education investments. In 1999, national debt had climbed to 115% of GDP because of the high social costs (and a few military expenditures) that had burdened the coffers in the period of low oil prices which hit bottom in the $15 range in 1998.

As the oil price picked up in the new millennium, the kingdom could reduce its debt to 28% of GDP by the start of 2007 while boosting budget allocations to education and qualification measures. For the two years of 2006 and 2007, the total funding allocated to human resources development reached $49 billion and a flood of new schools and colleges was devised.

Whereas the forecast for total nominal GDP and oil revenues anticipates a slight contraction in the year totals for 2007, the debt burden is expected to shrink further to less than 25% of GDP. Real GDP growth is expected at 3.6% to 3.8% for 2007 with an improvement to possibly 5.8% in 2008. Non-oil GDP increases of up to 7% have been forecasted for 2007 and 2008. Inflation pressures are expected to increase from around 3.5% in 2007 to 4% or more in 2008 but will be less than in other GCC countries.

However, perception of the kingdom’s socioeconomic outlook would be seriously distorted if one reviews solely capacity developments on the production side of oil and petrochemicals or industrial goods. Population matters are the country’s real story. The demographics of Saudi Arabia forecast a net population gain of 4.5 million people between 2007 and 2015.

With a projected 29.3 million inhabitants by 2015, the country’s population increase and total labor force will be considerably less than the respective increases and totals in Turkey and Egypt, not to mention Pakistan and India across the Gulf which will add 27 and 143 million persons to their population bases in the next seven years. 

At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s demographic rise in the oil age signifies a nine time multiplying of the population between the baseline year 1950 and 2015, a ratio that exceeds the growth rates in most other countries. With so much increase concentrated in a short period and given the national circumstances of high energy needs due to climate conditions and shortages of easily available fresh water, it becomes very clear why Saudi Arabia is bound to face challenges on its socioeconomic path in the next two decades.

Growing importance

Seeing these factors on one hand and the cultural parameters of an expansion-oriented religious mindset on the other, the role of Saudi Arabia is one of a medium to long-term player destined to seek a position of strength and growing civilizational, economic, and technological importance in the Middle East and Western Asia.

On the short-term horizon, the performance of the Saudi economy in 2007/2008 is based on corporate earnings that improved in the second half of 2007 and are expected to be strong in 2008, on robust consumer confidence that will be reflected in spending growth for 2007, albeit at a lesser rate than in the record retail spending growth year of 2006, and on the continued course of expansionary government spending on infrastructure, industrial, and social investments. 

The reinvestments of Saudi wealth at present and in the coming years are staggered at a volume of $350 billion in oil and gas, petrochemicals, water and power, industry, and construction. Construction of six new economic cities is targeted with a price expectation in the range of $100 billion, which almost looks understated considering the scope of the planned urban realms and the creation of jobs for more than a million people.

Putting the number of jobs under development into perspective, Saudi statistics said the country’s private sector workforce was around 5.5 million persons in 2005. But almost 90% of the labor force are foreigners while the current unemployment rates of nationals in the kingdom (officially 6.9% in 2005 with an increase to over 9% in 2006) are surprisingly high for a country in the middle of a boom cycle which moreover has been pursuing its avowed Saudization campaign for preferential employment of citizens for at least a decade. 

At the junction of 2007 and 2008, the Saudi Stock Exchange is a good proposition for playing catch-up with the bourses of the other member countries in the Cooperation Council of Arab Countries in the Gulf. Although the sentiment among regional analysts has been for the greater part of 2007 that the correction phase of Arab emerging bourses was winding down, the Tadawul Index stayed sluggish for most of the year and on some mid-October days was a tad negative when compared with the start of the year. Retail investors who had been burned worse than most neighbors in the correction of 2006 were slower than these neighbors in returning to the stock game. The SSE started what could become a local bull march in November of 2007, though, and valuations suggested in November that the SSE has some of the Gulf’s most attractive price plays to offer. 

The sub-sectors with the strongest gains to the end of November were insurance — an outlier in more than one way as the sector supplied a big chunk of the year’s primary market action and the newly listed companies started trading on a wave of speculative interest from retail investors — followed by agriculture and industrial stocks. Banking, cement, and telecom values on the other hand are regarded by a number of analysts as sectors where 2008 could see quite good gains.

To keep the dollar peg or not

A fashionable debate in the third and fourth quarters of 2007 is the dollar peg of the riyal and other GCC currencies. Will Saudi Arabia revalue the riyal, or perhaps switch its peg from the dollar to a currency basket? One aspect of this issue is the plan for a GCC economic and monetary union, which has been put on the agenda for 2010.

The balance of currencies is important for a monetary union and the EU’s pioneering acts in building the euro zone have shown an example of firmly aligning currencies in preparation for the step — but it is not unperceivable that the union could come even if some central banks take a slow step away from the dollar peg. However, the while the GCC union is still verbally on the table, the indications of actual implementation on the 2010 timeline are rather weak and ahead of a GCC meeting in Qatar in early December 2007, the political, institutional, and other nation-level obstacles to the step seemed larger than the currency issue.   

The second specter raised in conjunction with the dollar peg is that of imported inflation and self-coercion into following the Federal Reserve’s monetary policies. Analysts have taken differing views in this debate: some regional investment researchers, such as EFG-Hermes, reasoned that prioritizing of domestic concerns in determining of interest rates will be likely to change the Saudi approach away from following the Fed and eventually could lead to increased currency flexibility in the medium term; by contrast, analyst views from inside the Saudi economy seem to be leaning toward continuity of the monetary status quo that has served the kingdom for 21 years. The SABB financial group wrote in its fourth quarter economic report for 2007, “we continue to believe firmly that the Saudi riyal is not going to be revalued.”

