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Brand VoiceBusiness

Ankr Development Partners with Chaddad Group and RACE Sarl to Realize MONOT 95

by Executive Editors September 2, 2025
written by Executive Editors

Ankr Development is pleased to announce the appointment of Chaddad Group and RACE Sarl on MONOT 95, a landmark residential tower in Achrafieh brought to life by Bejjani Engineering & Contracting (BEC).

Located in the heart of Achrafieh, MONOT 95 represents a bold step forward in redefining urban living in Beirut. Developed by BEC (Bejjani Engineering & Contracting) , in partnership with the MONOT 95 SAL and designed by acclaimed architect Charles Hadife, the tower fuses contemporary design with the soulful elegance of Beirut’s heritage.

MONOT 95 is one of six ongoing residential and commercial projects exclusively managed, marketed, and sold by Ankr Development in Lebanon. It marks the company’s first development of its kind in the area, reflecting a growing commitment to investing in Beirut’s urban renewal through thoughtfully designed, high‑impact spaces.

At the core of this project are trusted partners:

● Chaddad Group, led by Managing Partner Patrick Chaddad, serves as the main contractor, drawing on its record of major developments across Lebanon and Egypt.

● RACE Sarl, led by Founder and Managing Director Roy Akl, brings regional leadership in MEP contracting, ensuring every system, from mechanical to electrical, meets the highest standards of performance and durability.

“MONOT 95 is more than a building, it’s a symbol of resilience, recovery, and the enduring spirit of Beirut,” says Patrick Chaddad.

“We’re proud to support a project that embodies Beirut’s future. Being entrusted with the MEP works for MONOT reflects our team’s commitment, expertise, and the strong partnerships we’ve built,” says Roy Akl.

“MONOT 95 speaks to a new generation. Through design, I want to nurture a deeper sense of community and inspire people to stay because Lebanon is a beautiful place to call home,” adds Charles Hadife.

Founders Kamal Bejjani and Jean Ramia of Ankr Development emphasize the project’s broader impact on job creation, sustainability, and driving forward economic momentum for Lebanon’s ongoing real estate recovery, expressing their enthusiasm for what this partnership means for the future of Beirut and its people.

“We consider this a prime location and are eager to collaborate with Charles on this project and future developments. We have great confidence in Lebanon’s real estate potential as well as its people, and we remain committed to contributing meaningfully to the country’s continued recovery and growth,” said Jean Ramia, co-founder of Ankr Development.

Construction is now underway, and MONOT stands as a testament to “home, heritage, and hope”, an invitation to experience the future of Beirut, rooted in its past and built for tomorrow.

Media Contact:

Ankr Development

📧 [email protected]

📱 +961 71 09 88 88

🌐 www.ankrdevelopment.com

September 2, 2025 0 comments
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Job posting

Job Posting: Assistant Editor for Arabic and French content

by Executive Editors August 21, 2025
written by Executive Editors

Executive Magazine is seeking a full-time Assistant Editor with strong editorial and translation skills to join our team. The ideal candidate will be fluent in English, French, and Arabic, with a demonstrated ability to edit texts that have been translated from English into French, ensuring accuracy, clarity, and style. They will work closely with the editor-in-chief and senior staff while reporting to the managing editor in day-to-day.

Responsibilities:

· Prepare both upcoming and archived English content for publication in Arabic and French

· Edit and refine French and Arabic-language texts translated from English to ensure linguistic accuracy and journalistic quality.

· Support translation processes across English, French, and Arabic where needed.

· Collaborate with the editorial team to ensure consistency across multilingual content.

· Utilize AI-assisted translation tools effectively while maintaining a critical editorial eye.

· Contribute to Executive’s mission of delivering sharp, credible, and analytical journalism on business and economics.

Qualifications:

· Native or near-native fluency in English, French, and Arabic

· 2-3 years of experience in translation and/or business journalism

· Proven editorial experience with multilingual publications, especially in business and economic reporting.

· Strong knowledge of and personal interest in economics and business.

· Familiarity with AI translation programs and ability to adapt outputs to professional editorial standards.

· Exceptional attention to detail and ability to meet deadlines.

About Executive Magazine Executive is Lebanon’s premier business magazine, providing in-depth analysis, investigative reporting, and forward-looking perspectives on economic, social, and political developments.

If you are a sharp, detail-oriented editor with a passion for language, translation, and economic journalism, we’d love to hear from you.

To apply: Please send your CV, a brief cover letter, and two samples of relevant work to [email protected] with the job title in the subject line of the email.

August 21, 2025 0 comments
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Analysis

Rebuilding Beirut:

by Jamile youssef August 14, 2025
written by Jamile youssef

Five years have passed since the devastating blast at the Beirut Port and many of the areas of Mar Mikhael and Gemmayze appear to have been restored, as evidenced by summer scenes of residents, expats and tourists exploring and sipping cocktails in new cafes, pubs and restaurants. Yet a walk through these same streets confirms the blast’s lasting impact. Some heritage buildings are still under construction, with scaffolding in front of them, while others are empty, quiet, and untouched.

Beyond the physical repairs and the reopened businesses, there are other questions about what was lost, what was saved, and what has changed. Over the past five years, the neighborhoods hit hardest by the blast have undergone much of the same frenetic transformations that mark the rest of a city undergoing economic crisis and experiencing both periods of growth and periods of turmoil in fits and starts. Today, those working to restore and preserve heritage sites face challenges of waning economic commitments and shifts in both governance and demographic gentrification.

When the blast hit

At 6:07 PM on August 4, 2020, a massive explosion, now considered one of the largest and most devastating in modern history—rocked the city of Beirut triggered by tons of unsafely stored ammonium nitrate in Beirut port. The pressure and heat wave from the blast killed 218 people, injured more than 6,500, and left over 300,000 without homes. Nearby residential and commercial areas witnessed severe damage.

Physical destruction spread in areas near and far beyond the port. According to a September 2020 Beirut Explosion Impact Assessment by Strategy&, the explosion caused approximately 3.12 billion U.S. dollars of damage in housing, healthcare, education, businesses, and culture. The cultural and historic sector alone accounted for 286 million U.S. dollars, across 60 city districts, representing how much of Beirut’s identity was lost.

Photo credit: Beirut Built Heritage Rescue

In neighborhoods like Gemmayze, Mar Mikhael, Achrafieh, and Karantina, modern-heritage homes from the period between 1920s to 1970s, suffered from shattered windows and door damage. Older traditional architecture buildings, from Ottoman-era to French mandate (1860s-1920s), were more severely damaged. Many of these buildings lost their signature Pirani wood roofs, signature stairs, and stained glass, elements which make these buildings irreplaceable to the city’s heritage and architectural identity. “The most painful part of the damage was to our traditional homes; we lost rare materials that we only find in older homes. This kind of detailed craftsmanship is difficult to recapture,” says architect and co-founder of Beirut Heritage Initiative, Joy Kanaan. The Beirut Heritage Initiative is an independent collective dedicated to restoring Beirut’s built and cultural heritage damaged by the blast.

Photo credit: Beirut Built Heritage Rescue

A rush of rescuers

Within 48 hours after the blast, 40 restorers and engineers-initiated Beirut Built Heritage Rescue to support the Lebanon Directorate of Antiquities to assess the damage. Soon afterwards, 200 architectural students, graduates and teachers joined the initiative as volunteers. Together, 1,600 heritage buildings were assessed and categorized based on risk: those at high risk of collapse requiring urgent and early intervention, those with significant damage but no immediate danger of collapsing, and buildings listed in ‘green’ or ‘blue’ zones with only minor damage. “One hundred heritage buildings were in a state of extreme danger; at high risk of collapsing entirely, these buildings were very close to the port… We acted and consolidated these most vulnerable buildings before the winter,” explains Nathalie Al Chabab, an architect and cultural heritage expert.

Since day one, countless volunteers and civil society groups stepped in and supported the affected areas by clearing streets and removing rubble, helping with shattered glass, distributing food and water, offering shelter, and helping to repair damaged homes and businesses. This was believed to have drawn international and donor attention. “Once they saw us working … funds came,” Al Chabab recalls, referring to support from donors including the European Union, Canada, Qatar, World Bank, UN agencies, UNESCO, ALIPH foundation, the German Archaeological Institute, and various NGOs. Kanaan praises the effort of the extraordinary people that worked together to rebuild the neighborhoods “by the people and for the people.”

Thanks to this mass collective effort, none of the 100 buildings categorized as high risk collapsed. “What happened was a miracle” Al Chabab says. “All countries and construction companies now take the Beirut blast as a case study in heritage reconstruction, as nothing similar had ever happened.” Nevertheless, damage is still visible in the nearby neighborhoods. Rehabilitation efforts are still ongoing by UN-Habitat and the World Bank and are expected to soon be completed.

In other cases, some of these buildings have been abandoned for years or even decades, with multiple inheritors unable to agree on what to do with the property. These houses are only structurally consolidated; temporarily supported to avoid collapse but not rehabilitated. Al Chabab warns that such support can last for two to five years, but after that, intervention is critical. Kanaan says that some of these buildings still are in need of repair and others are on the market to be sold. She adds that right now, the biggest threat to modern and traditional heritage is that many of these buildings sit on large blocks and have gardens around them, which raise their real estate market value. On the other hand, she notes that some of the rehabilitated buildings have benefited from the post-blast restoration efforts. Before the explosion, many of these heritage homes had been neglected in cases where owners could not afford maintenance amid Lebanon’s economic crisis and the fluctuation of the Lebanese lira. Although the blast was devastating, it brought attention and funding that allowed some neglected buildings to receive needed repairs, and regain civic, state, and international attention.

Photo credit: Beirut Built Heritage Rescue

The Airbnb effect

As buildings were enhanced and brought back to life, short-term rental markets such as Airbnb accelerated. Restored homes and buildings become prime assets and attractive not only for their architectural charm but also for their profitability. Airbnb listings began replacing long-term residential rentals at higher rates. “We know houses that were restored and had tenants but are now listed on Airbnb,” says Al Chabab, citing cases of landlords who took advantage of the new opportunity provided post-rehabilitation. In this climate of increased gentrification brought on by the short-term rental market, families, many of whom had lived in these heritage homes for years, found themselves unable to afford to live in their own neighborhoods.

Georges Shaaer, a shop manager who has worked in the same Mar Mikhael store since 1987, reflects on the area’s transformation. “Before 2020, this was a commercial and residential area; there were shops like mine, AC repair, auto parts. For three to four years after the blast, the area was dead. Now it’s all pubs. Maybe just me and two other shops remained in this street after the blast.” He adds: “Many didn’t come back. Renters left. These houses were turned into Airbnb; there are a lot of them in this area today.” As of mid‑2024, data from AirDNA, a platform that tracks global Airbnb performance, shows more than 2,200 listings in Beirut, many in traditional residential areas like Mar Mikhael. Following the blast and the economic collapse, more landlords saw Airbnb as an opportunity to earn income in U.S. dollar during the currency devaluation.

This trend, which did not begin in the aftermath of the blast but was arguably accelerated by the explosion—reflects more than just a shift in residents; it changed how the neighborhood feels and works. Gemmayze and Mar Mikhael were once known for having close communities, where neighbors knew each other, and local craftspeople ran small family businesses. Today, many of those families and small businesses are gone. In their place there are vacation renters and tourists, giving the area a more transient and less rooted feeling. Even so, some argue that Airbnb and similar models injected much-needed life and revenue into a paralyzed economy, especially during Lebanon’s economic, financial, and social collapse. But the lack of rental regulation, coupled with limited affordable housing alternatives, has made the situation hard for many.

How much recovery is real?

Internationally, recovery is often measured in terms of aid delivered and physical reconstruction projects. But real recovery must go beyond infrastructure and include restoration of homes, streets, and cultural landmarks that carry identity, collective memory, and meaning. Lebanon’s heritage architecture is a nation identity; its loss could deepen the national crisis.

After the blast, Law 194 was enacted in October 2020, which ceased the sale or modification of heritage buildings in blast-affected areas without approval from the Ministry of Culture. This measure aimed to prevent sales and protect Beirut’s architectural identity from uncertain real estate transactions and market-driven redevelopment. But unfortunately, the law expired in October 2022, and no similar law nor protections have been enforced since.

Kanaan warns that without clear laws or financial compensation and help; many owners are left with impossible choices. Maintaining a heritage structure is expensive, especially in a country

facing high inflation and ongoing multi-sectoral crises. “Many would rather sell or build high-rises to earn better income than leave an old house on a valuable plot” she says. The reason behind such decisions is often driven more by survival than greed in an environment where maintaining these buildings has become nearly impossible without support.

