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Society

Joseph Sarkis- Minister of tourism

by Executive Staff December 1, 2005
written by Executive Staff

Joseph Sarkis was appointed minister of tourism in the new cabinet. Here, he talks to Executive about this year’s downturn, the balance between security and tourism, and his hopes for public-private sector cooperation in promoting Lebanon as a major tourist destination.

E To what extent has the tourist sector suffered this year?

It is obvious that the security and political situation has had an impact on tourism in 2005. However, if we look at statistics up to the end of October and compare incoming visitors with the same period in 2004 – which was an exceptional year – we see a decrease of only 13.5%. This is not a dramatic drop if you consider what happened during the early months of this year. In 2004, we had a total of around 1.3 million visitors. This year we are already at 970,000 and still have two months to reduce the gap. Although the total will be lower than last year, it will not be much less, which means that people who come to Lebanon as tourists or businessmen have persevered with the situation and realize that there are political differences everywhere in the world, not just here. This was especially true for the Gulf tourists, though with the Europeans the decline was more marked.

E How have you promoted Lebanon in this difficult period?

I have tried, as minister of tourism, to maintain Lebanon’s name as a destination and its presence in the market. We succeeded in that goal without forcing it through any major promotion or advertising, as we know the situation is not ready for the launch of a big campaign. So we have used these last months, since I came to office, to prepare our infrastructure and programs to be ready for a better period.

E So it’s been a case of watching and waiting?

Yes, but also taking part in seminars and conferences in the Middle East and all over the world. In September I personally attended a conference in Amman for the Middle East section of the World Tourist Organization (WTO), which had all the other ministers of tourism from the region. I am happy to report that we succeeded in our bid to host next year’s meeting in Lebanon, which is very good news for us. We have almost finalized dates with the WTO’s secretary-general, who will attend, and the conference should take place in April 2006. It will be a great event for us. We are now working on a special program to demonstrate Lebanon’s unique potential amongst Middle Eastern countries.

E Was there any other good news?

Just a few weeks ago, on November 25, the WTO held its general meeting in Senegal. Lebanon was re-elected as a member of the general board, along with two other Arab countries. Again, this is a positive thing for us.
E Has international support for Lebanon’s tourist industry been more noticeable since you came to office in summer?

Yes, it has been noticeable. Tourist authorities all over the world are showing support for Lebanon, and the international community understands our post-war potential. We’re grateful to them, especially to the WTO. Since being in office, I have also received ambassadors from all major western and Arab states, who came on protocol visits but who told me that they are backing Lebanon and are willing to help. It was encouraging to hear that.

E How can Lebanon improve its image abroad?

Our target is to show the good face of Lebanon, not just the bombings and assassinations. We need to show that ours is a peaceful country. I explained many times that the bombings in Lebanon this year are different from all those which took place in other countries. Here, it is a targeted political issue and not the kind of extremist terrorism we see elsewhere. Tourists in Lebanon were not targeted. So I made an effort with the media, two or three months ago, and told them that they should be messengers for Lebanon, that they should not exaggerate in showing bombs and blood. Take the example of London or Sharm el-Sheikh: when the attacks happened there, we did not see TV images of people dying or suffering. And I think the media here have taken this into consideration and will help our image.

E Do you think Lebanon is regarded as a ‘safe’ destination?

Somebody asked me the other day which country I thought was the safest in the world. It was hard to answer because there is danger everywhere now, not only in the Middle East, and not only from terrorism but also natural disasters. Of course this doesn’t mean that we lie down and accept problems, but what is happening in Lebanon has happened elsewhere and will happen in other countries too.

E Are security measures having an impact on tourism?

This is an important point and will actually be the main theme of next year’s WTO meeting. How can we take strong security measures without restricting the flow of incoming tourists trade? Every country, not just Lebanon, must try to find a middle road between these two issues.

E Did the ministry’s budget grow this year?

We are fighting to keep our present budget. As you know, Lebanon has a difficult financial and economic situation and we still have an extremely low budget of about $8 million. Between a third and a half of this covers salaries and fixed costs, which leaves the rest for projects and promotion, which are obviously very expensive. So it is a small budget, as is the case with most ministries.

E Can the private sector help?

Of course, and I am trying to develop an excellent relationship between the private and public sectors – this is in both our interests.

E Concretely, what is the ministry doing to foster this cooperation?

We are finalizing the structure of a kind of tourist board, which could be named Destination Lebanon. It will be headed by the minister of tourism and will have representatives from private sector syndicates, like hotels, as well as other companies with an interest in raising visitor numbers, like Solidere. The board will have twelve to fourteen members and its job will be to promote Lebanon all over the world, as well as play an advisory role to the ministry of finance. It will have independent authority and its own budget. We are now completing a legal draft, which I can then show to the private sector, with the hope that the board will be created before the end of the year.

E Traditionally, Lebanon has attracted mostly Arab visitors. But which other markets have potential?

There is one large and easily accessible market – the Lebanese Diaspora. Lebanon only has around 4 million people, but at least another 10 million live abroad. I want to target the 2nd and 3rd generation emigrants who still feel Lebanese and retain links with this country. We need to send a message to them, tell them that Lebanon is their country of origin and encourage them to visit – something I recently told to a meeting of Lebanese émigré businessmen on Curacao, near Venezuela. I think this whole market has huge untapped potential.

E And to promote it?

We still think that satellite television is the best way to do an international promotion. Channels available abroad like LBCI or Future TV often make a film or a campaign about Lebanon, but this is not enough. We need to go to international media like CNN to get our message across. But as I said, now is clearly not the optimal time to spend money on launching a major promotion.

E In late August, Jordanians could obtain a visa at Beirut’s airport for the first time. How did this affect arrivals?

Very positively, and I worked personally on this. Because of the changes, 17,000 Jordanians arrived in September, which is a huge number. In fact September was the only month with year-on-year growth in arrivals. We also relaxed restrictions for Iraqis, and most probably the same will happen for Turkish visitors too.

E Does the Iraqi market have potential? What about security issues?

In Jordan, there are about 800,000 Iraqis, who have been largely responsible for an economic boom there. We also want to capture this market and are targeting the many rich Iraqis who like to travel. Next year there will be direct flights to Erbil, in the north, and also to Baghdad, so we hope to increase numbers. Security must be weighed up, but a key point is that we have no land border with Iraq. And I think the new security chiefs are aware that we have to find a workable balance between restrictions on entry and the health of the tourist trade. Of course, people are also worried that some visitors might stay in Lebanon and work illegally, which is why we should take care.

E Is Lebanon perceived as an expensive destination?

I always try to put pressure on all parts of the tourist trade, not only travel companies but also hotels and restaurants, to avoid giving the impression that Lebanon is an expensive country. If that happens, then we will pay the price. In the ministry we fix rates according to the grade of hotel or restaurant and we always bear in mind that prices must be reasonable. This is a constant concern, but having traveled so often I do not think it is true that Lebanon is expensive, especially when you consider the level of service we offer.

E Speaking of hotel grading, is there a need for an updated classification system?

Yes, definitely. We are tied to old legislation. But we are actually working on this with the private sector, which submitted a very good draft proposal to us. A specific team at the ministry, as well as our legal department, is tackling the issue, although putting it into force takes time. We would need to cancel the old law in parliament and pass the new one, but we hope to submit the new legislation for approval very soon.

E Looking ahead, are you prioritizing any particular niches?

I feel that developing eco-tourism and mountain tourism is important. More and more travelers want to get away from luxury, expensive hotels in the city and instead go to more scenic surroundings. Lebanon must take advantage of being the only country in the Middle East with ski resorts. We already have the support of NGOs and international organizations who are willing to help – for instance, two months ago we released a new information package to promote sites outside of Beirut, and were helped by SRI and USAID.

E Lastly, how dependent is 2006 recovery on political stability?

Of course, it is dependent on it. But every country has political instability, and I think we need to differentiate between political problems and bombs, which are far more damaging to tourism. I am now optimistic that Lebanon will not go back to a period of war or violence, and that the worst is behind us. But, equally, we have to give all this some time to settle.

December 1, 2005 0 comments
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Real estate

Abdul Hafiz Mansour- CEO, Horizon Management

by Executive Staff December 1, 2005
written by Executive Staff

Executive talks to Abdul Hafiz Mansour, CEO of Horizon Management, the real estate company, established in 2003, to oversee and develop the Hariri Group’s real estate portfolio, about projects in Lebanon and abroad.

E What are the most important projects Horizon has been working on so far?

We have been working on three projects to date. First of all, there’s the project codenamed V5, which will be one of the three most important shopping destinations in Beirut. It will be built on the site of the former Karmel St. Joseph School opposite Dunes in Verdun. While the fragmentation of ownership in Lebanon and the strength of the country’s property law often make it difficult to develop such a large area, we did not face any of those problems. Secondly, there is the Raouche Hotel, which is a 270-room, high-end luxury hotel, which will be built next to the Coral Gas Station in Raouche, one of the last available plots of land on that side of the Beirut seafront. Thirdly, there is the project codenamed V2, which will be built next to the Bristol Hotel, on a 7,000m2 plot of land. This project consists of two high-end residential towers with apartments of some 540m2 each, next to a suites hotel with one, two and three-room luxury apartments. There will be a small retail component that will not exceed 10% of the overall project. We have several other projects in the pipeline, but I prefer not to talk about things prematurely.

E What are the investments worth?

Including the price of land, which is worth between $3500 and $4500 per square meter, the V5 project is a $200 million project, while the Raouche Hotel is worth some $85 million. I cannot yet give any financial details regarding the V2 project.

E Is Horizon Management solely responsible for these projects?

For the V5 project and Raouche Hotel we work with our partner, United Real Estate Company, which is part of the Kipco Group, one of the largest investment companies listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange. Regarding the V2 project, we are developing this property on our own.

E Can you tell us a bit more about the main characteristics of the V5 shopping mall?

The V5 will stand on a plot of land of about 18,000m2, which is one of the largest plots of land in Beirut still available for development. The V5 has a more than 140,000m2 construction area, which includes the underground parking areas. The marketable area will be about 50,000m2, which will comprise retail and entertainment areas. We are still working on the tenant mix, but our aim is to create a destination area for the whole family.

