Feature

Secrets of the stones

by Executive Editors
written by Executive Editors

It is easier to walk into the Lebanese Parliament than gain access to the higher echelons of Lebanon’s jewelers, given the amount of security, how frequently top jewelers travel and their secretive nature.

To visit the offices of a jeweler is akin to entering Fort Knox: beyond the usual security to an office block there are multiple bulletproof doors to be buzzed through — including a holding room — until you’re sat in a padded leather arm chair of the ‘old world’ style.

When you keep merchandise worth up to $80 million on the premises, as some of the top jewelers do, such security measures are understandable. Yet while carrying out a heist on these jewelry fortresses would be difficult, just as challenging is getting interviews with members of what is arguably the country’s most secretive industry.

The sector, which by dollar value accounts for an estimated 30 percent of Lebanon’s total trade and exports, is so devoid of transparency that accurate figures are hard to come by and no companies are willing to open their books to external scrutiny.

“Around 90 percent of sales are not declared,” said one jeweler in a rare off-the-record disclosure.

Getting jewelers to talk is like getting blood out of a stone; they tend to clam up when it comes to figures, market variables and projections. Indeed, some jewelers are so tight lipped that half-hour interviews yielded just a few lines of useful information and usable quotes.

While Lebanon is well known for its banking secrecy, the jewelry sector should be equally — if not as infamously — renowned, particularly given its economic significance and export clout. According to the Syndicate of Expert Goldsmiths and Jewelers in Lebanon (SEGJL), Lebanon is the leader in jewelry and gold production in the Middle East (excluding Turkey), employing 8,000 people with 2,000 qualified jewelers and experts at some 60

major workshops.

According to the country’s other jewelry-related body, the Syndicate of Lebanese Jewelers, the sector employs 5,000 people. By comparison, the banking sector employs some 20,000 people.

Judging by the Lebanese Customs’ records, jewelry exports were valued at $707 million from January to September 2009, equivalent to 28.8 percent of the country’s total exports. Imports on the other hand were 4.2 percent of total imports, valued at $505 million in the same period.

However, domestic sales are not reported or listed by the Ministry of Economy and, as stated, much of what is sold and exported is not declared. According to SEGJL, approximately 80 to 90 percent of Lebanese jewelry is exported to the Gulf, Europe and North America. But the syndicate did not make clear whether that amount includes undeclared exports or not, and presumably much of what is actually exported is not disclosed, either by customers or by jewelers themselves travelling on sales trips.

When a single four-part set of jewels can sell for $4 million, “clients don’t want the value [of their jewelry] to be mentioned because of thieves and ransom threats,” said Gerard Tufenkjian, managing director of Beirut-based jeweler Tufenkjian.

One jeweler recounted that when he goes abroad for exhibitions he may take $3 million to $4 million worth of merchandise, but may only sell $2 million, so he will not declare the amount on arrival or departure. As Tufenkjian related, “Our business is in a bag, we come and go with one or two Samsonites [suitcases] to do our business.”

Patrick el-Khoury, head of publishing and events at Arabian Watches and Jewellery magazine, said he had heard rumors circulating within the industry that the sector was worth some $4.5 billion, which would be equivalent to a staggering 16 percent of Lebanon’s gross domestic product. “But this figure is not confirmed,” he stressed. Neither the syndicates nor jewelry companies would offer another figure.

The annual exhibition Joaillerie Liban 2009, however, stated on its website that “Lebanon has become one of the top five jewelry producers in the world,” with “60 percent of [the country’s] $1 billion production in jewelry and designer jewelry sold in Lebanon to visitors or importers from the region, Europe, the Far East and the Americas.”

Given the discrepancies of up to 90 percent between the SEGJL’s export figures, Khoury’s and Joaillerie Liban’s figures, the true value of the sector and the size of exports is essentially anyone’s guess. It is certainly one of Lebanon’s more successful sectors, but given its lack of transparency, a sizeable amount of money is not being disclosed and consequently, minimal revenues are going into government coffers.

Taxation is one reason the sector is opaque. Under Lebanese law, jewelers pay the standard income tax on employees’ salaries, but not on the value of precious metals or stones. For sales, taxation is 0.8 percent — a policy introduced in 2004 by the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

“We don’t impose this tax on the customer,” said Hovig Yessayan, marketing manager of Yessayan, adding that 95 percent of his firm’s sales go abroad to the Gulf and Lebanese expatriates.

The sector is dominated by family run firms, and families tend to not like their laundry, clean or dirty, aired in public

Diamonds are deception’s best friend

Another reason for the sector’s secretive nature is the diamond trade (see page 31). Lebanon exported 2.45 million carats in 2008, estimated at $48.47 million,  according to the latest figures from the global regulator, known as the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) (see chart below).

But according to Partnership Africa Canada’s “Diamonds and Human Security Annual Review 2009,” more than 97 percent of all diamonds leave Lebanon soon after they arrive, with 85 percent arriving in the country certified as industrial diamonds — used in drill-bits, saw blades and abrasives. Curiously, however, “some 250,000 more carats leave as gem quality diamonds than arrive — worth 36 times their import value,” the report stated.

