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Business

Q&A: Abdul Khaleq Raouf Khalil

by Executive Contributor May 1, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

The General Arab Insurance Federation (GAIF) is the umbrella organization for the insurance industry in Arab countries. Based in Cairo, Egypt, GAIF biannually convenes the regional sector’s landmark conferences. This year, the event is taking place in Beirut from May 10 to 12, and prepared by a committee chaired by Abraham Matossian, president of the Lebanese insurance association, ACAL. The Secretary General of GAIF, Abdul Khaleq Raouf Khalil, gave EXECUTIVE an interview explaining the role and positions of the Federation.


How many companies are members in the GAIF?

A: The Federation is an international Arab body, comprising 237 insurance and reinsurance companies, associations and national insurance unions. GAIF essentially aims to support relations among Arab insurance bodies and markets in order to promote cooperation among them and coordinate their various activities, with the aims of protecting member interests and developing the insurance sector in the Arab region.

By what methods are you pursuing those aims?

A: We concentrate our activities on four areas and main objectives. These areas are a) achieving economic integration among insurance markets in Arab countries; b) developing the insurance sector in the Arab region; c) supporting and developing business opportunities and activities of Federation members; and d) enhancing cooperation between the Federation and other Arab and international organizations and bodies. For each of these areas, we have identified a set of measures that we view as instrumental in furthering our aims.

Could you give us some examples of specific activities?

A: In seeking to achieve economic integration among Arab insurance markets, our activities include examining insurance legislations and systems in Arab countries, cooperation with Federation members in establishment of joint insurance companies, as well as cooperation in matters that could promote investment policies in insurance and reinsurance. We also strive to promote the Arab insurance market as a unified entity on the international scene. For developing our region’s insurance sector and dealing with the issues pertaining to Arab insurance activities, we are, among other things, engaged in forming both permanent and temporary expert technical committees and in establishing service and GAIF-affiliated consultancy centers that offer members technical, legal, and investment consultancy.

You are also committed to the education of Human Resources in the region?

A: Yes. We regard it as important to improve the technical and educational levels of employees in Arab insurance markets by exchanging expertise and information. To this end, we support the establishment of specialized insurance centers and institutes, along with the implementation of training programs and the organization of insurance conferences and seminars.

What role does Arabicizing of insurance language play in your efforts to integrate the sector?

A: Human and general resources available in Arab insurance markets must be employed to the greatest benefit. Arabicizing the insurance language means creating a unified terminology in Arabic and setting unified templates for insurance contracts, reinsurance agreements and other documents. This would help greatly to coordinate work among insurance companies in Arab countries.

How does GAIF contribute to the creation of new business opportunities for member companies?

A: Possibilities in this area begin with the publication of magazines and books that contribute to spreading awareness and integrated scientific thought in the insurance community and range to provision of arbitration and conflict mediation services for members. Conducting studies on the sector’s problems, collection and dissemination of statistics and information and regular expert meetings also are tools in developing the environment for new business growth for Federation members.

And what do you do to further the cooperation between GAIF and other Arab and international bodies?

A: We participate in international conferences and seminars related to insurance where we also coordinate the presence of Federation members by organizing exhibition involvement and stands. We extend a standing invitation to Arab organizations and bodies that are interested in insurance to attend our Federation’s conferences.

GAIF members will hold their 25th general conference this month in Beirut. Do you expect the event to mark a turning point for Arab insurance companies?

A: Beirut is preparing to host the 25th GAIF conference under the theme of “Arab Insurance: A Future Outlook.” We hope the conference will issue resolutions and recommendations that can be applied and would positively reflect on the Arab insurance sector.

What is the GAIF position on the role of insurance in developing Arab societies?

A: The Arab insurance industry plays an important role in supporting our national economies by providing insurance protection to individuals and institutions. This industry is also a main pillar of society as it gathers capital collected from insurance premiums and invests that capital in various economic areas, which reflects positively on the socio-economic level.

 

Mr. Khalil graciously granted this interview to EXECUTIVE via electronic transmission in Arabic, from which editorial staff extracted the English translation.
 

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Enjoying a life plan

by Thomas Schellen May 1, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Toward the end of last month, insurance managers from the Middle East and North Africa crowded onto the website of Saudi Arabia’s Monetary Agency (SAMA) to download the final version of the kingdom’s new insurance law. Many an executive surrounded himself during the following days with the new Lebanese insurance draft law and the Saudi law.

Years in the making, the Saudi law defines a new insurance regime that provides sector companies with a window to a potential boom in what is currently the region’s most interesting insurance market, with a per capita expenditure of merely $46 in 2002 and an insurance penetration of 0.35%. According to statistics published by Middle Eastern ratings agency i.e., this makes Saudi Arabia the lowest ranking oil economy in terms of insurance penetration.

The law’s announcement also points to an issue at the heart of the Arab world’s insurance industry concerns: the disparate regulatory environment. Observers and industry members widely agree that regulations have been, and still often are, either insufficient or damaging to insurance development – the latter occurring mostly in countries where protectionism eliminated competition on government projects. A paper analyzing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) for the Middle East insurance sector in the year 2000 by then vice-chairman of Arab Reinsurance and Insurance Group (ARIG), Ali Al Bahar, stated “laws governing the insurance industry across the Middle East are not uniform. This hinders cross border activity.” He went on to note that the practice of protected markets “hindered many companies from enhancing their products and services.” Self-defeating underwriting practices in some ruinously over-competitive markets, under capitalization of many insurers, one-sided portfolios and lack of internal transparency were other weaknesses listed in Bahar’s paper, juxtaposed by a smaller number of strengths, including the absence of natural disasters, high returns on shareholder equity, and wide availability of products. Promoting harmonization of regional insurance laws is one of the core aims of the General Arab Insurance Federation (GAIF), said the secretary general, Abdul Khaleq Raouf Khalil, in remarks to EXECUTIVE outlining the Federation’s principles and policies. In Khalil’s views on regional industry concerns, the era of economic globalization created new challenges to Arab insurers by opening these “promising markets to international companies, which made giant companies flock toward them.” As a result, established companies in Arab countries faced the challenge of “confronting weak insurance awareness comprehensively by unifying efforts among institutions.” Khalil named insurance education in schools and insurance promotion through the media as desirable means to increase awareness but specifically called upon governments to aid the sector by reducing taxes on insurance and offer incentives for policy buyers.

In context of larger demographic and cultural changes, societal provisions for retirement plans and pension funds are issues of monumental dimension in the Arab world. According to recently published research by Lebanese financial firm Saradar Investhouse, the share of life insurance premiums out of total premiums is remarkably low in nearly all Arab countries. Ranging from 31% in Egypt down to 4% in Saudi Arabia and 1% in Syria, life insurance ratios are in stark contrast to developed markets, where life insurance and wealth creation through insurance products dominate. Also in global averages for developed and developing countries, life premiums outweigh general insurance, said the report.

Executives from Arab insurance companies point to a number of reasons for the Middle East’s low acceptance rate of life products. Throughout most of the period following the eruption of their national wealth (which in some countries coincided with their independence), oil economies in the Gulf region provided their citizens with extensive free welfare assistance. In a few countries, selling of life policies was simply outlawed. Population growth and experiences of economic and cultural transformation have begun directing these societies towards appreciation of the tools that life insurance offers. However, communal and religious identities in Arab countries run strong, and carry an element of rejection to life insurance on account of dual factors. On the one hand, many Muslims abstain from buying standard life insurance products because risk concepts and investment structures of conventional plans are forbidden under the Islamic legal canon. On the other hand, the notion of ‘life insurance’ also carries emotional messages that can be interpreted as attempts to outwit the creator and deny the sole divine authority over life and death.

Arab advocates of the benefits of life insurance thus have been emphasizing that the real character of a life plan lies in financial safeguarding of people’s loved ones and in preparing for the future. And in course of the overall trend to evolve Islamic finance, insurance companies in Muslim countries are working towards a stronger presence of TAKAFUL insurance, that is insurance where policies and investment methods are in compliance with SHARI’A rules, satisfying both Islamic religious and secular supervisory standards.