E We’ve been hearing reports about the construction of the V5 mall for quite a while now. Why has it taken so long for the project to materialize?

In December 2004, parliament passed a new building code, which needed certain interpretive and regulatory government decrees to be put into effect. Normally that would not take more than a few months, but due to the extraordinary events of this year, the cabinet only approved those decrees much later, by the end of November, and they are not yet published as I speak to you today. So, we were delayed by some seven months, as our final concept has to conform to the new code. This was not a problem just for us, but for all development projects in the country. Now we can proceed in developing our concept and apply for all the necessary building permits.

E Without becoming too technical, could you give an example of how the new code affected building plans?

It is mainly regarding basements and superstructures in relation to the exploitable and non-exploitable areas. It will also clarify how to calculate the exploitable area with respect to land where you have differences in levels around the site.

E Lebanon’s retail climate has changed considerably over the last few years. Do you really think there is room for another mall? And how will this affect the market?

According to every estimate and study made on the issue, Lebanon still falls behind most countries in terms of available shopping space per capita. So yes, I do think there is room for growth. We think V5 will form a healthy triangle with the Souqs in downtown Beirut and ABC in Ashrafieh, each with its own character and catchment area. For V5, the catchment area is not only the immediate surroundings in Verdun, which is a densely populated, high-income area, but extends to the whole area from Ras Beirut to Corniche Al Mazraa. It will be the first shopping center facing the incoming traffic from the southern axis to Beirut. We are very confident of the suitability of the location for the mall. To be successful each mall should have its own character and its own specific attractions and magnets. And we will avail such distinctions to the V5 mall.

E What about the City Mall at Dora, the Metropolitan Mall and BHV/Monoprix in southern Beirut?

We don’t consider the City Mall a direct competitor, as we believe that the City Mall shall mainly serve the Metn area. Same is true for the Metropolitan Mall, which aims at hotel guests and residents from the region. BHV/Monoprix is a department store and hypermarket and does not have all the components of a mall. In this respect, the V5 will be filling a shopping gap in the catchment area we mentioned before.

E When the V5 and, in the future, V2 projects, are completed, what will be the consequences for Verdun and Hamra as retail areas?

V5 and V2 will complement and lift Verdun as a major retail area and hopefully increase the character of Verdun as a high street shopping area running from V5 to Concorde Square. Now, Hamra has of course considerably changed over the years, from a high-end to more mid-end retail area. In that sense, Verdun and Hamra do not directly compete and they could actually very well complement each other. Don’t forget that it is only a 5-minute walk from Concorde, and the future V2, to Hamra.

E Tourism saw a significant decrease this year. Are you confident tourists will return in the near future? And to what extent is that important for the success of the V5 mall?

These days, shopping is an integral part of tourism. Look at the Gulf nationals who come here. No matter how many malls there are in Dubai and Riyadh, they still go shopping here. Shopping has become an attraction in itself, so of course it is important to us. I think the current situation is but a transition phase. Given political stability, tourists will return in increasing numbers. The signs are there. The end of last summer was already better than the beginning. Look at the funds flowing into real estate investments that have been made this year.

Now, tourism forms an increasingly important part of the Lebanese economy. The bulk of tourists are not the kind who come for a few days to see the country’s main sites, but rather frequent visitors to the country, including those who have residence here and usually stay for two or three months a year.

E Dubai has developed very fast over the last few years. Are you not afraid of Dubai’s competition?

Dubai is a fact. It is good to have a success story in the region. Lebanon has been unfortunate in the recent past as it suffered from the Arab-Israeli conflict, but we have survived and we have the resources to create new opportunities and a new position for the country. Competition is only a good thing. It makes one work harder and be more creative. So, in that sense the success of Dubai will only help Lebanon.

E So, you remain positive about the future?

We are. We will no doubt miss the guidance of His Excellency, our late prime minister Rafik Hariri, who was an illuminated leader, who in a very short period brought developments to the country that astonished the world. I am confident that his successors will capitalize on his legacy and continue forward. Lebanon still has a lot of potential and untapped opportunities. I firmly believe that the Lebanese will be able to position Lebanon in the right spot regionally and internationally.

December 1, 2005 0 comments
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Society

Getting tourism off the ground

by Executive Staff December 1, 2005
written by Executive Staff

Joumana Azzi

Branch manager at Wild Discovery Travel & Tourism

E How many Lebanese are taking holidays abroad on an annual basis and how has this figure evolved over the last few years? What characterizes the outbound Lebanese tourist market? Is the trend of package tours catching on?

While we do not have exact figures on the number of Lebanese taking holidays abroad on an annual basis, the market for outbound holidays as a whole has been increasing substantially over the last few years, with many people going away three to four times a year.

The statistics on airport passenger traffic clearly indicate that there has been a substantial increase in departures over the years up until the first month of 2005. The year 2005 witnessed a decrease not only in the incoming flow of passengers, but also in the outbound tourism market due to the events Lebanon went through. However, despite the unstable situation, Wild Discovery increased its business volume in 2005, compared to 2004.

The outbound tourism market in Lebanon is mainly characterized by the diversity of the destinations that are chosen by the clients. The main destinations that are most frequently requested by the Lebanese are Egypt, Turkey, France, Italy, Greece and Cyprus. But Wild Discovery is seeing an increasing number of individuals going to the Far East, South America, Spain, Vienna, Prague, as well as very exotic destinations such as the Maldives, Mauritius and others, especially newlyweds going on their honeymoon.

The trend of package holiday solutions has caught on. It is attracting mainly clients wishing to buy a fully organized product, taking advantage of the knowledge and the expertise of the operators and most of all, the price advantage when you book a package compared to when you book individual and separate services. Obviously the size of the tour operator, his knowledge and his professionalism are key to a successful holiday experience.
 

Philippe Skaff

CEO (MENA) of Grey Worldwide

E To what extent was Lebanon’s image affected by the events of 2005? How did the media contribute to this? What approach should both the public and private sector take in 2006, to improve the perception of Lebanon abroad?

Although Lebanon’s image has been hurt this year, I think the effect was disproportionate to what actually happened. Like anywhere, the media always jump on bad news, and whilst they don’t necessarily exaggerate events, they take them very much out of context so that one bomb seems to imply total chaos. The loss of [ex-premier Rafik] Hariri, who was a very charismatic and appealing figure for the West, has also harmed Lebanon’s image there and almost left us orphaned.

To improve people’s perception of Lebanon, I think we have to prioritize both tourism and protection of the environment – the two go hand in hand. I would leave aside superficial things like shopping and instead concentrate on our cultural and historic riches. Lebanon has a unique and diverse atmosphere, which you can feel as soon as you step off the plane; it’s somewhere you come back to again and again, unlike some places where you can virtually tick off like a checklist. It’s like the difference between a poem and a story – you can read a story from beginning to end, but a poem has a certain ‘feel’ to it which can be rediscovered a thousand times. Every foreigner I meet who comes here on business says that Lebanon is the best-kept secret of the Middle East, which suggests that its image abroad is worse than the reality. But it’s impossible to run a promotional campaign on CNN, or wherever, at the same time as there are bombs on the news.

Ramzi Assily

Resident manager, Movenpick Hotel and Resort, Beirut

E What contribution can tourist resorts make to the Lebanese economy? What are your expectations for 2006, and over the long term? What can be done to better define and improve nationwide quality standards for resorts and hotels?

Tourist resorts already make an important contribution to the economy, especially with the local community and Lebanese expatriates who return from abroad during the summer. Resorts are definitely an upcoming trend now. We’ve seen more opening both to the north and south of Beirut, and they’ve proved that a six-month season between May and October can be very lucrative. And once one operation makes money, others will follow – like any trend in Lebanon. I don’t know exactly what’s in the pipeline, but one or two more new resorts will probably open next year, and the existing ones will expand. Our own operation is slightly different, as we are only open to hotel guests and owners of our cabanas, but next year we should maintain the same trend evident since we started. Obviously this last summer was not as good as 2004, but if the political situation stabilizes then we’re optimistic for a strong year.

In terms of standards, quality clearly starts right from day one and the size of the initial investment. But my personal opinion is that we need a better system of classifying hotels, ideally with foreign consultants brought in to help judge star ratings. And although Lebanese staff are sought after in the whole region, our training colleges need to find a better mix of management and technical skills. At the moment, there are only the two extremes.

Pierre Achkar

President of the Lebanese Hotel Association

E How many hotel rooms will Lebanon offer by the end of 2006? Is this capacity appropriate for Lebanon’s needs? What are the requirements for healthy and sustained growth in the hotel industry in 2006? What can the public sector do to better supervise and assist hotels?

We have around 16,700 hotel rooms at the moment. Another 3,000 rooms are under construction and although I don’t know exactly how many will open in 2006, we usually expect 500 to 600 new rooms annually. Next year should be no different. Often it is old hotels being renovated, which are sometimes not included on the figures for new rooms. There is no shortage of rooms, although occupancy rates have been down this year thanks to the political situation. Since 2001, we’ve seen growth of 30% per year, and expected 2005 to be the best ever. But for the first three months, Beirut was virtually closed and all our plans were cancelled. Things picked up during the summer and in fact, given all the uncertainty, it has actually not been a bad year. For healthy growth in 2006, though, the absolute first priority is political stability. As soon as we have that, we need a major promotion to improve Lebanon’s image abroad. In terms of public sector help, although legislation does need to be updated, it is not a prerequisite for growth in the hotel industry. More important is to unify the public and private sector in promoting the country, as professionals in the private sector know better than the government what should be done, and how to do it. I also believe that the national tourism council should be reactivated and funded jointly by both private and public sectors – this kind of co-operation is important for the health of the industry.

Khalil Malaeb

CEO of K&M Health Tourism International

E Why do visitors come to Lebanon for medical treatment? How healthy are the future prospects for developing this niche? Can we expect any major developments in 2006?