With the average diamond imported into Lebanon at $19.67 per carat (among the lowest rates in the world), if exported at 36 times this value they would be worth some $708 per carat; carry this over 250,000 carats and there would be a $177 million differential between the value of diamonds entering and exiting Lebanon.

This math is only a guesstimate, however, as the value of diamonds per carat can vary widely depending on the specific stone; the global

average price per carat stands at around $95, while the highest quality diamonds can reach up to $4,000 per carat.

According to KPCS figures, there is a difference of just $1.6 million between Lebanese diamond imports and exports.

“The most common explanation of where diamonds are misclassified is tax avoidance, or some kind of [money] laundering scheme within a trading company,” said Annie Dunnebacke, a campaigner at the natural resource focused rights group Global Witness, based in London.

Quite clearly there are a lot of diamonds knocking around that are not being declared — at least in true worth — and so far, the KPCS has not investigated such discrepancies in Lebanon (see facing page).

When asked about why the sector is not better regulated, Hovig Yessayan said: “When [you are] making money for the country, no one cares.”

Keep it in the family

Among the factors allowing the sector to remain so hidden from scrutiny is that it is dominated by family run firms.

Leading companies such as Tufenkjian, Nsouli, Antoine Hakim, George Hakim, Azar and Gemayel have been in the business for more than 100 years. And families tend to not like their laundry — clean or dirty — aired in public.

“It is a closed sector, much like banking,” said Yessayan.

The cutthroat competition between the high-end jewelers over designs also emphasizes secrecy.

“Secrecy is very important in this business, there are lots of designers and outsourcing cannot be recorded,” said Khoury.

As Lebanese jewelers’ reputations continue to grow around the world, the opaque nature of the sector is only likely to increase. Lebanese jewelers can export to the United States tax free, and are expanding their presence in Europe, the Gulf and Asia, whether through showrooms or attending exhibitions and fairs.

“Some 250,000 more carats leave as gem quality diamonds than arrive — worth 36 times their import value”

Setting standards

Competition comes from the Far East, but Lebanon has the upper hand on design and quality for regional sales.

“The quality of the jewelry that is [made] in Hong Kong or China is not as good as Lebanon’s, it is thinner; Arabs are used to bulky jewelry,” said Yessayan. He added that jewelry is 15 to 20 percent cheaper in Lebanon than in the Gulf. “So if you are buying a set of jewels for $500,000, it is worth flying over; even Sheikhas take a private jet here and we close the whole building down as we want total privacy for royal clients.”

Lebanon’s designs and highly skilled craftsmen have also placed the sector on equal footing with Europe.

“The standards we have here are comparable to Swiss or French jewelry, and we’re very picky about our staff,” said Karim Hakim, one of the four brothers who run George Hakim, based in downtown Beirut.

“The designs, the model making, the execution of the casting process in all its five stages, the setting, electroplating, polishing and so on, all are taught here in our country and [produced] uniquely by Lebanese craftsmen,” said Berge Arabian, a senior member of the SEGJL.

Lebanese jewelers have weathered well the financial storm of the past year and a half, particularly the high-end stores, on the back of wealthy customers moving some of their money into hard assets due to concerns about banking stability, inflation and the depreciation of the US dollar.

The regularity with which regional clientele buy jewelry, compared to Europe or the Americas is keeping sales buoyant. “In the West, people will buy [new jewelry] once every 10 years, but Arabs will buy…something new every two to three years,” Yessayan said.

There has been a slight downturn, evident in a drop in regional advertising expenditure, but this has not prevented jewelers from expanding in the region. Yessayan, which saw 20 percent growth in 2009, plans to open a showroom in Saudi Arabia, while companies are working on developing their own brands and identity by increasingly moving into retail.

Rumors circulating within the industry suggest the sector is worth some $4.5 billion, equivalent to a staggering 16 percent of Lebanon’s GDP

Branching out

“There has been a big shift away from wholesale. You sell more and you get cash, you don’t wait for payments and it is better for the brand too,” said Yessayan. “We are heading into branding and creating an identity for ourselves, including a watch brand, Scala.”

Bejeweled watches are a growing segment for the sector, similar to how fashion and car brands started to bring out their own line of watches over the past decade. The jewelers team up with Swiss horologists to manufacture timepieces that are then imported to Lebanon to be turned into a watch.

“The Lebanese are starting to compete with international designers, and Lebanese jewelers have excellent design, execution and prices. The combination of the three is quite unique,” said Khoury.

Yessayan said the demand for such bejeweled watches predominantly comes from the Gulf, with prices reaching $100,000 for a diamond-encrusted offering. The Gulf will remain the sector’s primary export market for the foreseeable future, given the Gulf’s status as the fourth largest diamond market in the world.

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Ungracious guests

by Nicholas Blanford
written by Nicholas Blanford

The Palestinian gunman, his face screwed up with rage, ran towards us, raising his AK-47 and yelled, “Get your hands up! Get your hands up!”

It was June 2007 and in the north of Lebanon, the Lebanese army and Fatah Al-Islam were in the early stages of a bloody battle at the Nahr Al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp — a confrontation that would last 106 days and leave 168 soldiers, over 200 militants and dozens of civilians dead.

