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Special Section

Luxury cars

by Anthony Mills November 1, 2004
written by Anthony Mills

The local luxury car market is all but paralyzed in Lebanon, thanks to the sky-high customs duties implemented 10 years ago have. Taxes on upper high-end cars like Maybach, SLR, Ferrari, Maserati, Aston Martin, Lamborghini, Bentley or Rolls Royce run at close to 50% of the car’s base value, and that’s not including the 10% VAT and 8% registration costs. The result? Luxury vehicle buyers in Lebanon pay between 60% and 80% of the car’s base value in tax – so, a Maybach or SLR will set you back around $700,000, and a limited edition Ferrari costs more than $1 million. Even for wealthy Lebanese, prices like that are prohibitive, especially during a recession, and even free-spending Gulf Arabs recoil at the prospect of paying so much tax for a summer hotrod. With no reduction of customs on the horizon, some distributors are considering closing up shop altogether while many are selling cheaper models to make up for the loss. Others plan to continue offering exorbitantly-priced vehicles because they bolster overall brand image.

“There is practically no market for high-end luxury vehicles in Lebanon because of the taxes imposed on these kinds of cars,” declared Samir Homsi, president of the auto importers’ association. “The only way to solve the problem is to get rid of the registration fees and bring the duties down to at least 30%.”

Overall sales of high-end luxury vehicles in Lebanon do not exceed 30 a year. Aston Martin distributors, Mana Automotive, expect to sell five cars this year; last year they sold two. As for the Bentleys, they have been selling, on average, one a year since the high customs duties were implemented. The Maybach, distributed by Mercedes dealers Gargour & Fils, went on sale last year and only two have been sold so far, with no more sales expected by the dealers for the rest of 2004. The MacLaren SLR, also distributed by Gargour, debuted this year and two have been sold, with one more sale expected before the end of the year.  Faring slightly better are Ferrari and Maserati, distributed by Bazerji & Sons, which expect to sell eight and 11 vehicles, respectively, by the year’s end.

For Roll Royce, the news is even grimmer: distributors Saad & Trad haven’t sold one of the prized automobiles since 2002. Prior to that, they were selling about one or two a year. The drop in Lebanon Rolls Royce sales is of such a concern to the Rolls Royce mother company that they are sending over a representative to discuss the possibility of suspending Rolls Royce sales in Lebanon altogether. Also the agents for Bentley, Saad & Trad added the Lamborghini franchise to their roster this year, but have not sold any of the cars to date.

To perk up slumping sales, Saad & Trad, along with other distributors, are beginning to offer somewhat less-expensive, but nonetheless still pricey, models. The Bentley Continental GT, for example, costs around $90,000 less than the average classic model and the distributors expect to sell between five and seven cars a year. “The customer says to himself: it’s cheaper and it’s still a Bentley. But it’s not as though we’re going to sell 10 or 12,” noted Michel Trad, Saad & Trad director.

For their part, Mana Automotive expects to begin selling a cheaper version of the Aston Martin some time in 2005. Excluding VAT and registration fees, it will cost roughly $150,000, which is about $100,000 less than the current cheapest model.  “More and more car manufacturers are targeting what we call the Porsche niche,” explained Alex Samaha, Mana Automotive general manager. “They are developing cars that will sell at about the price of a Porsche Carrera. If we had an Aston Martin like that, then instead of selling four to six Aston Martins a year we might sell 15 to 20.”

Other brands, however, will not be offering lower-priced models. Mercedes will continue selling the steeply priced Maybach and offer the equally expensive MacLaren SLR because although almost no sales are expected, the two luxury models will bolster the Mercedes brand as a whole, buttressing sales of other Mercedes models. “It’s not the money we make out of it,” said Negib Debs, the Mercedes-Benz sales manager. “It’s done for prestige. Plus, Mercedes doesn’t want to leave the upscale segment in the hands of Bentley and Rolls Royce.”

Mana Automotive has an additional motivation for plodding away at its unprofitable luxury vehicle business. “Traditionally, strong distributors need a luxury brand,” said Samaha. “For the moment, the investment in the premises, tools, training, and parts that it takes to sell these kinds of cars, and the margins we make, make it a losing – at best a break-even – business.”

To further boost the company’s sales, Mana Automotive is set to add the Ford owned Jaguar and Volvo to its already existing portfolio – which includes Ford’s Aston Martin and the Land Rover – when the distribution of all four brands is consolidated in Lebanon.  “We will be well positioned to be the company under which such a consolidation would take place, since we already have two of their brands, and are selling the Range Rover well,” Samaha said.

For the rest of high-end car distributors, though, their saving grace remains the reduction of the government customs duties, which would increase sales dramatically. The government would actually benefit more from a rise in sales than it does from the customs duties it imposes on the few high-end luxury cars that are currently sold in Lebanon.

Homsi asserted that if customs duties were reduced the number of luxury high-end vehicles sold in Lebanon would jump from not more than thirty to well over 200.

Notably, he said, Gulf Arabs who for the moment ship their plush cars over for the summer, would begin buying cars here. Customs duties on luxury cars in Dubai, for example, run at about 5%. The Bentley dealer in Dubai sells over 20 cars a year.

Fadi Makki, director-general of the ministry of economy, said he agreed that a reduction in taxes would help the situation, but added that only the finance ministry could decide the matter. A spokesperson for the finance ministry, meanwhile, said only the finance minister was in a position to comment on whether or not the present customs policy was economically sound, but he was unavailable for comment as a result of the 21 October resignation of the cabinet. Market observers, however, say the situation is unlikely to change any time soon, as the people benefiting from customs duties are not the same as those who would benefit from increased sales taxes. The former have no desire to relinquish their source of income.

Some importers suggest that if customs are reduced, and Lebanon really establishes itself again as the playground of rich Gulf Arabs, the latter would account for the vast majority of increased luxury car sales. For the moment, they make up a negligible portion because although they can buy cars in Lebanon customs tax-free if they take the cars back to the Gulf, most want to keep the car in Lebanon as a summer toy. To do so, they would have to pay customs. It costs less to ship cars in from the Gulf.

Even if the government did reduce customs duties, other impediments to the sale of high-end luxury cars in Lebanon would remain, said some industry observers. First, since the war, and particularly since the beginning of the country’s economic downturn, a number of the Lebanese who can afford high-end vehicles don’t want to be seen in them. This is particularly apparent in the case of stately cars like the Maybach. Although drivers are less hesitant about showing off in a luxury sports care, Lebanon has no roads on which to race a Ferrari, Lamborghini or SLR.

Other industry insiders, though, counter that with the renaissance of downtown Beirut as a hub for the wealthy, well-off Lebanese are rediscovering their taste for top-end cars. And those – both Lebanese and Gulf Arabs – who buy the sports cars, are, they maintain, more interested in exhibiting them than in racing them. “The majority want to show off,” stated Trad of Saad &Trad.

Importers say the few buyers who can afford high-end luxury vehicles fall into two distinct categories: those with established wealth in the family – the bourgeoisie – and those whose wealth is newly-acquired – the ‘nouveaux riches.’ It is the latter, one importer said, who seek to aggressively flaunt their riches, to shove it in people’s faces, to provoke. They often buy several luxury cars. The former want simply to satisfy their egos. Their attitude is: “I can afford it, so I’ll buy it,” said one importer. “Of course the ‘see what I’m driving’ attitude is also present. But it’s in the background.”

This division is also apparent in the choice of brands. “I see a chairman of a bank in a Jaguar,” said Ferrari distributor Bazerji. “But a ‘golden boy’ from the stock exchange I see more in a Ferrari or Maserati. The Ferrari is a show-off car, for people who want to show they have achieved something.”

Distributors agreed that most luxury car buyers attach enormous value to after-sales service and personalized treatment. They want to be pampered by dealers, both during and after any purchase. And they want to be sure that the car will be looked after and properly maintained. Distributors have to establish a reputation. “We show them what we’ve got, the tools. We even let buyers meet the engineers. Marketing is by word of mouth,” said Samaha. “We don’t rely on advertising. People who are interested in this category of car know where to find them.”

Box

Aston Martin Vanquish S: $350,000 (incl. 20% customs duty on the first $13,300 of the car’s CIF value + 50% on the remaining value) + 10% VAT + 8% registration fees

MacLaren SLR: $706,100 (incl. 20% customs duty on the first $13,300 of the car’s CIF value + 50% on the remaining value) + 10% VAT + 8% registration fees

Maybach (short wheel base): $658,900 (incl. 20% customs duty on the first $13,300 of the car’s CIF value + 50% on the remaining value)

Lamborghini Gallardo: $254,900 (incl. 20% customs duty on the first $13,300 of the car’s CIF value + 50% on the remaining value) + 10% VAT + 8% registration fees

Rolls Royce: $602,000 (incl. 20% customs duty on the first $13,300 of the car’s CIF value + 50% on the remaining value) + 10% VAT + 8% registration fees

Bentley Arnage RL: $229,400 (incl. 20% customs duty on the first $13,300 of the car’s CIF value + 50% on the remaining value

Ferrari Enzo Limited Edition: $1,179,700 (incl. 20% customs duty on the first $13,300 of the car’s CIF value + 50% on the remaining value) + VAT + 8% registration fees

Maserati Quattro Porte: $150,000 (incl. 20% customs duty on the first $13,300 of the car’s CIF value + 50% on the remaining value) + 10% VAT + 8% registration fees

November 1, 2004 0 comments
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Special Section

CATCHING UP WITH THE GLOBAL AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY

by Thomas Schellen November 1, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Some gadgets in the arsenals of today’s automotive designers and engineers will not befit the Lebanese market. Take for example one device that aims to improve the road safety of the new Citroen models C4 and C5, which had their world premiere this autumn at the Mondiale de Automobile in Paris and will be debuting next month in Beirut.

