• Donate
  • Our Purpose
  • Contact Us
Executive Magazine
  • ISSUES
    • Current Issue
    • Past issues
  • BUSINESS
  • ECONOMICS & POLICY
  • OPINION
  • SPECIAL REPORTS
  • EXECUTIVE TALKS
  • MOVEMENTS
    • Change the image
    • Cannes lions
    • Transparency & accountability
    • ECONOMIC ROADMAP
    • Say No to Corruption
    • The Lebanon media development initiative
    • LPSN Policy Asks
    • Advocating the preservation of deposits
  • JOIN US
    • Join our movement
    • Attend our events
    • Receive updates
    • Connect with us
  • DONATE
Business

Still seeking quality

by Thomas Schellen June 1, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Merger Ability

It is an accepted business paradigm that mergers can be instrumental in corporate growth, especially as positions in the top three companies are in many sectors associated with taking the lion’s share in total profits realized in the sector. However, the overall global picture shows that the majority of mergers are unsuccessful because they either fail outright or the financial savings of consolidation, mostly capital and expense synergies, are in the end not larger than the costs incurred through the merger. A crucial factor in the ability to acquire and integrate another company is determined by information technology and systems. Paul McCrossan, an international expert and consultant in merger negotiations among financial firms, told a Beirut seminar last month that in his experience, “a company with an excellent computer based administrative system can absorb another company one third its size with a similar product mix with almost no additional administrative staff – if it has a decent administration system.”

Banks in the alpha group have established good IT systems and automation levels, which would meet the requirement for technical administrative capacities that increase the ability to integrate a smaller bank.

Transparency of operations and openness of corporate culture are further factors seen as supportive of integrative abilities in a business organization, whereas the fixation of the entity on a single dominant individual as top decision maker is regarded as a potential obstacle.

For the record, a full nine of the 12 banks in the lead of the industry have accomplished acquisitions of smaller banks. Byblos Bank, SGBL, Bank of Beirut and Fransabank have the strongest track records for completed mergers and acquisitions in the last five years. Before shouldering the responsibility for building the Audi-Saradar group, both parties to the rapprochement had succeeded in absorbing smaller banks. Banque de la Méditerranée, although it does not prioritize presenting the public with a transparent view of its balance sheet figures and processes to the extent practiced by its peers, also has the systems and proved its ability to integrate a smaller bank into its group by buying Allied Business Bank in November 2001. Credit Libanais, which had undertaken two acquisitions in 1994 and one back in 1977, picked up the business of the American Express Bank in Lebanon in June 2000. These often-quoted merger waves and their sector-purging effect not withstanding, experts contend that the institutionalization process of Lebanese banks has been uneven and describe personality-centric management cultures in at least two big banks as obstacles standing against maximization of benefits from mergers, both potential and actual. From negotiations over assimilation of numerous small banks into larger ones in the past 10 years, it is also evident that the acquisition candidates –specifically because of lacking financial transparency but also owing to vanity issues on part of owners – have presented difficult negotiation partners.

Corporate governance

A critical qualitative category, and major buzzword in management seminars, is corporate governance. Although the level of corporate governance has improved over the past decade in all leading banks and human resources strategies have been implemented, experts view the level of institutionalization and corporate governance achievements in Lebanese banks as still lagging behind international standards. Good internal communications are crucial for achieving a high-quality corporate governance and strong identification between employees and bank. Proactive Lebanese banks have moved towards open door policies and open communications structures. In several major banks, however, employees admonish that communication fails in terms of reciprocity. Especially performance reviews are strictly one-way processes, top-down, and evaluations of their superiors by employees are missing from the corporate culture. Talking to Executive in confidence, banking insiders with many years of experience in operations and middle management raised further serious questions on the progress of corporate governance (see box).

The positive outlier in terms of achieving a corporate governance quality that is comparable to good, although not the top internationally achieved levels is Banque Audi, with Bank of Beirut and SGBL also mentioned by analysts and consultants as advanced on the path to fulfilling institutionalization.

Business Community Relations

The business community interactions between a bank and society are of two main categories, relations with customers, peers and business partners, and fulfillment of corporate social responsibility. Customers, who are the life of the bank, are treated generally with more courtesy and professionalism than in the mid nineties, when retail banking was traipsing precariously onto new grounds of customer relations. However, banks still get less flattering remarks when it comes to taking proactive roles in understanding and responding to customer needs. As ample anecdotal evidence from business and retail banking clients shows, customers still feel that banks are difficult to deal with, often bureaucratic, and less accommodating in practice than in their advertising projections.

