Comment

Simmering discontent in Nahr el-Bared

by Josh Wood
written by Josh Wood

It is five years to the month that the siege of Nahr El Bared began near Tripoli, and while the guns have gone silent, the potential for renewed conflict involving Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps looms ever as large. 

In conversations and interviews since with representatives from the different Palestinian factions in the camps — often in places where Kalashnikovs are stacked indiscreetly in the corner — the topic of Nahr El Bared has inevitably come up. The 2007 battle destroyed the camp, displaced tens of thousands and killed hundreds of Lebanese soldiers and mostly foreign Fatah Al Islam militants; it also represents for many Palestinians both their precarious position in Lebanon and the country’s careless disregard for their suffering.

To the south, in Lebanon’s largest refugee camp, Ain Al Helweh, the precarious security conditions that resulted in the Nahr El Bared fighting are mirrored in many ways. In Ain Al Helweh, the absence of proper governance, or even a single dominant armed faction or alliance, has allowed space for militant Jihadist organizations such as Usbat Al Ansar, Jund Al Sham and the Abdullah Azzam Brigades to establish themselves. Like Fatah Al Islam, such organizations operate with little regard for camp residents, the stability of the country or the few observed “rules of the game” that exist in relations between the Lebanese and mainstream Palestinian factions. 

The potential security threat these groups pose came up again in March when an Abdullah Azzam Brigades cell was discovered within the Lebanese army.  For the Lebanese government, trying to move security forces into the camp and arrest wanted extremists like Abdullah Azzam Brigades leader Tawfik Taha could risk another Nahr El Bared-type conflict. And yet, if nothing is done, the government facilitates the perpetuation of such groups and risks the increased likelihood of future confrontation. For mainstream Palestinian factions, who may not see eye-to-eye with the Lebanese government in general but also reject these fringe groups, moving against an organization such as the Abdullah Azzam Brigades risks sparking intra-Palestinian fighting within the camp. There are no easy solutions.

The Lebanese government has not, however, made any effective attempt to repair relations with mainstream Palestinians groups since the Nahr El Bared conflict. With the reconstruction still incomplete, mired in the contentions of politics and security and assailed by accusations of corruption, many Palestinians, already skeptical of the Lebanese state, have become even more suspicious of its intentions towards them. Relying primarily on donor funding for the rebuilding of the camp, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, tasked with managing the reconstruction, seems hobbled by mismanagement, ineffectiveness and underfunding: it is still more than $180 million short of the funds it says it needs for the project, but with little headway made on the reconstruction, donors have been hesitant to pump more money in.

Declared a closed military zone, there is also a fear that Lebanese security forces will also attempt to maintain a presence in Nahr El Bared if the camp is ever rebuilt — a move that would be an unwelcomed precedent in Lebanon’s other camps. 

If the intent of the heavy-handed destruction at Nahr El Bared was meant to teach a lesson to the more mainstream Palestinian factions that hold sway in most of the camps and encourage them to disarm, it largely failed. Having lost another of their camps, many Palestinians see arms as the only way to guarantee their safety from the government or militant groups, and today the camps remain one of the few places in the country where weapons are openly flaunted and military positions are occupied during times of peace.

With the eyes of Lebanon following potential crises that seem to present a more immediate danger — such as the specter of a return to political assassinations and the possibility of the Syrian conflict spilling across the border — the problems brewing in the camps are allowed to fester unseen on the other side of Army checkpoints. To ignore and leave unaddressed the plight of Palestinians in Lebanon’s refugee camps, however, is to leave burning a fire which could easily flare out of control, yet again.

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Society

Firing up the frozen desert

by Nadim Mehanna
written by Nadim Mehanna

As the last snow melts on Lebanon's mountain tops and with the ski season firmly over, ice racing is probably not the kind of driving experience you are gearing up for. But Lebanon's coldest winter in more than a decade certainly proved advantageous when our team went to the Arctic Circle for some extreme driving on ice, with Lebanon's mountain roads and abundant snowfall having provided a degree of preparation for extreme driving in minus twenty degrees Celsius. 

The ice circuit in Sweden's Lapland came about by chance some fifteen years ago, when a research team from Bosch accidentally arrived at a dot on the map called Arjeplog and found the perfect environment for testing equipment in sub-zero conditions. Bosch was soon joined by German car manufacturers for the same reason, creating replica racing tracks like Formula 1's Hockenheim, Indianapolis, the Euro Speedway and the Spa Francorchamps.

No brakes, all engine

So when Mercedes’ AMG asked us to stay at their Arjeplog lodge we leapt at the chance. After the plane touched down on the ice, the first stop was the garage: three lines of 15 E63 AMGs, C63 AMGs and the new SLK AMGs. Our group jumped into the E63 monsters with 525 horsepower and 700 Newton meters (Nm) of torque, to take us to an iced-over lake that, once out of the car, was so slippery we nearly ended up on our backsides.

