Eleven years of gradual economic reform have sputtered to a halt in Syria over the past six months amid nationwide revolts against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Gone are the halcyon years of a booming tourism industry, the headway made by the region’s youngest stock exchange and the foreign direct investment that had spiked since 2005 to reach $2.9 billion in 2010. Meanwhile, the expatriate Syrians lured back from corporate jobs in the Gulf and the West to join the fledgling financial sector have, by and large, packed their bags and left as the crackdown on demonstrators escalates. Between 2,600 and 5,400 have been killed, according to varying estimates, as Executive went to print.

The short-lived economic renaissance of sorts steered by Assad and Abdullah Dardari, a London School of Economics graduate and now former deputy prime minister, took a further blow when the United States and the European Union slapped multiple sanctions on prominent members of the Syrian regime and close economic partners in May, and imposed further rounds of sanctions in August and September that included the oil sector .

Tightening the screws

The EU has been selective in what individuals and entities it has targeted for sanctions.

On May 9 and May 23, members of the regime were designated, including President Assad and his maternal cousin, billionaire businessman Rami Makhlouf, whose portfolio includes Cham Holding and mobile operator Syriatel, and who the EU stated was targeted because he “bankrolls the regime allowing violence.” On September 2, the EU listed prominent businessmen and businesses for providing “economic support to the regime”, such as the presidents of the Damascus and Aleppo chambers of industry — respectively, Tarif Akhras, head of the Akhras Group, and Issam Anbouba, president of Issa Anbouba Establishment for agro-industry — as well as Cham Holding and certain subsidiaries, and the state-run Real Estate Bank.

On September 23, a further 15 regime members were added (bringing the total to 43 members of the regime and associated businessmen), as well as five Syrian intelligence and military directorates. A further six entities were added to the ‘banned’ list, including Addounia TV and Syriatel, as its licensing contract “pays 50 percent of its profits to the government.”

The EU moves allow for the freezing of the European assets of the individuals targeted and prohibits their travel to Europe. The latest sanctions also prohibited the selling, buying and export, directly or indirectly, of new Syrian banknotes and coinage printed or minted in the EU, to the Central Bank of Syria, as large amounts of Syrian currency had, until then, been produced in Austria. The September sanctions also prohibited financial loans, credit or joint ventures with listed persons or entities.

The US sanctions, issued May 27 and September 1, focused on military-linked businesses, Syrian hydrocarbon companies and Cham Holding, and prevent American companies from doing business with the figures in question. Sanctions were also renewed against the state-run Commercial Bank of Syria (initially blacklisted by the US in 2004 for financing terrorism), and Syrian-issued MasterCard and Visa cards have been frozen. The US and EU-blacklisted companies and individuals contacted by Executive refused to comment.

Hardly foolproof

“Sanctions are not a silver bullet,” said Andrew Tabler, a Next Generation Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy (WINEP) and author of recently published “In The Lion’s Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington’s Battle with Syria.”

“They are more like ways you can find to ratchet up the pressure in very specific ways to try and bring about some breaks in the regime, for instance, in getting elites to move away from [it],” he said.

The economic sanctions are an obvious psychological blow to the regime and its cadres, but do not have the same impact as those on the oil sector, which accounts for an estimated 20 to 30 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.

That said, while the latest sanctions have not directly targeted international trade outside of oil, wariness on the part of international shippers to trade with Syria and a sharp drop in domestic demand has seen cargo shipments at the port of Lattakia plummet, dropping 13 percent since the beginning of the unrest in March on the year before and 36 percent year-on-year in June alone, according to statistics published by the port’s operating authority. Reuters last month quoted shipping sources as saying volumes at the ports of both Lattakia and Tartous have shrunk as much as 40 percent in the first eight months of 2011, relative to last year.

Trade with strategic partner Turkey has also plunged, with Syrian exports to Turkey in June dropping 59.3 percent, to $48 million, from the same period last year, while Turkish exports to Syria declined by 18.1 percent to $113 million, according to Turkish government figures.