The term corporate social responsibility (CSR) attaches a strategic quality to the contributions an enterprise makes to the community. CSR has been a concept on steady global advance for some 10 years. From large multinationals to niche entrepreneurs, corporations are emphasizing CSR as a core aspect of their identity and adopting the practice of publishing dedicated CSR reports. Lebanese banks by and large do not yet carry an emblematic CSR identity. However, banks are among the most socially active enterprises in Lebanon. Albeit showing a larger gap between local performance and international standards than for other qualitative elements, about half of the banks in the alpha group are perceived as more active than most in terms of contributing to their communities. What Lebanese banks generally have been lacking in, was adoption of specific areas of concentration and development of track records in pursuing a relevant CSR agenda and consistent activities, whether in ecological, social, educational, cultural or inter-communal dialogue. As an epitome in every assessment of quality achievements in the non-balance sheet dimension of Lebanese banks, one guiding thought should accompany the reflection on the status quo and continued strife after excellence: banking is a serious business but it is up to all stakeholders to put money matters daily into the context of the living qualities and inalienable truths that endow the entire play of funds and finances with value. A drop of humor, perhaps even self-irony, goes a long way in keeping the serious from falling dead serious.

Fair Game?

Unfair payscales and a glass ceiling are holding back the advancement of employees

Salary fairness, evaluation procedures and equal opportunities are still tender spots in the corporate culture of Lebanese banks. Although bank employees have, by national standards, an exceptional average income, the high total salaries over costs ratios at banks camouflage huge income gaps. Three to 4% of the workforce benefits from, by Lebanese standards, very large salaries, said an insider. A division head in a big bank can take home $150,000 in annual compensation but another executive in the same division, who holds near identical qualifications and responsibilities, but with a slightly lower position, would be paid no more than $30,000 or $40,000.

When no performance bonuses and incentives are paid, as was the case in several banks in recent years, motivation to provide outstanding service diminishes. Talking among themselves and to friends, increasing numbers of employees also express high frustration levels because they are aware of the exact financial gains that their work contributes to the bank but see their salary increases as disproportionately small in comparison to their productivity. This job dissatisfaction on the branch level can be exacerbated if local managers are perceived as under qualified. According to banking analysts, some branch heads are paid not because of their managerial skills but hold their positions solely on the basis of their pull as ranking members in the local township, which the bank regards as essential for attracting customers from the community. Banks accomplished opening the career ladder to women up to the middle and some upper management positions. The echelons above those levels, however, have thus far remained closed. “Are Lebanese banks ready to appoint a woman to the post of chairman or general manager? Certainly not today and not tomorrow,” said a senior female corporate loan manager in the upper ranks of a major bank, who deals with companies above $5 million in turnover. If a woman is both highly qualified and outspoken, her stand in the acquiescence driven and male-dominated Lebanese business environment is decidedly tough. “I am not a ‘yes person;’ that is why I have a lot of problems in my professional life,” she said, “but sex discrimination is not as obvious as some other forms of discrimination. If someone says that there is no religious discrimination in the banking workplace, they are lying.”

June 1, 2004 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Business

Q&A: Saad Azhari

by Thomas Schellen June 1, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Relying entirely on organic growth of their business, BLOM Bank carried the baton of leading the Lebanese banking sector in terms of assets for more than two decades. As the creation of the Audi-Saradar Group is exerting consolidation pressure at the top of the sector, EXECUTIVE wanted to know how BLOM Bank views recent developments and if the bank is changing its strategies. EXECUTIVE asked and BLOM vice chairman and general manager, Saad Azhari, answered.

As the leader in the Lebanese banking sector, you have seen a new group emerging besides you, a competitor of regional format. How does that affect your plans and ambitions?

Our policy will not change, in terms of looking that we have a strong bank, that our assets are good assets, and making sure that our shareholders always get the best return. BLOM Bank has an important size in the Lebanese market and we achieved this in continuous internal growth over 40 years, which allowed us to contain costs. Our level of cost to income is extremely low. That is why we have the highest return on our equity, and the lowest cost to income ratio. And that is why we have also the highest rating. We are the only BBB+ rated company by ratings agency, Capital Intelligence.

