Society

Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil

by Executive Staff
written by Executive Staff

The oil industry’s manipulation of governments and the economies of countries to secure and increase profits has been happening almost since there was an industry to speak of. In Timothy Mitchell’s book “Carbon Democracy,” he highlights how through much of the early 20th century big oil companies worked to contain supply — in particular by preventing the emergence of an oil industry in the Middle East — to keep oil prices up, and consequently bolster profit margins.

Last year, the profits of the Big Five international oil companies (IOCs) — BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil and Shell — were up 75 percent on 2010, at a record $137 billion, yet production was down by 4 percent. And rather than invest heavily in production or job creation, these companies sunk $38 billion, or 28 percent of annual net income, in repurchasing their own stock, therefore boosting investor returns.

However, a major difference from the first half of last century is that IOCs are not able to negotiate quite the same profitable agreements with oil producing countries, or delay development, as before. This is reflected in the 2011 oil export revenues earned by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which for the first time exceeded $1 trillion. At the same time the OPEC results were announced last month, the Fraser Institute’s 2012 Global Petroleum Survey indicated that Middle Eastern countries have higher barriers to investment in hydrocarbon exploration and production than anywhere else in the world. There is a clear correlation here, as OPEC members have had to learn the hard way about who takes what for the extraction of underground riches; the IOCs have responded to this through the modes they still have influence over to retain profits.

In Carbon Democracy, Mitchell’s focus is the relationship between hydrocarbons and political institutions, tracking the changes from the industrial revolution all the way up to the so-called “Arab Spring” and how revenues from hydrocarbons are connected to democracy and economic development. Without oil, Mitchell argues, the current economic model of unlimited growth would not be possible, while the management of economic growth provided modes of regulation to govern carbon democracy.

Controlling supply is clearly a way of influencing prices and means of governing. This is one reason why there is a distinct lack of refineries in some oil producing countries, as delaying refining can artificially restrict the amount of oil that flows to the markets. But another reason is to drive a wedge between production and transportation, which helps prevent strikes and disruptions to the flow of oil by not overly centralizing the value chain and thus not have large concentrations of workers. This is a crucial point in Mitchell’s revealing book, as it was a deliberate government policy in the West in the lead up to World War One to switch from coal to oil to nip-in-the-bud further strikes by miners that had brought economies to a standstill. After all, miners’ strikes had led to the adoption of better working hours and conditions, welfare, healthcare and more democratic rights.

The chapters on the Middle East are particularly revealing, along with his debunking of conventional historical accounts — namely the discovery of oil and delayed exploitation — and what is misleadingly called the “oil crisis” of 1973, which was a pivotal event in transforming international finance, national economies, flows of energy and in placing the weakened carbon democracy of the West into a new relationship with the oil states of the Middle East.

Rather than being a black and white textbook case of supply and demand at work, of OPEC members cutting oil supply to pressure the United States over its unequivocal support for Israel during the October 1973 war, Mitchell shows that it was difficult to know how much oil prices went up due to a cut in supply or even how much supply was actually cut. For while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reduced exports, other countries increased production. Furthermore, unlike today, there was no ‘market price’ for crude oil, so no one could know what ‘the market’ actually was, while OPEC’s decision to raise tax on oil production by 70 percent at the time was somewhat coincidental, having been decided before the war broke out.

Mitchell’s book ends by considering the impact of supply constraints due to the rising demand for oil, and how climate change impacts market conditions in a post-oil world where alternative forms of energy will affect how people and economies are governed. How and when we might emerge into the post-oil world is, however, a question that remains to be answered.

0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Real Estate

More Bling on the beach

by Jeff Neumann
written by Jeff Neumann

To the more timid businessman, breaking ground on another exclusive beach club in Lebanon might not seem like a sound investment at the moment — given this summer’s grim tourism receipts and the grimmer questions over the civil war next door and how long that will go on. But the doom has done little to gloom the enthusiasm of another breed of developers who see so much long-term profit potential on Lebanon’s beaches that they won’t be deterred by a bit of war.

Among the new investment destinations is Nikki Beach, a project for a 46-villa seaside resort with hotel and club south of Beirut that is being developed as collaboration between local property company Zardman and Nikki Beach EMEA Hotels and Resorts, a unit of the Miami-based brand that specializes in glamour hospitality.

Forget your troubles in luxury
The chief underlying asset for the project is a 42,000-square meter seafront property in Damour and Zardman touts the location and accessibility from Beirut as selling points sure to attract investors when sales open later this month.