Trade with the US, however, has been negligible for years, with 2010 bilateral trade estimated at $928 million, or 2.4 percent of all trade, following the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003 that banned all exports except food and medicine, prohibited American businesses from operating or investing in Syria, blocked transactions on Syrian property and tightened the aviation sanctions first imposed in 1984. However, Syria was able to successfully bypass these earlier sanctions by re-exporting American goods through Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates. Where the US has hurt Syria is by limiting the leverage of Syrian banks internationally, and it could deliver a huge blow should it succeed in its efforts to put pressure on Turkey to also impose sanctions.

A bigger blow to Syria is the impact on trade with the EU; the economic bloc is the country’s largest trade partner and aid donor, accounting for 22.5 percent of Syria’s foreign trade in 2010.

But as a trade partner, Syria ranks low down on the major import and export list for the EU, accounting for just 0.2 percent of imports and 0.3 percent of exports in 2010, and ranked 50th of the EU’s trade partners, according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics. Nonetheless, the sanctions have had an effect.

“While EU trade sanctions are limited to the oil sector, non-oil trade with Europe has been affected as European companies have been limiting their trade with Syria, and the Syrian government itself is encouraging Syrians not to trade with Europe,” said Nabil Sukkar, a former World Bank economist and head of the Syrian Consulting Bureau for Development and Investment in Damascus.

No investment ban

The EU sanctions have not included an investment ban on European companies doing business in Syria, although this could be the next step. “I think an investment ban is coming. But what impact will it have? The largest investment [by the EU] is in the petroleum sector,” WINEP’s Tabler said.

Italy, whose bilateral trade with Syria was worth $2.69 billion in 2010 and which is Syria’s fourth largest import partner, has managed to delay the enforcement of EU oil sanctions until November. The European Investment Bank has stopped all loans to Syria and EU aid programs totaling $185 million have been slashed by 62 percent. The aid had gone towards funding infrastructure projects and providing expertise to the private sector.

But Sukkar believes such a move by the EU is disingenuous. “The cut in EU aid to Syria, intended originally to support economic liberalization, will strengthen the tendency of the new government to bring back controls. So sanctions will be counterproductive, they will hurt citizens’ livelihoods and will help the reversal of Syria’s liberalization policies,” he said.

For the sanctions to work beyond the oil sector, other revenue streams need to be targeted, said Tabler, hitting more prominent businesses in Damascus and Aleppo, particularly those with ties to Western firms such as the Joud Group, which manufactures and distributes Pepsi under license, and the Attar Group, which handles distribution for multinational pharmaceutical companies and electronic and software companies Sony, IBM and Lexmark, as well as being the country sales agent for Alitalia.

Other businessmen that could be targeted — listed in a report by the US Congressional Research Service but so far not sanctioned by Washington — are Majd Suleiman, head of media conglomerate United Group and son of Bahjat Suleiman, a former General Security Director officer, as well as Firas Tlass, the son of former Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass and head of the MAS Economic Group. Reducing the profit margins of major companies paying taxes to the regime would dent the Syrian treasury.

While Sukkar is against the sanctions, he suggested that such specific targeting would make a mark.

“The impact on specific companies and individuals… will deter others from establishing business relations with establishment figures,” he said. “But the imposed sanctions will not topple the regime and will not cripple the economy. Instead it will create economic and social damage, affecting both government finances and citizens’ livelihoods.”

“We will forget that Europe is on the map”

The Syrian government has, unsurprisingly, played down the impact of the sanctions. At a press conference in Damascus in June, Foreign Minister Walid al-Mu’allem responded to the first round of EU sanctions by saying: “We will forget that Europe is on the map, and we will turn to the east, to the south and all directions that extend a hand to Syria.”

The Syrians have lived up to their word to look elsewhere for alternative trade partners. Over the summer, Syrian officials went on a mission to get trade agreements with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia. Grain, for instance, has been purchased from Ukraine; a necessary import as Syria no longer produces enough food for its domestic consumption and agriculture output has not been as high as expected this year due to the ongoing drought in much of the country.

Russia has criticized the EU sanctions, and as of August continued to supply arms to Syria. In early September, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said Russia was “a great friend of Syria” and “a country with which we have numerous economic and political contacts.”