Insurers involved in TAKAFUL, including subsidiaries of global financial player HSBC, speak of a great potential. However, provider experiences do not yet suggest that sales growth of either Islamic or conventional life policies would suffice to meet the region’s needs for wide spread wealth creation and building of pensions. “Some insurance and reinsurance companies are building experience with TAKAFUL, but it is yet premature to pass judgment on the feasibility and relevance of these concepts,” opined the deputy general manager of regional reinsurance firm Arab Re, Tayseer Treky. Given the youth-heavy demographic structures of the large and populous Arab countries – from Algeria and Egypt to Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria, as well as smaller countries such as Lebanon – in conjunction with severely underpowered public sector social nets, planning for ageing populations appears as a need that will only increase in importance and urgency for decades to come.

In relation to this massive socioeconomic issue, concerns over intra-regional reinsurance capacities may be of lesser long-term consequence, but they have been weighing on the minds of Arab insurers for many years, and attracted a massive increase in attention after global reinsurance markets began to harden four years ago – and more so in the aftermath of September 11. Numerous Arab insurance companies felt hard pressed by the sudden drop in reinsurance availability, and industry members renewed calls for strengthening regional reinsurance pools. For the region’s reinsurance providers, the development offered a welcome opportunity. Nonetheless, managers do not dream of replacing the international firms in the market. “We do not look to international reinsurers as a threat. Reinsurance is international per se,” said Treky.

All deliberations of economics and business concerns in the Arab world are void without paying reference to regional security and political issues. Every Middle Eastern war, from 1948 until the 2003 Iraq invasion, dented the economic stance of the insurance industry to at least some extent. The abrupt decline of the Lebanese standing as the region’s avant-garde location for insurers after 1975 and the downturn of the Iraqi market after 1990 were both directly conflict-caused. And fundamentally, the regional insurance outlook will not be completely positive in the absence of peace.

Future prospects of individual markets with the greatest development potential thus are subject to the two key influences of political stability and improvement and liberalization of regulatory regimes. Iraq shows the strongest current promise of a yet to be realized huge peace dividend for insurance operators. Saudi Arabia is the encouraging example of market opening and regulation for the day, Libya is also en course, Syria another candidate for opening up. Countries that have a history of a strong private sector insurance market and countries that have successfully established and implemented advanced insurance legislation have the best prospects to serve as centers for Arab insurance development. Bahrain, where authorities adopted ambitious aims of establishing a major financial hub, is the noted example for the latter scenario, Lebanon the indisputable representative of the former. Veterans of the Lebanese insurance industry do not tire to declare that the Human Resources, experience and expertise concentrated in this country create a fertile ground suited like no other country in the region for fulfilling the role of insurance center. In view of the benefits of multi-polar structures and respectful competition, the Middle Eastern insurance industry would be extremely well served if these two and eventually additional countries were to evolve into centers of insurance excellence. Sound domestic markets with healthy, well-governed companies and exemplary supervisory regimes are required as ingredients for achieving such functionality for either country. In the opinion of Abraham Matossian, president of Lebanon’s insurance association, ACAL, and head of the event’s preparatory committee, the 25th GAIF conference represents a good omen for developing Lebanon’s role in the Arab insurance world. ”This is not one of many conferences,” he said. “More than 1000 participants have registered, which is an unprecedented number. Our topic is the future of Arab insurance. The fact that the GAIF is convening here this time is unusual because the conference never before assembled twice in the same country within a twelve-year period, and what further adds to its importance is the fact that this is the Federation’s silver jubilee conference.”

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Heineken shakes up the beer market

by Michael Karam May 1, 2004
written by Michael Karam

When Heineken bought Almaza at the end of 2002, the acquisition, “represented a further strengthening of Heineken’s position in growing beer markets thus creating a better balance between the activities of Heineken in mature and in developing markets. It also offers a strong base from which to export to surrounding countries.” Two year’s later the Dutch multi-national has not taken its eye off the ball and at the end of March of this year, another, crucial piece of the jigsaw fell into place when Brasserie Almaza bought local rival Laziza, giving Almaza and Heineken the brand portfolio to realize their regional ambitions.
“Two years on, we are on track with our vision of making Lebanon a credible sourcing hub for the Middle East,” explained Almaza managing director, Jean-Marc Landriau, sitting in his office at the company’s famous Dora brewery. Laziza had struggled to establish itself on the local market since being revived by Joe Khawam, grandson of the founder, in 2000.

 

The brand, which was brewed in Holland but marketed as a Lebanese beer, suffered from what Landriau describes as an “ambiguity of positioning.” It came in three “flavors”: Lite, Regular and Strong. However, few understood the Lite concept; the Strong version was a shade too expensive and the Regular was in no position to dislodge the mighty Almaza. “Laziza lacked the finances to market itself efficiently,” shrugged Landriau.

Before the Laziza buyout, Heineken’s Lebanese stable included Almaza, Amstel and Desperado, a beer and tequila RTD (ready to drink) beverage. Later this year, it will launch a new beer, Rex, to compete in the growing “strong beer” segment. It was a portfolio designed to compete in all niches of the local market but it had limited export punch. Although Almaza was exporting to Syria and certain on-trade outlets in Europe, the US and Canada, where it is styled as an ethnic specialty, the brewery’s sights were firmly set on the lucrative GGC markets.

Almaza was aware that 75% of Laziza’s sales were from its non-alcoholic beers, which had, given its limited resources, performed credibly in a local market, where sales were buoyed by Lebanon’s modest tourism boom and the increasing number of teetotal Arabs who wanted something fun to drink.
Buying Laziza meant not only a acquiring a high-profile brand but also an export platform to the Gulf. Now, Almaza wants to export Laziza to Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the mouthwatering Saudi Arabia market, where 60 million liters of non-alcoholic beer are drunk every year and where it will pitch for a 10% share of the local market, so far dominated by European non-alcoholic beers.

“Laziza is indeed our key brand for export in the Middle East region,” said Landriau. “We want to develop volume in the region. In 2002, Almaza was exporting 2% to the region. Today, we are exporting 25% of volume and by 2008, I hope to be exporting 40%.”

Landriau’s dream is to export more beer than Lebanon imports. Such ambitions will not come cheap. More exports means greater production. “We will have to invest, if we are to increase capacity by 10% every year,” said Landriau, who was painfully reluctant to be pinned down on the specifics of Heineken’s spending or its market share in Lebanon: “We need to protect ourselves from our competitors.”

He did however reveal that the Dutch company had spent euro 35 million “so far.” The tab includes the acquisition of both Almaza (rumored to have been bought for $24 million) and Laziza and new equipment. Landriau said there are plans to build a new brewery.

Until the Laziza purchase, Almaza and its stablemate Amstel controlled 60% of Lebanon’s $40 million beer market. The Laziza acquisition should increase that figure to 70%, while it is hoped that the new Rex will make a dent in the strong beer segment, which currents claim a 10% overall market share.

There have been casualties. Devotees of Laziza Strong will be sad to learn that their tipple is being discontinued to make way for Rex, at 8% the same strength as Laziza Strong but sold in a bigger, brasher can. The idea is to position Rex to compete with the popular and affordable EFS, Atlas and the daunting Everest. Many of these beers are the strength of white wine but cost as little as LL 1,000 a tin. EFS from Turkey, is the best-selling strong beer in Lebanon with a 9% share of the overall local beer market.

According to Landriau, strong beers have made a surprisingly successful impact in the local market. “The Lebanese consumer generally looks at price rather than strength. With these [strong] beers they get value for their money. This is in direct contradiction with global trends where stronger beer is usually more expensive.”

Also struck off the team sheet was Laziza Lite. Almaza felt the Lite option was too subtle a choice for Lebanon’s beer drinker. “It was difficult for the customer to define,” said Landriau. “Markets are either dominated by Lites (like the US) or non-alcoholic beer (like Spain). In Lebanon, this segment is definitely non-alcoholic and the Lite was squeezed out.”

The decision to axe Laziza Lite highlights the importance of clear brand segmentation. Almaza (and no doubt its illustrious parent company) is confident that each beverage has a distinct enough identity to hold its own in the local market. Heineken needs no introduction. It is the most visible beer on the planet. Almaza is secure as the local favorite (positioned, for those who care about such things, at a respectable 4.1% alcohol). Amstel, with its slightly more international profile is what Landriau calls “an upper-mainstream brand” and sells for around 10% to 15% more. Laziza (the regular beer) is priced slightly below Almaza with marginally higher alcohol content (4.7%) and a “sharper taste.” Rex represents the strong beer class. It is, said Landriau euphemistically, “an attractive price proposal.”