Our medical tradition is very important – we have 140 years of experience and this helps create trust with patients. Our doctors are often foreign born or educated, and a very high percentage of them practice a specialty or a sub-specialty. Plus, the cost of care here is about 40% to 50% cheaper than in Europe, with exactly the same quality, and Lebanon is the only country in the Middle East to have 80 hospitals accredited internationally. Compared to Arab countries, the cost of care here is similar but the standards are higher, whilst the market for Arabs taking medical treatment abroad is lucrative – it’s now worth $4.5 billion. As for the future outlook, developing medical tourism is not a one-year process. We’ve clearly been set back by the death of Hariri, who took a personal interest in promoting this niche. One major goal is to access the European market, especially those countries like the UK with long waiting lists. We also want to further promote Lebanon as a plastic surgery destination. For these kind of operations, many people now travel to South Africa because costs are perhaps 50% less there than in Europe. But we can offer even better value – and of course with the same level of excellence. In addition, we’re currently in negotiations with a re-insurance company to actually offer insurance during medical operations – something, which is usually wavered. It will apply to certain hospitals and should come into force in early 2006. Given that Lebanon will be the only Arab country to offer this kind of insurance, it’s another sign of confidence in our medical care.

December 1, 2005 0 comments
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Banking

Freddy Baz : Chief strategic advisor, Banque AUDI

by Executive Staff December 1, 2005
written by Executive Staff

In a broad ranging interview, Banque Audi’s chief strategic advisor, Dr. Freddie Baz, discusses the economy, regional ambitions and why he is fed up with Audi being referred to as the No. 2 Lebanese bank.

E In the latest Banque Audi report, you state that Lebanon was a “no growth environment in 2005,” but that it was able to “avoid a recessionary trap.” How were we able to do this and what if any role did the banks play?

What we wanted to highlight is that we are not in a bad situation but we are witnessing a coincidental stagnation after the high growth of 2004, in which we saw 6% real growth as reported by the IMF and the central bank among others. But after the dramatic events we witnessed in February, it was normal that the real sectors would take a hit in terms of overall confidence and its impact on aggregate demand for investment and consumption. So no surprises there, but paradoxically, while there was this stagnation, the financial sector witnessed a very interesting improvement. Sure, the impact of the assassination hit all areas of the financial sector: stocks, bonds currencies, especially currencies, when we saw great pressure on the lira, but after the demonstrations and the flag waving and the demands for Syrian withdrawal and the UN resolutions, most markets adjusted, showing a high appetite for Lebanese paper. Stocks and bonds have improved significantly and banks’ stocks have increased by 100%. Solidere shares hit $5 but bounced back to $13.5; spreads on Eurobonds decreased after some initial widenings, and the FX markets recovered by May, allowing the central bank to recoup one third of the dollars it used to defend the lira. So we are witnessing a disconnection between the real sector and the financial sector of the economy in which the investors and consumers are in a wait-and-see mode; which is normal. It would have been worrying if the financial sector had been equally stagnant. We are in a two-speed economy. There is a traditional time lag of 18 months in these scenarios. We can look forward to a better 2006, and definitely a better 2007, in terms of real growth and GDP.

E The share of T-bills and Lebanese sovereign debt in the portfolios of Lebanese banks remained high in 2005. Will Lebanese banks ever break out of their lending cycle to the government and embark on a fully-fledged retail and corporate banking culture?

You ask the question as if the banks only lend to the public sector and not the private sector. Let me tell you that the consolidated lending portfolio to the private sector is almost equal to the GDP. This is the highest exposure in the emerging markets. The South East Asian Banks in the late 1990s were never exposed like us. They were at 65% to 80% of GDP. We are at 100% of GDP in terms of consolidated private sector loans. We are not under-lending. This is a misconception. Because of our funding which is three times GDP we are obliged to use it for alternative uses, we just can’t lend it all to the private sector. That would make our private sector be lending three-times the GDP, which is unacceptable by any standards. For us to increase our private sector loan exposure the economy should grow. We believe the actual size of the economy, which is measured by GDP, is not a reflection of its potential size which we believe to be higher by a minimum of 40%. If we assume the actual GDP to be around $20 billion, the potential GDP would be close to $30 billion, probably $28 billion. If the environment is there to narrow the gap between actual and potential GDP, then, while our level of exposure will remain the same, that is “1 x GDP,” there will be room for an additional $8 billion of lending to the private sector.

E But surely we have a chicken and the egg scenario. What comes first, the funding or the growth?

I see your point, but in Lebanon auto financing ratios are very high, so we have to start seeing investors putting their own money first and then we will lend. Together we will trigger GDP growth rates. So it is up to the investors to show their own commitment by putting their own funds on the table and we will support them. However, I want to stress that Banque Audi has been active in its corporate lending in 2005.

E Are there any sectors with potential that you are watching with interest?

We are not a development bank. We are a private bank. We do not look at sectors of activity with a high leverage on growth, but we lend our money where we believe there is wealth, where risk is limited in the nature of the business and more importantly where there is a contribution of the company to the generation of wealth in Lebanon and the GDP. When we lend to the private sector, we lend to medium to big enterprises which in the case of Lebanon, the top 100 companies probably generate 75% of GDP. This lending is more secured than to smaller companies and while they should not be neglected, they will not get a higher share of lending than their contribution to the generation of wealth in the country.

E Banque Audi is still ranked No. 2 in terms of assets and deposits. Is the bank satisfied with its performance this year?

You say No. 2. Yes it is true in terms of absolute figures, but what does a differential of $200 million on a basis of $11 billion [of assets]? It’s not even 2% and this is the difference between the top two banks, which is how I like to refer to us.

E Well you are ranked first in other areas.

Of course, we are first in terms of lending to the private sector. We have to highlight it and show our commitment to the domestic economy. Our job is not just to collect deposits and buy securities. We are first in terms of footings. We are first in loans. We are first in Tier One capital and this is as important as total capital. Rating agencies base their calculations on Tier One capital.

E Then what are the areas you would want to address in 2006? What are the plans for revenue diversification and regional expansion? Which areas of banking appear most promising?

I believe we have the best revenue diversification, not only among our direct peers but in the whole industry and this did not happen overnight. It is the result of a huge restructuring launched in 1995, diversifying our business lines to diversify our assets and sources of income to improve our immunity against any reversal trends. We launched retail banking and private banking capital market activities. To do so, we triggered the consolidation process in the Lebanese banking sector. We closed five acquisitions. We improved our human capital. Today 52% of our staff are university graduates, 15% are MBAs and we have 15 PhDs. We launched the first GDR in the region, the first five-year private euro bonds in the region in 1995, and 1997; a ten-year subordinated note issue, a ten-year euro CD issue and four preferred share issues. In the last four years, we have witnessed an average growth rate in our assets and earnings of 30% per year. So our restructuring allowed us to consolidate our market positioning and to ensure a higher asset and profit growth rate than our direct peers. More importantly, if you look to the breakdown of our income, over different businesses we have a much better balanced breakdown today than any of our peers whereby non-interest income is 45% of total income. This is our immunity against reversal trends and it comes from private banking, bancassurance, and capital market activities. In the last four years, our trading floor has seen a turnover of $4.5 billion. We are the most important market maker on Lebanese stocks and bonds.

E Moving onto regional expansion, how were Banque Audi’s plans for a Syrian banking operation developing in the last quarter of 2005? What is the outlook for 2006, given the uncertain political situation in that country? And what are Banque Audi’s ambitions for the Egyptian market?

Firstly, I would like to give a brief preamble because our activities are not just restricted to those two markets. Our internal restructuring, which translated into high asset growth rates, led Banque Audi to a size today of $11 billion in terms of assets. This is $880 million in equity, $15 billion of footings and we represent 55% of Lebanon’s GDP and when you reach such an important size in the local market you have to go beyond boundaries because you have become too big for your country. We wanted to continue this growth by developing new markets rather than new business lines. First, we went into Jordan where we were granted a license for ten branches. Seven are operational and in 2006, they will all be operational. It doesn’t mean we can’t open more in future. What is of interest is that after 14 months in Jordan, we could build $300 million of assets, which is higher than the size of many operating banks in Jordan who have been there years longer than us, in some cases ten years. We had a good business plan that we will duplicate for all the other markets in which we want to expand.

E Including Syria?

In Syria we launched our operation in September [2004], but there was some delay because we were the first to apply … [and] we decided within the course of the application to double our capital and it took us back to the beginning of the process. We have four branches that are almost ready and we want to build a substantial network in Syria with 30 branches within a short period. It’s too early to give you figures but all I can say is that we are very optimistic. Now, given the [political] concern you expressed, we have not felt it on the ground. It is as if the business community is disconnected from politics. It does not mean that they are not part of the country but life does not stop. Sanctions we believe will not target the Syrians as a whole. We believe there is an immunity concerning business but any unforeseen dramatic developments will have a limited impact on the overall turnover and not diminish overall opportunities. Anyway, the stories of substantial Syrian withdrawals from Lebanese banks are not very accurate and we certainly did not witness this phenomenon at Banque Audi.

E Moving to Egypt, Banque Audi is understood to be one of six potential buyers for the Cairo and Far East Bank. The Egyptian central bank has given the go-ahead for Audi to conduct due diligence on this bank. What are Audi’s ambitions for the Egyptian market?

Before [answering] that I would like to add that three months ago we have been granted a fully-fledged license for Iraq, among the eight licenses that have been granted so far and we have a plan to open in Iraq in the north.

E How soon?

Definitely in 2006. Now in Egypt it is true that so far, we have not succeeded with an acquisition, but I would like to remind you that Audi put in a bid on the Egyptian American Bank in 2003, but it didn’t materialize because there was a new law that made medium-sized banks very expensive in Egypt and consequently they have not become very interesting for us. Today we are looking for platforms to grow organically in Egypt and Cairo and Far East Bank is one that we are looking at but there are three or four others too. We will try to close what is the best deal for Audi, not necessarily Cairo and Far East Bank but that is the bank that is in the news.

E Are there other areas Audi is looking at?

We are looking at certain North African countries as well as niche roles we can play in the Gulf markets, especially in corporate finance and private banking where [Lebanese bankers] have strengths. We have limitations and this is the only area where we can compete. To try to be competitive in retail or commercial banking [within the GCC] is impossible.

