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Business

Q&A: Thomas Doering

by Executive Editors July 1, 2004
written by Executive Editors

Owned by Lufthansa German airlines and a big German retail conglomerate, the Thomas Cook of today is a much changed company primarily extending travel and financial services to European consumers – but it has retained a strong image in the local market and even a few employees who remember working in Beirut in 1984. EXECUTIVE talked to Thomas Doering, senior vice president for corporate development, about the company’s objectives in reopening their offices.

You want to operate inbound and outbound travel and related services in Lebanon. What is the first item on your agenda?

We have a two-phased approach. The first phase is to open offices and establish our infrastructure in Lebanon. This is what we have just done. With this, we want to establish ourselves as a travel company to the local people. This is our first objective. In phase two, we like to invest to get people into Lebanon.

How important is the Middle East region in the business of Thomas Cook?

The Middle East is a region that we believe in, that we did our studies on, and that we now have decided to invest in. It is in our strategy as an expansion region, but it is quite small in terms of numbers.

What is your timeline for growing the business in Lebanon and opening new offices?

The way we do business is to have a proper business running before taking the next step. But if you ask me, I would open an office in the [Beirut International] airport tomorrow. Other places would follow as we learn which places are the best to go.

How big of an impact do you expect your operation to make vis-à-vis the established Lebanese competition of travel agencies and Beirut-based operators?

When Thomas Cook comes to a country it tries to bring all the best things from the world to that country, meaning that we can bring talent, technology, contracts, relationships, network and the power of this huge group. In corporate travel, for example, we will not be the one to take the smallest percentage as a fee. But with our technology and search technology, we might be able to offer you a ticket that might be cheaper by $500 on a $3,000 ticket, and that makes much more sense to our customers.

You obviously have done your studies

Yes we have, and we want to have a significant market share. Our aim is to be number one or two; normally we aim to be number one.

Is that in corporate travel?

Corporate and leisure go hand in hand. The same customers that go on business trips invest in their own leisure time.

How large do you assess the corporate travel market in Lebanon to be?

I do not think that anyone knows haw big that [cumulative corporate travel] budget is for all Lebanon – but it is significant because the number of airline tickets being sold here is for instance as big as in Egypt. The potential is there.

Are you seeking larger firms as your clients, or are you also approaching small and medium enterprises?

There is no minimum size. The relationship would be different with a small company, because smaller companies tend to come and buy a ticket on a case-by-case occasion. With a bigger customer, we might have a longer-term contract, and take over their whole travel budget, its administration, databases, etc. That is a very different relationship. But we are interested in both customers.

In your summer 2004 program, you do not yet offer Lebanon as destination. When can we expect to see Beirut listed in your catalogues?

As soon as possible. Our plan is to test the product in the market right after we come back. But it will need education of the people. We will need to go out and tell people what fantastic country Lebanon is. We need to tell people that it is safe to travel here and we need to tell people that this is three hours from Europe.

Will you offer Lebanon in package tours including several countries or focus on developing it as solo destination?

We always had cultural tours where you go and visit two or three of these countries. This business will be there and we will continue to do it. But I see the bigger chance for this market to position itself to the short-break passengers who just want to go on their own to a city and explore it. My vision is that we can go out and position Beirut as a product with the sophisticated traveler. We need to grab the niche between city and charter seven-to-14 day beach holidays. And if we can position ourselves there in the upper market, then we can offer culture, fantastic city, hospitality, good hotels, beach, and this fantastic [Lebanese] lifestyle around it.

How many of the 12 million annual passengers with Thomas Cook can be categorized as up market?

By far the biggest chunk of our business will be from charter package passengers, because this is where both our German and our UK business come from. But do we understand the trend of the individual traveler? Yes, we do. 50% of demand is not for charter package and this is the growing part. This is why these things become interesting for us.

Thomas Cook holds stakes in hotels and owns airplanes. Are you looking at investing into hotels here?

We go into hotels when we feel that we need to improve the product quality or secure product availability. This is something that comes up when we have very big volumes. Then we want to have some own assets. I think that is the answer to your question.

How about offering charter flights to Lebanon?

What I have just said is equally true for charters. Charter is the possibility to offer secured capacity with self-managed quality to a destination, but it only makes sense when you have big volumes.

How much are you prepared to invest into marketing a destination such as Lebanon to your customer base?

A lot at the right time. Our investment is by putting the destination into brochures, putting it into windows, putting it out to the public. Our window to the public is literally millions of publications – catalogues – and 4,000 own and many more associated travel agencies where these destinations appear in the window. I wouldn’t want to qualify that marketing power in terms of dollars but when is the right time to do it? It is coming slowly and it needs to be equal to the upturn in demand. There is no point in putting marketing dollars at a customer base that doesn’t understand the concept.
 

July 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Battling to stay in the ring

by Nadine Fares July 1, 2004
written by Nadine Fares

Lebanon’s $530 million retail jewelry sector has been putting in a strong performance over the last decade, with a reputation as one of the leading markets in jewelry manufacturing in the region. However, less optimistic observers will point to the fact that Lebanon has lost ground to other countries, notably in the Gulf, and, despite the potential for further growth, more could be done to promote the sector.

According to a report by the World Gold Council (WGC), before the outbreak of the civil war, Lebanon was the leading jewelry hub of the Middle East with a reputation equal to that of South Africa, London, Russia and Zurich. It had an emphasis on craftsmanship and creativity as well as an ability to combine the Middle East culture with modern methods. But the sector lost its luster during the war as most of Lebanon’s homegrown talent fled the country. Those who remained struggled to keep the industry afloat as Dubai, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia grew in stature. Ironically, the people who drove the development of the sector in these countries were mainly Lebanese.

“Although Lebanon continues to suffer from severe economic strains, we enjoy the fact that jewelry is still a major tourist attraction, especially to visitors from Arab countries, the US, Europe and Cyprus,” said Carole Hakim, marketing manager for Antoine Hakim Jewelers. “We have a worldwide reputation for our know-how in jewelry.” Leading jeweler George Mouzannar concurs: “There is no doubt that, as Lebanese, we are more into the creative side of jewelry making. Our designs can be found among the top international brands. This makes us proud, but of course there’s always room for improvement in any kind of business, and the jewelry industry is no exception.”

Exporting

According to ministry of trade and economy statistics, jewelry is Lebanon’s number one export industry, constituting 30% of the overall industrial sector in Lebanon. The latest data shows that jewelry export figures have increased by 9% since 2002 to around $465 million in 2003 – over 75% of which constitutes exports to Switzerland. First quarter of 2004 exports have reached $147.5 million.

But according to Vasken Hadidian, president of the Lebanese Jewelry Syndicate, the official figures hide the true story. “The government doesn’t differentiate between raw materials and finished products,” he explained. “Seventy percent of the figures constitute raw materials and not finished goods. The reason why Switzerland is seen as a major importer is because we sell them scrap gold, which is a form of money transfer rather than a commodity.” He added that Lebanon imports around 25 to 30 tons of jewelry yearly, only 30% of which remains in the country. The rest is designed, worked on, and then re-exported to Gulf areas, mainly Dubai and Kuwait. In fact, according to Hadidian, the majority of local jewelry is actually exported to the Gulf, with Switzerland mostly importing watches made specifically for the Swiss market. “We export to Switzerland under our international brand name, Romulus and Remus, with small quantities re-branded,” he added. There is room for improvement to make the sector more self-sufficient. Although Lebanon exports high-end jewelry (unlike the lower quality products exported by the Far East markets), it still lacks what it takes to make a genuine manufacturing sector. “We import finished products like chains, when most countries, like Italy, have all the equipment required to create everything they need,” said Mouzannar. “It is a pity that we still have not yet reached that level.”

Who’s buying?

According to Hadidian, local consumption is worth around $50 to $70 million. Statistics provided by the ministry of economy and trade reveal that jewelry imports to Lebanon reached around $302 million in 2003. “Subtract from that amount what we consume locally and the rest is reproduced and exported,” explained Hadidian.

“Only 2% to 5% of the local population, namely the upper class, spends on high-end jewelry,” he added, “the rest prefer to invest in gold in its cheapest form.” Hadidian admitted that local sales had been hit by the frosty economic climate. “Our biggest customers were middle class consumers. We are loosing them. Even the upper class is not spending as much as they used to in the past. Instead of buying an item for $10,000 they now go for something that’s around a $1,000,” said Hakim.

Competition

Jewelry, as a luxury product, is much more sensitive to the economic cycle. Naturally, jewelers also have a tougher time keeping their heads above water when the downswing comes, as they need continuous capital to continue and grow. Although their profit margin is around 20% to 30%, unlike other industries, the largest share of revenue goes to labor.

The competition is growing in the world and in the region, and Lebanon is feeling the squeeze. Today, Dubai offers the Dubai Metals and Commodities Center, a hub for gold, diamonds and commodities trade, which aims at attracting key players throughout the industry sectors – including relevant support industries such as finance, logistics and insurance – by offering free zone services. This has not escaped the attention of Lebanese jewelry makers. “They are offering great incentives, so why wouldn’t Lebanese jewelers focus their expansion on these countries? It’s enough that they are offering 100% business ownership and no taxes for up to 50 years. How can we even dream of such a perfect deal in Lebanon?” asked Mouzannar.

For the record, the local industry employs around 20,000, including business retailers and manufacturers. “No one can really know how many people actually work in this sector, because some have factories others have smaller workshops, and others work on a freelance basis. Labor is expensive compared to other countries like India and the East Asia,” explained Hadidian. Mouzannar added, like most industries in Lebanon, social security remains a big problem. “The government is not motivating people to invest in expanding their businesses in order to employ more people and spread out. It’s better for us to outsource finished products, as it’s less expensive. Having three employees is like paying for four and there are no facilities or incentives encouraging enough for us to develop our business,” said Mouzannar. Hadidian hopes the government is aware of regional developments and reacts appropriately. “So far, no one is showing interest in this matter. We are supposed to be the hub for the Middle East, but while we’re doing nothing, others in the region are doing a great job,” he said.

“We are still far behind in terms of international movements that will hinder our advancement and development,” he said, adding that Lebanon has yet sign the Kimberly process agreement. The agreement, which involves 48 governments and the diamond industry, is in an attempt to create a certification system that would label legitimate stones, thereby blocking the sale of conflict diamonds and protecting the integrity of the $7.8 billion annual trade. Statistics show that about 4% of that trade is in conflict diamonds, the profits of which are said to finance terrorism.

Hadidian admitted that since Lebanon hasn’t signed the agreement yet, “we are jeopardizing our reputation and hindering exports to other countries, as well as local development – like licenses for setting up diamond refineries and so forth. All of these should be taken into consideration before making any further decisions.”

Solutions

“We definitely stand out in quality and availability; yet our position needs to be enforced by building stronger strategies with the help of the Lebanese government,” said Chafic Idriss, marketing manager at Nsouli Jewelry. “We need an institution that can teach jewel manufacturing as well as a gem and metallurgy lab.”