Almaza retained J. Walter Thompson to create a marketing campaign that will send one very clear message. “In terms of overall communication, Almaza is alcoholic and Laziza is non alcoholic,” explained Landriau, re-emphasizing the importance placed on Laziza’s non-alcoholic, multi-flavored beer portfolio.

Landriau has not failed to notice the rise of the Alco pop or RTD (ready-to-drink) alcoholic beverages such as Bacardi Breezer and Smirnoff Ice. The two have become a global craze and spawned in their wake an army of similar, often more-affordable, concoctions (including Kassatly Chtaura’s Buzz, which is also set to launch a non-alcoholic product this summer). RTDs pose a formidable threat to the beer market, especially during the heady summer months. In Lebanon, the RTD market is worth $3 million and growing by 15% annually.

“Yes, of course they have taken volume from the beer market but we have reacted with Desperado,” said Landriau, pointing to a golden brown bottle of beer and tequila. Heineken also owns Murphy’s Irish stout, which is gaining global popularity on the back of the Irish pub phenomenon. Landriau is confident that both brands will buttress any assault on Almaza’s share of the market.

For the record, Lebanon consumes five liters of beer per capita. This is greater than Egypt (one liter) but less than Tunisia (nine liters). To put things in perspective, the French consume 40 liters per capita per annum while the Czechs virtually bath in the stuff, consuming an impressive 160.7 liters per person. “Lebanon is an underdeveloped market that we are looking to exploit,” remarked a no-doubt upbeat Landriau.

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

2004 national budget

by Tony Hchaime May 1, 2004
written by Tony Hchaime

There was much debate and not a little bad feeling, but in the end Parliament, after a three-day marathon debate, approved the 2004 state draft budget on April 7, with a vote of 65-31 and one abstention. It was a more realistic budget to the one originally set for 2003, probably due to the government’s failure to even come close to achieving the previous year’s budget targets. Nevertheless, despite the new budget’s “more realistic” terms, many remain skeptical of the government’s ability to meet its targets.

The overall budget deficit is forecast to drop to 32.5% of expenditures in 2004. This compares well to the 42.3% of 2002, and could be achieved given that the deficit during the first eight months of 2003 peaked at 38.0%. It also remains more realistic than the 26% target originally set for the year 2003. As such, the total deficit is expected to level off at LL3,300 billion, compared to LL 2,525 billion for the draft law of 2003, and LL2,695 of the first eight months of the year. The deficit target results from total expenditures of LL9,250 billion, and revenues of LL6,400 billion, in addition to net treasury expenditures of LL450 billion. However, according to the ministry of finance, the 2004 draft budget does not account for the potential impact of any reforms outlined in the 2003 budget law, reforms that were meant to increase the productivity of the public sector, reduce its costs, and enhance its efficiency on the economy and its profit on citizens.

Elsewhere, total government expenditures under the new budget are expected to amount of LL9,250 billion, almost 8% above the 2003 draft law, and only 1.3% below those actually incurred in 2002. Unlike the case with the 2003 draft budget, the government currently acknowledges the fact that little cost cutting can be implemented given the budget’s existing cost structure. Non-debt servicing expenditures are expected to reach LL4,950 billion, almost 8% above those earmarked for 2003, while debt-servicing costs are expected to amount to LL 4,300 billion, also 8% above the 2003 estimates. On the other hand, debt servicing accounts for a staggering 47% of total expenditures, at LL4,300 billion in 2004. According to the ministry of finance, the debt servicing remains high due to the fact that some older, higher interest bearing obligations have yet to mature and result in a higher overall cost. A more significant reduction in such costs is expected to materialize in 2005 and 2006, as the older loans mature, and the impacts of lower-interest obligations, and the non-interest bearing funds injected into the treasury, are felt. Nevertheless, the ministry of finance has estimated that the proceeds of privatization and securitization, should such plans be implemented, would effectively reduce expenditures by LL400 billion, or 4.3%.

Admittedly, LL7,700 billion, or 84% of total expenditures, are seemingly fixed costs, with little or no room for further cost-cutting. In that regard, personnel wages account for 37% of total expenditures. With such costs including wages and salaries, related benefits, pensions, and end of service indemnities, they inherently lack flexibility. This leaves the government with potentially manageable expenditures of only 16% of the total spending. However, given that the items making up these expenditures have been subjected to several previous reduction attempts, it has become apparent that realizing any significant reduction on this level will be difficult in the absence of certain structural reforms.
 

While most ministries will benefit from higher funding in 2004, compared to the 2003 draft law, some have benefited from some substantial increases. The presidency of the council of ministers, for example, was allocated an additional LL118 billion, mostly to the benefit of the Council of the South and the Central Fund for the Displaced. The ministry of public works and transport and the ministry of public health benefited from additions of LL62 billion and LL44 billion respectively.

It is worth noting, however, and perhaps on a more negative note, that no additional allocation was provided to social expenditures in the 2004 budget. Total social expenditures are expected to remain unchanged compared to the 2003 budget law, at LL2,291 billion, with the majority going to pensions and end of service indemnities. Government revenues originally expected to be reaped in 2003 return, mostly unchanged, in 2004, the budget of which was drafted on the basis of not introducing any additional taxes, or amending existing ones. While the ministry of finance has repeatedly expressed its concerns regarding the Treasury’s liquidity position, and the resulting necessity in increasing Value Added Tax (VAT) from 10% to 12%, such an increase has not been taken into consideration in the new budget, and no plans for its imminent implementation are in the pipeline, according to ministry officials.

Total revenues are expected to amount to LL6,400 billion in 2004, almost unchanged from the 2003 budget. Tax revenues are expected to reach LL4,645 billion, compared to LL4,726 in the 2003 budget law. The drop is mainly due to a drop in tariffs on trade and international exchange, resulting mostly from a reduction in custom duties. Nevertheless, around LL100 billion in additional VAT revenues are expected to result from improvements in tax collection, and the reduction of the threshold of businesses eligible for VAT.

While many praised the “more rational” numbers included in the 2004 budget, it remains to be seen if such numbers are actually achievable, given the current economic, socio-political, and security conditions. The budget does appear to not take into consideration the substantial benefits (in excess of LL400 billion) that might result from the implementation of privatization and securitization plans. As such, any benefits from such progress will be a welcome bonus over and above the numbers reported in the budget.

On the expenditure side, and excluding debt servicing, total expenditures for the first eight months of 2003 reached LL2,672 billion, compared to a full-year budget for 2004 of LL4,950 billion. As such, and accounting for the LL350 billion additional expenditures earmarked for 2004, the government may be able to keep spending within the assigned range. Certain unforeseen events should be factored in, as they might adversely impact expenditures. Following the announcement of the results of the cellular license management tender in April, both MTC and Detecon have indicated plans to expand and upgrade the country’s cellular network. While no concrete plans have yet been presented in that regard, such expansions are likely to necessitate substantial capital investments, which are to be fall on the shoulders of the Ministry of Telecommunication.

The numerous problems facing the government with upgrading and running the port of Beirut bear substantial costs. While the burdens resulting from problems with the unions have not been quantified, they may significantly impact costs. Nevertheless, the government is seemingly working on a plan to auction off the management of the port operations to a private-sector third party, but such plans have yet to materialize.

Moreover, and while many officials have proclaimed to transform Lebanon into the health and medical center for the region, the country’s medical infrastructure is, by international standards, mediocre, according to industry experts, and is beginning to lag behind others in the region (such as the UAE and Kuwait). If the government is serious enough to undertake a transformation in the health industry to achieve its aim of repositioning the country as the regional medical center, it will again need to undertake substantial investments in that regard, and run the risk of overstretching the budget.

Finally, it remains to be seen, however, how the government’s efforts to meet the set budget for 2004 will react to the outcomes of the municipal elections in May, and the presidential elections in August.