What do you regard as the key factor enabling you to reach market leadership?

We achieved this position of number one because of the confidence of our customers and we have been number for over 20 years, since 1981. Our customers believed that we provide security and a good service, and came to us because of that. We are still continuing to grow at a rapid pace and increasing our market share, as our figures for this year show.

Did merger and acquisition projects ever play a part in your development plans?

I cannot hide that there were a lot of merger discussions between us and other banks. Frankly, we found that elements that we require were missing: either the price was too high or the quality was not good. We would definitely not buy a bank just to grow. Some of the banks we discussed with, both foreign and local banks, have been bought by other banks.

How do you view mergers in Lebanon in terms of their benefits to the bottom line of the banks that went this road? 

Figures talk. Compare the actual present size of the banks that merged with what should have been their size, and look at BLOM. If you compare the risk profiles and look at profits of BLOM and the profits of banks that have merged, you will see that BLOM has the highest level of profits, even as it does not have the highest level of loans. Here you have high profit and low risk. What is better: high profit and low risk or high risk and lower profit? You judge for yourself.

If a new merger or acquisition prospect would enable you to ascertain the status of largest bank in Lebanon, would you pursue it more actively than in the past?

No. Our strategy will not change. For any merger to happen, it has to be sure that the quality of our assets will not deteriorate and that it does not negatively affect the return to our shareholders. Those are the essentials for us. We want to stay a strong bank with the highest rating in Lebanon. It is also very important to us to be able to give a good service to our customers.

Would you consider a merger as means to facilitate regional expansion?

BLOM Bank is the Lebanese bank with the strongest presence abroad. We have a subsidiary in Paris, which has branches in London, Dubai, Muscat and Sharjah. We have an offshore in Cyprus and we have constituted a bank in Syria where we have management control. We are also opening a branch in Jordan. We are expanding wherever we think it is possible and interesting for us.

It is often said that Lebanese banks need to be stronger and considerably larger in size to successfully compete in the region. What is your perspective on this?

I think that the size of the banks in Lebanon compares well to banks in the region. Compare the size of Kuwaiti banks and Lebanese banks, for example. The assets and deposits in Lebanese banks are almost twice of those in Kuwaiti banks. The banking sector in Lebanon is number three in size in the Arab countries, after Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Lebanese banks are growing larger and larger and today have large asset volumes. For example, we ourselves have passed $9 billion in assets. Our size is large compared to the economy and with our shareholders’ equity; we are over capitalized when compared to the risks on our balance sheets. We already have a good size compared to the region, we are able to have a presence outside and we have the possibility to expand.

So you do not consider large regional banks as having a size advantage over BLOM and other Lebanese banks?

Many Arab and foreign banks have a presence in Lebanon. Lebanon is an open market, while some regional markets are closed to us. I think we have a future advantage as these markets are opening up. Jordan is an example. Before, we could buy a bank in Jordan but not open a branch. As this has now been allowed, we are opening a branch there in September of this year. Lebanese banks have important opportunities in the region and I hope that we will be playing a much more important role in future.

Where does BLOM set priorities for domestic development?

We at BLOM have seen important growth in corporate banking and also in retail banking. This is for specific reasons. Retail is still a developing sector, where all banks increased their activities. In corporate lending, big corporate names here were historically mostly dealing with foreign banks. Some foreign banks have already moved out or are planning to move out of Lebanon. BLOM saw this opportunity. Last year, we created a corporate unit and effectively grabbed an important amount of clients that used to deal with foreign banks, which either left or are scaling down their portfolio, mostly because of Basel II and the strategy of international banks to reduce their exposure to emerging markets. That is why our loan portfolio had a good growth in lending last year, even though the lending in the Lebanese market was generally stable.

What is your ratio of non-performing loans?

The non-provisioned non-performing loans stand at less than one percent, 0.5 to 0.6%.

How important are private and investment banking in your activities?

In Lebanon, private banking is generally very limited, frankly speaking. You cannot strengthen private banking much, especially because of the taxes that the government collects on interests on international bonds. The big private banking activity is done by our subsidiary in Geneva. We have an investment bank that is mostly specialized in medium and long-term lending. Corporate and retail are expanding at a faster pace than other activities, but we are working in all activities.

Have Lebanese banks improved as much in non-balance sheet capabilities and quality as they grew in terms of balance sheets?