At the international level, steps have been taken to help revive the sector. A few years ago, as part of their move towards liberating the international jewelry market, the WGC approached the Lebanese government with a proposal to reduce customs duties to 4%, a rate similar to that of the UAE. They also recommended the establishment of an alternative jewelry hub in the Middle East, more specifically for the Levant and Egypt. Key jewelers from Egypt and the Gulf have urged Lebanese officials to encourage the jewelry sector. As a result, Lebanon has halved customs duties on imported finished gold jewelry to 5% in November 2000. At the same time, customs duties on all consumables and chemicals used in jewelry manufacturing were abolished. The government also stopped tariffs on precious stones. “Thanks to the government and the Jewelry Syndicate, VAT was decreased from 10% to just 1.2%,” said Mouzannar. This may have been the only positive step taken by the government thus far to keep jewelers from losing their businesses, said Hadidian, but he was quick to point out that many in the sector don’t feel that they have benefited from any changes in real terms. “The real problems that the industry faces lies in the hands of government officials. We are suffering while others are booming. One thing is for sure we cannot sit and wait for the government to do anything – one has to take matters in his own hands,” said Hadidian. “Industry professionals, who would like to go seek their future in Dubai, for example, should do so, as they will see no growth in Lebanon. They are providing so much for people in our business there, so why not?”

According to Hadidian, the only thing that could give Lebanon a genuine competitive edge is turning the country into a free zone market for jewelers, abolishing all taxes. “That is the only chance I see for us to compete.”

Fashion

While the Lebanese haute couture business has reached international catwalks and made it onto the backs of Hollywood’s most glamorous stars, Lebanon’s $150 million ready-to-wear garment sector, once a regional power, is decidedly threadbare. In 2003, Lebanon imported $247 million worth of garments but exported only $43 million worth. For the record, according to the Lebanese Industrialists Association, in 2003, Lebanon produced 25 million items of clothing; but the country actually has the capacity to triple this amount and, given the right initiative, create jobs for 30,000 workers, five times the current workforce. Still, Fouad Hodroj, president of the Lebanese garment manufacturers, is nonetheless upbeat and believes that Lebanon is going through a transitional phase, one that will see a brighter future. “International business trends change over time, the same way fashion changes seasonally,” he explained. “We must follow the trend now and Lebanese manufacturers should be working towards revamping their business strategies, investing in other creative aspects.” In the past, Lebanese designers have been known in the region for the quality and accuracy of their sewing, while a new generation of designers, including Elie Saab, Robert Abi Nader, Zuhair Mrad and Abed Mahfouz took a giant step into the world of glamorous clothing, selling to other Arab countries and achieving international recognition. “We are good at designing and creating beautiful clothes,” said Hodroj. “This is what we should invest in. Ten years from now, I see us designing and creating while sending sketches to the Far East or Egypt for manufacturing. This is what most Europeans do. It’s the way people are doing business abroad, and it’s time we follow that model,” Hodroj said. “Today, we are in no position to compete against ready-made garments imported from the Far East, as their prices are far less than ours. We can compete against European imports however, as our prices are almost the same. Therefore, we should be investing in quality rather than mass quantities, and more so, on the creative aspect. This is how international clothes industries are working – we should be doing the same.”

According to Daniel Tchakedjian, store manager of the ABC mall in Ashrafieh, it’s all in the quality. “The Lebanese fashion collections we have in our stores don’t sell as well as their Chinese and other counterparts,” he said. “I disagree when people say that it’s a matter of mentality and that people prefer to buy international products. They’d rather buy quality for the money they are paying and, unfortunately, the quality of local products is very low, especially when compared to its price tag.”

Maria Mansour, a local shopper, says that she prefers paying around LL100,000 on a shirt for her husband from Massimo Dutti, rather than from a local manufacturer. “I think [locally made clothing] is too expensive for what it is,” she explained.

Tchakedjian said that Lebanese are very sophisticated and are very smart shoppers. They will not buy anything that has no quality. Those looking for cheaper brands go for imported goods from the Far East. So what went wrong? Hodroj explained that the history behind the industry is important as it shows why the sector is in its current condition. The ready-to-wear garment sector began in Lebanon after the country’s independence in 1948. “This industry was booming in Lebanon. We found ourselves in this line of work more than others in the region, since Lebanese were naturally more open to other cultures, especially western ones.”

During that period, according to Hodroj, ready-to-wear garments accounted for 40% of the total industrial sector, and the garment industry enjoyed a long period of success that lasted until the outbreak of the civil war. “Before the war, there were no laws, no customs fees, no high electricity bills and no social securities to be paid, among other things,” said Hodroj. “But as production costs increased dramatically over the years, profit margins also had to increase, as producers had a great deal of expenses to pay. So, many in the industry suffered.”

To make matters worse, the industry lost nearly half its 25% market share after the government’s trade deals facilitated the import of Syrian and Egyptian products. “The government has not done enough to protect the local industry. What’s more, we cannot export our products to Egypt and Syria – does that make sense?” he asked.

Until the early 90’s, there were around 1,240 factories in Lebanon. That number has more than halved to 500 factories of varying size, employing 11,000 workers today. Those left are the ones who have invested in modernizing their factories with the latest equipment, and directed their business towards designing and producing quality products that have a chance to compete against European goods.

“Lebanese haute couture has been displayed along side Yves Saint Laurent, Armani and Christian Dior, among others. Hopefully, our ready-made clothes could do equally well in the future,” said Hodroj.

July 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Resorting to luxury: Lebanon’s new tourism

by Thomas Schellen July 1, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Lebanon’s new boom is tourism-related real estate. Significant developments – worth in excess of $4 billion – in this field have begun roughly four years ago and accelerated massively by this year. The Middle East’s largest resort project, Sannine Zenith, topped the list of headline-making projects by size. But other projects are also highly noteworthy, from the Metropolitan Park development in the Jamhour area above Beirut, which will be the Eastern Mediterranean’s first theme park, to a wave of new beach resorts with names such as Oceana, Bamboo Bay, La Voile Bleu, Edde Sands and, the latest addition, La Guava.

Ironically, as much as beach life has long been associated with the Lebanese scene, the development of good beach resorts is a recent phenomenon. As short ago as 2002, an economic guidebook on Lebanon could undisputedly label the nation’s publicly owned coast as having “little more to offer than uncontrolled industrial development and mountains of garbage.” Whereas beach facilities previously existed in some numbers, they did so either in form of elite islands for a most narrow clientele of Lebanon’s upper 10,000 or would meet only the lowest possible denominators of cheap fun, the new resorts are seeking to provide both class and relative affordability in an ecologically compatible setting.

The importance of resort development for the future of Lebanon can hardly be overestimated. These new trump cards in the Lebanese development game score on two crucial economic fronts – tourism and real estate. While sales of apartments and vacation homes on the high end of the market entered a boom phase over the past two years, economists, sector analysts and major real estate players cautioned that this flare of mostly foreign direct investments was restricted in its economic benefits. By contrast, resort properties are productive. As tourism destinations they attract visitors, offer jobs and operator profits. As real estate they boost values at the site and the surrounding area. Operators and developers of the new resorts reported sotto voce that their presence, whether on mountain or seashore, send land prices soaring in the immediate area by at least 50% and up to three times. In parallel, the developers uniformly agreed that the mere act of constructing a resort or setting up a building somewhere on unused land does not add any value. This value is created through sound commercial leisure activities that are up to 21st century standards on infrastructure, business concept, marketing, and environment.

Sannine Zenith

Beyond its image as behemoth and mother of all mountain resorts, much mystery still shrouds Sannine Zenith, the largest commercial real estate adventure ever attempted in Lebanon. The initial political hype over its ownership structure has settled and the land purchases have been registered to the As Salam company, which is now wholly Lebanese owned by Jean Abou Rached, according to public relations manager Firaz Amine. “This project is a golden egg. It is so beneficial to all of Lebanon that nobody can question it,” he enthused.

Burnt somewhat by controversies over an alleged sell-out of 1% of the nation’s surface, the developers prefer to liken Sannine Zenith’s current property tally of 75 million square meters to covering an area “four times the size of Beirut.” As the detailed final master plan and feasibility studies for the project are still being worked on, the use concept and ultimate scope of the mammoth site still has some vagueness to it. But the people of the company will gladly present feel-good videos that virtually glow with promise and reveal that in the end, after further intended land acquisitions, the project size will most probably amount to 95 million square meters of “virgin land.”

Of the land already bought for more than $200 million, about 30 % are earmarked for potential construction comprising of infrastructure and hotels (not less than 8), houses, and commercial buildings. Ski slopes (double the area of the Faraya ski slopes) and three, 18-hole golf courses will consume a substantial portion of the territory, for which the developers push the slogan “in the heart of Lebanon and above the clouds.”

A green spine with one million (yet to be planted) fast-growing Nordic pine trees, an artificial lake, a heliport and three residential villages – themed eco, sports and lakeside – are key characteristics of the design. Also important, areas above 1,600 meters elevation will not see any building of houses and other structures and the peaks zone above 2,200 meters will be turned into a nature preserve, Amine said.

As Salam, whose concept includes financing of the development by issuing $1.25 billion in Global Depository Receipts to willing investors, foresees a construction phase of 12 years, during which the project will provide thousands of jobs. A project of this magnitude cannot prey on only the rich as their clientele, and Sannine Zenith confesses to have a family-oriented approach that targets normal earners as well.

Asking prices for land in the area rose to $8 to $10 per square meter since the project was announced this spring, from $3/sqm, which As Salam paid in acquisitions last year, Amine said, marveling himself at the fact that the company could keep their intentions a secret during the purchase phase.

When work is underway full steam, the company “will be happy to sell a square meter at $100,” he gave as an approximation of anticipated future prices. If all goes according to plan, As Salam might even attempt to take their mountain identity to the sea and launch a new big seaside resort venture in North Lebanon, under the name Sannine-sur-Mer.

If successful, Sannine Zenith, with a population projection of 45,000, would provide a case study for what appreciation a large, desolate chunk of land, that no one knew what to do with, can achieve in a grand development scheme. “Once it is developed, it most definitely will be a project to lift the Lebanese GDP,” Amine said.

Oceana

Widely credited with having broken the ground for more stylish beach resort ambiences on the Lebanese coast, the Oceana resort is reopening this summer at a new site in the coastal plane of Damour, to where the resort relocated this year from their previous address in Rmeileh several kilometers further south. The all-new Oceana resort will be a double feature with a landside pool face for the day and a seaside promenade face at night.

The natural Mediterranean beach in Damour is narrower than in Rmeileh and the old railroad tracks cut right through the property, so Oceana operators Cimes focused their creativity on turning these two limitations of the site into advantages, Cimes CEO Gilbert Khoury told EXECUTIVE. To do so, the developers aligned a boardwalk on the railroad right-of-way to create a 310-meter promenade along which they strung a lineup of restaurants designed to serve the resort patrons as well as a hoped-for dinner crowd. Since Lebanese beach goers mostly won’t seek direct exposure to the ocean waves and prefer to frolic between swimming pool and picnic tables, Khoury expects that the narrowness of the natural beach will not hurt the resort which is laid out to accommodate these customer desires during the day with the recreation facilities on its 30,000 square meter site and the restaurants facing it along the boardwalk.