According to the developer, the project will entail a boutique hotel on the property, as well as amenities that five-star resort patrons would expect: spas, multiple swimming pools, restaurants, water sports, a fitness center and more.

However the resort's biggest asset, according to general manager of Zardman, Makram Zard, is its very limited capacity. “We are being very exclusive with sales,” he says, adding that, “If a client comes in with no background or familiarity with us we simply will not give them information. You will not see billboards advertising the sale [of our villas], we know who we want to attract.”

But another key selling point will be the Nikki Beach moniker aiming to brand the resort with global glitterati appeal. “We will operate the hotel and Zardman will sell villas. We will focus on quality of service and invest heavily in staff training,” Jihad Khoury, the chief executive of Nikki Beach EMEA Hotels and Resorts, tells Executive.

Set for delivery in 2014, the resort would be the third Nikki Beach in the Middle East and North Africa region, after resorts that are scheduled to open (with different partners) in Qatar this year and Cyprus in 2013. Plans for expansion of the Nikki Beach brand in the Middle East date back a few more years but did not pan out either in Lebanon or in Aqaba, Jordan.

Lebanon's 225-kilometers long coastline is dotted with many clubs and resorts in every price range and type, from the low-key bohemian to the techno-blasting beach party. Offering a glimpse on what Nikki Beach will use as lure for its clientele in Lebanon, the group eagerly flashes that it was once called the “Sexiest Place on Earth" in a British newspaper and voted the “World's #1 Sexiest Beach Bar” by international media outlets.

“When we met with the people from Nikki Beach we clicked right away,” says Zard. “We had the same vision for the project and knew this is something we would both benefit from.” Most of Zardman’s staff are in their 20s and early 30s — "a very young company,” according to Zard — and are tapped into what the mostly young and affluent clientele that Nikki Beach attracts worldwide are looking for in a beach destination.

Villas will start at around $320,000 and reach up to $600,000, and are offered in three sizes: 105, 125 and 155 square meters. Payment plans for the villas start at 15 percent down with the remaining balance to be paid over a four-year period. For the overall design, the Beirut office of US-based Soma Architects was tapped to lay out the villas, with Gatserelia Nawar & Associates handling the interiors. 

A sunny (and sandy) future
The Damour project will be Zardman’s first resort and while eager to disclose the price range for the villas the company would not disclose the cost of the entire planned development or the value of the assets it brings to the beach. Zardman holds a 27-year renewable lease on the land but would divulge in an interview with Executive only that the deed is held by its founder, and former Lebanese Canadian Bank chairman, Georges Zard Abou Jaoude.

According to Khoury, Nikki Beach EMEA Hotels and Resorts came aboard the project in 2011 after all licenses and planning for building structures had been completed. His rationale for getting involved is that Lebanon will remain a regional reference in hospitality and high-level entertainment and Nikki Beach would be seen as missing out if it did not open a branded resort here.

Khoury radiates confidence that the new project will be a winner even as the current wind is blowing tourism straight in the face. “It is an act of faith and as Lebanese, we have to have courage. The good years will more than make up for the bad ones," he says.

0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Rebuilding Syria after revolution

by Jihad Yazigi
written by Jihad Yazigi

Although now is apparently the time for destruction in Syria, hopefully, the time for reconstruction is not far off.

While it is difficult to estimate the actual cost of the damage inflicted to the country’s physical infrastructure by more than 16 months of a popular uprising — most of the destruction having actually occurred after the summer of 2011 — the Syrian National Council (SNC), which is considered by Western nations as their main interlocutor in the opposition, recently estimated that Syria would need some $12 billion in immediate financial support in the first six months after a potential fall of the regime.

While little of Syria’s large industrial concerns — such as power plants and refineries — have been hit, the urban landscape of many of the country’s cities is littered with flattened buildings, destroyed water, electricity and phone networks and crumbled roads and bridges. The cities of Homs — the country’s third-largest city — and Deir-ez-Zor have been particularly devastated, but so too have been dozens of smaller cities and towns across the country, in additional to the suburbs of Damascus and Aleppo. All-in-all, large parts of Syria will need to be entirely rebuilt.

It’s difficult to estimate what the $12 billion figure encompasses but if it were to cover only the first six months, this amount would exclude the cost of rebuilding most of the hard infrastructure, as this would obviously take much more than six months to carry out — in other words the total budget for rebuilding the country is likely to run much higher. In all cases, the question of how to source the money remains open.