The first firm order from instructor Bernd Schneider, five-time winner of the DTM (German touring car championship) and an ex-Formula 1 driver, was to “DSC OFF” — all electronic aids deactivated, so no guardian angels and just spiked tires to help stay on the “track.”

The first push on the accelerator delivered such a rush of torque that the spikes were unable to cope with it and the car went on a 80 degree drift. Running through bends at a 100 kilometers per hour there is some serious G-force at work that can only be countered by steering, throttling and never breaking. But despite the E63 AMG weighing in at two tons, the chassis was incredibly stable while the surgically precise throttle, the torque and the power made the AMG a cinch to drive in that icy wasteland. 

The next morning was spent roaring around the simulation race tracks, and in the afternoon the AMGs were fitted with on-board cameras with telemetry equipment for the competition to really begin. With a benchmark set by Schneider of 1.22.30, the AMGs set off one by one, with the teams keeping a watch out for cars that slid off into the snow banks on either side of the tracks. Any car requiring a tow from the G Class Mercedes cost the team a point, so there was a lot of snow spraying around as drivers tried to get back on the ice and team members puffed and panted to push the car out as best they could.

Drifting to win

After the race was over, telemetry analysis started with most recorded times 5 to 10 seconds slower than Schneider’s time. Then it was announced that the Lebanese team had collectively scored the fastest times, even slightly faster than Schneider's, although it must be said that he did not set his best time ever. Given the competition out on the ice, Schneider was surprised by the Lebanese effort, quipping: “You guys are really quick, where did you learn how to drive on snow in the desert?” Obviously, the remark was met with more than a few raised eyebrows. 

The last day was spent on faster tracks where drivers could really let the cars go full out, drifting at speeds of up 130 km per hour. It soon reached a point where drifting became almost second nature. While the AMGs were incredible out on the “rink,” we also drove the SLK 55 and C-Class 63 Coupe. The C63 Coupe was over powered for such conditions, and the SLK was the by far best on ice, being smaller and feeling like your were almost go-carting as the car drifted around the track.

Overall, a highly recommended trip, a total disconnection from everything and the ability to drive in a way you would never normally experience, even if you managed to get your car to the top of one of Faraya’s ski slopes.

 

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The celebration of suffering

by Jihad Yazigi
written by Jihad Yazigi

The announcement by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé on April 17 that Syria’s foreign currency reserves had halved since the beginning of the popular uprising in the country is hardly something to celebrate. Valued at $17 billion at the end of 2010, they would now be standing at some $8.5 billion according to Juppé’s estimate. 

Providing a correct measure of Syria’s foreign reserves has always been problematic. While in most parts of the world foreign reserves are handled by the central bank, in Syria they are managed by two separate institutions: the Central Bank of Syria and the Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS). This is a consequence of the fact that CBS has been acting for decades as the bank of all public sector enterprises, including the Syrian Petroleum Company whose exports of crude oil were the main source of the Syrian government’s foreign reserve accumulation in the last 20 years.

The foreign assets previously known to be held by these two banks, however, adds up to only about $10.7 billion — somewhat short of $17 billion. One explanation for this, according to some insiders, is that not all reserves are calculated at the same conversion rate, with some pegged at 47 Syrian pounds to the United States dollar (the going rate at the end of 2010), and others at 11.5 pounds to the dollar (a rate the government used in some transactions until the late 1990s). The conclusion of all this is straightforward: you cannot rely much on Syrian central bank data.

But let’s go back to Mr. Juppé. The French FM made his announcement a few days before foreign ministers of western countries were set to meet in Paris to discuss additional sanctions on Syria. The collapse of Syria’s reserves was presented as a success for the international community in using sanctions to inflict damage on the Syrian economy — and, as a consequence, on the regime, as many analysts would have us to believe.

However, one needs to be clear: rejoicing in a country losing in less than a year assets it took decades to accumulate is simply insane, if not cruel. The implosion of Syria’s middle class and a gradual decline in the average purchasing power began in the mid-1980s, when a severe foreign currency crisis reduced the country’s reserves to the equivalent of less than one month of imports. Things began to improve only from the latter part of the decade when the first oil fields discovered by Royal Dutch Shell and Total S.A. began production.

Syria’s production of crude oil then increased gradually until it peaked at around 600,000 barrels per day in 1996. The period witnessed strong economic growth but also the implementation of a strict austerity program by the government, similar in many ways to the stabilization measures applied by the IMF in various countries across the world.

This program was strongly criticized by economists, and has been blamed for the state’s disinvestment from vast segments of the economy and for the stagnation in real incomes, but it had one benefit, namely saving foreign reserves for future generations.