Come evening, however, the promenade should rise to a second life as destination for people who fancy a walk and a meal or a party on the seafront. Then the restaurants will shift their attention to their west-looking terraces. Under this concept, “the short distance to the water is an attraction instead of a handicap,” Khoury said. The big pulling point that led Cimes to establish the new Oceana at Damour are the green surroundings. With the nearest building 500 meters away, the beach resort aims to entice Beirut dwellers to its Utopian setting only 15 kilometers from the capital. “It might be pretentious but we think we can create a wholesome destination for people to come there,” Khoury said.


This determination includes a commitment to preserve the integrity of the Damour plane, which represents a unique alveolus holding fresh air in the country’s coastal zone. Being to close to the sea for their purposes, farmers could not find much use for the land. For several years, the area had been under study for development as eco-tourism realm, and Oceana wants to be an anchor for environmentally sound recreation there. According to Khoury, all soil dug out during Oceana’s construction was reused in landscaping and above ground structures are built with wood.

With time, the resort intends to promote bicycle and horseback riding, and jogging as alternative to morning walks in the polluted city. With such features, the Damour plane fits the profile of new tourism-related real estate projects that can create new leisure values, property appreciation, and economic opportunities.

Apart from the location’s great overall potential, one reason for moving Oceana to the new site, so Khoury, was that Cimes didn’t want to operate the resort on conditions of a short-term lease. When first venturing into developing beach resorts four years ago, the company wanted to reduce its risks and rented the land for its first two beaches, Oceana and Bamboo Bay. The new Oceana, which involved a $2 million investment, is still set up on leased land but the terms are longer, seven years in Damour versus three years in Rmeileh. In Jiyeh, where the company is working on improving and expanding the Bamboo Bay resort by adding hotel facilities, the contract is for 10 years with extension option.

Ultimately however, the drawbacks of leasing arrangements can outweigh the advantages as the market for beach resorts is heating up, Khoury discovered with a laughing and a crying eye. “Now we are established in the market, but most of the added value is going to the landlord instead of us,” he said. In the case of the Damour property, the cost of the lease is still slightly better for Cimes than the cost of finance in purchasing the land, partly because owners in the area revised their prices for selling substantially upwards within the relatively short time from when Cimes signed their lease agreement until today.

In the longer term, however, Khoury wants to achieve gains from both operating beach resorts and from the real estate appreciation a resort creates. His aim for future projects is to have a two-pronged structure of a real estate investment firm and an operator company – but with separate shareholding bases, to avoid conflicts of interest between the resort operation side and the real estate aspect of the business.

Faqra and Mechref

The ancestral tree of the new Lebanese resorts family includes a number of projects that were important in evolving this particular real estate culture over the past thirty years. On the mountainside, the Faqra gated community was established in 1974 as a winter sports resort and pioneer of such developments. After the war years presented it with the challenge of serving different needs from the original design – customer demand for plots and construction was driven by Faqra’s security and insulation from the conflict zone – the project could re-emphasize its original focus over the last 12 years and today continues to grow, marketed now as an all-year, high-altitude resort community.

At a size of two million square meters, the Faqra Club group of companies, whose original investment has been estimated to translate into approximately $73 million in today’s dollars, saw a substantial recent increase in sales prices for their properties, from an average of $200 per square meter two years ago to at least $300 today, according to company managers. Plots are also tending to be larger. While the company designed its plots originally to measure from 700 to 1,000 square meters, a new 100,000 square meter segment under development today offers land ranging up to 4,000 square meters per plot.

While its presence pulled nearby land values up, the remoteness of Faqra granted the project an existence largely undisturbed by problems with individuals developing land outside of the community’s boundaries, although Faqra’s strict building codes were not implemented there. The value-added that the company provides to its residents comes from the infrastructure it established and from communal services – water, electricity and such – which the project owners in fact subsidize.

Industry observers regard Faqra as a successful development, which however remains by necessity restrained in scope to a comparatively narrow profile of a second or third-residence community for a small target group of affluent Lebanese, Lebanese expatriates and regional buyers. Within these limits, the project’s standing is strong and if the prospect of a belt of ski slopes interlinking the entire Faraya-Sannine area under the Sannine Zenith concept is realized, the good new neighbors could give Faqra yet another boost.

A further landmark in the history of private developments in Lebanon was established when the Mechref community saw the light in 1996. While earlier upscale suburban developments, such as the Rabieh subdivision to the north of the capital, had to face the handicaps caused by the conflict years and the social environment of the time, Mechref opened the gates for a wholly privately planned and structured community angling into the market as new one-site answer to the residential and recreational needs of the well-heeled.

The Mechref community covers a land surface of 3.3 million square meters at 30 to 350 meters above sea level overlooking the Damour coastal plane. Since the developers acquired the land in the mid nineties for an average $17 per square meter, value appreciation of both land and built-up real estate has been substantial. According to general manger Fouad Salha, cost per square meter to the company stands today at $85 and selling prices average $250 to $300, with upward outliers. Calculating that 300 villas have been completed, at average size of 600 square meters per dwelling and $750 cost for land and construction per square meter, the real estate worth of the Mechref community easily reached more than $130 million over eight years.

About 30% of the total area comprises developable land, 40% of which are still available in the market, Salha said. The company today tries to discourage the buying of plots by persons who speculate on increases in their value and do not intend to establish residences there. He described the increase of land prices in the developed as 35 to 40% since 1996, which he claimed was juxtaposed by a contraction of real estate values in much of the overall Lebanese real estate market by a similar percentage, thus further underscoring the Mechref value proposition.

In Salha’s expectation, the community will gain further from clustering of attractive tourism projects nearby, such as the Oceana beach resort in Damour. The awakening of tourism in the area would allow taking a new look at a hotel project in Mechref, which the developers had shelved after earlier feasibility studies had not projected satisfactory returns.

The visions do not end here. The developer of the Edde Sands resort in Byblos, Roger Edde, has a full plan up his sleeve to capitalize on the cultural and natural wealth of this ancient Phoenician city kingdom to amplify its tourism power into a leisure land embracing tennis camps, wellness hotels, green villages and its own port for yachts and even cruise liners – a $2 billion dream for the Byblos-Amcheet stretch alone, and that is without counting in Edde’s ambitions for a snow-side resort development in the Tannourine-Jaj cedars region. “I am fully bullish on the Byblos destination,” Edde told EXECUTIVE. “I feel the tourism industry and tourism related real estate in Lebanon are two years ahead of a moving curve, which will move up substantially in the 15 years that follow.”

July 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Q&A: Nasser Chamaa

by Executive Contributor July 1, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

Solidere has launched a new program thought to bring many changes to your business. What is the program’s core offering?

The program is based on settling part of the price of real estate transactions through shares at a time when we have noticed a major pickup in interest in developing downtown projects.

What motivated you to create this program?

What started us thinking about this program was the realization that the share price cannot stay where it is, because it is significantly undervalued. We have to do something to try to make people and shareholders realize that there is much more value in the company stock.

In launching the program, you mentioned that the Solidere share price is undervalued. Where do you see the fair value?

We estimate that the land bank that we own is worth $ 4.5 billion. That is excluding the properties that have been developed, which we value at $300 million. This will increase immediately when the Souks are completed, bringing the value of the buildings that the company owns to about $800 million. So I think if you do the numbers, the shares are definitely undervalued.

Seven years ago, the most optimistic estimates by international finance houses saw Solidere shares going up to $18 or $20. Now we are happy to be at $7 per share. We are not happy to be at seven.

What number would make you happy?

I will not comment, but as the value of this land bank appreciates the share price appreciates. The other element is payment of dividends. This is a key component of our program, that we will request the cancellation of the shares, which we will acquire. Then whoever is left as shareholder in the company will own a bigger portion.

How long ago did you begin preparation for this program?

It has taken us some time but I think what is important is that this program is coming at a time when there is significant interest in development in the BCD.

Are you saying timing is everything?

Timing and the circumstances. The other beautiful part of this program is that it doesn’t have a drain on our cash situation. It is basically a buy-back program. We are buying back shares but without having to shell out cash and instead giving land.

Did you develop this all in-house or did you use outside consultants?

We consulted with different individuals but in the end these ideas really came from within.

Do you have grounds outside of the new program on which to base your optimism?

Beirut is a city that definitely is in fashion. I talked to international retailers who see that point very well and are able to gauge that through their global activities. They see that Arabs are now looking inwards and Beirut is a spot where they want to be. The Lebanese diaspora is also looking to invest in Lebanon.

Two years ago, you started on an upward curve. Is it correct that the company had a good year in 2003 but showed lower results because it did not want to record sales on its books before they were fully registered?

No, we had cancellations related to shareholders in Bank Al Madina. These were the transactions that had this negative impact on our income statement. Otherwise we would have had probably as good a year as the previous year.

Is the new program and special offer valid at this moment?

Yes, from the day that we declared it and it is already being practiced. But it has yet to result in sales. That is not the case. We have several contracts in different phases of execution. Some were prior to this offer. There are stages of signature, final stages of fine-tuning the contract, but as far as I am concerned, these are sales that are behind us. We are negotiating with a major investor on a huge lot, but this story is at a stage where we cannot yet make an announcement.

Are you in effect reducing the price of land that you sell in Solidere?

To make this program work, we offer a discount of 15% from the list price. We review our prices every six months, and have been moving them up all the time, and this will continue. Pricing the land is another mechanism that has to do with many other factors. We will not change that. What we have always done when we price land is that we stick to it to make sure that people who have invested are somehow protected.

How much did prices go up since Solidere started to market properties?

We started selling initially at $950 [per square meter of built-up area/BUA] and we had a transaction for a hotel that was at slightly less than $950. But since then we have gone up to $1,550. This was the price for a superb piece of land that sits right on the edge of the Marina. I will not be surprised when we are selling some similar properties with commanding views at $1700 or $1800 in two years’ time.

But is it a fact that with the current offer, prices for the buyer have gone down for the first time since the company was established?

No. We have made deals on a cash basis where we applied discounts. While this is not a cash deal, mind you, we are getting 40% payment in shares upfront. We were always getting 25%. This is already a plus. We are getting more money upfront. And we are getting the rest of our money more quickly, three years instead of five years. So this discount is not a giveaway. It has economic bases.

Thus, the 15 % discount would be compensated by a decrease in exposure of the debt over two years and at the same time by the price of shares?

Not by the price of shares. We are acquiring a larger down payment at 40%, which could be 40% in shares or 30% in shares and 10% in cash, instead of 25%. But I tell you something that nobody has noticed yet. This program will have a positive impact on our retained earnings, up to a certain point. As long as we acquire the shares at less than [the nominal issue value of] $10 and we are canceling them at $10, there is another positive impact for the shareholder but not for the real estate investor.

How much could an investor gain in a best-case scenario if he bought shares when they stood at $4 or $5 and used them now for the offer?