On the one hand, the Hariri bloc is leading a massive campaign, especially in the Greater Beirut area. Historically, the Hariri bloc, represented by Rafik Hariri and minister of finance Fouad Siniora, has favored economic growth, over other economic issues. While some proclaimed that such strategies have resulted in the massive debt burden on the country, Siniora’s latest comments maintain that stimulating growth in the economy is likely the optimal solution to the growing debt burden. Moreover, the minister clearly stated that a successful effort in curbing the debt would necessitate some “unpopular” privatization steps and cutting in expenditures.

Such strategies do not agree well with the Lahoud bloc, which has thrown its presidential weight behind halting the privatization process due to its “unfavorable national aspect.”

With the elections looming, the outcome is likely to dictate the government’s fiscal and monetary policies in the future. A win for the Hariri will likely result in more spending, growth, and serious efforts to implement privatization plans in the shortest timeframe possible. A win by Lahoud would delay privatization until “more favorable conditions” arise, and curb expenditures in an effort to reduce the deficit.

In that sense, the fate of the budget, the economy, and ultimately the welfare of the Lebanese people hangs in the balance during the second half of the year, and is ultimately in the hands of those, foreign or domestic, that will determine the outcomes of the elections.

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Qatar’s many faces

by Michael Young May 1, 2004
written by Michael Young

As the Middle East continues to be buffeted by the winds of reform, both real and fictitious, one country seems have learned how to play the game of professed reform to better control its content: Qatar.

In the last decade, the emirate, the world’s third largest producer of natural gas (after having invested heavily in the sector in the mid-1990s), has been portrayed as an Arab proponent of free minds and markets. However, Qatar’s politics have, in fact, been far more complex, and interesting. Like a latter-day Venice, the emirate has blended pragmatic amorality in its foreign affairs with an ability to play all sides in order to ensure its own prosperity, security and regime survivability.

In April, the architect of Qatar’s political transformation, Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, hosted an international conference on democracy and free trade in Doha. Though the level of participation was less prominent than the initial list of invitees suggested, though there were fewer top American representatives than promised, the gathering did serve the emir’s purpose, namely to substantiate talk overseas of his assumed liberalism. In that sense, it allowed Qatar to represent itself, yet again, as an exception in a region grappling with reformist winds of change, the very same that virtually blew down the Arab summit that was scheduled to be held in Tunis in April.

While Emir Hamad is indeed more enlightened than many of his fellow Arab leaders, he does remain an absolute monarch. Qatar’s policies are very much the ones he defines, in collaboration with, among others, his influential foreign minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem Al-Thani. And one of the emir’s most potent weapons has been his ability to develop a façade of free expression.

His crown jewel in that regard is Al-Jazeera, the satellite station that virtually no one in the Middle East can afford to be indifferent toward. Love it or hate it, Al-Jazeera is both Emir Hamad’s weapon and shield: he uses it to hit out at his enemies, most prominently Saudi Arabia (which has long regarded the freethinking emir as an unruly menace), but also to protect himself against the Arab nationalists and Islamists who delight in the station’s political line and what they consider its independence. “Independence” is a relative concept, however, in that Al-Jazeera is financed largely by Emir Hamad himself. At the Doha conference, one participant suggested that if the station was so popular, why didn’t it seek funding through commercials, like any private television station? The man was politely ignored. However, his query went to the very heart of the matter with regard to the station’s politics: to what extent is Al-Jazeera really separate from the emir’s interests?

In fact, Emir Hamad’s relationship with Al-Jazeera is a subtle one. By muzzling the station, his defenders suggest, he would merely undermine emerging Qatari pluralism and score another point for intolerance in the Middle East. Indeed, but it is equally true that by sponsoring the demagogical Arab nationalism or Islamism of Al-Jazeera, the emir also buys cover on his political left for hosting the huge American military base at Al-Udeid, from where American power in the Gulf is projected.

America offers Qatar what no one else will: security, permitting the emirate to export its natural gas without fear; but also a margin of maneuver vis-à-vis the emirate’s Gulf partners and the larger Arab states, so that Qatar has repeatedly taken on a prominence surpassing its diminutive size in both inter-Arab and inter-Islamic politics. It is to buttress its rapport with Washington that Qatar has also maintained ties – albeit ambiguous ones – with Israel. Yet, ever versatile, it was AGAINST Washington that Qatar stood before the Iraq war (even as it hosted U.S. Central Command), when it sought to avoid a conflict by intervening with the Iraqis after an Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in Doha in March 2003.

On other matters too, particularly Qatar’s relations with militant Islam (Qatari mosques follow Wahhabi teachings and the emir’s murky relations with Al-Qaeda have been the subject of considerable speculation), the cornerstone of Emir Hamad’s maneuverability has been his wearing the mask of openness. Democracy and a devotion to free markets, even when peddled by an un-elected ruler for life whose movement on democracy has been slow (if palpable), can go a long way to building up international goodwill. It has also allowed Emir Hamad to stand in the camp of the reformers, when some might question his authority to so brazenly do so. But Qatar remains blissfully indifferent to the contradictions on which its politics and stability rest. Security and profits are its mantra, and to preserve this, any and all fighting techniques are permitted – scratching and biting included.

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Bank of Beirut: Going steady

by Thomas Schellen April 3, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Following a very satisfactory 2003 for the country’s major banks, the outlook for the sector in 2004 is guarded but not downcast, said Salim Sfeir, chairman and general manager of Bank of Beirut.

Each and every bank in the sector’s leading stratum could outdo their expectations on the results they realized in 2003, Sfeir told EXECUTIVE. “Talking about 2004 and 2005 is a big question, because markets are slightly down and political uncertainties are still high,” he said. “But nevertheless, our financial forecast for the end of the year is not pessimistic. We look forward to having a smooth year, financially speaking.” Similar to other alpha group banks – the institutions at the top of the national banking hierarchy, with assets of more than $1 billion apiece – Bank of Beirut can point to exponential growth in the reconstruction years, both in size and range of activities. Today ranked sixth by assets and seventh in terms of tier-one capital among Lebanon’s banks, its evolution and performance appears archetypical for the fortunes of the sector’s better-achieving agents.

Entering the 90s as a very small player, Bank of Beirut ventured onto an ambitious path of expansion after installing a new management in 1993. Four years later, it was Lebanon’s third bank to go public, and in 1998, a merger with Transorient Bank completed the foundation that enabled Bank of Beirut to scale the $1 billion assets hurdle. In 2002, the bank made further headlines by acquiring Beirut Riyad Bank in a second large merger move, which contributed to a 2002 increase in assets by over 58% and boosted the branch network to over 40 domestic outlets and a subsidiary in London. The bank also established an international banking unit in Cyprus, adding to its representative office in Dubai at the seat of its strategic shareholder, Emirates Bank International. In parallel, Bank of Beirut in 2002 and 2003 undertook a number of measures to increase its tier-one and tier-two capital, including issuance of $55 million in preferred shares. It enlarged its product and services portfolio through creating new funds, retail and bancassurance products along with installation of a call center and an electronic banking operation. Perhaps more tiring than anticipated, the acquisition of Beirut Riyad Bank and integration of its labor force and customer base “was not an easy meal to digest”, Sfeir concedes, even as he maintains that the bank mastered the merger “in an excellent way. I don’t think it could have been done in a better way.” The bank’s underlying message seems to say that their growth expectations are far from exhausted but under national economic conditions, the next development cycle could be some time away.

Bank of Beirut has, so far, navigated 2004 with care – a mood primarily reflective of what management regards as ‘politically generated’ constraints on local and regional affairs encumbering the investment climate. The bank is party to a widespread sentiment that – positive impact of Paris II notwithstanding – the Lebanese political decision makers still need to fulfill their duty of facilitating macro-economic conditions more conducive for attracting investments. The lack of action on the government’s part has led the banking industry in general, and Bank of Beirut in particular, to declare itself apolitical. This does not mean that the bank would wait for political improvements before continuing their quest to innovate. Recent new products include a competitively priced account with revolving credit for salaried employees and a new lira-denominated housing loan. The bank’s current emphasis on housing loans took off with a product designed especially for Lebanese expatriates, who sought to establish a personal property bridgehead in their home country. As the interest rate environment on the lira has improved and lira products are more feasible than before, lira loans are a logical new product that many banks would follow Bank of Beirut in devising, Sfeir said. “The lira loan is another product. We are not highlighting the lira but promoting higher usage since interest rates have fallen to levels making it mandatory to start planning in this direction.” Like a dollar-denominated domestic housing loan introduced last year, the lira loan offers regressive interest rates.