This is what Syria is now set to lose. Not only are years of efforts being spoiled, but it is the reconstruction of the country that is rendered more difficult; future investment requirements that are made more difficult to fund. One good argument for this state of affairs, from the point of view of Western governments at least, is that a weakening of the state — because that is what the fall in reserves is about — would lead to a weakening of the regime and as a consequence to its fall.

There is historical precedent. This is exactly what many decision makers were saying in 1990 when sanctions were imposed on Iraq. We all remember the consequences of that, not least that Sadam Hussein stayed in power for 12 more years. In the meantime, the Iraqi population suffered, its social fabric was destroyed, and millions were displaced and driven into poverty. Failed sanctions were then followed by an American-led invasion.

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Society

Lacking the LUXury

by Yasser Akkaoui
written by Yasser Akkaoui

The problem with opening a restaurant that pleases everyone’s palate and becomes one of the city’s institutions is that if you try to do it again, you have set the bar so high that you might not make it over. Such is the case of Beirut’s latest upper-crust addition to the cities cuisiniere: LUX. Brought to us by none other than the same Johnny Farah and co. behind the famed and flavorful Casablanca, LUX has the feel of an upstate New York-style dinner with the clientele of Brooklyn’s Peter Luger Steakhouse.  

What its creators understand well is the economics of proximity: the Marfaa district of Beirut is fast becoming our version of the Empire City’s Meat Packing District with names like Farah’s own IF, Karen Chekarjian’s Atelier and Robert Keyrouz’s boutique, all choosing it for its ‘edgy on the water’ feel. But its not there yet. 

All the districts that have become our capital’s bohemian bread and butter — from Monot to Mar Mikhael — started with a select few flagship locales before bursting out into multi-million dollar industries in and of themselves. To reach this critical economic mass, those first few concepts have to be airtight, not places that lose steam once people figure them out.  

For those of us who expect the quality and feel that Casablanca gives us (and we do), the Asian fusion at LUX leaves much to be desired, apart from the meat Carpaccio, but do not try the fish as it is, well, fishy. What is perhaps even more perplexing is how an organic salad made by the same folks at Casa can taste so different — now that takes talent. And even for those of us who don’t mind spending a little extra to get a little more, a nice bottle of wine and a par-for-the-course dinner shouldn’t cost $250, even if the bottle docked me around $100.

This can all be overlooked if the ambiance can cover for it. But apart from the character the rusty sign at the entrance brings — which I recall seeing at the Carawan Gallery just a stone’s throw from the place — there is not much else to keep me enthralled except for the politeness of the staff. 

One thing that works at the moment is the clientele. Already, given the name and the area, the people you want to see and be seen by are there. But even if you strike up a conversation with the jolly bartender and then look around for less-busy company, you will find it hard to make the usual eyes around the room. Unlike Casa, the layout of LUX means you will be poking your head around the corner and glaring across the room, instead of flicking a glance at the lady in red. 

If LUX were just another addition to an already thriving district of bars and restaurants perhaps its shortcomings could be overlooked. But as a flagship restaurant of the Marfaa district it lacks the lure to drive people away from their comfort zones in other parts of the city. So, like many things in life, the original turned out considerably more captivating than the sequel.

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We’ve heard that joke before

by Thomas Schellen
written by Thomas Schellen

April has the connotation of pulling people’s legs. On April 1, for example, Israel’s naval commander Major General Ram Rotenberg’s ordering of three vessels to prepare an overnight sail to Naples to commence a 10 day exercise. Reports on Israel Radio said officers and crew were not amused when they found out on Sunday morning, after working through the night, that the whole thing was their commander’s idea of a wholesome joke. April Fools!  One hopes it was not meant as such a cruel jest when it was suggested that Lebanon could get a new techno park for entrepreneurs — a locale where startup companies and small enterprises with a high-tech edge could avail themselves of broadband connectivity and hard and soft business infrastructure. Yet when two highly positioned voices in the Lebanese socioeconomic fabric said, in a curious coincidence of timings just ahead of April 1, that they could provide the country with a techno park, more than one person asked me if I thought they were serious.

The economic heavyweights who announced techno park project ideas were Mounir Douaidy, the general manager of Lebanon’s urban developer, Solidere, on March 29, and Nicolas Sehnaoui, the minister of telecommunications, on March 30.  Doueidy positioned his projected park in Solidere’s Waterfront District while Sehnaoui pointed to a government property in the municipality of Dekwaneh. 