This depends on several factors, at what price you bought your shares, how long you have held them, what is your borrowing cost. But if you buy shares today and your borrowing cost is very low and you wait on these shares and then execute the program, these shares will probably be at a higher price a year from now and you will even get another benefit. You get a bonus of 10% on the price of your shares and you get a 15% discount on the land. The program is also telling you as a shareholder that your shares are dearer to you now. You should hold your shares and not accept to sell them at these lower levels.

Is the offer open ended?

We have no time limit on it today but it is an offer that we will have to keep assessing as time goes by.

Is the offer giving a certain edge to large investors and large shareholders over small ones?

No, not at all. It is probably giving more edge to the small shareholders. Large shareholders have held on to their shares. The small shareholders have been panicking when their share prices have been going down. I think today they have no reason to panic. They are in a position to feel that the company is backing their shares.

Can you ensure that no information on your new program was leaked, to people who had already been negotiating with the company over buying a property?

We have our internal procedures to make sure that this is the case and I hope they work.

How would you respond to concerns that this city is a place where insider trading and conflicts of interest between ownership and management are common?

I believe our internal procedures are working as far as confidentiality and as far as transparency. We have shareholders all over the world. We have to ensure that we are not only playing by the rules in this country but by global standards.

What about allegations reported by some Beirut media about controversies in your general assembly on June 21?

We answered that. The auditors obviously never said anything [of the sort which was reported]. No shareholders, including those who stood up and screamed for other reasons, said such things in the assembly. Where did this reporter come up with those allegations? We have no idea. In fact the owner of the newspaper also doesn’t know where these allegations came from.

Can you comment on expressions of discontent at your general assembly?

You have to evaluate this discontent. If it is coming from a shareholder who is concerned about the interest of the company, I definitely take it seriously, but if it is criticism coming from troublemakers or people who have disputes with the company, this is negative for the other shareholders who have real concerns and [who risk] not having these concerns heard.

Could you give examples for real concerns?

There are many concerns that shareholders can voice and they do voice them. One of the concerns is why we aren’t paying dividends. This is a catch-22 situation; if we pay dividends we will not have enough cash to move ahead with the development process. If we pay dividends, some shareholders will be happy because it is an immediate benefit but in a way it will be taken away from future potential benefits.

In the long term, where do you see Solidere obtaining revenues?

From property management. Key to that are the Souks. Are local retailers getting twitchy over the delays and planting their flags elsewhere?

I am not concerned that this will happen. In fact, we have every indication that retailers understand the importance of this location very well. I would have liked to have completed this project by now, but we are about to start now, within the next couple of weeks. So within the next 18 months, we will have it up.

What do you say to developers who say the price of land makes it almost impossible for them to make money?

I tell them there are others who do and continue to come and buy land. This is what is happening. I am sure that also in Saifi and other non-waterfront residential areas, projects are making money.

And developers who are buying land at $1200 BUA and have to sell at roughly $3,000, can achieve that now?

Absolutely.

July 1, 2004 0 comments
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Society

Convergence interrupted

by William Long July 1, 2004
written by William Long

2004 is already shaping up to be the year that “converged networking” (CN) – the merging of voice, data and video communications into one seamless system – truly came of age. Although the concept is not particularly new, it can now be said, with confidence, that the technical problems surrounding CN have finally been solved for the serious enterprise user and casual consumer alike. Most significantly though, both the capital and operating costs of convergence have declined substantially while, in the process, even the corporate telecom behemoths, whose profits were largely dependent on a segregated voice and data market, have come around to accept, market and even welcome the inevitability of CN.

Former incumbent telephone monopolies like Verizon and AT&T in the US, among others internationally, have recently rolled out an array of new services that turn the trend into an even more viable alternative for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), individuals, and multinational goliaths. “There is a shifting in the market from corporate based [clients] to now also include individual based [clients],” said Samer Halawi, regional director of Inmarsat, a $500 million firm that provides mobile voice, data and video transmission services to major news networks around the globe. “We are not a telecom company anymore,” he added, “we are an IT telecom conversion company.”

Chief among the new CN products, and perhaps the most exciting from the perspective of markets traditionally overburdened by heavy regulation and high voice tariffs, is commercial internet telephony, or Voice over Internet Protocols (VoIP) – a technology that employs internet-based standards to send and receive voice traffic as if it was data traffic. At its most radical – and this is where government resistance, especially in the Middle East, comes into play – VoIP completely sidesteps the old Public Switch Telephone Network (PSTN) to make use of the new high-speed data networks that have been built up around the world (see diagram I).

In a clear indication of where CN is headed, last month the market research firm Insight Research predicted that VoIP phones in the enterprise will outnumber traditional phones by 2009. Meanwhile, in the Middle East and Africa regions, retail sales of VoIP technology are expected to grow by 50% over the next two years (from $260 million in sales in 2004 to $390 million in 2006), a development which, in part, has led the UN to reduce the weight given to fixed phone lines when it calculates a country’s “teledensity.”

“IP is the way the world will be connected in the next phase of communication history. The idea of switched networks like the one we have now is so old, and so archaic that it is going to end, exclaimed Said Ghazzi, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) associate technology expert at the UN’s Economic and Social Council for Western Asia (ESCWA).

When it comes to just the VoIP part of the CN revolution, according to a report from independent market research group Gartner Dataquest, traditional service providers “can benefit by positioning VoIP services among their retail offerings at the earliest opportunity; in this way they get a new source of revenue and reduce the amount of voice revenue they lose to alternative operators.” All of which is why the ministry of telecommunication’s (MoT) apparent fear of VoIP in Lebanon actually seems, at first glance, like a baffling position. Even if one were to take at face value the oft-assailed fact that Lebanon’s telecom sector is still a state-run asset, operating for the revenue benefit of the government and not the service benefit of consumers, fears of losing the old PSTN revenue should be balanced out by the increased revenue possibilities that exist with the provision of a whole new range of CN services, like VoIP.

After all, that’s what former monopolies have realized – replacing telephone revenue losses with data revenue gains – so one would think, logically, that an actual monopoly like the MoT, who controls regulation, data pricing and telephone pricing, would have even more of an incentive to push the trend. And since the government is also increasingly forced to compete against illegal VoIP calls from home PCs and internet cafes, leading the charge as soon as possible rather than fighting back would make more sense.

But, of course, the state-run telecom monopoly is not an independent company and it doesn’t adhere to conventional cost-benefit calculations. Indeed, the MoT is necessarily more risk-averse and change-averse than any corporate behemoth since it values the ultimate prizes in Lebanon, short-term stability and survival, above all else.

This is perhaps why, even though revenue from regular phone lines has dropped by 9% over the last five years in Lebanon – due mostly to illegal VoIP usage as well as the growth in the cellular sector – the government persists in projecting rosy assumptions about the growth in revenue from regular phone lines: last year the ministry of finance was off in its estimate of such revenue by 56%.

“The solutions are simple,” said Ghazzi. “Everywhere else in the world, the incumbents saw that the growth of voice revenue has slowed down or decreased, and their attempt to respond to that is to build converged networks that create completely new revenue streams for the incumbent.”

Unfortunately though, unlike Morocco’s Maroc Telecom, Bahrain’s Batelco, and others in the region like Jordan and Saudi Arabia that have begun to come to terms with CN and VoIP, Lebanon has not addressed what Gartner calls “the sensitive issue” of how far VoIP will “cannibalize” their PSTN revenue.

“The Middle East region is split,” the report said. “The lack of deployment… results largely from fear and a reluctance to change a market structure that works, even if it is not ideal.”

Even though the MoT itself now uses VoIP solutions internally to reduce the rate it pays for international calls (by as much as 70% over the last four years, according to an MoT source), Lebanon insists on holding court with the diminishing number of countries where most commercial VoIP services are illegal. The irony, and the beginning of a downward spiral really, stems from the fact that while the government uses VoIP for its international call routing, individuals are prohibited from using the technology. Thus, as more and more people use VoIP services under the table like Net2Phone – employed at many internet cafés in Lebanon to save callers almost 70 cents per minute on calls to the US – the MoT predictably digs in even more against the technology. Instead of seeing a market opportunity bolstered by its unique stance as both regulator and monopoly service provider, the MoT even goes so far as to prevent well-established corporations from using all but the most basic of VoIP applications.

A statement from one high-level source at the MoT captured the government’s predicament: VoIP technology “is supposed to achieve significant cost savings for businesses. When used by telecom operators, most probably new entrants, it will significantly reduce service costs and therefore charges on consumers. [However,] the incumbent [government] will normally be forced to practice lower prices consequently.”

Although the source explained that the MoT was considering the revenue effect of calling cards and some other limited VoIP services to offset declining call revenue, he made it clear that the government was primarily looking backwards at “recovering the investment cost of the traditional infrastructure.” This positioning has led to the awkward arrangement, whereby the government forces VoIP to stop at a company’s walls: the data is switched back to regular voice traffic and sent along to the PSTN, as any other normal call would be.

Despite the limitation, some companies in Lebanon are still doggedly pushing forward with VoIP deployment, and realizing cost savings and efficiencies in the process.

In fact, Cisco Systems, a major global supplier of internet technologies, recently sold a 2,500 VoIP phone system to a large company in Lebanon that now has a fully converged network: its four separate networks – surveillance cameras, administrative network, data internet, and the voice system – were all successfully collapsed into one unit.

The company had been paying $120,000 per year just for maintaining the voice system.

According to Hussam Kayyal, general manager Levant at Cisco Systems, the company was able to realize an 80% drop in annual operating telecom costs with the new system – even though the full power of VoIP is effectively cut off at the company’s door-step.

While the initial investment for such a solution is significant – IP phones are more expensive than regular phones – the generally accepted value proposition is that costs are more than recouped over time. Moreover, a whole new range of service enhancing applications moves into reach – voicemail and phones that can easily move across positions, call monitoring and profiling, the integration of email, voicemail and other messengering services. Indeed, the list keeps expanding with the march of technology. Added to this is the fact that, “they’re ready,” said Kayyal of his client. Ready for when Lebanon joins its peers in the region to recognize the potential that CN holds.

Although it is said that some major Lebanese banks have received waivers for VoIP, legality, not infrastructure or cost, is still the most immediate stumbling block for large enterprises, like the company which Cisco Systems outfitted. “Look, the infrastructure could be made almost immediately available, and all would love to join the converged network…it’s a no-brainer, but they do not want to be prosecuted,” said Imad Taraby, the CEO of FiberLink, a leading provider of corporate internet services in Lebanon.

Of course, the extremely high cost of broadband connectivity in Lebanon is still a significant problem hindering VoIP growth – especially for SMEs who can little afford the $12,000 – $24,000 that it costs to procure the minimal amount of bandwidth needed for CN. “Even if they did allow VoIP over the current infrastructure, it is not commercially justifiable to do it,” said Kayyal. Either way, time, it seems, is running out. According to an April 2004 report from the independent market research firm Datamonitor, “The Middle East, Eastern Europe and Africa are to become the main beneficiaries of Western Europe’s outsourcing of its call centers,” Already, Tunisia and other country’s in the region where international calling rates have been liberalized are seeing an explosion in call center employment.