Even buildings officially classified as heritage by the Directorate General of Antiquities are at risk and often a burden for their owners. These owners can’t demolish or renovate them freely, yet they receive no technical or financial help to restore them. “They’re stuck,” Kanaan adds. “They can’t fix them, they can’t sell them, and they’re not supported by any governmental program.” She stresses the need for creative solutions. Cultural centers, museums, or NGOs could adopt these homes, use them, maintain them, and compensate the owners. Otherwise, the city risks losing more than just buildings, it risks losing pieces of its identity and soul.

Photo credit: Beirut Built Heritage Rescue

But the challenges run deeper than just laws or funding gaps. Lebanon’s political and economic instability make it hard for anyone, either local or international, to invest and commit to long-term cultural projects. “We understand the situation is difficult,” Kanaan says, “but unless institutions like the Honor Frost Foundation [a nonprofit organization that promotes the research and preservation of maritime archaeology, with a focus on the Eastern Mediterranean] or others adopt these buildings as offices, galleries, or cultural spaces, we will keep losing them.”

Trauma beyond the rubble

For many, the emotional scars of the blast remain open. “Psychologically? Of course we did not recover,” Al Chabab says; “the trauma is not over.” Mar Mikhael shop owner Shaaer agrees. “The country stands on a thin line. Another explosion, another wave of war, we just keep going and working.”

“The damage is not just physical; it is emotional and psychological. It was an absolutely devastating explosion,” says Kanaan. She emphasizes that true recovery requires more than fixing and repairing buildings, arguing that the area will recover completely when there is security, economic stability, and when heritage buildings are not only protected, but alive and part of the urban environment.

August 14, 2025 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyEntrepreneurship

Institutional heft in tumultuous times:

by Thomas Schellen July 30, 2025
written by Thomas Schellen

Just having celebrated its centennial, the Lebanese American University is starting its second century as an institution that is deeply invested in Lebanon’s socioeconomic transformation. A glancing view at the past and ongoing pivots of the institution – from “girls’ school” to women’s college to liberal arts college and internationally active university – and the various external shocks that LAU had to overcome in the past 60 years and up to the latest war on Lebanon, gives the impression that the institution itself is a somewhat under researched case study in social and academic transformations. It is also a case study for organizational leadership that is inseparable from the American and the Lebanese heritages in both scholarly and personality profiles. Executive discussed the institution’s constructive but meandering path with Chaouki Abdallah, the university’s 10th president.  

It has been one year at the end of June since the news of your appointment. You have assumed your position officially in October of 2024, a very conflicted moment in Lebanon. But before you agreed to leave your position at a large US university, how long did it take for LAU to find you and convince you to assume the role of the president at the Lebanese American University?

I have no idea how long the whole process took them. They started talking to me two or three months before we reached the agreement for me to come. I was at Georgia Tech as head of research when I got an email from the search firm, asking if I am interested [in the position at LAU]. I had a standard answer of saying ‘thank you so much but I am happy where I am’. They responded by calling me and suggesting that I might want to speak to the chair of the board [of LAU]. Given that it was a Lebanese university, I accepted a call from the chair of the board and we talked for a long time, like 30 minutes. He told me some things that intrigued me. They made me say ‘ha, I am interested’.

One thing that he said was that universities in Lebanon are consequential, almost the last line of defense, or the last institutions that are still delivering all their missions, so that people who graduate go on to do great things. He talked about LAU but also all other universities. And then he told me that during the economic collapse LAU took money out of their endowment in order to make sure that students were able to pay and attend classes. This led me to coming to see the board of LAU in NYC. My wife, who is American, is from Atlanta, and we always thought it would be my last post [to be at Georgia Tech] but she said, “why don’t you go and talk to them. You thought about what you can give back to the country at one point, so let us.”

On the macro scale of things, your arrival at LAU coincided with the university’s centennial, the hundredth anniversary year. Entering the second century is a hard inflection point or an incremental transition for LAU, as well as a psychological marker of importance indicating that you have something else to do now. What is this “something else” that you see as important for LAU’s second century?

To me, universities, and especially universities that are not for profit, are anchor institutions. They are not a business or bank. They are institutions that anchor society. The mission of the university on the highest level is to generate and propagate knowledge, and then become more than that. It becomes a mission to create the environment. It used to be that a university was only concerned about the student when they came to us and would then forget about them after they leave us [as graduates]. That is no longer the case. Before they come to us, we work with schools and we work with alumni. In addition to that, we now are a healthcare system provider.

After the first hundred years, LAU is part of the fabric of society, especially in higher education. The next hundred years, or the next chapter of the story entails the mission that we do a lot more to keep some of the talent that we produce, in the country. Lebanon is a brain factory. We export talents. We import everything else, but we export people who want to do great things for other places. It is not a question of wanting to keep everybody in here because the market and the society cannot absorb all the talent. However, I saw a recent study saying that 65 percent of college graduates aim to leave the country but only 16 percent actually want to leave. The others see no other choice but leaving.

Most people would like to stay if they have the opportunity. The role of the universities now is to create that [environment allowing people to stay and find careers] above and beyond what they already do, which is provide education. How will we do that? One of the areas that I worked with when I was with Georgia Tech, an area that really mashes with the Lebanese spirit, is entrepreneurship. How do you got people to start their own companies instead of just waiting to get hired by a bank or a company? Well, there is an art to that and we have a lot of entrepreneurship. The other area that is extremely important is for universities to be connected to their society, specifically in the research of solving problems.

There is a role for longer-term research and a role for research in basic sciences but there is an increasing need, and especially in a place like Lebanon, to solve problems, such as the problems that EDL has or that municipalities have in treating water, or that the government has in other areas. So I am promoting applied research. Academia has to be a part of society; it cannot be an ivory tower.

LAU in the last century was perceived for a while as “that girls’ school” or a second rate institution for those who could not get to the top university in Lebanon. That was something that people mentioned when discussing LAU even in the early 2000s. But at the current juncture, when Lebanon is still in a societal state of fragmentation, how do you see the role of LAU? Are you a potential unifier of society? Are you still strictly associated with the liberal American Arts tradition in education, or even the earlier missionary tradition that LAU was once founded under?

Let me start with the premise of the question. At one time, there were no universities, or places that educated women. LAU filled that very important role. It was [Beirut College for Women] and before that, since 1835, the American School for Girls. Many people I meet today from the Gulf, or from Lebanon, often their mothers went to LAU, because there were at the time no universities educating women. We had a super-critical role and we are proud of that heritage and our origin. Having said that, how do we see ourselves today? We are a global university. We do believe in the American liberal arts education and its ideals because, if you do it right, it is the best model anywhere. In the US they have applied it rightfully for a long time. Now, there is a lot of pressure on this modal, for one reason or another, but it is very important to have the general education. It is important to have taken history and philosophy before you become a physician or an engineer.

Are we a unifier? I think the role of universities by definition is to make students safe to have ideas, not to make ideas safe for the students. We are not here to tell people what they like to hear. We are a unifier in the sense that we people get educated, and if you do it right, they learn how to question and to ask why. The important part of college education is not the material that you take a course on or the skills that you learn. You can do that by taking a short course. The important part is learning that you don’t know everything.

You mentioned that you see education as something that best is not done with a strong profit motive or focus on making money. On the other hand, the economic impact of a university on society is a measurable quantity and important in assessing the value of a provider. In 2016, the office of institutional research at LAU endeavored to gauge the economic impact of LAU on Lebanon and put the number at around $900 million, or 1.4 trillion LBP at the time, which was relative to a GDP of around 40 or 45 billion dollars. How do you assess the economic impact of LAU at this point in time, as the economy is emerging from the crisis years and still has a long climb ahead in order to climb back?

When I mentioned that the university should not aim for profit I meant it should make enough money to break even and fulfill the mission. But the impact of universities is huge, economically. Just by the fact that we exist here, we buy [many things]. We have an impact, and our graduates have an impact. The ones who stay here will hopefully not only make good money but also pay taxes. According to studies, college educated persons stay married longer, are healthier, live longer, and contribute more to society. The benefits of education transcend the immediate benefits to the person who gets the education and extend to everybody else. I am aware of that study [on the economic impact of LAU], and I think we need to do this on a yearly basis. I think we should do it for all the universities. In fact, one of the things that I see right now as lacking severely, is a center or place where studies on the impact of X on everything – X in this case being higher education – are being done. We are thinking about how to do that. If you ask me how I would assess the total economic impact [of LAU] at this point, I couldn’t even guess. Our budget today is in the neighborhood of $300 million including the hospital. That is the immediate economic impact.

So is the indirect impact impossible to measure at the moment?

Studies I have seen speak of three to almost four dollars in indirect economic impact for each dollar in direct impact.

And with the benefits to every soft drink vendor, brewer, pizza baker and taxi driver, there will be another multiplier for calculating the induced impact and ancillary economic activity around a university.

That is the type of things that needs to be researched, vetted, and eventually communicated. The way I would frame it is to ask: if you do not have this university or this campus, what would be the loss? You would not have the $300 million [of our budget]. Above and beyond that, it is about formulas and studies by economists. I think it should be done throughout [the country] and under normal circumstances, all the universities would submit data to an entity that is under the state, and the state will collate all information and have economists do the calculations and publish them. I am familiar with people who do this in every state in the US. I did it when I was in New Mexico, and we had people doing it in Georgia, and so on. To put it in perspective, at the last university that I was at, the budget was $2.5 billion and the impact to the state was $10 billion. I also saw a study on another state where they did a deep analysis and estimated that the impact is 3-4 dollars to the state for every dollar that is spent on higher education. This does not yet consider the long-time value creation. It is on a yearly basis where the impact for every dollar spent, is for three to four dollars. I myself do not calculate the economic impact of educated people in this way. As I mentioned, educated people will be much more involved and the impact of the university is not just economic. But today’s economic reality [in Lebanon] is such that, if I don’t have the [LAU] university and assume a four to one economic multiplier, I will immediately lose $1.2 billion in the economic activity of the country.

Continuing the discussion on value creation by the university in terms of entrepreneurial and industrial activity, I want to inquire about the situation of your affiliated hubs. Is there an operating entrepreneurship hub and an industry hub? How much value do these create?

 We have an entity that focuses on the interaction with the business world, with companies. We also have the Makhzoumi entrepreneurial innovation center. Our assets by numbers at the university are the students, not the president and faculty. There is one president and 300 faculty, and there are 9,000 students. That is what we build on and that is what the innovation hub does. Our hub at LAU is hosting 15 companies per year and we need to reach an output that is much bigger. By the way, AUB and USJ have something similar. Everybody has something of this type but it really needs to be scaled up to the size of Lebanon. I do not have the latest numbers, but Lebanon has about 200,000 college students. 80,000 of them are at the Lebanese University. I think USJ is 12,000, I am 9,000 and AUB is 8,000. Then there are for-profit universities, the largest is LIU but I don’t know what they do. But the bottom line is that we need to get to [national] scale. We need to really connect these hubs and innovation centers together.

Turning to another topic of the time, in several recent speeches, such as a presentation at a conference at Phoenicia Hotel, you have talked about Artificial Intelligence, AI, and have a tech background. Are you planning a center for AI at LAU?

I think AI is something that is not to be isolated at one place. I know that my colleagues at AUB are creating a college focused on computing and so forth. My belief is that AI belongs everywhere. However, since everyone is [moving into AI], you cannot have everyone doing their own thing. You need to create an AI hub, which was the model I used at Georgia Tech. We are using AI in our operations, we are using AI in medicine, we are using AI in teaching when we are creating courses for every student but also we are creating and delivering courses for executives outside. My point is that there will not be a college [for AI] or something separated. There will be an AI hub to coordinate all of these activities and we are probably launching this in the fall. What I am right now trying to figure out is ‘what does LAU do in AI?’ and I am discovering every day people either working in AI, wanting to work in AI, or doing research on AI. AI is going to be the substrate on which a lot of the business is going to be done, internally and externally. We are delivering courses, doing designs based on this, operationally we are [using it], we are evaluating people based on some AI tools, and so on. I probably spend 30 percent of my time interacting with an AI agent.

I will not have anything to complain about this, as long as you are still occasionally interacting with a real life journalist…

I think you are safe for several reasons. Number one, you are asking questions that no AI agent would come up with. Your questions take our conversation into new directions. Number two, even under the most optimistic scenarios, creativity will always come from humans, not from a machine. The one test for me is humor. AI agents can now pass the Turing test but ask AI to tell you a joke and see if it is funny.