Spokespersons from the SNC have said that they will seek support from “friends.” Knowing the financial turmoil the European Union and the United States are going through, they probably have in mind the deep-pocketed Gulf states, in particular Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which have been very active in supporting the opposition. Another issue to have in mind is the handling of any large disbursement of money. Indeed, contrary, for instance, to Libya or Iraq, which have vast reserves of oil and gas and therefore the means to reimburse almost any amount of debt they incur, Syrians will need to be very careful to efficiently use the money they will receive. Indeed, no one will lend money to Syria for free, and aside from the political cost that will come with such help there is also a financial cost, i.e. a debt burden that will be supported by the population for years if not decades to come.

Will any transitional government in Syria have the means to manage and spend $12 billion in financial support, let alone that it will have to be spent in only six months? From a political perspective, can a non-elected body — because any transitional authority is unlikely to be elected — legitimately spend such a large amount of money, an amount that will burden Syrians for years to come? How about the longer term and the larger amounts of money that will be associated with any reconstruction program that a future Syrian government will be in charge of? Can Syrians avoid the missteps and massive corruption that have come to be associated with the Iraqi reconstruction program?

The current and previous Syrian governments have shown a remarkable inability to handle large projects and to manage efficiently investments that carry significant costs. Indeed, very few of the large infrastructure projects announced by the Syrian authorities in the last two decades have taken off because of numerous bureaucratic and political constraints; and those that have been carried out have faced endless delays, cost overruns and suspicions of corruption.  It would be naïve to think that these obstacles will be bypassed easily. From what the opposition has shown in terms of (lack of) knowhow and capacity, and from what we know from the Iraqi experience, there is serious ground to worry.

Because of its political implications and future costs, any reconstruction program for Syria will have to make clear how it will be funded and repaid and what measures will be taken to limit corruption as much as possible; more importantly, however, it must be sanctioned by legitimate representatives of the people if it is to embody a meaningful new beginning for the country.

 

JIHAD YAZIGI is editor-in-chief of The Syrian Report

0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Syria’s arms economy

by Nicholas Blanford
written by Nicholas Blanford

The prices of some popular weapons on Lebanon's black market have dropped for the first time since the uprising against the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad began in March 2011.

Bearing in mind that the demand that drove prices to record highs was almost all from Syria, the recent dip appears to strengthen reports that Syria's armed opposition is gaining ever-greater access to weapons and ammunition.

The two weapon types that recorded the largest drop are AK-47 rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. In March 2011, a good-quality Russian AK-47 or the Polish-manufactured version, known in Lebanon as a “Circle 11” from the stamp on the metalwork, cost around $1,100. By April this year, however, the rifle had doubled in price to around $2,200. The price climb for RPGs was even higher. A single grenade in March 2011 was worth $100 (itself a significant rise given that five years earlier it was selling for about $10). By April, however, it was nudging close to $1,000. Arms dealers were grumbling that they could not even find RPG rounds on the market.

However, since the beginning of May, both AK-47 and RPG prices have dropped to around $1,800 and $700 respectively. The cost of 7.62mm ammunition for the AK-47 also has declined from around $100 for a box of 50 rounds in April to $83 in June. Both AK-47 rifles and RPGs were the most commonly used, and sought after, weapons for the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and other armed opposition groups. The drop in prices suggests that the FSA is receiving a regular supply of armaments today, which has lessened demand in Lebanon.

It is widely believed that Saudi Arabia and Qatar have begun funding the FSA and that fresh arms supplies are reaching the fighters, mainly from Turkey. The New York Times reported in mid-June that CIA officers were in Turkey monitoring the flow of weapons to ensure that the recipients were not groups that shared Al-Qaeda's ideology.

The FSA also has had increasing success in raiding Syrian army depots and stealing weapons and ammunition, or co-opting Syrian army officers with access to arsenals. Indeed, the profits to be made from selling weapons have spurred Syrian soldiers to steal weapons and sell them on the black market, according to Lebanese arms dealers. That has led to some Syrian army weapons, including RPG rounds, to enter the Lebanese market.

The enormous profits to be made from selling arms has blurred political loyalties. There is a story presently circulating in the Bekaa about a member of a Syrian-backed political party who was in charge of the group's arsenal in his village. He struck a deal with a man from an influential family to sell the weapons to the Syrian opposition and they would split the proceeds. The weapons were duly sold across the border, but the second man then refused to share the profit with the party member. In revenge, the party member told the police where they could find the second man, who had a string of arrest warrants. The police laid an ambush and the second man died in a gunfight. The relatives of the second man then kidnapped the party member and he has not been seen since.