The fighting in the north clearly had unnerved the Palestinian gunman. He was a guard at the entrance of a small military base at Ain Al-Bayda, near Kfar Zabad village in the Bekaa Valley, manned by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), a Damascus-backed radical faction. The PFLP-GC runs five small bases in Lebanon: Ain Al-Bayda, Wadi Heshmesh just north of the Bekaa village of Qussaya, Jabal Al-Maaysara on a lofty mountain plateau east of Qussaya, Sultan Yaacoub in the western Bekaa, and another at Naameh, 15 kilometers south of Beirut.

The PFLP-GC and Fatah Intifada, another Syrian-supported Palestinian group that also operates small camps north of Rashaya in the western Bekaa, were on high alert during the fighting in Nahr Al-Bared.

My two colleagues and I were forced to sit on the ground, our hands on our heads, for five minutes until the arrival of the guard’s boss, incongruously dressed in a purple shell suit. Calm and polite, he told us: “We are guests in this country and we are here in these bases only to help liberate Palestine.”

That incident occurred more than a year after the National Dialogue, the round-table forum grouping Lebanon’s top leaders, had agreed to shut down the Palestinian bases and ban arms carried by Palestinian militants outside the 12 established refugee camps. Nearly four years after that decision was reached, it has yet to be implemented. The Palestinian bases still exist, surrounded by Lebanese troops who prevent civilians and journalists from accessing them.

The issue of the Palestinian bases may well become salient again in the coming months, given the easing of tensions between Lebanon and Syria since the formation of the new government in Beirut in November, and the visit to Damascus by Prime Minister Saad Hariri in December, 2009.

Although both countries have undertaken the historic step of exchanging formal diplomatic relations with the opening of embassies in Beirut and Damascus, the pace of rapprochement will depend greatly on how Syria reacts to Lebanese requests for assistance in some key — but solvable — areas. The first is the fate of the PFLP-GC and Fatah Intifada bases, the second is a decision to begin the long-neglected delineation and demarcation of the border between the two countries.

It is evident that following the Nahr Al-Bared experience, the army has no taste for forcibly dismantling the Palestinian bases, even though in military terms it would be a much simpler task to shut the isolated rural outposts than weeding out Fatah Al-Islam’s die-hards from the cramped interior of a Palestinian refugee camp.

Furthermore, the PFLP-GC, in particular, is an ally of Hezbollah — these days serving almost as the Lebanese party’s private militia force, which adds an awkward political component to closing the bases.

In January, Abu Musa, the leader of Fatah Intifada, declared that he rejected the disarming of Palestinians outside the refugee camps and that the fate of their weapons was a matter to be decided among Palestinians.

Abu Musa’s rare press conference appears to have been an effort to hinder attempts to close the bases before they had even begun. Importantly, however, Abu Musa would not have made such a bold declaration without the knowledge of his hosts in Damascus. Syria has said that because the bases lie on Lebanese soil, it has no jurisdiction to have them closed. In reality, if Syria instructed the PFLP-GC and Fatah Intifada to dismantle their outposts and return to the refugee camps in Damascus or Beirut, they would do so quickly and with a minimum of fuss.

Damascus bridles against international pressure and tends to dig in its heels when lectured by the West. Whether Syria will show goodwill over the Palestinian bases, remains to be seen. But if it does it would win international praise at almost no tactical cost to itself.

There are indications that the United States will soon develop a more nuanced approach toward Lebanon, beyond the repeated calls for the implementation of Resolution 1701. The new track will focus on the border between Lebanon and Israel, probably in terms of seeking to extend the current calm along the Blue Line. But there will be other indirectly related issues the Americans will likely pursue, such as encouraging Lebanon and Syria to begin mapping and formalizing their joint border and closing down the Palestinian military bases.

How Syria responds to such calls will provide early indicators as to how the Lebanon-Syria relationship will unfold in the months ahead.

Nicholas Blanford is the Beirut-based correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor and The Times of London

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Editorial

The time for waiting is over

by Yasser Akkaoui
written by Yasser Akkaoui

Like the sands of Arabia, the movement of money has shifted, and those economies considered too slow (Saudi Arabia), too conservative (Abu Dhabi), too risky (Lebanon) or too small to be a player (Qatar) are now destinations for the region’s capital. Dubai, once the flagship of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s prosperity, is nursing a bruised ego and considering its options.

What’s the moral of the tale? That steady-Eddies are the best bet? That the tortoise eventually beats the hare? That Saudi Arabia was the perfect example of a state exercising leadership and intervention when crisis hit?

Well, it’s not quite as simple as that, and maybe the answers can still be found among the skyscrapers of Dubai, where businesses, or should we say the business community, is still struggling to adapt its strategies to the new reality. Essentially, human nature is risk averse and there is a reluctance in Dubai to seek out new markets, because businesses in Dubai are playing a risky waiting game, hoping to turn a corner that may not loom into view for a while.

It is a syndrome that the Lebanese know only too well. They sat around in the late 1970s convinced that the civil war would soon be over — in just a few months things would pick up again. Fifteen years later, they realized they were wrong and that for many of them, the best years of their lives had been wasted. The Dubai mindset must change. The private sector must seek its corporate sustenance in the fertile plains of Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Qatar, all markets that rode out the financial storm.

