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Business

Venture capital in Lebanon stays hidden

by Nicolas Photiades October 1, 2004
written by Nicolas Photiades

If only every great idea could guarantee a swarm of investors knocking at your door. But the harsh reality is that, even after going through all the right motions (from hammering the fantastic idea into a solid business plan and assembling a capable team), entrepreneurs and growth-minded companies customarily face their greatest difficulties in attracting capital. And although nobody doubts that there is a shortage of liquidity in the country, most would-be business tycoons find that start-up money is even scarcer in Lebanon. Simply put, venture capital, for all those who are still asking themselves, refers to any investment in private and unlisted companies. Real venture capital is the investing in start-up and early stage companies. In Europe and North America, venture capital has long reached middle age, with the number of transactions being now levelled out. Once the domain of both little and big players, venture capital has become increasingly dominated by the mega financial institutions, such as global banks, insurance companies and giant pension funds, which all work through specialist business units or subsidiaries. Even in places like Western Europe, it is rare to see successful independent firms, which have been able to raise large amounts of money for venture capital purposes. Although the technology bubble of the late 1990s saw a resurgence of independent venture capital firms, most have now died a violent death or are dominated by the mega financial groups.

In Lebanon, we are light years from achieving what Europe and North America achieved. While the West has used the venture capital tool to grow itself out of recession and debt traps, we in the land of the cedar are still cogitating about the true meaning of venture capital. True, there were some speeches by senior bankers towards the late 1990s to early 2000s, which preached the necessity to establish venture capital funds in Lebanon, but nothing came out of it. Just talk, while our young entrepreneurs are still facing the limited choice of either emigrating to greener pastures or, worse, facing the local banks and their deadly corporate loans. Indeed, at the moment, most private sector firms, whether they are start-ups or established institutions are suffering from expensive over leverage, which is draining most (sometimes more) of their cash flow.

The current situation

Some attempts were made in the mid to latter part of the 1990s to provide the Lebanese economy with a financing alternative to classical banking. The European Union, the European Investment Bank, the World Bank, etc, all provided the local banks with funding to be directed specifically to emerging and start-up companies. These supranational loans were however, always small in size and did not really benefit the end-users (start-ups, etc.) as the banks often misused these funds and allocated them to other sectors. Moreover, the banks never really concentrated their efforts on asking the above mentioned supranational entities for funding to support venture capital, and rather concentrated on asking for funds in order to develop retail and consumer banking.
 

At one stage, some Lebanese financiers and bankers did decide to take the bull by the horn and established independent and proprietary venture capital/private equity funds, such as the Lebanon Fund, launched by Lebanon Invest, which got listed on the Beirut Stock Exchange. Banque Audi also followed the venture capital and private equity path by using its own money to invest in start ups and private equity. These investments were made via a holding company that is still wholly owned by the bank. Middle East Capital Group, another local investment bank also used its capital to carry out some venture capital and private equity investments in Lebanon and the rest of the region. However, these funds never really got 100% engaged in venture capital and rather concentrated on private equity, which is more investments in existing companies that needed to be turned around, restructured or have their operational and strategic direction changed, rather than seed money investments for start-up and early stage companies. Moreover, the cost structure of these funds was always high since the start and significantly affected their performance. Such a lackluster profitability from the part of the venture capital pioneers was a major discouraging factor to other banks and investors, which did not see venture capital as an interesting revenue diversification or investment option.

All these attempts to go into venture capital have been commendable for a small market such as Lebanon, which was just coming out from a twenty years glitch in terms of financial innovation, but is still largely insufficient. For new companies and entire sectors to emerge, boosting as a result the economy, a strong and diversified venture capital industry must be developed and set up. This can only be done with the goodwill and commitment of private Lebanese and Arab investors, which would see a developed venture capital financial sector as one of the ways of boosting the legendary entrepreneurial spirit of the Lebanese, whilst growing the local economy out of a debt and stagnation trap.

Where to go for funding

For the moment, the best way for young entrepreneurs to finance their new venture is to visit their local bank and ask for a Kafalat guaranteed loan. Kafalat is a government-owned sort of insurance company that guarantees bank loans for venture capital purposes. The cost varies from loan to loan, but is generally lower than the cost on a straight loan from the bank to the entrepreneur. It is worth noting however, that few banks would directly lend money to the entrepreneur without a Kafalat guarantee anyway, and given the relatively small size of Kafalat, the number of loans such an institution is ready to guarantee is generally small. Kafalat-guaranteed loans have a ceiling of around $200,000 and automatically exclude new ventures or start-ups needing more than this amount, such as technology oriented ventures, which are capital intensive and need more than $200,000 to build up a solid starting base.

The Islamic Angle

Another funding source for young Lebanese entrepreneurs is Islamic finance. Islamic banks are mostly engaged in financing products such as MUDARABA (trust financing) and MUSHARAKA, (venture capital financing), which are equivalent to participation transactions. MUDARABA is a form of partnership where one side provides only capital and the other only labor and entrepreneurial skills, while MUSHARAKA is a partnership contract where both parties provide capital towards the financing of a project or a venture. Most small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) in the Arab world, more particularly in the Gulf region, are actively seeking to finance their business through capital participation and profit and loss sharing, making Islamic finance in the form of MUSHARAKA or MUDARABA quite attractive.

Most SMEs and start ups in Lebanon and the Middle East can only rely on their weak cash flow to grow organically and cannot have access to outside capital. Their only chance for external capital growth would come in the forms of independent private investments, Islamic banking, or venture capital and private equity funds. While private investors are very selective and only look for investments with established track records (in other words, venture capital is not an option) and venture capital funds do not really exceed the number of fingers on two hands throughout the Arab region, Islamic banking, through its business nature and the SHARI’A rules governing it, is the only serious funding source for start ups and emerging companies.

Basle II compliance

Islamic banks are not yet covered by the new Basel II banking regulations and are subject to a less stringent regulatory regime. Very often, Islamic banks are established under laws specifically designed for them and their regulatory requirements are less detailed and constraining than those with which conventional banks must comply. Such a regulatory environment allows Islamic banks to have a competitive edge over conventional banks, which will soon have to comply with Basel II regulations. The latter make venture capital investments very costly and onerous for conventional banks, which will have to apply a risk weighting of 150% from 2007, the date the new Basel II capital regulations are applied throughout the world. In other words, if a conventional bank invested $1 million worth of assets in venture capital, it would have to set aside at least $120,000 of capital.

With the advent of Basel II, the slim hope of seeing conventional banks getting involved in venture capital is slowly dimming away. However, a whole new market is opening up for Islamic banks, which will be able to diversify and expand their MUSHARAKA and MUDARABA activities, with little competition. For the moment, Islamic banks concentrate mostly on MURABAHA, which is the largest category of development-related financing and the most common form of SHARI’A-compliant short-term financing employed by Islamic financial institutions. It is undertaken by the bank purchasing specific goods at the order of the ultimate buyer and simultaneously selling them to that buyer on a cost-plus basis.

With the venture capital market freeing up from conventional competition, Islamic banks will have the possibility of diversifying their assets and of getting rid of their concentration problem. The latter has been the main characteristic of Islamic banks over the last ten years, and can only be solved with the creation of new markets, such as Lebanon, and the hiring of venture capital experts, whose job will be to boost the MUSHARAKA and MUDARABA parts of the business.

Lebanon is going in the right direction with the establishment of the first Islamic institutions in recent months. What is now needed is for the opening of branches or subsidiaries of large Islamic financial institutions such as Kuwait Finance House, Al Rajhi of Saudi Arabia, Dubai Islamic Bank, etc, in Beirut. Such power houses would have a major positive effect on the local economy and would fill an important gap left by the local conventional banks, which is that of venture capital financing.

Venture capital has worked wonders in the West and has boosted moribund economies to prosperity in less than a decade. The US and Western Europe have rightly relied on the patriotic feelings and national commitment of their institutional and individual investors to fund a nascent venture capital sector. The outcome of such an investment gamble has paid off, as the beneficiaries of venture capital funding have repaid their faith in a major way, as the value of transactions in the buy-out, start-up and early stage markets more than quadrupled in less than ten years in Europe (between 1986 and 1995). What is urgently needed in Lebanon is for our individual investors to emulate their Western peers and place some more faith into the capabilities of their young entrepreneurs. The massive arrival in Lebanon of Islamic banking would provide the institutional investor base for both venture capital and private equity.

(BOX) How do banks finance their own expansion?

The capital needs of banks in Lebanon vary significantly from one bank to another. The twenty largest banks in the country are generally able to attract external capital more easily than their smaller peers, which are struggling to look more attractive to potential capital suitors. The larger banks’ better financial performance, more solid track record and qualitative aspects make it more attractive for a regional individual investor to provide them with fresh capital injections. In recent months, a few large local banks have been able to lure Arab and Lebanese individual investors into their capital, with the most recent example being Banque Libano-Française (BLF), which had to replace its majority shareholder, Crédit Agricole of France, with a regional investor. Replacing a Western financial group with another is virtually impossible at the moment, as the Lebanese market is too small and risky to attract any strategic institutional investor from Europe or North America.

For the smaller banks, which fall below the largest twenty in terms of total assets, raising capital externally is a tall order. Although, some, such as Banque BEMO, have succeeded in recent years, this was only due to a healthy qualitative and quantitative performance, as well as to a clear strategy of maintaining a certain optimum size. Such attributes are always likely to attract external regional investors, who have become increasingly picky in recent years, and who have steered away from the majority of the thirty smaller banks in the country. The latter have not really reached the level of attractiveness required for external capital financing.