In continued pursuit of its strategy to offer funds products attractive to small and large investors, the bank last year collaborated with First National Bank (FNB) in the creation of two new funds, the Beirut Global Income Fund in July and the Beirut Lira Fund in October. “Small investors took part in the funds and saw high returns,” Sfeir said. “Investors are well informed today, and expect returns that are higher than what they can gain elsewhere. As long as we are providing those returns, we are reaching our target.” According to Sfeir, the funds collaboration between Bank of Beirut and FNB was to the mutual benefit of both institutions. Could this development indicate a stronger partnership in the making, or perhaps another merger prospect? Not in the current situation, where the law and regulations supporting bank merger activities with central bank soft loans haven’t been renewed. “There is no merger law now; it would be a waste of time to get excited,” he said. “With a merger law, it would be a new opportunity.”

Profitability before size and profit optimization at lowest possible risk levels make for two fundamentals in the Bank of Beirut strategy, translating into an unhurried pace in the bank’s continued ambition for an increased role in regional markets. Together with its partner, Emirates Bank, the institution has applied for a license to establish a presence in Syria. It is also approaching the Nigerian market through a rep office project in Lagos, and – for the longer term – contemplates its entry into Iraq. In Sfeir’s view, international expansion is no easy fix and offshore markets poise high risks for Lebanese banks that venture there. They have to calculate a high costs of funds based on the interest rates paid to depositors, and offshore clients accepting those rates would not be likely to be a model for creditworthiness. “Whoever is going to borrow at our own rates will be a risky partner, on whom we have no control,” Sfeir said, “and this I don’t recommend at all to my people.” He accepts only the top five banks in the country as a peer group for Bank of Beirut and sees the optimal size of the Lebanese banking sector as containing no more than 12 or 13 banks. But domestic size ranking was never a concern of the bank, Sfeir said. “We never looked at other parties, the market and colleagues. Our policy is to compete against ourselves. To be much better than we have been.” The bank has a young labor force – the average age is below 40-years-old – and Sfeir prioritizes in-house training and continued education over hiring new staff. The priorities for the current period in the Bank of Beirut evolution are “to maintain the quality of our service and products,” he continued, “and improve the quality of our people through adequate education programs. This will reflect on our results.” The executive admonishes the existence of unprofessional banking practices that extend even into the ranks of the alpha group – but nonetheless appears less concerned about sector-specific problems than about the performance of the public sector leadership. “Lebanese bankers are good bankers,” he said, “I didn’t say that the Lebanese politicians are good politicians.”

The one internal snag factor that Sfeir identified for his institution – which adopts the motto ‘banking beyond borders’ – would be, “shyness.” “Every time when we are shy, we fail.” Extending an invitation to everyone to get closer to Bank of Beirut, the tough talking banker shows a softer side. “We are opening our doors to accommodate the public with a big smiling heart.”

April 3, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Q&A: Freddie Baz

by Executive Staff April 1, 2004
written by Executive Staff

How long were the two banks involved in negotiations before signing the agreement to form a single group?

The two banks have had a long proactive relationship. Every now and then we sat together on the managerial level and assessed the situation of the banking industry in Lebanon and the consolidation process. In this favorable environment, more direct talks started two to three months ago but as one issue among several in our meetings. After negotiations started in serious, the whole process didn’t take more than one month.

Then it was a smooth procedure?

It was a very smooth procedure. The two parties are really open minded and not driven by any subjective considerations, which normally present an important obstacle for merger operations. There was never any ego dimension. Issues came up in a healthy way and never generated emotional attitudes or structural obstacles.

Will you form a group of banks or a single bank?

When Banque Audi becomes the sole shareholder of Saradar, Saradar shareholders will change part of their shares into Audi shares, and therefore will become shareholders of Banque Audi. We call the new entity that is emerging, the Audi-Saradar group, which, however, is not a legal concept. From an accounting standpoint, Banque Audi is the holding company where all the accounts of all the subsidiaries will be consolidated.

Under perspective of management culture and operational environment, would you describe the deal more as a merger or more as an acquisition?

In a merger, one institution absorbs another institution, which is not the case here. Both banks are keeping their legal status. As Banque Audi is paying partly in cash and partly in new Audi shares to be issued exclusively to Saradar shareholders, you can consider the cash configuration as an acquisition and the share configuration as a merger. But the spirit of the negotiations was the most important element, and the spirit was the spirit of a rapprochement of two banking groups into one mega group, which is Audi-Saradar. It is really a rapprochement between two banks, creating huge synergies at different levels: human, managerial, franchises, commercial, financial and so forth.

Is the absence of the merger law going to affect the process?

The scheme that I was describing by definition does not get any benefits from the merger law. Even if the law were in place, we would not have been granted any soft loan, because both entities are still operating and no license will be given back to the central bank.

Was size ever a consideration in the discussions?

Size has never been a target for us. Banque Audi’s target has always been to be among the best banks in Lebanon, not the biggest bank of Lebanon. However, when you reach the high quality level, which we believe we have reached over the last three years, your customer base obviously expands, and size follows.

Is your key strategic aim domestic or regional?

Both are related. You cannot expand beyond your national boundaries if you haven’t reached a mass in the domestic market. It is surprising that a country like Lebanon, which has developed its banking industry to 3.5 times the level of GDP, couldn’t build private entities with a size that would allow them to compete with regional banks. If two, three or four major banking groups in Lebanon materialize, and if each of those banks have a size similar to the top two or three in some countries in the region, we have a lot of chances to gain market shares in those markets.

Will financial firm Lebanon Invest be taken out of the market?

Who said that? By definition, if a merger or acquisition results in having three of four insurance companies or investment companies, the healthiest solution is to consolidate internally. But for the time being I cannot say that we have decided to liquidate this or merge that. Without going more into specifics, I can say we are in the process of reassessing all subsidiaries in order to generate the highest financial synergies.

But is it correct to say that Saradar Investment House will be absorbed into Audi Investment Bank?

If you believe in internal consolidation, by definition you have to consider it internally. For the time being there are no schemes at all for any of those entities. Starting with the signatures under the merger-acquisition agreement, we are becoming one entity. In each single entity, the best people have to manage the business, and in each subsidiary, the best people will get the responsibilities warranted by their expertise. I do not comment on these issues now because the steering committee has been assigned. It will assess the real values in each business. There are no preset positions.

How long do you estimate the steering committee to have to work on these assessments?

The committee’s role is to ensure the rapprochement’s best and optimal conditions to assure the interests of the new shareholders, which represent the old shareholders of both entities. It is a matter of not just assessing material things. In view of our size, it should take a minimum of two months or perhaps three.

In any merger, people in the involved companies have concerns over their jobs. Did you discuss any redundancies?

No. Since these entities will operate under their actual status, there is definitely room for all the people working for the group. The business synergies resulting from the rapprochement will probably create need for further jobs in the group.

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Revitalizing banking

by Tony Hchaime April 1, 2004
written by Tony Hchaime

Despite its proud regional reputation, Lebanon’s banking sector has faced a number of hurdles in the past few years. Strong regional competition, stemming from the spawning of a number of large-scale Arab banks – mainly in the Gulf – have created obstacles for a sector seeking expansion, while a high level of liquidity, a large number of small-scale, inefficient banks, and an overcapacity of banking institutions for a country of Lebanon’s size have not helped the sector.

The central bank, in close conjunction with the Association of Lebanese Banks, has been working hard to overhaul the banking sector and allow it to regain its regional competitive advantages. One initiative was the unprecedented move in late February by the central bank to amend two laws – 1998’s law number 7055 and 1999’s law number 7274 – allowing Lebanese banks to lend to non-residents and invest in foreign debt securities respectively.

The amendments to law number 7055 would allow any Lebanese bank to extend loans to non-residents up to an amount of 5% of its equity per borrower. The total loans to non-residents, however, may not exceed an aggregate amount of 25% of the bank’s equity. This compares to a ceiling of 20% per resident borrower.