The cars have a system capable of monitoring lane-separating guidance lines on the road. Infrared sensors under the car trace these lines and trigger an alarm if the driver leaves his lane at a speed of more than 80km/h without setting a direction light. An alarm hits daydreaming/sleepy drivers in form of vibrations in his car seat, shaking them to attention where they might feel it most, although waggish motoring journalists immediately ventured that some drivers might now cruise in deliberate serpentine patterns along the highways, so as to enjoy a massage to their bottoms.

While Citroen’s new optional lane-crossing alert might not make it anywhere into the catalogue of standard equipment required by safety codes, investment into the system would definitely be wasted on Lebanese roads. Apart from reasons rooted in driving habits here, road conditions – beginning with uneven lane markings – simply wouldn’t be suitable.

This puts the device in the same league as some of the proximity alarms in big luxury cars, through which manufacturers wanted to protect their clientele from the experience of denting their fenders when scraping too close to other cars. In wheel-to-wheel Beirut traffic, some drivers had their alarm beep every second minute of normal maneuvering.

The serious reality underlying such amusing discrepancies between international and local driving cultures is that the global car industry is today dealing with issues that sometimes seem light years apart from the awareness of a market like Lebanon whose annual adoption of new vehicles would even in ideal scenarios be a split atom compared to current worldwide output of 60 million cars. But for having any chance to integrate this country into the much-discussed future of the automobile, the policy makers, auto importers and consumers of Lebanon must stay in touch and often catch up with these developments. 

It starts with the industry’s fundamental economic and operational concerns. The big car producers today encounter decreasing demand growth in their European, American and Japanese markets. Their mega-plants with daily output capacities of 700 or more vehicles per day are regarded increasingly as inflexible and past their prime and are challenged by leaner competitors with more modern plants and/or lower labor costs. As the most recent capacity reduction plans and intense disputes between labor and management in the European General Motors factories illustrated ever so clearly, these problems greatly burden manufacturers as well as society at large and put planning abilities of industry strategists to the test.

Analysts specialized on the automotive industry have suggested recently that the next big thing in car manufacturing will be in sourcing components globally from low-wage manufacturing locations and decentralized production of built-to-order vehicles in small factories very close to their markets. Studies indicated furthermore that the road to new profits for an automotive brand in a decade or so could be to turn itself into a mobility provider, a company that satisfies driving needs through not only in producing cars but employs a business model to maintain ownership of the vehicles and lease them to customers in several cycles. This would allow producers to realize their profits throughout the entire life of the vehicle from provision of financing and insurance services, along with revenue from after-sales maintenance and repairs.

 

Killing us softly

Could such fundamental changes in the auto industry be harnessed to the advantage of Lebanon? It may be a daring thought, even though the impact of such eminent changes in manufacturing and brand management on the local auto sector appears undeniable. However, in the car industry and among public sector planners here, only a rather limited number of forward-thinking minds seem today concerned with the evolution of mass mobility and long-term issues.

Besides automotive manufacturing and economics, these vital questions also regard technological changes mandated by the negative aspects of the century-old gasoline burning combustion engine. The depletion of fossil fuels – a concern exacerbated by growing demand for cars in new markets such as China, where sales of locally produced cars reached 1.51 million units in the first eight months of 2004 – is bound to resurge as the auto’s global economic bogeyman, illuminated scarily by projections of ever-rising oil prices.

Energy consumption and the health and climatic impact associated with the automobile are issues that societies ignore only at their own peril. Commitments to pollution avoidance, energy conservation and environmental care are understood today as guiding necessities for the survival of the global automotive culture. These commitments have already resulted in massive improvements in lowering fuel consumption and reducing harmful emissions, but they also require responsible decision making from national levels.

In these regards, Lebanon has a colossal untapped potential for improvements through policy making. Current taxation of motor vehicles is heaviest on new and most lenient on technically obsolete cars. As such, the policy incorporates a certain component of social concern for transportation needs of lower earners but runs very much counter to all ambitions of making traffic safer and cleaner.

If Lebanese lawmakers could envision a tax model capable of encouraging citizens to scrap over-aged cars and acquire new, energy-efficient ones – for example by allowing a limited-time transfer of the tax rate due on a very old car if it is replaced with a new, efficient model – they could create incentives for rejuvenating the national car stock with positive impulses for national health, safety and economy. Action is also mandated urgently in respect to controls of pollution levels and creation of mechanisms enabling authorities to interfere when public health is endangered. By not addressing issues such as the need to halt traffic during pollution emergencies, legislators here further widen the distance between the global and local automotive cultures.

Positive signs of assimilation of the Lebanese driving standards into global best practices came this year through the progressing implementation of the mandatory car insurance requirements and road worthiness inspections or mecanique. On the insurance front, the numbers of vehicles with third-party-liability insurance is increasing for both, bodily injury and material damage covers. This is thanks to the fact that well reputed insurers offer the bodily injury policy only in conjunction with a policy on material damage.

The combining of the two covers offers insurers a better chance for keeping their motor portfolios viable and enlarges the range of protection for society. Such policies are available at $100 to $120 from leading providers. This, insiders point, is still a bargain price and would probably need to increase by 50% to make the business of TPL motor insurance profitable for sector companies.    

The process of having motor vehicles undergo a technical inspection before issuing them with Mecanique stickers, in force since the beginning of the year, is also moving towards becoming a fixture in local driving culture. According to Amjad Hamzeh, claims manager and administrator at the Hadath inspection station, the facility processes about 2,500 cars per day, or half its technical capacity. Inspections involve a checklist of 156 points with direct impact on road worthiness, Hamzeh said, which are completed in about 20 minutes of checking per vehicle. The Hadath facility is the largest of four inspection stations in Lebanon, which are staffed with a total of 300 personnel.

At present, the number of cars failing to pass the unfamiliar test on the first attempt is relatively high, at 50%, but the inspectors anticipate those figures to drop in the future as drivers get more alert to the preparations they need to make for the new mecanique. Most defects are minor, with problems like malfunctioning headlights, direction signals or seatbelts, Hamzeh noted, and can be fixed easily.

The number one cause for sending drivers back is not even technical and stems from discrepancies between the vehicle chassis number and the number recorded in the car registration. The manager advised that drivers should check their headlights, seatbelts and especially compare the chassis numbers of the vehicles to their registration papers, to avoid having to re-visit.  

While he acknowledged that the stations had been confronted with complaints and had to battle various ways of attempting to bypass the inspection procedure, Hamzeh emphasized that controls against abuse were in place and functioning. The inspectors had heard about alleged dangerous practices of exchanging faulty parts only temporarily for the mecanique visits but never encountered evidence, he said and warned, “People should not trust third parties who take their money under the pretense that they could make their cars pass the mecanique without testing. That doesn’t work.”

There are many more aspects to modern mobility-driven civilization. A bit more to the sidelines of the issue of a better driving culture is the concept of keeping cars shining way beyond their age. A new local franchise enterprise scheduled to open at the end of this month has set its mind to do exactly this and create the Lebanese market for car detailing as well as protection of interior and bodywork.

Businessmen Walid Yazbeck and Simon Barakat acquired the franchise of internationally leading automotive services firm, Ziebart. They invested sizeable amounts into building a modern facility on the northern entrance of Beirut where cars can receive a fundamental cleaning and polish plus protection against stains on the upholstery, fading dashboards, and minor exterior dents. With a range of service packages priced from $90 to over $300, the company aspires to triple their expected initial turnover within five to six years, even as the entrepreneurs assume that they have to raise their clientele from a currently very low level of awareness. “The market needs to be educated and expanded,” Yazbeck said. “We will create the need.”

This leaves the thorny issue of driving mores and attitudes. The way in which this society looks at the car betrays a mixture of three widespread attitudes: infatuation with a symbol of alleged potency or attractiveness; use of the vehicle as a handy outlet for frustrations; and informality of road etiquette.  

All this isolates the Lebanese from the cutting edge in automotive culture. Whether sitting behind the wheel, co-driving or discussing it over a cup of coffee, many Lebanese readily concur that this country is rife with lousy driving – and seem frighteningly content to do nothing about it. But if Lebanese living abroad can function well in their adopted automotive environments (and are dismayed over the road behavior they witness when visiting home) and if an up-and-coming Brazilian race car driver by name of Anthony Kanaan can win the US IndyCar Series this year as the first pilot to complete all 3304 laps of the races – then at least the problem does not seem to be genetic. 