However, banks in Lebanon have shown significant resourcefulness as regards to capital raising. Most have relied on the good years in the last decade to grow organically (internally), whilst some have taken advantage of favorable market conditions to carry out Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and list on the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE). The current stagnation of local and international equity capital markets for emerging market banks has led some Lebanese banks to resort to issuing preferred shares (a hybrid of debt and equity), in US dollars and carrying a high dividend/interest rate. These issues have been mostly placed with the banks’ customers.

October 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Q&A: Omar Razzaz, World Bank country manager for Lebanon

by Executive Contributor October 1, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

In September the World Bank issued its annual report Doing BUSINESS IN 2005: REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH, co-sponsored by the International Finance Corporation, the private sector lending arm of the World Bank Group. The report examines investment climates around the world, based on the regulatory performance and reforms undertaken in 145 nations. Comparing data and showcasing examples of best practice, the report demonstrates how governments can create a better business environment, which benefits all firms, as well as society as a whole. EXECUTIVE met with Omar Razzaz, the World Bank’s country manager for Lebanon, to discuss how the country’s business environment fares by international standards, the challenges facing reformers and the advantages offered to investors.
 


The World Bank’s annual DOING BUSINESS IN 2005 report just came out, with more countries and benchmarks than ever before. Governments are coming forth and requesting to be a part of it – what is the value of this report?

This is a yearly report with very critical information, not just on laws and regulations, but on the actual experience of businesses. That’s why it is meaningful. Businesses are not just interested in the legal framework, but how things work on the ground. The report tries to address the type of indicators that really matter to a business: how easy it is to start, how easy it is to operate and how easy it is to close a business. The other side of this report is that it looks at these indicators on a yearly basis, so you can see change all the time. A country that ranks very low but has gone on a pro-active program by the government to improve its business environment will be registered by the report very quickly. That is why the DOING BUSINESS report is increasingly noticed by investors around the world. Where a country ranks is as interesting to them as the pace at which it moves.

How would you assess Lebanon’s business environment based on the findings of the report?

Lebanon has its strengths and weaknesses. Among the strengths, you have the relative ease with which one can get credit and close a business – by regional standards that is. Where Lebanon does not do well is in terms of starting a business: the procedures as of now take 46 days, and the cost of starting a business is 130% of income per capita. This is much higher than in other countries in the region, as well as elsewhere in the world: just look at Latvia, another small country, where the cost is 17%. It has to do with the number of procedures, the time it takes and the uncertainty that’s involved in the process. The solutions are there: if you reduce the steps, if you automate them, if you set up a one-stop shop where investors can come and you give them clear procedures, it would dramatically change the situation. And it can be done fairly quickly: Jordan managed to reduce the time required to set up a business by nine weeks. The one other aspect in which Lebanon doesn’t do very well is the enforcement of contracts. In this area, Lebanon really stands out. It takes 721 days on average to enforce a contract and it involves 39 procedures. This is two or three times longer than even in developing countries. It is very difficult for a business to operate in an environment where you have a contract that you can’t have enforced. And there really is no reason why this has to continue. Lebanon, in terms of its jurisprudence, in terms of its human capital, has some of the best legal institutions in the Arab world. To improve that situation is a matter of will, of putting in the systems, and of training.

Have there been any significant attempts at implementing the necessary reforms to improve the investment climate here?

There have been very important islands of reform in Lebanon. If you look at the area of property registration or the application of VAT on transactions – these are areas that can take a very long time and in Lebanon it has been streamlined. But in the last two years, there hasn’t been a concerted effort by the government to systematically upgrade laws and regulations and undertake reform. This is a major drawback, because with a debt to GDP of almost 180%, the fiscal and monetary policies can only take you so far. They can reduce debt perhaps, and bring it down to 150-160%, but that is still a high level. The only way to reduce the debt is to grow out of it and increase your GDP. So it’s critical for Lebanon to focus on the investment environment to find ways to increase that pace of growth.

But this year, Lebanon witnessed a positive turn in many of its economic indicators: there’s been a sharp increase in export, tourism, construction permits, and bank deposits for instance. The country has experienced its highest GDP growth since 1997. Is this just cyclical growth or will it have a long-term impact, notably on the level of investment?

Our assessment is that this is not short-term. Lebanon has definitely benefited from this situation – it has allowed growth to reach 5% for instance. But the DOING BUSINESS report suggests that if a country moves drastically on reforms, it could add up to 2% on its growth rate. So what the Lebanese economy has done this year is fantastic, but if the country had improved its regulatory procedures for business, it might have added 2% more, thereby growing at 7%. And for Lebanon to deal with its debt problem in a sustainable way, it needs to grow at around 6% to7% every year, and this is achievable. When you look at the composition of the investments and the growth, tourism is fantastic and does create jobs, buying real estate is great. But what you want to see is more Lebanese expatriates and Arabs starting businesses that will create value added, jobs, on a sustainable basis. And for that to happen, you really need to make operating a business a much more straight forward undertaking.

How does this country fare by regional standards? Does it have any comparative advantages to other Arab countries in the eyes of investors?

Lebanon has to think dynamically in terms of its comparative advantage. It shouldn’t necessarily try to reclaim what it had in the 1960s, but rather think in terms of today – an era of information technology, globalization – to figure out its strengths and weaknesses. The most important element that Lebanon has that foreign investors would want is an innate cultural talent for creativity and service. If you look at the industries that are blooming, they are service industries, industries that relate to creativity, advertising, marketing, TV production… I’ve heard that six out of ten commercials in the Arab world are produced in Lebanon. This says something about the human capital in this country. This a multilingual country that is very exposed to information, trends from the West, and its juxtaposition between the Arab world and the West gives it a tremendous advantage in picking up important trends that might be relevant to the area, and modifying them to local tastes. Studies now show that for countries to compete, for countries to succeed, it’s not a matter of capital or resources, it’s a matter of the know-how that exists in a country and the systems that the country has that allow it to utilize that knowledge. The Lebanese have the know-how that is very hard to acquire by formal training. What they lack are the systems. And it’s incredible, because for most countries, the systems are the easy part to acquire. This is something you can buy with money, and a little bit of decision-making and coordination. Yet you find the systems that allow investors to invest money, to register, to get information, to have day-to-day operating procedures that are clear without dealing with a huge amount of red tape, to be the missing part here.

Yet at the same time the World Bank is pushing for educational programs in Lebanon to provide better technical and vocational training?

Here we come to the issue of equal opportunities. Lebanon has a long way to go before it can be proud of offering its population equal opportunities. There is a tremendous human capital in Lebanon, but that doesn’t mean everybody has access to the same quality of education. Those who have access to quality education, to private schools, to private universities, have tremendous talent. But those who are left behind are relegated to competing with unskilled workers, which is a very difficult thing to do in Lebanon given the relatively open borders and the inflow of foreign workers and high standards of living. For the average Lebanese, this is one of the hardest places to live. You can neither do what pays, because you haven’t been equipped, nor can you compete in the unskilled or semi-skilled professions because the standards of living are too high. And that is why vocational training and education are critical.

Speaking of unequal opportunities, is the lack of progress in improving the business environment excluding marginalized groups from participating in the formal economy in Lebanon?

This is very important. The more you deregulate entry for start-up businesses, especially small and medium enterprises, which are the ones that are most employment generating here, the more you create opportunities for employment, formal employment, which gives more protection to workers and has a snowball effect. In contrast, if you have high minimal capital requirements, then many of the businesses will stay in the informal sector. They will not be able to borrow, to expand, to pay taxes, which gets you into a vicious circle of the economy not growing and public finances not improving.

Another problem which Lebanon faces is the fact that it ranks internationally among the top violators of intellectual property rights. To what extent does this act as a deterrent to investors?

To the extent that Lebanon wants to move into the information age and the high-value added economy. In India, about 5000 to 6000 workers in Bangalore are producing about a third of all of India’s foreign exchange earnings, just because of the tremendous growth of the IT industry. Lebanon is so well positioned to enter that area. If it updates and reforms intellectual property rights and puts in the IT infrastructure, it can benefit a lot from it. Many countries make money out of piracy, but that’s not what Lebanon is about. Given Lebanon’s human capital, it needs to make the leap into becoming one of the producers of intellectual property, not one of the countries that live off piracy.

Closely related to this issue is the prospective of Lebanon joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), which the government hopes will happen in 2005. Is the country ready for it?

Lebanese business are ready for it, in the sense that there is a business acumen, an entrepreneurship that allows Lebanese businesses to excel anywhere in the world. My concern is whether Lebanon can bring the cost structure of doing business down. As long as these procedures, which we have been talking about, are prohibitive, as long as the cost of power is the way it is, as long as telecom is so expensive, as long shipment and agro-processing is costly and delayed and inefficient, Lebanese businesses will be greatly disadvantaged. Again, it’s about putting in the systems that will allow businesses to compete. It’s not about the innate ability of Lebanese businesses to compete with European businesses. If anything, I think lowering the barriers will allow for greater innovation.

Lebanon of course, also suffers from its external environment – the instability of the region, which affects investments into MENA as a whole. What impact do you think recent regional developments, most notably the passing of UN Resolution 1559, will have on the country?