The services given by banks have improved a lot over the past years. Before, you had to deal with three or four people at a bank branch, to undertake an operation such as depositing a check or transferring money. Today some banks, including ourselves, have a teller system, in which one person can facilitate your operations. Secondly, delivery channels and their variety improved a lot. Before, the only option was to go to the bank. Today you can use ATM, phone banking, internet banking, and the call center. In standard of services, Lebanon has arrived at a very high level in worldwide comparison. You cannot see this from the balance sheet but you can see it through the operations, dealing with the bank.

Do you expect the banking sector to continue its first quarter good performance in the remainder of 2004?

It will definitely not be an easy year, because the treasury bills that Lebanese banks had bought before Paris II, especially in September, October, and November of 2002, will all mature by end of 2004. Those treasury bills carried a high interest rate and banks hold a large number of them. The renewals will be at a much lower rate. Secondly, we have to put a legal reserve of 15% of our US dollar deposits at the central bank. A central bank circular in 2002 asked banks to deposit a certain level of their dollar reserves for two years with the central bank, at interest rates that first stood at 9% and then were lowered to 8.75 % at the end of 2002. These two-year deposits are all maturing and will be replaced at a much lower rate. Banks thus are definitely going to be squeezed on those interest margins.

How about deposits by Arab investors?

We are continuing to see an important growth of deposits coming towards Lebanon from Lebanese and Gulf countries, and the pace may be a bit higher than last year. This is a good sign of confidence. We are also continuing to see interest in different projects. I have recently been in Kuwait and met a lot of people who are interested to buy homes in Lebanon. And some of the big groups there want to undertake important projects here. The same is true for groups from Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.

So overall, your expectation for 2004 is for a smooth year?

In general terms, 2004 will achieve a good growth of deposits and assets for the banking sector in Lebanon. There is going to be more pressure on banks in terms of profits towards the end of the year, and perhaps there will be a slight decrease in profits. We will not see a repeat performance of 2003. It would be good if banks can achieve stability of profits, which is a little difficult. Banks are expanding and all banks are trying to increase their market share and there is more competition. Overall, I don’t see any troubles in 2004.

June 1, 2004 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Economics & Policy

Take a hike

by Faysal Badran June 1, 2004
written by Faysal Badran

Crude oil and its derivatives epitomize the notion that besides matching bids and offers, there often lies in the background a multitude of factors, which not only affect prices but also, and more importantly, the perception about supply, capacity, consumption and relative tightness/availability of the product. The movements in crude oil have been, to a large extent, a barometer of political and economic guesstimates – and the massive run up in prices will no doubt have an effect on the global economy. It is not so much the nominal level of prices that leads to alarm, but the trajectory and what prices are in effect “saying” about the future.

Since the Asian crisis of 1998, often a key data point in markets, prices of light sweet crude oil have quadrupled from just below $10 to nearly $42. The rise, from a technical standpoint, has been reinforced by several NYMEX closes above $40. While it is true that oil and other commodities have benefited from a surging Chinese economy, it is an aspect often de-emphasized, as the recent China numbers are utterly unsustainable and the true driver will be sentiment toward Middle East politics.

Oil prices still matter to the health of the world economy. Higher oil prices since 1999 – partly the result of OPEC supply-management policies – contributed to the global economic downturn in 2000-2001 and are dampening the current cyclical upturn (world GDP growth may have been at least half a percentage point higher in the last two or three years had prices remained at mid-2001 levels). Fears of OPEC supply cuts, political tensions in Venezuela and tight stocks have driven up international crude oil and product prices even further in recent weeks. By March 2004, crude prices were well over $10 per barrel higher than three years before.

Current market conditions are more unstable than normal, in part because of geopolitical uncertainties and because tight product markets – notably for gasoline in the United States – are reinforcing upward pressures on crude prices. Higher prices are contributing to stubbornly high levels of unemployment and exacerbating budget-deficit problems in many OECD and other oil-importing countries. In Lebanon, the situation and its impact at the gas pump has added yet another restraining factor to the Lebanese economy, and infuriated motorists.