Beyond the monetary issues, Saudi Arabia faces a definite need to assert its role as economic value producer and viable business location on the international map. This is where the improvements in the regulations for foreign direct investments and economic participation of non-citizens are crucial. The political perception of Saudi Arabia in Western populations is marred by negative image factors on women’s and human rights, perceived shortfalls in tolerance and individual freedoms, and, in general terms, substantial cultural distance.  

In the past, the cultural distance to developed countries stayed in place while the economic interaction happened in the oil sector through trade and joint ventures with a few corporate partners. Intensification of trade ties and funds flows has occurred on all levels in 2007 from outgoing remittances by foreign workers and heightened investments in global petrochemicals in Europe, the Far East, and the US through the state-backed petrochemicals giant SABIC which expanded its existing international operations and bought GE Plastics n a strategic move. In parallel, the Saudi aim is to attract foreign direct investments into the kingdom at a much greater rate — talk is of luring in $80 billion within 10 or 20 years.

Business leaders with experience in Saudi Arabia advise patience in expecting the implementation of reforms and changes. It would be naïve and dangerous to assume that the kingdom would shape shift into a society molded after the wishes of its economic partners in the developed countries. The question is if the reform impetus will be sufficiently strong to change the hermetic Saudi economy of the past into a hermeneutic state exemplary of a third millennium Islamic national identity and of the new Arab role in the global community. 

From the side of Saudi interests, it is clear that this fortuitous ratio of oil revenues and current account surpluses will not stay as strong as it can be expected for the seven years starting in 2002 and lasting into 2008 or a perhaps a little more. The global economy will not stay on a broad expansion course forever, and the country wants to be ready when the oil price cycle swings again.

December 30, 2007 0 comments
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Off the people, buy the people

by Riad Al-Khouri December 30, 2007
written by Riad Al-Khouri

The past year appears to have been a good one for Jordan; was the same true regarding the well-being of average Jordanians? On the positive side, the country continues opening up to the rest of the region and the world economy. This can be felt in the boardrooms of Amman — though to a lesser extent on the street — and was confirmed by Jordan ranking a phenomenal ninth globally (and first among Arab states) in the Globalization Index for 2007, released last month. Developed by Foreign Policy magazine (published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) in collaboration with consultants A.T. Kearney, the index measured economic, personal, technological, and political integration in 72 countries accounting for 97% of world gross domestic product and 88% of the earth‘s population. The index looks at 12 variables in four baskets: economic integration, personal contact, technological connectivity, and political engagement. Jordan led all of the index’s Arab countries, among which Morocco was 40th worldwide, Tunisia 46th, Saudi Arabia 52nd, Egypt 55th, and Algeria 70th.

In the political dimension, Jordan topped the countries covered by the index, and did well in the personal sphere and in economic integration. A look at Jordan’s foreign partnership agreements confirms the latter element. It is the only Arab country that simultaneously has free trade with the United States, a partnership accord with the European Union, a Qualifying Industrial Zone arrangement with Israel and the US, and membership of the Agadir agreement to facilitate trade among Arab states and the EU. These arrangements put Jordan firmly inside the Western economic and political sphere, but the kingdom also boasts a widening range of links with other countries, as well as membership in international bodies such as the World Trade Organization.

However, in the index’s technological dimension, the country ranked 50th, in stark contrast to other indicators. This combination of high marks in some areas and a dismal showing in another typifies the contradictions in Jordanian life today, which became even more apparent in 2007. For all its development, Jordan still has a way to go in assuring sustainable development, cutting unemployment, and reducing poverty. Given the continuing Jordanian real estate boom, the influx of Gulf and foreign capital into the country, and the presence in the kingdom of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who are mainly not poor, Jordan may this year have evolved more than at any other time in the past half-century. Yet underneath, the country’s traditional core remains.

Among many other spheres, this traditionalism reflects in the country’s parliament as seen once again this year when Jordanians elected a new Chamber of Deputies, comprised of 110 members from 45 electoral districts. Although political parties and movements participated, they won few seats due to the country’s tribal fabric, and Jordan’s electoral law, which adopts the uninominal principle — voting for a single candidate only, rather than for a list, even when the electoral district (as most do) has more than one seat. Vote buying is also important and helps plutocrats win elections. (The government does not deny the existence of such a phenomenon, only saying that the media has exaggerated it.) As a result, the outcome of the November 2007 elections was similar to those of others since 1993, with tribal and traditional figures continuing to dominate, even as globalization sweeps through the country with greater force than ever. 

Examples of this contradiction are apparent in Amman: In the midst of dramatic construction activity and demographic growth, the Jordanian capital is acquiring a modern veneer that hides its traditional fabric. Among many other features of globalization, branding is a feature of daily life in Amman, with massive advertising spending on new or existing brands. However, many of these products are imported, a phenomenon which, coupled with weak exports, exacerbates the country‘s chronic trade gap. In that respect, the latest figures available for the kingdom’s foreign trade are not encouraging. Although the value of exports increased by over 11% during the first nine months of the year compared to the same period in 2006, the much larger figure for imports rose close to 12%, resulting in an increase in the already yawning trade deficit by more than 12%.

In sum, given this volatile mixture of rapid but sometimes superficial development coupled with entrenched traditionalism and a shaky economic base, I predict that in 2008 many Jordanians will continue to feel left behind in the country’s surge toward globalization. The new government formed after the elections must keep the social lid on, especially with fuel price hikes coming from the elimination of subsidies. That will be tough going, but with the US and Israel underwriting the country’s stability, Jordan next year will probably stay the course. Anyway, watch this space.