These recent events have thrust Lebanon onto the international scene, which means that what the country does or doesn’t do is much more noticed today than it was yesterday. This poses both a challenge and an opportunity for the country. If the next government is a decisive government that takes strong actions on consolidating the freedoms in the country, protecting them, enhancing the transparency and accountability of the government, improving the business environment, taking concrete steps on the macro-economic level to put the country on a more sustainable path towards growth and debt reduction, this is going to be noticed, and noticed very favorably. If it turns out to be a government that is unable to take any serious action towards fundamental social and economic problems, and if it is perceived as even moving back on Lebanon’s uniqueness, which is its freedom, that will be registered as well. We are hopeful and the World Bank will be very active in continuing its support and will work with any government that comes in, to assist it in enhancing Lebanon’s performance and thereby it’s image in the world.

October 1, 2004 0 comments
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Interminable terminal

by Executive Contributor September 28, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

The saga concerning the private jet terminal at the Beirut airport continues. The new terminal was supposed to open its doors last June, but until now it has not. “We are facing technical problems with the air conditioning and lighting,” said Samir Fakeh, head of the Civil Aviation Department. “The system does not function as it should.”

Fakeh was not able to indicate the exact nature of the problems, nor was the SNAM contracting company responsible for the overall finishing of the 120,000 square meter terminal, which hosts eight VIP lounges, a 300 square meter shopping area and restaurant. No retail space has been rented out yet.

The building took some two years to construct and forms the backbone of a $33 million investment to better facilitate the growing fleet of private jets flying to Beirut. So far, 13 private jet companies from Europe and the Arab world have handed in requests to rent space at the new facility. Despite the delay, none of them has canceled yet, said Fakeh. Still, he would have liked to tap into the busy summer tourist season. He was unable to give an estimation of possible losses, which may run into hundreds of thousands of dollars.

An indication of possibly the real reason for the delay came in Fakeh’s answer to when the facility might open. “Maybe in September,” he said, “but maybe we’ll have to wait for the presidential elections to be over.”

Fakeh did not want to go into further details. It’s no secret, however, that differences in opinion over the second mandate of President Emile Lahoud have paralyzed much in the country. The new VIP facility appears to have fallen into the stagnation trap due to the ambient political rivalries. And like many other sectors, the opportunity costs are swiftly mounting.

Speared by roadwork

From August 3 to 17, the main artery leading to the Murr Tower from Sanayeh and the Hamra district, Spears Street, was closed. As a consequence, many shops were forced to close down temporarily. A leading victim was the Barbar sandwich outlet, which had to close for two weeks, sending home 85 employees and reporting an estimated loss in sales of some $100,000.

“For 23 years Barbar never closed,” said Abed Serwan, the manager of Barbar’s Spears outlet. “But now we did not have a choice.” Serwan complained that for one year there has been work on Spears Street almost every month. Unlike its outlet in Hamra, the Spears outlet depends more on drive-by customers.

Other shops, mainly small groceries and souvenir shops, are estimated to have suffered losses of roughly up to 70% during the period of roadworks. Mustapha Yamout, who runs a tourist pension on Spears, also said that in the past year there have been eight major works and at least 20 minor ones. “Couldn’t that have been done in a more efficient way?” he asked.

The works on Spears are part of an overall project to refurbish some 90 streets in Beirut. “The whole infrastructure for sewage, water and electricity needed changing, after which the road needed re-asphalting,” said the engineer in charge of the operation, William Debs, who works for Elie Selwan contracting company.

According to him, “people always complain,” even though normal procedures were followed in an attempt to reduce discomfort to a minimum. “So, normally we always work on one side of the road, keeping the other side open to traffic.”

But why close Spears Street in the middle of the tourist season? “According to the traffic police,” Debs said, “there’s less traffic in summer, as schools and many offices are closed. Also, the municipality asked us to work during school holidays.” So are the works finished? “We need to put just one more layer of asphalt next month,” Debs said. “But that’s only one night of work.”

Politics and pension funds

The creation of a viable social security net in Lebanon inched a step forward as the cabinet adopted a plan for a national pension project, under which retirees would receive continuous monthly pension payments and be insured for medical services. If passed into law, the plan would gradually replace the one-time end-of-service indemnity payments scheme managed by the National Social Security Funds (NSSF).

The plan’s provisions stipulate that participants can receive pension payments after a minimum employment of 20 years, during which the retiree and his employer would contribute a total of 12.25% of the retiree’s salary: 5% deducted from the salary and 7.25% payment by the employer, up to a salary ceiling of $3,340. Employers would also be responsible to pay a contribution to their employee’s retirement health insurance, amounting to 5% of the salary without a ceiling.

Participation in the scheme would be mandatory for all new employees entering the job market (more than two-thirds of the Lebanese workforce is younger than 35) and all those currently enrolled in the NSSF who were born after 1969. Working persons born before 1969 may participate on a voluntary basis, on condition they do not withdraw their end-of-service indemnity and will have at least 20 years of insured employment at their retirement.

Pension advisors and insurance actuaries Muhanna group, who drew up the pension project for the Lebanese government, set the minimum monthly pension at $120, based on an employee earning a minimum salary of $200 [CORRECT?] over 20 years of membership in the scheme. If he or she is registered for 40 years, the minimum monthly pension would be $240. [CORRECT?] Under the model, a person starting to contribute at a salary of $600 and average annual salary increases of 3% would reach a pension of $642 after 30 work years, or 44% of his final salary.

Given the political stakes involved in the plan (and it was largely depicted in the local media as a defeat for Speaker Nabih Birri, who has considerable influence over the NSSF), debate over the plan is far from complete and adoption of the plan in parliament is anything but certain. After being passed into law, it would take at least two years to implement the scheme.

When Black isn’t beautiful

After an absence of almost 40 years, Chivas Regal has returned to the Lebanese market. But the whisky that was once the by-word for sophisticated drinking is now having to slug it out with the lesser brands in promotion wars fought in the aisles of Lebanon’s supermarkets.

Sales Manager Isabelle Dahan said Chivas intends to become a major market player within three years. What that effectively means is that it hopes to overtake Johnnie Walker Black Label as the market leader – an ambitious undertaking since Black Label currently controls 70% of the deluxe whiskey market and sells for roughly $2 less. The remaining 30% is currently split between Dewar’s Ancestor’s (15%) and a handful of other brands, such as Dimple’s.

Naji Hammoudeh, business manager for KFF Food & Beverage, which distributes Dewar’s, said he expected Chivas to gain a 20% to 30% share of the deluxe market within two to three years. “The domination of Black Label will be significantly reduced,” he predicted. Black Label distributors Diageo didn’t comment.

Chivas Advertising Director Carla Zoghby refused to reveal the amount of the brand’s advertising budget. Dahan declined to reveal sales since the product’s relaunch at the beginning of August, but she said Chivas was being sold “everywhere,” even in corner shops.

Chivas is being promoted through a widespread billboard campaign, as well as in newspapers, magazines and cinemas. Female promoters have also been positioned at various points-of-sale, armed with brochures. So far, Chivas distributors NEXTY are not offering promotional gifts. But, Dahan conceded, they may.

Zoghby dismissed the suggestion that billboard advertising might damage Chivas’ deluxe brand image. “Chivas is a legend,” she stated. At the same time, Dahan acknowledged that below-the-line promotion was never good for brand image, but said that in a market in which other players had embraced the practice, Chivas had no choice but to follow suit.

Little progress after Allawi

The recent visit to Lebanon by Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi produced little in the way of progress on three pressing economic issues: the fate of $500 million deposited by the previous Iraqi regime in Lebanese banks (now in the custody of the central bank); alleged losses incurred by Lebanese exporters who say contracts with Iraq, or Iraqi trade pledges, were not honored once the war ended; and the drastic drop in Lebanon-Iraq trade because of security concerns, which were accentuated by the harassment and kidnapping of truck drivers and businessmen, some of them Lebanese.

For example, the Port of Tripoli has registered a 50% drop in Iraq-bound trade, while road transit from Lebanon to Iraq has plummeted by 70%, denting any optimism generated by Lebanon’s $197.1 million cumulative balance of payments surplus for the first five months of 2004.

“Up until now, there has been nothing on the economic issues,” said Fadi Abboud, president of the Lebanese Industrialists Association. Although the oil, gas, transport and currency sectors were all discussed, observers said Allawi’s visit was primarily of a political nature, designed to improve diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon on the one hand, and Iraq on the other. “As long as the security situation in Iraq remains as it is, nothing will be done with respect to the economic matters discussed during Allawi’s visit,” Abboud added.

“I don’t think the issue of the Iraqi deposits will be resolved in the near future,” opined economist Kamal Hamdan. “It will depend on the political situation in Iraq. We may have to wait for elections there, and a legitimization of the political structure.” Hamdan predicted that Lebanese exporters would, eventually, be compensated for actual contracts not honored by Iraq. But he said that Lebanese exporters hoping to be compensated for investments they claim they undertook in response to informal import agreements could be disappointed, in part because of the difficulty in verifying such claims.

Italian furniture, made in Lebanon?

Lebanon has untapped potential to serve Italian furniture makers as a manufacturing base for medium-range lines for the Middle East market. Paying a visit to Lebanon, the president of the Italian federation of wood, cork, furniture and furnishing manufacturers, Roberto Snaidero, told Executive that he is envisioning increased collaboration between members of his association and Lebanese enterprises.

To open more opportunities for Lebanese companies for joint ventures with Italian furniture producers and manufacturers in general, Snaidero organized meetings with industry leaders here and in Italy. “As the president of our association, I now want to go deeply into this matter here in Lebanon,” he said. “This process cannot be resolved in the short term but it is important to begin. I think it is important for us and for Lebanese companies.”