November 1, 2004 0 comments
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Special Section

Baby you can drive my car

by Thomas Schellen November 1, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

In the first nine months of 2004, Lebanon’s dealers sold nearly 15,000 new vehicles, nearly 17% more than in all 2002, the year in which the recession and introduction of the Value-Added-Tax had severely depressed the market for the country’s automotive dealers. Expectations are that by year end 2004, well over 18,000 new vehicles – an improvement of around 50% over 2002 – will have been bought by individual owners and fleet buyers.

These results are, however, only from dealers of new cars. While buyers can find some late-model, good looking vehicles on the lots of used car importers, these traders are not part of the dealership organization. Their overwhelmingly primitive presentation facilities and operations contribute nothing towards improving the state of the automotive sector in Lebanon in terms of business sophistication or customer service. In this respect, used car dealers and the army of small vehicle workshops scattered around the country are equally unproductive, maintaining the problematic status quo of an automotive care industry without universal standards on quality or safety, not to mention a high margin of fraud.

In the private sector, registered dealerships are the only ones with the realistic potential to spearhead the creation of a domestic auto sector fit to meet the growing needs for vehicular safety and reliability, energy efficiency and environmental responsibility. A good handful of official dealers have in the past two to three years already invested six-figure amounts into new showrooms and/or, more importantly, after-sales facilities and car maintenance workshops that satisfy the requirements of the international manufacturers they partner with.  

The sector is also more transparent than it was a few years ago. Albeit not conclusive in every detail, figures on sales provided by the importers’ association today allow analysts and interested public to gain insights into the business anatomy and market trends of Lebanon’s automotive sector. As industry and public planners still have nothing but vague estimates to rely on in assessing the size, age and composition of the national vehicle stock, the car importers’ data are highly relevant for better understanding the sector’s economic contribution and issues it has to face.

Looking at the stats

As the data for the current year reveal, European makes defended their position as the preferred choice of drivers in Lebanon. They accounted for 47% of units sold in the first eight months of 2004, even as the exchange rate between the euro and dollar (as well as pound sterling and dollar) continued to weigh against imports from Europe.

In a year-to-date comparison, European makes gained 31% in their sales over the same period last year, bringing their market share from 46% in 2003 to 47% in 2004. In 2002, Europeans had accounted for roughly half the cars sold in Lebanon. Japanese makes are the second main choice of Lebanese car buyers, even though the increasing popularity of Korean brands has eaten into their market share. Car makers like Hyundai, Kia and Samsung enjoyed a market share increase from 7% to 8% in 2002 and 2003 to 11% in 2004, corresponding to the lessening of the Japanese automotive grip, which has experienced a decrease in market share from 43% in 2003 to about 38% in the first eight months of 2004.

In fact, Korean cars, along with American makes, comprise the two strongest regions in terms of sales increases this year. US brands achieved the strongest percentage gains, their 575 units sold in the first eight months being more than double of what the US brand importers did from January until August 2003. However, in perspective to 2002, the market share of US brands edged up by 1.5 % to just below 5% of the total Lebanese car market.

The US increase over 2003 is partly a result of a temporary absence of the Ford brand from the statistics, whose reported jump from one to 58 sold units in a year-to-date comparison stuck out in the statistics as a stellar ratio. However, improvements for all brands of main GM dealers Impex (one of the dealers who invested substantial amounts into new showrooms and upgraded service facilities) certainly indicated a strong performance of American vehicles in the sector’s short-term evolution.

Pepper and shellfish

Looking at vehicle types, the markets for trucks and commercial vehicles remained slow. By contrast to the passenger car segment, sales in this segment continued to be dominated by the Far Eastern brands, with nearly 70% of the market, because of the cost advantage in comparison to European and American vehicles. Among subcategories of the passenger segment, Sports Utility Vehicles captured a 17% share of vehicles purchased from January to August.

When analyzing positions for this profitable segment, the Japanese beat their competition by claiming almost two thirds of the market between January and August, followed by the Europeans (19%) and the US (9%). Porsche’s venture into the SUV segment seems to have paid off for their local dealers, as sales for the Cayenne were almost double of those for their regular models. The Hummer found enough takers to confirm that the Lebanese macho toy niche is alive and kicking. 

While car sales are looking up on the whole, the picture is far from uniform on the level of the various brands. The super luxury marques struggled in particular (see story on page xX) but on the budget end, products from south-east Asia couldn’t score with buyers and the Eastern European Lada shrunk to a very marginal market share.

In the “merely expensive” section, things looked decent. The Japanese luxury brands Infiniti and Lexus appeared able to secure increasing favor with the up-market audience but German oberklasse stalwarts Mercedes also improved by over 40% vis-à-vis the first eight months of 2003. BMW and Britain’s Jaguar held their grounds with certainty and US nobles Cadillac more than doubled their sales.

Outstanding results on the middle rungs of the price ladder came from Peugeot, which leapt to the top of sales this year, followed by Nissan, Renault, and Toyota. The latter two improved their position relative to last year while Nissan sales contracted slightly in a year-to-date comparison. Between them, these four makes ruled the scene in volume with over 46% of all new car sales between January and August of 2004.

Traditional mainstream manufacturers with a midfield position in terms of local market positions were Honda and Volkswagen, improving their sales by 41% and 64%, respectively. Ranked between them in terms of units, Korea’s Hyundai nearly doubled their sales. Kia, Chevrolet and Seat advanced solidly in percentage terms. Two newcomers, the re-vitalized Skoda and the urban-life specialist Smart found friends.

A total of 23 brands enjoyed a plus sign in the statistics, but a significant number of car makers were not as lucky. From Aston Martin to Tavria, the association’s official records for the first eight months of 2004 showed no single sale for about 20% of the brands on its list.

In addition to these makes, 17 manufacturers registered drops in sales ranging between 5% and 77%. Those in decline included some well-known and long established names, from Alfa Romeo and Volvo to Citroen and Opel, as well as the single-model manufacturer, Mini, which had initially ridden into town quite strongly on the back of its youthful image.

As major and smaller dealers of mainstream brands agree, price is the leading element in customer buying decisions, followed by model appeal and after-sales service quality. In the first two points, local dealers depend much on the manufacturers. But in service quality and, an additional factor of substantial importance, local reputation, dealer performance strongly influences the market perception of a brand.

German make Opel – which once enjoyed a strong Lebanese market position – is an example of a brand that has suffered as a result of years of bad agency representation. According to current dealers Techno Cars, Opel had been well represented before the conflict years, selling 4,000 cars per year. But during the war, the dealership was vacant for a long period and the dealer did not offer any services, driving down the brand’s local reputation and resale value, Techno Cars manager Nadim Hakim told Executive.

To create a viable dealership, Hakim’s company started out by first importing a large supply of spare parts and rebuilding the car’s image. After 10 years of selling the brand, Techno is now on a solid footing regarding the resale value of Opel models, Hakim said. Here, however, the importance of the manufacturer’s awareness comes in. However, Opel’s inflexible pricing policy – the manufacturer did not adjust its offers to cushion the impact of the euro rise – kept the sales potential of the make stunted. It was only after regional dealers managed to gain the attention of the general manager at Opel’s Dubai office that factory prices for Opel cars were decreased for dealers in the Middle East. At the Beirut Motor Show this month, Techno Cars will be presenting the new Opel Astra and other models, from which the importer expects an upwards push for their sales.

With cost being such a decisive consideration in the local market, aggressive pricing is a tool that many dealers here employ in their battle for market share. This was recently reflected by a whole bunch of makes being advertised in wholly price-driven billboard advertising campaigns, which included quotations for some European models that were offered at up to $1,000 below their net price in key EU markets.

The aggressive pricing may well be held responsible for the fluctuation in sales of certain makes, giving some dealers a market share advantage over more conservative competitors. However, although such pricing strategy may result in the increase in sales, the low costs do not necessarily lead to an increase in profitability, which is especially true in the significant fleet car deals, which show very subdued profit margins. It is worth noting that many members of the car sector admitted to EXECUTIVE that in light of this situation, they expect a radical contraction in dealer numbers over the next few years.

The reality remains that even with an increase to more than 18,000 new cars sold this year, the Lebanese market for cars is not only naturally restricted in size, it is also beset with unnecessary obstacles and fiscal burdens that suppress sales of new cars. In this regard, nothing has yet improved during the past 12 months. 

November 1, 2004 0 comments
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Comment

Mutton dressed as lamb

by Yasser Akkaoui November 1, 2004
written by Yasser Akkaoui

And so after much political tomfoolery and sleight of hand, Hariri is out and Karami is in. His first task was the creation of a cabinet that turned out to be comprised of vehement anti-government types, many of whom had given up on ever holding public office, and the usual pro-Syrian lackeys.