Prior the amendment to law number 7274, banks were restricted to securities issued by the governments of no more than 10 nations, including the US, Japan, and certain European countries. The new changes allow Lebanese banks to invest in any foreign debt security, be it sovereign or corporate, as long as the security is rated BBB or higher by any of the internationally recognized rating agencies, such as Standards and Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s.

The moves are being highly debated in Lebanese financial circles, as they constitute a major turnaround in the policies of central bank governor Riad Salameh, who was traditionally set on maintaining a high level of liquidity in the banking sector in Lebanon, and ensuring that such liquidity remains within the country’s borders (a policy that was underpinned by the two original laws). As such the central bank’s change in direction raises questions as to the motives behind the amendments to the laws.

The banking sector in Lebanon has grown substantially over the past few years, with growth in assets and deposits witnessing a compounded average annual growth of 15% each between 2000 and 2004. Following the events of September 11, and the subsequent so-called US-led war on terror, Arab funds have been flowing into Lebanese banks, increasing liquidity. Salameh has estimated the excess liquidity in the Lebanese banking sector at the beginning of 2004 at almost $5 billion.

On the other hand, Lebanon’s investment environment, although witnessing significant growth in certain sectors is relatively small, compared to the level of funds available for investments. Despite the lower interest rate environment, deposit rates on foreign currency deposits remain in excess of 4% among the large Lebanese banks, and may be even higher for long-term, large deposits. With such developments occurring rapidly, Lebanese banks faced problems in securing high-yielding uses of funds. A globally low interest rate environment, a limited investment climate in Lebanon, and a high risk surrounding Lebanese government bonds, might have made it difficult for Lebanese banks to achieve enough returns on all the excess liquidity to justify paying such interest rates on deposits.

In a pre-emptive move, the central bank allowed Lebanese banks to seek alternative investments for their funds, albeit in a highly selective and restricted manner, aimed at maintaining the sector’s image of safety and high liquidity. The market for such investments may be lucrative. However, the rapid growth of infrastructure-related projects in the region requires a massive amount of debt financing by regional banks. Infrastructure projects are spawning in the Gulf and Africa, in such sectors as power-generation, water desalination, and others. To this day, the long-term financing required by such projects has been restricted to international banks and major Arab (non-Lebanese) banks. Such projects present attractive lending opportunities for Lebanese banks enjoying high levels of liquidity. In fact, such projects typically enjoy a high level of safety and cash flow predictability, as they are often guaranteed by government organizations or international insurance coverage policies offered by such institutions as the World Bank affiliated Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

In such a sense, the Lebanese banking sector stands to greatly benefit from such opportunities. On the profitability front, Lebanese banks may substantially widen their interest margins, achieving higher returns on loans to non-resident companies in the region. Such returns would compare favorably to the low-yield deposits by Lebanese banks at foreign financial institutions. Moreover, such moves by Lebanese banks would significantly improve their efforts to expand regionally and compete with major Arab banks. While Lebanese banks have been historically successful in attracting Arab funds, their abilities to invest funds outside Lebanon have been highly restricted by the central bank’s regulations. The recent amendments would certainly allow Lebanese banks to aggressively expand geographically.

It remains to be seen, however, if such changes by the central bank are a precursor to more liberalization in the sector in the near future. Banking experts fail to see any other major changes in the near-term, unless drastic changes in market conditions necessitate it. After all, changes in market conditions such as the sudden increase in excess liquidity, and the lack of investment opportunities in Lebanon were potentially the main drive behind the central bank’s move to liberalize foreign lending and investment.

On the other hand, the central bank’s attention is likely to turn to a consolidation of the sector in the near term. The recently announced merger between Banque Audi and Banque Saradar has triggered much speculation as to the possibility of the merger becoming the first of a series of such activities, aimed at consolidating the highly fragmented banking sector. While the central bank governor has yet to approve the Audi-Saradar alliance, such moves have been historically encouraged by the central bank. This latest development may be used by the governor as a launching pad to entice other players in the sector to follow suit, or face the risk of being dwarfed by the scale of local and regional market leaders.

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Trouble with stocks

by Nicolas Photiades April 1, 2004
written by Nicolas Photiades

The re-opening of the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE) in 1996 offered local businesses the means to raise equity funding to finance restructuring and development plans, as well as expansion strategies. It also coincided nicely with the rise in emerging market equities, and the initial listings of Lebanese companies and banks, such as Solidere, Banque Audi and Bank of Beirut, met with immediate and substantial rises in stock prices.

However, for the past six years, the BSE has been a thorough disappointment – a condition partly explained by global factors affecting emerging and other Arab markets. Last year, while many Arab stock markets experienced growth of between 20% and 70% in 2003, the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE) experienced none. It has been plagued by illiquidity and tiny total market capitalization, which by mid-February 2004 amounted to around $1.7 billion (including over-the-counter stocks, such as Société des Grands Hotels du Liban [SGHL], the Casino du Liban and the ABC). Some stocks can now spend an entire week without any trading, while it is not unusual to see that one or two stocks can account for 100% of daily trading. In the “boom” years Solidere’s market capitalization alone used to reach $1.7 billion.

Lebanon’s depressed economic environment and the consequently low credit rating of the country (B- by Standard & Poor’s) are no doubt the overriding reasons behind the BSE’s stagnation. A stable economic and, more importantly, political environment is key and has been the key driver behind the relative success of the Amman Stock Exchange, which now boasts more than 100 listed companies.

There are, however, other factors. While an uncertain geopolitical situation has constantly driven away local and international investors, the absence of a domestic Capital Markets Authority, an equivalent of the US’ Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has had a greater effect on dampening the enthusiasm and appetite of local, regional and international investors. Were the government to have set up a local Capital Markets Authority simultaneously with the re-opening of the BSE, a significantly larger number of quality investors, with a greater focus on transparency and proper regulation, would have been attracted by Lebanese listed stocks.

The government’s “generous” fiscal policy of the mid-1990s, which meant that interest rates on Lebanese pound deposits and Treasury bills were significantly high – at one point, T-bills paid interest rates reaching the 45% mark – turned domestic investors’ funds and savings towards bank deposits and debt instruments, and away from domestic shares. The Solidere shares suffered particularly as a result. The high interest rate structure on deposits and debt securities contributed significantly in the premature end of an equity investing culture in Lebanon.

The lack of diverse BSE stocks also contributed significantly towards its demise. The listing of real estate, cement companies and banks was not enough in terms of diversification, with domestic and international investors requiring a wider choice of sector stocks in order to efficiently diversify their investment portfolio. A stock exchange must reflect the diversification of its local economy, and clearly this was not the case for the BSE. Foreign investors assumed that the Lebanese economy had very little scope for diversification and decided to reduce their exposure to Lebanon. In comparison, the Amman Stock Exchange is much more diversified and includes a large number of stocks emanating from different sectors. Banks there account for a significant portion of the exchange’s market capitalization, particularly the Arab Bank, which is regarded as one of the few international pan-Arab institutions. In contrast, Solidere, the BSE’s largest stock, is domestically focused and carries less importance in relation to the economy than a bank.

Company managers in Lebanon never really realized that the basis for efficient financial and operating management consists of diversifying funding and financing expansion mainly with equity. Today, companies are stuck in a situation where their cash flow is completely or significantly absorbed by debt servicing, and capital stock cannot be increased, as their creditworthiness and capitalization levels are negatively affected. Strong financial fundamentals and an apparently solid creditworthiness are essential for a successful public share offering as credit risk forms an essential part of the equity investment decision.

The limited number of investment banks and specialized finance companies in Lebanon, acting as intermediaries between the stock exchange and companies, was also a reason behind the current lack of development of the BSE. The lack of market makers has led to a secondary market illiquidity and the immediate loss of value of initial public offerings. The Gulf countries, on the other hand, have more developed brokerage and finance company sectors, which make markets on a much larger panoply of stocks and other securities.

The capital structure of the majority of Lebanese institutions, which is based on family ownership and control, has been a major factor behind the under-development of the BSE. Family owners find it very difficult to concede part of their controlling stake to new shareholders, which are generally regarded as an outside threat to their total management control. Moreover, the local mentality has always focused on long-term banking relations rather than stock exchange listings, as the latter means a more stringent reporting discipline that family owners are generally unwilling to comply with. This state of play compares unfavorably with both Cairo and Amman, where transparency is a must and companies are more institutionalized.