Developing the skill base of engineers and staff in partner firms here would be essential, while large investments would not be a guarantee for success. “Lebanon is not a big market and some countries around it cannot buy the top class of furniture. We have to move into these countries with medium-range furniture, so we can start with investments in the range of $1.5 million to $2 million,” he said.

He pointed to Snaidero Middle East, a kitchen manufacturing joint venture between the Italian Snaidero Group and local partners (Indevco) as a model for such partnerships. Snaidero Middle East, established in 1995 with an investment of $1.3 million in equipment and training, succeeded in marketing its products in 14 countries of the region and today contributes 5% to 6% to the total turnover of Snaidero Group, according to Maro [OR MAURO?] Matiussi, general manager of Snaidero Middle East. “We estimate to have around 10% market share in Lebanon, which we estimate makes us leaders in Lebanon and in the region as a whole,” he said.

Banking on religion

Islamic banking products continue to rise in market appeal, with international and regional banks working to meet demand. The latest Sharia-compliant financial tool to be made available to Lebanese and Middle Eastern investors is the HSBC Amanah Global Equity Index Fund. Launched last month as the first index tracker fund to invest in the 100 largest Sharia-compliant companies by market capitalization, the fund is a product of HSBC Amanah, the Islamic financial services division of leading global banking group HSBC.

Buyers can participate with a minimum of $5,000 in the fund, which is designed to provide them with long-term appreciation of capital through investment in a portfolio of worldwide listed equities that meet Islamic standards. These standards mandate, among other requirements, that companies under investment not be involved in activities such as gaming and alcohol, which are forbidden under the tenets of Muslim faith.

Demand for Sharia-compliant banking products among customers of HSBC Lebanon has been increasing consistently and amounts to “a lot,” confirmed a spokesperson for the bank, who declined, however, to give figures on either the number of private banking clients at the bank’s Lebanon branches or the exact demand for Sharia-compliant products among its customers.

Meanwhile in the local market, Beirut-based Al-Baraka Bank announced that it is opening four new branches. The bank, which operates under Islamic principles, had seen several years of minimal activities in Lebanon until it undertook a restructuring beginning in 2003.

Eating goes upwards

With the number of tourists entering Lebanon reaching an all-time high, business has been booming for Beirut’s retailers and restaurants this summer. Cafés and eateries in the Beirut Central District reported an average increase of some 30% compared to normal year-round sales, and a general increase of 5% to 10% compared to last year. Serge Kirbeh, however, manager of Asia rooftop restaurant, reported a 30% increase compared to the annual average, even though he added that “last year was better.”

Restaurants in other parts of town did well too. George Khoury manager of Amore in Verdun, a traditional hotspot for Arab tourists, reported an increase similar to last year of some 35% compared to spring figures. The management of the Blue Elephant in Raouche estimated July turnover to be up 25% compared to last year, and no less than 200% in August, “thanks to an intensive advertisement campaign.”

But it is not just restaurants that are doing well. “Every summer sales are up some 60%,” said Jihad el Murr, managing director of Virgin Megastore, “not just because of Arab tourists, but also because of the Lebanese who return for holidays.” Most retailers in the downtown reported a figure similar to the ones in the restaurant business.

Likewise, most shops and retailers in the Verdun area experienced a 25% to 30% increase in sales, while lingerie, souvenir and clothing shops in Hamra reported an average increase of some 25%. Though Arab tourists did visit the ABC shopping mall in Ashrafieh, it seems it has not yet become their favorite hangout, as most shops reported an increase of no more than 20%. A comparison with last year is not possible, as the mall only opened its doors six months ago.

Closing the St. Georges blinds?

“We can’t keep the blinds open” said Fadi Khoury, chairman of the once magnificent St. Georges Hotel. “They will be able to see me and I can’t risk that.” After more than a decade of fighting, often very publicly, with Solidere and the Beirut municipality, both in the courts and in the press, Khoury initially comes off as determined to press ahead with his vision of reconstructing what was once Beirut’s, and the region’s, star attraction for the rich and famous. “I will not sell out, never!” he told Executive.

While the last two scraps have kept up the image of Fadi the fighter, the culmination of so many years of battling has clearly left him fatigued even as he pulls out map after map of what has, for him, been an exhaustive exercise in the complications, contradictions and “injustices” of Beirut’s rebirth.

Khoury acknowledges that the long-running saga on rebuilding the St. Georges has also taken its toll on his personal fortune. Several years ago, the authorities ripped up the hotel’s berths that were bringing him an average of $1.5 million in annual boat docking fees. Shortly thereafter, he had to endure various municipal obstacles to fully operating his beach club – his main source of revenue. Now, he says, “My revenues have been cut to so little. I have virtually no way to make a profit.” A pathway to the oceanfront, a reduced sea wall, his old piers and permission to build are all that he wants, he says. The crusading sound bytes of public space, “just compensation” and “anti-monopolistic development” would all stop there – he is, after all, a businessman.

As he adjusts one of his many remote cameras from his desk to close in on what he calls an illegal Solidere office trailer near the St Georges, Khoury adds, softly, almost to himself, “I don’t know how long this can continue.”

September 28, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

It’s a hard road to economic health

by Tony Hchaime September 1, 2004
written by Tony Hchaime

In a highly publicized speech at the end of July 2004, Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Nasrallah Butros Sfeir called on the government to review the minimum wage in Lebanon (which currently sits at $200 per month, 40% lower in real terms, than the minimum wage of 40 years ago) and pleaded for improved living conditions, which are pushing thousands of Lebanese to seek new lives abroad.

Sfeir’s call for economic reform came on the heels of headlines splashed across the front page of leading newspapers that almost 90% of the Lebanese population falls below the internationally recognized poverty line – a statistic, released in the wake of Mercer Consulting’s equally gloomy March 2004 survey, which ranked Beirut as the 37th most expensive city in the world, the only city in the Middle East (aside from Tel Aviv) to place in the top 50. Beirut, it said, was more expensive than San Francisco, Frankfurt, Munich, Prague, and Athens.

There is some doubt as to how the particular economist came to this figure, because by global standards the fact remains that Lebanon is a middle income country, while 20% of the world’s population earns less than $1 per day. Still, the average income per capita stands at $4,500 per year, or less than $400 a month and if the average person spends a mere $10 per day on food and drink, 75% of the monthly income is already depleted, and this is not including an allowance for gas and transportation, utility bills, schooling, housing, medical care, and other household expenditures. Apart from low income earners, there is also the crippling unemployment rate, which has reached staggering proportions in the past two years. According to recent economic publications, unemployment hit 20% by the end of 2003, which translates into one fifth of the whole labor force, or around 350,000 Lebanese citizens. The unemployment problem is aggravated by the fact that there are a high number of foreign workers filling low-paying jobs.

So, with spending needs for the average Lebanese exceeding monthly incomes by up to 75%, most people are forced to mortgage their cars, homes, or other possessions. Seeing such a high demand and necessity for borrowing, banks were not slow to respond to this demand. With interest rates at around 12%, this is tantamount to kicking a man when he is down.

Based on total non-commercial lending figures from Lebanese banks, and the latest estimates of the country’s population, the average Lebanese carries a debt burden of $1,710, which is sufficient to cover only an additional $140 of spending per month. Still, bank borrowing has not reached the magnitude expected, considering such low levels of income, mainly because of numerous credit facilities offered on most, if not all, consumer goods.

But with lackluster economic growth plaguing the country for almost seven years and little or no GDP growth, it is certainly a wonder why the cost of living has become so high. One explanation lies in the economic policy instituted by Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and Finance Minister Fouad Siniora. After years of growing public debt and recurrent large budget deficits, Hariri desperately needed to come up with new ways to improve government finances. Not much could be done on the expenditure side, at least not without stalling infrastructure works, which led to the government’s two-ply plan to increase government revenues: taxation and broad privatization and securitization.

Numerous attempts to implement a privatization and securitization plan failed over and over again and so taxation became the ultimate tool to offset part of the high interest paid on the debt in the form of municipal taxes, value added taxes, taxes on telecommunication, taxes on (often unreliable) utilities, airport taxes, taxes on deposits and interest, taxes on energy sources with sky-rocketing costs, and the list goes on. At current taxation levels, between 20% and 40% of any bill paid on any type of good or service in Lebanon goes towards government taxes. Typically, around 40% of a post-paid cellular telephone bill is taxes. However, the level of taxes is not the only problem – the way the tax system is structured forces many Lebanese to pay taxes even if they are not generating income. In that regard, the Lebanese taxation system forces business developers to pay taxes on every dime spent on establishing a company or buying a store, beginning with construction, licensing, decorating, and lasting for months, and maybe years, before they even start operating. Another expense burden for the average Lebanese has been increasing gasoline prices. With taxes and government fees constituting almost 75% of fuel costs in the country, and international fuel prices more than doubling over the past two years, it was only a matter of time before people took to the streets in outrage this past May and June. The result? The government capped the price of a 20-liter tank of gasoline at LL22,300, of which over 75% still goes to the government in the form of fees and taxes.

Such an increase in energy costs has created a domino-like effect on prices of consumables throughout the nation, as rising transportation costs have filtered down to various necessity products. Although no official inflation figures are disclosed, financial and economic experts place the annual inflation rate in Lebanon at close to 5% in 2003 and 2004.

But, as if that were not enough to daunt the majority of the Lebanese population, electricity costs are at record levels in Lebanon, matching some of the highest rates in the world, but failing to match their quality and reliability. Furthermore, high-income Gulf tourists have been flocking to the country in massive waves over the past three years, resulting in a sudden spike in demand for housing, clothing, and food and beverages, which leads to corresponding increases in prices across the board – or, in other terms, INFLATION. The ultimate victims of such developments end up being the local residents, which (a) do not contribute to the price increase, (b) do not benefit from increases in income levels, and (c) still have to purchase these, now more expensive, necessities.