Closer to home, the Arab League at the end of August called for an “end to the spilling of blood and for Syria to follow the way of reason before it is too late,” but has not gone as far as calling for an economic boycott or annulling Syria’s membership in the Greater Arab Free Trade Area. Damascus rejected the league’s statement, as did Beirut, signaling that bilateral trade with Lebanon will continue. Such support from Beirut, Moscow and its allies, albeit limited, does dampen the effectiveness of the US and EU sanctions.

“Syria will be able to mitigate the impact of sanctions through deepening economic ties with Iraq, Iran, Russia and other Asian countries. Also Lebanon will always accommodate Syrian business needs for financial transfers,” said Sukkar.

According to shipping sources in Beirut, trade with Syria has not been affected and is very much ‘business as usual’. Lebanese banks hold accounts for Syrian officials, including Rami Makhlouf, according to a banking source, although banks agreed, unofficially at a Union of Arab Banks meeting, not to carry out international transactions on behalf of Syrians, or provide alternative names or addresses. Meanwhile, Finance Minister Mohammed al-Safadi said following meetings in Washington and with the IMF in late September that it was not in the interest of Lebanon to be the financial hub of Syria, and that Lebanese banks have taken measures to align with the international sanctions. If upheld, this could also affect foreign remittances on behalf of Syrians.

If ties with Iraq cool, as Baghdad has recently hinted at, and Turkey joins in on the sanctions — Ankara has already intercepted arms shipments — the Assad regime will find itself increasingly isolated. “Syria would be surrounded. And it is not like Jordan has a lot of love for Syria,” said Tabler. Indeed, if Jordan closed its borders, this would have a major effect on Syrian trade with the Hashemite kingdom and Saudi Arabia, Syria’s third largest trade partner. The loss of Iraq as an export destination would be equally devastating, accounting for 30.3 percent of total exports, or $4.6 billion, in 2010.

Sound as a pound?

Syria’s Finance Minister, Mohammad Jleilati, was trying to put on a brave face when he said on the sidelines of a meeting of Arab finance ministers in Abu Dhabi in early September that the economy will grow by 1 percent this year.  A recent IMF report estimates Syria’s economy will contract by 2 percent, while the Institute of International Finance estimated the economy will contract at least 4 percent this year and the fiscal deficit will widen to more than 6 percent of GDP.

But Tabler and other sources Executive spoke with suggest the Syrian economy could shrink as much as 20 percent; tourism revenue (worth more than $8 billion last year) has almost completely vanished, the cities of Homs, Hama, Deir ez Zor and Daraa have been at a virtual economic standstill for months, banks are reporting steep declines in assets and trade is falling off. Syria has seen roughly $2 billion in capital flight this year, and the Central Bank of Syria (CBS) has had to spend at least $2 billion defending the Syria pound (SYP), according to CBS Governor Adib Mayaleh, though the official exchange rate has still slipped slightly, from SYP46 to the dollar in March to SYP48.41 in September.

CBS foreign reserves are officially at $18 billion, although sources peg that number nearer $15 billion, and Mayaleh said Syria has a $5 billion fund created several years ago for the specific purpose of supporting the currency during crises, although he did not make clear whether it was included in the total reserves. Syria also has an estimated 25.8 tons of gold reserves, according to the World Gold Council data, worth roughly $1.4 billion at average world gold prices at the end of last month.

The currency reserves will allow Syria to cover import needs for over 20 months, according to the finance ministry, but that also depends on countries staying friendly with Damascus and remaining willing to trade.  Furthermore, international currency rates could cause Syria more fiscal woes than it is already facing, having lost access to the dollar on the global markets.

“Restrictions on money transfers in dollars, initiated from outside as well as by the CBS, have disrupted trade,” said Sukkar. “There will be further disruptions in trade if the EU imposes restrictions on transfers in euros. Then Syria will have to go to other convertible currencies, such as the [British] pound and the Japanese yen, both of which have been as volatile as the dollar and the euro over the past year.”

How well the central bank handles these challenges will be key to the continued funding of the Syrian regime amid increased economic isolation and the possibility of further sanctions.