But it is not all gloom and doom for the glamorous emirate. Its time will come again. The hard work has been done. Not only is Dubai ‘built’, it was built at a time when the price of construction commodities was lower than it is today and a time when the dollar was in ruder health. Today, anyone wanting to emulate Dubai’s undoubted magnificence, and they will for this is the nature of the beast, will have to pay triple the price.

The hard work has been done; the table is set; the private sector just needs to get hungry enough to go find some food. 

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Sectarianism ends at home

by Sami Halabi
written by Sami Halabi

 

As Mediterraneans, we Lebanese like to compare ourselves to our Italian counterparts in more ways than one: our food, our way of life, our weather; the list goes on. But one, perhaps less desirable, similarity is just starting to be addressed by our Mediterranean cousins. Last month, an Italian judge ordered a father of a 32-year-old to pay his daughter’s allowance, which came to $490 per month, as well as $16,850 in arrears or risk having his assets confiscated. The ruling was slammed by Italy’s Minister for Public Administration — who described the ruling as “a slap in the face of good sense” — calling for a new law to force Italy’s bamboccionas, roughly translated as ‘big babies’, to leave home by the age of 18.

Generally speaking, laws that dictate to the public how they should conduct their lives are antithetical to free societies; but considering that more than 59 percent of Italians under the age of 34 still live at home, the proposed law could be a welcome exception. 

Looking to our own country, a similar pattern of refusing to fly the nest emerges. The lack of a census makes hard numbers impossible to come by, but the phenomena of the bambocciona in Lebanon is perhaps embodied in a well known Arabic proverb: “Those who live with their parents [can] take it easy.”

Taking it easy, however, has far-reaching economic consequences. Without incentives for progress, societies naturally become inefficient and lose economic footing. Just look at the former Soviet bloc’s economies during the Cold War or that of Cuba’s today. Conversely, societies that push their youth to “find their own path” not only encourage (or force) them to find a job, retain it, and develop their own ideas independently from their family; they also, in effect, encourage integration within society that breaks down cultural stigma and religious discrimination. 

With a little help from the Allies in World War II, the Italians managed to scrap their most deplorable political construct: fascism. Even with the horrors of a 15-year civil war, the Lebanese have still not managed to do away with their primary political ailment, sectarianism, since it reared its ugly head in the mid-1800s.

The conflation between the bambocciona and the protraction of sectarianism in society is significant in the Lebanese context since children are first and foremost susceptible to their parents’ ideologies. In a seemingly endless and vicious cycle, children raised in a sectarian household pick up the bitterness of the previous generation, add their own context to it, and inevitably hand it over to their children. What’s more, young men and women typically leave the nest only when they are married, usually to someone from the same sect and political mindset, thus compounding the problem and making any break of the cycle virtually impossible.

It is almost laughable to observe Lebanon’s political class squabbling over the establishment of a committee to merely study the abolishment of political sectarianism, let alone sectarianism in general. Firstly, those spearheading the initiative — the parliamentary opposition and more specifically the parliamentary speaker — have little political interest in implementing tenants of the Taif accord, which mandated that a non-sectarian senate be formed who’s head would rival the speaker’s for political influence. Hence, it’s quite obvious that the call is little more than a political parry to the parliamentary majority’s thrust over the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons.

For their part, the Christian parties in the parliamentary majority and opposition are up in arms and clinging to the rights accorded to them by the institution of political sectarianism. Those with the most to gain from sectarianism, the country’s religious figures, predictably balked at the mere suggestion of setting up the committee. The last time civil marriage was proposed, the Sunni mufti rejected it outright, as did the Maronite patriarch out of “solidarity” with his Muslim counterpart. To top it off, the prime minister could only muster the sentiment that any agreement should be based on a “consensus,” the Lebanese code word for indefinite delay.  

With all this bickering in the political sphere just to establish a committee, waiting for our “leaders” to resolve the issue is tantamount to “Waiting for Godot.”

While enacting policy in Lebanon to force youths out of their homes and into the real world may be a tad excessive — not least given the economic hardships Lebanon has faced since the end of the civil war — creating the societal structures to produce a healthier and more economically vibrant country has to start somewhere. It’s not going to start in the halls of government, so it might as well start at home. Babies have to stop crying sometime, no matter how big they become.  

SAMI HALABI is the deputy editor of Executive Magazine

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Tight-lipped Libya’s brazen bluff

by Paul Cochrane
written by Paul Cochrane

When sanctions against Libya were lifted in 2004, international oil companies (IOCs) viewed the former rogue state as the El Dorado of black gold, and clamored to be the first to exploit the country’s riches after a 30-year hiatus. But five years later, IOCs are reining in their enthusiasm as doubts arise over how much oil Libya really has.

As international relations thawed, Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) embarked on a global campaign to attract IOCs, offering competitive bidding rounds to explore and develop the country’s energy reserves. Part of the enticement was an oft repeated statement that 70 percent of the country was yet to be explored for oil and that Libya had 39 billion barrels in proven reserves.

These ‘facts’ are still doing the rounds, with the “BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009” and the United States’ International Energy Agency (IEA) stating Libya has 43.7 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. At face value, this would mean Libya has the fourteenth largest reserves in the world and the largest in Africa, ahead of Nigeria’s 36.2 billion barrels.