In a final non-AI induced shift of my questioning, I want to ask you about the social angle of LAU activities. This is specifically about the fact that you had very important, and well publicized programs funded by the United States Agency for International Development, which up until this year has been funding activities around the world, including education. How did you experience this cessation of USAID funding as institution, and how did you cope?

We had about 20 million dollars impact on our budget. It was the second largest source of funding for us, and the impact was huge. We are still dealing with it. We said we are going to finish the students that we have and took this upon ourselves to take care of the students we have. We are not going to be able to do the same thing that we used to do, or as much as we used to do. We had a couple of programs [with US public funding], one was the USAID and another one was with MEPI, the Middle East Peace Initiative. That one is still ongoing. It is smaller but it has funding for the students.

In dealing with this issue, we are looking at the whole revenue mix of the university. We are a private university and after USAID going away, we get 90-some percent of our revenue from tuition. This is not sustainable, because we in turn give more than 50 percent in financial aid. We cannot [keep raising tuition payments] and maintain the quality as well as the financial support and so on. We are looking at other ways of doing things, such as diversifying our tuition base. We have a campus in New York now where we hopefully will generate some revenues. We have a successful online program which needs to be scaled. But we also are looking at areas beyond tuition. One thing [in revenue diversification] that I am focusing a lot on, is fundraising and philanthropy. We are trying to raise more funds for our endowment. Our endowment has been okay over the years, but we had to dip into it, as I mentioned, during the economic crisis and had to do the same thing during the summer war [of 2024]. The plan is now to raise some funds, leverage our international connections, our alumni, and others, and frankly try to take advantage of opportunities that we perhaps did not have before, namely the opportunity that Lebanon hopefully stays on this path and reaches a state where it becomes again an attractive place for international students.

Would you like to have a campus in Aleppo, Homs, or Hama?

Syria is an interesting place, for a lot of reasons. We are ultimately looking at a global LAU strategy. There are many places in the world where there is potential, including places where there is a lot of Lebanese diaspora who want an American education. It could be in Africa, in Latin America, and many places but [the strategy] has to fit together. My criteria are twofold: one is if it is part of our mission and we therefore have to do it and figure out how to pay for it. The other criterion is if something is not part of our mission but will generate money and resources that feed into the mission. Syria, under these criteria, is not immediate but it certainly is on the horizon.

Do you have a fundraising target for filling up your endowment?

Yes we do. We are now at 650 [million USD] and have a campaign to go up by about 200 to 250 million. But at four percent [interest returns] per year, we need to get to about a billion [dollars in the endowment] in order to have $40 million per year in interest. If we can get there, I can operate the financial aid more comfortably, and so on. Ultimately, by my back of the envelope calculation, we need about $1 billion and will probably get to $850 or 900 [million].

Is the current scholarship and financial support model still viable or will it have to change over the long term?

No university can do [without this model]. Otherwise we can only admit people who can afford to pay. You will always have to have financial aid based on need and on academic [merit]. You need to provide that to be a university in the full sense of the word. Otherwise you are either depending on one source of funding where that source can dictate your decisions, or you only accept only people who can pay, regardless of their ability. This is a model that for profit universities apply: you pay, you get in. That is not something that I think is the mission of a true university. But financial aid cannot be 50 percent, that is too much. My goal would be to reach 30 to 40 percent.

To return to the beginning of this conversation, you followed the call to LAU one year ago and came here during a very conflicted time. The past academic year was a period of several shocks, not only in the region and aggression on Lebanon, but also of shocks in the realm of academia that forced out people such as the president of Columbia University or confronted Harvard University with radical cuts in their funding by the federal government in the US. You also said in this interview that you do not see the ivory tower model as the future of education. So after this one year with commitment to LAU, would you say that you escaped the American academic ghetto to the freedom of the academic province of Lebanon or would you rather still be in Atlanta in sunny Georgia?

I want to answer this from a few angles. First of all, my friends in the US thought that I knew something at the time. Of course, I did not. But it is a very challenging time for higher education everywhere. The many reasons for this have to do with culture, with politics, and with finance. In Lebanon, higher education has always been the road to the next level. My family is a great example. My father is a stone mason, with eight children, had them college educated, and today every single one of us is three levels higher in the socioeconomic or the financial order than my father was. It is very important to keep that in mind that one role or aspect of higher education is to continue to help individuals to have a good career and good income.

At the same time, there is an opportunity for us in Lebanon right now, because there are a lot of people, young professors or young graduates, who perhaps did not consider coming back last year and were planning to stay not only in the US but other places. But either because of the positive trajectory that Lebanon is on, or because of restrictions on immigration in other places, people could be attracted back to Lebanon and one of the things we need to ask is how can we attract those people? How to make joining this [country] enough of an enticing opportunity that is not having people say we can come and visit for a while but will leave as soon as possible.

Is your identity then split between being a permanent contingency planner and a strategist for permanent development?

Yeah, but a I think a good strategist is someone who thinks in terms of scenarios. The plan will always change. As the saying goes, a plan does not survive its first encounter with reality. But if you do not have a plan, you are always reacting and switching. We have a lot of this in the country and at LAU. We have always been reacting and existing in this constant crisis mode. When you put a plan together, you adapt. You may have to switch but you stick with the plan. My plan is to make LAU sustainable not just financially but also produce the economic impact, do the research on the economic impact, and the entrepreneurship aspect, and so on. I may not be able to do something when people, for example, say they will not support the entrepreneurship event. But that does not mean that I do not stay focused—and I think that people have to work towards this mind shift. And all of that relies on information, on data that you can extract and draw real insight from, versus saying ‘so and so said this’ or ‘this is how we did it before’. That is the other cultural shift: to try to be data informed in our decision making.

How many years do you give yourself to work toward this goal or achieve this goal?

My term is four years and so it is three more years. It is a work in progress and I am currently assembling a team and we are getting some things done. By the time I finish my term, we will see. Either my wife will tell me ‘you come back’ or she will say “I” ’ll come and join you’.   

July 30, 2025 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyQ&A

Talk about smart buying

by Thomas Schellen July 23, 2025
written by Thomas Schellen

For conscientious merchants, panic buying is a menace. Generally, there are few things that individual merchants can do to discourage people from hoarding of essential goods. But when fears over the danger of yet another vile regional Middle Eastern war started to run hot in June of 2025, one fairly young and very ambitious Lebanese retail chain decided that it was the right moment to try some anticyclical action.

“After the recent escalations, having seen that people are in a state of fear and might go into panic buying, we decided to send a clear message to all our customers and the retail industry that Tawfeer is here and that we will invest in decreasing prices”, says Rami Bitar, the CEO of both Capital Partners, an internationally active trade group, and supermarket chain Tawfeer. In what according to Bitar was “the complete opposite” of fearful customer expectations, the Lebanese supermarket chain lowered the prices for more than 1,000 items on its shelves as of June 18, while Lebanon’s fears of a new level of armed conflict between Israel and Iran were running very high. Lowering prices and proactively communicating them to consumers would send a strong signal to alter the people’s perceptions of impending political and macroeconomic instability and inflation, hoped Bitar.

As things unfolded over the twelve days of armed exchanges between Israel and Iran, the retail sector problem of over-purchasing was averted later in June, along with many much greater dangers. However, discussing the counterintuitive June 18 pricing measure in context of Tawfeer’s business model and wider expansion strategy suggests that theirs is much more than a one-time tactic of mobilizing customer attention.

Challenging assumptions of what is possible, profitable, and prudent in local retail appears to be the core strategy of the supermarket chain, which, after having opened a 1,000 square meter market as its third store in Saida as of July 10, says that it operates 36 stores across Lebanon under a soft discounter model. This platform, which has in recent years expanded at a faster pace than a few local retail directories have kept up with, ties in with a new central logistics center, a solar power equipped warehouse that can accommodate up to 50,000 pallets of goods.

The warehouse, the construction of which was finalized earlier this year, according to Bitar represents an investment of $23 million. With its storage and distribution capacity that allows for optimization of human resources and streamlining of financials, accounting, and product distribution, is a cornerstone of Tawfeer’s current, and recently upscaled, expansion plan of targeting about 500 outlets – in two categories of discount supermarket and discount neighborhood store – by 2030 and moving from just under 1,000 staff members today to a retail headcount of 3,500.

“We are not comparing ourselves to [high-price supermarkets present in Lebanon] which are catering to A- and B-type consumer categories, nor are we comparing ourselves to [existing] chains that cater to B- and C-type consumers. We provide ourselves as solution for inflation, a solution of smart buying,” Bitar tells Executive. According to him, the discounter concept of Tawfeer is captured in the consumer philosophy of: ‘why pay more when you can get the same quality as in a higher-end market but pay less?’

An internationally successful business model

A soft discounter is positioning itself with a combination of proprietary store brands or value product lines, where it seeks to significantly undercut the prices of competitors and their legacy brands – Bitar says by 15 to 20 percent – and an additional modest selection of branded products that are offered at similar price points as found at competing markets. By number of stock keeping units (SKU, the individual codes that distinguish each item and its price) in its assortment, a soft discounter is situated nearer to a hard discounter – a retailer that carries an even more limited range of basic, store-branded goods – than to a conventional supermarket with ten thousands of SKUs from dozens of brands. The assortment in Tawfeer stores according to Bitar will be limited to 8,000 SKU that cover consumers’ preeminent demands without loss in quality.

Marketers anywhere conventionally and historically like to target customers (A-type consumers) that are affluent and can be attracted to very profitable brands – such as imported store brands that might even be considered budget brands/value lines in their home markets but can be sold at a premium to an import-happy Lebanese consumer. Or they bet on customers (B-type consumers) that mostly base their buying decisions on appearance and habit rather than undertaking sharp price-value calculations or paying much attention to product information.

Habitual bargain hunters as well as people forced by circumstance into various coping strategies, or highly aware, information seeking and data comparing customers are not the types of consumers that marketers for the longest time have been prioritizing. Traditional retailers worked as standalone sellers with strong relationships but weak organization and limited consistence. Only in the last century, the prevalence of traditional retail regressed in developed markets such as European trade of fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG).

While modern retail made forays in Lebanon from the latter part of the 20th century, modern retail behemoths did not achieve all their proclaimed goals from the early 2000s, such as winning market dominance by way of opening hypermarkets in the 10,000 square meter size range. This notwithstanding, traditional retail has been more sticky than expected by foreign market entrants over the years. Also, as Bitar describes it, affinity to traditional retail is still the rule in the behaviors of Lebanese consumers. Yet in his perspective, the Lebanese retail market with a fragmented load of small, more likely than not inefficient, neighborhood stores (dekkaneh), a smattering of pricey hypermarkets, and provincial/communal chains with affiliations to consumers’ historic loyalties, has become in post-crisis Lebanon overripe for the kind of consumers’ behavior change that drives discount retail successes around the world. 

“Our 2013 decision on the opening of Tawfeer was due to the fact that we are a third-generation family business, which my grandfather established 80 years ago. As we were selling to more than 15 countries in Europe, including Germany, Spain, Austria, in the EU as well as Eastern European countries, we saw the huge rise of discounters in Europe. We saw this all over, whether in high-income countries, or in low-income countries,” Bitar says.

As he experienced it, besides the rise of ecommerce, international growth trends in physical retail have focused in recent years on discounters and neighborhood stores, rather than very large supermarkets with sheer endless isles. Thus, in his opinion, the Lebanese market today is rife for the arrival of the discount store concept that Bitar discusses with a tone of admiration – recalling the story of German discount pioneer ALDI – and has experience with from working for over ten years in the trade and discount retail business in Eastern and Western Europe.

Usual challenges and a “secret sauce”

By Bitar’s estimation, Tawfeer is already the third largest retail chain by its market position early in the second decade of its presence as multi-store operator. Moreover, in terms of annual market share changes, it is the market’s leading disruptor in terms of market positions. The largest annual growth in the retail sector “is coming from Tawfeer, every year now. That is why everybody is watching us and chasing us. We have the financial power and have the determination and are risk takers,” says Bitar.

The chain’s initial 20 stores – rolled out between 2015 and 2021 – had been designed on basis of a single pilot store’s success between 2013 and 2015. After a one-year interruption of adding new stores because of the Covid19 crisis, about 40 percent of the current portfolio – which also includes stores operated under franchise – have been established since January of the first post-pandemic year 2022.  Not only did the company stay the course of applying its business model consistently during the years of social crises and economic pressures, its newly announced goal of 500 stores by 2030 has upped its previous, already ambitious, target by a factor five.