December 30, 2007 0 comments
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Banking & Finance

IPO Watch

by Executive Contributor December 2, 2007
written by Executive Contributor

Top 10 IPOs for the Region in 2007

1. DP World

UAE, Transport

$2.822 billion, 17% equity offered

Lead Manager: Deutsche Bank

2. Development Bank

Saudi Arabia, Financial Services

$2.807 billion, 70% equity offered

Lead Manager: Samba Financial Group

3. Saudi Kayan Petrochemical

Saudi Arabia, Oil and Gas

$1.8 billion, 45% equity offered

Lead Manager: Samba Financial Group

4. Deyaar Development

Saudi Arabia, Oil and Gas

$882.59 million, 55% equity offered

Lead Manager: Millennium Finance Corporation

5. Kingdom Holding

Saudi Arabia, Financial Services

$860.91 million, 5% equity offered

Lead Manager: Samba Financial Group

6. Air Arabia

UAE, Transport

$713.03 million, 55% equity offered

Lead Manager: SHUAA Capital

7 Jabal Omar Development

Saudi Arabia, Real Estate

$537.01 million, 30% equity offered

Lead Manager: Bank Al Bilad

8. Compagnie Generale Immobiliere

Morocco, Real Estate

$430.97 million, 20% equity offered

Lead Manager: CDG Capital

9. Talaat Mostafa Group

Egypt, Conglomerates

$412.36 million, 10% equity offered

Lead Manager: Hermes Holding Company

10. Al Khalijj Commercial Bank

Qatar, Financial Services

$337.99 million, 17% equity offered

Lead Manager: Commercialbank

Year in review and what’s ahead for 2008

Top 10 IPOs for the Region in 2008

1. Saudi Mobile Telecommunications

Saudi Arabia, Telecoms and IT

$1.5 billion, 40% equity offered

Lead Manager: Banque Saudi Fransi

2. EgyptAir Airlines Holding

Egypt, Transport

$1 billion, 20% equity offered

Lead Manager: Goldman Sachs

3. United International Bank

Bahrain, Financial Services

$800 million, 40% equity offered

Lead Manager: Global House Company

4. International Petroleum Investment Company

UAE, Financial Services

$544.57 million

5 Power and Water Utility Company

for Jubail and Yanbu

Saudi Arabia, Power and Utilities

$466.6 million, 30% equity offered

6. DEPA United Group

UAE, Construction

$400 million

Lead Manager: Morgan Stanley — UBS

7. Prince Abdul Aziz Bin Musaed Economic City

Saudi Arabia, Real Estate

$399.9 million, 30% equity offered

Lead Manager: Deutsche Bank

8. Damas Jewellery

UAE, Consumer Goods

$272.32 million, 25% equity offered

Lead Manager: HSBC Financial Services

(Middle East)

9. Chemanol

Saudi Arabia, Oil and Gas

$200 million, 50% equity offered

Lead Manager: Samba Financial Group

10. Future Pipe Group

UAE, Basic Materials

$108.9 million

Lead Manager: SHUAA Capital

Initial public offerings in the region 2007-2008

The average values for IPOs in the region are expected to grow in 2008, indicating a strong willingness for private or state-owned enterprises to go public and expand into new markets. The highest rises in average IPO value are expected in Bahrain, which is set to rise from $69.48 million per IPO in 2007 to $425 million per IPO in 2008, and Egypt, with an expected rise to $1 billion per IPO in 2008, from $209.55 million per IPO in 2007. United International Bank is preparing to sell 40% of its ownership to investors in Bahrain in the coming year, while EgyptAir Airlines Holding is offering 20% of its equity to investors

Gulf countries expect the most IPOs in 2008. Leading the way in the Gulf is Saudi Arabia, which plans to host 26 IPOs, followed by the UAE at 19, and Bahrain with 3 deals expected. Elsewhere in the region, Syria plans to handle 4 IPOs in 2008, trailed by Egypt and Jordan, both of which expect to host 3 deals.

Regional IPO growth remains hot. The most active sectors for IPOs are headed by financial services, oil and gas, real estate, and transport. Much of the growth in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE is fuelled by increased activity in the financial sector, where firms are seeking to expose themselves to investors and increase credit access to fund expansion into new markets

December 2, 2007 0 comments
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North Africa

Nadim Ghantous General Manager Byblos Bank Africa

by Executive Contributor December 2, 2007
written by Executive Contributor

E What made Byblos Bank decide to expand into Sudan?

Byblos Bank has had a 30-year relationship with Sudan. We never had any problems and it was a good experience. The chairman is familiar with Sudan, which made a big difference in our approach. In 2001/02 there were signs of the country opening up and encouragement from the Central Bank, prompting Byblos Bank to become the first foreign bank in Sudan. In September 2003, we opened in Sudan. Byblos Bank Africa was supported by the OPEC Fund for International Development, which has a 20% stake in the bank, 10% is held by the Islamic Corporation for Development (100% owned by the Islamic Development Bank, IDB), 5% by a Sudanese family, and the other 65% by Byblos Bank Beirut.

E What has been the experience in Sudan so far? Has it been a success?

It was nothing less than a full success. We came at the right time and were able to actively participate in the economic growth of Sudan by providing financing needs to local corporations, offering efficient banking services. We are the only bank that is open until 4:30 p.m. We have foreign currencies available at all times. We provide yearly credit facilities, rather than transaction-by-transaction. We have dedicated staff for corporate and retail banking, who are there to serve our clients.

E What are the quantitative results?

We now have 4,000 clients, out of which 1,000 are companies. Most NGOs, diplomats, and foreign companies bank with us. Our assets now stand at $225 million, coming from a starting capital of $12 million in 2003 that had been increased to $25 million in 2005. And this is coming all from one location — our headquarters and branch.

E What difficulties has Byblos Bank encountered? How has it responded?

The main challenge was to build up a working team. In early 2004, our team consisted of 14 people: five expats from Beirut and nine Sudanese. Today, there are still five expats, but 60 Sudanese. We were able to find young men and women who today are among the best in the industry in Sudan. We looked for Sudanese working in the Gulf who wanted to return. We found young men and women, enthusiastic and ambitious Sudanese eager to learn, with good ethical backgrounds. Our employees undergo on-the-job training here and at the Byblos Bank headquarters in Beirut, where they focus mainly on customer service, risk awareness, and IT-banking.