E How important is trust in the sector for international confidence in Lebanon as a receiver of financial aid especially with a donor conference looming?

It is an important asset but whenever the donors meet it has nothing to do with the private companies in this country. But as long as you have strong and well-established financial institutions, it will improve the overall perception of the country. A country with a solid financial sector has more of a reason to ask for assistance but it is not directly related; we are talking about public versus private. We have a banking sector that endured two decades of war and a time when we had two governments but one central bank – the central bank was never divided.

E How important is any national reform program to the banking sector?

Anything, which will improve the overall efficiency of the economy, is welcomed by the banking sector because at the end of the day we are organically linked to the economy. Reform – economic, financial, and political – by definition improves the overall efficiency of the economy. Privatization will improve efficiency. Look at how deteriorated the service [of cellphones] is nowadays. Such a weak level of quality although [the cellphone sector] is managed by two private companies. They are not motivated.

E With Basel II looming can we see an eventual consolidation of the banking sector?

Not at the level of big banks because we are over capitalized. But it will affect a certain number of middle sized or small banks but this is a positive trend because we need to further consolidate. As far as I am concerned, we have not yet really witnessed real consolidation in Lebanon although the number of banks has dropped by around 25 or thereabouts. Real consolidation is not lobsters eating shrimps; it is lobsters eating lobsters, more mega mergers between the big banks to be able to compete with big international banks in a post [peace] settlement era. I think within the top 10 banks there is a potential for three mega mergers.

E To be more robust regionally?

Of course! You have banks like NTB, Arab Bank or NBK from Kuwait with equity amounting to the consolidated equity of the Lebanese banking sector.

December 1, 2005 0 comments
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Economy

Time is ripe for tough reform

by Nicolas Photiades December 1, 2005
written by Nicolas Photiades

The assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri on Valentine’s Day 2005, highlighted Lebanon’s economic vulnerability to sudden political and security events, as reflected in the significant slow down in economic activity; the massive decrease in GDP growth; and the rise of the proportion of public debt to government revenues. In the last quarter of 2005, after Syria’s withdrawal of its troops, relatively successful legislative elections and the naming of a “national unity” government – the country’s economy was still characterized by an extremely high level of public debt, wide fiscal and external current account deficits, a narrow economic base, and a fragile, arguably explosive, political environment.

At the end of 2004, the international community, as well as all the Lebanese were hopeful that a steady increase in government revenues and a substantial growth in the GDP would gradually reduce the debt burden and help the country outgrow its debt problem with new- found tourism revenues and foreign investment mainly from the Gulf. However, and perhaps with a degree of hindsight, those reading the runes should have predicted the unfolding of a different scenario, one based on the fallout of UN Resolution 1559, the extension of President Emile Lahoud’s mandate and a tightening of Syrian authority in the country.

Growth figures disappoint

Real GDP growth fell from a very positive 5% in 2004, a level unseen since the early 1990s, to an expected 1% at best for 2005 as the country’s GDP of the last few years (an average of 2% to 3% for 2001, 2002 and 2003, and 5% in 2004), was almost wiped out. This yo-yoing of growth figures should constitute a message to the Lebanese government that it is now time to genuinely tackle the debt and the economy. For the moment, the debt burden is still one of the largest among rated countries, with the debt to GDP ratio being estimated to exceed 170% by the end of 2005, and interest payments consuming around 55% of fiscal revenues (in both 2004 and 2005). The country’s overall fiscal deficit has remained very high at almost 10% at the end of 2004, and 11.7% estimated at the end of 2005, despite significant efforts to improve the primary fiscal balance of the last decade.

Moreover, the country’s economic base is still narrow and government revenues undiversified. The country still lacks primary resources and its export base is limited, with economic activity concentrated in services, namely banking, trade and tourism. The activities in the service sector account for around 60% of GDP, reflecting a high level of concentration on a handful of economic activities. This concentration coupled with a high dollarization of the economy and bank deposits increase Lebanon’s vulnerability to political and regional shocks. The current account deficit (or the current account balance to GDP ratio), after a period of decline between 2001 and 2004 (especially after Paris II), moved up again to an estimated 19.7% for 2005, compared to 13.1% in 2002, 12.4% in 2003 and 15.0% in 2004, approaching 2001 levels of 20.4%, which were then considered disastrous and a first sign of a country collapse.

More pressure from politics

The political environment remains precarious, with tension with Syria growing as the days pass by. The encouraging “free” elections of June 2005 produced a government of national unity, which is still unproven as regards to urgent economic reforms, although the resilience of this government is proving solid so far, as disputes and tensions between pro and anti-Syrian political factions take place on a daily basis. The government is keen to carry out long-overdue economic and administrative reforms, including privatization, as well as start planning for a debt restructuring program, which will be based on a successful donor conference planned in Beirut towards the end of 2005. However, it is clear that the deterioration of Lebanese/Syrian relations, which have been further exacerbated by the recent UN resolutions forcing Syria to cooperate in the investigation of Hariri’s assassination, should hamper the government’s efforts to initiate such reforms for the time being.

There is also the more delicate internal problem of Hizbullah, which still refuses to give up its arsenal of weapons and integrate into the Lebanese domestic political set up, in line with both the Taif Accord and UN Resolution 1559. This multiplies Lebanon’s political problems and opens two fronts, one external with both Syria and Israel and one domestic with the Hizbollah-Amal coalition. Although it is clear that such problems emanate from decades of civil conflict and its consequences, the country is still facing significant political problems that have been affecting the economy substantially during 2005. It would therefore be worth noting that the longer these problems persist, the more likely economic recovery will become unreachable.

Tempering risk

All these risks remain more or less mitigated by a high level of external liquidity, a large and relatively sophisticated banking sector, and resilient confidence among the Lebanese, which has been reflected in a continuously strong and stable deposit base within the country’s banking sector. Another positive factor is the return of Gulf Arab tourism towards the end of the summer and the resumption of Gulf investment in the country, despite the turbulent political scene.

The high liquidity, estimated to stand at around $9 billion in terms of official foreign currency reserves and $11.4 billion in terms of commercial bank foreign assets reflected the country’s prudent approach within an unstable domestic and regional political context. The foreign currency reserves approached $15 billion prior to Hariri’s assassination, and were instrumental in restoring confidence among depositors of the banking sector and in preventing a devaluation of the Lebanese pound. The current official foreign currency reserves cover more that eight months of imports and exclude around $1.8 billion in Lebanese government eurobonds held by the central bank, which are not considered to be liquid. Although foreign currency reserves declined in the aftermath of Hariri’s death, they partially recovered due to the issuance of several government eurobonds, an easing in the dollarization rate due to regained confidence, and to a resurgence of non-resident deposits in Lebanese commercial banks.

Strong deposits

Another strong sign of liquidity is the strength and stability of commercial bank deposits, which amounted to a little less than $60 billion in October 2005. The country’s banking sector has been capable of solidly financing itself through customer deposits and has not had to rely on market funds, which are more costly. Such customer deposits have been mainly used in the past decade by the banks to subscribe to government debt securities (including Treasury Bills in Lebanese pounds) and have provided the government with a source of steady financing. These customer deposits have historically shown a high degree of resilience to external political shocks and have been supported by a committed Lebanese Diaspora. On that note, Lebanon is traditionally regarded as one of the most important countries in the world in terms of remittances, which is a mitigating factor against potential risks.

Although the economic situation appears to be at risk in the short term due to internal and external political problems, the economic upside in the long term could be significant. Indeed, were the government to succeed in sorting out the political mess and resuming an efficient economic reform program that would include serious privatization and a long-term debt restructuring program, then economic prosperity would be regarded as a real possibility. For the moment, the country’s rating is still one of the lowest in the world at B- (S&P) and B3 (Moody’s), with the government required to undertake a massive effort in reducing debt and improving government finances, as well as for the political environment to ease considerably, if this rating is to reach more acceptable levels.

December 1, 2005 0 comments
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Looking Back

Winning ground in the middle east

by Lee Smith December 1, 2005
written by Lee Smith

It is perhaps an index of globalization’s totalizing embrace that foreign policy communities around the world have been chuckling over the same one-liner all year long: The war in Iraq is over and Iran has won. Well, there’s no doubt that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s (IRI) long and assiduous cultivation of Shiite networks in Iraq reaped dividends once Iraq’s former president Saddam Hussein, the IRI’s most serious threat, was deposed from power. But in truth, nearly everyone with an interest in the region has a lot to be thankful for this New Year’s Eve. But given the disappointments, betrayals and miseries that have befallen the Middle East over the last century, it’s not clear that even younger Arabs are capable of seeing events except as a variation on catastrophe. Or, to put it another way, if the Israelis are still around, we must still be living in the shadow of the nakba.

The fact is that this really was one of the most momentous years in the history of the modern Middle East and most of the news for residents of the region was good, very good. The only clear losers were the Syrian and Iraqi Baath parties, the US taxpayer and the liberal interventionist wing of the Republican Party, otherwise known as the “neo-cons.” Iraq itself, which is in many ways now Ground Zero of the Middle East, is too tough to call. Obviously, ordinary Iraqi citizens are paying with their lives because, one, the US cannot provide security in regions that are not already secure; and two, some Iraqis and their jihadi cohorts take great pleasure in killing other Iraqis and will keep trying to do so come hell or high water. And yet, there are elections, there is the struggle to build democratic institutions, like a constitution, and there are the Iraqi people themselves, many of whom disagree with their neighbors that Iraq was better off under Saddam Hussein. So, it’s going to be many years before anyone knows whether Iraq was a winner or loser this year, and it’s going to be Iraqis who make the call.

As for the rest of the region’s major players, Executive braved the ever-capricious winds of Middle Eastern politics to bring you our year-end round up in the hope that things won’t change too much before we go to press.