But Libya, like the majority of oil producing countries, has been playing it thick and fast with their figures. A leading petroleum geologist familiar with Libya, who asked for anonymity so he could still work in the country, told me: “[The reserve] is nothing like that, it is a third to half of that figure.”

That would mean anywhere between 14 to 21 billion barrels, placing Libya second in reserves in Africa, ahead of Algeria’s 12.2 billion barrels. And as for 70 percent of the country being unexplored, that figure is “nonsense; it is very well explored,” said the source.

The geologist added that the amount of reserves that Libya actually has are evident at the NOC’s technical conferences, where diagrams are shown that indicate less than half of the official government figure — if you know what you are looking for. When the presenters are questioned in public, “they squirm,” the source said, but when queried in private on a technical basis they agree that Libya doesn’t have the reserves it claims.

There was further indication that Libya has been inflating the figures when the NOC last year revised their production capacity target of 3 million barrels per day by 2015 down to 2.3 million barrels per day.

The exploration licenses Libya granted to IOCs are also indicative of there being less in the ground than hoped. Out of the 90 wells drilled after the country’s most recent exploration and production sharing arrangements — the EPSA-4 acreage, launched in 2004 — only five discoveries have been made. International oil and gas exploration and production company Occidental has had a zero success rate, drilling 18 dry wells.

IOCs are now banking on the Sirt, Ghadames and Kufra fields to turn up trumps, but even if there are sizable finds they are unlikely to boost the reserve’s figure to 43 billion barrels. The NOC’s current policy is to focus on developing existing fields — there are an estimated 60 to be tapped — rather than offer IOCs expensive tenders to explore territory that may well draw a blank.

So why is Libya cooking the books? One reason is that it attracts more foreign direct investment (FDI) and interest from IOCs, similar to how countries like to boast of huge FDI inflows yet fail to mention that however-many billions of dollars is over 10 years or has been ‘pledged’ in investment — very different from actual annual inflows. Secondly, it puts Libya in a better bargaining position within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) when it comes to oil quotas.

“It isn’t acceptable within the NOC to question [the] numbers because [they are] given for political reasons, for political advantage within OPEC,” said the source.

But why would BP and the IEA back up the Libyan figures? Well, the British oil giant is operating in Libya and presumably doesn’t want to ruffle any feathers. As for the IEA, its credibility came under fire last November when a whistleblower said the agency was deliberately underplaying an impending global shortage over “fears that panic could spread on the financial markets if the figures were brought down further.”

The game that Libya is playing is dangerous and, alas, one that it is not playing alone. Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer, has never been transparent with its reserve figures, nor are the majority of OPEC producers.

If we can’t take oil reserves at face value and trust them, then how much oil is there? If you subtract 20 odd billion barrels from Libya’s ‘proven’ reserves, and so many billion barrels from, say, Saudi, Algerian and the United Arab Emirates’ reserves, among others, then the total global oil reserves would be substantially less than claimed. It’s time Libya — and everyone else — starts telling it like it really is or the financial markets could be in for yet another turbulent ride.

PAUL COCHRANE is the Middle East correspondent for the International News Services and writes for Petroleum Review

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Total tiptoes back to Iran

by Gareth Smith
written by Gareth Smith

 

President Barack Obama’s Iran policy is complicating the calculations of all parties interested in the country’s vast energy reserves. But along with the resource-hungry Asian tigers, France’s largest oil company is keeping its options open.

Total has long wrestled with the United States’ policy toward Iran, which has obstructed the implementation of its 2004 deal to develop phase 11 of the 26-phase South Pars gas field. For Total, as for energy-hungry nations like China and India, South Pars is a massive prize with 13 trillion cubic meters of gas — around 8 percent of global reserves.

To date, US-led sanctions have slowed down Iran’s exploitation of the world’s second-largest reserves in both oil and natural gas. Measures aimed at US oil companies, enacted in 1996 by President Bill Clinton, have been followed by banking sanctions drawn up under president George W. Bush by Stuart Levey, an official retained by Obama as undersecretary at the Treasury.

New moves in Washington targeting companies linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) are likely to bar from the lucrative US market any company worldwide that does business with companies and individuals on a US hit list, known as Specifically Designated Nationals (SDN). With the IRGC playing a growing role in Iran’s economy, “new intelligence” promised by Levey’s department could extend the SDN well into the energy sector.

Phase 11 of South Pars is slated to produce 2 billion cubic meters per day of gas for a liquefaction plant, South Pars LNG, as well as 70,000 barrels a day of condensate. At present, despite total gas reserves of around 29.6 trillion cubic meters, Iran currently plays only a small role in the global export market, consuming nearly all current domestic production of around 116 billion cubic meters.

For Iran, the production of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is essential for efficient export as it avoids the construction costs and market inflexibility of pipelines. LNG requires a high level of expertise and experience, both of which Total possesses.

Along with Statoil Hydro of Norway, Royal Dutch Shell and Spain’s Repsol, Total long delayed decisions over its involvement in South Pars, partly due to haggling with Tehran over terms but mainly because of sanction fears.

Frustrated at the Western companies’ delay, Iran looked east, agreeing on investment deals of more than $90 billion with Chinese, Indian, Malaysian and Russian companies. Last June, Iran and the Chinese state-owned company China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), signed a contract for the upstream task of extracting gas from phase 11, apparently replacing Total.