E How does the banking sector in Sudan differ from others in the region? What are its characteristics?

Sudan is unique in that the banking sector is purely Islamic in the North and only recently conventional in the South, where only one bank operates. It is a very interesting system, similar to investment banking whereby the bank partners up with the client in the project or business, or buys goods on their behalf and resells it to them — at a profit, of course. On the other hand, customers also partner up with banks for investment deposits, whereby they share with the bank in the profits by the loan portfolios, as well as the risks.

sudan is unique in that the banking sector

is purely islamic in the north and only

recently conventional in the south

Another characteristic is that Sudan has a very strong central bank, probably the strongest in the region, that has proven to have excellent skills in good times and bad, managing the liquidity fluctuations, changing the currency — which was done perfectly, controlling local banks, and swiftly getting directly involved where needed.

E What are the challenges facing the banking & finance sector in Sudan?

They lie mainly in coping with future liquidity requirements when the economy will really boom. Another one is to achieve a faster turnover of financial investments.

E What are the medium- and long-term goals of Byblos Bank in Sudan?

Our slogan is “Your bank for life” and therefore we are here to stay indefinitely. We started to branch out in the Khartoum area by building our new HQ — a 14-floor mixed-use tower — in the center of town on Baladiya and Meknemr streets, and another branch close to the industrial zone in Khartoum, North Bahri. This branch will be finished in September 2008 and the headquarters in 2009.

E What products is Byblos Bank offering in Sudan? Which ones are successful and why?

We offer regular services for individual and corporate banking, trade finance, capital expenditure financing, investment deposits, export loans, raw material loans, car loans, housing loans, etc. All are successful because the bank provides swift and efficient service with strong liquidity available at all times and personalized service, as well as tailor-made solutions.

E How does Byblos Bank evaluate the overall economic and business climate in Sudan? Where does Byblos Bank see the country moving over the next years? The basic requirement for any investment is physical security and this is one feature in Sudan that the country can be proud of — it is absolutely safe. The Sudanese people are very welcoming and very courteous, which facilitates a lot of interaction and the solving of problems. Certain ministries are strongly encouraging foreign investment. The country is slowly moving towards more of a consumer society, as can be seen by the number of cars and consumer electronics sold, or supermarkets and restaurants. We do expect a surge

December 2, 2007 0 comments
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Tehran’s domestic battles begin

by Gareth Smith December 1, 2007
written by Gareth Smith

Western media reaction to last month’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran’s nuclear program sounded chillingly like the beat of war drums. Even supposedly reputable outlets seized on the line — from British spin doctors — that Iran had “failed to come clean.” In fact, the report recognized that Iran had improved its cooperation with the IAEA, in line with a decision Tehran took in August despite growing western belligerence.

The US and British-led plan is undermining the pragmatists in Tehran. Hence, last month’s announcement of spying charges against Hossein Mousavian, the former Iranian security official who played a leading role in nuclear negotiations with the Europeans.

I found Mousavian an urbane and intelligent man when I interviewed him several times in 2004 and 2005. He was one of the three Iranians leading talks with the European Union. That was a time when Iran suspended key parts of its program and when some European diplomats spoke privately of a compromise in which Iran would keep at least some uranium enrichment capacity.

The charges against Mousavian — which include passing secrets to the British embassy — have all the hallmarks of being political. The fundamentalists who criticized the talks back in 2003-5 have taken over more and more levers of government power since the election in 2005 of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency.

But Mousavian is part of an older trend of Iranian officials who have paid a price of working for an agreement with the West and then failing to deliver tangible benefits in a compromise that recognizes Iran’s “rights”.

Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, resigned (or was pushed to do so) in October after the failure of his dual strategy of talking to Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy chief, and improving cooperation with the IAEA. The dialogue with Solana was undermined by opponents at home and in Europe.

Gordon Brown, the British prime minister who at first distanced himself from the Middle East policies of his predecessor Tony Blair, made a speech at the London Lord Mayor’s banquet last month that president Bush must have enjoyed. Brown warned Tehran it had a choice between “confrontation with the international community leading to a tightening of sanctions” and “a transformed relationship with the world…if it changes its approach and ends its support for terrorism.”

Western proponents of tougher sanctions and — “if necessary” — military force against Iran argue that harsh treatment will change the behavior of the regime in Tehran. They say existing sanctions are already biting, despite the country’s record oil revenue, which rose by 13.6% to $54 billion last Iranian year (ending March 2007).

Certainly, the international energy majors with existing Iranian interests are pausing. Royal Dutch Shell, Total, OMV and Repsol are all holding off commitments on investment after their agreements in principle over developing Iran’s massive gas reserves — the world’s second largest. Iran has given the companies until June 2008 to decide. But it insists both its gas and oil reserves can be developed if necessary through Iranian companies cooperating with east Asian companies, and some small European companies willing to take risks that may offer huge long-term benefits.

The warming up of the domestic political battles in Tehran also reflects a build up to parliamentary elections due in March. Iranian politics have changed in many ways since the last poll, in February 2004, saw a relatively unified conservative camp win a comfortable majority in a quiet election after many leading reformists were disqualified.

Critics of Ahmadinejad — including both reformists and conservative pragmatists allied to former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani — were encouraged by their performance in December’s local council elections. But in all likelihood, conservatives will retain their parliamentary majority — even if reduced — and maintain their advantage as Iran moves towards the 2009 presidential election.

However, the political pendulum swings in Iran, the western expectation that internal Iranian politics can work in its favor is misguided.

First, the track record is terrible. Consider Bush’s botched intervention in the 2005 presidential election, when his message that the poll “ignored the basic requirements of democracy,” presumably designed to help a boycott campaign led by right-wing exiles, was followed by a high turnout.