While AK-47 and RPG prices have declined, the cost of prestige weapons continues to climb. They include arms such as the AKS-74U, popularly known in Lebanon as the “Bin Laden gun” as it apparently was favored by the former Al-Qaeda leader. A Bin Laden gun costs $5,000 today, compared to about $2,800 a year ago. A Russian “Dushka” 12.7mm heavy machine gun is worth a staggering $9,000 compared to $3,000 in March 2011. Even that pales to the price of an American M4 assault rifle fitted with a M203 grenade launcher. Worth $5,000 in March 2011, today it will set you back at least $15,000.

 

NICHOLAS BLANFORD is the Beirut-based correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor and The Times of London

0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

Getting Beirut’s green back

by Ali Sayed-Ali
written by Ali Sayed-Ali

On a hot Saturday in mid-June, hundreds of young people across Beirut took part in a campaign to temporarily occupy key high traffic locations and replace them with ‘guerrilla gardens’. What took place was a welcome contrast from the tire-burning and road-blocking protests of late; instead, participants laid out patches of grass on sidewalks and roundabouts and picnicked under umbrellas to raise the profile of their cause for public green spaces.

Only two days before, the chief of the Beirut municipality, Bilal Hamad, held a press conference to announce the launch of the “Beirut is Amazing” initiative. Attempting to both respond to public pressure and direct the discourse, Hamad announced plans to rejuvenate the city’s parks. Unfortunately, the project is as uninspired as its name, and ignores an area constituting 77 percent of the city’s public green space — the Horsh Beirut. This park is a key issue of the guerrilla gardeners.

The Horsh — destroyed by fire in an Israeli raid during the civil war — is a sprawling 330,000 square meter urban park that until now is reserved for the exclusive use of those selected by the Beirut governorate. Only two years ago this historic piece of real estate was a non-issue for most Beirutis. That was until a non-governmental organization called Nahnoo (Arabic for ‘us’) rallied supporters and started asking the right questions. Today, beyond their media campaign, Nahnoo has compiled research, consulted legal experts and urban planners, organized public events and coupled advocacy with a policy focus to lobby cooperatively with decision makers.  The movement, however, isn’t without detractors — including many ordinary citizens from neighborhoods around the park. In typical ‘tragedy of the commons’ rationale, critics of the campaign say the Lebanese will not be able to collectively own such a pristine space without destroying it, pointing to threats as terrifying as barbecues, argileh, littering, and “immoral behavior”; thus, we must deprive ourselves of our public space in order to protect it. Hamad himself made these very arguments during a public forum organized by Nahnoo earlier this year.  The forum attracted an almost full house at Hamra’s Madina Theatre, where the majority of the audience was too young to remember the park in its glory days. Many were also angry. They saw the park’s closure as an act of exclusion, one that deprived them of a much-needed refuge from Beirut’s concrete jungle and a meeting point in a city that has one of the lowest levels of public green space in the world. Of course, it is not simply about green space, and the reasons given for the parks closure are superficial at best.

In a sectarian and segregated city the park takes on new meaning. Its triangular shape separates the suburbs from the city with barb-wired walls, keeping Christian, Sunni, and Shia neighborhoods apart. The question that many are asking away from the spotlight reveals an unspoken yet palpable sectarian turf war: “Who will control the park?” Of course legally, the municipality would be required to ensure the park remains clean and safe. On the ground, control is exercised differently. Groups of young men loyal to this or that political bloc could set up shop, hang their flags and effectively “take over” the space. Some believe that Sunni and Shia youth will clash and the violence could ruin Horsh Beirut.

Those leading the campaign for public access to the park understand the risks and realize that a sense of community ownership is necessary for its survival once opened. This is why they are planning to use the space to bring youth together, undertake public education programs and create an active Horsh Beirut neighborhood association to play a role in ensuring responsible use of the park. The tug of war over this rare publicly-owned green oasis in a slowly suffocating city represents a clash between two ideologies: those with a ‘fear-of-the-other’ worldview and a new generation that refuses to submit to prevailing stereotypes and are adamant about reclaiming public space for the people; while the former sees the park through the prism of perpetual conflict and eyes it with suspicion, the latter looks to make the Horsh a space for community and unity, and a source of hope for the future. In many ways, it is the struggle between continuing to entrench the trauma of the civil war and moving Lebanese society forward.