The burden of higher energy prices places Lebanon in an even more vulnerable position in terms of the costs of “doing business,” and shakes the household spending patterns as more money is diverted to filling the tank. This has compounded the other issues facing the economy, be they punctual like the Euro rise, or structural like under-investment, lack of system credibility and massive fiscal imbalance. While it is true that policy can do little to counteract the rising cost of energy, such a shock, were it to continue, would amplify the layers of problems facing the country, and add to social angst. The addiction to gas guzzling SUVs may be coming home to roost, and taxi drivers can barely make ends meet.

Globally, the vulnerability of oil-importing countries to higher oil prices varies markedly depending on the degree to which they are net importers and the oil intensity of their economies. According to the results of a quantitative exercise carried out by the IEA in collaboration with the OECD economics department and with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund research department, a sustained $10 per barrel increase in oil prices would result in the OECD as a whole losing 0.4% of GDP in the first and second years of higher prices. Inflation would rise by half a percentage point and unemployment would also increase.

The OECD imported more than half its oil needs in 2003 at a cost of over $260 billion – 20% more than in 2001. Euro-zone countries, which are highly dependent on oil imports, would suffer most in the short term, their GDP dropping by 0.5% and inflation rising by 0.5% in 2004. The US would suffer the least, with GDP falling by 0.3%, largely because indigenous production meets a bigger share of its oil needs. Japan’s GDP would fall 0.4%, with its relatively low oil intensity compensating to some extent for its almost total dependence on imported oil. In all OECD regions, these losses start to diminish in the following three years as global trade in non-oil goods and services recovers. This analysis assumes constant exchange rates.

The adverse economic impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing developing countries is generally even more severe than for OECD countries. This is because their economies are more dependent on imported oil and more energy-intensive, and energy is used less efficiently. On average, oil-importing developing countries use more than twice as much oil to produce a unit of economic output, as do OECD countries. Developing countries are also less able to weather the financial turmoil wrought by higher oil-import costs. India spent $15 billion, equivalent to 3% of its GDP, on oil imports in 2003. This is 16% higher than its 2001 oil-import bill. It is estimated that the loss of GDP averages 0.8% in Asia and 1.6% in very poor, highly indebted countries in the year following a $10 oil-price increase. The loss of GDP in the Sub-Saharan African countries would be more than 3%.

World GDP would be at least half of one percent lower – equivalent to $255 billion – in the year following a $10 oil price increase. This is because the economic stimulus provided by higher oil-export earnings in OPEC and other exporting countries would be more than outweighed by the depressive effect of higher prices on economic activity in the importing countries. The transfer of income from oil importers to oil exporters in the year following the price increase would alone amount to roughly $150 billion. A loss of business and consumer confidence, inappropriate policy responses and higher gas prices would amplify these economic effects in the medium term. For as long as oil prices remain high and unstable, the economic prosperity of oil-importing countries – especially the poorest developing countries – will remain at risk.

The impact of higher oil prices on economic growth in OPEC countries would depend on a variety of factors, particularly how the windfall revenues are spent. In the long term, however, OPEC oil revenues and GDP are likely to be lower, as higher prices would not compensate fully for lower production. In the IEA’s recent WORLD ENERGY INVESTMENT OUTLOOK, cumulative OPEC revenues are $400 billion lower over the period 2001 to 2003, in which policies to limit the growth in production in that region lead to on average 20% higher prices. The hike of future prices during the past several months implies that recent oil price rises could be sustained. If that is the case, the macroeconomic consequences for importing countries could be painful, especially in view of the severe budget-deficit problems being experienced in all OECD regions and stubbornly high levels of unemployment in many countries.

Fiscal imbalances would worsen, pressure to raise interest rates would grow and the current revival in business and consumer confidence would be cut short, threatening the durability of the current cyclical economic upturn. Europe has felt the oil surge to a slightly lesser extent recently as the Euro has surged by nearly 40% against the US dollar, but further gains could be crippling, especially given the high tax structure prevailing in the continent.

Oil has also had a role in reflecting the weaknesses in US foreign policy. As such it represents yet another thorn in the side of the neoconservative establishment plans to effectively “rule the world.” One of the platforms of US policy in Afghanistan and the obvious hidden agenda in Iraq has been to secure the oil to satisfy the gas guzzling addictions of the US consumer. So far, the result has been an unadulterated disaster. Not only has oil continued to climb, but the recurring incidents in the Gulf have added a risk premium that had not existed before the Iraq adventure began. In sum, Bush and his oilmen in power are responsible for what promises to be the most expensive driving season in decades.