Means used in pursuit of this new target include its own training facility, called Tawfeer Academy; vertical integration of value chains, acquiring for example the group’s own industrial bakery and planning for a slaughterhouse; leveraging of its own importing capacity when making deals with existing wholesalers and importing agents; besides the aforementioned cutting down on overheads by use of a smart, centralized logistics hub that offers several advantages over the conventional picture of multiple delivery trucks with invoice-waving drivers lining up on urban streets next to supermarkets.

Fundamental requirements of and challenges to the operation, on the other hand, exist in form of substantial and hard to reduce operating costs (composed mainly of store rents, utilities, and employee costs) and threefold core concerns: stock management, employee supervision, and customer relations management.

Failures in these three areas – in form of product mismanagement, waste, internal theft, and customer theft – add greatly to the cost base of a retailer. A current study of the German retail environment by a specialized research institute named EHI has for example quantified total losses from these problem at about 1 percent of the retail sector’s turnover in the country. This seemingly small percentage translates into an actual annual damage of 4.95 billion euros, with theft by customers – including organized theft by criminal gangs that even feed stolen products into online retail – amounting to 2.95 billion euros, followed by theft by own employees and employees of suppliers to the tunes of 890 million and 370 million euros. On top of theft in its different forms, stock management problems accounted for about 750 million euros in losses discovered at inventory in 2024. 

Tawfeer, like all retailers, has to contend with economic forces beyond their control (such as inflation) but aspires to reduce the impact of inflation on the consumer. In terms of meeting the future core challenges of the sector, however, it is betting on the all-new miracle technology of artificial intelligence. AI cameras that monitor store shelves, function in conjunction with electronic shelf labels and alert employees to discrepancies for shelving plans, will help optimize stock management at Tawfeer stores in what Bitar calls “a revolution of shelf monitoring”. AI cameras will also be used for employee monitoring and reduction of internal theft. Customer monitoring via AI tools are intended for even wider uses, by creating heatmaps of customer behavior, measuring their facial expressions, and time spent at different shelves.

“All of this will allow us to gather big data, whether from products, from employees, or from clients, and will allow us to customize our ways to better serve clients,” Bitar enthuses. For him, the future of marketing indubitably is “targeted promotions based on AI-generated customer knowledge”. He is, however, cognizant of the risk of being an early adopter of a technology whose flaws have yet to emerge in practical operations and has widened the organization’s time window for expected amortization of investment into AI to double the 18 months recommended by consultants. This is a risk he is willing to take because of huge competitive advantages that he anticipates for retail innovation leaders.

“We have a plan, an aggressive investment plan, for the coming five years. We believe that we will be spending not less than $5 million on AI in the coming five years, and so we are budgeting at least $1 million a year for different software [products] and developments that will make our business easier, quicker, and more efficient,” Bitar says, adding that the improvements expected from AI tools will apply across different departments of the operation, not just in stores.

In the human development aspect of the expansion plan, he on the other hand emphasizes the role of partnerships with small and micro retail players. In a belief that the Lebanese market has plentiful room for the concept of a neighborhood store of 200 to 300 square meters, Bitar wants to see hundreds of current dekkaneh operators become franchise partners that adhere to the same price policy as a Tawfeer discount supermarket. 

“The traditional dekkaneh operators do not have a future. We want to integrate them to become part of Tawfeer. We need them, and they will need us because of changes in the market,” he says, adding that these franchisees would remain owner-operators of their stores but become better equipped to face challenges from competitors.  This concept, branded as Tawfeer Express, according to Bitar will carry a message for every small, traditional operator: “I don’t want to see you go out of business, so let’s partner.” 

In an economy that is based less on scarcity and more on need for fair distribution, panic buying is an anachronistic and mysterious but very real occurrence. The associated phenomena of sudden but needless shortages and price gouging for essential goods can become very dangerous, especially for those of us who have to count every penny twice when going to the neighborhood store, grocer, or gas station. But nonetheless, in times of impending catastrophes (both natural catastrophes and man-made ones, or the deep worry over either), narrow social strata of the somewhat affluent and easily fearful descend into archetypical hoarding, putting over-purchasing pressure on modern supply chains.

For conscientious merchants, panic buying is a menace. Generally, there are few things that individual merchants can do to discourage people from hoarding of essential goods. But when fears over the danger of yet another vile regional Middle Eastern war started to run hot in June of 2025, one fairly young and very ambitious Lebanese retail chain decided that it was the right moment to try some anticyclical action.

“After the recent escalations, having seen that people are in a state of fear and might go into panic buying, we decided to send a clear message to all our customers and the retail industry that Tawfeer is here and that we will invest in decreasing prices”, says Rami Bitar, the CEO of both Capital Partners, an internationally active trade group, and supermarket chain Tawfeer. In what according to Bitar was “the complete opposite” of fearful customer expectations, the Lebanese supermarket chain lowered the prices for more than 1,000 items on its shelves as of June 18, while Lebanon’s fears of a new level of armed conflict between Israel and Iran were running very high. Lowering prices and proactively communicating them to consumers would send a strong signal to alter the people’s perceptions of impending political and macroeconomic instability and inflation, hoped Bitar.

As things unfolded over the twelve days of armed exchanges between Israel and Iran, the retail sector problem of over-purchasing was averted later in June, along with many much greater dangers. However, discussing the counterintuitive June 18 pricing measure in context of Tawfeer’s business model and wider expansion strategy suggests that theirs is much more than a one-time tactic of mobilizing customer attention.

Challenging assumptions of what is possible, profitable, and prudent in local retail appears to be the core strategy of the supermarket chain, which, after having opened a 1,000 square meter market as its third store in Saida as of July 10, says that it operates 36 stores across Lebanon under a soft discounter model. This platform, which has in recent years expanded at a faster pace than a few local retail directories have kept up with, ties in with a new central logistics center, a solar power equipped warehouse that can accommodate up to 50,000 pallets of goods.

The warehouse, the construction of which was finalized earlier this year, according to Bitar represents an investment of $23 million. With its storage and distribution capacity that allows for optimization of human resources and streamlining of financials, accounting, and product distribution, is a cornerstone of Tawfeer’s current, and recently upscaled, expansion plan of targeting about 500 outlets – in two categories of discount supermarket and discount neighborhood store – by 2030 and moving from just under 1,000 staff members today to a retail headcount of 3,500.

“We are not comparing ourselves to [high-price supermarkets present in Lebanon] which are catering to A- and B-type consumer categories, nor are we comparing ourselves to [existing] chains that cater to B- and C-type consumers. We provide ourselves as solution for inflation, a solution of smart buying,” Bitar tells Executive. According to him, the discounter concept of Tawfeer is captured in the consumer philosophy of: ‘why pay more when you can get the same quality as in a higher-end market but pay less?’

An internationally successful business model

A soft discounter is positioning itself with a combination of proprietary store brands or value product lines, where it seeks to significantly undercut the prices of competitors and their legacy brands – Bitar says by 15 to 20 percent – and an additional modest selection of branded products that are offered at similar price points as found at competing markets. By number of stock keeping units (SKU, the individual codes that distinguish each item and its price) in its assortment, a soft discounter is situated nearer to a hard discounter – a retailer that carries an even more limited range of basic, store-branded goods – than to a conventional supermarket with ten thousands of SKUs from dozens of brands. The assortment in Tawfeer stores according to Bitar will be limited to 8,000 SKU that cover consumers’ preeminent demands without loss in quality.

Marketers anywhere conventionally and historically like to target customers (A-type consumers) that are affluent and can be attracted to very profitable brands – such as imported store brands that might even be considered budget brands/value lines in their home markets but can be sold at a premium to an import-happy Lebanese consumer. Or they bet on customers (B-type consumers) that mostly base their buying decisions on appearance and habit rather than undertaking sharp price-value calculations or paying much attention to product information.

Habitual bargain hunters as well as people forced by circumstance into various coping strategies, or highly aware, information seeking and data comparing customers are not the types of consumers that marketers for the longest time have been prioritizing. Traditional retailers worked as standalone sellers with strong relationships but weak organization and limited consistence. Only in the last century, the prevalence of traditional retail regressed in developed markets such as European trade of fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG).

While modern retail made forays in Lebanon from the latter part of the 20th century, modern retail behemoths did not achieve all their proclaimed goals from the early 2000s, such as winning market dominance by way of opening hypermarkets in the 10,000 square meter size range. This notwithstanding, traditional retail has been more sticky than expected by foreign market entrants over the years. Also, as Bitar describes it, affinity to traditional retail is still the rule in the behaviors of Lebanese consumers. Yet in his perspective, the Lebanese retail market with a fragmented load of small, more likely than not inefficient, neighborhood stores (dekkaneh), a smattering of pricey hypermarkets, and provincial/communal chains with affiliations to consumers’ historic loyalties, has become in post-crisis Lebanon overripe for the kind of consumers’ behavior change that drives discount retail successes around the world. 

“Our 2013 decision on the opening of Tawfeer was due to the fact that we are a third-generation family business, which my grandfather established 80 years ago. As we were selling to more than 15 countries in Europe, including Germany, Spain, Austria, in the EU as well as Eastern European countries, we saw the huge rise of discounters in Europe. We saw this all over, whether in high-income countries, or in low-income countries,” Bitar says.

As he experienced it, besides the rise of ecommerce, international growth trends in physical retail have focused in recent years on discounters and neighborhood stores, rather than very large supermarkets with sheer endless isles. Thus, in his opinion, the Lebanese market today is rife for the arrival of the discount store concept that Bitar discusses with a tone of admiration – recalling the story of German discount pioneer ALDI – and has experience with from working for over ten years in the trade and discount retail business in Eastern and Western Europe.

Usual challenges and a “secret sauce”

By Bitar’s estimation, Tawfeer is already the third largest retail chain by its market position early in the second decade of its presence as multi-store operator. Moreover, in terms of annual market share changes, it is the market’s leading disruptor in terms of market positions. The largest annual growth in the retail sector “is coming from Tawfeer, every year now. That is why everybody is watching us and chasing us. We have the financial power and have the determination and are risk takers,” says Bitar.

The chain’s initial 20 stores – rolled out between 2015 and 2021 – had been designed on basis of a single pilot store’s success between 2013 and 2015. After a one-year interruption of adding new stores because of the Covid19 crisis, about 40 percent of the current portfolio – which also includes stores operated under franchise – have been established since January of the first post-pandemic year 2022.  Not only did the company stay the course of applying its business model consistently during the years of social crises and economic pressures, its newly announced goal of 500 stores by 2030 has upped its previous, already ambitious, target by a factor five.

Means used in pursuit of this new target include its own training facility, called Tawfeer Academy; vertical integration of value chains, acquiring for example the group’s own industrial bakery and planning for a slaughterhouse; leveraging of its own importing capacity when making deals with existing wholesalers and importing agents; besides the aforementioned cutting down on overheads by use of a smart, centralized logistics hub that offers several advantages over the conventional picture of multiple delivery trucks with invoice-waving drivers lining up on urban streets next to supermarkets.

Fundamental requirements of and challenges to the operation, on the other hand, exist in form of substantial and hard to reduce operating costs (composed mainly of store rents, utilities, and employee costs) and threefold core concerns: stock management, employee supervision, and customer relations management.

Failures in these three areas – in form of product mismanagement, waste, internal theft, and customer theft – add greatly to the cost base of a retailer. A current study of the German retail environment by a specialized research institute named EHI has for example quantified total losses from these problem at about 1 percent of the retail sector’s turnover in the country. This seemingly small percentage translates into an actual annual damage of 4.95 billion euros, with theft by customers – including organized theft by criminal gangs that even feed stolen products into online retail – amounting to 2.95 billion euros, followed by theft by own employees and employees of suppliers to the tunes of 890 million and 370 million euros. On top of theft in its different forms, stock management problems accounted for about 750 million euros in losses discovered at inventory in 2024. 

Tawfeer, like all retailers, has to contend with economic forces beyond their control (such as inflation) but aspires to reduce the impact of inflation on the consumer. In terms of meeting the future core challenges of the sector, however, it is betting on the all-new miracle technology of artificial intelligence. AI cameras that monitor store shelves, function in conjunction with electronic shelf labels and alert employees to discrepancies for shelving plans, will help optimize stock management at Tawfeer stores in what Bitar calls “a revolution of shelf monitoring”. AI cameras will also be used for employee monitoring and reduction of internal theft. Customer monitoring via AI tools are intended for even wider uses, by creating heatmaps of customer behavior, measuring their facial expressions, and time spent at different shelves.