The idea of a techno park is neither bad nor new. Clustering of businesses is a good way to enhance competitiveness and generate synergies. The concept rose to global acceptance in the 1990s through the mother of all information and communications technology (ICT) clusters, Silicon Valley. The datedness of the techno park concept, however, casts the first doubt over the seriousness of these latest Lebanese projects. There have been at least three major aborted ICT park projects in this country among the many victims of Lebanon’s chronic disease of unrealized projects. The latest attempt was called the Beirut Emerging Technology Zone (BETZ). Researched from the late 1990s, this tech zone project was finally shipwrecked about five years ago in Damour, the sleepy coastal town south of Beirut selected as “perfect” for locating the zone.

Why would a new Lebanese techno park succeed, more than a decade after other countries in the Middle East established their ICT clusters, such as Smart Villages in Egypt and Dubai Internet City in the United Arab Emirates? On the other hand, the absence of first-mover and big-size advantages doesn’t predicate failure of a good concept.  Also, the success of other clusters in the Middle East (and some will argue, of Lebanon’s Berytech technopole) demonstrates the potential of new techno parks. The next question is why did Lebanon’s ICT zones never get off the ground at the time when they were avant-garde projects? Dumb question, sad answer: politics, of course. BETZ ran into petty political cliffs even on the municipal level. Looking at Damour in hindsight, it seems it was much easier to build beach resorts than create ICT clusters. This notwithstanding, there is no disputing Lebanon’s comparative advantages vis-à-vis other locations in the Middle East in human capital, entrepreneurial spirit, and even private sector business dynamism. 

The ingredients are there, but are the consensus and will strong enough to overcome political inertia and clusters of administrative incompetence? This crucial question returns us to the issue of insincere projects and reputation management. Douaidy was sincere on the company’s agenda by saying that Solidere was thinking about making Waterfront lots available for the project on a temporary basis as, “it could be a few years before we start selling these lots for development.” 

Even before his presentation at the ArabNet entrepreneurship summit in March, members of his team emphasized that Solidere is “only thinking about a techno park in the Waterfront.” Asked almost a month later if there was any progress on the idea, they said, no, not really. 

It is true that temporary projects in Lebanon mysteriously instill more confidence than big master plans. But will a consultation with entrepreneurs and a presentation of a good idea be enough to start us on an ICT cluster in Beirut, where budding Lebanese entrepreneurs can gear up in the next few years toward serving the growing markets of countries such as Iraq and, hopefully, Syria?

Methinks not. Kindly, Lebanon, prove me wrong

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Business

Rooted in the roof

by Thomas Schellen
written by Thomas Schellen

When people mess with botany in the design sort of way, you either get a sculpted garden or a jungle feeling. The former can be as totally enthralling as the Jardins du Château de Versailles, but at the economic cost of having to be manicured constantly and at the ecological expense of being and appearing highly artificial. 

The less obviously intrusive design is the hallmark of the organic approach, which appears to be working well enough on the business side for Green Studios, a recent Lebanese entrepreneurial venture. Green is so ueber-in as a corporate marketing mantra that it is almost prohibitive to trust a company that comes bearing a green moniker on its forehead. But you can trust the business story of the Green Studios venture to be solidly rooted in the most traditional art of shaping and uplifting the human environment with greenery: they design and deliver rooftops and walls that resemble green fields and gardens. “We are a local startup of four major partners, each coming from a different discipline,” said Jamil Corbani, chief executive of Green Studios.

The twist is that the partners in Green Studios have approached this conventional business with some novel homegrown research and development (R&D), a patent (how rarely does a reporter hear of new patents made in Lebanon), and have sprouted from zero revenues to profitability in only the company’s second year, with a net income of slightly over $100,000 on revenues of $471,000 in 2011.

Profits bloom

For the current business year, (which ends on August 30), Green Studios predict a year-on-year increase of 17 percent in revenues to $550,000 and 7 percent net income hike to $110,000. Corbani said revenues and gross profits from September 2011 to February 2012 jumped 300 percent when compared with the same period in 2010 to 2011, implying that the company made a huge leap in the second half of its fiscal 2011. Green Studios was incorporated on September 1, 2009. 

The elements driving their growth spurt were initial market exposure through the Project Lebanon exhibition in June 2010, registration of its patent in April 2011, winning of an entrepreneurship award from the Beirut Traders’ Association and Bank Audi in June 2011, and landing a green wall project with the Lebanese benchmark developer, Solidere. 

“As soon as we registered the patent we were well positioned for business,” Corbani said. He called the win of the first prize in the Beirut Traders’ Grow My Business (GMB) competition “super important” for boosting the team’s morale and for building the company’s momentum, in combination with the contract for the green wall in the Sweat Tea hospitality establishment in the Beirut Souks, the flagship commercial development of Solidere. 