Lebanon: a winner (triple plus)

In a region where the word “martyr” is perhaps a little worse for wear, the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri set off a chain of events that effectively liberated his country, and set Lebanon back on the democratic course it was derailed from for thirty years of war and occupation. But the undisputed heroes of the revolution are the Lebanese people, all of them, including those who never took to the streets and those who some believe stood on the wrong side of the street. Pluralism is no doubt a harder ideal than national unity, but it is also sterner building material. As for all the post-March 14 disenchantment, much of it is legitimate – for instance, is there no room in Lebanese politics for the youth who led the uprising outside of the student cadres of General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement? Still, it’s important to put this remarkable year into context.

Things are changing so quickly; most local skeptics haven’t had the time to figure out what’s going on. Last year the parliament wasted its time ruminating over Arabism and other ideological niceties; this year the country’s elected officials took up real matters, including the economy, election laws and security. It is the latter that has been on the minds of most Lebanese, especially since the wave of violence left many dead in its wake and did serious damage to the vital leisure and tourism sector. But insofar as the purpose of that terrorism was to set the nation at arms again against itself again, it failed and the Lebanese succeeded. The UN Mehlis report has delayed action on several important issues – especially national security and international investment, both of them tied to disarming the Palestinians and Hizbullah. Hizbullah had a middling year. It became part of the government – except apparently for those uncomfortable moments when Damascus insulted the government’s prime minister – and may indeed be transitioning from armed gang to political party. Premier Fouad Seniora has the attention of a concerned international community but lacks the support of a strong Maronite partner. If that sectarian power struggle sounds to many like politics as usual in Lebanon, it’s not, or at least it hasn’t been for thirty years. This is the real thing, and it was earned.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: winners
(double plus)

One of the Bush administration’s more reasonable, and less noted goals in invading Iraq was to boost that country’s oil-production, a potential capacity, it was hoped, that would give the United States some leverage with which to pressure their long-time allies in Saudi Arabia. You see, over the last many years, the American taxpayer has dished out many billions of dollars to float the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet, which protects the free flow of Gulf oil, which in turn ensures that the Saud family stays rich, fat and happy – and in power. But in the aftermath of 9/11 it became apparent that many in the Saudi elite believed those same US citizens were infidel scum who deserved to die. So, the White House wondered how it could get their nice friends to stop saying such bad things in Saudi schools, mosques and the media. They hit upon the idea that if only they could get more oil to market maybe that would help bring the Saudis to heel. But of course, that would’ve meant that the US actually had to protect Iraqi pipelines, and in Iraq the US is mostly only capable of defending Baghdad’s Green Zone.

Thus, the Saudis’ position as keystone of the global economy went unchallenged, and the Kingdom had a bumper year as oil surged to a whopping $70 a barrel. The Bush administration effectively declared major operations against Saudi Arabia over when US Vice President Dick Cheney rolled out the red carpet for the royal family’s brand new Lebanon hand. Saad Hariri may turn out to be a very good leader of his country someday, but it was his Gulf friends who got a young businessman with no political credentials or experience an audience in Texas. This is how a superpower tells a petro-monarchy: “We are not worthy, we are not worthy … ” And now all Washington can do is hope that with King Abdullah finally and firmly in charge, he’s serious about taking on his own domestic terrorists and that he won’t do it by letting them blow off steam in Iraq or Manhattan.

Other Gulf states are investing in a future where oil is not king. Construction, leisure and tourism projects have made Qatar the fastest-growing state in the Gulf, or the new Dubai, but that’s just until Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid al Maktoum finishes Dubailand, or Dubai’s new Dubai, an enormous theme park that once completed will double the size of the existing Emirate. Look for the Gulf to keep thriving.

France: winner (double plus)

What a bonne annee for La France, the year it became relevant again in the Middle East! Without a large economy or formidable military, Paris has had trouble projecting power in the region since it was flushed out of Algeria. Two years ago, the Chirac government made a lot of noise about the US war on Iraq, which may have won it accolades throughout the region but distanced Paris too much from the US to have any impact in it. Then came Syria and Lebanon. For a host of reasons, French President Jacques Chirac was furious with the young Syrian president he’d effectively taken under his wing, and intimated to US President George W. Bush in the summer of 2004, that he had a project they might both profit from. France led the way with UN Resolution 1559 and the US, with troops in neighboring Iraq, served as a goonish enforcer and voila! France was back in the game.

Egypt: winner

A lot of people did well this year in umm ad-dunya: The Muslim Brotherhood surprised even themselves with the large number of seats they gained in parliament, and the ordinary Egyptian voter got a sense of what real political choice might look like, both in the country’s first contested presidential race and then the parliamentary elections. And since it is a law of nature that anytime the people fare ok, the regime loses big, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had something of an off-year, which might be expected after 24 other untouchable seasons. Oh sure, the president managed to keep Washington off his back by sending mukhabarat chief Omar Suleiman to consult with the PA on security issues, but at home 88 people died in an attack in Sharm el-Sheikh, and the regime showed little in the way of intelligence by rounding up thousands of Bedouins in response. (Self-help hint to Hosni Bey: It only gets better if you are honest about your issues. Now, say “Al-Qaeda.”) Still, many people, probably the majority of registered voters, really did re-elect Mubarak for a fifth term and would have done so even without his aggressive TV commercials. But all those slickly produced music videos were meant for Western audiences anyway, and the campaign wasn’t really about the Pharaoh but his son Gamal, a Western-educated, reform-minded man of the future. Sound familiar?

Jordan: winner

The Hashemites have enjoyed a tremendous financial boom since the onset of the US occupation of Iraq as real estate prices alone have surged some 30% over the last year. Most of that financing has come from money that left Iraq after the fall of Saddam, a trail that will be more closely watched now after 57 people, mostly Jordanians and Palestinians, died in an attack on three hotels engineered by Iraqi colleagues of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. King Abdullah II replaced his reform-minded prime minister with a former security chief and the diwan’s new mantra is, “political reform plus security,” which means no reform and no matter how much money you bring to town, you’re going to pay dearly if you mess with Jordanian security.

Iran: winner

Compared to the other players in the region, Iran didn’t do as well as many observers suggest. Yes, it consolidated its influence in Iraq, and like the Gulf states it profited greatly from high oil costs. Also, it has managed so far to run circles around the EU 3 (England, France and Germany) that has been “negotiating” with the IRI over its nuclear program. But those talks have taken a few strange turns over the last year, especially after the election of Iran’s tone-deaf new president. Until President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad advocated the destruction of the US and Israel, even the hawks at the Pentagon had no real military option for Iran. Presumably, that is no longer the case, since American officials started to take “death to America” sloganeering pretty seriously after 9/11. And Ahmadinejad’s re-structuring of his foreign service to better suit Iran’s apparent new policy direction has also put a number of Western officials on edge. So the Iranian issue, relegated to the backstage for the last three years, has now moved to front and center and the curtain is rising. In the next few years look for Iran well south of here on the scorecard.

Israel: Winner

It goes without saying that Israel always stands to gain when Arabs lose – but what about when Arabs lose their illusions? If you’ve missed the news from Iraq, Mr. Zarqawi has put paid to the notion of one glorious Arab nation ranged against the outsider. He’s killing Arabs, mostly from a rather largish Muslim sect known as Shiites. As it turns out then, the Middle East is made up of lots of groups, many of whom, especially the smaller communities, will make alliances with others to advance and protect their interests and their lives. In this context, the Zionist imperialist warmongers to the south look less like outsiders and more like a regional minority that’s done well for itself – like Iraq’s Shiites and Kurds. Wow, those Jews win even when Arabs do too!

Ariel Sharon: winner

The Gaza withdrawal earned him international acclaim, including thawing relations with a number of Muslim and Arab states, like Pakistan, Qatar and the UAE. Now Sharon has left Likud to start his own party, Kadima, or Forward. In the last two elections, it was Arabs who elected the prime minister, but it’s unlikely the PA, Hamas, Islamic Jihad or Hizbullah, will have a very large say this time. Sharon has provided Israelis with plenty of security and even if he wanted to withdraw from the West Bank, and he doesn’t, there is no political will in any of the country to do so.

Palestinians: winner

The Gaza Strip isn’t much, but it’s a place to start – and more to the point, it’s a place where more than half a century’s worth of previous Palestinian leadership has been managed. And now President Mahmoud Abbas is busy trying to cobble together meaningful political institutions while tackling corruption and crime, noble and daunting tasks for any democratically elected leader. He’s got a lot of help from the international community and everyone’s rooting for him – except for his political rival, Hamas. Understandably, Abu Mazen doesn’t want to touch off a civil war, especially one he might not win, but without monopolizing legitimate violence, there will never be a sovereign Palestinian state, not because the US, Israel or the EU won’t allow it, but simply because it won’t be a state. Maybe he is waiting to see how the Seniora government takes away Hizbullah’s arms and gets them fully into the political process.

Syria: loser

Insofar as the goal of any regime is to ensure its continued existence, Syria didn’t do all that bad for an international pariah state. And just when we thought we’d seen the last of Baath party comedy as former Iraqi minister of information Muhammad Said al-Sahaf ran for the hills when US tanks he said didn’t exist were closing in, the Syrians roll out their own investigation into the Hariri assassination. What’s really a gas is that Damascus’ Westernized leader evidently thinks that a German judge goes about his business like a Syrian one. “Yeah, that’s the ticket – Mehlis built his whole case on Hosam Hosam and now he’s got nothing, nothing I tell you! Ha!” It would be really funny if there weren’t so many lives at stake, not that Syria cares as it’s been throwing its insults at its neighbors for several decades now just to keep its own hindquarters dry. Everyone else in the region is furious with the regime, but few wish its demise. Cairo, Riyadh, Amman cannot bear the idea of the Bush administration feeling its oats – What, us next? So, who knows if the family in Damascus will survive, but in the future, God-willing, Syrian high-school students will be hard pressed to believe that at one time their country was run by vicious, buffoonish adolescents.