Secondly, it is far from clear who the West would like in power in Tehran. Many Washington neo-conservatives, like their Israeli allies, were delighted with Ahmadinejad’s election win, believing to would bring confrontation nearer, and have done nothing to disguise their glee at the propaganda opportunities he has presented them, particularly in remarks about the Jewish holocaust.

But there are still some Europeans who believe an agreement is possible, because they realize, especially after Iraq, what the alternative might be.

 

December 1, 2007 0 comments
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Stand-up and laugh

by Paula Schmitt December 1, 2007
written by Paula Schmitt

The Egyptian American comedian Ahmed Ahmed says in his stand-up show that, because there is a supposed terrorist also called Ahmed Ahmed, his name is in a most-wanted list. That makes air travel a unique — if not, horrible — experience. But one cannot but laugh when he tells of his ordeal: “I always know who the air marshal is on the plane. He is the guy reading People Magazine upside down and looking right at me.” After googling his own name and finding out that indeed there seems to be a terrorist called Ahmed Ahmed, the comedian wonders if the other Ahmed is in the Arab world going through the same identity mix-up: “I swear I am not a comedian, I am a terrorist!”

These and other stories are told by the Axis of Evil, a stand up comedy group formed by Ahmed, Aron Kader (whose father is Palestinian and mother is an American Mormon), Maz Jobrani (Iranian-American) and Dean Obeidallah (Palestinian-American). Of all places, the Axis’s first performance happened where the expression Axis of Evil has a whole different connotation: Washington, D.C. Since then, November 2005, they have been touring America using humor as a weapon against prejudice. Now, after full-house performances throughout the US, the Axis is touring the Middle East with a mission that is as necessary as destroying prejudice: helping make the Arabs laugh at themselves.

In America, the Axis of Evil Comedy Tour has been welcomed with raving reviews by the likes of CNN, Time, National Public Radio, and Newsweek. Along with the laughter, the group aims at promoting a shift in cultural perceptions. “We don’t want to be defined any longer by the worst examples in our community. There are a few terrorists and they define all of us,” said Ahmed in an interview on CNN.

But the paradigms are changing already. A lot has happened since 9/11, when Dean Obeidallah followed the suggestion of a club owner and dropped his Arab surname, performing under his middle name instead, Dean Joseph. Now, the group has become so popular and is so successful in defying prejudice that one of the Axis’s show in the US was sponsored by one of the main targets of the jokes: the FBI. With some of the officers attending one of the performances, Ahmed looks at them, sitting close to the stage, and tells the audience “It’s so nice to be standing in front of the FBI and not be handcuffed.”

In his routine, Ahmed reminds the audience that after 9/11, hate crimes against Middle Easterners increased by 1,000%, but that still leaves them in fourth place among hate crime victims — behind blacks, gays and Jews. “I just want to be number one in something,” he joked. United in prejudice, but with the wisdom to transform pain into pleasure, the ethnic comedians are more important in healing and unifying than they are given credit for. Quoting a colleague who is a rabbi, Ahmed says “you can’t hate anybody when you are laughing with them.”

But do Arabs easily laugh at themselves? Kader has one line aimed at the more uptight, imitating a fictitious Arab who insists he does indeed have a sense of humor: “Whoever says we don’t have a sense of humor, I will kill you and burn your flag.” But it takes a lot of high self-esteem and intellectual freedom to laugh at oneself. The only practicing Muslim in the group, Ahmed jokes that “you know you’re a Muslim when you drink, gamble and have sex but you won’t eat pork.”

Comedy is about stereotypes. As a Brazilian, I know my country has them in abundance and I was genuinely offended when my government threatened to sue the producers of the Simpsons cartoon, after one episode showed the Simpson family travelling to Rio to find out what happened to the money they were donating to a boy living in a slum. On the same trip, the Simpsons watch TeleBoobies, a show in which semi-naked girls entertain Brazilian children, while the Brazilian public transport system is depicted as one long conga line. Sadly, even our president at the time made the surreal comment that the cartoon “brought a distorted vision of Brazilian reality.”

Since when does comedy have the duty to reproduce reality? What some suspect, though, is that the president was offended not by the distortion, but precisely by the small bits that didn’t distort our reality all that much. After the embarrassing, irrelevant dispute, Homer Simpson made his retribution in style. In a later episode, he is the proud owner of a monkey. And he asks his friend to be careful with the animal, as it was a present from Brazil, and whose pedigree is very important, since “this monkey is the cousin of the tourism minister.” Kudos.
 

December 1, 2007 0 comments
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Hardliner city

by Andrew Tabler December 1, 2007
written by Andrew Tabler

Until recently, Syria bucked the age-old political dictum that regimes under intense external pressure halt domestic reforms until the coast is clear. The country’s 10th Five Year Plan, approved a year after Syrians were named suspects in the murder of the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, introduced a slew of economic and social reforms designed to transform Syria from a state-dominated and socialist system to one involving greater domestic freedoms and a partnership with the country’s vibrant private sector. While liberalization in Syria’s finance, forex and trading regimes continue to unfold, Israel’s bombing of an alleged Syrian “nuclear” facility on September 6th has triggered the widest crackdown since the dark-days of the 1980s on Western influence in Syria and the ways its people communicate with the outside world.

The first signs came in mid-September when the Syrian government announced that names of all schools, businesses and shops must be in Arabic ahead of Damascus’ serving as the 2008 Arab Cultural Capital. As businesses with western names like KFC and Shrimpy prepared to change their marquees, foreign schools and universities were ordered to integrate Syrian curriculum into their hitherto Western teaching models. Even Arab European University — one of the darlings of Syria’s European-supported reform process — was forced to drop the term “European” in favor of “International”.