But these investors are relatively untested in LNG, and Iran has no liquefaction plant eight years after work first began on South Pars. Unsurprisingly perhaps, reports continued in the Iranian media throughout last year that Total was working to continue its involvement, although the French company denied it was in talks with Iran.

Then in December Christophe de Margerie, Total’s chief executive, admitted to The Wall Street Journal that the company was keeping its options open over South Pars through wider cooperation with CNPC.

His interview was published shortly after Seifollah Jashnsaz, head of the state-run National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), told Iran’s Mehr news agency that NIOC had met Total in the second week of that month.

But it seems Total has found a way around the problem. It isn’t talking to NIOC about South Pars, but it is talking to the Chinese.

De Margerie said Total was discussing with CNPC a multibillion-dollar natural gas project in northern China, as well as deals in Iran and Venezuela’s lucrative Carabobo region. Total and CNPC, with Malaysia’s state-owned Petrona, also won the rights to the small Halfaya oil field in Iraq in December. De Margerie portrayed the cooperation as being between Total’s expertise and China’s sheer volume and market presence. And he confirmed that Total was talking to CNPC about cooperation over South Pars — presumably as CNPC benefits from Total’s expertise in liquefaction, the key challenge in the Iranian field.

Exactly what form this work could take without upsetting Washington is unclear. De Margerie insisted Total would still prefer a comprehensive deal including gas extraction, its transformation into LNG and the export of LNG — something that would be incompatible with US sanctions. But short of this, Total is surely signaling it wants to keep open its interest in Iran.

For Tehran, the stakes could barely be higher as it plans to spend $200 billion to double gas production by 2014. While Iran’s oil revenue is recovering along with the recovery of oil prices to around $80 a barrel from $40 in February 2009, developing gas reserves remains a necessity if the country is to meet an ambitious growth target of 8 percent. Improving growth from the current 2.2 percent projected for 2010 by the International Monetary Fund is an urgent necessity if the authorities are to provide employment for young people and ease political unrest. Total may still play an important role in realizing these goals.

Gareth Smyth is the former Tehran correspondent for The Financial Times

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IMF still chasing Turkey’s tail

by Peter Grimsditch
written by Peter Grimsditch

It threatens to be the longest running thriller since “The Mousetrap” opened at Saint Martin’s Theater in London more than half a century ago. Negotiations between the International Monetary Fund and Turkey over a standby loan have been on and off ever since the previous $10 billion agreement expired in May of 2008.

Bankers, analysts and journalists have been speculating for most of that time that a new deal would be struck within days, weeks or months, and the reports of the amounts being discussed have varied from $6 billion as the “minimum needed to rescue the Turkish economy,” to sums as high as $50 billion.

“Excuse our cynicism,” said Timothy Ash, head of emerging markets strategy at the Royal Bank of Scotland in London, “but we have had similar promises appearing in the media of an IMF deal being cut at the IMF autumn 2008, spring and autumn 2009 meetings, the Group of 20 summit in April 2009, then successive Barack Obama-Recep Tayyip Erdogan summits.”

Prime Minister Erdogan has been orchestrating a guessing game that rivals any Agatha Christie plot. His teasing snippets from time to time have left the press indulging in its well-practiced sport of inventing what it doesn’t know. What is certain is that, with deft sleight of hand, Erdogan is heading for a double victory in what seemed until recently a titanic domestic clash between politics and economics.

The prime minister and his closest cohorts have been talking up the Turkish economy for months, saying it survived the global financial crisis unscathed and dropping broad hints that the country didn’t really need an IMF loan anyway. His optimism seemed to fly in the face of a raft of depressing numbers — a recession that saw gross domestic product fall by nearly 6 percent in 2009, a ballooning budget deficit, an unemployment fall of 16 percent at one point, and slashed industrial output.

Certainly these numbers didn’t impress the IMF, which wanted the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to cut public spending and raise taxes. For Erdogan, this was akin to inviting him to commit political hara-kiri. Raising taxes before the municipal elections of March 2009 would probably have sent his party’s popularity into a tailspin. In fact, Erdogan spent heavily to court voters in the month leading up to the poll. He also announced a $2 billion increase in retirement pension spending last month. Understandably, there was less fanfare about a vast range of tax increases revealed on December 31, 2009.

Putting up tax rates voluntarily rather than as a condition of any IMF loan probably doesn’t make too much difference to the people who have to pay them. Yet at least Erdogan can argue that he is negotiating with the IMF from a position of strength not weakness.

Petrol prices went up on January 1 to $2.64 for a liter of unleaded; cigarettes were hit, with a domestic packet now costing $2.86 instead of $2.35; most alcohol is more expensive; car taxes rose; tolls across the Bosphorus bridges went up; electricity bills will increase by 1.3 percent. Natural gas was spared — for the moment. Its cost is expected to rise by 5 percent this month in what may be the first of two increases for this year.

In effect, Erdogan has fully funded the pension increases with new taxes and even made an annual “profit” of $1.35 billion on the deal.