A faltering economy and diving business prospects would undoubtedly erode support for the regime among middle class Syrians and the business elite — groups which, to this point, have largely backed the Assad government. But in the war of attrition that sanctions amount to, whether they have the desired effect of shaking the regime’s iron grip on power, or whether they harm everyday Syrians more than anyone else, are still open questions. 

“[It] all depends on agricultural production, oil prices and how much overall economic demand has dropped,” said Tabler. “The real challenge is for the sanctions to hit the regime more than anyone else.”

As Damascus struggles to repress widespread protests across the country, now in their seventh month, it will also have to contend with a comprehensive sanctions package from the United States and the European Union on Syria’s oil sector.

The sanctions prohibit purchases of what until now has been Syria’s 145,000 barrels per day (bpd) export regime, with the International Monetary Fund valuing these oil receipts at $4 billion annually, amounting to some 25 percent of total government revenue. Sanctions also ban all new investment into the country’s hydrocarbon sector.

The EU represents 96 percent of the export market for Syria, with Germany, Italy and France alone accounting for more than 70 percent. But the sanctions will not be enforced immediately, as the EU vote on September 2 stipulated an implementation date of November 15 — a compromise deal with a coalition of members, chief among them Italy, under domestic pressure from refiners that had been affected by the disruption in oil supply from Libya this year.

While Europeans have been outspoken in their criticism of President Bashar al-Assad’s brazen repression of dissent, for many the sanctions come as a surprise. Because of a tight supply market, especially in the Mediterranean, as well as longstanding European involvement in the Syrian energy sector by super-majors Shell and Total (and a litany of newcomers), the official line in Brussels was that US-style sanctions would hurt the people, rather than the regime. However, persistent lobbying by representatives of the Syrian opposition in exile, who made a simple yet compelling case advocating a ban on imports, may have had the desired effect. Anti-regime lobbyists noted that the Assad regime may be in too precarious a position to maneuver the levers of power and bureaucracy required in finding new markets for its relatively unattractive oil, much less respond to a multitude of disruptions across the entire supply chain.

A minnow in the ocean

Syria does not have a significant oil industry to wield as a political tool with the West. Historically, relations with the West have been fraught with tension over Syria’s antagonism toward Israel, its involvement in Lebanese politics and its alleged support for the insurgency in Iraq. But while the country may punch above its weight ideologically, it is considered a minnow in the global oil arena and has few resources from either a technical or market perspective to weather a sustained and serious embargo from the West.

Syria’s oil output in 2010 was estimated to be 385,000 barrels per day, which represented a victory for the sector as the first time in a decade that the country was able to buck a year-on-year decline (often at rates as high as 5 percent) that had many analysts writing Syria off as an exporter by 2020. Syria benefitted, however, from the flurry of global exploration and production activity that was spurred by the dramatic rise in the price of oil from $35 in 2000 to $147 in the summer of 2008. The newfound incentives saw companies aggressively pursuing opportunities using technologies that had until then been deemed uneconomical.

President Assad and former deputy prime minister for economic affairs Abdullah Dardari responded to the changes in the market by embracing western firms and instituting a series of laws that made the Syrian play (the country’s market and resource opportunities) “the best of any country in the Middle East”, according to Ken Judge, an official with Gulfsands Petroleum, whose main production assets are in Syria.

Super-majors Shell and Total, producers of the country’s premium Syrian Light grade, declined to expand operations in the country, focusing instead on marketing refined products to the rapidly growing Syrian demand and using the country as a platform for entry into the post-Saddam Iraq. A litany of independents, however, entered the trade and began an aggressive drilling campaign, particularly in the heart of the country, but also in the northeast Deir ez Zor region. Companies such as Dove Energy, Loon, Stratic and France’s Maurel & Prom invested millions of dollars in the play, encouraged by a global market that was rewarding risk and a Syrian market that had already paid off for at least one independent, United Kingdom-based Gulfsands. The company discovered oil in 2007 and by 2009 was posting impressive production gains, with profits jumping some 160 percent from $18 million in 2008 to $48 million in 2009.