Internet speeds throughout the country then slowed to a trickle in late September without reason. Rumors filled the Syrian capital that a Finnish firm supplied technology to Syrian authorities to more closely monitor internet traffic in the country. Suddenly added to the list of banned opposition websites and blogs were such popular services such as Facebook and even some functions of Google news. The new software is rumored to allow complete tracking of individual e-mail accounts inside and outside of Syria.

Syrian “reformers” ran for cover. Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdullah Dardari — Syria’s reform guru and author (with German assistance) of the Five Year Plan — recently stopped meeting foreign media without prior permission from Syria’s Ministry of Information. As President Assad’s right hand of reform, Dardari is under intense criticism by pundits and economists for everything for fiddling with the economic numbers to his stark warnings that Syria must cut its annual $7 billion subsidies bill or risk a fiscal crisis of major proportions. While Dardari insists that Syrian oil production is plummeting at a rate of 11% and therefore the state must accelerate efforts to make up the difference through taxation, his critics say the high price of oil will keep the budget deficit in check. The subsequent announcement by his rival, Finance Minister Mohammed al-Hussein, that the 2008 budget deficit would be in excess of $3.8 billion, down from a $5.86 billion only five years ago, failed to stem the tide of calls for Dardari’s head in a much-anticipated cabinet change. Neither did the regime’s midnight hike of gasoline prices by 20% two weeks ago and to be followed by a 20% hike next year. Diesel is still only $0.14 a liter, however, ensuring that a steady supply of smuggled fuel will continue to make its way to Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan where it fetches nearly five times the price.

But who’s counting anyway. Dardari’s effort to launch an “Executive Plan” to monitor the Five Year Plan and actually see if Syria was meeting its targets was quietly shelved late last summer for unknown reasons. The regime’s preference to fly blind in reform followed the state’s closure earlier this year of the renowned media coverage monitor IPSOS-STAT’s Damascus offices. Syria might have plenty of new private sector newspapers, magazines and radio stations, but no one knows exactly who listens to them and how they compete with their hard-line state-owned competitors.

Rollbacks in Syrian reform this autumn are the latest chapter in a two-year hiatus in political and social legislation. In his acceptance speech to a second seven-year term as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said Syria has been in a “battle with destiny” (presumably with Israel and the US) and therefore has not had time to follow up on changes to the political parties, emergency and NGO laws promised in the 2005 Baath Party conference. The latter law, rumored to be on the verge of passage last September, is now expected next year.

So why is the regime letting private sector banks, insurance companies, foreign exchange house and trading companies flourish? Some people say it’s due to the state’s fiscal problems. But a closer look shows that, ironically, Syria’s pullout from Lebanon in April 2005 was perhaps the most powerful impetus for reform during Assad’s first term. Strained ties with Lebanon forced the state to implement long-dormant legislation to allow Syria’s private sector to do what Syrians long contracted Lebanese to do for them. In the bizarre world of Syrian reform, Friedrich Nietzsche’s quote “that which does not kill us makes us stronger” has never rang more true.
 

December 1, 2007 0 comments
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Editorial

A different focus

by Yasser Akkaoui December 1, 2007
written by Yasser Akkaoui

This year’s Executive Facts and Forecasts has picked three nations in the MENA region that it believes best represents its economic heartbeat: an emerging Sudan, a thrusting UAE and a Lebanon that is in transition but which has potential in abundance.

One of the exciting stories of the past years has been the resurgence of Sudan from decades of political conflict and war, enabling the country to truly access its natural resources — such as oil and sugar — and use these to develop a burgeoning economy. The result has been double-digit growth that has propelled Sudan into the limelight and made it attractive to investors seeking to diversify their emerging markets portfolio.

The UAE (and the rest of the GCC for that matter) had another record year and will continue to set new economic benchmarks. Those who believe that the oil boom is past its peak had better think again. This is not a flash-in-the-pan correction similar to what was experienced in the 70s; black gold will maintain its robustness to fund even greater projects and fuel prosperity throughout the region and beyond. But this success is not just down to increased oil revenues; they have merely helped implement a remarkable vision that has seen assets used to create sustainable economic development and transform a region into throbbing modern metropolis

Lebanon, being the regional barometer that it is, must thank its lucky stars that the political crisis that has plagued the little Mediterranean nation since mid-2006 happened during the current oil boom. The economic development in the GCC has allowed Lebanese talent to be absorbed into, and contribute to, the dream and brand Lebanon was able to diversify and become less reliant on an ailing and limited local economy. The good news is that the election of a new president at the end of 2007 should herald at least three years of calm and allow Lebanon to once again take its place as the most elegant boutique in the regional mall.

What we at Executive hope to showcase in this annual issue is that, despite the tag of instability that is so often attached to the region, the Middle East and North Africa is filled with credible and sustainable opportunities with the vision and talent to make them happen.

 

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North Africa

The Maghreb – Opening markets

by Executive Staff December 1, 2007
written by Executive Staff

Although both Tunisia and Morocco have free trade deals with the European Union and Algeria’s economic and political ties with Britain have reached an unprecedented high, there is a growing feeling in all three Maghreb countries that rapid growth will be spurred from the southeast — the Gulf — rather than from the North.

Even before oil prices rocketed to $100 a barrel, Gulf investors had begun to move into North Africa in a big way, eyeing especially tourism and real estate opportunities in Tunisia and Morocco, while banking interests kept a close watch on the possibilities afforded by future privatization of the monolithic Algerian state banking sector.

Gulf money is, ironically, being starved of investment opportunities at home while in Europe much of the focus previously directed towards the Maghreb is shifting to the newer and poorer members of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe.

Yet the influx of Gulf money is neither charity towards fellow Arabs nor less demanding of moves to liberalize the Maghrebian economies and open up sectors previously denied to private sector investment. The UAE firms Emaar, Dubai Holding and Abu Khater Investment Group are moving into the region in a big way. And the decision to allow “alternative” financial products in Morocco — for which read Islamic finance — opens up the possibility for the spread of a banking system that is also gaining roots in London.