With such dire economic conditions facing thousands of university graduates at graduation, it is of no surprise to see a rising trend in the emigration of Lebanese graduates, as it is becoming increasingly impossible to find jobs, establish careers, build families, and secure enough income to live an average life with only the most basic of necessities. So yes, Beirut is certainly an expensive city to live in. But while Lebanon is far from being the only country in the world facing economic woes, the difference remains that governments in most other countries respond to the needs of the people by either providing subsidies, easing taxes to stimulate economic growth, raising the minimum wage level, or imposing regulations for cost of living adjustments, which would allow companies to compensate workers for any significant increases in the cost of living. In Lebanon, however, the lack of economic growth should, “in the opinion of the current and recent governments,” be compensated by raising taxes.

September 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Just like mama used to make

by Anthony Mills September 1, 2004
written by Anthony Mills

Naji Khairallah, owner of Fattoria del Sole (Factory of the Sun), Lebanon’s only producer of Italian cheese, prefers to preface the good news by recounting the bad. The story begins in 1997, when Khairallah, who had spent 30 years in Italy as an interior designer, and an Italian business associate were having dinner in a Beirut restaurant. “We asked for fresh mozzarella and the waiter brought us the yellow, imitation kind,” Khairallah recalled. “We thought: why don’t we set up a mozzarella factory here?” And so it came to pass. In its heyday, five years ago, Fattoria del Sole used to produce 20 different kinds of FORMAGGIO including MOZZARELLA, PROVOLONE, RICOTTA, and PECORINO. Khairallah employed 36 staff and turned over $50,000 to $55,000 a month. Then came disaster. Khairallah’s Italian partner was imprisoned for conning a Lebanese bank out of $1 million in bad checks. The factory had to close down for three years – during which Khairallah was hounded by debt collectors and lawyers, and lost a sizeable portion of his $500,000 investment.

There was however, a bizarre twist. While serving his three-year sentence, Khairallah’s former partner made friends with a fellow inmate who was due for release. The ex-partner told the inmate that he was appointing him director of Fattoria and ordered him, upon his release, to go to the plant and take over control from Khairallah. “One day, a guy shows up here, and without saying good morning orders me to hand over the keys of the plant and my car. I said: ‘Who are you?’ He said: ‘I am the new director, appointed by the Italian in jail.’ They were in the same cell together. So, I hit him. He came back 11 times, and each time I hit him. And then I closed down. The police came here 11 times and took me away. From the first time, I told him: ‘Every time you set foot here, I will hit you.’ But he kept coming back.” “I lost money and customers,” acknowledged Khairallah. “When we opened again, it was very difficult to reintroduce ourselves to the market. All the customers thought we might close again. We are still making up for the three lost years. It’s very hard. They were the worst three years of my life.”

Since the factory reopened in 2002, the battle to regain lost momentum has been an uphill one. Today, Fattoria employs only around seven staff, produces only five or six kinds of Italian cheese because it no longer employs an in-house Italian cheese production specialist, and turns over less than half its pre-closure revenues. But Fattoria del Sole is back. And despite the turmoil of the past, insists the brawny Khairallah from behind a large wooden table in a makeshift kitchen inside the plant, the future is bright. “I can do the work of 10 men,” he boasted. “No one can follow my pace. People thought we would close again within two months. Now it’s been two years, and we are growing.” Today, Fattoria enjoys a 70% to 75% share of Lebanon’s mozzarella market and 40% of the country’s Italian cheese market overall.

Khairallah has drawn a line under judicial proceedings related to his former partner, who is now back in Italy (the money he conned the bank out of was never retrieved). Khairallah’s lawyer has convinced him that a court case brought against him by a bank demanding repayment of a loan taken out as part of the initial Fattoria investment will remain bureaucratically bogged down for 10 to 15 years. And he has taken out another 7- to 10-year, 5% interest, $400,000 small-to-medium-sized industry loan to finance Fattoria’s rebirth. Within the next four to five months, he predicted, the factory should break even. This year, the plant is selling twice as much mozzarella and ricotta as a year ago. Revenue for 2004 is projected to grow by 40% over 2003. “I’m not worried,” he chuckled.

However, Khairallah tempers his optimism. “In the current economic environment, our strategy is to grow slowly,” he said. Fattoria has not resumed exporting – before its temporary closure, about 10% of its products were channeled to foreign markets. “It is important for us to grow again domestically. Then we can think about exports,” Khairallah said, noting that Lebanon has one of the highest per capita dairy product consumption rates in the world. Khairallah said he expected the market for mozzarella and ricotta, at least, to grow, but admitted that they only constitute 5% of the cheese market. “A lot of people don’t know what mozzarella, ricotta or provolone is,” he said. And any attempt to increase awareness of Italian cheese in Lebanon would have to rely on substantial advertising, Khairallah said. “I just can’t afford to do that.” Asked if he thought he would ever be able to sell Italian cheeses to small groceries, Khairallah responded: “Absolutely not, even though the Italian cheeses I produce are not much more expensive than the Arab ones. They don’t understand the difference between good cheese and bad cheese.” Fattoria supplies only restaurants, resorts, hotels and supermarkets. Under the current cheese market conditions, Khairallah agreed, a factory producing only Italian cheese would not survive and so two months ago, Fattoria began producing Lebanese cheeses, such as halloum and akkaoui. “The market for Lebanese cheeses is bigger,” Khairallah conceded. But Khairallah is finding competition in the Arab cheese sector stiff, particularly in the form of cheap Syrian imports. He implied that Syrian cheese importers were benefiting from an unwillingness on the part of the Lebanese government to protect Lebanese cheese producers. “It’s a pity that here in Lebanon we promote the interests of other people ahead of those of the Lebanese. Competition is not fair,” the Fattoria boss grumbled. He pointed to his high overhead costs – electricity, fuel, and telecommunications and compared them to Syria, where they are much lower. And he observed that while Lebanon allows Syrian cheese imports, Damascus has barred cheese imports from Lebanon. “It’s politics,” Khairallah remarked resignedly. He implied, as well, that some Syrian cheese importers might be compromising on quality. “I don’t understand how they can sell halloum at LL3,500 (about $2.30) a kilo,” he said, and suggested that the situation was being aggravated by the government’s failure to enforce quality regulation.

Another problem is the lack of regulation: of the 150 to 160 dairy factories in Lebanon, only about 25 have a license, according to Khairallah. The unlicensed ones are able to produce cheaper, inferior-quality cheese. And certain dairy factories in the Bekaa Valley use cheap, imported Syrian milk to produce cheese, putting plants like Fattoria – which uses Lebanese milk – at a further disadvantage, Khairallah said.

He said his Arab cheese market share wasn’t even 1%, although he expected the figure to grow because Fattoria’s low-salt Arab cheeses were attracting ever-more buyers. Fattoria keeps the salt content of its products down in part so they can be sold as light and healthy to an increasingly health-conscious clientele, but also, because according to Khairallah, there is a general demand for low-salt Arab cheese.

For the moment, Fattoria is still the only producer of Italian cheese in Lebanon. Khairallah doesn’t expect a domestic competitor anytime soon. He argued that this was because the necessary investment in machinery was prohibitively high. But in a country in which successful schemes are quickly emulated, the absence of Italian cheese-producing copycats may be a sign that not everyone shares Khairallah’s faith in the business. Fattoria must, however, compete with Italian imports – such as imitation (processed) mozzarella, which Khairallah plans to begin producing soon. It will be sold for use on pizzas and mana’eesh, and will allow Fattoria to tap into a market that is creating demand for between 1,500 and 2,000 tons of imported imitation mozzarella cheese a year. Fattoria mozzarella sells at less than half the price of Italian imports, and is better, because it is fresher, Khairallah said. “Imported mozzarella has a shelf life of one-and-a-half to two months. It’s not fresh. It contains preservatives. Our mozzarella has a shelf life of 10 days, and our ricotta five. We don’t add anything.”

Except perhaps, a bit of Lebanese determination.

September 1, 2004 0 comments
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Society

Sex and the city, Beirut style

by Anthony Mills September 1, 2004
written by Anthony Mills

This year, record numbers of Gulf Arabs came to Lebanon. They came for our cooler temperatures, terraced cafés, chic shopping, beaches, and late nights. They came to turn heads with flashy cars with tinted windows, shiny credit cards and designer clothes. They came to drink openly (or discreetly) in bars, clubs, restaurants, and cabarets. And they also came for sex. And while they were, on the whole, satisfied with what they got, some did complain that there weren’t enough hotel rooms, that the food and service in many restaurants was substandard, that telephone calls were scandalously expensive, that Lebanese shopkeepers were charging them outrageous prices, that the country’s internet service was ineffective, that water shortages were too common, that something had to be done about the traffic jams, that the shopping was better in Dubai, and that there were too many prostitutes in the hotels. But hey, you can’t have everything.

For their part, the Lebanese publicly celebrated the record arrivals and rejoiced at the funds that would funnel into the economy. But privately, they complained that the (mainly GCC) tourists, although cash-heavy, didn’t spend that much, quibbled while shopping and taking taxis and were unpleasant and disrespectful to the Lebanese who serve them, while a significant number sullied Lebanon’s honor by chasing anything in a skirt (or trousers). “Dealing with Gulf Arabs is unlike dealing with anyone else,” said one exasperated luxury hotel employee. “We can’t check them out before four, because they don’t get up before then. Cleaning up after them is a nightmare. They spill drinks, scratch the floor, and ruin the furniture. Once, they covered one of our most beautiful suites in narguileh smoke. They even covered the smoke detectors up and had a barbecue.”