This lack of desire to obtain a listing could be solved partly with governmental fiscal incentives that might encourage companies to list. Even though the government has already reduced the dividend tax from 10% to 5% for listed companies, this measure is still insufficient and should be compounded with other fiscal incentives. What would the treasury gain from an active BSE? Well, more income from taxes on trading and capital gains, as well as the development of local capital markets, which is crucial in providing local institutions with greater financial flexibility or with an ability to tap diversified funding sources.

A lackluster privatization program, which under any circumstances should have boosted the BSE exponentially, is regarded as another major reason for the loss of interest for Lebanese listed stocks. Although there is a current will to put privatization back on track, it comes way too late for the BSE, which could have benefited significantly from a few privatizations back in 1996-1997, when emerging market shares were in very high demand by international investors (eg, the success of the Banque Audi and BLOM GDRs during that period). Were one or two public companies to have been privatized in 1996, the BSE would have reached a strong momentum, which would have been more difficult to break in times of crisis, such as during the 1998 Russian/Asian crises. The collapse of Asian and Russian stocks in 1998 sent all emerging markets into a tailspin plunge. All Arab stock markets, which were just re-emerging after years of deep sleep (mainly in Lebanon, Egypt, and other North African countries), were significantly affected by this shock. The more recent Nasdaq debacle and corporate scandals in the US have also virtually killed off any remaining interest for stock exchange activities among Lebanese investors, who are buying stocks but to a much lesser extent than pre-2001. A significant number got burned very seriously after being badly advised by Lebanese brokers and private bankers.

The recession experienced by the Lebanese economy since 1998, and the political volatility of the last few years, contributed significantly towards the disappearance of international investor interest in Lebanese equities and the lack of faith and disheartening of local investors.

What is currently needed is above all an efficient and transparent government policy towards the domestic stock market and the development of domestic capital markets (including debt capital markets). The recent implementation of a sophisticated quotation system is a step in the right direction, but remains insufficient. Lebanon still has an inadequate regulatory framework as compared to Amman or Cairo, and has no capital markets authority to regulate capital markets as a whole. The establishment of such an authority has never been more necessary.

The acceleration and greater transparency of the privatization program and process, as well as the decrease in interest rates on the Lebanese pound, are also regarded as key factors towards the development of the BSE. The latter is a vital channel towards equity funding, and will be needed at one stage in the future, particularly by local banks, as some of them will have to increase their capital following the implementation of Basel II guidelines.

The Lebanese government’s role is crucial in the sense that it should make clear to the international investor community, through a series of continuous road shows in major cities, of its commitment to reforms and economic recovery. Investors need constant reassurance about a country’s future economic plans and have to feel comfortable with the level of transparency. The slightest doubt about the disclosure of economic plans would generally drive down any market in the world.

Finally, Lebanese banks, which claim to have developed investment banking activities, could have a major role to play in the future development of the BSE. These banks could offer advisory services to their corporate borrowers, encouraging them to follow a better and healthier financial and operational strategy. Equity financing, particularly as regards to new projects and expansion, forms the basis of corporate creditworthiness for any institution, and the revival of the BSE can only facilitate a move towards better credit quality and more efficient management.

Nicolas Photiades is managing director of Orion Financial Solutions. He is advisor to the Lebanese banking sector on securitization and structured financing.

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Real success story?

by Thomas Schellen April 1, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Gada Sardouk is trotting out the government line. “Beirut’s downtown is the success story of the entire region. People are visiting in huge numbers,” said the director general of the tourism ministry. “Yes, it is sometimes crowded but the area has no problems. If there were anything to harm the tourist, it would be empty.”

Warped logic aside, if the growth of the area’s restaurants and cafés is a measure of its vitality (numbers rose from around 40 in late 2001 to over 70 in the summer 2002, 99 in autumn of 2003, and more than 110 this spring), the same activity offers equally negative indicators, such as the district’s high rate of restaurant closures and re-openings, affecting one in every five establishments over the last two years and with some properties on Maarad street housing more than three outlets during the same period. But the real problem is highlighted by the teams of municipal officers that swarmed through the area in February and March, instructing tenants to remove outdoor plant decorations, abide by sidewalk seating limits and meet hygiene standards. Those, though not all who were in breach were fined. A token gesture, say many; the problem has not gone away.

The two largest stakeholders in the area, the municipality of Beirut and Solidere, the company tasked with its redevelopment, say they are engaged in a major clean-up campaign to improve the area’s image by purging the downtown hospitality sector from various style aberrations and regulatory infractions. Both have been compelled to act. City hall does want to see the downtown become ‘sin city’ and Solidere does not want its shareholders repulsed by a deteriorating ambience. “Merchants and operators approached us to discuss how to organize the management of the area,” explained Georges Nour, property administration division manager at Solidere. “Nobody was respecting the rules.”

“Presently, the Beirut Central District (BCD) works in a very narrow and ill-directed way,” said one of Lebanon’s highest ranking public figures who refused to be identified. “It is an attraction for the bad side of tourism,“ he fumed. “Ours is a country that is 7,000 years old. We should have much more important poles of attraction for tourists. The downtown is over saturated with nightclubs and pubs that are so expensive that only a few rich people can enjoy it. This is not the vision of a downtown where people meet to exchange views on topics of culture, politics, or religion. When you sit in one of these cafes today, you hear anything but.”

Prime hospitality stakeholders in the area also raised grave concerns. “Investments are risky if regulations are not enforced. Can the authorities not see what is going on?” asked an angry Michel Fernein, owner of La Posta.

“For the time being, the situation is not as we expected,” said Dory Daccache, head of the Crepaway restaurant group and who holds stakes in four budget and mid-level eateries in the district. “That the area has been going down is not really a sufficient term to describe it.” According to Ferneine, both the luxury and mid-market restaurant niches have seen revenue shrink in the last year. “The average spend per ticket in 2003 was lower than in 2002, especially in the evenings,” he said. “Patrons who would order an upscale dinner and an important bottle of wine now stay away. They are no doubt put off by the congestion, noise, and harassment.”

The downtown appears to have a problem of clashing restaurant cultures. Restaurateurs are at odds over loud music and ‘un-neighborly’ practices and fight over precious outdoor seating areas. The situation has seen three distinct sub-groups emerge: those that actively disregard rules and live by fly-by-night mentality; those that want to see rules enforced and espouse a long-term strategy of doing business; and a buffer group, probably the largest of the three, comprising entrepreneurs that fundamentally accept the need for regulations and positive conduct, but do not actively seek to improve things and instead go with the flow. Plaintiffs from the second group insist that it is neither a matter of price competition nor a complaint against the riff raff. It is, they claim, all about Lebanon’s image. “Any downturn in revenue is our problem,” said Fernein, “but the reputation of the country is at stake here. The downtown is the most important project in Lebanon. How can something this important have so many things that obviously don’t work?”

Surprisingly, many of these complaints have been echoed by operators whose establishments in the past year have been less than scrupulous in maintaining their own standards in terms of rampant outdoor seating, lack of customer bathrooms and harassment of pedestrians.

“If it is not regulated, the city center is going to be a jungle,” said the owner of an eatery serving what he called “affordable food in big portions,” out of a kitchen installed in what was clearly designated to be a retail store. On condition of anonymity, the entrepreneur admitted that he had hired a hostess for the specific purpose of approaching potential customers. “We are a new place,” he said. “People wouldn’t notice us if we didn’t send the hostesses to explain our menu.” When asked about restroom facilities for the 40 or so seats in front of his establishment, he said a new portable toilet would be installed that night. He had a simple explanation for the area’s hospitality problems. “They didn’t expect the boom,” he said. “More restaurants than they ever expected opened in this area.” There is some truth to this. According to Nour, the success of Maarad began as an “urban management accident.” The Solidere master plan had earmarked the street for vehicular traffic and not as pedestrian zone. The plan had expected retail businesses to populate the street, and most buildings were not equipped for restaurant use, creating challenges in the adaptation of facilities, setting up generators, storing supplies (including cooking gas), and the collection of waste, that only a few investors rose to.