At the same time, a regional shift towards utilizing associated gas production, by either bringing it to market or by re-injecting it into aging oil fields, allowed the state-owned Syrian Petroleum Company — which controls the sector through independent production and joint ventures with foreign producers — to gradually arrest declining output. Through its marketing arm Sytrol, the method allowed for a 15-year export plan that would offset the gradual decline of its premium Syrian Light blend with substantial growth of its primary export blend, Soueideh (also known as Syrian Heavy), which would allow the country to maintain current export levels until 2025. Syrian Heavy is a low quality and technically challenging oil to process, sold at a discount to benchmark Dated Brent. It can only be processed by a minority of refineries in the world, which are generally concentrated in Europe and the US, as well as in Syria. As has been a pattern in the region, the government invested its inflated revenues from increased crude output into manufacturing and heavy industry.  This boosted domestic demand for refined oil to the point where, by the mid-2000s, it outstripped domestic supply. Syria was left increasingly reliant on imports of refined oil it purchased with precious foreign currency when, had the country instead prioritized expenditure on its own refining capacity in the last decade, it could theoretically be supplying to its own market. Syria’s refining capacity had long stood at 240,000 barrels per day which, outstripped by domestic energy consumption, forced Damascus to begin an import regime that now stands at approximately two to three cargos a month to meet its gasoil and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) needs. It buys these cargos at market value, which it then sells domestically at deeply subsidized prices. According to the US Energy Information Administration, the practice cost the government $3 billion in 2010, but will likely remain in place as the government seeks to retain popular support.

Both ends of the sanctions

Syria’s proven reserves have generally remained around 2.5 billion barrels, the lowest of any Middle Eastern oil exporter, and accounting for just 0.2 percent of the world total.

In 2010, BP estimated the country’s reserve-to-production (R/P) ratio — the amount of time it would take to exhaust oil at current production levels — to be 18 years. It is indicative of the diminutive size of Syria’s export stream, in global terms, that their top buyer, Italy, has imported an average of 41,500 barrels per day this year, which is less than 3 percent of their total import mix.  Its major buyer, Eni, is confident that they can source supply elsewhere.

Similarly, although major US investment had been halted in 2004, the latest sanctions formally and entirely cut the cord with Syria’s oil sector. Though the vast majority of Syria’s domestically refined crude is consumed in-country, the US had been taking in 9,300 barrels per day of refined Syrian petroleum products, contributing to the $400 million in payments to Damascus in 2010, according to US trade data. The US was Syria’s largest single purchaser of refined petroleum products, yet accounted for less than 0.004 percent of America’s 2.6 million barrels per day of total imports of petroleum products. By contrast, Libyan oil reserves of light sweet crude, highly sought after by European refiners, stood at 46 billion barrels with a R/P ratio of 78 years at 2010 production levels. The loss of Libya’s 1.4 million barrels per day on the market compelled Saudi Arabia to increase output and US President Barack Obama to authorize a rare 30 million barrel sale from America’s strategic reserves. The loss of Syrian supply would be unlikely to engender such moves.

Although Assad did get somewhat of a reprieve with the November 15 implementation date, the regime is expected to have difficulty finding new markets to keep up its export schedule. Kate Dourian, Platt’s Middle East bureau chief, believes that “countries will voluntarily stop working with Syria.” Indeed, both Danish Maersk Oil and French giant Total voluntarily cancelled scheduled deals in September, with Maersk spokesman Michael Christian Storgaard attributing the stoppage to “US sanctions”. Traders Vitol and Trafigura, on the other hand, continued with planned sales of one cargo of gasoline each, to Syria’s state-owned Sytrol in August.

Though Vitol and Trafigura, both based in non-EU Switzerland, would not be required to comply by the EU standards, an email from Vitol’s press office to Executive stated that the company “has been and will remain in full compliance with all local and international sanctions legislation relating to Syria.” Dourian believes that the “reputational risk” involved with the Syrian market is not worth it for Western traders — who have no infrastructure or long-term deals at stake with the country — to continue their dealings with Damascus even ahead of the November 15 deadline.  Heavies such as Shell, who are still dealing with Damascus, are under pressure from grassroots campaigns by Syrian activists and non-governmental organizations.