But Abbas Mohamed, a 42-year-old UAE banker in Lebanon for a month with his wife and two daughters, said he and other Gulf Arabs were not always being treated decently either. “In Bhamdoun and Aley, 70% of restaurants are below standard. They place greater emphasis on the number of customers than on quality,” he said. “The shops increase prices to ridiculous levels for Gulf Arabs,” charged another disgruntled Gulf tourist, sitting on a bench in the new Ashrafieh ABC shopping mall (where curiously enough many of the outlets were on sale). Lebanon’s shopkeepers claim that over the last few years, the Gulf Arabs have become even more reluctant to spend like they used to. “They aren’t spending blindly, like in the eighties,” said Ziad Annan, director of the new Rolex showroom in the downtown. “Nowadays, they are a lot more careful.” Others disagreed. “It’s ridiculous. They sleep on money,” mocked a taxi driver. “They don’t respect us,” complained another. “They spend a thousand dollars on a hooker and won’t give us a dollar.”

He has a point. One 22-year-old “businessman” from the UAE, who had just emerged with two friends from a custom-made reflective silver Audi glinting in the afternoon sun, said his nine-day shopping bill would run at around $50,000. He and his friends are staying in a four-storey palace, complete with its own chefs, and have had another three vehicles flown over for their visit – a Mercedes MacLaren SLR, an SL55, and a Bentley. Some hotels reported bills of $500,000, settled directly by the guests’ banks. A prince staying at one luxury hotel was spending in excess of $100,000 a day, said a hotel employee. Jewelry has been the big-ticket item this summer. When EXECUTIVE visited Chatila jewelers to ask about summer business, one customer was inquiring about stones worth millions of dollars. Other Beirut jewelers confirmed that over 90% of buyers were Gulf Arab women, who when alone might spend a paltry few thousand dollars, but when accompanied with their husbands would shell tens, even hundreds, of thousands. “After all, the husbands are the bank,” quipped one jeweler. Another popular outlet is Abdul Samed Al Qurashi’s House of Aoud, Amber and Perfumes in the downtown, where vials of rare scents can fetch thousands of dollars, and a kilo of Indian amber retails for $35,000. Also fashionable are the $31,500, VERTU diamond-encrusted cell phone and the ever-popular Rolex watches – although gophers, sent to buy the prestigious Swiss time pieces for clients sleeping off the excesses of the previous night are politely sent away. “We don’t sell to pimps,” said the director of the Rolex showroom. But the pimps sell to others; and it is the world’s oldest profession that has stolen the show this summer. The big money has, and always will, go on the hookers.

“Our hotel has changed. All we need is a red light above our door,” complained an employee at one of Beirut’s most luxurious hotels. It was now impossible, she said, to control the flow of prostitutes in and out of the hotel. She claimed that the staff, such as housekeepers and valet parking employees, were providing prostitutes, pimps and drivers with the room numbers of single, male Gulf Arabs, who are then solicited by phone. Security guards, in turn, were being paid to let the prostitutes into the hotel. A taxi driver outside the hotel said drivers regularly arranged prostitutes for guests. “They say: ‘I can arrange anything for you’,” he said.

“I have seen this hotel change,” said a 29-year-old Kuwaiti tourist sitting in the lobby. “Over the last two years, it has gotten much worse.” He said prostitutes now roamed the hotel corridors, loitered in lifts, and knocked on the doors of single male guests, ostensibly by mistake, to make contact. “You can see them in the lifts. They are wearing tight clothes. They look at you in a certain way, eye you in certain places. They move from room to room, knocking on doors. Then they pretend they have made a mistake, but get talking to you. They say: Are you Ali? I say: I can be Ali, or whoever you want me to be.”

“Sometimes I have a massage,” he conceded. “And I take the ‘extra’ massage. After all, the massage must be perfect. You don’t cut something off half way through. But no sex,” he added quickly. He said he did frequent Super Nightclubs – cabarets at which meetings with prostitutes can be set up for the following day – every night, but only to relax and drink screwdrivers.

Two years ago, security wouldn’t let prostitutes into the hotel, he added. Now, he confirmed, they were doing so, in return for a cut of the prostitute’s earnings. Sometimes, he claimed, security would also solicit money from the prostitute’s client. They had done so to him. An employee of the hotel acknowledged that prostitutes operated in the hotel. “The reputation of the whole area is suffering. It is happening in all the hotels. But at the end of the day, it is a source of revenue for the country.”

An 18-year-old Saudi tourist standing next to his bright red Chevrolet Lumina in a downtown side street said he will spend around 20 nights in Super Nightclubs, and routinely meets prostitutes the following day – feeding a roughly $17,000-a-month holiday bill. Along with beaches, high-end nightclubs like Cassino, Crystal and Tempo, and the free flow of his favorite alcoholic drink, Black Label, Jounieh’s Super Nightclubs are the prime attraction in Lebanon, he admitted. The Super Nightclubs he frequents are packed with Gulf Arabs of all ages, many of them drinking, he said. Behind the wheel of a giant jeep he’d been hired to drive by Saudi tourists, a Lebanese driver spoke angrily of the shame brought upon Lebanese women who cater to the sex tourists. He claimed there was particular demand for virgins.

“Every night, the guys I drive around spend until six in the morning in the Super Night Clubs, drinking,” he continued. “They’ve been doing it for five weeks. They go to Jounieh, Kaslik, or Maameltein and spend thousands of dollars on prostitutes. It’s a shame Beirut has become a whorehouse.” He said that minibuses full of prostitutes pass by the Ain Mreysseh hotel strip, stopping just up the road. “Scouts” for wealthy clients then peruse the occupants, choosing those deemed satisfactory. “They cost $600 to $800,” he said.

A tourism ministry official, who asked not to be named, shrugged off the complaints: “Yes, [some] people, especially from the Gulf, come here especially for [sex]. But this kind of tourism is everywhere. And we have other things as well, like eco-tourism.”

For some Gulf Arabs, a trip to Lebanon also means enjoying a few drinks, but although they are emboldened by Lebanon’s more liberal mores, most drinkers prefer to be discreet. “They drink beer out of teapots, or whisky out of glasses wrapped in cloth. Sometimes, they leave their families at the table, come to the bar for a couple of beers, and then go back to the table,” the downtown restaurant employee noted. “It’s not the Lebanese they’re concerned about. It’s the other Gulf Arabs.”

Plus ça change.

Box

Bhamdoun’s mayor, Osta Abou Rejeili, likes to see himself as something of an enforcer. And while Lebanon’ sex trade may be booming elsewhere, he insists the mountain resort of Bhamdoun is strictly family oriented. “They know what will happen if they set foot here,” says Abou Rejeili, sitting a restaurant from which he surveys the town’s main shopping street, two-way radio in hand. “We have made it clear through action in the past. The road to Bhamdoun is blocked for people seeking prostitutes. There is not a single bar or Super Nightclub in Bhamdoun.” While he became uncharacteristically coy about what action had been taken in the past against suspected prostitutes, Abou Rejeili is nonetheless determined to maintain the secure family environment he says is the secret of Bhamdoun’s success in attracting ever-increasing numbers of Gulf tourists. He has employed a host of undercover security officers to safeguard an atmosphere, which allows women and children to stay out safely late at night. A few weeks ago, an undercover squad observed a man verbally harassing a female tourist. “He got what he deserved,” declares Abou Rejeili. “They didn’t break his neck, but they roughed him up real good – not a little bit – real good, in front of everyone, to set an example. Then he was handed over to the police, and deported. We mean it. We will never allow anything to disturb our way of life here. We are on full alert. Our eyes and ears are everywhere.” Abou Rejeili acknowledges that his undercover forces had no written mandate to act as law enforcement officials and detain, let alone “rough up” troublemakers. But he says he had a verbal understanding with all the security services allowing his forces to act in such a manner.

Other forms of “unacceptable behavior” are also not tolerated. “One guy was walking along with his elbows out. He nudged a girl. I stopped him. I said: ‘Keep your arms down. This is a public street.’ If someone is walking along in a tank top, we ask him to change. If he’s carrying a beer we ask him to go and drink in a café.”

On the street, the effect of Abou Rejeili’s security regimen is palpable. A 46-year-old Saudi tourist, in Bhamdoun with his family for the 6th or 7th year running, said: “Saudi Arabia is very safe. But it is even safer here. I feel as though everyone is a policeman.”

September 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Beware of stockbrokers bearing gifts

by Faysal Badran September 1, 2004
written by Faysal Badran

In November 2003, EXECUTIVE predicted that the revival in stocks would prove ephemeral (‘Happy Days?’, November 2003), stressing that technical and even fundamental factors would prevent a genuine new bull market from developing out of the ruins of the old. Furthermore, the dizzying move up from October 2002 appeared to be mostly a corrective move up within a secular bear market. After a sharp speculative blip in 2004, the stock indices have rolled over showing negative returns for the year, and leaving many Wall Street analysts and most economists quizzical. The reality is hope of recovery does not a recovery make. In fact hope, in matters of money, is a fatal ingredient.