“You cannot believe how dirty it is behind the doors of some kitchens and service areas,” lamented one manager. “Some neighbors here have had an abominable lack of hygiene.” This situation is improving now, he added, since a system for collection of food waste and used cooking oil begun in February, as part of the initiative to better the area.

Many stakeholders agreed that implementation of hygiene standards should be more strongly enforced. “Lebanese regulations on restaurant hygiene are excellent,” said Daccache, “but some restaurants do not apply the regulations, and enforcement is weak.” The inspectors from the health department at the Beirut municipality, the supervisory authority for restaurant cleanliness, are reportedly meticulous in checking that employees working in restaurant kitchens wear hair covers and gloves and have clean fingernails. As a result of the unsanitary practices of some operators prior to the implementation of a new garbage collection scheme earlier this year, pest problems reportedly got so alarming that competitors in the same building had to hermetically seal off doors in order to ward off a despicable daily invasion of cockroaches from the garbage next door. Yet some restaurant owners wonder if all establishments are inspected with equal vigor. “The health inspectors are very tough on me,” said one manager who lambasted his neighbors for having no toilets and dirty kitchens. “If they are also being checked, how come they are still in business?”

Central to the whole issue is the legal status of restaurants, cafes, snack bars and nightclubs. Stakeholders and legal experts estimate that only a minuscule portion of downtown establishments operate with a full license, a legacy of Lebanon’s restaurant law, which was adopted by parliament in 1950 and has remained virtually unchanged since 1970. “In general, obtaining a restaurant permit from the ministry of tourism is extremely difficult,” said Paul Awad, a lawyer specialized in issues relating to the hospitality industry. “Not more than 5% to 7% of restaurants hold a permit.”

Getting a permit is a two-step process. Firstly, operators have to prove their basic compliance with regulations on kitchen facilities, bathrooms and exits, etc. If these are met, the restaurant, cafe or pub can launch its business but it still needs to complete the second step of the licensing in which the applicant must prove the existence of one parking space per 4m2 of restaurant floor space, on the same grounds as the restaurant location itself. Alternatively, the establishment can pay the municipality between $5,000 and $7,000 per non-realized parking space. “Nobody has these spaces, and nobody is willing to pay these amounts,” Awad said. “Therefore nobody gets a permit.”

Realistically, restaurants that have completed the first stage of licensing requirements face little trouble and can be reasonably certain that they will not be shut down. However, the second license is the basis for the classification of restaurants, the lawyer said, and one important consequence of the lack of full licenses is that eateries and pubs are not classified by the ministry, which in turn diminishes the ministry’s ability to monitor their compliance with price levels and service charges. On a day-to-day basis it works. The ministry does what it feels it has to, to maintain standards. “To be realistic, Lebanon is a tourism country. We deal with the private sector in form of a partnership,” said Sardouk. “We are very strict in responding to complaints but very flexible in communicating with the private sector. We are not a police state.” Sardouk added that in the whole of 2003, the ministry of tourism had received 10 serious complaints from tourists and acted upon them, only one of which involved a downtown restaurant. Hospitality establishments in the area display stickers with tourist police telephone numbers, should they have a complaint. When Executive tried to contact the tourist police, it was connected to an Ogero recording that said the number was “not yet in service.”

However, weaknesses in the legal framework clearly contribute to the current malaise. Operators who disregard rules tend to use what they see as absence of a clear legal environment as an all-purpose excuse for ignoring standards and regulations, but for those who wish to instigate improvements or challenge infringements, the legal ambiguity can be a major impediment because an “unlicensed” restaurateur with a complaint does not enjoy full legal status and is immediately at risk of becoming a target. In their plan for improving downtown, the municipality intends to enforce compliance with all standards before this summer. This will involve making operators abide by the areas of public space they rent from the municipality for outdoor seating and respect those regulations that insist that emergency pathways be kept clear and enforce all other municipal codes. For its part, Solidere has retained a consultant to style the area with a range of official materials, colors and designs for awnings, tables and chairs. “We are proposing to the municipality all ideas that we want to implement,” said Nour. “The organization of the public open space is the mandate of the public sector administration. We are offering only value-added. Urban management needs dialogue between the city and the people.” Reassuringly, in this context at least, both the municipality and Solidere claim that relations between them have never been better.

Restaurant owners who want to see standards improve say they are prepared to contribute to enticing back a better class of customer. In the long run, they also expect that the overall growth of the city center towards the seafront and the hotel district will alleviate some of the problems the area has experienced in the last two years. Finally, on the legal front, a revised restaurant licensing law with more practical regulations is under review in parliamentary committees, with hopes that it will be pushed through soon. But in a country where the law is frequently overlooked when it becomes a hindrance, it remains to be seen whether this will be enough.

Overcrowded mess

With seating boundaries constantly in violation, Maarad is becoming an accident waiting to happen

The restaurants and cafés on Maarad and Al Omari Streets are demarcated by round, metal studs embedded into the pavement, which represent the limit that a restaurant can place an umbrella, awning or gas heater. If they exceed the boundary, restaurant owners are, in theory, in violation of municipal seating regulations, designed to ensure there is enough space for pedestrians and emergency vehicles to pass. Most of the restaurants regularly violate these laws and Maarad Street, with its gas heaters and plastic awnings, is an accident waiting to happen.

An example of this blatant violation could be found at Al Sa’a, located across from the clock tower. On the last Sunday of March, the café increased its sales area from its usual 100 to some 168 chairs. The restaurant not only set up extra rows of tables in front of an empty storefront adjacent to their location, it also added two tables per row to an area that passersby should freely walk through according to the law.

The manager of Petit Café, one of the places on Maarad with the highest number of outdoor seats, admitted to Executive that in the high season (when the lion’s share comes from outdoor guests), he makes an average of “including cover charge, $25 per customer.” This is too much to resist for landlords who say they are struggling with the BCD’s exorbitant rents. For Layali al Balad, for instance, the owners pay a reported $260,000 a year to sublet the tiny premises. By bending the rules during one day in the busy summer season, 24 “extra” outdoor chairs can add another $1,440 to the day’s takings; that’s in excess of $44,000 each month. When some landlords are paying up to four times the market rate, this extra revenue can make all the difference.

On March 30, Executive, posing as a potential customer, spoke to restaurant owners and managers in the area to see how many outdoor diners they could accommodate at full capacity. Al Sa’a said it could accommodate a staggering 500 diners. La Cita offered to seat 120 diners, Kiub’z 150, while Petit Café and Layali Al Balad said they could seat 450 between them. Even with the most generous calculations these seating arrangements would easily put them in violation of municipal laws. Only Hani Osman, manager of TGI Friday’s, said that if he wished to exceed his legal quota, he would have to check with the municipality.

That the rules are being broken at will is obvious, but what is inexplicable is that the municipality is unable to exert its influence. In the property management offices of Solidere, a large map, dated December 2002, is pinned on the wall. It delineates in perfect detail areas where hospitality enterprises are allowed to set up tables and where they are not. The map is equally well known in the halls of the Beirut municipality, where officials admit that the regulations are not enforceable and that patience is required in the almost daily fights with some BCD tenants. According to the municipality, rent per square meter of its territory is 3% of the annual rent per square meter of a restaurant’s indoor area. The municipality would like to increase this to 15% or 20%, but for the time being income from the downtown business, either in rent (of public space) or fines is not a money-spinner. (Some outlets have been “fined” – in some cases as much as $30,000. This constituted rental dues and fines for operating outdoor seating for two years without a license.) It may simply be that many of the owners are politically backed and, therefore, immune to the rules and regulations that mere mortals have to abide by. The Bendakji brothers –who own Kiub’z, Petit Café and Layali al Balad as well as Al Sa’a, Grand Café, and VIP (the latter two are in the area of Abdel Malak Street) – are allegedly stoutly backed by top political individuals and appear to flout regulations with impunity. In the short term, a new walkway over the downtown ruins could offer visitors and restaurateurs on that side of Maarad a solution. The walkway will be inaugurated in the summer, but the municipal board has not yet reached a decision on allowing outdoor tables. Permanent barriers are also planned but fears remain that there will always be those whose connections will encourage them to ignore the law.

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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