“All of this will allow us to gather big data, whether from products, from employees, or from clients, and will allow us to customize our ways to better serve clients,” Bitar enthuses. For him, the future of marketing indubitably is “targeted promotions based on AI-generated customer knowledge”. He is, however, cognizant of the risk of being an early adopter of a technology whose flaws have yet to emerge in practical operations and has widened the organization’s time window for expected amortization of investment into AI to double the 18 months recommended by consultants. This is a risk he is willing to take because of huge competitive advantages that he anticipates for retail innovation leaders.

“We have a plan, an aggressive investment plan, for the coming five years. We believe that we will be spending not less than $5 million on AI in the coming five years, and so we are budgeting at least $1 million a year for different software [products] and developments that will make our business easier, quicker, and more efficient,” Bitar says, adding that the improvements expected from AI tools will apply across different departments of the operation, not just in stores.

In the human development aspect of the expansion plan, he on the other hand emphasizes the role of partnerships with small and micro retail players. In a belief that the Lebanese market has plentiful room for the concept of a neighborhood store of 200 to 300 square meters, Bitar wants to see hundreds of current dekkaneh operators become franchise partners that adhere to the same price policy as a Tawfeer discount supermarket. 

“The traditional dekkaneh operators do not have a future. We want to integrate them to become part of Tawfeer. We need them, and they will need us because of changes in the market,” he says, adding that these franchisees would remain owner-operators of their stores but become better equipped to face challenges from competitors.  This concept, branded as Tawfeer Express, according to Bitar will carry a message for every small, traditional operator: “I don’t want to see you go out of business, so let’s partner.” 

July 23, 2025 0 comments
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Q&A

The linchpin of leapfrogging:

by Thomas Schellen July 21, 2025
written by Thomas Schellen

The human being by conventional wisdom and scientific study is to a very large part a creature of habit. Discovering and applying the principles that allow individuals and businesses to change entrenched behaviors to become more productive, is what makes or breaks social adaptation and economic reason. In a democracy’s institutional behavior, the quest for greater productivity and societal relevance is like the search for the philosopher’s stone of governmental sustainability, or a transformative magic potion that facilitates institutional behavior change and speed of progress by a state and its institutions in service to its sovereign. For an insider perspective on Lebanon’s current challenges towards this end, Executive sat down with Fadi Makki, the minister of state for administrative reform. 

When the office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform (OMSAR) was established back in 1995, its very name stood for an important element in putting Lebanon’s post-conflict public sector on the right development track. As such, OMSAR soon became associated in people’s mind with the activities of UNDP in supporting the Lebanese public sector. Compared to the ministry’s role back then, what is different about the “new” OMSAR today?

As you are aware, OMSAR has been a project-driven ministry. If you have funding, [OMSAR] can work. If you don’t have funding, it has nothing. My predecessors never thought of institutionalizing OMSAR. It had great features in good days, being agile, quick and a magnet for funding. It worked beautifully in times of abundance. But when dire times occurred, the whole thing literally collapsed. 2020 was when OMSAR collapsed and that is when we realized that we should have created capacity, talked about sustainability, and have institutionalized. There were so many learnings. I have inherited what is like a collapsed temple. It has legacy, it has history. It also has some kind of mandate but [this mandate] is not promulgated in law that was adopted in parliament. [The mandate} is not an actual law but was created by the Council of Ministers.

My first task when I came here four months ago, was to reassemble the team. I looked who is still there, who left that I could bring back, and where I could acquire new human resources. How could I be creative in obtaining support. There is so much innovation because “nécessité fait loi”, necessity is the mother of invention. I was eager to open different ways to find resources. I discovered that there is much that you can source from volunteering. You can achieve much with a sort of advanced internships from graduate students from top universities. One could attempt reskilling of whoever was left, the few dozens of people that I still have at the ministry. Re-skilling is something that was never thought about before. You can re-skill, which we did. At the same time, you need funding. We are now using the likes of grants from the EU, UNDP, the Germans and others too, to support what we have, not fully replace. What is different from the old times is that we are not running only on grant money but that we are re-skilling, and using sources such as volunteering and pro-bono support form universities and we are also oiling the wheels for additional funding. Finally, for projects without owner, we are trying to obtain some loans, which speaks for the World Bank loan on digital transformation.

So there are now three main channels of budgeting for OMSAR, one avenue through volunteering and pro bono contributions, one avenue would be through grant money, and one avenue would be debt finance? So there would be no revenue from the usual fiscal sources and taxation?

I have a small budget – the smallest in all the cabinet at about $600,000 – which I use for advisors. OMSAR is not a burden on taxpayers. And getting a loan for IT and technology would be an investment, not an [operating loan], because it has a high return on investment and would trigger and boost [development].

How much of your operational calculation is based on volunteering for the public good? It is a fascinating concept that we witnessed for example through civil society initiatives to light up streets in Beirut in the darkest days of 2021. How much of your mission as a project ministry are you able to fulfill with volunteer contributions?

   Quite a lot. My ministry is 37 people. That is what I inherited. Of those, the professionals, meaning people with degrees, number one third. I have effectively 10 to 12 people that we have to re-skill. I have 20 more who are volunteers or sourced through grants and minimal contracting. So essentially I managed to triple our capacity in creative ways. This said, I am suffering [from human capital depletion] because with more people, I can unlock additional funding. [We need] people who can write concept notes, who can write proposals. We see a lot of good will in the donor community, but we cannot just tell them what we want. That kind of give and take requires advanced [human] resources, someone who has done some project management.

What are currently your most important projects?

Senior recruitment absorbs most of my capacity. I have three pillars; one is admin reform which comprises senior recruitment and the actual reform agenda of restructuring the public administration, the second pillar is digital transformation, and the third, anti-corruption. They go together. You cannot do anti-corruption without digital transformation, and we cannot do that without restructuring the administration. You cannot restructure without recruiting senior experts to oversee administrative reform. It is really a very nice framework that I oversee.

As I said, senior recruitment absorbs most of my capacity, simply because the sheer volume of demand on recruitment is incredible. In the first few months, we had openings for about 24 [senior] positions, between CDR, Ogero, and three regulatory authorities – telecom, civil aviation, and electricity –the privatization [council], Rachid Karami Fair, and a cannabis regulatory authority. These have all been open. We completed two sets of positions, filling eight positions at CDR, and one at Ogero. And [very shortly], we will have four sets of appointments to announce, which will be a very high load. As I speak today, we are looking at the imminent filling of positions at the Electricity Regulatory Authority, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority, the [Higher Council of Privatization and PPP], and Tele Liban. These are almost 20 positions in senior capacity, and the recruitment process has been very demanding.

We meet every morning on this topic of senior recruitment where we discuss our targets and issues such as scoring [of candidates], interviewing, discrepancies, arbitration needs, coordination of experts, etc. It is really a big operation and I have been trying to have less personal involvement but there is fire fighting to be done all the time.

Is there still a component of sectarian allocation in the process of appointing ranking civil servants?

Unfortunately, yes. For example, we were told that the president of CDR is Sunni so we had to look at Sunni candidates only. We had a bit more than 30 percent of candidates that were non-Sunni but only looked at Sunnis.

In terms of willingness and desire of qualified candidates by their professional background, is there a supply overhang or a demand overhang, meaning an overabundance of top candidates for each position or a desperate deficit in finding enough technically and personality-wise qualified candidates who want to work as premier civil servants for the Lebanese people?  

There is a very interesting metric, which is the number of people who are applying for a position that has not “normally” been associated with their sect. I have that number, and I want to see more of that. If I am catholic and thus don’t apply for a position, such as president of CDR which has historically been held by a Sunni person, my not applying is a sign that I do not trust the system even though I heard the President and cabinet promising reform and talking about the reshuffling of positions. We have been looking at this figure as an important metric of trust.

Are you a builder of meritocracy?

Within constraints. There are certain rules that we are operating within. When we grade candidates, the information for name, sect, and gender is masked, so the people who are evaluating, don’t know who they are evaluating. But to be realistic, on another level, we can look at the sect filter. It is meritocracy in the sense that those who we are naming in the short list, are the best. But it is not always the case that we are able to attract the very best from outside [of electronic recruitment channels on the platform of OMSAR]. That is why we are wondering if we need some room for head hunting.

Do you use any AI tool in the process?

We got an offer recently. Suppose we have about 640 candidates for CDR positions. What we currently do is evaluate against minimum requirements – if a candidate meets them or not – and then a second filter, get the score, get the civil service score, and then a third score. It is really scientific. One interviewing company came to me and said, they could do that in one hour, providing a ranking and recommendation without even needing to short list, based on the competency framework that we give them. However, I do not think that this is ready yet. It could be deployed with some validation but I don’t think it is perfectly legal. In a bid to be entrepreneurial, I am going to ask people to give us the permission to experiment with this, just to evaluate if the AI is reaching similar results as the official process. But principally, the limitations of AI would have to be disclosed and the perception of using an AI tool would need to be managed carefully.

As you were saying, there was no real institution building at OMSAR during the project-driven 25 years of activity before the collapse of 2020. Why?

Not at OMSAR, and not at other institutions. I will tell you why. I was a beneficiary. I was director general at the Ministry of Economy from 2003 to 2005 and I at that time benefited from the technical assistance that OMSAR provided to the MoE, helping us in creating the planning and performance monitoring function. OMSAR wanted us to create a unit but we could not recruit at that time [due to a public sector hiring stop], so we could not populate that unit with staff. So we were enacting focal points, which means asking someone who is doing other things to also be responsible for performance planning, which is not ideal. I do not like focal point as a concept. Almost 25 years later, we still do not have planning functions at every ministry. It is still one of my top priorities to create such planning functions. But I want it through creation of units. It might sound strange to say that we want to hire in staffing new units in the administration, but I do not see any other way to build a public administration.

The administration is no longer as bloated as it once was. We are running with 30 percent of needed capacity and sometimes there are even more vacancies. Therefore, we can no longer speak about implementing reform without adding staff while reskilling existing manpower and letting some go who can no longer fit.

In the mission statement on the OMSAR website, the three pillars are good governance, capacity building, and digital transformation. Anti-corruption is of course intrinsic to good governance, but the original mission focus on building capacity makes it sound somehow like OMSAR in the past was tasked with capacity building – but without building OMSAR’s own institutional capacity. Isn’t this a bit of a logical incoherence?

Yes, OMSAR was tasked with building capacity without building its own capacity first. This was a major shortcoming and that is why we are trying to avoid this by becoming institutionalized and perhaps create it as proper ministry, not as office of a minister of state. Right now it is a state minister’s office that is tasked with admin reform. In order for the donors to say that it is the most important ministry, it has to be a ministry for admin reform. It is on everybody’s mind that we need to do financial reform but at the same time we need to do admin reform. Without it, you can no longer do proper implementation of governance. Therefore, the time is right to properly institutionalize from inside of the ministry so that it becomes on-par with the big ministries.

Admin reform has been done on contractual basis with funding coming from here and there, but senior administrative appointments are here to stay and we need to think of something, a mechanism to contract people into senior positions, constantly upskill them, shift them and move them around. That human resource funding and strategy is what we need to play more and more fully. 

You mentioned several times the concept of skill building, reskilling, or upskilling. This brings to my mind that you developed a paper and whole study on e-readiness back in 2003, one in which OMSAR found this e-readiness to be low or wanting in the administration and elsewhere. Today the e-readiness seems still to be wanting but at the same time, we usually mean a totally different concept when one talks about e-readiness in context of a digital society, not just such things like landline penetration rates and basic ICT infrastructures. What does the high intensity and speed of digital development mean for your quest of reskilling people at OMSAR? How difficult is it to re-skill people?

It is difficult but it equally is an opportunity. Because you could leapfrog. We lost so many [of our administrative human] resources. Therefore, and I am talking here about the core administrative functions, the fiscal burden is no longer [as high as] it used to be. Pensioners are a separate consideration and I do not want to talk about the situation in the military. The hard-core administration is nothing [in terms of cost] compared to what it was before. This is a golden opportunity to invest in those [civil servants] who are remaining. We want to give those who stayed skills in planning, digital transformation, performance monitoring, and some technical skills.

At the same time, you want to bring in a very limited number [of new people]. You no longer need a full cache. This cache is now two thirds vacant. Yet, we don’t want to refill every position. We want to transform the administration and make it more agile, more compact, and create a modern ministry. At the same time, we want [to hire people] to fill new administrative units of HR functions, planning and performance monitoring, and digital transformation functions. We need to map the administration and reskill some to fill the new functions, hire for the new functions and let some [people] go from the old functions. At the same time, we want to reengineer the [government] services. Technology and AI gives us the opportunity to do that. Its leapfrogging because you do not need anymore to automate the administration as it is. You could simply short-circuit many processes and cut down on red tape. From user perspective, there could be many cuts in the services value chain. So the sequence is restructuring, reengineering the services, and then filling positions to support these services.