What we are witnessing now is the return of the bear market in full force. Pundits and most commentators, especially ones that want to take your money away, seem focused on many issues to highlight that in their view, stocks are a decent investment at these levels. They go through a litany of reasons, and the talking heads of CNBC attempt to reinforce these views on a daily basis. Once again, do not believe the hype and look at some current themes, which seem dear to the hearts of those who advocate investing in stocks with reckless abandon and focus on the technical aspect of the market – ie, looking at the internal dynamics of price, volume, and sentiment. In that area, it’s quite simple: price has broken down, volume is abysmal, and sentiment is still way too hopeful that help is on the way. All three major indices are below their key 40 week moving averages. The recent Google IPO goes a long way to show that, despite the reduced pricing range, people are still keen on bubblenomics. As has been written AD NAUSEUM, for stocks to be truly making a long term bottom, the speculative juices need to be all but gone, investors should not be afraid to buy, valuations need to be at historical bargains, and there should be technical support. None of these factors exist, not by a long shot. With regard to arguments of valuation, a picture is worth a thousand words. The four charts depict various measures of valuation of stocks versus historical norms, going back in some cases to the early 1930s. As you can clearly see, we are nowhere near a level, which can be considered a bargain; in fact, we seem to be in a “Bubbble II” phase. Many things seem to be missing from the argument that the US economy is improving. It has long been held that the economic recovery was unsustainable and would begin to fade once the massive stimulus from fiscal and monetary policy receded. That appears to be what is happening now as evidence of widespread economic weakness continues to accumulate. While the vast majority seems so certain that we are merely going through a “soft spot,” the recovery may be faltering more seriously than expected. While the rising price of oil is being singled out as the major villain, it is more likely just a catalyst that is exposing an economy that was already beset with major structural imbalances that made a normal recovery cycle untenable.

The evidence of softening is no longer anecdotal, but is now widespread. Consumer spending was down 0.7% in June and up only 1% in the second quarter. June retail sales were down 1.1% and down 0.2% ex-autos. Year-over-year chain store sales in July were up only 3.1%, the lowest in a year. Mortgage refinancing that resulted in hundreds of billions of dollars of cash-outs are more than 80% off last year’s peak. July employment was up only 32,000 while the June number was revised down to 78,000 from 112,000. More importantly, in 32 months of recovery since the official recession bottom employment gains have exceeded 200,000 in only three of these months. If this were an average recovery, the monthly average increase should have been about 322,000 per month for the 32-month period. In addition, wages and salaries have made up an unusually low percentage of disposable income, meaning that consumer spending was heavily dependent on non-wage sources of income such as capital gains, rising home prices and tax refunds.

The list goes on and on. GDP was up 3.0% annualized in the second quarter, the lowest of the last five quarters. Construction spending was down 0.3% in June after rising 0.1% in May. Non-defense capital goods orders, excluding aircraft, were down 2.8% in the three months ending June 30. The Conference Board leading indicators were down 0.2% in June, while the smoothed annualized growth rate of the ECRI weekly leading index was up only 0.1, down 9 percentage points since April. M2 growth on a year-to-year basis was up only 3.5%, the slowest in nearly a decade. June industrial production was down 0.3% in the US, 0.7% in Italy, 1.3% in Japan, 0.3% in the UK, and 1.9% in Germany. These nations account for 60% of world GDP. The fragility of the economy is a result of the structural imbalances left over from the late 1990s bubble. These include the twin trade and budget deficits, the extremely low consumer savings rate and record consumer debt. These imbalances were not only uncorrected, but were actually exacerbated by extremely aggressive monetary and fiscal action since that time. With the stimulation winding down, the fragile economy is sensitive to any outside negative catalysts that come along. One cannot deny the importance of oil prices to the economy – considered the straw that broke the camel’s back – and that the current economic malaise is due to the underlying structural imbalances, which need to be resolved before a truly sustained recovery can get underway. While oil is obviously important, and short-term market movements have mirrored oil prices, any substantial decline in energy prices will not produce anything more than a brief rally. The irony of the current stock market situation is that with the market completely focused on oil prices, the possibility that such prices could peak and decline may have actually discouraged further selling, and may have kept stocks from collapsing. After all, if the Street believes that oil prices are close to a peak and the economy is in fine shape, why sell stocks? In this sense, it is a lot easier to blame the depressed market situation on a temporary oil price rise than to face the fact the economy has serious secular problems that are not subject to easy solution.

One of the most dangerous arguments, or advice, being put forward to encourage people to buy or stay in stocks is that there are no alternatives, and that cash is trash. The best way to address this point is by pointing out that most meltdowns in stocks (most recently the Japanese Nikkei collapse from 1989) occurred during a period of falling interest rates, and when the perception was that cash is not rewarding. Cash is not trash, it is the most relevant asset class in the current environment, especially that bonds are not too safe from a real, inflation adjusted, rate of return point of view. As for all you Nasdaq lovers, comments by tech managements are so numerous and so much alike in their analysis of conditions that the disappointments have to be industry-wide rather than company specific. From a technical perspective, see the chart below. Individual investors should play it safe, as stocks are highly vulnerable and the downside shock could occur at any time.

September 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Vex, lie and videotape

by Michael Young September 1, 2004
written by Michael Young

Arguably the best-publicized political-cultural phenomenon of recent months has been the release of Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11, a pseudo-documentary whose purpose, the director, has affirmed, is to remove President George W. Bush from office. While there is much to dislike in the film, from its tendentiousness to its glaring non-sequiturs, it is one of those works that raises a host of disturbing questions about the boundaries of free expression.

The first is whether a film openly touted as a political bludgeon can be a reliable statement on the Bush administration’s policies toward the war on terrorism and Iraq? While documentaries need not be impartial toward their subject matter, they do enjoy an atypical veneer of objectivity by virtue of their supposedly filming reality. Fahrenheit 9/11 was provided the added advantage of being awarded the Palme D’Or at Cannes, effectively endorsing the film’s artistic credibility. But is this credibility merited? Partisans on either side of the Moore divide will not convince each other of the worth or worthlessness of so divisive a film. However, there is one benchmark that both sides must be sensitive to: the internal consistency of the film. And by that yardstick, Moore has failed: in the first half of his film he posits that the Bushes have been in the Saudis’ pocket for years (an allegation initially made by journalist Craig Unger in his House of Bush, House of Saud, while in the second he traces the administration’s entry into the Iraq war. The two are implicitly linked in Fahrenheit 9/11, yet Moore never examines whether the relationship is legitimate. In fact, he cannot overcome a flagrant contradiction: if Bush is a Saudi stooge, why did he go into Iraq, a move the Saudis found deeply alarming, and that was to a large extent designed to wean the US off the Saudi oil teat?

Moore provides no explanation, and the absence of one has led critics to pan the film as “propaganda.” But the marketplace does allow propaganda (after all what is advertising?), though it also encourages an informed public to differentiate between the truth and lies. Has the American public been discerning? According to a recent poll by McLaughlin and Associates, a conservative polling firm in the US, a majority of likely voters didn’t have to be, since 87% of them (from a sample of 1,000 respondents) had not even seen Moore’s film. Nor was that just because Bush supporters boycotted Fahrenheit 9/11 in droves. Of likely John Kerry voters, a very high 78% had also not seen the film, while 81% of Nader voters had not either. In other words, even among the electorate that embraces Moore’s message, Fahrenheit 9/11 had a limited impact. A second aspect of Moore’s film that has raised alarm bells is his often-manipulative depiction of individuals he doesn’t like, or of the implied villains of his tale. At the start of the film, for example, Moore shows Bush and various other administration officials in embarrassing situations, usually while grooming themselves for a television appearance. Most famously, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz is shown sucking a comb so that he can plaster down his hair. While the shots are amusing, they are also cheap, since no one ever looks good in the hands of a political foe. However, that’s fair game in a propaganda film. Far more disturbing is the way Moore depicts the Saudis. He plainly pushes negative cultural buttons in his American audiences with regard to Arabs. In a commentary on the film, Turi Munthe, the Daily Star’s book editor wrote: “A long sequence in the central section of the film is intended symbolically to show how the Bushes and their men have metaphorically made a pact with the ‘Saudi devil,’ as Moore runs in succession two-dozen clips of George W. Bush, his father and their advisors shaking hands with brown men in Keffiyehs.”

For Munthe, there “is not a single ‘good’ Arab in the film, barring the charred bodies of Iraqi women and children who serve only as anti-Bush scarecrows.” For him the Arabs in Fahrenheit 9/11 are victims of friendly fire, “the kind that essentially kills the very people it is intended to cover.” There is truth there, as anyone who has seen the film can confirm, though Moore would deny it. Yet in his anti-Bush crusade he is single-minded in his destructive ambition, where all weapons, even the manipulation of cultural hostility, is acceptable. But is it acceptable? Even admitting it is, and many would disagree, the 12% of voters who have seen the film would do well to do what any market imposes: learn more about the product to see what part of it is counterfeit.

September 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

On the edge of oblivion

by Nicolas Photiades September 1, 2004
written by Nicolas Photiades

Fitch, the powerful international rating agency, warned in July that Lebanon risked being downgraded if the government failed to act on its much promised monetary reforms and privatization, the two conditions that determined the Paris II donor conference. While the first condition has been more or less met, the second has been postponed ad vitam eternam, while politically, a consensus of complete stagnation has been reached, and will remain, until after the presidential elections.

So, while the Lebanese party through the summer, the bottom line is that the country is still teetering at the edge of the abyss and remains the laughing stock of the international capital markets and investors. Its B- rating is shorthand for the fact that we are one step away from default and collapse.