And now that President Lahoud has purged all internal opposition, he has no excuse for any political and economic shortcomings that may develop over the coming seven months. We do not know what to expect in terms of the economy, given that the criteria for selecting the new team appeared to be based more on political expediency than a genuine desire to address Lebanon’s economic woes. This is underlined by Karami’s warning not to expect miracles. If this was meant to offer hope, one dreads to think what he will say when things get rougher; and they will.

What is bewildering is that all this flies in the face of basic democratic principles. The people have been absent from the equation and thus feel more like helpless spectators than a genuine electorate.

Meanwhile, opposition has grown stronger with both Hariri and Jumblat swelling the ranks of those who do not support the new administration. While Jumblat is as vocal as ever (and the shadow of his late father seems to loom larger than it has done in years), Hariri’s record in opposition is of mounting a comeback and so it remains to be seen just how clean a break his exit deal was.

So where now? There has been a massive shift in how people see the future. While there is still every chance the frog will become a prince, some still believe in the white knight who will slay the dragon? If he is out there, he will want to claim his traditional virgin. The danger is that she may have turned into a snaggle-toothed, saggy hag and the knight may no longer be interested.

November 1, 2004 0 comments
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Real Estate

Small is beautiful: Boutique hotels are in

by Anthony Mills November 1, 2004
written by Anthony Mills

The buzzword among real estate developers is boutique. As the hotel sector continues to expand with new, bigger hotels – a Hyatt, Four Seasons, and Hilton are all under construction – developers have also hit on the notion that not only is small beautiful, it is also lucrative. It has taken a while for the penny to drop. More than a billion dollars has been invested in hotels since 1995, and only one developer in Beirut, hospitality mogul Bechara Namour, has gone boutique with his 30-room Relais & Chateaux Albergo on Abdel Wahab El Inglizi (even the gilt-edged InterContinental Le Vendôme doesn’t really qualify as boutique). But this is set to change.

At least four boutique hotel projects, with a combined investment of close to $500 million, are already underway in the downtown area, a prime attraction for increasing numbers of both Gulf Arab and Western tourists. There is unconfirmed talk of a fifth boutique project on Uruguay Street, and Solidere is being inundated with inquires by developers eager to cash in on what they see as the shape of things to come. Real estate insiders and hospitality executives unanimously agree that the boutique hotel segment in Lebanon holds potential, not least because visitors to Lebanon are among the biggest-spending tourists in the world. “A visit to Lebanon is expensive. Life here is expensive. So, the quality of service must be high. Boutique hotels will appeal to them,” said Albergo general manager Michel Chardigny.

“There’s no doubt there’s a market,” concurred real estate adviser Michael Dunn, “although it is fairly seasonal. There are more and more Gulf Arabs, and if we get it right they’ll come all year round. But the boutique hotels will really have to market themselves.”

Out of town, Gulf Arabs accounted for the vast majority of guests at the recently opened Chateau Raphael boutique hotel in Maameltein – a Jounieh coastal strip notorious for its nightlife – according to one of the hotel’s employees. The “Chateau” opened for the beginning of the summer season and offers 17 suites (seven duplexes, seven junior suites, and a royal suite) ranging in rack rates from $285 to $715, as well as two restaurants (one Lebanese and one Italian/Chinese) and a swimming pool.

“We had a group from Germany and we have one coming from Cyprus, but most of the visitors in the summer were Gulf Arabs from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,” the manager explained. Currently, only two rooms are occupied. “Dead season,” the employee explained.

The Chateau was originally earmarked as the boutique arm of the Safir Hotel group, which runs the Beirut Safir Heliopolitan Hotel, but a spokesperson for the chain said negotiations fell through. Chateau Raphael owner George Anastasiades, who also owns Anastasia Travel, was not available for comment.

Chardigny said the boutique hotel sector potential in Lebanon reflected a global shift in guest preferences towards smaller, more personable, and quieter hotels. “All around the world now people don’t like big hotels anymore. It’s a new phenomenon. Over the last five years or so, people have begun attaching much more importance to privacy, discretion and top-quality personalized service. I think the time of the big ‘palaces’ like the Savoy is over. Now, rich people want to feel as though they are at home,” said Chardigny. Some real estate insiders predict that emerging boutique hotels, particularly those associated with international brand names, will provide serious competition for the so far unchallenged Albergo. “I think they’ll knock the Albergo off its perch. It’ll be downgraded to a three-star boutique hotel,” contended one real estate insider. “If you look at the bar, it’s horrible. The reception area? It’s horrible. It doesn’t create a nice atmosphere when you walk in. The restaurant is, boudoirish, feminine and tacky. The swimming pool might as well not be there.”

Chardigny, however, does not seem concerned. “Everyone is a competitor. For the moment Relais & Chateaux are the best quality chain. But the others are very good too. We are worried. We will wait and see.”

While developers are busy as the proverbial bees, real estate experts doubt that all will be genuine boutique hotels. So what’s the magic formula? According to Dunn, a guest must feel that they are unique, that they couldn’t possibly get a better hotel. A car should be waiting for them at the airport. And from then on, they must be continuously coddled, in a luxurious environment of discrete but unmistakable exclusivity. “It’s service, service, service,” he said. “You’ve forgotten your toothbrush? Don’t worry. Your trousers are pressed at three in the morning. You have a bottle of champagne in bed. These hotels are for spoiled people who want to be pampered. Most hotel rooms are so unmemorable.”

The developers of the Abchee Group boutique hotel next to the Virgin Megastore declined to talk to EXECUTIVE about the project, saying it was too early to do so. But Solidere, the company responsible for most of the revitalization of downtown, said the building had been designed by world-renowned architect Kevin Dash and constituted an overall investment of roughly $70 million. The building will offer private parking and will boast several high-end retail outlets – the marketing of which is to be overseen by RAMCO Real Estate Advisors. But the project has its critics: one real estate consultant, who asked not to be named, said: “It’s too noisy for a boutique hotel, probably too busy. A traffic intersection like that is going to be busy all through the night, and for the next number of years dirty, dusty and noisy. I’m very surprised, unless their objective is to make money out of the shops.” Construction of the boutique hotel close to the Banque Audi headquarters downtown represents an $85 million investment by Al-Mawarid Bank, owned by the Kheireddine family. The project – to be completed by the end of 2007 – is the brainchild of Al-Mawarid Chairman Salim Kheireddine. Tranquility will be ensured by the hotel’s location on a roughly 8,000 square meter plot of land in a peaceful corner of the downtown district known as Wadi Abou Jamil. The hotel will be composed of 10 inter-connected buildings arranged around a sizeable garden courtyard. It will incorporate an above-ground built-up area of 15,000 square meters – including three restaurants – and a below-ground area of around 45,000 meters servicing the hotel. Al-Mawarid is hoping to engage in a partnership with the “W” chain luxury boutique hotel arm of Sheraton’s Starwood Group, but is also involved in talks with two other leading hotel chains.

The all-suites hotel will count a hundred “keys”– almost too many for a boutique hotel. The smallest suite will cover about 55 square meters and the largest around 300. Rates will range from about $350 to several thousand. Naturally keen to emphasize one of the key attributes of any successful boutique hotel, Marwan Kheireddine, Al-Mawarid general manager, said: “The service will be by far superior to existing levels of service in Beirut hotels. Our clients will be high net worth individuals – either tourists or business people – demanding, and willing to pay for, exclusive, personalized services.”

As part of a third boutique hotel development project – owned by Solidere – a building roughly opposite the upper end of Maarad Street, and called “Le Grand Theatre,” or “Grand Theater,” a reference to its previous incarnation, is also being refurbished. It will adjoin two constructed buildings, which will house a boutique hotel and restaurants. The premises will be leased to a tenant, who would manage the entire complex. Meanwhile, development of an old salmon-colored building abutting the Riyadh El-Solh Square car park, is being overseen by sole owner Mousbah Bakri, who has already spent tens of millions of dollars buying the building from former shareholders – both family members and previous tenants – and refurbishing. Interestingly, Bakri said he would have preferred to develop office space in the building. But according to the terms of the contract under which he repossessed the building from Solidere, he is obliged to ensure that it retains its original function – that of hotel. Nonetheless, he is equally confident that his boutique hotel will perform, especially among Western tourists enamored with the idea of staying in a quaint heritage-laden building at the heart of the renascent downtown district.

Although some real estate observers suggested Bakri’s hotel would actually do better than the grander boutique hotels under construction, others questioned the building’s suitability for a hotel project, saying the rooms would be too small, and the building was too old. “You would have to spend more money than it was worth,” said one developer. Solidere is confident the boutique hotels will enhance the appeal of the capital’s Central District. “The developers are doing a wonderful job,” stated Solidere executive Monib Hammoud. “The boutique hotels will complement the other hotels in Lebanon. They will reposition Beirut on the international architecture and design level and will help upgrade the tourist industry to international standards.”

However, as the boutique hotel craze takes hold, it is also attracting profit-hungry investors who don’t know what it takes to establish a successful boutique hotel. And the last thing Solidere wants sullying the Central District is a string of failed boutique hotels. “Many people are approaching us with plans to develop a boutique hotel,” observed Hammoud. “Many don’t have the right conception of what a boutique hotel is. We monitor the supply. We don’t want oversupply. We make sure the mix and the balance are respected.”

