The Gulf countries’ Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) are maturing and growing in importance, but these enormously wealthy bodies have yet to pay serious systematic attention to their corporate social responsibility (CSR). SWFs in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries are, like their global counterparts, investment vehicles controlled by government agencies, but unlike some others around the world, the Gulf funds are fairly secretive. They do not publish their investment strategy and are not publicly accountable, which puts them even further away from adopting a clear CSR policy. The Islamic bases of the GCC states nevertheless provide an element of SWF CSR underpinning; and in any case, the situation of these funds in general is evolving in a way that will hasten their embracing principles of social responsibility.
Looking at specific funds in the Gulf region, the sheer numbers are staggering. To take but one of several in the GCC states, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), with assets of over $800 billion, is the largest SWF in the world and substantially growing through government capital injections based on huge oil revenues. By other measures however, ADIA falls short. For a start, there is as yet no strong internal governance structure of the ADIA, which still lacks a true investment policy. The operational autonomy of the entity is in fact weak, which has a negative impact on development of policy, including that to do with CSR.
Secondly, nobody is able to say clearly exactly what ADIA’s assets are worth, a serious shortfall in terms of transparency. Governance is also an issue since according to its own information, 80% of its funds are managed by outside firms and the SWF’s investment strategy is determined by fund managers from foreign countries working with a small group of advisors.
ADIA and the West
At the same time, high-profile ADIA involvement in the US and Europe have heightened scrutiny by officials worried that investments could be used to further political aims that were not consistent with Western notions of CSR. The Bush administration, however, has appeared eager to fight any backlash at a time when the US economy could benefit from overseas capital. Thus, American Treasury officials work closely and quietly with the Abu Dhabi government and ADIA to help pave the way for further investment in the US. At the same time, to re-assure people in the West generally and Americans in particular, the government of Abu Dhabi has pledged that investments made by its SWF would be based solely on commercial grounds and not for political gain. On the other hand, such an orientation could in effect be detrimental to the adoption by ADIA of a coherent CSR policy.
In the context of an emerging democratization of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other Gulf states, local councils, the media, and public opinion have a relatively small impact; but without their potential lobbying, questions of CSR can become neglected. However, this could be changing, as representative government becomes more important on the UAE federal level, which could in turn start asking ADIA and other SWFs in the country about their CSR towards local communities. On the other hand, foreign influences are comparatively strong, including those companies or individuals that manage ADIA funds and advise it.
Disclosure of investment positions and of the currency composition of ADIA investments is extremely low, as is the home country regulation and oversight governing the authority. Commitments in particular with regard to the separation of the management of ADIA from political authorities are not forthcoming. In such a situation, ADIA will most likely simultaneously continue to be pressured into making investments in the US, while being persuaded to adopt greater transparency and better corporate governance, including stronger CSR.
Unlike ADIA, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) is a leader in the wide scope and range of its global investments. Thought to manage assets of $250 billion, substantially growing through capital injections by the government based on soaring oil revenues, KIA is also under political pressure to rescue troubled Western businesses. However, Kuwait’s parliament leans towards a fundamentalist pro-Iran position that will increasingly question investments in the West in general, especially in the US. Signs may also emerge towards ethical investment that takes account of Islamic interests and values, which is a positive move towards a coherent CSR policy.
Structurally weak for CSR
However, there is as yet no clear allocation and separation of responsibilities in the internal governance structure of KIA. At the same time, the authority still lacks a true investment policy. The operational autonomy of the entity is in fact feeble, which has a negative impact on development of policy. Disclosure of investment positions and of the currency composition of KIA investments is still puny, as is the home country regulation and oversight governing the authority. Commitments in particular with regard to the separation of the management of KIA from political authorities are not forthcoming.
In such a situation, KIA will most likely continue to be pressured into making investments in the US, and to a lesser extent in Europe, that are not consistent with its declared investment policy. With American weakness in the region growing, and an uncertain situation prevailing in Western economies and stock markets, this clearly is a potentially unstable situation and could lead to increased tension inside the country between parliament, the media, and public opinion on the one hand, and the cabinet and the ruler on the other. In such an atmosphere, different points of view regarding CSR policy could emerge.