For developing markets such as Lebanon, where oil intensity is still high, the impact of higher energy has the effect of a large tax, which is acting as a drag on economic activity through a compression of disposable income. The net effect though, can be more mixed over the medium term, if the higher energy can be offset by higher growth in the Gulf and more remittances from Lebanese expatriates as well as more Gulf tourists. But that’s a long shot. The true impact is, in the short term, to choke further any sign of upturn in the Lebanese economy.

The following is a detached look at where prices can go based on the below chart. Unless crude oil can break back significantly below $36 a barrel, we are staring at stubbornly high prices, maybe toward $50. But since this is the most political commodity, and the effectiveness of OPEC at guiding prices is almost as ineffective as central bank currency intervention, prices will tend to overshoot before falling along with other commodities. The risk of prices staying high at this juncture stems from external factors – such as the total loss of control of the situation in Iraq, or worse, further unrest in the Arabian Peninsula – rather than from the notion of a booming world economy. The world economy, at best, has experienced a temporary lift, and will soon revert back to sluggish growth and sticky unemployment, providing a weak backdrop for most industrial commodities.

SUVS TAKE A BACK SEATBuyers turn to more fuel efficient, smaller engine automobiles as petrol prices continue to bite – By Anthony Mills

Hussam Batrouni, 24, manager of the Petit Café, only uses his eight-cylinder Ford Expedition at night – he is looking for a four-cylinder daytime car. Elsewhere, Kamil Roumieh, a 25-year-old inventory controller, has been forced to buy a modest a four-cylinder 1.4l Renault Clio. He used to have a bigger six-cylinder car but couldn’t afford to commute. He is one of the lucky ones. Many cars owners now find they are unable to offload their gas-guzzlers and are faced with crippling petrol bills of up to $500 a month. Other commuters are simply discovering the delights of taking the bus to work.

The government’s recent pledge to cap gasoline prices at LL25,000 (nearly $17) a 20-litre tank, must be of little consolation to Hussam and Kamil, who have seen petrol rates almost double in six years, as global crude oil prices climb to record highs in a country already plagued by stagnant salaries and general economic malaise. As consumer attention, in the roughly 15,000-car, $220 million market, shifts towards new, smaller, more efficient four-cylinder cars, overall demand for new cars has risen by almost 50% in a year (used car salesmen, for their part, speak of a 40% drop in sales). Today Size does matter.

“A year and a half ago, customers started becoming more gasoline-cautious. The name of the game used to be power. Now it is fuel efficiency,” declared Samir Homsi, president of the Association of Automobile Importers. The old theory was that bigger cars were better because they were safer. Tell that to T. Gargour & Fils – better known as agents for Mercedes – who are receiving increased interest in the diminutive, two-seater Smart car which, despite scoring impressive crash test results, looks like it would blow away on a windy day. The attraction is the car’s staying power: 500km per 20 liters of gas. “More and more people are asking about it,” shrugged Cesar Aoun, Gargour brand manager.

At the other end of the scale however sales of 12-cylinder super cars have not been affected as much as their six- and eight-cylinder cousins. “We haven’t seen much of an impact on high-end cars,” confirmed Kamel Abdallah, deputy general manager of Kettaneh, which imports Porsche, Volkswagen and Audi. “It is the middle segment that has shrunk most drastically.” One sales manager for a major distributor defined this shrinkage as a 60% to 70% slump in sales, a phenomenon that has not been helped by a strengthening euro, which alone has been blamed for a 20% to 25% hole in the market.

Sales may be up in the budget range, but importers are having to sell more of the smaller models to make up for the decline in sales elsewhere. “We have to work twice as hard,” acknowledged Abdallah, who will throw-in an airline ticket to Cyprus for every sale of the new Volkswagen Gol. Some dealers, under pressure to keep sales up, are resorting to disingenuous tactics. “Because the business has become so tough, some companies are bordering on unethical practices in their promotion, just to get around the tougher market and increase in prices,” said Abdullah. Certain dealerships – which he declined to name – were being dishonest, or deliberately misleading, about cars’ gasoline consumption rates. And, he went on, advertisements stressing low installment rates sometimes deliberately don’t paint the whole financial picture.

Elsewhere, in their effort to boost sales, importers are luring in customers with low-interest installment schemes and longer guarantees. “We are trying to facilitate everything for the client, so that they forget about fuel consumption,” one salesperson said.