Leapfrogging is something that has been called for by OMSAR but that Lebanon somehow has not been good at over the past 30 years. Another hot term in corporate advisory is nudging, and it is a term that you have promoted previously in your career. Will nudging – gently pushing people into policy and behavior compliance – be part of your strategy?

You probably noticed from the ministerial declaration at the start of this government that I managed to have the term behavioral science included as one of the principles in forming the administration. I am proud to have injected this. If you want, “piece of me” into this declaration. There is a lot of room for nudging and behavioral science in senior recruitment. By creating a shortlist with some kind of implicit ranking of candidates. Even though it is a shortlist and the ministers are free to choose the number four name, it will be slightly more difficult for them because they then have to prove why they choose the number four and not the number one candidate. This is behaviorally informing a shortlist. There is room for behavioral science.

There even is a lot of room for nudging even in anti-corruption and we will integrate those aspects into our new strategy for 2026 to 2030, which we are currently working on. We are trying to change perceptions and social norms. There are perceptions that there is so much corruption, making [the administration] a basket case. But in the moment when you are starting to change that perception with facts and numbers, of how many are applying [for civil service positions] and how much trust there is, perceptions change. We have to work with scientific tools where we are changing perceptions – and when you change perceptions, you start changing behaviors.

As far as collaborations, there are your collaborations with other Lebanese ministries as well as collaborations with the international community or external partners. Half of the news items on your website highlight meetings with this or that ambassador or this or that international representative.  It is obvious that outreach is important for OMSAR. Within this network building and outreach, both internally and externally, what are your priorities?

In Lebanon, priorities are horizontal. I need to regain trust of three groups of stakeholders. My first group is citizens. I need to regain their trust. They kind of gave up on us, and I need to [build trust] inch by inch, using everything available to me: metrics, numbers, scientific methods, nudging, to change perceptions and change behavior. I also need to regain trust of the donor community because they gave up trusting us about five years ago. So many things happened during that time, we had the financial collapse, the corruption saga, the garbage saga, the thawra, the corona crisis, the port explosion. We had the total disintegration of government services. We saw [donor] support going straight into other NGOs or humanitarian relief but not into public administration. We are trying to regain this trust. And thirdly, we need to regain the trust of other ministries. And this is extremely important. OMSAR has been a kind of incubator and innovator that was carrying the torch of digital transformation in the government and was restructuring – and all of this collapsed five or six years ago. So ministries went it alone. Whoever managed to get a bit of funding, started a fragmented process, and this is extremely dangerous. But before I can tell them to stop doing this and to come and speak to us, I need my capacity. I am building my capacity and making sure that I am running ahead of them and do not slow them down, but I need to start putting some regulatory framework and standards in place so that they join this and that the different entities and ministries start speaking to one another and install systems that are interoperable. It is now my duty to regain the trust of the ministries. Otherwise, we are going to have a massive, chaotic, and fragmented projectization in services and in digital transformation in particular. This keeps me form sleeping because it would be an irreversible damage.

Your ministry by default has a mission that relates to issues of public entities and ministries, from gender equality in the administration to computerization and automation, skill development, and so your fingers should be in every ministry as far as those issues. Is that right?

Absolutely. But what we are doing now, is central planning and decentralized implementation. OMSAR will never be a big team and huge ministry, but I have to have a central planning function and team that does standard setting, that issues guidelines, and creates model ministries. There needs to be some handholding but not implementation. Implementation has to be decentralized, but in an orderly and organized fashion.

In the years of the pre-crisis phase, in 2018-19, there were ministries such as the Ministry of Investment and Technology or the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, both led by ministers of state. In 2025, we see roles in digital transformation being held by the new Ministry of Investment and Technology Affairs, as well as by the Ministry of Telecommunications. How does OMSAR collaborate with the latter? Will it be necessary to establish a ministry of AI and digital transformation?

The creation of a ministry for technology and AI is a fact. The question is how we can minimize overlap and create more synergies between both of us. The basic idea is that we need a regulator. Will this ministry be the regulator? Or will this ministry be creating another regulator? I have a conceptual problem if there is a ministry to create a regulator. We should be very thrifty or efficient in how many organizations we create. It looks like it is good for them to play a role as far as standard setting and technology advisory. But it should stop here. Any service reengineering and redesign should be closely linked to admin reform and stay under OMSAR. This makes sense and we have seen different examples for this.

You have different models and responsibilities with regard to digital transformation in the UAE and in Saudi Arabia, for example. There are different models so we have best to imagine the value chain. The value chain is thus: policy making, regulatory oversight, standard setting, and implementation and operations. And we are trying to make sure that this is clear. Implementation should stay within ministries, as for regulation, we should look at data regulation, cybersecurity, and many aspects of technology, the APIs and the interoperability. There is room for a technology regulator and there is room for the middle ware, the infrastructure that links all ministries through a seamless platform. However, the reengineering of services, is clearly an OMSAR mandate, the capacity building on digital services is clearly an OMSAR mandate, and so is the communication with citizens on the update of services,

And you are also in the driver’s seat as far as appointing the regulatory authorities that should ideally be independent from ministries?

And here I have now a suggestion. The Ministry of Telecommunications is involved in digital transformation where they look after data centers and have the connectivity. There is the Ministry of AI and Technology, there is OMSAR, and there is the Ministry of Industry that oversees Colibat for e-signatures, plus there is the Ministry of Justice that oversees some issues of signatures, and the Ministry of Finance that looks at payment gateways, and the central bank also is involved. What we need is some kind of a supreme council or higher institution, just like we have the higher privatization council. It is high time that in addition to the Ministry of Technology, the regulator, and OMSAR, we bring everybody together under the umbrella of one council headed by the prime minister. Something like this will be essential for coordination.

In the Saudi framework that you alluded to, it seems that the pivotal role of the crown prince is something that could not be easily replicated in Lebanon.

But we do have the executive function, so the prime minister should be playing the role.

From an ex officio perspective, definitely, but the permanence of leadership positions seems different between the Lebanese system and other regional government systems, with many questions about the best method. This brings us back to behavioral science and the question why humans behave as they do. Thinking about another behavioral case seen in the governance system of a global power, one that has lately been occupying the minds of people in most countries, is your ministry playing the role of a department of government efficiency? Are you Beirut Elon?

Am I DOGE? Not yet. But eventually we have to think of administrative efficiency and the fact that we have three pools [of people] at ministries and government: those who want to go, for whom we need to create a graceful exit; then there is the hard-working administration group of people who are re-skillable and we need to invest in them, and not only reskill them but also think of higher salaries. This becomes actually easy since we are no longer a bloated administration. And then there is the third pool that will come from outside and need an appropriate salary scale. This is something that has a DOGE element. So not yet but eventually we will be needing to fulfill a government efficiency role.

In closing, talking about meritocracy and sectarian limitations, I want to add that there are a few cases where we have recently presented shortlists for senior recruitment candidates to the Council of Ministers. These shortlists contain names of people from different sects – and this will be a premiere. Even if the candidate is chosen who is member of sect that also previously was grandfathering this role, it is a breakthrough that we had the courage of taking the shortlist to the Council of Ministers with names where not only the Catholic candidate for the Tele Liban chairmanship is included but also the Maronite. This is already taking things halfway to a meritocratic system. I am extremely happy that at least on a few positions, we have made recommendations [which diverged from the historic pattern].

July 21, 2025 0 comments
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Editorial

A flower dares to bloom

by Yasser Akkaoui July 16, 2025
written by Yasser Akkaoui

It may have been the most pivotal period in changing the fortunes of Lebanon, definitely in the last 30 years, and perhaps in all my lifetime. The past eight or nine months have turned our local world on its head, militarily, economically, and politically.
We have suffered continued violations of our sovereignty and deep disregard for the principles of peace. We have witnessed, without being able to put any stop to them, tides of airplanes, drones, and missiles cross our skies with the most ill of intents. Yet we have also witnessed the lifting of sanctions on Syria, signals of structural reform in our regional and national economy, and new investment blossoms. We have been reassured that our Lebanese democracy, flawed and vulnerable as all democracies are, is
alive and kicking on national and municipal levels.
But what puts our compunction even more into perspective of global risks are vast increases in global military spending – reported as 9.4 percent over recent years, reaching a record high of over $2.7 trillion in 2024 – and pivots away from development funding and humanitarian funding, such as a tripling in the European Investment Bank’s defense-related lending to €3.5 billion.
As nations focus on military build-up and self-reliance, commitments to multilateral institutions are weakening. The net effect of escalating defense spending and conflicts is a troubling retreat from the globalization of the past 35 years. Nations are becoming more selective, fragmented, and security conditioned, fundamentally altering the economic logic that drove global integration. The global consensus needed for climate finance, debt relief, and coordinated health responses could fragment, making global problems harder to solve.
Meanwhile in Lebanon, we see today more flares of hope even as we know that badly needed reconstruction funding and investment for growth and productivity still fall far short of reclaiming what has been taken from us in war and economic meltdown.
We cannot put our heads in the sand: our domestic policy process needs far greater diligence and care or our society’s constituents. But we have enough tested and proven
talent for pursuing a simultaneous social and economic miracle.
The most urgent issue today is that we cannot be sure if our process is now on a stable national path in its regional envelope. Will any visitor from the seats of global powers have our best interest at heart? Will our elected leaders be resilient against the old culture of corruption? Will our political system become a conduit of reform and balance?
Our small signs of hope need reassurance. Can we coexist in a global neighborhood, where our enemies constantly show us that they do not treat us as their equals? And how will the integration project of Lebanese and neighboring economies come into fruition? How can we avoid costly design mistakes and planning errors in a regional context of multiple uncertainty?
Nothing is certain in this region, not even uncertainty. But our little Lebanese flowers are blooming in the craters torn by bullets and bombs.

July 16, 2025 0 comments
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Last Word

The dangerous masculinization of public life

by Marie Murray June 30, 2025
written by Marie Murray

In recent years, and more dramatically in recent months, global politics has seen a notable shift toward ‘masculinized’ messaging —brash, combative, performative, and increasingly authoritarian. This isn’t just a narrative shift away from an equitable, egalitarian, and respectful tone or about who holds office, although that greatly determines political course. It is a dangerous drift of how leadership is enacted: power over empathy, dominance over cooperation.

Nowhere has this shift been more visible, or more influential, than in the United States, where the state is employing war language against migrants at home while funding wars abroad. This political tone, set by the U.S., is currently echoing far beyond its borders, reshaping the language and posture of power around the world.

I am writing this from the US, where I am visiting my family for the first time in two years and where evidence of this shift in political tone was on display at JFK airport. Upon arrival, my family of five (only one of whom is not a US-citizen) were instructed to stand in the border control line for non-citizens. When we reached the desk, my Lebanese husband was instructed to take our children to collect our luggage while I was taken aside because my “passport needed to be verified.” I was brought to another room and after a 15-minute wait, I was questioned for 30 minutes. I was asked about my family members and my husband’s family members: their places of residence and their occupations. I was asked about my life in Lebanon: my home, work, my children, and why I lived there. I was asked about why I came to Lebanon in the first place and why I wanted to come to Lebanon: my motivation for pursuing a masters degree, my relationship with my husband. I was asked about all the trips I had taken in the last several years.

In the same room, an American student from Columbia University, also in questioning, asked why he had been selected for interrogation and was also told that his passport needed to be verified.  Another man traveling with his elderly mother from Jordan (citizenship unclear to me) explained that he had accompanied her to help her while she visited family members. He was told flatly that he should have stayed home—she didn’t need help. I don’t know what purpose this use of resources and information gathering served—but I do know that those of us in that room were treated like suspects by virtue of—as far as I could tell—the countries we travelled from or universities we attended.

Across continents, leaders have either borrowed from or attempted to shirk this style of vilifying opponents and reducing policy to tweets and threats. In this new arena, space for complexity shrinks and democracy becomes a game of chest-beating rather than service.

One of the most devastating outcomes of this shift has been the sidelining of the care economy. In the U.S., investment in education, healthcare, humanitarian work, and environmental care has withered –ostensibly to decrease public debt, though the Trump administration’s ‘one big beautiful bill’ (the chest thumping resounds) which increases national debt by upwards of four trillion makes a lie of that priority. While budgets for care have been gutted, billions continue to flow into the military-industrial complex. Trump’s proposed budget –yet to pass in the senate—would bring military spending to over $1 trillion in the coming year.