Lebanon, with its high international calling rates and outright prohibition on international VoIP, has entirely shut itself out of this growth industry – despite the fact that the country suffers from an unemployment rate thought to be as high as 20%. This is perhaps one reason why, as Gartner put it: “Having no VoIP strategy is not an option. It is time that participants in the Middle Eastern market devised one.”

July 1, 2004 0 comments
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Society

Smoking out the competition

by Anthony Mills July 1, 2004
written by Anthony Mills

Lebanon’s days as a liberal haven for tobacco advertising may be numbered, in light of a petition signed by 10 MPs that urges the parliamentary health committee to outlaw all forms – above- and below-the-line – of tobacco advertising. However, established industry giants – such as Philip Morris, British American Tobacco and Japan Tobacco International, widely regarded as the ‘big three’ players in the global tobacco game – are fighting back as they seek to engineer a partial ban. They agree with outlawing tobacco advertising on television as part of their commitment to “responsible marketing” but stand accused of constructing a strategy that will harm emerging brands. If they get their way, the market leaders will be able to continue with almost all below-the-line activities and a handful of above-the-line ones (such as limited print and cinema advertising) to ensure a continued presence in the local market, while effectively curbing the challenge of those companies that rely on TV for successful brand building. “If you are losing market share to new competitors, the best way to counterattack is to say: let’s ban advertising so that you can use whatever awareness you already have in the market to try to increase your market share while preventing the others from becoming known to the consumers,” said an tobacco industry executive, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “It’s a sort of gentleman’s agreement, disguised as a responsible marketing campaign, which has been struck between key players in the industry to stop advertising on television.” He explained that the leading tobacco companies have lost a significant market share in recent years. “In the tobacco business, when you lose a 0.2% market share, heads roll. Imagine losing 1%, or 10%, or even 20%.” Five or six years ago, the ‘big three’ controlled about 90% of the market; now they make up less than 50%. They have lost about 20% to 22% market share to local cigarette brand Cedars, which used to have a share of only 2% to 3%. French cigarettes Gauloises and Gitanes have gained around 10% and Davidoff about 3% to 4%. In addition, a host of lesser-known, cheap brands, such as German-produced Three Stars – which sell at LL1,000 a pack – have made small but meaningful inroads. The solution? Cut off the supply of oxygen. “If you stop advertising, these people are going to reap the benefits,” concurred Joe Ayache, associate managing director of ad agency Impact BBDO.

However, even before there was talk of a tobacco advertising ban, industry leaders had begun to move into below-the-line activity to prop up their declining market shares. A few years ago, Philip Morris – which owns Marlboro – was spending less than 50% of its advertising budget below-the-line. That figure has since risen to more than 80%. Things are no different at British American Tobacco (BAT), another leading tobacco company with brands in the Lebanese market. “We are focusing our efforts on the point-of-purchase,” acknowledged Zeid Nadhim, BAT regional manager. He said BAT’s above-the-line ad expenditure had plummeted from about 75% a few years ago to less than 5% today.

“Tobacco advertisers have been affected by the economic situation and they don’t care about the reputation of the brand. This is why media advertising has dropped so drastically,” said Mounir Torbay, secretary-general of the World Federation of Advertisers’ Lebanon chapter. “They need the ‘push’ and not the ‘pull.’ They want people to buy more, to switch from one brand to another. This is very difficult to do through media advertising.”

Marketing executives of Lebanon’s the ‘big three’ insist they favor regulation for moral reasons. “The shift towards below-the-line advertising and our voluntary abstention from television advertising is definitely not driven by business reasons,” stated Elie Moukarzel, area manager for Kettaneh, which represents the marketing interests in Lebanon of leading cigarette manufacturers Philip Morris. “It is purely responsible marketing.” Continued below-the-line as well as various kinds of above-the-line advertising are not at odds with the ‘responsible marketing’ mantra. “We support restrictions on tobacco advertising but we don’t support a total ban. We believe below-the-line advertising should be preserved because this is where you can limit communication to adult smokers who have gone in to make their choice of brand,” said Bechara Baroudi of Marlboro Lebanon. Nadhim, however, believes that tobacco advertising should be permitted in various publications without a significant young readership.

But tobacco companies’ efforts to ruthlessly milk media advertising before any demise, and their determination to block the prohibition of almost all below-the-line, and some above-the-line advertising lend fuel to the suggestion that the ‘responsible marketing’ slogan, in Lebanon at least, is a façade.

“The people who are saying we should delay this, or never do it, are people who are trying to protect industries and their interests,” said Ghattas Khoury, a member of the parliamentary health committee seeking to implement a ban.

Industry efforts to delay and condition a ban are apparent in a May 9 Philip Morris document obtained by EXECUTIVE, entitled COMMENTS ON THE LAW PROPOSAL SEEKING TO BAN TOBACCO ADVERTISING IN ALL MEDIA IN LEBANON. The document says any law prohibiting tobacco advertising should contain a number of exceptions, including: · “Advertising in any publication that has at least 75% of its readership over 18 years of age.

· Outdoor advertising that is not closer than 100 meters from any point of the perimeter of a school attended by minors or in close proximity to playgrounds or other facilities frequented particularly by minors.

· Advertising in cinemas, when at least 75% of the audience is over 18 years of age.

· Communications to consumers at points-of-sale tobacco products.

· Tobacco product sponsorship until December 1, 2006.”

If implemented, these suggestions would conveniently ensure that companies like Philip Morris retain the means to market their products, while depriving emerging competition of their most important brand-building platform: television.

Khoury, who favors a total above- and below-the-line ban, is finding his position untenable. His foes include advertisers, advertising agencies, and MPs from South Lebanon’s tobacco farming heartland.

Some tobacco giants, ad agencies and advertisers argue that a complete, immediate ban is unsustainable for economic reasons. “If you deprive our ailing advertising industry of tobacco advertising expenditure, it will be a blow for an industry that is already struggling to survive,” said Torbay.

But Khoury said this was just a cynical business ploy. “They have played a very intelligent game here,” he said. “They are hammering us with the idea that we are kicking people out of jobs. But in fact they are motivated only by increasing sales,” he said. A current tobacco advertising ban draft law appears to accommodate the interests and views of Khoury’s foes. It does not call for an immediate or total ban, although above-the-line advertising would be completely banned as of January 1, 2006, as would the distribution of free promotional gifts. Below-the-line sponsorship of sports and cultural events would be prohibited starting from January 1, 2008 (allowing Marlboro to sponsor another three Lebanon rallies), while most other forms of below-the-line advertising would be tolerated.

Asked if it was likely that all below-the-line advertising would be banned in the near future, Torbay chuckled: “I don’t think that is a clear and present danger.” (BOX)

While alcohol does not face a ban on above-the-line advertising, distributors are under a different type of pressure. Hit by the current recession, they have been forced to cut costs and are shifting ad spend below-the-line, despite the potential harm this does to long-term brand image. “There has been a real shift towards promotional advertising,” acknowledged Carlo Vincenti, of Bacardi Breezer and Johnnie Walker distributors G. Vincenti & Sons. “This reflects the economic climate. The consumer no longer wants just his favorite brand. He wants it with a special offer. And for us, it is less expensive than any main media campaign.” Vincenti said his company’s below-the-line spend had risen from less than 15% a few years ago to 35%.

As a product of the depressed advertising market, there has also been a move within above-the-line alcohol and tobacco ad spending from television to outdoor, such as billboards – which are fashionable, easier to create and, most importantly, cheaper. The emergence over the last few years of competition-enhancing ready-to-drink (RTD) beverages, such as Bacardi Breezer and Smirnoff Ice, has increased overall alcohol ad spend in Lebanon but has also contributed to the rush to below-the-line spending. Smirnoff Ice and Bacardi Breezer control over 85% of the RTD market share.

“The market is growing and consumption of whisky is down because of the economic crisis,” said Hadi Kahhale, business manager at Fattal, which distributes Dewar’s, Jack Daniel’s, Absolut Vodka, Bombay Sapphire, and Kefraya (in which it has a share). “There is pressure on us to increase volume of sales, and one safe way to increase volume is through promotions.” The lion’s share of alcohol ad spend is now being funneled into in-store, point-of-sale activity, promotion and sponsorship by zealous marketing directors. Supermarket shelves are stacked with alcohol-related ‘special offers.’ “There has been a lot of sales pressure on the marketers, who cannot compromise on price. So they had to undertake promotions,” said Ayache.

The transferal of alcohol advertising spend to below the line has been hastened by intense inter-brand wars, particularly over whisky, which accounts for over 85% of spirits imports into Lebanon and 45% to 50% of spirits sales in the country. Over the last few years, above-the-line ad spend on whisky has decreased by more than 60%, from more than $10 million in 2001 to $4 million today. The battle is most passionate between Dewar’s – distributed by Fattal – and Johnny Walker – distributed by Diageo. Dropping whisky consumption rates have raised the stakes in the fight for market share. Between them, Johnnie Walker, Dewar’s, and William Lawson (distributed by Fattal) control over 80% of the whisky market share. Fattal has just spent $500,000 re-launching Dewar’s.

The below-the-line alcohol brand war is being fought primarily at “off-trade” locations, such as supermarkets, groceries and mini-markets, which account for 95% of sales, and 70% of below-the-line spend at Vincenti & Sons. The rest goes to “on-trade” locations such as hotel bars, restaurants and nightclubs.

Alcohol distributors say that although they know the practice is bad for long-term brand image they are compelled to follow a trend no one admits to initiating, but all blame on the changing demands of consumers financially sensitized by the country’s economic woes and the need to protect their revenues and market shares. “You have to observe what’s being done and you have to be a part of it,” said Vincenti. “It’s a vicious circle. Everyone’s doing it, so you have to do it.” He acknowledged that below-the-line spend should not exceed 20% over a year, although his company’s currently stands at 35%. The trend towards below-the-line alcohol and tobacco ad spending is mirrored in the advertising industry as a whole. In four years, total above-the-line advertising spend in Lebanon has dropped by almost 50%, from around $130 million. Alcohol- and tobacco-related advertising used to account for between 20% and 30% of total spend. It is now less than 10% – of which two thirds can be attributed to alcohol, and one third to tobacco.

July 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Broadening horizons

by Anthony Mills July 1, 2004
written by Anthony Mills

Banque Nationale de Paris Intercontinentale (BNPI), an offshoot of France’s BNP Paribas, is celebrating its 60th year in Lebanon, an indication that the bank remains confident of the Beirut market. Based on the niche market the bank has already carved for itself and its plans for regional growth, it is clear that the decision to maintain its presence here is also a well-planned, strategic move. “It is important for us, as an international bank, to be in Lebanon, not only because it is the link to Europe, but also because it is the key to developing our regional business in the Middle East,” said Claude Rufin, BNPI Beirut director-general.