At the same time, an expected price collapse of Syrian oil after the sanctions take effect may make Syria’s crude attractive to buyers in the east, who tend to be less influenced by Western politics in the oil industry. A number of logistical obstacles, however, would have to be overcome. Syria’s shipping capacity is designed for Mediterranean markets and short trips. Loading ports in Baniyas and Tartous are limited to Aframax class tankers, with a capacity around 600,000 barrels. They can technically make the journey to Asian and Indian markets but would do so at a higher cost per mile than larger tankers, which would offset the discounted prices. China and Russia my be tilted towards buying from Syria by political considerations but India, the closest east-of-Suez destination that would potentially accept Syrian Heavy, traditionally favors political neutrality in its oil dealings in the Middle East.

Additionally, the premiums paid for the financial instruments necessary to secure these deals and guarantee tanker costs, have also been rising. According to the UK-based Worldscale guide for tanker rates, Syria pays around $18,000 per day to ship a full Aframax load to the EU, but a Reuters report in March of this year noted that rates had gone up by 26.5 percent, concurrent with the first round of EU sanctions. The price hike is due to the risks perceived by traders in handling the cargo and is likely to rise further as sanctions drag on.

China, with recent acquisitions through its state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation, does have a 35 percent interest in Syria Shell Petroleum Development, but this represents less than 10,000 barrels per day of the company’s 2.8 million daily production.

Russia, however, has long standing plans to build a major naval facility in Tartous.  Ambitions of a blue water base in the Mediterranean are , according to IHS Jane’s analyst David Hardwell, “as old as the hills”.  This isn’t necessarily dependent on Assad; an opposition visit to Moscow late last month no doubt included assurances as to the viability of the project in a post-Assad Syria.

The extent of Russia’s, China’s, and perhaps India’s willingness to step up and support the regime in the face of increasingly unified and diverse pressure on the country is unclear.

Although indications from Moscow and Beijing are that they will not stand for another Libyan style intervention, both countries would need to go out of their way to serve as substitute markets for Syrian oil in the medium term. Russia, for example, is invariably the largest, or second largest (running neck and neck with Saudi Arabia) net oil exporter, and imported just 1,000 barrels per day in 2010, according to BP. Though a price collapse of Syrian Heavy after the November 15 moratorium on EU imports is certain, China’s heavy refineries are already enjoying a decidedly buyer’s market, which has seen sharp discounts in heavy oil for east-of-Suez deliveries.

Structurally, it is potentially much easier to thwart Syrian efforts to sidestep the embargo than augment them. Organization of Petroleum Exporters (OPEC) powerhouse Saudi Arabia, who in August withdrew its ambassador to Damascus to protest the regime’s crackdown, demonstrated its willingness to dip into its spare production capacity, in response to supply disruptions from Libya, by increasing output by 300,000 barrels per day in June. 

This was accompanied by a statement from its Oil Minister at the time Ali Naimi indicating that any disruption to global oil production from the unrest in Libya, or any other producing country, would be met by swift action from Riyadh. Furthermore, although less likely in the short term, Barack Obama reserves the right to penalize any company with US interests that does business within the Syrian oil sector. Washington has successfully wielded a similar threat in discouraging many international oil companies from doing business with Iran.

Even if the Syrian government does get its oil to market, the earnings derived may be diverted into ensuring that the imports of LPG and Gasoils remain on track to keep the country functioning.

A September 23 report from Reuters quoted unnamed traders as saying that Damascus was making overtures on the international market to swap crude oil in return for refined product that the country needs to meet consumption.

The same report went on to detail the difficulties that Syria was facing in concluding contracts, even ahead of the November 15 deadline, primarily because the financial instruments necessary to facilitate such deals — such as insuring shipments and payments — have also been impacted by the sanctions. The report concluded that Damascus would likely eventually find a willing partner to finance the operations, but that its premiums to underwrite the risk would be extraordinarily high.

Even if Assad can keep some of the oil revenue flowing to prop up his embattle regime, this lifeline will be thin. 

“It is potentially much easier to thwart Syrian efforts to sidestep the embargo than augment them”