At least 50% of Kettaneh’s car sales are through bank-financed credit. In tandem with rising petrol prices and a worsening economy the company has established joint programs with banks to promote sales. At the same time, this represents a conscious move away from in-house financing which was fast becoming an unsustainable risk. “The overall economic situation does not justify extending credit terms as we used to,” said Abdallah. “We are transferring our risk.” He was echoed by Ziad Rasamny of Rasamny-Younis: “Our target is to do less in-house financing and to rely more on banks.”

The association has also been imploring the government to reduce high customs taxes on cars, and heady registration fees, which are pushing up end prices and ultimately stunting importers’ efforts to sell. Importers stress that the newer, more fuel-efficient a car, the better it is for Beirut’s smog-filled environment.

Used car dealers, too, are shifting towards the smaller-engine market. “Before, the Lebanese liked to buy top-notch used cars with six, eight, even 12 cylinders. Today, an eight-cylinder used car is very difficult to sell, a six-cylinder one you can just about sell,” explained the owner of a car lot on the old Sidon road. “The best is four cylinders.”

June 1, 2004 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Society

Chain reaction

by William Long June 1, 2004
written by William Long

Given that Lebanon’s restaurant market is notoriously fraught with high costs, cutthroat competition and seemingly inane bureaucratic hurdles, it is of little surprise that some of the country’s best known franchises have struck out across the region, in what they say is an effort to not only grow, but to survive. However, with a much improved restaurant draft law moving forward, and with Lebanon still being seen as a vital area to base operations, the country could just be on the brink of experiencing some homemade growth in a sector that has already seen over $1 billion in investment since the hey-days of 1996.

“If we were not franchising in the region, or elsewhere, I would not see a long-term healthy business for Casper and Gambini’s in Lebanon,” said Anthony Maalouf, the director of franchise operations for Casper & Gambini’s (C&G), who, along with Kabab-Ji and Crepaway, is at the forefront of Lebanese franchises striking out of their home bases and into the more lucrative domains in the Gulf.

In the case of Kabab-Ji, expansion plans are even more far reaching. Toufic Khoueiri, the chairman of the Lebanese fast food eatery who just received the 2004 Lebanese Restaurant Franchise Award at the Horeca trade show in Beirut, recently embarked on a trip to the US to establish a beachhead in the US’ highly competitive, $400 billion restaurant market. “The strength of Kabab-Ji’s brand positioning within Lebanon will translate to similar brand strength within the US market beginning with the opening of its first prototype restaurant (as of now, set for the second quarter of 2005),” said a statement from the company. Of course, Khoueiri has reason to be confident. Kabab-Ji has been a spanking success in Lebanon since its opening in 1993. With nine restaurants in all now operating in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and of course, Lebanon – and with an expected 30 to 35 Kabab-Ji restaurants set to operate regionally by 2007, Khoueiri seems well positioned to take his recipe right to the doorstep of his US-based competitors. Khoueiri also has a unique position in the restaurant franchise market, as he sells a wide variety of traditional Lebanese food – something which, in the US, is a haphazard $1.8 billion market dominated by small, family run operations. For this reason, his competitors are eyeing Kabab-Ji’s first forays into the US market closely –his success or failure may represent either an incredible starting point or an unavoidable ceiling of growth for Lebanese restaurant franchises, many of which express their frustration over what they say are diminishing returns in their home market.

“We should be in Europe or in the States. That is the goal, our dream,” said Dory Daccache, Crepaway’s chief international officer, confirming what are the ultimate prizes in the restaurant franchising business globally.


The turn towards markets outside of Lebanon is, of course, an old story. With the familiar litany of complaints – Lebanon’s relatively high-fixed costs, small population, large number of restaurants and treacherous (not to mention, unpredictable) legal and administrative hurdles – all constantly rehashed in the press, it is easy to get the impression that Lebanon’s restaurant market is “saturated” and wholly un-supportive of new ventures. “The same effort you put in opening up in Lebanon, if put somewhere else is more lucrative and more rewarding,” said Khoueiri, who, like other owners, stressed that the real profit centers sustaining the core enterprises are the franchise operations outside of Lebanon.