Working on the Sweat Tea project with a renowned French landscape architect and expert in green walls provided Green Studios with a huge learning experience, Corbani said. The company furthermore established contacts with a German firm, ZinCo Green Roof, which holds a number of patents in the technology. According to Corbani, Green Studios will collaborate with ZinCo on green roof technology for hot climates. Joachim Stroh, a spokesperson for ZinCo, confirmed to Executive that the two companies had signed a letter of intent. 

The German firm, which has activities in about 40 countries and on its website claims to be a global market leader in the technology of green installations, eyes the Arab market for expansion, Stroh said. 

Remarkably, the evolution of Green Studios did not, at least not initially, involve any market research or business plan. It was more of an existential move, as his spouse’s determination to have the couple’s first child in Lebanon motivated Corbani to look for an entrepreneurship opportunity in their home country where he could use his training as an economist and experience in hydroponics and agriculture. Linking up with friends versed in architecture, landscape architecture and agricultural engineering, led to the establishment of the company.

Each contributed modest financial capital — the company’s description in the business outline submitted to GMB put its combined common equity and additional paid-in capital at $106,000 — with Corbani the largest single shareholder at 46 percent. The partners split their investment capital equally between R&D into hydroponics and plants on one hand and landscape design capabilities on the other hand. The firm’s operational bases are a nursery in Tabarja, north of Beirut, and a small design office in the Beirut suburb of Antelias. 

According to Corbani, the firm’s competitive edge lies in its specialization in green installations in hot climates. Its patent is for a “skin”, the plantable surface that can be mounted on a wall or roof to make it a green wall or roof. 

The market size that Green Studios sees in Lebanon is only a rough guess. “We estimate that three percent of landscaping jobs are high-end jobs and that five percent of these high-end landscaping jobs are up for grabs [for the company]. This gives you a target to reach $3 million to $4 million annually after five years,” Corbani said.

In pursuing its long-term commercial aims of becoming a leader in green installations suitable for hot weathers, the company now wrestles with two objectives of doing more R&D and acquiring more business through regional expansion of operations. “Our main concern is how we will really balance these two, because we are very young and have time to grow,” Corbani said.  

Balancing growing and growth

He aims to achieve the balance by registering several patents in the United States and through establishing a base outside of Lebanon as a platform for the next growth stage. “Then strategically I would be interested to team up with an American or Japanese company that is willing to enter into the hot-weather markets. I want to have such a partner.” 

In the meanwhile, Green Studios is competing for work on high-end residential projects in Lebanon like the Beirut Terraces, an apartment tower scheduled for construction across from the Phoenicia InterContinental and Monroe hotels in the central district. 

By midyear, work is also expected to start on a green roof for one block of the Hamra head office of Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank. The initiative is a collaboration of BDL and the United Nations Development Project’s (UNDP) energy efficiency support program for Lebanon, dubbed Cedro.

Cedro-UNDP has taken the project through its preparatory phases to the point where three competitors for the project have been short-listed — a joing bid by Green Studios and ZinCo among the three — and the contract is to be awarded and execution to commence within two months from end of April, according to Cedro-UNDP Project Manager Hassan Harajli. 

The project is for an intensive green installation with about 80 percent greenery and 20 percent recreational space for central bank employees, and thus fits the high-end categorization. Harajli told Executive he could not provide an estimate of the project’s value, but added that UNDP had allocated a budget and the BDL had committed to filling eventual funding gaps. 

According to Harajli, Cedro will use the project to measure the green roof’s energy savings effect on the heating and cooling of the very active BDL floor located beneath, as a case study for energy efficiency. 

But it is also a standard-setting project and for that reason the UNDP applied very stringent selection criteria on the qualification of contractors. Harajli said, “It is the first time doing a green roof of this size on a public building in Lebanon. We can’t get it wrong.” 

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The perils of pipedreams

by Paul Cochrane
written by Paul Cochrane

Serious plumbing problems have arisen in the last year for the region’s multibillion-dollar pipeline plans. For starters, the Euro Arab Mashreq Gas Pipeline, also known as the Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP), has been attacked 14 times over the past year in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, ending exports to Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, as well as to Israel via an offshoot pipeline. At the tail end of the 1,200 kilometer pipeline, the uprising in Syria has postponed the completion of the AGP’s final leg to Kilis in Turkey.  

Meanwhile, the recent European Union (EU) sanctions on Iran have spelled the end of the viability of the much feted Nabucco gas pipeline that was to take gas from the AGP, Iran and the Caspian region, via Turkey, to Europe. The root of such pipeline problems is that usual suspect: politics. The AGP was attacked in the Sinai, according to statements by the Egyptian Ansar Al Jihad group, as part of a campaign against “the corrupt (Egyptian) regime and its Jewish and American backers.” Indeed, last year’s revelations about the preferential pricing of Egyptian gas have shown the shadowy political bends of the pipeline. When the AGP was launched in 2003, the Egyptian Natural Gas company described it as facilitating “the dawn of Arab integration”, but recently revelations have shown how it was used to sweeten Egyptian ties with Amman and Tel Aviv, with Washington’s blessing.