“Most prospective developers don’t bother to spend the money on acquiring the necessary expertise for a feasibility study or market research,” said Kheireddine. “There is room for a couple of boutique hotels downtown. That’s all.”

Not everyone is convinced that Gulf Arabs will, in fact, flock to the new boutique hotels. Albergo Manager Chardigny said that although some Gulf Arabs do stay at his hotel, most visitors hail instead from Europe and America. “It’s not really Gulf Arabs’ style,” he said. Other observers agreed that Gulf Arabs may prove hard to lure away from glamorous hotels like the Phoenicia and those that have mushroomed across the Gulf.

Dunn disagreed: “Gulf Arabs love places like boutique hotels,” he said. “And they’ve got the money to pay.”

“The vast majority of our clients are going to be from the Gulf,” echoed Kheireddine. “It is wrong to stereotype Gulf Arabs. I have a lot of Gulf Arab friends who are as sophisticated in their taste for wine and French art as anyone else in the world.”

The $7 million hotel

Lina Mroueh, owner of up-market “Lina’s” sandwich chain owner, intends to develop a $7 million boutique hotel in a 1930s building “close” to downtown Beirut. Mroueh declined to disclose the exact location of her development but revealed that the property purchase would account for about 60% of the investment. Echoing Albergo manager Chardigny, Mroueh said she was tapping into potential offered by a new breed of hotel clientele – one that increasingly eschews big hotels – and by the increase in visitors to Lebanon as a whole.

Buoyed by the success of her sandwich chain, Mroueh is confident her instincts will again deliver a quality product. “All you need is entrepreneurship, the right operator, the right concept, and a lot of Lebanese-style hospitality and warmth,” she explained. “And you need happy, dedicated staff. I will go the whole nine yards. Quality is everything.”

Would her hotel would fit the classic boutique profile? “It’s not about luxury. My hotel will be chic. Simplicity is more luxurious. Boutique is an attitude. You can wear things from Marks & Spencers, even if you didn’t pay much for them, and look good if you have the right attitude.”

Mroueh plans to ensure that, once built, her hotel will achieve an international cult status. “I have a network of people, internationally, who will be happy to come and stay at the hotel. They will build brand awareness,” she said. “They’ll be an international crowd, Europeans, Gulf Arabs, Korean and Japanese businesspeople.”

November 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

FNB reaches for the top

by Thomas Schellen November 1, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Provided that their development of assets and deposits continues along the lines of the first nine months, Lebanon’s First National Bank is set to achieve growth in the magnitude of 20% to 25% this year – strengthening its claim to be one of the fastest advancers in Lebanon’s banking industry at the beginning of the millennium. In their half-year results on June 30, FNB reported total assets breaching the $1 billion mark at LL1.506 trillion, and by August 31, the bank’s books showed further growth to LL1.536 trillion. On December 31, 2003, assets clocked in at LL1.308 trillion. Customer deposits reached LL1.196 trillion at the end of August, up from LL1.112 trillion at the close of last year.

These figures mark 2004 as a year of moderation in the development of FNB, knowing how the bank has advanced in less than five years from assets of merely $80 to $100 million, to its current position in the upper middle field of Lebanese banking. Beginning in 2000, the numerical stepping-stones of this growth journey comprised annual increases averaging in the magnitude of 40%. In 2002, FNB recorded profit growth of 130% at an increase of 50.5% in deposits (the sector average then was: 7.52%) through a combination of new business and the acquisition of smaller bank, Societé Bancaire du Liban. The bank last year achieved another jump in profits, from $720,000 net income in 2002 to $2.07 million in 2003, but still lagged behind its peer group. For 2003, FNB was ranked 17th in the sector in terms of assets.

Under the current categorization of Lebanese banks, its recent performance advanced FNB into the realm of the sector-leading Alpha Group of banks, whose assets exceed $1 billion. But just as his bank could claim the cherished qualifier, FNB chairman and general manager, Rami Nimer, would raise the bar. “I think the Alpha Group should be over $2 billion,” he told EXECUTIVE. He certainly has a point. The compounding of assets in the sector today is such that more and more banks cross into ten-figure territory. While the $1 billion barrier seemed high enough just a few years ago to delineate the sector hierarchy, a bank today needs to be safely over $2 billion in assets to claim a market share of 3%. As trends have been moving, the gap between the top ten banks – which dominate the market to over 70% and would constitute the Alpha Group at over $2 billion in assets – and the tiers of capable mid-sized or smaller banks, is becoming even more pronounced. By this rationale, establishment of a new Alpha Group marking makes sense to set the lead group apart from the pursuers. So in Nimer’s reckoning, FNB should be regarded as an institution in the high Beta Group. In his view, banks should turn their attention more to off-balance sheet activities, such as private banking and fiduciary operations and Nimer made it clear that it can be better for a bank to not be craving after size for size’s sake. “There are so many changes in the world of banking and being a good mid-sized institution is beneficial. Banks should think different to the classic game of size,” he said. “It is an important issue and volume makes the difference. But with Basel II, size is not the issue. Size without utilization can be more of a burden than a plus.” He is not the only top bank executive to deliver it but this message bears repeating in light of the risk pressures weighing on the Lebanese banking sector.

While thus espousing an esteem of unpretentious banking and maintaining an approach that FNB is a young and growing bank, Nimer nonetheless affirmed the wide consensus among local sector players that banks here need to reach certain size or would be faced with oblivion. And there is no doubt which side of the game FNB wants to be on. In the bank’s annual report for 2002, the chairman’s letter described the rise to then 19th rank in the sector as paving the way to become one of the top 15 banks “in the near future” and, in the longer term, ascend to be one of the top ten banks. The undercarriage of FNB’s growth capabilities was established with its founding by a group of Kuwaiti and Gulf Arab businessmen in 1994, who initiated marginal expansion of the bank’s activities over the first years of its operations. According to Nimer, these newcomers to Lebanon’s surging financial market couldn’t take FNB’s evolution to its potential but they established a capable organization that provided a good platform for the growth instigated following Nimer’s entry into the bank and a change in management between 2000 and 2001. This allowed FNB to prove that it had the foundations to be more than a delta group player and the bank quickly advanced through the ranks of the sector, defying any concept that the Lebanese banking field today couldn’t any longer offer the opportunities of rapid expansion that had abounded a decade earlier. “We are still building the bank but the results until now are quite encouraging. Although the big banks were there, we grew drastically,” summarized Nimer the experience of the past four years. Attributing the ability of FNB to succeed to the bank’s greater flexibility in comparison to larger players, he named as other factors the trust of their shareholding base in the team’s professionalism and performance and the new management’s experience in the local market. Giving proofs for the bank’s confidence and accomplishments, Nimer cited how FNB won out in arranging financing for the Four Seasons Hotel project in Damascus and shares many cross clients with its peer group and leading banks in Lebanon. Judging from Nimer’s engaged personal style, another component in the bank’s recipe appears to be a substantial dose of dynamism. In a business where the art of success lies in defining and applying an institution’s strengths out of a limited arrear of choices well known to all players, key instruments with which FNB wants to build its continued growth are further expansion of the retail operation, private banking, and venturing cross border. In the retail arena, FNB planted their stakes by developing the branch network from 6 in 2000 to 16 by end 2004, with a Jounieh branch scheduled to open this month. The bank enhanced its market reach with a catchy new logo and expanded retail products and in the summer of this year, it heightened its profile by moving its headquarters from Hamra to a new prestigious downtown address. As far as niche creation, Nimer is looking strongly to private banking. Having not long ago commenced working in this business line, the bank this year already achieved $80 to $90 million in off-balance sheet volume, he said. FNB made footprints in the local financial markets also through developing funds traded on the BSE, collaborating on them with Bank of Beirut. True to the Lebanese banking mantra of regional growth, FNB has two concrete ambitions for cross border activities: Syria and Iraq. In Syria, the bank is a partner in a project with Kuwaiti and Jordanian institutions and the prerequisite domestic investors, working to start a joint venture bank that plans to be operational in 2005. FNB shareholding participation in that venture is projected at 10% to 11%. For Iraq, FNB secured the license to establish a representative office from the country’s central bank and hopes to establish this office before the end of the year as first step into that market. While he described organic growth in the Lebanese market as his first choice for the development of First National Bank, Nimer named a further acquisition or merger as a viable option for FNB. In this field, the banker had accumulated experience through his role in the assimilation of Banque Beyrouth pour le Commerce into Byblos Bank, which at the time (1997) was the largest merger in the history of the sector here. Although that experience was not smooth, it gave Nimer very useful expertise for managing the acquisition of Societe Bancaire du Liban, which he called very successful. In terms of mergers, Nimer saw the bonding between the Banque Audi Group and Banque Saradar as an ideal situation and encouraging example to the industry although for the time being, FNB would be thinking on a different scale for its eventual merger projects. “We haven’t reached our potential yet, so my preference is a merger with an equal or smaller size institution, not a larger one,” Nimer said.