Backed by this new source of interest, the countries of the Maghreb can look forward to 2008 in a situation of macroeconomic stability and steady growth.

However, the region will have to keep up the pace of reform if it is to continue to attract petrodollars as well as tackle its leading economic and social headache — high unemployment among quickly-growing, young populations. All three have kept inflation in check but pressures remain, meaning that significant monetary and fiscal relaxation would be ill-advised. The encouragement of private sector job-creation as opposed to public sinecures is the priority. This will entail sustained deregulation and liberalization, robust financial sectors and the continued development of trade and investment ties.

Morocco

Morocco has achieved average GDP growth of 5.4% since 2001, thanks to a raft of reforms, but is expected to only achieve 2.5% this year. The drop is mainly due to the effect of a severe drought on agriculture, which contributes 20% to GDP and more than 40% to employment. The cereal harvest fell from 9.3 million tons to 2 million tons and exports of products like citrus fruits have also nosedived.

The country is committed to reducing its reliance on agriculture, and the government is confident the economy will bounce back and targeted 6.8% growth in 2008. The IMF forecasts a marginally more modest 5.9%. In the third quarter of 2007, due mainly to the lively services and construction sectors, unemployment dipped beneath the psychologically important 10% level, despite the loss of 20,000 agricultural jobs. As elsewhere in the region, unemployment is a serious issue, with the government saying 400,000 jobs a year must be created over the next 10 years to keep pace with population growth and reduce overall joblessness. This is no small feat — over the past 10 years, a period of relatively high growth, on average only 130,000 new jobs were created annually.

With fears of inflation eliminating any expansionary fiscal policy as a tool for cutting unemployment, job creation will have to come from the private sector, aided by the government’s pro-business stance. Sectors such as telecom, transport and the all-important labor-intensive tourism sector are all expected to register growth between 7 and 9% over the next year.

As well as seeking to strengthen the trade-oriented industries that benefit from EU open ties, Morocco is seeking to develop trading relations with its immediate neighbors, which have been weak up to this point, not least down to Algeria’s support for the Polisario Front in Rabat’s continuing conflict over the Western Sahara.

Tunisia

In 2007 Tunisia marked 20 years since the Change, when President Habib Bourguiba, who had led the country since independence, was replaced by Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali. Under Ben Ali, Bouguiba’s socialist model has been incrementally rolled back in favor of free markets and private enterprise.

For the past 35 years, Tunisia has made attracting FDI to the country a cornerstone of economic policy, and has specifically encouraged investment in export-oriented sectors. Its geographical position, relatively affordable land and labor, and most importantly a range of trade deals, particularly that with the EU, are touted by officials as ideal reasons to invest in the country.

This policy has been accelerated since the Change, with privatization and a gradually more open economic policy being keys to ensuring that foreign capital continues to flow in, and exports to flow out. FDI grew from $83 million in 1986 to $3.65 billion in 2006, and has created an estimated 270,000 jobs in that time.

The IMF has praised Tunisia’s “outward-oriented development strategy” which eschews protectionism and looks to encourage foreign participation in the economy and stimulate exports. Over the past decade, exports have grown by 15% annually and now contribute more than half of GDP, compared to 35% 20 years ago.

Now Tunisia is focusing on further improving its attractiveness to foreign investors and in increasing the export of “value-added” — i.e. more expensive and higher-margin — products. The 11th Development Plan includes pledges to “stimulate private investment, particularly in high value-added sectors” and “improve the business climate, attract more FDI.”

Legislation is in the pipeline to allow companies to apply for 10-year tax holidays on profits derived from exports, after which they will be taxed at 10% — equal to the lowest rate in the EU.

No set timeline has been laid out for the shift of the dinar to full convertibility. Most estimates are in a vague three-to-five year range, despite the undoubted benefits of convertibility to foreign investors. While Tunisia’s present system of controlled floating rates is seen both as transitional and not a huge barrier to investment, the fact that there is no set date for full convertibility puts in doubt the political will to implement a full float.

Tunisia’s macroeconomic stability looks secure enough, promoting a continuation of strong growth. This growth will be essential to ensuring that jobs are created for the growing population, many of whom are — or will be — young university graduates, equipped to work in high-end, demanding jobs.

Unemployment has remained stubbornly around 14% for the past half decade. By continuing to promote FDI in high-earning sectors, the government is taking some of the right steps to increase employment. However, they need to be supplemented by a loosening of red tape and an even more active encouragement of private enterprise. The official projection is for unemployment to be cut to 13.4% by 2011 — even taking into account fast population growth, this seems woefully short of what is needed.

Algeria

The soaring world price of energy defies all attempts by oil and gas rich countries to diversify the fundamentals of their economies. Algeria’s non-hydrocarbon growth this year is expected to be 6%, with overall growth of 5% as hydrocarbon output was reduced. Even so, the cash interpretation of these percentages is such that the significance of oil and gas in the economy is going up, not down.

Government coffers are brimming with hydrocarbon revenues, and money is being ploughed into big projects such as the $60 billion Complementary Plan for Support to Growth which aims to bring the country’s infrastructure up to the standards of the developed world, as well as providing jobs for the country’s unemployed.

This level of funding coming on-stream requires a continuation of careful monetary policy, particularly as other pressures such as rising food and construction costs are also present. The IMF predicts 4% inflation by year-end, tolerable for an emerging market, but has warned that keeping a lid on prices is a key priority for the country, along with the elusive goal of a diversification away from hydrocarbons.

Two other, thornier problems highlighted by the organization are high unemployment and an underdeveloped financial sector. Overall unemployment is 13% officially, but youth unemployment may be as high as 45% — a very serious issue indeed for the country. While public funds and continued growth should help cut unemployment to a degree, a report prepared for the IMF has suggested that supply-side reforms will also be beneficial. These include easing labor legislation to make hiring and firing easier, a reduction in employer contributions to social security, using oil revenues to cut taxes and ensuring that the financial system is robust enough to support private enterprise.