In 2005, Cairo had inked a long-term deal with Tel Aviv to sell gas at anywhere from $0.70 to $4 per million British thermal units (BTU), depending on which media sources one consults, well below the global average of $6 to $7. Jordan’s special price arrangement with Cairo was $3 per million BTU. The pipeline attacks have cost Egypt needed export revenues, likely the reason they pulled the plug on the Israeli contract last month. Now the Israelis will continue to shell out an additional $4 billion to source gas elsewhere while Jordan’s energy bill will be an extra $2.4 billion this year to offset the loss of as much as 25 percent of the kingdom’s energy supplies. 

Significantly, the pipeline shutdown has highlighted the AGP’s over-dependence on Egyptian gas, something energy observers have pointed to for years. On paper, Egyptian gas was to flow through Jordan to Syria and Lebanon, with Syria pumping in its own gas for export on to Turkey and ostensibly to Europe. The problem is Egypt’s domestic energy consumption is rising fast, as is Jordan’s and Syria’s; even if the pipeline is completed, there will likely not be enough Egyptian or Syrian gas flowing through the AGP to meet even the Levant’s needs, let alone leave extra to sell on to Turkey or Europe.  

For the AGP to be viable if or when it re-starts, more gas must be sourced — perhaps from Iraq or Qatar to supply the AGP in Syria, or from Iran and the Caspian region which can connect to the AGP via the Nabucco network in Turkey. Iraqi instability, however, means completion of that part of the pipeline network is years away, while the Nabucco pipeline is no closer to realization than when it was announced in 2002. 

Financing Nabucco has been a major obstacle, which is forecasted to cost as much as $25 billion. But what may be the death knell was the EU’s decision to follow Washington in slapping sanctions on Iran earlier in the year, ending all energy exports from Iran to the EU. Nabucco is only commercially viable if it can draw on Iran’s reserves — the world’s second largest — as Azerbaijan and the Caspian states cannot provide enough gas for Europe, Turkey, the AGP and other export commitments. 

What is supremely ironic about the EU’s decision is that Nabucco was supposed to loosen Russia’s grip on the EU’s gas imports — currently at some 34.2 percent — given Moscow’s propensity to turn off the taps to enforce its will, as it did during a price dispute with the Ukraine during the icy winter of 2009.

Theoretically, pipeline networks linking the Middle East, the Caspian region and Europe would make for glorious dividends for all involved. Political shenanigans, however, will likely keep these networks pipedreams, especially given that the crucial link — Syria — looks to be spinning down the tube for some time to come.

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Society

Views, Reviews, and Previews

by Thomas Schellen
written by Thomas Schellen

The new book by Lebanese communications consultant and former ad-man Ramsay Najjar, “Views, Reviews, and Previews”, in intellectual association with Executive, is a tour de force of theories, recommendations and projections on the pivotal role of communications and journalism in the history of humanity, as well as in the unfolding of the Arab uprisings. Executive sat with the author to chat about his latest work. 

What motivated you to write this book?

The driving force that pushed me to write this book was that I discovered, to my surprise, that we lacked a serious source on the deed of communications in this part of the world. A reference sounds a bit too academic, but this was the driving force. But that was the second reason, the less important. The first was the ‘Arab Spring’. I always had a theory that in this part of the world, [with maturity of legislative, executive and judiciary being a long way off], the fourth pillar — communication — might be our only shortcut and roadmap to real democracy. That is why when the ‘Arab Spring’ started, I felt ‘this is my theory!’ and I wanted to grab the opportunity to prove this was opening a window to reach democracy, which we always thought to be beyond our nature and beyond the organic gifts that were given to the Arabs. 

Would you be able to summarize your book in three words?

The title is doing exactly what you are asking me to do. We have views, in the sense that we are writing about the essence of communication from its start with the dawn of humanity until today. The ‘reviews’ is a connection between this and the real life, be it in politics, in the lives of society, in struggles, in war, everything where communication becomes organically linked to the game of life, and the third part was the preview and the ‘Arab Spring’, how can we make sure that communication can be the real safety net that would guarantee for this change to be positive and evolutionary. 

Some key words appear quite frequently in your book, one that you emphasized yourself was ‘nuances’ and another one was ‘noble’. Both terms are rarely used in connection with the topics of journalism and advertising. Are these translations from Arabic concepts?

These are original to the English book and the proof of that is that the Arabic version does not have an equivalent of the term nuance. This word is key in my book because I meant to write an ethical chart that people in media should respect and abide by. Nuances are strategic because of three chapters in my book where I meant to create a certain equilibrium that will help the reader understand why the media is the fourth estate, why it was given the privilege of being the only tool that the citizen has to practice his democratic belonging to a system to observe and render his rulers accountable and liable. 

Even more frequently than nuances, noble appears more than 120 times in the first 250 pages, or on average on every second page. Why do you stress so much on media as a noble cause and journalism as a noble profession?

Nobility is lacking in this part of the world. I think that we have imported the concept of media without its noble dimension. Even professionals in this line of business have a tendency of forgetting that they are in this noble cause. Only when they die, we remember that they are on a noble mission. My theory is that this fourth pillar can build the ‘temple of democracy’. 

In the sixth chapter you defend the role of advertising and talk of its noble mission and benefits. Why is that a separate chapter?

All my life I felt that advertising is really underrated in this part of the world; that is what I try to say in that chapter. Also, the practitioners of advertising never have the time or motivation to defend themselves and their profession in the way I try to do. 

Do you see it as realistic description when you say the journalist of the past was “super human, intelligent, enlightened, noble, daring, combative, and exemplary in seeking the truth and amplifying the voice of right and its achievements”?

Let us say it is the 17th or 18th century and you are recruiting a reporter. Would you have accepted to recruit someone who is less than that? In the early 20th century, you would have had Andre Gide, Albert Camus — those were the people with the profile of a journalist. 

So you are not talking about the average practitioner of journalism?

No, I set a precept. Let us take Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the Renaissance; he was a journalist. Victor Hugo was a journalist. Milton, Baudelaire were journalists. Take the Arab example of what we pretend to call the Renaissance period, the Mohammed Abduh, Mohammed Ridha, Jurji Zaydan. All these were not only journalists but saw the fulfillment of their humanity would only be achieved if they either launch a newspaper or have a publishing house.

When you say that only the voluntary soldier and the journalist willingly face death, you seem to be saying that the journalist has something of a martyr impulse.

If he wants to abide by my ethical chart, yes. 

You speak of a journalistic oath. How would one want to go about implementing this?

If doctors have it, engineers, pharmacists, and lawyers have it, I don’t see why we are until today not imposing on journalists to have a professional oath. Under the assimilation theory that I believe in, this [oath] will push you as journalist to be more disciplined. I am not saying that every single journalist will become a saint over night by respecting the code but at least it is the right way to go. 

In your opinion, when you think of journalism as the brightest jewel in the crown of humanity, and taking all things into consideration, will quality journalism come back to the Middle East? Under your anthropological postulate will this new journalism provide leadership in the future and will your book help in giving birth to this journalism?

For me, the journalist should play the role of a catalyst, to empower the citizen to become more mature, more aware and vaccinated against all those diseases and viruses [of bad societies]. I believe that the ‘Arab Spring’ is definitely the opportunity for communication to play the role that is lacking in this part of the world, of empowering people to kind of elevate their IQ from instinct to the mind. I totally believe in that. 

At the end of your book you develop scenarios on the future. How much probability do you give to this scenario where journalism as the fourth estate gives birth to democracy?

As a consultant I am not supposed to be present in the sense of ego. I am telling you that there is a scientific probability that is solid. Now, my personal subjective opinion is on a totally separate track but I believe it is possible and I can defend this. If four specific coordinates — the demographics, the freedom of expression, the law of ownership of media, the auto-regulation — are respected to the letter, the chances are very high. If they are not, we are doomed. We will go from bad to worse. 

So its either good journalism or dictatorship?

Exactly. That is how I see it. 

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Yemen’s long path of thorns

by Farea al-Muslimi
written by Farea al-Muslimi

Yemen’s old history books speak of the fifth century King al-Tuba al-Yamani who, in the final seconds of his life, gives his heir some tips on ruling the country. The king whispers to his son that the one who rules the kingdom should “bear the bites of snakes and scorpions, devour its money, waste its blood, and kill the closest people to him, even it be his brother”. One might now wonder whether former President Ali Abdullah Saleh said anything of the kind to Abdu Rabbou Mansour Hadi, who took up the reigns of power at the end of February and has since gone about a purge of former Saleh loyalists

For 15 years before becoming president, Hadi had perhaps the most boring job in Yemen: as Saleh’s vice president his job was to attend ceremonies, cut ribbons and sit silently wearing his sunglasses. In just 60 days as president, he has sacked no less than 20 military commanders and 4 civilian governors.

This has relatives and loyalists of President Saleh, who still man many of the posts in Yemen’s government and military, feeling unnerved. Muhammed Saleh al-Ahmar, half-brother of the former president and the air force commander, refused to step down and shut down the airport upon hearing of Hadi’s decision to remove him. Eventually air force bases began to take orders from their new chief — the widely respected General Rashed al-Ganad — but Ahmar refused to hand over the air force's headquarters, stacked with Republican Guard units lead by one of Saleh’s son. He only left office on May 4, the same day tens of thousands of Yemeni’s took to the streets to demand the purge of Saleh loyalists.  