November 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Go West or East young bank

by Nicolas Photiades November 1, 2004
written by Nicolas Photiades

Banque Audi’s recent move into Jordan is much more than just a reflection of Lebanese pioneering tradition. Lebanon’s dire economic situation has affected the quality of loan portfolios and domestic placement opportunities and has forced many of Lebanon’s leading banks to look beyond their borders to diversify assets, improve the quality of profits and revenues, and rely less on a stagnant local economy.

Indeed, in the last ten years, banks such as Société Générale de Banque au Liban (SGBL), Byblos Bank, Banque Audi, BLOM, and Lebanese Canadian Bank have either purchased banks in neighboring countries, set up joint ventures with local banking groups in these countries, or established branches abroad. SGBL was the first to show interest in Jordan and purchased a small Jordanian bank in the late 1990s (Middle East Investment Bank), while Banque Audi recently followed suit by obtaining a license to open branches there. Audi has already opened three branches in Jordan, and has an objective of opening up to ten branches, while BLOM has also obtained a branch license in Jordan. Meanwhile, Byblos Bank has set up a banking subsidiary in Sudan, and Lebanese Canadian (LCB) has purchased a minority stake in a local Sudanese bank. LCB even set up a full branch in Canada to cater for the 300,000 strong Lebanese community there and ultimately aims at obtaining a full banking license from the Canadian Authorities. Finally, Fransabank has expressed a keen interest in opening a branch in Algeria.

While branches are being opened willy-nilly throughout the region, many Lebanese banks have been keeping an eye on the development of the Iraqi banking sector, where potential is significant. It is only a matter of time before Lebanese banks start sniffing around Baghdad and other main Iraqi cities for opportunities. The Iraqi banking market has around eighteen private banks, and almost as many government owned banks, with the private banks having all been set up during the embargo years by local merchant families. These are now all keen to develop their banking franchise and have expressed clear intentions to hook up with fellow Arab banks, mainly as a means to acquire expertise and banking know-how. Lebanese banks have been particularly favored by Iraqi bankers, who are said to be impressed with their technical capabilities and banking traditions. A number of Iraqi banks have made it clear to Lebanese bankers that they would be ready to give up 49% of their capital (which is the regulatory maximum for foreign stakes in Iraqi banks) to Lebanese banks, as well as the management. Although the security problem in that part of the world still hampers any efforts to establish banking operations, and the greed of some Iraqi bankers as regards to their selling prices is a major obstacle, Lebanese banks will certainly start making acquisitions there in due course.

Other countries such as Egypt and Algeria also appear to be interesting for Lebanese bankers, who would definitely have a clear qualitative advantage over their local peers, particularly with regards to Algeria. The latter is very similar to Syria, in that local banks have little or no sophistication in a country that sticks out as one of the richest in the Arab world in terms of natural resources. Moreover, the corporate, project finance and retail banking sectors are just crying out for more sophisticated financial institutions located on-site. However, Algeria’s banking environment is still severely hampered by insufficient and antiquated regulations, and transparency and disclosure standards remain light years behind those of Lebanon. The old socialist or even Soviet-style banking sector is still in place despite almost complete decrepitude, and the Algerian authorities have a significant amount of work to carry out before transforming Algeria into a gold rush destination for Lebanese bankers. Setting up a branch there as a first step would not be a bad idea though, as it would give the bank in question time to gauge the market, establish a list of what is needed in terms of regulation, and even get opportunistic in terms of project financing and retail banking.

Egypt is a different proposition, in that it is the most populated Arab country and has a very solid industrial and corporate base, which is also characterized by a strong track record. Gaining market share, even small, in the Egyptian corporate sector would be a major revenue boost for Lebanese banks, and would allow them to diversify away from the limited and small Lebanese corporate sector. However, Lebanese banks have to bear in mind that, despite Pharaonic efforts by the Egyptian central bank to improve regulations and supervision, the banking sector remains characterized by a weak financial profile of the country’s banks – particularly with regards to public sector banks – due to a weak operating environment and to a slowdown in the economy and in structural reforms that started in 1998. A challenging economic situation and regional uncertainties, combined with weak industry fundamentals, are expected to keep the banking sector under significant pressure in the medium term, especially considering that most Egyptian banks are not well equipped to face unexpected shocks.

For the moment, the Egyptian banking sector suffers from poor underwriting skills and asset quality, low profitability and under-capitalization of the state banks (the four largest banks in the country) and of some of the private banks, a low level of automation, underdeveloped risk management systems, low level of disclosure and high reserve requirements, which hamper efforts to spend in other areas where investment is urgently needed. The experience of Jammal Trust Bank (JTB), the only Lebanese bank to have courageously ventured into Egypt in times of state dominance, should serve as a good example to other Lebanese banks with expansion thoughts in this particular market. JTB has been consistently asked by the Egyptian authorities to provide substantial amounts of capital and employ unnecessary staff (including elevator attendants and an army of makers of bad coffee).

Lebanese bankers, however, could take heart from the recent efforts in terms of regulation, as well as from the abysmal state of the local competition. A market share can be built in Egypt, provided that efforts to expand there are supported by significant financial and operational resources, and extra-competent management. Indeed, competition from the few private banks, particularly on corporate banking, should be tough.

The Syrian market has also attracted a lot of interest from Lebanese banks, since the opening up by the Syrian authorities of the local banking market to foreign banks, with Lebanese banks being particularly favored. BLOM, SGBL, BEMO, Byblos, Fransabank and Bank of Beirut have opened branches there, with Bank of Beirut even setting up a joint venture with Emirates International Bank and Qatar Islamic Bank. The Syrian market offers significant potential to Lebanese banks, which are more comfortable with this market than foreign peers. Exposure to Syrian customers has been substantial for Lebanese bankers for decades, and it is a question of the Syrian authorities developing and improving the regulatory environment before Lebanese banks start cruising in this market.

With its population of 15 to 17 million, and its growing industrial base, Syria offers interesting potential on both the retail and corporate banking sides, although there is still a lot of work to be done on the Syrian side. Indeed, not only does the country need to be rated, but banking regulations have to be significantly developed to look at least similar to those that already exist in Lebanon, while transparency, accounting standards and other important regulatory and supervisory pillars are far from being ideal.

The advantages of establishing branches or fully authorized banks abroad are multiple for Lebanese banks, with the most obvious and important being the opportunity to diversify revenues, assets, funding and capital. For the moment, Lebanese banks are constrained by the high risk offered by their economic, political and social environment. The Lebanese government’s rating is so low that it does not do justice whatsoever to the domestic banks and the banking authorities, which have worked hard in the last few years to develop a solid regulatory environment and strong internal infrastructures (risk management, treasury, banking products, etc.). This hard work is now being cancelled out by a weak and volatile environment, which is forcing banks to seek for profits and size elsewhere. The existence of large, and relatively under-developed fellow Arab countries, virtually next door, is encouraging for Lebanese bankers, who see clear expansion opportunities.

By developing and expanding into other countries, Lebanese banks would gradually cancel out the low rating tag of the Lebanese government, and would be less reliant on a unique source of income and funding (deposits). They would slowly develop into regional financial institutions, and if European and North American activities are also developed (like they should), some Lebanese banks could gain international status as well as start to be considered as universal banks. In other words, getting to become another Arab Bank would most probably be the key objective for a Lebanese bank. Jordanian based Arab Bank is one of the largest banks in the Arab world, and is one of few banks world-wide to benefit from a rating that far exceeds that of Jordan (Arab Bank has a rating that goes beyond the investment grade level as compared to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s current rating of B+). This is due to Arab Bank’s significant presence in France, the UK and Switzerland (all AAA rated countries), which dwarfs the bank’s total asset levels in Jordan, and consequently produces substantial and permanent Euro and US dollar revenues that flood into the bank’s coffers from stable and strong economies.

Finally, it is worth noting that the development of French, Swiss, US and other activities located in developed economies is not an impossible task for Lebanese banks. These institutions have the possibility, similarly to other Turkish and Middle Eastern banks, to bring their operations in the West up a level or two, by gradually entering parts of the local markets (e.g. syndicated loans, government securities trading, etc.), where they can reap some benefits. Acquiring local expertise would be one way to develop their presence in Western countries, which would be key in placing Lebanon in the map of countries with innovative and pioneering banking expertise.

The Phoenician spirit

During the civil war period, several Lebanese banks made the strategic decision to establish sister banks to the ones already established in Lebanon in countries such as France, Switzerland and Belgium and even the US. These sister banks had more or less the same shareholders as the Lebanon-domiciled banks, and were fully authorized by the French, Swiss, Belgian and US central banking authorities. The aim of these foreign entities was to channel Lebanese savings out of Lebanon in times of war and to cater in terms of banking services to the Lebanese communities, who had sought refuge in these countries.