BNPI has regional expansion plans that evoke an echo of the bank’s past. After establishing itself in Lebanon in 1944, BNPI moved into Syria in 1945, Egypt in 1948, and Iraq in 1954. Because of regional turmoil, it was subsequently forced to pull out of all but Lebanon. And recent unrest has proved a core problem in enticing French corporate clients to set up shop in Lebanon. “We are trying to bring them here, to convince them that life is good here, and that you can do business here,” he said.

The bank has already reestablished itself in Egypt, and has opened branches in the Gulf – including Dubai, Bahrain, Qatar and Abu Dhabi – and has just received a license to operate in Saudi Arabia, where it plans to establish an outlet “within a few months.” BNPI has also asked for a license in Kuwait, which is expected by the end of the year.

Saudi Arabia’s attractive GDP was, Rufin acknowledged, a major element in the bank’s decision to move into the kingdom, despite a recent spurt of al-Qaeda insurgency. BNPI will be seeking to diversify its activities in Saudi Arabia, from corporate and investment banking, to dealing room and swap operations, and most significantly, private banking. “After all,” Rufin observed, “there are significant private fortunes in the country.” Rufin said BNPI plans to return to Syria and Iraq – at some stage – and to open a branch in Jordan as well. But a recent law in Syria allowing for 49% foreign ownership of a bank does not satisfy BNPI. It will only invest in Syria if it is allowed majority ownership, despite the allure of Syria’s retail banking potential.

As well as regional expansion, BNPI is also planning growth within Lebanon. The bank’s leading international status – BNP Paribas is the world’s fifth largest bank – and 100% French ownership have helped it lure in, and retain, both corporate and private customers – notably among the worldly Lebanese – who see BNPI as a confidence-inspiring international financial bastion tinged with a Lebanese hue. “They can do business with us in Beijing, Sydney, or New York,” noted Rufin. The bank has five branches in Lebanon and employs 215 staff.

Rufin conceded that BNPI had seen business wane in Lebanon over the years. Back in the 1950s and 60s it presided over one of the biggest market shares in the country.

“Our strategy is not to chase market share,” explained Rufin. “We focus on winning over top corporate clients and high net-worth individuals. We serve fewer clients, but they are top-notch, and interested in what an international bank has to offer.” Although not in pursuit of market share, the bank makes sure it maintains a solid balance sheet marked by a high profit ratio. It has a return on average equity of around 50% and a cost-to-income ration of below 50%. The main raison d’étre of BNPI, Rufin said, is the provision of economical loans to the private sector, which is reflected in the bank’s loans-to-deposits ratio of above 50%.

According to Rufin, the pillars of BNPI’s continued high profitability have evolved over time. The bank has always concentrated on corporate investment banking, with a focus on corporate clients turning over more than $10 million a year. In this context, a variety of offers, including business collateral and short- and medium-term facilities, are provided. The bank has also added a strong emphasis on the financing of international trade in the last few years. With a view to Lebanon’s strong import-export tradition, which has been bolstered by perceived business opportunities in Iraq, BNP Paribas established a new “trade center” in Beirut. Offering banking services with a trade focus, it is one of 80 such centers around the globe whose interconnectivity facilitates international trade. In addition to its corporate banking strength, BNPI has turned increased attention towards private banking, offering clients high-return products. Certain accounts offer returns of 3% to 5% on the dollar. Other products, all capital guaranteed, provide higher returns of between 6% and 10%, but over a longer time frame. “These are for clients who are a little more sophisticated,” observed Rufin. BNPI tailored products developed by its parent institution to the needs of the Lebanese market and opened a private banking center in Beirut one-and-a-half years ago in support of its activities. This center is electronically connected to all BNP Paribas private banking establishments in Europe. BNPI is also attempting to develop its retail banking business. To this end, the bank has overhauled all its branches in Lebanon, to homogenize them with modern branches in Paris, Honk Kong or New York. Emphasis is being placed on customer care. The bank is also developing services in conjunction with insurance providers. “With our international backup we should be able to offer the kinds of products that will attract clients, such as loans that were not offered before, especially as the Lebanese real estate market is thriving. We will try to be much closer not just to the companies or very wealthy clients but to more medium-range customers interested in banking with an international bank.” BNPI’s continuing expansion and growth plans in the country may seem surprising considering the recent decisions by foreign banks to reduce their exposure to Lebanon or pull out altogether. But Credit Agricole’s recent move to slash its ownership of Banque Libano-Francaise and ABN Amro’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2002, did not cast a shadow over BNPI’s resolve to maintain its presence here. “We do not plan to leave Lebanon, because 1) we know the market, 2) we know the clients, 3) we remain profitable – which is crucial, 4) Lebanon is a country that can develop financially and economically, in a regional context, creating synergy with our other branches in the region,” said Rufin, adding that the bank had also created customer loyalty by providing uninterrupted service during the war.

According to Rufin, the country’s historic commitment to banking, dynamic economy and a resurgent real estate market was cause for optimism, as was the increase in international conferences being held here and tourists visiting Lebanon. “One gets the impression that, little by little, Lebanon is reacquiring a regional role. Its efficient service sector is a big help. There is word of a 3% to 4% increase in GDP this year. It’s a start.”

July 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Banks with buying power

by Tony Hchaime July 1, 2004
written by Tony Hchaime

Last month’s issue of EXECUTIVE profiled the 10 mostly likely medium and small Lebanese banks to be acquired or merged. As we now seek to identify the potential acquirers, we shift our spotlight towards the banks financially capable and strategically oriented to undertake M&A activities on the buy-side of the table.

Due to the concentration of assets and deposits towards the top of the table, however, the spotlight falls only on the Alpha group of banks, and of those, only some enjoy the combination of all the factors that would render them eager and willing to go down the acquisition path. Before attempting to identify banks that fit such a profile, it is essential to identify the main criteria required to become part of this exclusive “buyers” club.

As is the case with anything in life, members of the club should be “willing and able” to go down the acquisition road. Being “willing” means having an expansion oriented strategy, be it geographical expansion, services expansion, or other forms of expansion. Moreover, such a strategy should be keen on “non-organic growth,” through the acquisition of existing institutions that would help cross milestones faster. Surely enough, being “able” means having sufficient financial resources to undertake such monetarily demanding transactions. Recent years have witnessed a number of new share and debt offerings by major banks, with the primary purpose of funding acquisitions and expansion.

Looking at the “willing and able” candidates, the list shrinks down to the following 10 mostly likely players.

Banque Audi – Saradar

Beginning at the top of the list of banks in Lebanon, Audi-Saradar raced to the top following the closure of the merger between the two banks in mid-June 2004. Resulting in the largest bank in Lebanon, Audi’s acquisition of Banque Saradar accomplishes Banque Audi’s long-lasting favorable outlook on growth from acquisitions. Banque Audi has undertaken significant acquisitions in recent years, beginning with the acquisition of Orient Credit Bank in 1998, Lebanon Invest in 2001, and culminating with the largest acquisition in the history of the banking sector in Lebanon: Banque Saradar in 2004.

Banque Audi – Saradar has become a full-service financial institution, with strong retail and corporate banking operations complimented by a strong and geographically diversified private banking division inherited from Banque Saradar. Moreover, the bank is certainly seeking to expand overseas, operating branches in Jordan, France, Switzerland, and potentially the Gulf.

On another note, Banque Audi – Saradar enjoys one of the highest liquidity levels in the banking sector in Lebanon. The bank enjoys cash levels in excess of $4 billion, in addition to more than $1 billion deposited at other banks. Such liquidity levels far exceed the funding requirements for the acquisition of any local bank.

As such, Banque Audi-Saradar is surely “willing and able” to undertake new acquisitions. It remains to be seen if such activities have been put on hold recently. In fact, the acquisition of Banque Saradar earlier this year is Audi’s largest ever, and will certainly take time to fully digest. Consolidation in a typical merger of that size could take anywhere between 18 months and two years, and as such, the bank is likely to put any other options on hold until then.

BLOM Bank

Known for more than two decades as “the largest bank in Lebanon” BLOM Bank has been displaced to second position following the Audi-Saradar merger. Shear size has historically been BLOM’s strongest asset, priding itself as having the scale to sustain any shocks in the highly unstable local and regional socio-political and economic environments. While the bank remains significantly large by local standards, it is dwarfed by the major regional banks attempting to gain a foothold in Lebanon. It remains to be seen, however, if BLOM’s management, led by the bank’s founder’s son, Saad Azhari, is seriously considering a scale-oriented strategy to regain its lead over Audi.

Should that be the case, the most rapid way to gain size in the financial industry is through the acquisition of other institutions. Nevertheless, BLOM Bank has historically been absent from the M&A arena, not having undertaken any major acquisition in the sector for years. While this may have been the reason behind other banks catching up to it, BLOM’s management has expressed no intention to seek size through anything other than “organic growth.”

Byblos Bank

Byblos Bank was one of the first Lebanese banks to undertake acquisitions during the peak years of the country’s reconstruction era. The bank acquired the Credit Bancaire du Moyen Orient in 1996, and followed it by the acquisition of Wedge Bank in 2001, and the local operation of ABN Amro in 2002.

Such acquisitions shed some light on the bank’s strategy, as the acquired banks do not really provide Byblos with a significantly wider branch network, but do provide the bank with strength and development in areas where they seemingly lacked. Currently the third largest bank in the country, Byblos Bank is still busy digesting its latest acquisitions while consolidating its retail banking operations. The bank does enjoy a high liquidity level, with cash and deposits at other banks in excess of $3 billion, surely more than enough to undertake M&A activities in the local market. Nevertheless, such activities are likely to be delayed for another two to three years, as the bank is also currently focusing on establishing a presence in Africa, with the first Byblos branch in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum set to become operational in early 2004.

Banque de la Méditerranée

Despite priding itself as being one of the strongest diversified financial groups in the country, and its close affiliation to Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, the bank has also opted to stay away from growth through acquisitions over the past years (the purchase of Allied Bank was too small too represent a new strategic direction). The bank is currently focused on expanding the range of services it provides, maintaining and perhaps gaining market share, and consolidating its operations in the highly unstable domestic environment. The bank’s revenue base remains traditionally interest-driven, with more than 80% of income from interest revenues. Moreover, the bank has a history of investing the majority of excess funds in government T-Bills, which account for more than 30% of total assets. With such a structure leaving the bank with around $1 billion in available cash, it underlines the bank’s distance from the M&A route in the near term.

Banque Libano-Française (BLF)

BLF underwent a number of structural changes in the past years, topped by the decision by major shareholder French bank Crédit Agricole to sell down the majority of its stake in the bank. This comes as somewhat of a surprise as the French banking institution has not expressed any loss of interest in BLF or Lebanon in past years.

Nevertheless, such a development would probably put on hold any expansion plans drafted by BLF for the near term, as the bank’s remaining shareholders are busy seeking investors to acquire part or all of the equity share sold by Crédit Agricole.

On the other hand, and while BLF has been absent from the M&A arena in recent years, the bank remains mostly focused on traditional commercial banking services, and as such is likely to seek the development of new departments to offer additional services, such as private banking, investment banking, and others. In that regard, a preferred means to that end may be through the acquisition of a smaller, more specialized bank that would provide BLF with an existing and efficient operation.