The US taxpayer: loser

It is a tribute to Middle Eastern hospitality that so many in the region are eager to distinguish between the American people and the policies of their government. Nonetheless, it is useful to remember that government by and for the people means that Americans are their government and are thus endowed with the right to hire and fire their leaders. It’s actually a really good thing, even when voters re-elect a president for a second term, as they did the current inhabitant of the White House. Of course, the many billion dollars the US has spent to give Iraqis a chance to elect their own leaders, is a much smaller percentage of what WW II took out of the US economy, and the military casualties aren’t even as high as civilian deaths on 9/11. But as domestic support for Iraq is waning, the Bush administration has yet to disclose any real new strategy except: Stay the course! Ok, but for how long and what’s the price, in lives and dollars? The real problem is that the one workable solution that doesn’t entail vacating Iraq would demand not less but more from American taxpayers, like higher tariffs, especially on fossil fuels, and most likely a draft to fill the ranks of a military that was not trained for a mission it nonetheless mostly believes in: bringing democracy to Iraq.

The neo-cons: losers

Misunderstood and largely unloved by both those who do and do not understand them, the neo-conservatives are a boutique school of American policymakers, politicians, journalists and intellectuals who have very little in common except their shared belief that US policy in the Middle East over the last 60 years was in error. Given that the attacks on the World Trade Center left thousands of civilians dead in a major US city, they have a point. Once the administration found no WMD in Iraq, the neo-cons were pressed into service – now, the US was in the Middle East to import democracy. As farfetched as that thesis may sound to some, and as mendacious as it may sound to others, without it much of what transpired in the region this year wouldn’t have happened without that idea. For instance, there is a very powerful current in US policymaking circles that still argues that the US needs Syrian help and if that means giving Bashar al-Assad a free hand in Lebanon so be it. The neo-cons won that fight and some others, too. Still, it’s sheer fantasy to imagine that a group of academics and journalists ran the government of the United States while CEO millionaires like George W. Bush, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld looked on helplessly. No, the neo-cons deserve some credit and as they are not that powerful they’ll take a lot of blame, some if it in Iraq perhaps.

December 1, 2005 0 comments
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Finance

Building up the financial markets

by Executive Staff December 1, 2005
written by Executive Staff

Jean Riachi

Chairman, Financial
Funds Advisers



E How could UN sanctions on Syria affect Lebanon’s finance sector? What can we expect from Syria in the long term, after possible regime change or crisis resolution?

I don’t think UN sanctions on Syria would affect Lebanon’s finance sector. I don’t see how they could affect it. They might affect the transportation sector, the industrial sector but I don’t see what effect they could have on financial markets or banks in Lebanon, other than maybe the freezing of some Syrian accounts in Lebanon, which cannot be negative. So, I don’t think sanctions would have a significant effect on this country’s finance sector. On the contrary, if there are any sanctions which affect Syrian institutions, that might affect the level of activity of Syrian nationals through Lebanon. They’re mainly commercial banking issues.

So far, although the assassination of former prime minister [Rafik Hariri] has created some fears, it has also created some optimism. Capital markets, fixed income and equity, have shown positive trends this year. Fear has been balanced by hope. The trigger was economic rather than political, which means that for the equity market the performances of the companies themselves justified the upward trend of stock prices and for the fixed income Eurobond market I believe that the better tenure of the budget deficit and the liquidity that we have had in the country have sustained the bond market. So I don’t believe they went up because of the assassination of Hariri or its results, such as the withdrawal of the Syrians, as people say. I think the reasons were here.

As for a financial sector in Syria, you have state commercial banks administrated by the state under a socialist system. The few private banks that have opened are too young to have any significant impact on the economy so you can’t even talk about a financial sector in Syria.

There are two scenarios. Either they comply with international requests and everything is okay with them and I think that then they will initiate a lot of reforms, or they maintain a situation of confrontation, which makes them into a sort of fortress, and they find ways of getting around the sanctions. They’ll find ways to finance their economy through neighboring countries. But that would have a retarding effect on any efforts to reform the banking sector. They would go backwards. I can’t imagine anyone willing to promote reforms in a state of siege.

Marwan Abou Khalil


Head trader, Gulf Finance


E How will the opening of regional exchanges in Dubai and Cairo affect the performance of the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE)? Can we expect the BSE to respond positively to the regional competition, especially in light of the expected privatization initiatives, or has it missed the boat?

The BSE is a different case from Dubai or Cairo. We need political and economic stability first. Dubai and Egypt have them. When we have them here, we can have expansion. We hope, nonetheless, that the opening of the exchanges in Dubai and Cairo will have a positive effect on the BSE. However, I expect some capital to go from here to there. We have seen a Lebanese company go public and it wasn’t traded on the BSE. It was traded on the Dubai stock exchange. That was a negative thing for Lebanon. In the short-term, the opening of these two exchanges may have this kind of negative effect on the BSE. But in the long run I hope it will help the Lebanese markets. Maybe in the short run Lebanese companies will be listed on the exchanges in Cairo and Dubai. But maybe as hope returns to this country, new foreign funds will be invested here, through these exchanges. In the long run, maybe we will become like them. We hope so.

We are afraid that the BSE will miss the chance to reap the benefits from any privatization. But if there is a good political climate and renewed faith in our country we will be able to attract foreign capital investment in the privatization process. But we hope that the privatization process is reflected on the BSE, and not on foreign ones. Privatization of big companies here would result in market capitalization and in a greater volume on the BSE. For the moment, we have Solidere and two or three other big companies. That’s all. The other companies are small companies. They never give dividends. They don’t care about the stockholders. The privatization of government companies here will help the BSE, provided it occurs with the right timing. I don’t think the timing is right now. The BSE is not moving. Since March we have had about the same price for Solidere shares, between $12 and $13. We’re waiting for a boom. It’s a fundamentally excellent company. But we need political stability. That’s why I think we should wait for the right timing for privatization, when we have foreign investment. It’s pointless privatizing a company, if when it is launched, no one wants it. The amounts generated will be small. It will bring a low volume to the BSE and it will become a black mark on the record of the BSE.

Faysal Barbir

Investment adviser,
Arab Finance Corp



E What will the impact of privatization and administrative reform within the public sector be on Lebanon’s financial markets?

We are on the verge of some very important structural reforms. Privatization is something that Lebanon needs in order to go forwards. Financial markets, in particular, need such reform. We’ve been seeing lots of demand from regional and even local investors, as well as from European and American financial investors, whether they were high net worth individuals, companies, investment banks, or huge brokers who now regard Lebanon as a very interesting emerging market and are now willing to diversify into our country given that we have a more stable political scene now. In terms of the Lebanese markets, we need privatization in order to increase our tools of investment and the opportunities that we can present to those investors who are willing to take this risk and invest here. If you look at our equities market, it’s really very small and limited, even though Lebanon benefits from a pioneer banking sector and the best banking and finance people in the whole region. It’s really contradictory that we have such a small equities market. I believe that now with all the money that’s present in the neighboring countries, in the Gulf region, mainly due to high oil prices, the whole region has boomed so much that people really are interested in moving money here. But it will come here if there are the opportunities and tools I mentioned. If we privatized some of the public companies, we would have these tools. We need more listings.

We also really need administrative reform, because there’s lots of corruption. We need a more efficient system and a more effective team. For the moment, everyone is working individually. This way of thinking needs to be gotten rid of. The problem is that the system is too politicized. You can’t really create something if you’re putting the wrong people in the wrong places. Unfortunately the whole country is like that. But I think we’ll get there.

We already have the willingness. And there have been sneak previews of possible success with demand for sovereign or corporate Eurobond listings, and hopefully by the summer MEA will be listed. Another is EDL, and another the telecoms industry. So we’re getting there. We are on the right track. The only problem is the short-term political pressure.

December 1, 2005 0 comments
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Insurance

The hopes of insurers go up in smoke

by Thomas Schellen December 1, 2005
written by Thomas Schellen

Insurance industry representatives in Lebanon recently acknowledged that they expect 2005 to end pretty much as a lost year for business, in line with the “no-growth” environment for GDP and overall economic performance. However, the detailed impacts on sector profits this year cannot be tallied for several more months – with the additional caveat that credible assessments of cumulative performance by all the 50 registered insurance and reinsurance companies still remain elusive in a sector which continues to keep even experts guessing on the real positioning of many companies.

On the national level, the November 2005 research figures released by international reinsurance firm, Swiss Re, assess Lebanon’s premium production at $577 million in 2004, comprised of $180 million in life and $397 million in non-life insurance. With an average of 15.5% annual growth from 1999 to 2004, the 9.3% inflation-adjusted increase between 2003 and 2004, represented a decent result for the year 2004, and expectations for 2005 had initially been for good continued development.

Sclerotic growth

Rates of insured-ness have undoubtedly progressed over the half-decade since antiquated Lebanese insurance laws of the mid-20th century were revised in 1999. But as the practices of local insurers stand, public disclosures of financial results are not a given and the numbers that are available are often inconclusive as to the industry’s health, profitability and growth.

The large estimate range on Lebanon’s macroeconomic parameters – beginning with population size and GDP – does not help much either, as demonstrated by the variance between the Swiss Re assessment of Lebanon’s insurance density and penetration and that of other authoritative sources. Swiss Re gave figures of a per capita expenditure on insurance of $163.8 (density) and a 2.82% share in GDP (penetration) for last year, while the 2005 DAIR handbook by i.e. Muhanna ratings services, quoted a lower density of $144.25 but a higher penetration of 3.04% – not insignificant variations of 13% in one and 8% in the other direction.

However, such variations in evaluating insurance results are actually common for many developing countries and more than exposing information gaps on a market like Lebanon, they may say something about the need to improve research methodologies and form global institutions for this financial sector, which shows less worldwide independent monitoring than banking. But by the undisputed baseline understanding that Lebanon has about a 0.02% share in global insurance premiums, it clearly remains weak in many insurance areas, although according to Swiss Re’s numbers, Lebanon’s life insurance market improved significantly more than the non-life sector in 2004, increasing by 27.4% versus 2.6% for general insurance. But if measured by expectations voiced by important insurance minds four years ago, life insurance growth is still a disappointment. Where managers had hopes of achieving a premium portfolio of $1 billion in the second half of the decade, the real growth of the past three years falls significantly short of this.