Most Lebanese banks, which had set up sister companies overseas, still keep their foreign operations in place today. Indeed, BLOM has a successful sister bank of appreciable size in France and Switzerland (Banorabe), while Banque Audi has a fully authorized banking institution in Switzerland, which has succeeded in twenty five years to carve itself an interesting little niche in private banking. Audi also has a solid presence in New York, and even had at one stage an outfit in Los Angeles, that was sold in the mid 1990s. Other Banks, such as Byblos Bank and Banque Libanaise pour le Commerce (BLC) also saw, at an early stage, the importance of establishing domestically authorised banks on foreign soil. While Byblos chose Belgium, BLC chose to open four branches in the United Arab Emirates. A certain number of Lebanese banks also followed suit in the 1970s by establishing branches or fully authorised banks in other countries, such as Banque Saradar and Fransabank in France, or Jammal Trust Bank in Egypt.

Today, the reason for setting up shop elsewhere is aimed principally at following a new breed of Lebanese economic immigrants. While the objective to escape from Lebanon is still present, this time it is more to flee from an inhospitable economic environment rather than a war. The reasons, for overseas expansion are now dominated by different parameters, of which the most important remains the diversification of revenues away from a very risky domestic economic situation.

November 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Crude morals

by Michael Young November 1, 2004
written by Michael Young

The marketplace, like justice, is said to blind, its scales designed to weigh gold rather than contending cases in litigation, let alone rival endeavors to flaunt moral certainties. That’s why it has been with mystification that over the years this space has looked at exceptions to, or confirmations of, that rule. And now, with oil having crossed the $50 per barrel threshold, it is astonishing how much righteousness can be included in so many liters of crude.

The definitional moment for the “moralization” of oil came on September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of the attack, pundits, publicists, show-boaters and demagogues argued that because most of the hijackers on that fateful day were Saudis, it was important to reconsider the relationship between America and Saudi Arabia. Since the relationship floats on an ocean of oil, many a critic naturally argued that that was where the US had to show it was serious.

Among the unserious ideas that burbled to the surface was the effort by one group, named Americans for Fuel Efficient Cars, to launch a crusade against sports utility vehicles (SUV). Their main premise was that since SUVs consume large quantities of gasoline, their owners were effectively pouring money into Saudi coffers, and, so the group claimed, into the terrorist activities the Saudis were allegedly financing. To this was added another moral argument – that SUVs pollute more than normal cars (an untrue contention) – completing the circle of opprobrium linking oil to various true or imagined evils. More serious were those who sought to split the immoral Al-Saud from the vital mineral enriching them. The first publicized effort to resolve this dilemma to America’s satisfaction came from a former Rand Corp. analyst, Lawrence Murawiec, who, in August 2002, gave a lecture at the Pentagon where he proposed that the Saudis either put an end to their shady dealings with militant Islam and end anti-US, anti-Western and anti-Israeli “predications,” or else America should invade the kingdom and its oil fields. A similar line was taken by former CIA agent Robert Baer, who, though more conversant on the Arab world than Murawiec, advised in his book, SLEEPING WITH THE DEVIL, that a Saudi royal impose the “rule of law” in the kingdom by “outlawing righteous murder, jihad, the Muslim Brotherhood. That would be a start; then you could move on to outlawing grotesque commissions, theft, and bribery.” Otherwise, Washington should seize the Saudi oil fields. This would create difficulties, “but would all that be worse than standing idly by as the House of Sa’ud collapsed and the world’s largest known oil reserves fell into the hands of Muslim Brotherhood-inspired fundamentalists…?” That Saudi oil wealth had been used to corrupt members of the American political establishment, specifically the Bush family and their acolytes, was the basis of another recent book, HOUSE OF BUSH, HOUSE OF SAUD, by American journalist Craig Unger. Everywhere, it seems, oil has become a byword for things gone wrong – an indispensable commodity that is also virtually indistinguishable from Middle Eastern vice and terrorism, or, simply, an odiously voracious lifestyle in the West. And at $50 per barrel these arguments are even easier to make, even as most people in the world focus on the economic repercussions of high oil prices.

The thing with introducing morality into the market, however, is that it leads to dead ends. The Saudis may be bad news, but they are the ones to whom everyone has turned to boost oil supply and bring crude prices down. Consumption of gasoline for lifestyle reasons may be wasteful, but how is it different than consumption for economic growth? Is an SUV driver any more reprehensible than a Chinese or Indian factory owner, whose rising demand has been the major factor pushing oil prices up? Are there right and wrong ways to consume oil?

The answer to all the questions is “no.” The only sensible resolution of the oil problem is through amoral market mechanisms. So obvious a statement barely merits being repeated, yet even an experienced pundit like Thomas L. Friedman of The New York Times could not help throwing a pinch of reproach in an October column on how the Bush administration refused to take sensible decisions in Iraq, because of “ideology.” He asked, should the government “impose a ‘Patriot Tax’ of 50 cents a gallon on gasoline to help pay for the war, shrink the deficit and reduce the amount of oil we consumed so we send less money to Saudi Arabia? Never. Just tell the Americans to go on guzzling.”

There you had an impartial proposal and two barbs. Friedman offered a defensible (if misguided) policy prescription like a gasoline surtax, but also a moral mechanism to hammer the Saudis and irk the “gas guzzlers.” No one will remove moral agendas from the marketplace, but they should be cut back drastically. The market is not a church, nor the blackness of oil a nun’s habit.

November 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Does it really matter who wins?

by Faysal Badran November 1, 2004
written by Faysal Badran

By the time of this publication, and barring any confusion á la Florida, or a major 9/11-type ‘event,’ the new president of the US will be known. But while in the US the presumed majority will be celebrating and the others put up a good face to it, we in the rest of the world can ask if the decision will change anything. And we can also ask if such an exercise of democracy meets the standards of reason.

In attempting to guesstimate the winner of the race for the White House, the most rational approach should be to evaluate performance of the incumbent, meaning to lay down some form of report card for George W, and try to measure how he has fared in relation to his stated objectives. Before embarking on this though, let us address the issue from a Lebanese and Middle Eastern perspective.

To put it bluntly, the outcome simply does not matter. At least not in the sense either one man or another will have a different aerial view of the region. They do not. Their policies in this area are driven by pure US national interest, and unfortunately, and until we bring to the table viable alternatives, this means heavy support for Israel and selfless interest in oil. So, before you delay something on the account of the elections in the US, please bear in mind that we are unlikely to see any US president don a keffieh!

More relevant is, at this stage for our region would be the subtle hints from Kerry that he will attempt to reassemble all or part of the shattered international consensus. This is not negligible, but not money in the bank either. It is better than the bloodthirsty imperial neo conservatives, but again, election promises are made to be diluted. So, if either of the men does reach out to the world in attempting to bring the region to a more stable framework, and try to build bridges, it may be a good thing. The problem is that it may be too late.

My contention is that Kerry, given Bush’s record, would by all rational measures have to be poised to win. Before you think to yourself that with three weeks to go the polls were dead even, it is worth remembering that polls are not very accurate, especially when the polarization is so high. Meaning, they don’t always capture the undercurrents of society. The most relevant example of poll inefficacy is the French presidential elections of April 2002. Not one poll had predicted that extreme right wing leader and 1930s nostalgic Jean Marie Le Pen would make it to the final round. Almost every poll showed in fact that Jacques Chirac and his socialist rival would face off in the second and final round.

Sometimes, when a country is angry, the polls don’t show that. And without falling into Michael Moorism, it seems that most Americans had plenty of reasons to be dissatisfied with Bush. Let’s look at a point-by-point assessment of his term.

? On the most pressing issue for Americans, national security, Bush, having exhausted the mileage out of 9/11, has in fact destabilized one of the most fragile regions of the world and exposed Americans and American interest to great danger. He has also exacerbated the tensions in the region by fueling the extremist argument that the US is an overreaching empire with no morals. Bush has done little to bring the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to the forefront despite many smart people in Washington, including Colin Powell urging him to do so. In fact, many, including myself, feel that the fuel for extremism comes from the massacre and dislocation of the Palestinians. Now you can add Iraq to the mix. And although most sane observers agree that the removal of a tyrant is a good thing, the new Iraqi chaos may be an impossible price to pay. There is no conceivable way that the Americans can consider that the Bush brand of democracy did very well in Iraq so far, and his ability to export this notion has been as ineffective as his drive to export goods and services to China! As a corollary to his “smoke ‘em out” foreign policy, Mr. Bush also vowed to secure the oil. Well, let’s just say that for the layman on the street, and in his car, he has done exactly the opposite as oil, and thus gasoline prices have more than tripled since he got anointed by the Supreme Court. One would think that with 150,000 troops on the ground, supposedly spreading democracy, oil would have been at least stable. Not so.

? The US economy has seen a slight uptake, but no real improvement. Mr. Bush has had the worse record in job creation since Truman, and his tax cut, aimed at the wealthiest 5% and top corporations, has had no real aggregate impact if not to polarize even more the majority of the population trying to make ends meet. For the purists, Bush took office with the Dow at 10,800, and has presided over steady erosion toward 9,800 today and quite a few scandals to boot – Enron being the most prominent. Bush also turned a fiscal surplus into the worse deficit (even when taken as a percentage of GDP) ever.