In terms of the bank’s financial ability to undertake such acquisitions, BLF benefits from a considerable level of liquidity, with excess funds around $1.3 billion. Moreover, the bank could potentially acquire another bank by swapping part of Crédit Agricole’s equity stake in the bank with another local bank.

Fransabank

Fransabank has been one of the banks in the spotlight recently, showing off rapid expansion into new services, namely in the areas of private banking and investment banking. While the bank developed the Fransa Invest Bank in-house, the bank has been historically spotted on the M&A route, with the acquisition of Bank Tohme, Universal Bank, and United Bank of Saudi and Lebanon in 1997, 2000, and 2001, respectively. The bank recently acquired, in 2003, Banque de la Bekaa, putting itself in close proximity to the high-potential Syrian market.

As such, the bank has a growth-oriented approach, focused on adding new services, and diversifying away from purely interest-generating activities, which have historically contributed the most to the bank’s bottom line. As the bank is currently focusing on consolidating its human resources and branch network following its recent acquisitions, it may put its expansion on hold in the short-term. Nevertheless, the bank’s strategy remains geared towards growth, and in favor of acquisitions. As such, we may see Fransabank once again on a buying spree in the medium term.

Bank of Beirut

While Bank of Beirut has only undertaken two acquisitions in the past few years, they were relatively significant in size, adding substantially to the bank’s balance sheet. Bank of Beirut acquired Transorient Bank in 1999, following by Beirut Riyadh Bank in 2002. The bank’s primary goal remains growth, with a focus on quality service. While the bank has experienced significant growth in-house, Bank of Beirut’s management seems to favor acquisitions as a means to accelerate such a growth. Based on the bank’s historical track record, and current expansion strategy, targeted acquisitions are likely to be in the pipeline for Bank of Beirut.

In terms of the bank’s ability to undertake such transactions, year-end 2003 numbers reveal sufficient liquidity, with cash and deposits at other banks reaching in excess of $1.3 billion, broadly sufficient to undertake a number of targeted acquisitions locally.

Société Générale de Banque au Liban (SGBL)

While having historically been present early on in the M&A arena, SGBL has been somewhat distant from the scene in the past few years. SGBL was one of the first to undertake M&A activities in the post-war era, acquiring Globe Bank in 1993, Bank Geagea in 1997, and Inaash Bank in 2000. In the past few years, however, and following the acquisition of Fidus, SGBL has been more focused on expanding overseas. SGBL is aggressively growing in Cyprus, expanding the network to four branches (two onshore and two offshore units). In addition, the bank operates 15 branches in Jordan, and is aggressively seeking a license in Syria, where it currently operates an offshore unit in the Damascus free zone area.

While the bank does consider Lebanon to remain its primary market, and has undertaken numerous steps to expand its presence in the local market, it is not likely to commit substantial financial resources to acquire other banks locally, but is likely to do so overseas.

Credit Libanais

Led by Joseph Torbei, the chairman and head of the Association of Lebanese Banks, Credit Libanais remains one of the leading banks in Lebanon, regaining a favorable position in the market following a period of turbulence in the 1990s. The bank has invested substantial amounts to improve the quality of its services, widen the range of such services and create an attractive market image.

Such goals went hand-in-hand with the bank’s acquisition strategy, which started in 1994 with First Phoenician Bank in 1994, and culminated with the acquisition of American Express’s local operation in 2000. The latter added significantly to the bank’s level of service and expertise, as it brought along a professional, modern and experienced management team.

As the bank continues to expand, it may undertake certain acquisitions, but such transactions are likely to be highly selective, and would target only such institutions that would add to the bank in terms of human resources, IT systems, and other value added areas.

BBAC

While BBAC remains one of the major players in the Lebanese banking sector, its growth strategy differs somewhat from that of other major banks in that it did not seek scale and growth as aggressively. BBAC has been absent from the M&A scene for years, and has not indicated any significant intention to undertake acquisitions.

Growth in the bank, while steady, has been relatively more modest, and focused particularly on retail banking and, to a lesser extent, corporate banking.

Conclusion

It seems then, that while a number of large Lebanese banks are eager to go down the M&A path seeking growth and scale, most are not likely to engage in any such activities in the very short term. Some are busy consolidating recent acquisitions, while others are busy with shareholding or management restructuring.

Considering the fact that a number of smaller banks are ripe for acquisition, such a delay by the larger banks to pursue these smaller banks may seem gloomy at first sight. Nevertheless, and as outlined in last month’s issue of EXECUTIVE, such attractive smaller banks may, while awaiting suitors, work on improving efficiencies, perking up image, and thereby significantly increasing their chances of getting a better value when the time comes to negotiate a sale.

Such a development would certainly, on one hand, please the central bank and its efforts to promote consolidation in the sector, while on the other, it would ensure a healthy consolidation, where the smaller, to-be-acquired banks would provide tangible added value to the buyers.

BOX

Putting all things into perspective, and after profiling both buyers and suitors, there may be a certain time-lag before the priorities of buyers and sellers coincide. EXECUTIVE’s June issue identified a number of small and medium-sized Lebanese banks with attractive features for potential consolidation into the larger players, and such banks are likely to be presently willing to undertake such transactions. On the other side of the table, however, and as outlined in the story, banks eager and able to undertake acquisitions are not likely to engage in such activities in the very short term, as most are busy consolidating previous mergers, undergoing internal restructurings, or other activities. Nevertheless, such banks do place considerable importance on growth through selective acquisitions, and are likely to go down the M&A route in late 2005 and 2006.

Historically, larger banks in Lebanon tended to acquire smaller institutions, but have shifted recently to target larger groups (ABN Amro by Byblos, Saradar by Audi). Such a change in strategy, much to the displeasure of the central bank, has dented the buying power of the large institutions, at least for a while. As such, the newly formed, significantly larger institutions will need time to consolidate and go back shopping for more. As the trend returns, however, and as large banks pursue some of the attractive candidates identified in last month’s issue of EXECUTIVE, another problem arises. Top banks in the country are seeking scale through the merger with other large institutions, and added services and access to new markets by acquiring small specialized banks. The side effects of such developments may include a massive gap between newly formed ultra-large, full-service, regional Lebanese banks, and smaller, medium-sized banks from the Beta group, which are too costly to be acquired and too small to acquire on their own and grow sufficiently. The possibility of avoiding such a problem can be reached by encouraging equal mergers by such medium-sized banks, a move likely to be strongly encouraged by the central bank, which is making all attempts to improve efficiencies in the sector by cutting out excess fat and creating scale.

July 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Crisis management at the central bank

by Nicolas Photiades July 1, 2004
written by Nicolas Photiades

For more than a decade, Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank, and the Banking Control Commission (BCC), an independent administrative body established at the BDL in 1967 to supervise banks, have maintained a stable banking and financial system. Both have provided the banking sector with strong support, set up a good regulatory environment to enhance the reliability of the system, and have dealt swiftly and effectively with recent “crisis” situations, involving varying degrees of mismanagement at Credit Libanais in the late 80s, Inaash Bank in 1999 and Banque Libanaise pour le Commerce (BLC) in 2001. Most recently, it was forced to deal with the murky affair of the Al Madina Bank, the political implications of which, threatened to undermine the very fabric of the banking system. To its credit, the central bank emerged from the imbroglio with its integrity intact.

The BCC, with its staff of over one hundred, which include around seventy professional bank examiners, is responsible for supervising the financial sector, and monitoring the implementation by the financial institutions of the relevant articles of the Code of Money and Credit (CMC) and their adherence to the BDL’s monetary regulations. It is also supposed to verify and analyze financial statements provided by the institutions it supervises and is empowered to impose corrective measures and restrictions on individual financial institutions if necessary. So far, the track record of the BCC has been proven by the many successful interventions and bank failure preventions that occurred successively since the Intra Bank collapse of 1966. Indeed, the BDL set up the BCC in 1967 to replace the banking control department, which did not have sufficient independence and supervisory responsibilities as broad as today’s BCC. One of the most noticeable accomplishments of the BCC was the saving of Crédit Libanais in the late 1980s. This bank, which had suffered from its affiliation to the collapsed Bank Al Mashrek group, was taken over by the BDL, which re-capitalised it and imposed a senior management that remains to this day. For a number of years, Crédit Libanais remained a BDL-owned bank, whose sole purpose was to manage existing deposits and customers, and restructure operations with the view of ultimately selling the institution to a third party (which was ultimately the Bin Mahfouz group of Saudi Arabia, which owns parts of the National Commercial Bank, one of the largest banks in the Arab world). In the Inaash case, both the BCC and the BDL moved swiftly to find a white knight (Société Générale) to take over that institution, thanks partly with financial incentives, while in the case of BLC, a newly appointed management was brought in by the BDL to restructure the whole bank, and capital of around $150 million was injected, making the central bank a majority shareholder. The BLC case was similar to that of Crédit Libanais, but is currently being managed actively and is actually competing with other domestic banks instead of being constrained by the management of existing customers.

The reason behind the BCC’s swift intervention whenever a bank runs into trouble is explained by the BDL’s cast-in-gold policy, which aims at using all means available to maintain a stable financial and banking system. Indeed, the BDL believes that it would be very costly for the entire Lebanese banking system to allow any bank to fail at this critical stage of the country’s economic development and the image of financial stability must always be maintained in the eyes of international investors. For this reason, many crises of confidence, runs on deposits and bank failures have been dealt with efficiently by the BDL, which has always succeeded in reassuring investors and the public alike. Although, the more recent Bank Al Madina case appeared to have been handled too slowly, it was nevertheless sorted out without the public being too affected by the collapse of a bank that was experiencing abnormal growth.

In the months following the Paris II conference in November 2002, the BDL issued a new directive requesting the banks to increase their statutory reserve requirements. This was another effort to solidify the support and prevention policy as regards to the financial system, as it helps prevent liquidity crises, even though there are doubts as to the ability of banks to access these reserves on a timely basis. The work of the BDL and the BCC is constantly exposed to the fragile domestic economic environment and to radical external events (such as a major regional war or a disastrous domestic political decision) and the raising of the level of statutory reserves is still an insufficient measure when one realizes that there is no formal mechanism under which the BDL can make dollars available to the banks facing runs on deposits. There are however, numerous crises prevention measures. The BDL has laid down a series of regulations, which are meant to assist the banks in times of crises and to prevent a large number of banks from stepping out of normal and healthy banking practice. One measure was to allow banking institutions to hold equity in foreign currency for up to 60% of total equity, matching as a result the dollarization rate of the banks’ consolidated balance sheet. Another measure is to set up the minimum capital adequacy ratio at 12%, compared to 8% in most other countries. All these measures and rules reflect the BDL’s will to prevent major capitalization and liquidity crises, and are supposed to decrease the intensity of intervention in cases of bank failures, which can turn out to be costly and often inextricable.

Elsewhere, the BCC has consistently shown a capacity to intervene and support any banking institution in difficulty, despite the fact that its members (five in total, including the chairman) are appointed according to political affiliation and religious background. The BCC’s members are well supported by a more junior but nonetheless efficient and operational staff. The BCC stands out as arguably the most efficient government regulatory and supervisory authority in Lebanon.