Insurers that are owned by banks or affiliated with international sector firms are often viewed as the companies best positioned to survive in the Lebanese market, yet not all perform equally. In 2004, some bank-affiliated firms were presenting outstanding results in comparison to their peers while some players in the same segment saw their claims’ ratios grow much more than their premiums.

In this context, it is worth noting that the banking industry’s performance split is by and large top-down. Large banks essentially set the pace for the industry for both quality and compliance with international standards, while a handful of the smaller banks may be withering on both counts. But although the concentration of market shares at the top of the insurance sector is similar to that in banking (a few banks and insurers account for over 80% of activities in the respective realms), experts frequently caution that mere size of a Lebanese insurance firm does not provide a high certainty of across-the-board quality.

Neither premium volume nor data currently available on capitalization, reserves and total assets offer enough information to determine the sector’s leaders and losers as long as asset quality or loss ratios can be obfuscated in resistance to public scrutiny.

An unsettling reality in this regard is that the Lebanese insurance sector is still as far away from effective consolidation as it was five years ago and that transparency is largely amiss. Questions over advancing regulations and the monitoring of firms loom as large as ever and there is much room for improvement in promoting insurance awareness and governance quality gains within private and public protection providers.

Much-needed initiatives for the advancement of insurance did not progress in the political arena in 2005. The issues of pension planning and reforming the national social security network received no legislative attention, nor did tax benefits for life insurance or the 2004 draft for a new insurance law.

No sign of leadership

The latter issue is not of little concern – and it is also an indicator that the insurance industry itself is not just a victim of political foot dragging. The new law, said its advocates in the spring of 2004, would make Lebanon a role model for insurance legislation in the region, and allow the country’s insurers to reap the benefits.

The private sector insurance stakeholders, who have tried for years to repair the sector’s image, thus are still some distance away from projecting a cohesive front. This inertia could have consequences for the perception of Lebanon as a regional insurance power, based on the fact that insurance reforms and regulatory improvements in other markets appear to be taking effect.

The sector’s outlook is not without question either. By the track record of industrial and consumer behavior in Lebanon over the past five to ten years, corporate and retail customers have been inclined to treat insurance as expenditure during hard economic times. This dampens expectations that the industry will achieve strong improvement until the general economy shows some real gains.

The friendliest short-term prospect for local insurers could be profitability from their secure underwriting business. This is in the context of increases in global reinsurance rates. Although a cost factor for insurance companies, the last major incline in reinsurance rates at the end of 2001, allowed local companies to even out rate structure imbalances by hiking rates up under reference to the hardening of the international insurance market. This, say local analysts, has resulted in stronger underwriting profits in the past four years than companies were able to realize before 2001.

While the 2001 to 2002 reinsurance rate hikes were triggered by 9/11, the possibility of newly softening rates this year was voided by the natural catastrophes of the past 12 months. For the Lebanese market, analysts said that while it is too early to tell if local providers would notch up their rates once again by pointing to international conditions, the hard global market would be helpful in maintaining profitable underwriting rates.

December 1, 2005 0 comments
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Looking Back

The unlikely quartet

by Michael Young December 1, 2005
written by Michael Young

In November, during the French book fair in Beirut, the magazine L’Orient-Express – previously the monthly supplement of the daily L’Orient-Le Jour – was published as a special 10-year anniversary issue. The idea was the brainchild of the former editor, Samir Kassir, but when he was assassinated last June, it was up to the onetime staff members to prepare the content without the guidance of the irrepressible man who had been the magazine’s vital force.

The regret one felt in knowing Kassir never saw the issue was nothing compared to the disappointing reality of the aftermath of his death. The far-too-constrained national reaction showed how cheaply he had gone, so unacceptable coming from a Lebanese society that had, by the time Kassir was killed by a bomb placed under his car, regained its sovereignty. At the essential moment of newfound emancipation, an avatar of that effort, a writer who had risked his personal safety for years to condemn the order the Lebanese had lately demonstrated against, was virtually forgotten. That’s why the anniversary issue of L’Orient-Express was a bittersweet experience; it pleased the insiders, those who knew Kassir, but it also proved a mere sideshow for the society as a whole. Through that indifference, the Lebanese effectively forgot a part of their post-war self, and not by a long shot the least attractive one.

Four different lives, one Lebanon

It says much about the contradictory nature of Lebanon that four of the prominent deaths recorded in 2005 – those of former premier Rafik Hariri, the providential businessman who rode into the country on a white checkbook; Basil Fuleihan, his protégé and among the best and brightest of the returning wartime generation; Ghazi Kanaan, long the tough cornerstone and cynical broker of Syrian power in Lebanon; and Kassir, the prodigal son, who alighted from Paris and used his talents of writer and polemicist as an antidote to the worst of the new order – offered up a striking image of post-war equilibrium. Each complemented the other in some way, even when they were antagonistic. What ensued was a Levantine compromise, but one, also, destined to shatter amid the false expectation of indefinite steadiness. The greatest irony of all was that the four died as their ambitions were either about to be fulfilled, or had been.

The face of post-war Lebanon

To describe what Rafik Hariri meant for Lebanon after 1990 has been done ad nauseam. In all respects he embodied the energy of reconstruction after the conflict, was the indispensable agent of economic confidence, and, through his death, showed he had the power to play a post-mortem trick on a Syrian regime that had for years used him to advance its interests, while also mistrusting his every move. What made Hariri dangerous was that unlike his foes, he had a striking vision for Lebanon. It was flawed, hubristic, narrow, elitist, unaccountable, and, for all of those reasons, helped generate the crippling debt Lebanon faces today. But a vision there was, and it had a place in the modern world, so unlike the cheerless substitute offered by Syria and Hariri’s foes, where the choice roles were left to intelligence officers, and where the ambient philosophy was essentially the same as practiced by organized crime rings.

Orbiting Hariri

Hariri was the axis of the system in which Fuleihan, Kanaan and Kassir navigated. While Fuleihan was so closely tied to the late prime minister that drawing a boundary between the two seems almost absurd, he was also something distinct: an embodiment of the best that Hariri had managed to attract in the early 1990s: the 30-something university graduate, preferably with a degree from a foreign institution, devoted to the art of making money, and crafted in the best ateliers of urban mobility in London, Paris, or New York. Beirut was awash with such figures in the immediate post-war period (it still is), and while they were naturally drawn to a prime minister who offered them status, they were also often the antithesis of what Hariri himself had been.

Like many a returning Lebanese in those years, Fuleihan was a man of theory, hungering for action, and to achieve that objective he needed to hitch his fortunes to a man of action like Hariri. Fuleihan’s intelligence ensured he would succeed, but countless others, fighting for the limited number of stools in the Hariri set, were either denied entry, or found themselves banished to a mediocre anteroom, far from the inner circle, moving among the sycophants the prime minister was so good at turning to his advantage, but who were otherwise eminently forgettable.

Samir Kassir’s most memorable encounter with Hariri showed another side of post-war Lebanon, and of Hariri himself. In 2000, Kassir had written a now-famous article criticizing, without naming him, the then-head of the General Security service, Jamil Sayyed, and more generally the role played by the army in Lebanese life. Sayyed responded by threatening Kassir and ordering carloads of agents to pursue him for weeks, relentlessly, at times aggressively. One evening, Hariri asked Kassir and the editor of As-Safir, Joseph Samaha, to join him at a swanky Beirut restaurant. The point was not to feed the pair, however, but to have them follow him home in their car, enclosed within the confines of his motorcade. When the General Security agents tried to follow, Hariri’s guards blocked their path, earning Kassir a momentary reprieve.
Hariri was not the first or last politician who shielded Kassir against arguably the most powerful man in Lebanon. But the incident showed something about both men: for Kassir, free expression and provocation were oxygen, and he was willing to go to the line in defending it, though his pen had often been directed against Hariri. For Hariri, Kassir was more than just an enemy of the security services and men he loathed, he was also an expression of what Hariri, sometimes reluctantly, imagined Lebanon to be. The late prime minister did not like criticism, but he was willing to argue with his critics without dispatching goons to exact retribution; and he anyway preferred co-opting others to threatening them. Kassir was never co-opted, but Hariri never held that against him. Indeed, why should he have?

Free men

Kassir, much like Fuleihan, was part of that exiled Lebanese war-time generation that came home after the fighting stopped. Yet where Kassir was a man boisterously of the left, Fuleihan always seemed more the solid burgher, levitating above ideology. That was the façade: anyone who knew both men could recall how Fuleihan was readily a militant in his days at the American University of Beirut, while Kassir, while never abandoning his leftist roots, steadily became more bourgeois as he kicked into his mid-40s. Sometimes opposites, toward the end objective allies, Fuleihan and Kassir distilled the post-war cosmopolitanism of Beirut, the very same that was overpowered by, and somehow coexisted with, the hard, rural stewardship of the fourth man who died in the past year, Ghazi Kanaan.

In the same way he could acknowledge the importance of a freethinker like Kassir, Hariri could just as pragmatically accept the reality of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon, and work with its top administrators. Of all the strange relationships in post-war Lebanon, the bond that existed between Hariri and Kanaan was surely the oddest. Whatever brought together the businessman and the intelligence agent, the visionary and the anti-visionary, the natural co-opter and the unambiguous enforcer?

Many things, in fact: their shared appetite for power, their instinctive grasp of how best to achieve their mutual interests, their successes as men of action, and their dislike of abstraction. At play between Hariri and Kanaan were near perfect market forces, as both regularly resolved their differences by finding an equilibrium between what both were after. Kanaan ran Lebanon like a country estate, and Hariri, technically the lord of the manor, accepted him as the foreman he could not fire. The prime minister’s critics pointed to this as proof that he was an essential prop in the Syrian order; Hariri’s defenders argued that, under the circumstances, smooth collaboration with Kanaan was far better than a confrontation the Lebanese could not win. Perhaps, though one must measure the implications of Hariri’s policy: it did at times let him do what he wanted, but by allowing Syrian interference in every aspect of decision-making, it also institutionalized Lebanon’s sense of dependency. Paradoxically, as many a journalist would admit, Kanaan was little concerned with the excesses of a free Lebanese media. It was revealing that Kassir’s problems were primarily with the post-1998 order set up by President Emile Lahoud. Kanaan rarely directed threats against journalists; Kassir’s difficulties were provoked by the Lebanese over whom Kanaan presided. It was his misfortune to pay the price for the desire of Lebanese security officials to prove themselves to their Syrian superiors. Yet how ironic that before Hariri’s murder, it was much easier to mock the Syrians than it was to attack Lahoud. Syrian rule allowed this latitude to the Lebanese media, and those like Kassir took advantage of this. What he did not realize – his own killing being the warning – was that once the Syrians withdrew, the margin for such expression would disappear.