American-made and U.S.-funded bombs still drop on Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and now Iran, even as that same region is cut off from American humanitarian aid. The most hopeful development in this scenario came after two weeks of mutual aggression: further escalation is in nobody’s interest. But despite of this loudly proclaimed win of voluntary restraint of masculine power politics at the brink of the abyss of total war, the geopolitical lessons from the first half of this year have been clear: aggression will not be thwarted but acclaimed; destruction is funded; dignity is not. Reversing this course means redefining leadership as responsibility first and foremost, and it means restoring the moral balance between what we build and what we break.

June 30, 2025 0 comments
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Q&A

Diminishing the USAID shock at Lebanon’s hillfort of innovation

by Thomas Schellen June 20, 2025
written by Thomas Schellen

Developmental disruptions are piling up on the liabilities side of the world’s sustainability balance sheet in 2025. For the tiny, battered country of Lebanon, each of this year’s new shocks – be it a financial or geo-economic tremor, a disruption that is climate-related or technological, a political imperialist insanity or an illicit military aggression – weighs in heavily on the liability side of the national reform and development balance sheet. Each shock increases the risk of deterring needed investments and speaks of new danger in public and private institutional paralyses. This magazine’s perception at the start of 2025, of experiencing a deceptive calm in the eye of a regional and even broader, multi-level “perfect storm,” has in every imaginable and many non-imaginable regards been borne out in the first half of the year.

The only question is which global storm system, apart from the obvious hurricane of regional militarist aggression and war of identities, has the severest impact on this fragile economy and its towering social investment needs. Two outstanding candidates are changes in humanitarian and developmental funding – on global scale highlighted in June by a massively downward revised and re-prioritized OCHA appeal for humanitarian aid due to imperiled fundraising success in the year to date – and Lebanon’s continuing drift to the bottom in the fostering of entrepreneurship when compared (on the 2025 Global Startup Ecosystem Index) to the region’s growing startup ecosystems of Arab countries from the UAE and Saudi Arabia to Jordan and Qatar. 

A notable intersection of both factors, Lebanese innovation and entrepreneurship institution Berytech, is an outlier in the two crucial regards of keeping the proverbial Lebanese entrepreneurial spirit strong and expansionary on the one hand and digesting the shock of seeing a once dominant source of funding – the United States Agency for International Development – vanish in Trumpian mists from February. Executive sat down with Nicolas Farhat, the deputy general manager of Berytech, to inquire about the state of the institution whose academic lair atop a hill in the Beirut conurbation inspires allusions to a hillfort, those settlement habitats that not only in form of Epipaleolithic tells but also in present, digital times stand out as bastions of civilization and development.  

Interview with Nicolas Farhat

Walk me, if you would, through the inflection points in the story of Berytech from the initial idea of an academia-induced technopole through the association with bank funding, involvement of the private sector, the subsequent integration with BDL’s circular 331 ecosystem, and then the switch to donor funding.

It is true that Berytech at its start wanted to replicate the model of the French Sophia Antipolis technopole and incubator in Lebanon. When Berytech was established in 2002, the original entity included the commercial banks of Lebanon participating with a seed investment in form of an indirect social enterprise called in French société en commandite, where profits get reinvested to a certain extent to support the ecosystem. We also back then received funds from the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) to build this building. When the Berytech 1 Fund was created in 2007, it was funded by big US tech companies, not the banks. In 2015 the fund was under the circular 331 and in 2018 and onward, IM [Capital] was anchored by USAID. Simultaneously, all programs were funded by sponsors and partner donors which majorly are EU-funded programs and programs funded by European countries.

The funding pipeline of Berytech, which has been in existence since the 2000s, has in recent years drawn upon diverse sources, notably development grants. What share of your funding and financial pipeline today comes from European partners?

The core [operation] of Berytech is of course to support the ecosystem of entrepreneurship and innovation. But how do we go about this? We can say that we do it along three verticals. The first vertical, which was started in 2002, is having an incubator. One incubator is here at this building [in the USJ Mar Roukos campus] and another one is in [Beirut’s] Mathaf neighborhood facing the French embassy. There also is a plan to open a new facility in [the north-central Lebanese town of] Amchit in 2026.

Our second vertical is the programmatic part. In the past few years, we have deployed over 40 programs, with a total programmatic funding of about $93 million. We have been working with all international donors, such as the EU, Netherlands, USAID, and UN agencies. We also work with international NGOs, agencies like AFD, and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) such as the World Bank and others. Our third vertical is the investment arm. We created the Berytech Fund 1 in 2007, Berytech Fund II in 2015/16, and then the IM [Capital] and IM Ventures funds. Also, you will hopefully see new funds being launched in the coming year or two.

Let’s talk about this third vertical, your investment arm and the funds you are working on in your collaboration with what I believe was originally a Berytech brainchild today branded as IM Fndng. Will such funds be applying a Private Equity (PE) or Venture Capital (VC) philosophy, with their expectations on return on investment?

What we are envisioning for forthcoming funds is innovative financing mechanisms, not the traditional PE or VC vehicles. They will also not be vehicles such as the Berytech [I and II] Funds of the past. I note here that the IM [Fnding] was among the first to use an innovative funding mechanism. It did this by matching public funding, i.e. USAID funding, as guarantee in securing private capital. To its SoLR & Renewable Energy Fund, IM also recently attracted CMA-CGM, the giant shipping company, to come in and propose a financial product that is affordable for the Lebanese private sector.

The key word to look at in the forthcoming funds is going to be affordable finance. If you look at the SME sector and the ecosystem of startups over the last four, five years, the system was mainly relying on grants, ether in cash of in kind. All the funding that came to the private sector, however, did not really make a dent in the real funding needs of SMEs and startups. This funding was also focused on [specific criteria] and many SMEs were not included.

Most funding that will be coming to Lebanon in 2025, will be addressed to micro-credit institutions, lending to Nano enterprises with a cap of 30 to 50 thousand dollars per ticket, and probably high interest rates. What we are looking at is catering to the private sector in MENA with focus on SMEs. We therefore have two vehicles that we are actively working on, in partnership with DFIs. We experienced a setback [in setting up those funds] when the project was delayed due to last year’s war. But we are hopeful today that it might materialize at an accelerated rate now. One fund will focus on social, environmental and economic impact by SMEs. It is not sector-agnostic but it is not only focused on circularity and green economy. An SME that promotes import substitution and can enhance local production and meet local demand and later on export, which will be improving the trade balance and the balance of payment of Lebanon, could tap into this vehicle.

When USAID announced their 90-day moratorium on funding while programs were being reviewed from the start of the second Trump presidency in the US, nobody was eager to talk about what was indubitably a shock, whether it might have been a disruptive negative shock or even a healthy shock in favor of greater self-sufficiency. Now, as the USAID cuts have been implemented, how large was the shock and what was your learning out of this at Berytech?

This question is a great one that comes at a very sensitive time. What put Berytech in a better position when compared with other USAID partners or implementing bodies, is that we always had diversified sources of revenues for funding its programs. We also always had a mix between donor funded and revenue generating activities. When you consider USAID’s role in this entire mix, it did not represent the majority of our funding. It was, however, a significant source of funding and a shock for us [when this funding vanished] but we were able to adapt quickly.

One of the main programs that had been funded indirectly by USAID – by which I mean that USAID used to act as the intermediaries between European donors and implementing partners such as Berytech – was the Water and Energy for Food (WE4F) program for the MENA region, which we were leading. We were lucky in that when we received the “stop work” order, when there was a disruption and later on termination of this program, one of the donors – the Swedes, i.e. the Swedish International Developmental Cooperation Agency – were able to transfer to us a small funding directly, which would allow us to wrap up our activity in a responsible manner and address to the extent possible the needs of our stakeholders, which were SMEs in Lebanon and MENA, plus services providers and subcontractors. This allowed us to safeguard 4.5 years of activities under the WE4F program. So today we are in the final stages of discussion to launch a 2.0 version of this program directly with the donor partners.

In terms of funding, how would the 2.0 version of this program compare to the first edition? Would it be equal in size, larger, or smaller?

The 2.0 version has an additional component that tackles the risk of experiencing a shortage in funding as we all need to be aware that at a certain point donor funding may not last. Thus the 2.0 version in total program size will be 50 percent in terms of grants to start with on top of a buy-in component. When Syria opens up – and we are mapping the Syrian ecosystem today in an exercise that will be finished by end of this month – we will have room to conduct those additional activities as part of our mandate, with funding on top of the existing mandate. But the main catch of the WE4F 2.0 program is that it is setting the ground for a regional fund that will have the mandated facilities that I mentioned in the beginning of this interview. This money is supposed to indirectly de-risk this fund in anticipation of having an anchor investor join.

This will be a complete and sustainable exit from a donor funded program. If we get WE4F 2.0, we will be able to operate over the next three years by continuing to do what we have done while simultaneously preparing the launch of the regional impact fund that, if profitable, hopefully will sustain our regional activities over a long period of time.

So the regional fund would be larger than the original WE4F funding allocation?

Absolutely, significantly larger.

Looking at the regional dimension of development, much potential might be directed towards our esteemed neighbor country that is nether nominally nor de facto at war with us, which is Syria. Recent large partnership and investment announcements for Syria involved large port developments with CMA CGM and even larger power station Build-Operate-Transfer agreements with a Qatari-led consortium. What will Berytech’s strategy be to assert your early mover advantage and competitive edge as an innovation hub that has a history and track record of almost 25 years?  How will you compete if external actors or Gulf-based entrepreneurship actors get active in Syria?    

Development in Syria and the size of it is a delicate issue. We also have to be realistic about the size and capacity of Berytech. We certainly position ourselves as a potential major player in the development of the ecosystem of entrepreneurship and innovation in Syria. We are today mapping the ecosystem in Syria, for which we have received funding from some of the donors…based on some geographies that were pre-selected as safer regions where an ecosystem can be developed. I do not think that anyone can predict how fast things will happen in this development. There are many uncertainties in Syria. It is a “wild card”. But Berytech certainly will have a role to play in the ecosystem there. We do not know how things will play out with everything around us being reshuffled but we are hopeful and see a new phase for Lebanon, Syria, and the whole region.

What are the next steps from this hopeful but uncertain current situation? You have referred to the need for functional and advanced infrastructure in order to keep startups in Lebanon. My impression from the first companies who set up at this Mar Roukoz facility in the 2000s was that they were attracted to this location because the new locale of Berytech was one of the few places in Beirut where you could convene an online meeting with an international correspondent. But what is your edge today?

We still have this resilience and track record. For the past four years, despite of all the adverse events in Lebanon and the crisis, this facility specifically did not have a shortage in electricity for a single minute. Even during the last war, when there was a risk of seeing the telecom cables hit so that we would be disconnected from the whole world, we had satellite internet connection installed in less than 48 hours as backup. This retained many of the current tenants that we have, because of this location. What we offered in 2002 as a luxury and as advanced service, what we offered over the last 5 years, is resilience and business, especially given that many of our tenants cater to markets outside Lebanon.

It seems that the mindset of a full-service provider against all odds has served you well. Do you have a contingency plan for any eventuality, from a regional military conflict to a global trade war?

You can say in a nutshell that we are very agile in managing and mitigating risks to the extent possible. One of the interesting aspects when talking about resilience of Berytech and Lebanon is this example for me: when the war started last year, we saw that many of the donors that we were working with started shifting their support from private sector and SMEs in the agri-food sector towards humanitarian aid and towards filling food boxes. For over four years these donors had invested into food security in this particular sector [of agri-food]. So when a shock and adverse event happened, we said that the local sector could somehow cater in terms of food production.

As the war started, our team was stuck here, as many of our colleagues lost access to their homes, were displaced. Some of them were working remotely, others passing by the office, and you can see we had a direct view of everything [that happened in the war on the suburbs]. At the same time, it was the busiest period of the year including in the WE4F program’s four-and-a-half year run.

On top of this pressure, we were finding that everyone had started with filling food boxes, so we made an appeal to donors requesting to support the companies that are working in Lebanon. Some donors said they could not accommodate the request because they needed to act under a top-down decision and did not have time. Some donors, however, such the WE4F Program donors, allocated a funding to us for selection of 15 food processors working in the safer part of Lebanon that could ramp-up production in a very fast way, while also meeting requirements such as using less water and relying on sustainable energy solutions, if they can get a small grant.