Although the BDL and the BCC have proven to be able regulators and supervisors, particularly as compared to many regional counterparts, there is still significant room for improvement. Indeed, the BDL and the BCC have to start taking a significantly more proactive role when tackling banks in the country, by going beyond the due diligence stage and into enforcing financial and operational directions that would be commensurate with the situation of each individual bank. There must be stronger and more severe ways of making sure that the strategy laid down to each individual bank and every decision made by the BCC is more rapidly and efficiently implemented. There are still a large number of smaller banks, as was the case with BLC, who ignore and evade BDL and BCC rulings and who do not seem to realize that their ultimate collapse could have serious repercussions on both the banking sector and the nation.

The banking environment is now changing rapidly, with most banks in Lebanon having to abandon their traditional policy of gathering deposits and placing them in high yielding government debt securities. Most banks are now asked to behave as commercial banks rather than deposit banks, and establish the appropriate internal systems to step up their lending efforts and support economic growth. The BDL and the BCC, aware of the changing situation, should substantially intensify their pro-activeness, and guide the smaller and more inefficient banks (there is at least thirty of them) towards safe and healthy banking practices. For instance, the BDL and the BCC must guide smaller banks towards:

§ Better risk management à credit and market risks can be more effectively managed with recent techniques. Inexperience could prove fatal.

§ Capital management à Lebanese banks need to be more actively advised on how to allocate the right amount of capital to underpin risks by product.

§ Cost control à Tighter management of operating costs will be the only way to counter thinner margins and limited revenue diversification. The BCC must make this clear to the smaller banks, which have yet to realize this.

§ Product distribution à Product and service diversification and their distribution through efficient channels are key. Although this is not a prerogative of the BCC, the later must nevertheless make sure that banks look at this aspect seriously and make efforts towards achieving that objective.

More severe measures – such as suspending senior managers from their duties and publicly warning an institution (in the press) in a similar manner to regulatory authorities in Europe or North America – must be taken against banks that try to outsmart BDL and BCC directives, and consolidation must, in some cases, be forced. The laissez-faire attitude of the regulator, which worked well in the 1990s, must now give way to a stricter and more severe relationship with mediocre bankers. Leniency and apathy can be extremely damaging, and can lead to major problems such as the collapse of a medium size bank.

Setting up an independent body with the prerogative of going beyond the assessment and situation analysis stage and into actual execution of strategic plans for particular banks, could be the solution. The BCC and the BDL are bound to the tasks of realizing the situation in each individual bank and making recommendations. They cannot easily take pre-emptive measures against any bank, but would rather wait for a significant faux-pas or even an ultimate collapse. A newly set up independent body, with more aggressive prerogatives could be the ticket to greater system-wide efficiency

Such an aggressive body or behavior from the BCC would have come handy in the case of Bank Al Madina, the collapse of which could have been prevented had there been significant pre-emptive measures taken well in advance (e.g. warnings, guidance, etc.). However, it is worth noting that the Bank Al Madina case was known to have been plagued by outside political interference, which hampered the work of the BCC and the BDL. The latter must be allowed to work without such intervention, which normally affects the work of any regulator and supervisor. Political interference in the work of the supervisor affects the credibility of the national regulatory authority, particularly in the eyes of international investors, who remain crucially important for Lebanon.

It will be hard to have a perfectly regulated and supervised banking and financial system in a country where economic fragility is omnipresent and where political interference on behalf of rogue bankers is part of Lebanon’s daily life. The BDL and the BCC are an island of relative effectiveness in a sea of mediocrity. Support, partly in the form of providing the regulator with more seasoned and efficient human resources, or the provision of any necessary means that would help transform the national financial system into a global player, is crucial. This is needed sooner rather than later.

July 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Lost in translation: the Elyssar plans

by Thomas Schellen July 1, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

The large majority of building stock in any modern society needs to consist of affordable, social, smart residential units, which means a massive presence of low cost apartments. This is an inescapable attribute of the highly populous and predominantly urban human existence that defines our world. Lebanon, with its very high degree of urbanization and population agglomeration, underprivileged masses and overall young citizenry, is at least as dependent as any developing country on improving and increasing its metropolitan living quality through provision of inexpensive but humane housing.

At the peak time of drafting great post-war reconstruction programs, this urgent necessity was recognized in one single key project for creation of urban living spaces – Elyssar. Under the patronage of the mythically enlarged figure of the Phoenician princess and founder of Carthage, Elyssar was initiated as a development project for the capital’s southwestern realm with a preliminary master plan in June 1995. In the area between Beirut International Airport and the new Sports City – both at the time two of the largest construction sites in a construction-happy city – Elyssar was to create a mixed environment with commercial and recreational qualities and at the very minimum, 2,500 units of quality housing for low and middle income families. Nine years later to the month, and well over half into the project’s “global estimated time frame of 14 years” for accomplishing this development, Elyssar in reality remains the forgotten twin-sister of Solidere that was lost in the slums. Not a single low-cost apartment, workshop and shop appropriate to the economic situation and needs of the poor has been built. The BHV-Monoprix shopping complex on the airport highway across from Sports City is the only element of the concept that stands accomplished. Today, outside of some references in highly academic but incompletely researched papers from international conferences on urban development, Elyssar doesn’t even exist. Or does it? Amazingly, the administrative offices of Elyssar are operating in 2004 and according to PR-responsible Fadi Moucharraf, do so with a staff of “around 40.” The entity has prepared a large amount of engineering studies and plans, said Moucharraf, but central management has put a moratorium blocking all media inquiries and interview requests due to the absence of new activities.

This leaves it anybody’s guess as to what the real status and future of the Elyssar project might be – a viable question of public concern not only because of the project’s theoretical importance but also because of its obligation to meet public scrutiny. Created explicitly for improving both the social and physical fabrics of Beirut’s suburban areas that had borne long-term damage from Lebanon’s internal conflict in form of illegal settlements and unacceptable living conditions, Elyssar is, by the decree that defined its legal status in 1996, “a public agency with administrative and financial autonomy.” As such, it ought to be directly accountable to the sovereign public and its political organs and representatives. Some reasons for the utter failure in implementing the Elyssar project to date are common knowledge. The realm under the agency’s responsibility has in critical aspects not been accessible to normal state authority. Sect-related influence spheres in the area and active resistance by people living in the concrete slums over years made it prohibitive for government representatives to instigate measures, such as the tearing down of illegal buildings that stood in the way of road and infrastructure construction. On occasion, government officials setting foot in the area, namely entering the Ouzai quarter, were confronted physically by outraged crowds. The financing formula for building the affordable housing units, which were to be offered to the displaced and underprivileged people living in the slums north of the airport, hinged on the plan to find commercial investors willing to pay large amounts for developing the neglected and run-down Elyssar seafront into chic resorts. But as Beirut reconstruction and commercial development activities began to slacken in 1997 and 1998, this concept fell victim to the less-favorable-than-expected circumstances. The worsening crisis stemming from the government’s overestimation of economic growth coupled with exploding reconstruction costs and rising public debt subsequently eliminated any rational possibility that sufficient government “allowances” would be available to increase the Elyssar project’s viability.

In addition to these immediate political and financial problems, the concept drew suspicions from an increasingly skeptical populace and became the target of opinion makers alleging that underneath the veneer of social development and promotion of economic opportunities for the masses, “dirty hands” were manipulating the project for corrupt self-enrichment. These allegations may not have been presented with full and verifiable evidence but they left large population groups with an image of Elyssar as a scam run by Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Until today, and in the minds of some students at top Lebanese universities, Elyssar is nothing but another exploitation scheme by which the ruling clique wanted to amass more money, power and control over some of the most valuable real estate in metropolitan Beirut. All above factors played a role in turning a proposed grand Lebanese solution for an important socioeconomic challenge into a Lebanese problem exemplifying the national struggle with administrative inefficiency, distrust of politicians, internal disunity, and massive suspicions of corruption and squander of the people’s monies. Elyssar wanted “to set new precedents of the government will and dedication to promote balanced growth and to provide social equity to all Lebanese citizens,” stipulated the officious document that can be read on the agency’s website. “The success of Elyssar is also crucial for the future of Beirut. Its redevelopment should provide back to Capital [sic] its distinguished character along the waterfront while setting higher standards for quality of living,” it said.

In light of the unabated housing crisis in Beirut’s poorest suburbs and the danger of increasing social tensions among impoverished segments of society, such words constitute bitter and involuntary irony on part of a public agency that will not or cannot explain what options remain for rescuing its forgotten project, which it is managing PRO-FORMA at a cost to the public that must have accumulated to millions of dollars over many wasted years. As things stand today, it seems increasingly difficult to envision a new future for Elyssar under its original mission. Some real estate experts now expect the project to be reborn as an upscale commercial development venture, because they see the land between Beirut Airport and the city as prime real estate with potential per square meter values comparable to downtown. While the assuredly well-paid, seven-member board and general management of Elyssar and their superseding political decision makers are not available for comment, it is not possible to do anything but speculate about such possible fundamental changes in Elyssar’s orientation. The uncertainty is made worse by the fact that neither public nor commercial alternatives to the scheme are in sight, which would have the much needed capacity to serve as a model for low and middle income urban housing creation. Opinions among developers today differ whether such a project could be feasible. Some reasoned that all such projects require public subsidies and no investor would be able to venture into a socially responsible residential development of the required proportions, while others claimed that too much government involvement is the main obstacle to making social housing projects work.

There is also a growing argument for fundamental questions on orchestrated housing projects. Town planning specialists continue to discover from evidence in developed and developing societies that mega-projects in social housing run up an incessant bill of negative social and economic results, from growing crime rates to failure in motivating both job creation and job acceptance. The challenge resulting from the human limitation to centrally plan urban life and implement compatible schemes for mass-living places all deliberations on this important issue in a bind to come up with what modern marketing-speak likes to call “innovative solutions.” The progress of commercial developments of large real estate projects in Lebanon is slowly extending from top-end wealth communities down the income ladder. It may one day reach the point where social projects become satisfactory under both profit and humanitarian considerations. But the urgency in alleviating the plight of Lebanon’s slum inhabitants in the meantime gives a multitude of reasons to ask about the vision and weakness of Elyssar. On paper, the Elyssar mandate is concise and unchanged. The area under this public agency’s care is outlined in its official FINAL MASTER PLAN from May 9, 1997 as being bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the west and the Beirut International Airport road to the east and stretching from Adnan Hakim Street (where BHV is located) in the north to the airport’s boundary. This rectangular area comprises 560 hectares of urban and waterfront properties, including three kilometers of sandy beaches.

The mandate stipulates that three sources of funding are to be used for developing the area: · Allowances from the fiscal budget

· Profits from real estate developments

· Loans or investments from public or private sources

The core development objectives of the mandate are, in order of presentation on the agency’s website:

· Creation of a vision

· Building affordable housing units

· Upgrading of infrastructure

· Creation of development opportunities

July 1, 2004 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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