 

ALI SAYED-ALI works in democracy and civil society development in the MENA region

0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Comment

A dwindling number of options

by Jihad Yazigi
written by Jihad Yazigi

Press reports that the Syrian government is printing money in Russia to pay civil servants salaries and to close its budget deficit have raised serious concerns.

Two issues — one political and the other financial — are at stake.

The decision to print Syrian bank notes in Russia has been known for some time, as the Minister of Finance, Mohammad Jleilati, announced at the end of May that his government was close to finalizing discussions with the Russian authorities for that purpose. It follows a ban imposed last fall by the European Union on printing Syrian bank notes; two EU members, Austria and Belgium, were among the countries printing Syrian currencies.

However, by going to Moscow, the Syrian authorities have only confirmed an increased dependency towards their Russian counterparts, with all the political consequences that this new state of affairs may entail. For months now, the consecutive rounds of sanctions imposed by the EU, the United States, the Arab League and Turkey have squeezed the Syrian government’s room to maneuver and increased reliance on Russia. Last December, for instance, the Central Bank of Syria announced that it had opened correspondent accounts with three Russian banks — VTB, VEB and Gazprombank — in a bid to avert new sanctions on its foreign assets by the European Union, which were eventually imposed in February.

Since then, there has been speculation that much of the country’s foreign reserves had been moved to Moscow, though a lack of transparency makes it difficult to confirm the location of these assets or their size (estimated at around $17 billion prior to the beginning of the uprising in March 2011). Other indications of this growing dependency include negotiations to have Syria join the existing Customs Union that consists of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, or the recent series of bilateral agreements in sectors as varied as petroleum, electricity and manufacturing.

As international calls for action to stop the bloodshed in Syria grow, Russia is likely to hold an increasing number of cards in its hand to pressure Damascus. From a financial and monetary point of view, however, the main issue of concern is not where Syria prints its currency but for what purpose. Indeed, while the story initially published by Reuters quoted Syrian bankers saying that the newly printed money was meant to finance the government’s deficit, the governor of the Syrian Central Bank strongly denied it, saying that the new bank notes would replace worn out bills, an operation the central bank “has been regularly doing since it was established just like every central bank around the world.” The government has also denied it was having any difficulties financing salaries and other payables; Jleilati recently said that the 2012 budget deficit was forecast at a reasonable 6 to 7 percent of gross domestic product, in line with expectations. The Minister of Finance has an obvious interest in downplaying the difficulties his government is facing, but while there is little doubt that the treasury is increasingly strained, it is difficult to claim that a collapse is imminent.

It will not be easy to identify the purpose for the government to print new bank notes. Since May 2011, the Central Bank has stopped publishing its monthly bulletin, which reported, among other things, the levels of money supply. What is clear, however, is that if the government were to resort to the printing press to finance its expenses, the risk is an immediate inflationary impact.

While the government had managed to keep a relative lid on the consumer price index for most of last year, prices have jumped in recent months, climbing 15 percent in January on an annual basis, and more than 30 percent in March and April — including a more than 40 percent increase in the food and beverages category. Relying on the printing press, therefore, risks increased social unrest.

However, the only obvious conclusion from this debate is that both from a political point of view and from a financial rationale, the options at the hands of the Syrian government are fast declining.

 

JIHAD YAZIGI is editor-in-chief of The Syria Report

0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Economics & Policy

Q&A – Walid Daouk

by Zak Brophy
written by Zak Brophy

Walid Daouk, Lebanon’s minister of Information, was given a baptism of fire upon taking his post in June 2011 when his pet piece of draft legislation, The Lebanese Internet Regulation Act (LIRA), caused a storm of opposition and vitriolic denunciations, leading it to being put on the back burner. Executive met with the minister to discuss life after the LIRA and the promise and perils within Lebanon’s media sector.   

What was your incentive to develop the LIRA legislation?
I have not seen any legislation related to electronic media. What I had in mind was to protect the [news] websites. There are so many of them and they are of great importance. In the coming couple of years they will become more important than the newspapers. I said let’s not try to regulate, but fix it in some way. I had two ideas. The first was to put a label that will let us know where the website is domiciled. This would make it more credible.

The second part of the law was to help the websites get better services. What can you do if another website is able to steal your content as soon as you post it? So to protect the intellectual property rights of a website, I would say the registered website would benefit from the legal intellectual property rights in Lebanon.

Were you surprised by the backlash to your proposed law?
Unfortunately I didn’t lobby with the community because it didn’t occur to [me]. I saw there was a loophole in the law and I wanted a law that would benefit the owners of the websites. In my mind it was great, but unfortunately some people were against it and said that I am against freedom of speech. This is not true, in the second article of the draft law I said freedom of speech was fully respected.