This is what we did. We were able to close this call in record time, less than six weeks, selecting the top 15 companies from hundreds of applications, and provided them with cash grants of up to 25,000 dollars to adjust their working capital needs and ramp up food production. This is the intra-entrepreneurial staff of Berytech, the talent, the dedication that enabled us to address an issue in a timely manner an issue that happened in the country. Nobody had to do it but everyone volunteered. We worked overnight and on weekends to wrap it up.

So just to assess the dimension of this support, we are talking about 15 companies receiving up to 25,000 each, so much less than a million dollars.

Less than one million but this was calculated on basis of working capital needs for two to three months, which was affected by supply chain disruption and cash shortfall. During the war, cash is king. The money coming as working capital allowed them to increase their production very fast. This was large in terms of impact and it was also done to raise awareness about the importance of supporting producers in times of crisis, and not just buy staple food and put it in boxes and distribute it. It is the idea of sustainable investment.

For the coming years until 2030 in this very volatile region, do you have set KPIs on annual growth of your funds, or of your programs, or the tech startup nourishment activities?

Every program and every fund has its own set of KPIs, and their own monitoring and evaluation framework. On an aggregated basis, the Berytech annual report captures indicators such as the number of entrepreneurs served, the number of SMEs, and the number of technical assistance provided, the investment raised, numbers of jobs created directly and indirectly, along with segregation by gender and age group. To give you a small example that we are doing well, we have supported more than 6,000 entrepreneurs over the past five years, more than 1,000 startups, and more than 1,300 m-SMEs in Lebanon alone. We have conducted more than 93 million dollars worth of programs and raised investments of more than 38 million. Although the whole landscape of donor funding is changing, we are not at a crossroad today. [This is because] we are looking at things strategically from the question of how we can activate our revenue generating activities while keeping a certain number of programs running for another three or four years, until [the economy] picks up again.

June 20, 2025 0 comments
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CommentHospitality & Tourism

The Lebanese vibe

by Hamad Elias June 18, 2025
written by Hamad Elias

It’s not just creativity—it’s the Lebanese vibe: a spirit forged in adversity, expressed through authenticity, adaptability, and connection, and now re-emerging as one of the country’s most undervalued strategic assets. It’s the lived rhythm of a people who transform collapse into reinvention, and scarcity into innovation—again and again. These traits underpin a sector with the potential to drive recovery: Lebanon’s creative economy. Rooted in design, film, fashion, digital media, and cultural production, this ecosystem is a functional response to systemic breakdown that generates livelihoods, exports identity, and captures global audiences.

Internationally, these sectors are classified as Cultural and Creative Industries (CCIs)—a rapidly growing segment that has consistently outperformed traditional sectors in times of disruption. Lebanon is well-positioned to harness this momentum, drawing on its creative human capital, entrepreneurial instinct, and extensive diaspora networks. As Managing Partner of SRM (Socially Responsible Management), a Lebanese social enterprise dedicated to bolstering the capacity of organizations through managerial support, institutional development, and operational optimization, I’ve had the privilege of witnessing firsthand how these Lebanese vibes translate into real-world impact. SRM’s work in Lebanon, the MENA region and Europe, has consistently demonstrated that the pillars of adaptability, connectivity, authenticity, synergy, and influence are operational principles that drive measurable change. However, to harness these pillars for economic recovery, there are critical steps stakeholders must take to bolster Lebanon’s creative economy.

Adaptive cultural resilience drives Lebanon’s creative economy

Before the 2019 collapse, Lebanon’s CCIs contributed an estimated $2.3 billion USD—nearly 5 percent of national GDP—surpassing agriculture and construction and employing approximately 75,000 people (4.5 percent of the workforce). The film industry alone recorded a 675 percent increase in production over a decade, while artisanal exports—ranging from jewelry and furniture to traditional crafts—were valued at nearly $500 million USD. In today’s contracted economy, achieving similar output would represent an even larger share of GDP, making CCIs one of the few scalable levers for equitable, post-crisis recovery.

But this transformation will not be driven by slogans or donor templates. It will be built, as it always has been, by filmmakers, designers, musicians, artisans, and tech-savvy storytellers who continue to create relevance under pressure. Yet this resilience operates within an ecosystem that actively undermines its own potential. From unreliable power and prohibitively expensive internet to fragmented governance and a lack of formal creative industry recognition, Lebanon’s environment is not built to support creators. Weak intellectual property protections and a playing field skewed by unregulated competition not only erode trust but also choke the space for genuine innovation. Across the region, countries like the UAE and Saudi Arabia are institutionalizing creative ecosystems—with tax incentives, copyright enforcement, export hubs, and fully equipped production zones. Lebanon’s creators, by contrast, navigate without a map: no unified licensing, no CCI-specific incentives, and minimal IP protection. The result? Global-quality content built on local improvisation—but with no safety net, and little scalability.

Despite this, Lebanese creativity is remarkably generative. Startups have bypassed local banking collapse through fintech. Digital agencies have sustained content pipelines by partnering with global platforms like Netflix and Shahid. Marketing firms have delivered region-leading campaigns with minimal budgets—fusing global fluency with cultural nuance.

Resilience is one of Lebanon’s few scalable economic levers. But for it to translate into growth, it must be met with structure. In the short term, the Ministries of Culture, Economy and Trade, Information, Tourism, and Finance must jointly establish a clear policy framework for the creative economy. This includes licensing creative professionals, enforcing digital rights management, and offering targeted tax relief for cultural production and exports. Medium-term priorities should focus on building adaptive infrastructure—production hubs, content labs, and creative zones with reliable utilities and digital access. Long-term competitiveness depends on a national strategy that recognizes cultural and creative industries as an essential pillar of economic recovery, backed by legal protection, fiscal incentives, and export integration.

Lebanon’s diaspora network: an economic and creative lifeline

For generations, Lebanese migration has established a global network of professionals and entrepreneurs whose connections, funding, and market access continue to prop up the creative sector back home. But let’s not sugarcoat it. This strength faces real, structural headwinds. Domestic instability and limited opportunities have driven talent out, while infrastructure gaps, high operational costs, and fragmented export pathways turn even the most promising ideas into uphill battles. While diaspora networks offer vital external support, Lebanon has yet to build the frameworks needed to turn these connections into a scalable, sustainable advantage.

And yet, digital agencies and content producers are already tapping into diaspora partnerships to deliver high-quality marketing campaigns, content, and multimedia solutions for international clients. Lebanon needs a phased, intentional strategy to harness this comparative advantage —one led by private sector actors from both Lebanon and the diaspora: start by launching diaspora-led co-production funds and virtual creative hubs in the short term. Build on that with government-backed export partnerships in the medium term. And invest in digital infrastructure that makes scalable, efficient export models a reality in the long term.

Differentiation as survival

Lebanese producers have long mastered the art of embedding creativity into commerce, using storytelling, design, and cultural cues to elevate products beyond their functional value. But the sector’s potential is stifled by distribution bottlenecks and fragmented market access that leave even the most compelling brands struggling to reach their audience. Investment in scalable content production is inconsistent, and support structures for emerging brands are inconsistent at best. In the short term, invest in immersive storytelling and brand-led content marketing that draws consumers into the Lebanese narrative. Lebanese entrepreneurs, talented creative professionals, and CCI firms—building on the initiative-driven spirit that defines the Lebanese vibe—should lead this charge. In the medium term, they should collaborate to develop regional distribution hubs and export accelerators that give brands the logistical muscle they need. In the long term, a cooperation-focused government vision should elevate and amplify these private sector initiatives—deepen cross-border partnerships and expand regional networks to cement Lebanon’s creative products as premium offerings on the global stage.

Inclusive creative clusters and collaboration

Lebanon’s creative clusters have emerged organically, often without government design or regulatory frameworks. From artisans perfecting their craft in workshops in Bourj Hammoud, Tripoli, or Saida, to digital media startups experimenting in converted studios across Beirut, these ecosystems reflect grassroots energy—not industrial policy. However, startups and artisans often struggle to access financing, while fragmented markets and inequitable support systems hold back scale. Uneven quality controls erode competitiveness in high-value markets.

To unlock the economic potential of these clusters, Lebanon must shift from recognition to support. In the short term, this means formalizing these clusters through legal frameworks, quality assurance systems, and intellectual property protections. In the medium term, shared production facilities and mentorship platforms can give creators room to grow. And in the long term, targeted public policy—designed to stimulate cross-sector collaboration and anchored in regional competitiveness—can position Lebanon as a true hub of creative commerce in the Arab world.

Narrative power in creative economy

The country’s narrative strength is recognizable: a richly layered, cosmopolitan identity that draws on heritage to generate meaning, relevance and global appeal. Cultural policies, too often ad hoc and reactive, fail to provide the infrastructure needed to transform diversity into shared purpose. Too much of Lebanon’s global cultural output—particularly in cinema—still remains tethered to stories of war, trauma, and sectarian fracture. The opportunity now is to reposition Lebanon not merely as a country that has endured, but as a country that enables: a hub of creative energy, emotional fluency, and cultural design.

The role of national institutions is not to dictate this narrative, but to protect the creative space where it emerges—to convene, enable, and elevate. In the short term, this means supporting creators to define and tell authentic stories that resonate globally. In the medium term, it requires building the digital infrastructure, creative clusters, and export pipelines to deliver Lebanon’s creative voice to the world. And in the long term, it demands a national narrative framework—one that unites Lebanon’s diverse identities into a cohesive story.

The Lebanese vibe as strategy, not sentiment

From my position as Managing Partner of SRM, I’ve had the privilege of working alongside some of Lebanon’s most visionary creators. Through our support to NGOs, community-based organizations, and businesses across the arts, cinema, cultural heritage, ecotourism, design, film production, digital communication, and web development, I’ve seen closely how the Lebanese creative pulse converts into global relevance and measurable impact. SRM’s work has consistently shown that the five core traits of Lebanon’s creative economy—Resilient (Adaptability), Globally-Rooted (Connectivity), Authentic (Cultural Identity), Synergistic (Collaboration), and Influential (Narrative Power)—can be levers of economic transformation when embedded into policy frameworks and operational strategies.

Three urgent economic priorities that are observable from our work are the following:

  1. Retain and Recirculate Creative Talent: Lebanon must reverse its creative brain drain by deploying four strategic levers: establish Creative Tax Haven Zones to ease operational costs, launch Diaspora Co-Investment Funds to attract global Lebanese capital, implement Sectoral Fellowship and Buyback Programs to incentivize return, and build Creative Clusters with Infrastructure Subsidies to anchor talent in key sectors like film, design, fashion, and digital media. We need to make staying in Lebanon—or returning from abroad—not just a sentimental choice, but a viable economic one. In doing so, we could retain or repatriate up to 20,000 creative professionals, with a potential GDP impact of over $500 million annually.
  2. Export the Lebanese Vibe as a Cultural Intelligence Service: Beyond products and content, Lebanese creators offer something rare: the ability to translate culture into emotional intelligence. Our creative professionals can deliver adaptive, culturally attuned services to global markets—particularly across the Gulf, Francophone Africa, and diaspora hubs. With targeted policy recognition, IP protection, and export pipeline development, Lebanon could establish a $750 million annual industry rooted in narrative power and cultural fluency.
  3. Build a Cross-Sector Production Ecosystem: Lebanon has the raw ingredients to become a destination for global film and media production—geography, climate, competitive costs, and an emotionally rich creative workforce. But without equipping country-wide support sectors—construction, hospitality, logistics, crafts, fashion—with the standards and capabilities required by international production houses, this potential will remain theoretical. Through targeted incentives, creative clusters, and bundled service offerings, Lebanon could unlock $2 billion in cumulative inbound production over the next decade.

The Lebanese vibe is not a nostalgic brand—it’s a strategic national export. It encapsulates emotion, depth, adaptability, and elegance—the kind of intangible capital that can’t be replicated by industrial scale or petro-dollars. It is an ultimate comparative advantage: a high-value, low-capital asset rooted in people, not pipelines. In an era where differentiation, cultural relevance, and emotional resonance define global competitiveness, Lebanon’s creative economy stands uniquely positioned to deliver what others cannot. But for it to scale, we must shift from improvisation to intentionality—from isolated brilliance to coordinated infrastructure. We must export not just culture, but meaning—packaged with purpose, backed by policy, and aligned with national development. The cultural and creative economy is no longer Lebanon’s hidden asset—it is its loudest signal, and its most promising path forward.

Hamad Elias is a Managing Partner at Socially Responsible Management

June 18, 2025 0 comments
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