In 2007, Algeria recommenced privatizing its previously troubled banking sector, offering 51% of state-owned Crédit Populaire d’Algérie (CPA), the country’s fifth-largest bank, with a 15% market share. Technical bids were submitted by several large international banks, including Banco Santander, Citibank and BNP Paribas and the deal was expected to be sealed before the end of the year at the time of going to press.

The fact that such large banks are enthusiastic about the privatization bodes well for the Algerian banking sector, where previous privatisations ended in crisis and renationalization. It is also a fact that has not escaped the bigger Gulf banks. State-owned Algerian banks account for 95% of loans and deposits, but suffer from inefficiency and a high proportion of non-performing loans — around 38% of all credit, compared to 5.8% in the private sector.

However, there are currently no published plans to privatize the largest state banks, Banque Exterieur d’Algérie (BEA), Banque Nationale D’Algérie (BNA) and Banque de l’Agriculture et du Développement Rurale (BADR). Since they would all benefit from the capital, technology and professionalism that the private sector can bring, it is only a matter of time before the government applies the same logic to them that it did to CPA and Banque de Developpement Local (BDL).

And those all important new ties with Britain, now assuming the economic mantle once worn by France? Bouteflika’s two-day visit to London in July 2006 was the first visit for an Algerian head of state to the UK since the country gained independence from France in 1962. His 48 hours in London was aimed at promoting Algeria to potential UK investors and the broader international community, but especially to the British energy and telecom sectors. Britain’s recognition of the potential gains from these newly forged links was signalled by its intention to acquire larger premises in Algiers for its embassy and easier visa access. The British Council is also back after a 13 year absence.

Peter Grimsditch is editorial director of the Oxford Business Group.

 

December 1, 2007 0 comments
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The Tunisian Change

by Peter Speetjens December 1, 2007
written by Peter Speetjens

On November 7, 2007, it was precisely 20 years ago that “the change” took place. Today, one month later, the streets of Tunis are still colored red with tens of thousands of the nation’s flags and images of President Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali, while you cannot open a magazine without reading about the incredible progress the country made under the inspiring guidance of its great leader.

So, the national press agency reported that on the 20th anniversary of “the change” 3,000 intellectuals, members of civil society and jurists had signed a declaration praising the gains the country had achieved, while emphasizing that these could not have been achieved without the will and “perseverance” of the Tunisian President. Réalités Magazine put a heavily retouched photo of the president on the cover with the headline: “The new face of Tunisia.”

This kind of journalism can hardly do any good for the country, as it just screams for an ironic reply, knowing that “the change” first of all, and rather euphemistically, refers to the disposal of former President Habib Bourgiba by current President Ben Ali. After some 30 years at the helm, Bourgiba was judged “senile”. Newly sworn in, Ben Ali solemnly declared he would never stay as long in power as his predecessor, yet 20 years and two constitutional amendments later, Ben Ali still firmly sits on the throne. Hence, he also known as “Ben a vie” (Ben for life).

Still, putting irony aside, one cannot but admit that Tunisia has booked impressive results under Ben Ali’s leadership. For “the change” not only refers to the change at the top, but also to gradual transformation of Tunisian society: From a socialist-inspired model, in which the benevolent state took care of everything and everyone, to a more liberal scheme, in which free market forces and private enterprise were allowed to take center stage. Remarkably, Tunisia achieved its change without any major social upheavals or financial crises, despite the fact the country’s economy was in a deplorable shape by 1987.

While countries such as Egypt, Syria and Algeria are still struggling to come to terms with the reality of the post-Cold War era, the Tunisian private sector today contributes 76% to the country’s GDP of some $33 billion, employs 71% of the country’s workforce, and represents 64% and 85% of annual investments and exports respectively. In addition, Tunisia has known a more or less constant annual economic growth rate of 4% to 5% annually and consequently saw its GDP almost double since the infamous change.

The good thing about the Tunisia transformation is that economic progress so far did not come at the expense of social development. So, still some 80% of the population belongs to the country’s middle class, while less than 4% lives under the national poverty line. Nearly every household is connected to the electricity grid. An increase in health centers and hospitals, combined with free medical care for the needy, saw life expectancy increase to an average 73 years, while illiteracy has been reduced to less than 20%.

The latter may still seem a lot, yet one should know that by the end of the French colonial rule in 1956 no less than 98% of Tunisians were illiterate. In that sense, it is no exaggeration to state that Tunisia has come a very long way, especially as it did so without an abundance in natural resources. Add to that the country’s safety record and, last but not least, the fact that in 2008 Tunisia’s free trade agreement with the European Union will go into top gear, and one understands why Tunisia has become a darling destination for international investors.

So, the Spaniards bought themselves into the country’s formerly state-owned and quite lucrative cement industry. The Italians have signed up to construct an electricity plant and industrial city. The Turks are building an airport and the Indians a phosphate producing plant. In recent years however, it has especially been the Emiratis who have come to appreciate the Tunisian model and the country’s strategic position on the edge of Europe.

It made President Ben Ali a busy man. In July, he laid the cornerstone for “The City of the Century,” Dubai Holding’s $15 billion dollar mixed-use project on the edge of Tunis, while in November he laid yet another symbolic first stone for “Tunis Sorts City,” Bukhatir’s $5 billion theme-based development on the shores of the capital’s Lac du Nord.

Seeing Tunisia’s achievements over the last 20 years, it is all rather unfortunate that the country’s media still too often behave as a caged bird. Its overzealous parroting and personal worship only leads to unintended irony. Ben Ali, the new face of Tunisia? No, not quite. Ben Ali, the face of a remarkable Tunisian turnabout? Like it or not, but most probably the only reply to that question would be a wholehearted: yes, indeed.

 

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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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