Do you still think new websites, news or otherwise, should have to register with the government?
No, they don’t have to. The law is for those that want to. It is not obligatory.

Would Lebanese libel law also apply to the registered websites?
Yes, if a website is registered I would know where it is domiciled and therefore if people are illegally harmed by these sites they could take them to a Lebanese court.

Would content on social media websites be subject to these regulations?
No, absolutely not. This has nothing to do with it and you cannot control this.

Is LIRA dead in the water now?
It is put aside for now as there is a draft law that concerns all of the media and it is being studied within a media commission at the parliament. Definitely it is better to have everything within a greater code, but my idea was to address this loophole quickly. In any case it is optional. A media code in parliament in my opinion will take many years to pass, during which time we will still have the loophole.

With so many media barons represented in parliament, will this law pass?
It will but the questions are ‘if’ and ‘how’. It is so political. This is why I prepared my draft law to be quick.

On Twitter recently, you said you believed in “absolute freedom of speech in any blog or any media” but later tweeted “bloggers in some circumstances should refrain from telling the whole truth for the sake of the public and the community.” There seems to be an inherent contradiction here.
It is not a contradiction. I believe fully in freedom of speech. However, in some professions, such as lawyers or doctors, there is a ‘code of ontology’.

But doctors and lawyers are responsible to their patient and client. Who are journalists responsible to protect?
You can say whatever you want as long as what you say does not harm the public interest.

Who determines that?
There must be a code of conduct for journalists and the media sector but in Lebanon this does not exist. I am pushing for such a code.

Enforceable by law?
Definitely not. It should be by the media’s own adherence.

Most journalists don’t have access to the editor’s syndicate and there is no union or syndicate for broadcast journalists. What are you doing to formalize this profession and to ensure journalists can enjoy proper professional support and protection?
The syndicate was presided over by the same chairman for the past 50 years [Melhem Karam]. To join the syndicate was something pending his will. These days, however, we should not only leave the syndicate open for the ones who benefited from the time of Melhem Karam. Now we should open the syndicate for all journalists.

Does the ministry have a role to play in that process?
The ministry has a moral role and I am trying to push it.  I am going further, to have the syndicate become a federation, because now it does not include the broadcast journalists. We want everyone in the media profession included, such as the photographers and the sound engineers… I want to have a federation that is one body that is united and therefore stronger.

This is what you would like to see but have you seen any movement in that direction?
It is too early to say but the new syndicate was voted three weeks ago and I am pushing very hard in this direction.

Chapter 10 of the Audio Visual Law aims to limit political and corporate control of the media but is patently not enforced. Can the ministry do anything to curb the increasingly partisan and sectarian tone of the Lebanese media?
Unfortunately not, for political reasons I can’t even impose penalties against any defaulting media — that is to say media that is not in line with their conditions of contract, and unfortunately they are all breaching the law. However, I can re-equilibrate by improving the public media.

Previous cabinets wanted to protect their own [political] and religious media. No cabinet dared to strengthen the public media. They neglected it. I am saying it is now time to reinforce Tele and Radio Liban to give them their federative role.

This takes money. Where is this going to come from?
The government could get the money even if it will take a lot. I don’t have today the intention to be in competition with the private media, especially in television. But Tele Liban could have a niche where it could succeed, for example in education or local output. Commercial stations would not go there because it would not generate much advertising. Tele Liban’s news gets good audiences. We are around 4 percent, which  in my opinion is good. We also have the national news agency, which has correspondents all over Lebanon. We are the first to broadcast the news but the majority of the media takes the news from the NNA and then do not credit it.

Lebanon’s predominance in Arab media has dwindled in the face of huge budgets and assertive media coming from the Gulf and other areas of the region. On a policy level can anything be done to ensure Lebanon maintains a prime position within the regional media?
Yes. I hope to have a Beirut media center. At the Dubai media center the majority of the workers there are Lebanese.  The idea is to have a media city, or cities, in Lebanon where you can incorporate the studios and the newspaper buildings. I am confident we can attract these Lebanese ex-pats back to Lebanon.

Many of the TV licenses expire this year.  Can we expect new terms of contract or will the status quo continue?
Unfortunately the status quo will remain.

Why unfortunately?
Because everyone knows there is a breach in the conditions of contract, and unfortunately for political reasons nobody is being penalized for these breaches.

 

0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail