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Banking on diplomacy

by Paul Cochrane December 3, 2011
written by Paul Cochrane

It has been a difficult year for the Lebanese banking sector. While deposits are only marginally down on 2010, Arab uprisings have affected banks’ regional operations and the Lebanese economy is feeling the ongoing global financial crisis. But by and large, these are the sorts of issues Lebanese bankers are used to handling; risk management is a hardwired Lebanese specialty. What has presented unusual concern this year is the black cloud lingering over the sector following the listing in February of Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) by the United States Department of the Treasury as a “financial institution of prime money laundering concern.”

The designation left LCB’s reputation in tatters and, after a limited run on the bank, shareholders opted for LCB to merge with Société Générale de Banque au Liban (SGBL) rather than to appeal the charges. For the banking sector, the LCB designation was a well-aimed kick to the nether regions. Banks are still “paranoid” 10 months later, a senior member of Banque du Liban (BDL), Lebanon’s central bank, recently told me.

The concern is that other banks could find themselves in the US Treasury’s sights — a worry compounded by the apparent political motivation of Washington’s decision, as LCB was accused of laundering money on behalf of Hezbollah, the steward of the current Lebanese government and designated as a terrorist organization by the US. The US decision looked on the surface to be a warning to the banking sector — and Lebanon generally — to play ball. Not helping the sense of paranoia is the failure to release results of the investigation into any wrong-doing on the part of LCB by either Washington or BDL.

There was an upside from a regulatory point of view, however, to the taking down of LCB. Due diligence has suddenly taken on special importance, compliance officers’ voices are better heard in the board rooms and those in need of screening software to detect suspicious transactions have quickly placed orders.  Rumors of further LCB-style designations have persisted, while additional pressure has been heaped on Lebanon following multiple rounds of US and European Union sanctions on Syria in response to Damascus’ crackdown on protestors. For the sanctions to have bite, Lebanon cannot be a financial conduit for the Syrian regime; Lebanon is not required to abide by US and EU sanctions — only United Nations resolutions are binding — but it has pledged to cooperate.

With around 60 percent of Lebanese banks’ deposits in American dollars, and the lira pegged to the greenback, Lebanon, as the BDL source put it, is effectively part of the US financial system — Beirut must respect US decisions whether it likes them or not. Indeed, Beirut’s compliance on this matter is so crucial that it was the first item on the agenda in talks between Prime Minister Najib Mikati and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in September. In November, Daniel Glaser, the Treasury Department’s assistant secretary, visited Beirut to push the issue further. Yet while bilateral meetings were underway in late September, another black cloud loomed on the horizon. A second bank — which shall go unnamed — was suspected of money laundering, according to sources in the financial sector and within BDL, although officially BDL would neither confirm nor deny this.

Yet what seems to have happened behind the scenes is an arrangement whereby in exchange for Lebanese cooperation on Syria there would be “no more LCB surprises,” as the BDL source put it. Beirut is in a form of “partnership” with Washington, and BDL is under pressure to deliver by making sure no money laundering or terrorist financing (by American definitions at least) is occurring within the banking sector. If another bank is in the firing line, the US may point its finger, and BDL will investigate rather than merely getting a day’s warning from Washington — as happened with LCB.

Some may call it a Faustian pact, and it goes against the grain of supposed transparency in the financial sector that is being pushed worldwide, but as a diplomatic move it suits both Washington and Beirut nicely, for the time being at least. Lebanese banks are right to be paranoid and to keep in line with US regulations in order to avoid the devastating blow to the sector’s credibility that an LCB redux would mean.

Paul Cochrane is the Middle East correspondent for the International News Services, and a regular contributor to Money Laundering Bullettin

December 3, 2011 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Sun goes down on a destination

by Executive Staff December 3, 2011
written by Executive Staff

While 2011 may yet prove to be a good year for democratic ambitions in the Arab world, it was most certainly not a good one for tourism in Lebanon.

Put bluntly, it was “the worst year in 20 years for the Lebanese tourism industry,” according to Paul Ariss,  president of the Syndicate of Owners of Restaurants, Cafes, Night Clubs and Pastries in Lebanon.

Following three years of consecutive growth, the number of foreign arrivals dropped by 24 percent in the first nine months of 2011, while across the board, room occupancy rates plummeted by 15 percent.

Regional turmoil, especially in Syria, is regarded as the main factor affecting the figures but internal political bickering at the beginning of the year and the negative travel advice issued by many Western embassies also had an effect.

That cold spring wind

As the Arab uprisings lit up one regional capital after another, it gradually became clear during 2011 that Lebanon was not to break the tourist arrival record again.

According to the Ministry of Tourism (MoT), 1,276,100 foreign visitors entered the country in the first nine months of 2011, compared to nearly 1.7 million during the same period in 2010. In 2010, Lebanon set an all-time high of nearly 2.2 million tourist arrivals, contributing an estimated $8 billion to Lebanon’s gross domestic product.

The fairy tale was not to be repeated in 2011. Even if the last three months of the year were to attract the exact same number of arrivals as in 2010, the total number of tourists would not exceed 1.7 million, a decrease of 22 percent. In reality, the end-of-year result is likely to be worse, as until October every single month of 2011 recorded a decline.

Traffic in July was particularly affected, with a decrease of no less than 39.3 percent on 2010’s figures; summer months are traditionally Lebanon’s high season.

As in 2010, most tourists in 2011 came from the Arab world, followed by visitors from Europe and Asia. According to the MoT, some 430,000 Arabs flocked to Lebanon during the first nine months of 2011, compared to 710,000 during the same period in 2010, down 39.4 percent.

Around 374,000 Europeans arrived by October, a smaller relative decrease of just 10 percent. By October, 206,000 people from non-Arab parts of Asia had entered Lebanon, a decrease of some 28 percent.

Industry professionals agree on the causes of the downturn. “The Arab crisis, especially in Syria, reflected badly on the Lebanese tourism sector,” said Pierre Achkar, head of the Association of Hotel Owners in Lebanon (AHOL). “A lot of Arab tourists, especially Jordanians and Arab families from the Gulf, come by car. With the political situation in Syria, that was virtually impossible.”

A closer look at tourist arrivals reveals that only 99,000 Jordanians entered Lebanon in the first nine months of 2011, compared to 217,000 by October 2010, a decrease of over 50 percent. During the same period, some 84,300 Saudis, 46,000 Kuwaitis and 22,600 Emiratis visited the country, a decline of 46 percent, 41 percent and 37 percent, respectively.

The vast majority of Asians visiting Lebanon in 2010, some 65 percent, were Iranians. By October 2011 only 119,000 had entered the country, a decline of 37 percent. This too was largely due to the regional situation, as many Iranians visit Lebanon by bus following a pilgrimage along the many Shia religious sites in neighboring Syria. Interestingly, the number of Iraqis and Turks visiting Lebanon remained more or less the same, while African visitors were the sole group to show an increase, up 16 percent to some 44,100 by October 1.

Ariss of the restaraunt owners’ syndicate also pointed to regional turmoil for the decline, yet blamed domestic factors too. “The absence of a government during the first four months of the year and the accusation issued by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon also played a role. What’s more, we had Ramadan in August and people generally travel less during Ramadan,” he said.

Falling revenues

As a consequence of the drop in tourist arrivals, Ariss said the overall turnover of Lebanese restaurants in 2011 will decline by some 30 to 40 percent. While there are no reliable figures available, he estimated there are more than 6,000 restaurants of all types in Lebanon, 70 percent of which operate all year round. They employ more than 50,000 persons on a permanent basis and up to 70,000 at peak times. Ninety percent of employees, Ariss claimed, are Lebanese.

The Association of Car Importers in Lebanon estimated that car rentals in 2011 were some 40 percent down. Many retailers, particularly in the heart of Beirut, had a rough year as well. “We cannot complain,” said Frank Luca, owner of souvenir and artisan store Orient 499. “Of course we had a reduction in sales, but I have many friends in retail, and they had a year much worse than me. Overall, we still had a good year, with fewer visitors buying more. Some 50 percent of our clientele are foreigners, half of whom are Arabs, while the other half are Lebanese.”

“The whole market has been affected by the regional situation and the Beirut Souks are no exception,” said Joseph Asseily, chairman of the Beirut Hospitality Company (BHC), a Solidere subsidiary founded in 2010 with the aim of bringing Downtown Beirut to life by establishing restaurants, cafes and hotels. So far it has opened Momo, Café M, Relais Foch and STAY, while L’Atelier is set to open next year. “What 2012 will bring is anyone’s guess, but we are determined to make Beirut the food capital of the Middle East.”

“Ramadan cut the 2011 summer in half, but that was calculated,” said Suzan Bou Dargham director of public relations at the Four Seasons Hotel in Beirut. “We expected 2011 to be at least as good as 2010, but with the political situation in the region constantly changing, we had to have a plan B.” She declined to give specific figures regarding turnover or occupancy rates.

AHOL’s Achkar estimated that, as a result of lower occupancy rates, hotel revenues in 2011 have declined by some 38 percent. According to the MoT, the average room occupancy rate for five-star hotels in Beirut during the first six months of 2011 amounted to 48 percent, compared to 63 percent in 2010, while the average bed occupancy rate was 52 percent, down from 74 percent.

The average room occupancy rate for four-star hotels in Beirut decreased from 62 to 50 percent. Outside the capital, average occupancy rates across the board hovered between 20 and 40 percent.

In its most recent survey of the Middle East hotel sector, Ernst & Young concluded that despite a decrease of 15 percent year-on-year, the average room rate at Beirut hotels amounted to $222 in the first 9 months of 2011, which made the capital’s hotels the seventh most expensive in the region. The regional average amounted to $183.30.

Hotels

According to Achkar, there are some 400 hotels with a total of 21,000 rooms in Lebanon, employing some 18,000 people, with another 3,000 rooms under construction.

“In 1975, Lebanon had around 475 hotels, yet the average size in those days was much smaller. For example, here in Broumana alone there were 36 hotels, yet most had an average size of only 14 to 18 rooms. Today there are 7 hotels. Over the years, the trend has been to grow bigger and bigger, and today a hotel with 300 rooms is no exception.”

Among the more noteworthy planned newcomers on Lebanon’s hotel scene is the Grand Hyatt, Beirut. Scheduled to include 351 rooms, it is expected to be the biggest hotel on Lebanese soil after the Phoenicia InterContinental.

The Kempinski chain also has plans for two five-star outlets in Lebanon. Set to open in 2012, the Kempinski Hotel Beirut is a resort hotel located at what once was the famous Summerland Hotel. The hotel is in the final stages of construction and will have 151 rooms and 56 luxury apartments, as well as a marina with up to 60 berths. Between Aley and Bhamdoun, the German hotel chain is currently constructing Al Abadiyah Hills, which is set to open in 2013 featuring 74 rooms, 12 villas and 181 apartments.

Ending up, but slopes ahead

Tourism in Lebanon picked up slightly toward the end of 2011. The Eid Al Adha holiday in early November saw hotels and restaurants fill up across Beirut, while according to Achkar, meetings, incentives, conferences and exhibitions (MICE) tourism showed an increase. “It sounds ironic, but Lebanon in 2011 was one of the most stable countries in the region,” he said. “Beirut and Dubai proved popular destinations for business meetings and conferences. Let’s hope that trend will continue next year.”

That said, “The political turmoil in the region prevented many Arabs from choosing Lebanon as their final destination,” said the restaraunt owners’ syndicate’s Ariss. “2012 is going to be worse, as the causes of the crisis prevail and Syria will remain politically instable. In addition, the raise in wages, not only the minimum ones, will have disastrous consequences on the tourism industry. Companies have started lay-offs. Expansion plans have been halted. New investments are being postponed. Many restaurants in 2012 will shut down or change owners.”

“Political stability in the region, and especially Syria, will be essential for a full recovery of the Lebanese tourism sector in 2012,” said Achkar. “In addition, it does not help that Lebanon is still haunted by the negative image created by the international media, which seems to only report on negative events. This does not really affect Arab tourists and Lebanese expats, but it does make potential Western visitors think twice.”

With the aim of countering Lebanon’s negative image abroad and attracting more western tourists, the cash-strapped Ministry of Tourism in 2010 proposed to introduce a LL 5,000 airport tax to be used exclusively for promotional activities, yet the proposal never made it through parliament.

“If I look at the stands of neighboring countries, such as Syria, Jordan and Egypt, I honestly feel ashamed to participate at tourism fairs,” said Lebanon’s Minister of Tourism Fadi Abboud. “At such events we look like the poor cousin. Tourism represents 22 percent of our GDP and we should invest in it. Yet you cannot create an industry if you do not promote it.”

More visitors from Europe would surely help diminish Lebanon’s over-dependency on Arab tourism. “It would be great if Lebanon in the near future could attract more tourists from the US and Europe,” said Bou Dargham of the Four Seasons. “But how do you do that in the short term? Today, when you type in Beirut or Lebanon, Trip Advisor shows you in red letters: ‘Travel Alert: Safety and Security Concerns.’”

Following the kidnapping of seven Lithuanian cyclists in the Bekaa Valley and attacks on United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) troops, the British and French embassies warned their citizens to avoid or be cautious when traveling to the south or east of the country. Following alleged incursions by the Syrian army into Lebanon, the British embassy in October advised against “all but essential travel to within 5 kilometers of the Syrian border,” while it “continued to advise against all travel to Palestinian refugee camps and against all but essential travel to the Bekaa Valley and south of the Litani [River].”

The French Embassy furthermore warned against the danger of kidnapping in the Bekaa Valley, potential attacks of French UNIFIL troops in Saida and further south and called on travelers to avoid certain suburbs of Beirut and Tripoli. Seeing the events which occurred in Lebanon in 2011, such specific and carefully worded warnings do not seem unreasonable.

The same cannot be said about the travel advisory issued by the US State Department, as it urges “all US citizens to avoid all travel to Lebanon due to current safety and security concerns.” The statement edges on the hysterical, warning, among other things, that “public demonstrations occur frequently with little warning and have the potential to become violent” and “family or neighborhood disputes often escalate quickly and can lead to gunfire or other violence with little or no warning.”

This is almost ironic coming from a country enamored with firearms and that boasts an annual homicide rate twice as high as that of Lebanon. Issued on April 4, 2011, following the fall of the pro-American Hariri government and with negotiations over a new cabinet in full swing, some people claim the travel ban to be politically motivated. The US travel warning is particularly harmful, as the red alert on the popular site TripAdviser is directly linked to it.

“In 2011, we had hoped to attract an increasing number of Western expats living in the Gulf, yet the opposite happened,” said Achkar, who despite everything remained positive about things to come. “We’ve seen much worse. We’ve had the 2006 war, an 18-month blockade of downtown Beirut and months without a government or president. But we’ve always overcome. And we will overcome again.”

December 3, 2011 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Castles made of sand

by Executive Staff December 3, 2011
written by Executive Staff

When future generations of Lebanese look back on 2011, they may remember it as a year when the economy, having driven up the growth graph since the 2006 war, simply ran out of road at the top and headed off a cliff into recession.

How far the economy has fallen and how much further it may dive is a question that will have no certain answers anytime soon. As Executive went to print 2010’s national accounts — the primary method used to calculate the size and relative growth of an economy — had not yet been released by the government, much less those for three first quarters of 2011. 

“Every growth estimate is nothing more than a guestimate,” says Jad Chaaban, acting president of the Lebanese Economics Association. As such, in October the International Monetary Fund guesstimated that this year growth had fallen to 1.5 percent from 7.5 percent in 2010. What makes the outlook even more somber is that it was the second time this year the fund had revised growth downwards; previous to April the growth estimate was still hovering between 2.5 and 4 percent, depending on which international organization you chose to cite. By November the fund went even further.

“After four years of strong growth, Lebanon’s economy has lost momentum reflecting domestic political uncertainty and regional unrest,” said an IMF press release marking the end of their annual appraisal visit to Lebanon. “Latest indicators are pointing to some pick-up in activity, and the economy could grow at 1 to 2 percent in 2011, markedly below an average of 8 percent per year during 2007-10.”

Of course the government itself did no better in calculating growth. The previous finance minister’s budget proposal — which like all other budget proposals since 2004 have not made it past Parliament’s sticky gates — estimated growth at 5 percent.

“You are not walking into a certain environment… If the problem gets worse in Syria all of our exports will go down and we could even have the counter effect, with refugees coming into the country and a huge consumption problem,” said Chaaban. “With this uncertainty that is present today, you can’t just have one scenario. It’s more honest as an exercise to do different scenarios. I’ve never seen anyone give you a real plan for something with one scenario, unless they want to sell you the plan.”

This precipitous fall in economic activity was not only a byproduct of the country’s failing infrastructure or lack of official employment, inflation or economic policies. At the start of 2011 Lebanon got a new year’s shock as the cabinet collapsed over the issue of trying ‘false witnesses’ for misleading the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, set-up to investigate the assassination of former Prime Minster Rafiq Hariri and 22 others in a 2005 explosion. Since then, the issue has largely been ignored, but its repercussions are still being felt.
Almost immediately the readers of Lebanon’s economic crystal balls saw the dark clouds approaching. By the end of the year there was still little consensus over what the ultimate effect was. While the IMF posited a figure of 0.8 percent growth for the first six months of 2011, Finance Minister Mohamad Safadi joined the guessing game in October when he announced that the same period saw no growth and projected a 4 percent outlook for the second half.

“Neither the zero growth for the first half of the year nor the 4 percent for the second are precise or accurate,” says Elie Yachoui, dean of the School of Business Administration and Economics at Lebanon’s Notre Dame University, who agrees that all the indicators suggest that the gross domestic product (GDP) growth for this year will not exceed 2 percent. In an exclusive interview with Executive Safadi explained that the 4 percent projection was based on a “best-case scenario” playing out next year.

“This year [2011] clearly we wasted opportunities from the start, with changes taking place in the Arab world and the collapse of the  government,” said Nassib Ghobril, head of economic research and analysis at Byblos Bank. “If we had a government in place we could have been able to benefit and be on the radar, just like we did in 2008 and 2009 from the global financial crisis. All of this was before Syria. Once that started it affected confidence even more.”

Two months after the government collapsed the situation in Syria erupted, with widespread protests engulfing the nation, which constitutes Lebanon’s only open land border. The effects of the crisis on the economy were palpable, especially over the summer months when many tourists would usually arrive over land. Official figures show a 25 percent yearly contraction in visitors by the end of September — falling to 1.28 million compared to 2010’s year-on-year figure of 1.69 million. The turmoil in Syria was still ongoing as Executive went to print, a fact that Riad Salameh, governor of Banque du Liban (BDL, Lebanon’s central bank, finally admitted last month has hammered Lebanon’s economy.
“Since Lebanon’s economy is so closely intertwined with that of neighboring Syria, the unrest across the border has taken a huge toll on the Lebanese economy,” he said in a television interview in November.

As the terra firma shook under Lebanon’s economy, the structural indicators also gave in. For the first time in many years Lebanon’s balance of payments, a relative measure of money coming in and out of the economy, turned from a surplus to a deficit. A detailed breakdown had not been released by the time Executive went to press (something that used to happen during the days of the surplus) but consolidated figures show that by end-September the deficit had reached $302 million dollars, a far cry from the $186 million surplus posted in September 2010.

In the past the positive balance of payments was heralded as one of the shining beacons of Lebanon’s economic indicators because it overshadowed the balance of trade (the difference between the monetary value of exports and imports in an economy), which subjects Lebanon to a host of economic ailments. All throughout the year the balance of trade was setting record lows, and by the end of September 2011 had reached a five-year nadir of $11.18 billion — constituting a 10 percent increase in the trade deficit on 2010.

That is not withstanding the level of remittances entering the country, which, as Executive went to print, had not yet been released by BDL or the World Bank. Some 45 percent of households have at least one person abroad sending home money, according to research conducted by economist Robert Kasparian, who heads the compilation of Lebanon’s National Accounts.

Last year remittances reached a level of around $8.2 billion, although that figure includes some dubious additions such as payment of salaries from abroad.
“Our economy is more an external economy than an internal economy,” says Notre Dame’s Yachoui. “The remittances of Lebanese workers amount to $8 billion or $9 billion; it’s as if we were exporting such an amount. As long as the global economy is recovering I don’t expect any new crisis in terms of Lebanese employment aboard… unless a new international crisis erupts.” As Executive went to print, the Greek and Italian sovereign debt crises were looming apocalyptically over global markets. 

Pressure on the lira

As the rate of growth in the country’s economy nosedived, its currency has felt a downward drag, though, as has been the case since December 1997, the BDL maintained the exchange rate of the lira to the US dollar at 1507.5 through tapping its $30.6 billion war chest of foreign currency reserves. (By the end of September the total foreign assets of the BDL totaled some $32.2 billion, of which $16.2 billion was in gold.)

In the absence of an operational currency exchange market that could be used to value the Lebanese lira, the main indicator of currency pressure is the deposit dollarization rate, which rose during the first three quarters from 63.2 percent to 66.6 percent.

Adding to the weight on the lira and rattling the banking sector earlier this year was the debacle involving the United States Treasury Department and Lebanese Canadian Bank, when the treasury proposed banning US financial institutions from opening or maintaining certain accounts at the bank, in effect forbidding it from using the US dollar. At a time when government was at a standstill, this had reverberating effects on economic confidence due to the suggestion (still unproven) that the bank was working with Hezbollah — which the US has labeled as a terrorist organization — setting off speculation over possible banking sanctions. There are still widespread reports of investigations being carried out by the US treasury into a list of banks, although Lebanese authorities have refuted these. “We have no problems and no issues at all with the American treasury,” insisted Finance Minister Mohamad Safadi when questioned by Executive about his meetings with US officials.  

“The dollarization rate is still high but there is no panic or rush to the dollar,” said Ghobril. “There was obviously in the first half of the year, especially during the first few months, but now that is not the case; it’s a stable market. As long as there is no outflow from deposits the [currency] situation will remain stable.” Commercial bank deposits stood at $115.7 billion after the first nine months of 2011, a 6 percent growth year-to-date and a 9.4 percent growth relative to the first nine months of last year.

Feeling the inflation

While exports fell during the first three months of the year, they experienced a relative turn-around over the next two quarters and managed to stay in the black. However, imports have been rising; even in a period of assumed recession when consumption usually falls, the value of imports rose 9 percent year-on-year in the first three quarters.

While on the surface this figure may not seem too much of a worry, it has to be taken into account that Lebanese consumption of imports increased far less than the price they paid for those imports. Fuel prices averaged $113 per barrel in the first nine months of 2011, compared to $77 per barrel in the respective period of 2010, causing fuel imports — which constituted 18.3 percent of all imports by end-September — to rise by 5 percent in value. “Excluding this item, imports that have increased in value are mainly those that are highly affected by the volatility of international prices,” an October trade report issued by the finance ministry said.

Thus, the problem of import inflation is intensifying. Official figures, which are widely discredited by economists, put the third quarter year-on-year consumer price index (CPI), the major indicator of inflation, at 4.8 percent, while the governor of the central bank estimated it will hit 6 percent by year’s end on the back of rising commodity costs.

There is currently no concrete indication of how much this inflation is due to higher import prices and how much is homegrown. According to a World Bank report issued in May regarding 2010, “imported inflation in Lebanon has a strong impact on the CPI because imports amount to… 50 percent of domestic consumption.”

Still, Chaaban, whose organization is carrying out a study to quantify the sources of inflation, deems that the common estimate thrown around — that import inflation constitutes around 70 percent of inflation — is inaccurate. He estimates the figure somewhere between 50 and 60 percent because of the prevalence of what is commonly referred to as “the cartels.”

“If you look at the structure now — what we call the syndicate of this, or the syndicate of that — it’s basically cartels of this or cartels of that,” said Finance Minister Safadi.

At the crux of the matter is the long-standing issue of exclusive agencies, basically monopolies, enjoyed by importers who can sell a given brand in the country. This is compounded by a lack of legal controls on price fixing and other non-competitive practices such as import bans on certain sectors. Politicians, rich families or religious establishments, whose constituents are usually the same people wearing different hats, often own and control these companies.
“The 500 to 600 families that run the country need to admit to themselves that in order to keep the country running they must open up and partner with new companies and open up their capital,” said Chaaban.

A quick fix would be to pass and implement a comprehensive competition law, something that has been drafted and proposed for years but never made it through parliament. Given the make-up of the Lebanese economy and political circles that may not be such a surprise. “With regards to exclusive agents, you have companies that market thousands and thousands of items and the politicians have connections and interests with the oligarchs,” said Yachoui.
Another concern regarding inflationary pressures in the last quarter of the year was a demand put forth in October by the country’s main labor union to increase the minimum wage. The issue was debated widely in the press and in cabinet until the latter decided to impose an increase on the eve of a general strike. Rather embarrassingly for the cabinet, a later decision by the Shura council, Lebanon’s highest court, threw out the measure shortly afterward because it was deemed contrary to labor law. As Executive went to print negotiations between the labor minister and the unions were ongoing and it was not clear when and if a new minimum wage measure would be passed.

A tool to help possibly ease inflationary pressure would be to de-peg the currency from the US dollar and instead peg it to a basket of currencies of countries where Lebanon sources its imports, such as a mixture of the Chinese yuan, the euro and the dollar. This would allow the exchange rate to ease some of the pressure on prices. The country’s main import currency is the euro with Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain constituting 28 percent of all imports from 2006 to Q3 2011, followed by China and the United States with 8 percent, respectively. However, such a move would go against the longstanding policy of the central bank to annul the local currency market in the interests of “currency stability.”

“The banking sector has resistance to venturing into complex schemes even if they would probably be beneficial for us as a country,” said Chaaban in relation to such a proposal.

Add or subtract value?

Another further upward pressure on prices is expected to come in the form of an increased value added tax (VAT), as proposed in the 2012 provisional budget. Yet the budget, as well as its associated revenues, is based on growth, which is anything but assured. Minister Safadi told Executive that all items, including VAT, where up for discussion as long as the end result did not increase the proposed deficit figure of $4.14 billion, an 11.4 percent increase on the 2011 budget, which never reached a vote in Parliament.

In theory, the constitution states that the budget needs to be passed by the end of January at the latest. But if it is not, at least according to minister Safadi, “it’s not a catastrophe.” Lebanon has not managed to propose and pass a budget since 2004 and this year looks no more certain, with a host of new taxes on the banking and real estate sectors set to be debated by many of the very same proprietors of these institutions in both cabinet and Parliament.

What is perhaps nearing catastrophe in Lebanon is the state of its infrastructure, with its insufficient water supply and decrepit transmission network, almost nonexistent wastewater treatment, daily power outages, crumbling roads and insubstantial public transportation system. To amend this, vital infrastructure projects such as power plants and water storage facilities, among others, need to be built. The problem is that, with a widening deficit and a debt-to-GDP ratio of some 140 percent (depending on whose GDP figure you use) financing these projects from the government coffers has become nearly impossible, even if a budget is passed. The electricity sector is projected to need some $6.5 billion in investment and water some $8 billion, just in capital expenditure, according to the Ministry of Energy and Water.

“Very simply, our treasury is no longer able to solve any problem related to any public service — that’s it,” says Yachoui. “We are left with only one solution which is a very ‘light privatization’ where we sign investment and management contracts in all the public service sectors with the private sector without selling any of our public services.”

And that is precisely what has been proposed through a draft public-private partnership law that has been through several drafts, with the reasons for its delayed passing unbeknownst to many, including the finance minister.

Gloom on the horizon

The economy looks set to suffer in the year ahead as harbingers of a precipitous slide have been calling out ever more vociferously. The Beirut Stock Exchange, for instance, lost around 20 percent of its value in the first nine and a half months of 2011. A new listing of the national carrier was put on hold indefinitely by the central bank, which owns the airline, and a new capital markets law passed this summer is still to be implemented.

Unemployment is ostensibly on the rise. Few give credence to the official numbers, which have not been updated since 2007, when the figure was put at 9.2 percent. But, according to a leaked presentation about an unfinished project being conducted by the World Bank, unemployment rates amongst men and women are 10 and 18 percent, respectively, which, when added to those working in the informal sector, make up “close to half the labor force.”

Among the few silver linings is an expected increase in telecom penetration due to broadband infrastructure upgrades. The World Bank estimates that every 10 percent increase in broadband penetration accelerates economic growth by 1.3 percent.

“Any analysis of this sector gives you a stand-alone impact: it gives you the potential but not the real growth after impact,” says Chaaban. “If there are more jobs and profits from this sector and then there is inflationary pressure the net effect is zero.”

The telecom sector cannot save the economy on its own, however, and it should be taken into account that the new infrastructure will be owned and operated by the government, and thus it could quash already limited private sector participation.

What’s more, as Executive went to print Prime Minister Najib Mikati had announced on a popular TV show that he would resign if funding for the special tribunal for Lebanon was not provided in some fashion by the end of the month.  If that occured it would result in the same scenario that caused the economy to plummet in 2011; the lack of a cabinet. This time, however, it will be more than just internal strains that the economy will have to bear.

“We are still subject to the problems in Syria and what happened in the first part of the year, from which we still haven’t recovered, so the outlook is tied to that,” says Ghobril. “As for the sources of growth, frankly, I can’t see them.”

December 3, 2011 0 comments
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Nothing left to offer

by Sami Halabi December 3, 2011
written by Sami Halabi

Arabs across the Middle East and North Africa took action for social, political and economic change in 2011; the Lebanese, meanwhile, largely stood silently by as their country continued to revel in sectarianism and a sham ‘democracy’. No more can we claim to be more enlightened or forward thinking than our Arab brethren. What has been made clear over the past year is Lebanon’s rot: from its politics, to its economics, its food and even its collective psychology.

The Lebanese should take a lesson in empowerment from the rest of the region; the longer our situation persists, the more backward we are shown to be. If we continue to avoid the needed fundamental structural change, the socioeconomic situation will only deteriorate, putting us at risk of our society snapping — as it has many times before — resulting in sectarian violence.

But toppling the people at the top is not the answer. At the start of the year, the Hariri government came down and by the middle, Mikati’s had emerged. Yet little changed on the ground.

When Hezbollah and its backers pulled out of the cabinet, causing the Hariri government to crumble, the main reason was that Hezbollah could not tolerate being part of a government headed by a man who would accept it being targeted by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). The manner in which the excuse given for bringing down the government — the controversy over the so-called ‘false witnesses’ issue — was duly swept under the rug by the new government is yet another example of how internal political squabbling produces few results other than personal political gain.

 When the Mikati government emerged in June, it was a by-product of both Syrian pressure to have a government in place that could support it as it came under fire for its brutal crackdown on dissent, and Saudi consent for a prime minister that would protect their interests by playing it down the middle.

What these two instances show is that despite people across the region taking to the streets chanting “Al shaab yurid isqat al nizam” — the people want the fall of the regime (or system) — we are still unable to break the cycle of internal stagnation brought on by external influences. What has kept us in our current state is the self-fulfilling mantra that the people alone cannot change the basic realities of life in Lebanon because there are larger tribes outside the country that manipulate our chieftains. We, their subjects, render ourselves helpless and apathetic because we believe any action taken toward change will ultimately fail. This proved to be true this year, when disorganization and internal bickering caused a youth movement that called for secular change to fall apart from the inside.

But, as the external factors began to change in 2011 — most notably on the Syrian front — a unique opportunity to change how the country is run presented itself. During a year when our economic growth has been erased because of failing infrastructure and a region in turmoil, our socioeconomic sectarian system entrenched by the threat of ‘fitna’ — sectarian discord — is proving unable to protect those it claims it does.

In the absence of societal progress and productive economic growth there is little left for sectarian chiefs to dole out to their subjects. Emigration is proving less of an option as the world deals with the global reality of fewer jobs and less pay. Thus, the support mechanism is, in effect, running low on fuel.

The debacle over raising the minimum wage, which erupted in October, is the best example of this. Once the chieftains realized that simply dishing out more cash to their subjects would bring on further, unsustainable demands due to increasing inflation and unemployment, they backtracked and their impotence became apparent.

When the people realize that the problem is the monopolistic structure of the economy, they will also realize that the solutions necessitate changing the economic nizam. This will undoubtedly play itself out in other areas, from the elections to the water supply, as 2012 progresses. To maintain their system, the chieftains will try to use a weapon they know how to wield best to maintain their power: fear. If it does not work, the only other option for them is fitna, because structural change will result in their own self-destruction.

It is up to the rest of us to decide whether we will continue to be duped by the old ways, or turn on our chieftains and hold them to account.

Sami Halabi is Executive's economics and policy editor

December 3, 2011 0 comments
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Real Estate

Golden shores

by Executive Staff December 3, 2011
written by Executive Staff

While 2010 saw the launching of five development megaprojects, all in downtown Beirut, this year saw a more modest track of real estate announcements.

The biggest by far was the Waterfront City project, a joint venture between Joseph Khoury Holding and the United Arab Emirates’ Majid Al Futtaim Properties, which will encompass 5,000 residential units along with a Carrefour shopping mall and entertainment complex at the Dbayeh marina.  In July, Walid Bejjani, a member of the board at Waterfront City, told Executive that while investment in the first phase is around $200 million, the overall expenditure will exceed $2 billion.

In June, Solidere and London’s Stow group (the developers behind downtown’s first high-rise, Marina Towers) announced they had joined forces to create Zaitunay Bay, which will see Beirut’s marina lined with 22 shops and restaurants, all leading to a membership-only yacht club with 53 serviced residences. Prices will float at above $22,000 per square meter (sqm), the highest in the city. At the launching ceremony, Beirut Waterfront District Chairman Farouk Kamal told Executive that the budget had ballooned to more than $200 million.

From downtown to out-of-town

Solidere, the only listed real estate company in Lebanon, has around 1.27 million sqm of built-up area either under construction, awaiting permits or ‘under study’, out of a total portfolio of nearly 3 million sqm in downtown.

Elsewhere in downtown Beirut, the first mega-residential village announced it would offer 20 small-size studios, ranging from 65 sqm to 160 sqm, within one of the 22 buildings in the District//S community, due to high demand for small, fully-serviced and furnished units within the capital.

Summerland Village, the 73-unit residential section of the upcoming Summerland Hotel and Resort Kempinski, will also offer serviced apartments, introducing the concept of branded apartments to Beirut.

While branded and serviced apartments are marketed as pied-à-terre for non-residents, experts believe there is growing Lebanese demand for gated communities on the outskirts of Beirut. Seven Invest real estate developers plan to create a carefully picked community of 30 villas in their new project, The ONE, in Ain Saade, located 7 kilometers from downtown Beirut, with each villa ranging from 550 sqm to 650 sqm and including its own garden and swimming pool.

The firm’s architectural team is collaborating with fashion designer Zuhair Murad to give each villa a unique design flair, a new concept in Lebanon. With proper infrastructure already present, the group’s director Fawaz Sawaf says it will offer an alternative to those who originally planned to buy a house in the city center. “It’s the same price as a 300 sqm apartment in Beirut but you get the gardens, clean air and the larger villa with a pool,” he says.

Problems

Aside from a lack of proper infrastructure and project delays due largely to outdated and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures for obtaining permits and licenses, the main problem for developers remains the cost of land in the capital.

“Price per built-up area is dictating the increase in the price of apartments, and with the end users becoming price sensitive, developers are now having to study the market well and need to have the best combination of unit size and the best prices,” says Mireille Korab Abi Nasr, head of sales and marketing at FFA Real Estate.

Office towers developments will be more affected by price sensitivity of prime plots as they generally require a larger area of land.

A planned deal for Capstone Investment Group in downtown failed when the landowner changed his mind on one strategic parcel, forcing the developer to negotiate on another two parcels. According to developers such as Capstone’s Chief Executive Officer Ziad Maalouf, the issue is that landowners have inflated expectations regarding valuations despite the new realities in the market. While Lebanon was possibly underpriced up until a year ago, Maalouf says he believes the prices are now growing too fast.

Buyers’ concerns

Homebuyers have become extremely price-sensitive in recent months and are making increasingly high demands before putting their money on the table. “Everybody wants more for what they are paying,” says FFA Real Estate’s Nasr. Buyers are reasonably becoming more concerned about project specs, the right finishing and having their apartments by the date promised, since there is more competition in the market and it has become easier to compare projects, especially if they are within the same district.

But it isn’t just buyers that are price-sensitive. Though many experts believe the proposed 3 percent tax on real estate capital gains, included within the Ministry of Finance’s budget proposal submitted in October, will not pass in the near future, the government’s effort to raise revenues has sent an unpleasant ripple through the industry. It would primarily affect speculators rather than end-users, however, as investors have made exorbitant profits since property prices started escalating in 2005.

Though it will force both buyer and seller to declare the true price of a property when they register it, something usually not practiced to avoid paying higher taxes, some developers say it will just increase the asking prices of high-end projects.

Looking ahead

Uncertainty is the most repeated word among industry experts. As such, developers who are not building in prime areas, or who owe money to banks to pay off loans, might drive prices down in an effort to sell quickly.

In the last two years, “non-professional developers” in the market have been continuously blamed for offering low-quality stock or selling at prices that disturb fair market price, but there seems to be a consensus this year that fewer projects have been launched by such groups of investors.

 

Sidebar: Building environmental awareness

While Greenstone is widely credited as the first developer in Lebanon to implement green construction and get certification from the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED), it appears the concept is catching on. Developers both in and outside of the capital are looking at long-term cost saving, though many industry players complain that the term “green” is mainly used as a marketing concept and not all developers make the investment they should in these initiatives. Still, London-based green-building consultancy firm, G, has partnered with 45 buildings in Lebanon to help them attain LEED certification. Nader Nakib, chief executive officer of G, told Executive in September that investing in green technology makes sense because of government subsidies. Jouzour Loubnan, an environmental non-governmental organization that has partnered with developers such as Estates and Har Properties, hopes around 35,000 trees will have been planted by the end of this year, having launched a new program whereby for every square meter built and sold, one square meter of new forest area will be planted.

December 3, 2011 0 comments
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Yemen turns a page

by Farea al-Muslimi December 3, 2011
written by Farea al-Muslimi

In ancient times, what is now Yemen was given the name Arabia Felix — or “Happy Arabia” — by the Romans. But in modern times, it has enjoyed such a description in title only. In recent decades, Yemen has become known as one of the poorest countries in the world: the homeland of extremists, racked by conflict under the 33-year dictatorial rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

When the Arab uprisings began, Yemenis saw a new chance to continue their struggle toward a more democratic state. For years, Yemenis have been politically active in the streets, from the political campaigns of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) during the presidential elections in 2006 to the southern movement rallies in 2007.  But as other Arab rulers felt the spring wind in their windows, Saleh tried to temper it by announcing a dose of reforms right off the bat. Some were entirely unrealistic — like announcing 65,000 new jobs for Yemeni youth in one night. After the Yemeni Parliament began the year by passing new legislation allowing Saleh to run for the presidency ad infinitum, Saleh announced his three famous “No’s” a month later: no presidency forever, no running for elections again and no inherited presidency, meaning that his son, who was being groomed for succession, and who is the leader of the Republican Guard, will not succeed his father. 

Saleh’s concessions failed to appease those itching for immediate change, however, and February 3 witnessed the first massive demonstrations. Taking place in more than 17 governates, the protests organized by the JMP called for political and economic reforms and a fair distribution of wealth. Up until this point, demands for Saleh to step down had not been made. The JMP called an end to the demonstrations but groups of young people remained in Sanaa’s squares demanding Saleh’s departure. These unknown youth were the catalyst of Yemen’s continuous uprisings for the next nine months.

The point of no return came on March 18, when the security forces’ snipers opened fire on protesters, killing more than 50 and injuring hundreds. The first massacre of its kind in Yemen was a turning point for the uprisings; a wave of resignations by senior military and government officials ensued. The First Armored Division of the military, a powerful segment of the army, declared their support of the uprisings, thus providing their influence on the side of the protesters, but also complicating future agreements.  With the tide seemingly having turned, most thought Saleh was in his last days, if not hours, in power. However, due to an international cardiopulmonary resuscitation, especially at the hand of Saudi Arabia, eight months passed without a transition of power. No sanctions were imposed on the regime and, at the beginning of June when Saleh was injured after his presidential mosque was bombed, the Saudis provided three-month sanctuary to the embattled dictator before his eventual return.

Each day of delay was to the detriment of regular Yemenis; with limited electricity and skyrocketing prices, the humanitarian situation became catastrophic. Violence broke out in many governates, including clashes between government forces and tribal leaders in the capital and escalating violence between government forces and extremists in the Abyan governate. With the situation deteriorating drastically, the international community slowly ratcheted up pressure. Even if Saleh was “the man” when it came to fighting Al Qaeda, it was clear his brand of “stability” was no longer sustainable.

On October 21, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution urging Saleh to sign a power transfer deal proposed earlier by the Gulf Cooperation Council. One month later, on November 23, given one final ultimatum by the Security Council, Saleh signed the plan whereby he will remain honorary president but will delegate his powers to his deputy, Abd-Rabbu Mansour al-Hadi. Under the plan, the latter will work to form a new government with the opposition, with elections intended within three months.

Such a signing was received by the majority as a victory and a new page in the history of Yemen, though the reality is that in Yemeni politics, signatures are much easier to put on paper than they are to abide by. However, it seems that, after a full nine-month term, change of some sort has been born out of Yemen’s uprisings. But as the Arab uprisings have made clear, the fall of a dictator is only the start of a revolution.

Farea al-Muslimi is a Yemeni activist and writer for Almasdar

December 3, 2011 0 comments
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Bludgeoning Syria’s economy

by Jihad Yazigi December 3, 2011
written by Jihad Yazigi

The past 12 months have been devastating for Syria’s economy. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has contracted by several percentage points (possibly by as much as 20 percent), the foreign currency reserves accumulated during the country’s short oil boom have been seriously depleted, the fiscal deficit has at least doubled, the national currency has lost some 15 percent of its value and the confidence the country was starting to gain from international investors has been shaken.

The prospects do not look any better for next year, with western sanctions on the country’s oil and banking sectors gradually starting to impact broader sectors of the economy and the Arab League likely to adopt similar measures.

One of the most frustrating aspects of the last year has been the confusion created by the government over its policies. After decades during which the economy was centrally planned the country adopted in 2005 a “social market” development model, in which the state was expected to limit its intervention to “social services” and to give the private sector more freedom to operate.

The debate over the role and size of the state in the economy seemed to have been finally settled, and until early this year the government had applied this relatively clear road map in spite of its shortcomings and justified criticisms.

Within days of the beginning of protests in the southern city of Daraa in mid-March, however, priorities changed entirely. Subsidies paid on energy products that were deemed “unsustainable” until a few weeks earlier were increased by some 25 percent, civil servants’ salaries rose 30 percent and free trade agreements that had been in place since 2005 were now to be renegotiated.

The moves unsettled analysts and investors and appeared to have been made out of panic rather than on the basis of any rational analysis.

Then, as the year was coming to a close, more confusion came. Minister of Economy Mohammad Nidal al-Shaar, realizing the extent of the damage, said that the decision to raise subsidies and salaries announced in March was “unsustainable” and that the government could not subsidize the economy forever.

The lesson to be drawn from all this is straightforward: You do not solve political problems with economic measures. To protesters chanting “we want freedom,” the government responded by saying “we will pay you better salaries”. The protesters continued to take to the streets because their demands were not met and, as the government was spending above its means, an economic challenge was added to the political problems that remained unanswered.

How dark are the prospects for the Syrian economy?

In the short-term one should not expect miracles. Investment and spending will continue to decline next year, and as foreign currency earnings decrease renewed pressure on the value of the Syrian pound should be expected, with all that entails for inflation and loss of purchasing power.

In the longer term, however, the dramatic political changes that are likely to result from the current unrest carry significant opportunities.

Liberalization alone has not been enough to revitalize the economy and it has in fact highlighted its weaknesses. The country has one of the most diversified economies in the Middle East with four different sectors each generating more than 10 percent of GDP (agriculture, oil and gas, tourism and trade) and three others making up more than 5 percent (manufacturing, finance and real estate). It also benefits from a relatively large market, a well-educated workforce and an extraordinary geographic location.

However, in spite of all these comparative advantages, and years of reforms, Syria attracts less foreign direct investment than its much smaller and resource-poor neighbors, Lebanon and Jordan. And it regularly ranks among the worst performing economies in most global surveys; 14 out of 17 countries in the Middle East in the Doing Business Index of the World Bank and 15 out of 16 countries on the Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum.

The underlying reason for this lacklustre performance is a business environment plagued by an overwhelming and corrupted bureaucracy, a judicial system mastered by the well-connected few and a broad sense of unaccountability and lack of responsibility across the state and its institutions.

These are challenges that cannot be solved through economic measures; rather they require deep changes in governance that are unlikely to ever take place under the current political system.

 

December 3, 2011 0 comments
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Real Estate

Executive Insight – European investors look to Lebanese real estate

by Ziad Maalouf December 3, 2011
written by Ziad Maalouf

In August this year, Capstone Investment Group was trying to conclude the acquisition of a prime piece of land on Abdel Wahab El Inglizi Street in Ashrafieh. As part of our private equity activities, we invite a select group of high-net-worth individuals to join us in each investment, and allow them up to two weeks to send us their indications of interest. In that specific deal, and since everyone perceived the real estate market in Lebanon to be bearish, we gave investors one month to get back to us. However, within only a week, the deals were two and a half times oversubscribed; demand came from Lebanon and the Middle East as well as Europe, not only from Lebanese or Lebanese expatriates but European individuals and institutions.

Of course, we were only able to accommodate a limited number of investors, but the unusual interest from Europe was baffling. After all, the political situation in Lebanon leaves much to be desired; economic growth has slowed down, the real estate sector is going through a perceived period of stagnation and the region in general is in the process of upheaval. So why would Europeans want to invest in Lebanese real estate at this time?

Simply because Europe’s economic woes are no better and the venues for viable investments are drying up. Inflationary pressures are rising, stock markets are sluggish and cash at the bank has been losing value. Furthermore, the exponential spike in public debt in many countries, without a feasible plan in sight to reduce it, has put the whole fundamentals of the Eurozone in question. As a result, some are saying that the developed world is heading towards Japan-style stagnation.

In contrast, the real estate sector in Lebanon has traditionally been one of the country’s most successful after banking and tourism. Given the scarcity of land and the steady demand from both residents and expatriates, Lebanon’s real estate has always been considered an attractive low-risk investment, which over the years, and despite the chronic political instabilities, has generated decent returns.

Furthermore, reduced interest rates, low taxes, high liquidity and the availability of long-term financing from Lebanese banks, considered fiscally conservative by international standards, are contributing to the fundamentals and resilience of the market. In addition, foreign investments remain robust and are expected to reach over $5 billion in 2011, with more than 60 percent allocated to real estate. According to the International Monetary Fund, the attractiveness of Lebanon as an investment destination has been, to a large extent, boosted by the faith in its real estate sector. 

While regional peers from Dubai to Morocco suffer, demand for properties in Lebanon continues unabated and prices in general remain stable, despite certain predictions to the contrary. It is true that the market experienced a period of unusual growth between 2005 and 2009, but all indicators today point to normal growth rates, supported by the unwavering demand from Lebanese expatriates who buy real estate in their homeland as a long-term investment and not for speculative purposes. In fact, it is estimated that more than 80 percent of the market is driven by end-users and not by speculators.

There is no doubt that a significant amount of capital is sitting idle in Europe looking for viable investment opportunities. If Lebanon is to attract international institutional investors, real estate development has to be transformed into a more sophisticated and professionally run business that abides by international norms of design, luxury and quality.

Most importantly, local developers will need to sharpen up their management skills and be able to set up the right financial and legal structures that optimize fiscal benefits and maximize returns, which in normal circumstances should not be less than 20 percent per annum. In my view, such returns can be achieved today by carefully investing in the right opportunities in smaller residential units, Grade A offices (which are in short supply in Beirut today) and retail, in addition to resorts, hotels and furnished apartments, as tourism continues to be an important pillar of the economy.

December 3, 2011 0 comments
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Deciphering Turkey’s foreign policy

by Peter Grimsditch December 3, 2011
written by Peter Grimsditch

In theory, not to mention in several hundred acres of newsprint, 2011 was the year Turkey’s foreign policy fell apart. The tabloid version of the ‘zero problems with the neighbors’ policy postulates that Turkey happily ignores the political shortcomings of a broad expanse of thugs, from Syria to Libya, Iran to Israel. By being diplomatically and commercially close to the unsavory leaders in each of these places, Turkey would gain influence, make money and help maintain an uneasy and fragile stability.