The United Nations envoy to Yemen Jamal Benomar is now leading a new phase of negotiations between confronting sides. But getting Saleh’s relatives and allies to give up their financial and political power is an uphill battle. In Benomar’s own words before departing the country “the worst is yet to come.” Already there are murmurings in Sanaa that UN Sanctions could be imposed after a Security Council meeting on May 17. That’s not all.

Taking apart Saleh's old power apparatus is just one issue facing Hadi as he tries to balance an extremely fragile peace in Sanaa and quell mounting violence outside the capital. Yemen was already in an economic crisis before the uprising. Today it faces a humanitarian crisis, armed conflicts in many governates, governates outside the government control, fighting with Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in the south, just to name a few burning issues. Yet, for all the press Yemen gets because of its role at the crossroads of so many conflicts in the region, little is done to actually help those who rose up against autocracy. So far the UN has received only $63 million dollars out of the $447 million dollars it needs for its humanitarian operations in Yemen. Moreover, the northern province of Saadaa is now under the harsh control of ethnic Houthi elements, and could inflame another sectarian conflict like the other six that occurred between 2004 and 2009.

Perhaps the largest challenge facing Hadi (and the rest of those with an interest in Yemen, from the United States to Iran,) goes is beyond military and security issues. Yemen’s youth movements remain camped out in the country's squares, unemployed yet determined to see out their revolution to wherever it may take them. But with idle hands in the devil's workshop, the more they sit around, the less likely they are to join the workforce. 

Indeed, with the almost surreal swirl of calamitous circumstances enveloping Yemen, Hadi may need a miracle to come out of the coming months with the country anywhere near a semblance of stability — but it is not impossible. Thus, if he manages to continue his purging of Saleh’s old guard on the back of international, regional and local support, Yemen's downward spiral may be begin to plateau, and perhaps he may have more favorable advice to offer whoever is next at the helm.

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Sweet offerings

by Sami Halabi
written by Sami Halabi

Patchi International (Patchi), the family owned Lebanon-based chocolatier with operations in over 29 countries, is planning to offer up to 49 percent of its ownership to a strategic partner in the next two years, its Founder and Chairman Nizar Choucair tells Executive.

“We believe that we cannot continue by ourselves,” says Choucair. “We are not in need of funding. We just need companies in our field of business that have more expertise than us in the areas we are willing to invest.” Strategic partners will be included on the company’s board of directors on condition that they do not divest for a period of five years from time of acquisition.

The plan for expanding its shareholder base was first hatched in 2009 when Patchi had announced that it was interested in floating 49 percent of the company through an initial public offering (IPO) but later called off the listing citing post financial crisis market conditions as the reason.

Choucair declined to give details on how much the company was worth or what the target price of any IPO would be, stating that a valuation for the company has not yet been set. However, he says the company has seen a 45 percent increase in turnover since global coca prices spiked in 2010.

According to Choucair, who has run the business since 1974, the new expansion could be a mix of equity participation and IPO but the company has yet to decide whether it would offer the entire proposed stake to a strategic partner, put it on the market, or seek a combination of both. He adds that currently the company is targeting a sale of between 45 and 49 percent.

Listing in Lebanon, however, is not an option for Patchi because, “Lebanon has no laws that protect you or the partners you work with and lawyers can fool you,” says Choucair. Instead, he adds that the company will actually move its registration to the United Kingdom’s island of Jersey for its tax laws and because it “acknowledges the [Sunni] Islamic laws that state that when the owner dies, they give a share to the son, and half of that to the daughter.”

When asked about the type of partner Patchi would be willing to consider selling a stake to Choucair stressed that the company was not looking to sell to a private equity fund but rather to a company larger than Patchi in the same line of business in order to serve their new target markets.

According to Choucair, in the coming years Patchi will focus its retail expansion in the Far East with a focus on China. The move is another in a series of expansionary measures by the company away from its local Lebanese market. Patchi’s largest operation is in Saudi Arabia where it also has concentrated the manufacture of its chocolates.

But while the company’s main expansion focus is outside its home nation Choucair insists he is not giving up on Lebanon. He tells Executive that a new 15,000 square meter factory some 40 kilometers south of Beirut is slated for opening by the end of the year and adds that Patchi also expects to open four new branches in the country (Hazmieh, Nabatiyeh, Jbeil and Tyre). “But that would be it in Lebanon,” he says. “I love Lebanon and am still investing here since this is where I belong. However, I will not invest any more than that.”

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