? Bush has alienated many layers of society, increased the dislike of US policy abroad and placed both the perception and reality of the American dream on a collision course with historical reality. He has little to offer to the world, and little to offer to the unhappy families that have seen over a 1000 of their loved ones killed for no legitimate reason, suffered increased energy bills, and mortgaged US fiscal safety for generations to come. As change in the current global environment could not be bad and the economic facts speak for choosing a new president, my pre-election guesstimate is that Kerry will squeak through. Will I have to eat my words?

November 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Wishing for a miracle

by Tony Hchaime November 1, 2004
written by Tony Hchaime

“I trust Lebanon and its beloved people to God Almighty.” While Rafik Hariri’s resignation flourish may have had more than its share of melodrama, one has to question whether the end of his 12-year “reign” – punctuated as it was with a Hoss-led INTER-REGNUM – will mark the end of an era characterized by donor conferences, a Solidere-dominated Beirut Central District, rampant construction projects and inflows of Saudi money. Certainly Omar Karami’s government is faced with a daunting task and, which he admits, “cannot do miracles.”

That may prove to be an understatement. The formation of the new cabinet was fraught with in-fighting and it remains to be seen how its final composition will bring about constructive changes, especially in light of the fact that former finance minister Fouad Siniora made it perfectly clear in his 2005 draft budget that Lebanon’s situation is desperate. The budget deficit

What Siniora’s budget achieved, (Siniora probably knew he would not be around to implement it) was to unveil the true state of the Lebanese government finances. He also reiterated that taxes have been taken to the highest level possible and custom duties can’t be raised. Few methods to increase government revenues remain available. The cost of living has reached almost unbearable levels and raising taxes to boost government revenues is not an option. The Hariri government had tried every trick in the book to reduce expenditures in previous years, such as the cost of debt, pruning MEA, and improving efficiency at state-owned assets such as the Port of Beirut, Ogero and Libanpost. With no room remaining to cut any more, Siniora came up with radical cost-cutting measures never before attempted by any government. It is through the arguably over-ambitious cost-cutting measures that Siniora aimed to reduce the deficit in the new plan. The 2005 budget foresees total expenditures of LL9,575 billion, significantly lower than then LL10,150 billion budgeted for 2004 – incidentally, total expenditures had already reached LL7 billion by August of 2004.

It is not, however, the magnitude of the cost-cuts that have labeled the new budget “overambitious,” but rather the means to achieve such targets. The unorthodox methods include the following:

– Cancellation of all perks provided to cabinet ministers and members of parliament, such as petrol allowances, discounts on utility and telephone bills, custom duties on vehicles, and other bonuses.

– Increase in the working hours of all public institutions, in addition to a 3% reduction in salaries of public sector employees.

– Cancellation of the State Security apparatus, reduction of the number of army personnel from 65,000 to 25,000, and that of the police from 30,000 to 17,000.

– Reduction of the length of the compulsory military service to 6 months, from the current 12.

– Cancellation of the ministry of the displaced, the Council of the South and its associated fund.

On the revenue side of what was labeled a “reformist bombshell,” not much has changed from the plans and strategies presented in 2004. Maintaining an opinion that the Lebanese people have suffered enough to support the budget deficit over the years, Siniora insisted that no additional taxes would be levied, nor would there be any increases in government fees and duties. Total revenues are expected to reach LL7,160 billion for 2005, compared to the LL6,850 billion budgeted for 2004.

So the focus falls back to government expenditures and how to reduce them. Government expenditures include debt servicing and other expenditures. Debt servicing has successfully been reduced in 2004, thanks to the efforts of the last Hariri government. Will the Karami government be able to maintain such achievements? It is difficult to foresee, especially since interest rates have already started heading upwards since President Emile Lahoud’s controversial extension. Should the government be able to achieve such revenue and expenditure targets, the overall deficit would be expected to fall to LL2,415 billion (25% of expenditures), significantly below the deficit of LL3,300 budgeted for 2004 (32% of expenditures).

Reforms introduced through Siniora’s draft budget

While such measures would undoubtedly significantly reduce government expenditures, they have not been well received by other cabinet ministers, the military, or members of parliament. Elsewhere, as part of an attempt to force desperate reforms, the draft also includes the establishment of two internal units within the ministry of finance, one to monitor the performance of the ministry, while the other would be solely dedicated to manage the public debt at the ministry. That in addition to radical changes in the social security, merging public schools and reducing the number of teaching staff, and other measures.

Finally, the minister intends to tackle what represents undoubtedly the greatest drain on government finances: Electricite du Liban. Currently, the government spends an estimated $300 million a year to cover the losses of EDL, which result mainly from mismanagement and poor bill collection, factors exacerbated by high fuel prices globally. Almost a third of the $33 billion public debt results from funds spent to cover EDL losses over the past decade.

While the issue of privatization and securitization of state assets was once again brought up in the draft budget as a necessary and crucial step, the minister downplayed the chances of such measures being undertaken. Siniora, perhaps rightfully, claims that serious economic reforms, namely at EDL, among others, should be implemented prior to engaging in successful privatization schemes.

Lahoud’s previous attempt at controlling government expenditures by putting forward a cost-aware government under Selim Hoss backfired, paralyzing growth by blasting foreign investments and halting infrastructure projects and construction permits.

The public debt

One of the major tangible problems awaiting the new government is the massive public debt, a burden of around $35 billion sitting on the shoulders of every single Lebanese citizen making a living in the country. Surely enough, not much can be done on reducing the absolute value of the debt as it currently stands, since the Lebanese government is nowhere near having enough surplus funds to repay any loans.

In fact, assuming Lebanon would still have to pay a total of $800 million in interest between September and December of 2004 – which is somewhat of a conservative estimate – total debt servicing for the year would not exceed $2,600 million, which is significantly below the debt servicing burden of 2003, which reached $3,233 million (See public debt and debt servicing chart).

This reduction is total cost of debt, of around 19% between 2003 and 2004 was achieved thanks to many efforts by the Hariri government, which include cheaper loans from Paris II, 0% loans obtained through agreements with the banking sector in the country, in addition to some securities market gimmicks, such as the recently completed Eurobond swap. Would a new government led by Karami be able to pull off such achievements? While it is hard to say at this stage, it may be sensible to warn that not many people possess the weight of Hariri on the international scene, or the domestic financial scene for that matter. Time will tell if a government of so-called “technocrats” will be able to maintain the trend set by the previous government this year.

Interest Rates and the Lebanese Pound

Directly related to the public debt are interest rates. They have driven the cost of the public debt up and down over the past year. However their impact is not limited to this as interest rates typically make or break an economic comeback from recession anywhere in the world, fluctuating in relation to two main parameters: government borrowing and eco-political stability. Although the Hariri government continued to borrow in 2004, an improved economic and investment climate allowed it to reduce the cost of such borrowing. The country witnessed its best-ever tourism season, and money was flooding in from across the region and beyond.

However, the sensitivity to stability proved itself once again in the past 6 weeks, as political uncertainty following the extension of Lahoud’s term in power, the resulting UN resolution 1559 and US sanctions, and the departure of Hariri have all put upward pressure on interest rates (see interest rates chart). All such developments resulted in an increase in interest rates of 1% on the domestic currency by the central bank, a major increase by economic standards. Such a move, under the pretext of “defending the national currency,” as advocated by Riad Salemeh, is the first significant hike in rates in two years.

Defending the national currency, in fact, has always been a highly debated issue in Lebanon, as it has a tendency of draining the country’s foreign reserves, with not many tangible or directly visible benefits. The Hariri government had, however, successfully increased the country’s foreign exchange reserves to more than $12 billion, and has been able to maintain it above that level for most of the 2004. Things took a drastic turn for the worse, however, between September and October, following the extension of Lahoud’s term and the announcement of Hariri that he would not lead a new government. The ultimate result was massive pressure on the domestic currency, forcing significant intervention by the Central Bank, and ultimately leading to a drastic drop of almost $1 billion in foreign exchange reserves in less than three weeks (See Foreign Currency Reserves Chart). As Karami’s government is handed the reigns, a daunting task awaits it: keeping interest rates low, and alleviating pressure on the domestic currency so as to not erode reserves. For that, political and economic stability are a must. Although it may not be fair to judge from a first impression, Karami’s efforts to form a new government do not inspire much confidence, as such efforts have done nothing but further emphasize the divisions among the Lebanese, and each and everyone’s quest for power at the expense of everyone and everything else.

Yet again, time will tell if the Karami government will be able to inspire confidence in people to stop the pressure on the Lebanese pound and the widening interest differential between the domestic currency and foreign currencies.

So now what?

The Lebanese status quo is changing. Pressure is mounting on the lira, eroding reserves, US and UN sanctions hang overhead, fuel prices are rising and electricity power shortages are more frequent as Lebanon hits an all-time low standard of living… the picture does not look so good. The last time Karami held office, the lira fell through the floor.

November 1, 2004 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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