So when, by invading Gaza in 2009, Israel effectively sabotaged the Turkey-sponsored proximity peace talks with Syria, the foreign policy crafted by Ankara’s philosopher-politician Ahmet Davutoglu suffered its first punch in the midriff. This year, by cozying up to the regularly lamented Muammar Qadhafi while much of the rest of the world was plotting a bombing campaign in the name of protecting civilians, Turkey appeared recklessly out of line. However, it has emerged that Ankara was almost certainly looking both ways, by partly financing and supplying military training to the “rebels” from a fairly early stage.

Switching to the immediate next door neighbors and the continuing Syrian conflict, the easy narrative taken by most in the media is that Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan hung in there with a bunch of murderers for far too long. His valiant efforts to act as regional bigwig urging reform were never likely to succeed and Ankara’s prestige was dealt a humiliating blow. Turkey’s ability to put forward a consistent policy was again in tatters when Erdogan inevitably flipped and announced that enough was enough and the whole unsavory Bashar al-Assad gang had to go.

Then there is the continued retreat from a cuddly diplomatic and military love affair with Israel, the increasing unlikelihood of implementing the theatrically staged signing of protocols with Armenia and the bold threat to dispatch warships to the Eastern Mediterranean to singe an Israeli beard if necessary — just how much unraveling can one foreign policy take?
Viewing the wood and not the trees throws up another perspective. The dynamic duo, the Batman and Robin of Turkish foreign policy — Erdogan and Davutoglu — are not stupid, short-sighted nor fickle. The chain of events inspired by the self-immolation of a Tunisian fruit-seller has had a profound effect on Turkey’s standing in the region and augurs well for an even more profound diplomatic and commercial marriage with the neighbors.

The Arab Spring has transformed Erdogan into the idol of many on the Arab street. The prime minister’s popularity at home is such that it would take a political earthquake to oust him and his party at the next elections. For his people the Qadhafis and Assads are irrelevancies, reminders only of the stoic attempts by Erdogan to spread peace, democracy and prosperity throughout the region. Just as a puppy is not just for Christmas, so foreign policy is not for a year or so, nor are banalities like zero problems with the neighbors the stuff of election manifestos. There is one succinct summary of foreign policy from 30 years ago that illustrates its peculiar characteristics. Told of Britain’s intentions toward the Falkland Islands around the time of the Argentinean invasion, then United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig characterized his British opposite number, Lord Carrington, as a “duplicitous bastard.”

It would be churlish to apply Haig’s crudities to other countries but the observation that all may not be as it appears is equally true. This rule applies also to Turkey, Israel and the US. The popular picture has Turkey and Israel in near open war but this doesn’t bear scrutiny. Despite Barack Obama’s disdain for the Israeli prime minister, though not as crude as Nicolas Sarkozy’s characterization of Benjamin Netanyahu as a liar, the US president is too shrewd to continue to openly embrace Turkey if they were as deeply hostile to Israel as the headlines would have it.

Ankara’s announced ambition as a regional broker and its pursuit of zero problems with the neighbors remains. The obstacles — having the neighbors infested with the wrong sort of leaders — are slowly being removed. Even the recalcitrant Israeli leadership may have to adapt to the changing world.

Peter Grimsditch is Executive's Turkey correspondent

December 3, 2011 0 comments
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Palestine’s resurgent authority

by Ahmed Moor December 3, 2011
written by Ahmed Moor

The year 2011 began with a great deal of uncertainty — perhaps even promise — for the Palestinians. Much of that had to do with the revolutionary fervor that had taken hold in the region. The ousting of Tunisia’s Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak were regarded by many young Palestinians as an opening — an opportunity to force open their own binds.

The March 15 Palestinian youth movement successfully captured and focused the energy of the Arab uprisings on the need for rapprochement between the Hamas and Fatah parties. After a period of stiff resistance by both political leaderships, efforts were made to the end to the rift that has bedeviled the Palestinians since 2007.

Not all progress on reconciliation in the first part of the year can be linked to the agitations of young Palestinians. Much of the impetus for the renewed political process was tied to the fact that Mahmoud Abbas was politically weaker after losing his main Arab sponsor, President Mubarak, while Hamas took account of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s increasingly isolated position — as Damascus had worked to counterbalance Cairo — and sought to buttress their legitimacy by engaging with the Palestinian Authority (PA), though for several months the deal that had been inked went nowhere.

That began to change as autumn approached. In 2009, September 2011 had been set as the deadline for the realization of Palestinian statehood by Salaam Fayyad, prime minister of the PA. In September 2010, United States President Barack Obama affirmed such aspirations by declaring that a Palestinian state would come to be in the next year.

As September 2011 approached and it became clear the claims would be pursued, Benjamin Netanyahu’s government began to issue hysterical statements about the potential consequences. Obama had long since walked back from his pledge, and his administration stated that any Palestinian moves at the UN would be vetoed.

Officially, the Americans and Israelis claimed that the only way to resolve the occupation was through bilateral negotiations. But in fact the Israelis were more concerned about the implications that recognition of the Palestinian bid would have for them in the International Criminal Court, International Court of Justice, and other international bodies that would become more accessible to the Palestinians. And the Americans, for their part, continue to cave in to the desires of the Israel lobby.

As part of their statehood development track, the Palestinian Authority also approached UNESCO, the education, science and culture promotion wing of the United Nations, for membership. Their approval prompted the Americans and Israelis to withhold their funding contributions from the organization.

The push for statehood had two very important consequences for both Hamas and Israel as the moves taken by the Palestinian Authority comparatively weakened both of the PA’s adversaries. For Hamas, a surge in Abbas’ popularity meant a corresponding dip in theirs. And for Israel, the Palestinian attempt to highlight Israeli intransigence succeeded magnificently on a global stage.

It was in this context that the Hamas-Israel prisoner swap was conducted. After more than five years of fruitless negotiations, the two sides agreed to exchange 1,027 Palestinians for one Israeli prisoner. While roughly 7,000 to 10,000 Palestinian prisoners remain incarcerated in Israel, the release of even a fraction of them greatly enhanced Hamas’ prestige. For Israel’s embattled prime minister, the move meant a temporary boost in his poll ratings as well.

But despite the political uproar, in the end the statehood bid that was submitted to the UN did not gain enough support for a vote, ostensibly, said Security Council members, because the Palestinians remained politically divided. In that way, the bid inadvertently created an added incentive for Hamas and Fatah to genuinely mend their rift. Khaled Meshaal — Hamas’ political leader — and Mahmoud Abbas met in November to discuss when elections could be held. Crucially, Salaam Fayyad agreed not to join the next government, a major point of contention for reconciliation.

As things stand it is difficult to foresee the future in Palestine and, given the symbolic nature of the UN bid, to assess 2011’s gains. But it appears that the drive to join international institutions is a sustainable one and, more importantly, elections for a national unity government are on track for May of next year. But, as ever, nothing is certain in Palestine. 


Ahmed Moor is a contributor to Al Jazeera English and is a Master in Public policy candidate at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government

December 3, 2011 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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