Whatever the governments themselves might say, the investments of ADIA, KIA, and other SWFs in the Gulf region (or for that matter globally) are not purely about maximizing the value of their portfolio. On the other hand, these and other SWFs are not known to be primarily ethically driven, which is an important basis for CSR. However, a difference between Gulf SWFs and their counterparts elsewhere may be the strong Islamic culture that pervades the region, and the positive role that religion can play in business and public life in general. On the other hand, the relative weakness of Gulf SWF management structures could make it difficult for them to determine policy beyond the most short-term of investment horizons, thus letting CSR fall by the wayside. An example to the contrary is Norway, which has already excluded a number of arms manufacturers from its SWF for obvious ethical reasons. In the same spirit, the Norwegian SWF dropped the British mining and metals group Vedanta Resources, blaming it for environmental damage and human rights violations in India. The world’s biggest retailer, Wal-Mart, has even been excluded by Norway’s SWF for reasons of CSR. In the same spirit, but in a different cultural context, whether or not Gulf SWFs make good use of principles of Islamic ethical business remains to be seen.
Gulf SWFs, like any other investment institutions able to take significant stakes in companies, have obligations towards the stakeholders of those firms. However, GCC SWFs are unfortunately in a uniquely tricky position due to post-9/11 Western phobias. As a result, Gulf funds’ profiles and obligations are distorted and otherwise manipulated; and their loose governance just makes things worse. At the moment, many certainly still do not feel the need to follow best practice CSR, but it would clearly be better for the GCC SWFs to adopt recognized investment codes in order to allay silly Western fears.
The conduct of Saudi Arabia in relation to the al-Yamamah arms deal with Britain in the late 1980s — and the investigation into the bribery associated with this deal, which was abandoned in 2006 — reveal the way that some in the GCC do business. Transparency and accountability principles espoused by Western civil society organizations and progressive business advocates look irrelevant in this context, while controlling investment behavior and enforcing good CSR practice through shareholder activism may also not bear fruit. Some Gulf SWFs are in effect the private domain of a ruling family, and there are no shareholders to whom to appeal.
CSR advocates thus simply give up when faced with the opacity of many Gulf SWFs. Yet, some of these, like ADIA, frequently invest through foreign managers who themselves can be lobbied. Moreover, pressure can be placed on governments; the threat of boycott, for instance, would work to persuade an SWF to influence an investee company. It should also be remembered that many of the interests of SWFs and CSR advocates coincide. Given the sensitivity of GCC countries over the far-ranging and extensive nature of their investments, the last thing a Gulf SWF would want is to become entangled in a financial scandal or to be associated with a company breaching environmental principles.
SWFs need reminding that CSR makes good business sense. Part of the role in promoting CSR within SWFs must fall to the media and civil society. The most forward-thinking of the funds themselves see that annual CSR publications by SWFs and greater openness would be welcome. CSR guidelines would be a next step, but in the GCC states, Islam already provides a basis for this. Islamic sensitivities in investment are valuable in defining CSR for the Gulf’s funds. Serious stakeholder dialog with SWFs and activism on social and environmental issues from funds is the right way forward, and the publishing of annual reports would be a good start.
Long road ahead
Finally, it has to be remembered that the whole question of SWFs and CSR is a two-way street. Just as Gulf funds have to learn how and who to operate with locally, SWFs are sometimes unpopular in countries where they invest; and have been branded as locusts in Germany and piranhas in Japan. Such feelings are sometimes even translated into concrete action through boycotts. Perhaps not in the same vein but a boycott nevertheless, the UK’s Co-operative Bank revealed last May that it was blacklisting some SWFs because of the human rights records of their controlling governments. The bank declined to name the funds, but those on its list are thought to include SWFs controlled by Saudi Arabia, Dubai, and Qatar, among others. Clearly, this is a small but telling indication that there is still a long road that Gulf SWFs must yet travel in order to practice proper and effective corporate social responsibility policies.