Lebanon’s credit rating (which determines the country’s ability to repay the principal on its debt and service interest) has stabilized to B- (by Standard and Poor’s) and B2 (by Moody’s) since 2002. When the country was rated by these international rating agencies for the first time in the mid 1990s, the rating was not significantly higher and was below investment grade anyway, at BB- (S&P) and B1 (Moody’s). As of 1994, when Lebanon became a successful and frequent bond issuer, the necessity for a credit rating was imperative. International investment banks and the global capital markets needed a rating in order to accurately price the bond issues that were sold to institutional investors world-wide, and benchmark them against issues made by other countries.

Lebanon’s sovereign credit rating is one of the lowest of the world. Indeed, only Bolivia, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela have a similar rating on S&P’s scale, while Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Paraguay are rated below B- at CCC and selective default (SD) levels. The remaining 106 rated countries all have credit ratings above B-, including Mongolia (B), Pakistan (B), the Philippines (BB), Ukraine (B), Benin (B+), and the Cook Islands (B+). With a higher credit rating, these countries can borrow slightly more cheaply than Lebanon, which is at the top end of the table in terms of credit risk. Lebanon’s B- rating signifies that the country “generally lacks characteristics of the desirable investment” or is a country where “significant credit risk is present, but a limited margin of safety remains.”

As we all know, the reason for Lebanon’s low rating stems principally from its large fiscal deficit and public debt burden, which accounts for more than 180% of GDP and is the highest amongst rated countries. The fiscal deficit, at above 10%, is also regarded as high and has not shown signs of going below the 10% mark for some time. Furthermore, the country’s external financing or liquidity remains heavily strained, despite the Paris II. Lebanon has not delivered on its promises and therefore cannot expect aid from foreign governments and institutions such as the World Bank or the European Investment Bank. Moreover, the central bank is believed to have little if not negative net foreign exchange reserves, which can only be replenished with external, non-debt, capital inflows.

Another reason for the country’s low rating is the uncertainty surrounding the government’s ability to generate additional revenues (despite the introduction of the VAT) and diversify the economy. But the most serious reason, which triggers a negative reaction from rating agencies, is the political infighting that has been plaguing the country’s economic reform efforts for more than six years and which has brought about a substantial drop in confidence from international investors. In other words, the outside world sees Lebanon as having too much debt, insufficient revenues and lacking political will. The rating agencies see Lebanon’s strategy to raise funds to finance its fiscal deficit as backfiring. By raising public debt to unsustainable levels, the government has become highly reliant on attracting investor funding to Lebanon, and has also become extremely vulnerable to external conditions. Indeed, if the world’s capital markets experienced a downturn and the flavor for emerging market debt once again disappeared, the government would not easily be able to turn to local banks, saturated with Lebanese government debt securities. This financial flexibility will then be substantially weakened, and the credit rating may then go below the single B bracket. The most immediate and obvious consequence of a low credit rating is the high cost of borrowing for Lebanon. International capital markets determine the price of indebtedness (or the level of interest) according to how risky the borrower is, and the credit rating assigned by internationally recognized and accredited rating agencies, such as Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch, is used by these markets as the symbol that distils all credit information into a single letter and as a benchmark, according to which pricing is determined. Lebanon’s B- rating means that the cost of borrowing is extremely high, not only for the government, but also for the whole economy, which has to align by the benchmark set up by the government’s rating. If Lebanon is downgraded further, the cost of borrowing for the state would increase by 200 basis points (2%). Therefore, Lebanese Eurobonds would carry a coupon of around 520 basis points (5.2%) over US Treasuries, compared to the current spread of 340 basis points. If on the other hand, Lebanon were to reach the holy grail of investment grade (probably not in our life time) and get upgraded to BBB level, it would pay 200 basis points less than it currently pays, or a spread of around 140 basis points over US Treasuries (similar to Mexico, which is rated BBB- by S&P). Simply put, the government would have more money to channel into growth projects. At the moment, the high cost of borrowing, coupled with the high level of indebtedness has forced Lebanon to direct most of the country’s revenues into debt servicing, leaving virtually nothing to fund badly needed growth projects. The low credit rating firmly embeds Lebanon amongst the world’s third world countries, and puts the country on an equal footing with some pretty mediocre nations.

An even worse case scenario would be the discontinuing of the country’s rating, which would cause the cost of borrowing to shoot up to astronomical levels. Raising funds at whatever the cost would be extremely difficult, and the global capital markets would completely marginalize Lebanon. We would be the Phnom Penh, rather than the Hong Kong, of the Middle East.

So what to do? First and foremost, the country needs to establish political stability. Rating agencies loathe politically unstable sovereigns and have frequently stated that Lebanon needs to establish a consensus within its fragile political coalition. The public and investors alike need to know that there are no more political conflicts within the ruling coalition and that there is a clear and firm intention to carry out an efficient recovery program. Second, social stability must be solidified. The strengthening of democracy and transparent governmental efforts to create jobs and slow down the country’s brain and youth drain are vital. The government today is ignoring this issue and is focusing instead on fiscal and monetary economics. Ignoring social economics has been a major error.

Third, Lebanon must navigate skillfully in very rough regional and international diplomatic waters. The regional environment has never been worse, and the country cannot afford a faux pas if it wants to carry out an efficient fiscal, monetary, and social economic adjustment program. Fourth, the Lebanese government must finally carry through on its promises to revive a moribund privatization and reform program. Until now, Lebanon has been sluggish at best in its attempts to carry out privatization. As regards to the latter, the timing is awkward: emerging market initial public offerings (IPOs), an essential method through which a successful privatization is made, are virtually dead, whilst strategic institutional investors are either not attracted by the Lebanese market or simply have too many problems of their own to contemplate investments overseas. In addition, factors such as divisive domestic politics, the unclear and most often deteriorated financial situation of companies to be privatized, labor union staunch resistance and endemic disputes between the government and the rare foreign bidders, make privatization an insurmountable task.

It is therefore vital for the government to start using securitization tools to restructure public entities that are candidates for privatization, in order to make them more attractive to increasingly choosy foreign bidders, and carry out successfully a couple of privatization transactions. This would kick start the privatization program in a serious manner, show a clear political will, and bring in much needed cash into the coffers (the partial privatization of the telecommunications and the electricity sectors could very well bring in revenues in the range of $2 billion to $3 billion).

Last but not least, the Lebanese government should actively explore the growth route. A clear option for the Lebanese government is to grow itself out of a debt trap. The rating agencies always preach for the diversification of revenues and for the protection of cash flow. Lebanon has lost sight of its growth-orientation and has focused more on fiscal and monetary economics. The introduction of the VAT and attempts to boost the tourism sector are moves in the right direction, but remain insufficient. The government should seriously tackle the strengthening and the restructuring of existing inefficient sectors to further boost government revenues.

The communication of a clear political will and commitment as regards to privatization and securitization to the world financial community, the execution of a large, immediate and transparent privatization, and more importantly the immediate halt in the political infighting and the announcement to the world’s diplomatic community that all is well within the triumvirate, are merely quick ingredients for a small upgrade. However, the BDL’s monetary tools have bought the country some time, but are insufficient and cannot be sustained without parallel reforms and privatization. However, the BDL could also crack down on inefficient banks and restructure and “specialize” the financial sector, and get permission to use the idle $4 billion worth of gold reserve (either sell it partially or obtain cheap funding with it as collateral). These are only the immediate steps that need to be taken by the Lebanese government, in order to stabilize the current rating situation. If carried out efficiently, together with the provision of much needed financial aid, Lebanon would probably move up a few notches on the rating scale. But it would take much more efforts by the country in the long-term to attain the elusive investment grade rating (BBB).

You have been warned.

Nicolas Photiades is an independent financial adviser on financial, capital optimization and strategy.

September 1, 2004 0 comments
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The bigger picture

by Yasser Akkaoui September 1, 2004
written by Yasser Akkaoui

No matter how much it hurts to see the constitution tinkered with, the extension of the presidential mandate should not be our main problem. At the end of day, these minor maneuverings (and they are very minor) are inconsequential in the region’s grand scheme, one that is driven by the heady whiff of economic rewards for those who fall into line. Lebanon is small country with a big debt, a Middle East backwater, driven by self-interest. We are missing the bigger picture.

Whatever they might think, our politicians are not real players. There is not one who bestrides the regional, let alone world, stage, so let’s drop the posturing and get on with the job at hand: getting the country out of its economic misery by creating an environment of political cooperation and consensus and setting an example of hard work and selflessness.

Instead of arguing over whose people get what jobs, we should argue over how to draft the national economic recovery program. National unity should replace personal greed and a ministerial portfolio should be a privilege, rather than an opportunity to build a pension plan.

This is the only way to regain the confidence of the international community. They know our leaders are high-profile, low-caliber operators. They will not be impressed with the imposition of a new presidential term however competent the incumbent and they will want to see results –privatization, transparency and civil service accountability to name a few – before they grant further soft loans.

Lebanon went to the last donor conference in Paris, took the money and left. Paris III is now mission impossible. The international community, now bitten will be more than shy; it will be downright obstinate before Lebanon’s whiny supplications. If we were to stand any chance of getting help, it was going to take a wholesale shake-up of our political landscape and this does not look likely given the perpetuity inferred by the presidential extension, hence the need for a genuine demonstration of willing to correct our economic woes.

And let us not forget the likes of Fitch and Moody’s, which will be carefully scrutinizing their rating of Lebanon. Political infighting was always seen as an entry in the negative column. If it gets any worse in the light of this recent edict, they will no doubt be swift to act.

September 1, 2004 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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