Even some of the prime minister’s opponents, as well as impartial sources, are beginning to share his resolute belief in the innate strength of the Turkish economy. A 30-year, $2 billion bond — the longest maturity ever issued in Turkey — was more than three-and-a-half times oversubscribed. The issue followed an upgrade in the country’s sovereign ratings to BB+ (one step below investment grade) from global rating agency Fitch Ratings.

The forecast for the economy is also on the up. A report by Turkish brokerage house Is Investment put likely growth for 2010 at 4.3 percent, increasing the figure to five percent if the elusive IMF deal comes off. In any case, IMF money is not viewed as a bailout but a measure to help Ankara roll over its foreign debt and ease the flow of loans to industry. Erdogan’s few quoted comments in January ranged from finalizing an agreement within “days or weeks,” to suggesting that a deal may not happen at all. IMF spokeswoman Caroline Atkinson provided more intrigue by saying, “We have not had a mission fielded nor requested.”

And so the plot thickens. As no one in the know is giving the IMF game away, la politesse and protocol dictates that Executive will not reveal the identity of the villain in the mousetrap either. It is enough to say that things are not always as they seem.

Peter Grimsditch is Executive’s Istanbul correspondent

 

 

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Iraq’s electoral maelstrom

by Ranj Alaaldin
written by Ranj Alaaldin

Just two months shy of Iraq’s national elections in March, an apparent bombshell of a development hit the country. The country’s Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), as per the requests of the Accountability and Justice Commission, decided to ban more than 500 mainly Sunni electoral candidates from contesting the elections.

Iraq’s Sunni groups have organized and galvanized themselves in an impressive manner for the elections. There are at least three formidable groups that many expect to pose a serious challenge to post-2003 Iraq’s traditional powers: the Shiites and the Kurds. The Iraqi Accord Front, the Iraqi National Movement (INM) and the Unity Alliance of Iraq comprise serious and experienced politicians that, individually at least, have already proved their worth in Iraq’s previous elections.

Out of the three, it is the INM that has hit the headlines. One of the political parties within this coalition belongs to prominent Sunni Saleh al-Mutlaq, a former Baathist the IHEC has banned for glorifying and promoting the now outlawed Baath party. Banning such a well-regarded figure has the potential for disaster. It could lead to a mirroring of the 2005 Sunni boycott of the elections, with serious repercussions for the post-election environment and, as a result, complicate the United States’ plan to withdraw troops later this year.

Despite the headlines and the hype surrounding this debacle, it is not yet the “call to return to war” that some are making it out to be. The banned candidates were given the opportunity to appeal and 59 were reinstated. Ali al-Lami, the executive director of the Accountability and Justice Commission told Asharq Al-Awsat that the reinstatement of these candidates to the electoral list “was not a result of political or marginal agreements.” Rather, it was due to a mix-up over personal details such as names and dates of birth.

More important still is the reaction from Iraq’s other major groups, which have been relatively quiet; given that prominent figures such as Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and his fellow INM member, the current Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, are still expected to take part in the elections, Sunni resentment in Iraq is unlikely to be anywhere as high as it was in 2005.

Analysts have been overwhelmingly critical of the IHEC decision, calling it a disaster for Iraq and a marginalization of the Sunnis. Some have derided the fact that just as former Baathists were being brought into the democratic system they are being pushed out again, just when they, and their “Sunni” Iraqi nationalist ideology, might pose a serious political threat.

Most former Baathists have recognized the futility of violence and are largely engaging in the democratic process. However, as the famous saying goes, do not confuse kindness with weakness. There is a feeling among Iraqis that as the so-called Baathists, or former regime loyalists, are welcomed back into the political arena, once they take up their positions of power and become comfortable (and confident), then they will start to show their true colors.

Take the example of parliamentarian Zafir al-Ani who recently, in defiance of the constitution, has openly praised Saddam Hussein and his former regime and has understated its crimes. This might be no more than attention-seeking antics, but it does stoke tensions.

Even more worrying for the vast majority of Iraqis were comments made in early January by British ambassador to Iraq, John Jenkins, who told the British Iraq Inquiry that a military coup in Iraq was a real possibility. Following this, Jenkins was vehemently criticized for making a remark that, essentially, played into the hands of those still yet-to-be reconciled Baathists.

According to on-the-ground Iraqis, the response from the Sunni tribes, who would be pivotal for any successful military takeover, was that they would be ready to overthrow the government if the British were willing to support it. The reason the British might want this, they said, would be that Iran wields too strong an influence in Iraq for the West to be able to match it through other means.

Just days after Jenkins’ remark, fears of a military coup abounded as Baghdad underwent a major security lockdown. According to Arab media reports, the lockdown was enforced in response to an attempt to overthrow Iraq’s Shiite-led government. The Iraqi government was quick to allay such concerns — reassuring that they had in fact foiled an attempted mass-terrorist attack — but the reality is that Iraq is still very much a victim of its past.

RANJ ALAALDIN is a scholar on Iraq and is published regularly in The Guardian

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Obama‘s self-defeatism

by Executive Staff
written by Executive Staff

 

In his 2004 book “Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire,” the British historian Niall Ferguson offered an interesting premise for what might ultimately bring about the decline of the United States. 