Staying on good terms with Syria

In understanding Hariri’s relations with Syria, it is important to grasp that he was no revolutionary. A conservative businessman, he preferred stability to the potentially destructive unpredictability that a break with Syria could have led to. Hariri’s ambition at the end was not, as the hagiographists have written, to take Lebanon out of Syria’s orbit; it was to widen his own margin of maneuver inside that orbit. In the weeks before his death, Hariri had made clear to the Syrians he would not take on his electoral lists the more egregious of their supporters, as he had in the past – in effect announcing that he planned to make the parliamentary elections a real contest. But at best, he and other opposition candidates hoped to win around 50 or so seats. This was no coup against Syria; it was an effort to re-impose the equilibrium that Hariri had put to good use in the days before Lahoud and Rustom Ghazali replaced Elias Hrawi and Ghazi Kanaan.

What Hariri didn’t grasp was that, for his enemies, this would anyway be misunderstood as a bid to overturn the Syrian order. They feared Hariri’s triumph because he would have easily won the round. Instead, he got too close to the sun, and paid the ultimate price. Yet it was not so much the game that was too big for Hariri; it was Hariri who unwittingly proved too big for the game. For a supremely self-assured man, this descent into momentary modesty proofed fatal, as it did for Fuleihan.

If we are to believe what we hear about Kanaan, in his final days he was unhappy that everything he had built up in Lebanon had collapsed. It’s difficult to imagine a hardy survivor of the Baathist order devoting any time to nostalgia. It’s equally difficult to lend credence to official Syrian reports that Kanaan killed himself in response to a hostile campaign in the Lebanese media. No such campaign was waged, and Kanaan was not someone to let words get him down. In fact, if anything was likely to have killed him, or caused him to kill himself, it was that he posed a mortal threat to the worried Syrian regime he served. His adeptness highlighted its incompetence. At the threshold of his crowning moment, when he could have for the first time imagined exercising absolute power, Kanaan may have fallen victim to his prospective success.

As for Kassir, he was on a cloud after the Syrian withdrawal in April. On the eve of his death he was described as being his usual confident self when discussing political changes. He was very far away from imagining that his murder was already in the final stages of preparation. Kassir had won and his years of effort had paid off. Afterwards, it was clear that his was the accomplishment not of money or power, but of ideas. In being the first to die after Syria’s pullout, Kassir proved how essential his weapon was in destabilizing the enemies of free expression.

December 1, 2005 0 comments
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Real Estate

BCD property prices stay on the rise

by Peter Grimsditch December 1, 2005
written by Peter Grimsditch

Despite the political turmoil of 2005, Lebanon’s real estate sector saw activity and prices remain relatively stable. Solidere sold more land than ever before and both Gulf Arabs and Lebanese nationals continued to invest in hot properties. The Beirut Central District remained (and still remains) the axis around which everything else revolves, and experts predict the short term can only get better.

According to the Lebanese Order of Architects and Engineers, the number of construction permits and overall construction experienced a dip compared to 2004 levels. By November 1, 2005, 9482 permits had been granted for a total construction area of 5,839,354m2, while for the whole of 2004, 11,258 permits were granted for a total area of 7,719,348m2.

About half of all permits were issued in Mount Lebanon (4,657), followed by south Lebanon (1888), Nabatiyeh (930), Beirut (913), the Bekaa (799), and the north (295). In terms of space in square meters, Mount Lebanon led the way (3,116,845m2), followed by Beirut (968,601m2), south Lebanon (648,742m2), the north (422,876m2), the Bekaa (375,687m2) and Nabatiyeh (297,603m2).

All things considered, Solidere performed remarkably well in 2005. While much of Beirut and Lebanon appeared to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, Solidere sold some 300,000m2 of land in the downtown, more than ever before. The price per square meter of built up area (BUA) in the Beirut Central District (BCD) increased from some $1,000 in 2000 to $1,200 last year and some $1,400 today. The price is even higher along the seafront, where hardly a vacant plot of land remains. An equally luxurious fourth complex, as well as a handful of luxury hotels (including the Hyatt and Hilton) will, next year join the high-end residential Platinum, Beirut and Marina Towers. Worth some $1.5 billion in investments, the area overlooking the marina has already been dubbed Beirut’s “Goldern Strip.” Investors who wish to develop along the downtown seafront will have to wait until 2007, for the completion of the land reclamation project known as Solidere II. However, assuming that the political and economic situation in Lebanon remains stable, they will have to reckon with m2 of BUA.

Solidere cleans up

Solidere declared over the first nine months of 2005, a profit of $51.1 million, while its increased liquidity allowed the company to reduce debts from $234 million by the end of 2004, to $130 million by the end of 2005. Shareholders were able to cash a 32% profit per share, compared to a 2% profit over the same period last year. The share price rose to $14 at the end of 2005, while experts, some say rather optimistically, predict shares to hit $20 in the near future.

According to a study by Ramco Real Estate Advisers, some 4.5 million square meters have been bought by Gulf Arabs since 2001, which represents a total of 270 transactions at an average of 17,000m2 each. About 900,000m2 were sold in 2005, which illustrates the fact that Arab investors so far remain positive about the future of Lebanon. For the first time ever, Kuwaiti nationals bought more land than Saudis.

The sale of land is not only meant for the construction of towering residential projects and hotels, but also smaller luxury villas, roughly within the geographical triangle of Beirut, Bhamdoun and Faqra. Due to the increasing anti-Muslim climate in Europe, Lebanon’s winter capitals of Faraya and Faqra witnessed an increased construction of chalets, villas and even a palace, as Arab nationals rather ski there, than in Gstaad.

Arab nationals remain among the main buyers of high-end real estate in Lebanon, yet it seems Lebanese expatriates increasingly buy and invest, especially since the retreat of the Syrian army last April. The high-end seafront residential properties are predominantly bought by Gulf Arabs, (60% to 70%), while more inland, in areas such as Saifi and Wadi Abou Jamil, about 70% of clients are Lebanese. And sales are booming. Many apartments are sold even before the foundations are laid. Marina Towers and Park View claim to have sold all their apartments, while Beirut Tower claims to have 80% sold and Garden View, 60%.

Looking elsewhere

While the BCD area remains the natural center of gravity for Lebanese real estate, other major investments continued to take place along the coast, in Ain Mreisseh, Raouche, Ramlet el Baida and at the Corniche. Also, several major developments saw the light in the narrow strip between downtown Beirut and Ashrafieh, most notably the Sursock Towers, the landmark high-rise building with 500m2 of luxury apartments at Tabaris, designed by Pierre Khoury Architects.
The ongoing gentrification of Beirut with the downtown area as its center continues in other areas beyond Ashrafieh, such as Zoqat al Blatt, Kantari and the upper end of Zoqat al Blatt, where investors have bought large apartment blocks. Outside Beirut, no major developments have taken place, with the exception of Yarzeh, Baabda and to a lesser extent Hazmieh and Naccache.

Following the success of the 37,000m2 ABC mall in Ashrafieh in 2004, 2005 saw the opening of the giant City Mall at Dora and the smaller Metropolitan Mall in Sin el Fil. The City Mall measures no less than 200,000m2, of which 75,000m2 are meant for retail, including a hypermarket and department store. The Metropolitan Mall, part of the Habtoor group, offers another 14,000m2 of retail space on the market. It remains to be seen how both will perform, especially the latter in the largely untested Sin el Fil.

After a six-year delay due to political bickering, 2005 also witnessed the go ahead for the $120 million Souqs project in the BCD. Due to be completed by 2007, the Souqs will offer another 60,000m2 of retail space on the market. While the rent in ABC and City Mall lies at around $800m2, the price per square meter in the Souqs is expected to be around $1,000.

Verdun will soon witness another retail development with the announcement that the V5 shopping mall will be open for business in 2008, adding a further 50,000m2 of retail and leisure space when it is completed (see interview with Horizon CEO Abdul Hafiz Mansour on page 180). While there is a widespread consensus among project developers and real estate experts that Lebanon does not yet offer enough retail space per capita, it remains to be seen if malls are the answer and if all available retail space can be made profitable. One thing is certain, with the increased competition, especially after 2007 to 2008, rents in certain areas and malls will come down.

Office works

The market for office space remains Lebanon’s least significant. Following the success of office buildings such as the Nahar building and Atrium, a few new state-of-the-art office buildings have been nearly completed in the BCD, including Two Park Avenue. Prices are hitting $300m2 per year and there is demand for modern buildings. The same cannot be said about first generation offices built by Solidere in the heart of the city. Occupancy rates are at about 65%, due to a combination of factors, most notably their small size and limited parking space. Rents there are much lower at some $150m2 to $250m2. Rents in Hamra or Ras Beirut too are much lower starting at $50m2 going up to $175m2. Popular among business and embassies is also Rue Charles Malek between Tabaris and the improving Sin el Fil.

The new Monot?

While six years ago you could barely get a coffee in Gemaizeh, today people jam the streets especially on the weekend to visit the dozens of café’s, clubs and restaurants offering anything from Cuban cocktails to sushi. While Gemaizeh has seen rents triple – hitting $500m2 per year – Rue Monot, which held sway for much of the previous eight years has seen prices tumble from $500m2 per year to some $250m2 to $300m2 per year. With the increased popularity of the area however, problems with noise and parking have increased and the character of the area has changed from slightly alternative to more and more mainstream. Some say the first generation bar owners and clientele are already looking elsewhere. The next cool area? The word on the street is that the savvy operators will move to Hamra with its flat, pedestrian sidewalks. Watch this space.

December 1, 2005 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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