Rather than being prompted by external phenomena, Ferguson wrote, decline might come from domestic financial dynamics, not least a ballooning fiscal crisis resulting from the American tendency to consume much and save little. The US, he warned, faced an impending social security crisis because Americans were living longer and the fiscal system was inadequate to pay for future generations. The self-defeating ways to deal with this reality, he continued, were to engage in massive increases in income and payroll taxes, to slash social security benefits by equally dramatic amounts, or to cut discretionary spending to zero.

Whether the massive debt incurred by the US government to absorb the repercussions of the financial shock of 2008 will accelerate this process is open to debate. But there is no doubt that the Obama administration has embraced a self-consciously skeptical worldview, with a willingness to openly admit to American limitations, financial and political. But, it’s not clear that honesty is the best policy in this case.

Take Obama’s speech last December, announcing his new Afghanistan strategy. What was to be a statement of American resolve was, in several passages, undermined. Instead of describing an America united in strength, Obama stated that “[in] the wake of an economic crisis, too many of our neighbors and friends are out of work and struggle to pay the bills. Too many Americans are worried about the future facing our children. Meanwhile, competition within the global economy has grown more fierce. So we can’t simply afford to ignore the price of these wars.”

On Afghanistan specifically, Obama stressed that Washington would not bankroll a nation-building project, because such a scheme “sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost.” How odd it was, then, that the American project as defined by Obama could only truly succeed if the administration actually does engage in nation building. In other words, the US is dangerously close to wanting to have its cake and eat it too in this period of acknowledged financial realism.

Most empires generally survive on two things: money and what we can call an ethos of domination: a sense of international entitlement and mission. In the case of the US, both have taken a beating in recent years, though American decline remains a relative concept. However, Obama, more than George W. Bush, has taken a bite out of America’s imperial ethos. From the start, as a presidential candidate, Obama highlighted American constraints, mainly to defend his idea of the country needing to seek cooperation rather than confrontation in the world. That was, perhaps, valiant, but the prospect of a weak America has great costs.

That’s because imperial powers can be instruments of stability, essential regulators of the global order. As Ferguson noted, the British Empire played an essential liberalizing role in the world economy, by being “an engine for the integration of international capital markets.” In the years “between 1865 and 1914 more than $4 billion flowed from Britain to the rest of the world, giving the country a historically unprecedented and since unequaled position as global net creditor, the ‘world’s banker’…or, to be exact, the world’s bond market.”

For the writer and academic Fouad Ajami, however, it is less the material than the psychological that preoccupies him when examining America’s, and Obama’s, newfound despondency. In a recent article in The Wall Street Journal, Ajami lamented what he called “the truth about the Obama presidency,” which he defined as “retrenchment abroad, and redistribution and the intrusive regulatory state at home.” Ajami expressed his anxiety with the administration’s essential isolationism, obscured by the “patina of cosmopolitanism” in the president.

“We’re weary, the disillusioned liberalism maintains, and we’re broke, and there are those millions of Americans aching for health care and an economic lifeline. We can’t care for both Ohio and Anbar, Peoria and Peshawar. It is either those embattled people in Iran or a rescue package for Chrysler,” Ajami wrote with barely concealed bitterness.

The desirable interplay between economic restrictions and political power is one the Obama administration has yet to properly define. In many respects power is as much about illusion as reality, even if the reality of US power still remains more compelling than the illusion. For the US to revel in its difficulties can also mean international instability. One needn’t like American power to realize that what America loses, the global political and financial system will lose too.

Michael Young

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Society

Style over substance

by Mona Alami
written by Mona Alami

 

Network companies around the globe have been reporting delays and difficulties in data transmission, due to the exponential growth of number of smartphone users. Lebanon is no stranger to the trend, in a country where outdated telecom networks have become a cause célèbre and BlackBerry users, trendsetters.

Last December, British mobile phone operator O2 apologized for service trouble as some customers were periodically unable to make and receive calls or transmit data because of pressure on the network from smartphones.

In Lebanon Ayoub Merhi, manager of the BlackBerry store in downtown Beirut, acknowledged that when BlackBerry was introduced in 2009, users had initially faced similar network problems. These problems could be partially blamed on increased use of applications by customers with smartphones, which repeatedly pull data off the Internet at short intervals.

“Network services have certainly improved since last year, as mobile phone [companies] beefed up the network by adding additional stations around Lebanon,” he said.

“MTC currently provides about 10,000 lines to BlackBerry users,” he added. “Alfa joined the market at a later stage — it had to first update its network grid to obtain the right to service BlackBerry users which, today for Alfa, amount to about 3,000 clients,” said Merhi.

However, some 2,000 to 3,000 users with prepaid cards do not have access to online applications or email services.

Imad Tarabay, chief executive officer of Mobile Broadband Wireless Internet (MOBI), said Lebanese mobile operators’ service problems were mostly the result of a deficient international network route, which has yet to be updated to accommodate the growing number of BlackBerry and other smartphone users.

“Another problem worth mentioning resides in the fact that many of the hundreds of applications available on the BlackBerry website are blocked from Lebanon for unknown reasons,” he added.

With some 30,000 Blackberry users expected in Lebanon by the end of next year (according to the BlackBerry store), telecom companies should try to learn more about smartphone applications and what their increasing popularity might entail in the long run, to try to alleviate pressure from phone networks.

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