According to Maalouf, with no corporate tax structure in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Lebanon levies a 15% tax on profits) and with a more rational bureaucratic structure, profit margins are between 20% and 40% greater in the region compared to Lebanon – a difficult range to beat. And yet, some observers are openly bullish about Lebanon’s restaurant market and on the potential success of even more homegrown franchises – especially if the country is able to get its administrative house in order.

Indeed, despite the steadfast convictions of some already operating franchises in Lebanon, the country seems to be in the midst of what Paul Ariss, president of the Syndicate of Owners of Restaurants, Cafes, Night-Clubs and Pastry Shops in Lebanon, calls “a boom” – although, formal statistics on the industry are not available.

“The restaurant business in Lebanon has been booming for the last eight years, despite the local economic situation and the limited number of tourists, who, in fact, visit Lebanon not more than 100 days a year,” said Ariss. “I believe that more than one billion dollars has been invested in the restaurant business since 1996. More than 4,000 institutions are operational, 70% permanently and 30% seasonally, creating jobs for more than 60,000 people.”

Ariss’ optimistic attitude is reflected, perhaps more cautiously though, by Sarah Abi Najm, a member of the franchise consulting group Solutions, which operates between the Middle East and Europe. “The current restaurants … are not doing as good a job as they could be to meet the demands of the market,” she said, noting that her consulting company is currently working to introduce more than 10 franchising outfits in Lebanon alone in the near future.

“The emergence of the BCD and Monot restaurants, pubs and discotheques have killed those institutions that are located in Jounieh and Broumana,” admitted Ariss. “But this trend is not a principle, since Aley has witnessed the emergence of more than 35 restaurants of all types. The true miracle is Batroun, which witnessed the birth of more than 30 restaurants and pubs since 2001, thus attracting thousands of local clients eager to discover new places and mainly pay lower prices.”

Despite the seasonal nature of some restaurant markets, tourists are indeed driving growth in the sector in a way that offers increasing revenues, and increasing encouragement to would-be owners. In fact, for the first time in 20 years, Lebanon attracted over one million tourists in 2003.

What’s more, with younger investors coming to the market – Ariss said that he believed most new investors in restaurants are now below the age of thirty – and with C&G predicting an 18 month window for returning an investment on a restaurant franchise, it is not surprising that most universities in Lebanon are turning out more and more hospitality management graduates. According to Ariss, there are now more than 50 hospitality technical schools alone in the country.

Of course, this is not to paper over the systemic problems facing the restaurant sector, or the franchising business more specifically. Indeed, Ariss, together with some sympathetic MPs and owners, are pushing hard for a sweeping overhaul of the 1960s era law governing restaurants and franchises. “The actual laws impose many constraints that represent a real obstacle and a formidable nightmare to investors,” said Ariss. There are two specific examples illustrating the outdated laws, according to Ariss. First every restaurant has to secure a certain number of private parking places for its clients, depending on the restaurant’s service area. If this cannot be done, a fee has to be paid to the municipality. In Beirut, for example, the fee for one parking space is LL30,000,000. Second, every new project has to get a building conformity clearance from the municipality. If the building is subject to a violation on any of its floors, the restaurant cannot obtain clearance unless the violation is cleared and all the fees are paid.

Since 1995, the restaurant sector has witnessed the emergence of more than 2,000 new restaurants, in all regions of Lebanon, but with the main investments done in Achrafieh, BCD, Monot Street and now in Gemaizeh. But as Ariss is quick to point out, many of these ventures have not been able to obtain their operating license from the ministry of tourism because they simply cannot comply with the arcane terms of the relevant laws (Daccache listed five separate ministries and five separate approval processes that are necessary to engage, in order to open a restaurant).

At the end of 2002, more than 50 restaurants and pubs in the BCD and Monot Street, who did have their licenses, were fined. It was after this incident, Ariss said, that movement really began to gather steam to reform the laws. “Our syndicate, with the cooperation of the Syndicate of Hotel Owners, established a legal team that reviewed the old laws and prepared a draft for a new legislation,” he said. “The project was presented to MP Salah Honein who submitted it to the parliament in May 2003. The committee of tourism in the parliament then established a sub-committee to study the law project and in mid-May [of this year], our syndicate, in close cooperation with all the tourism syndicates and Honein, submitted a final draft that will have to be discussed and adopted by the parliament.”

Although a deal has not yet been struck, after almost four decades of working under the same outdated regulatory structure, relief feels closer for Lebanon’s restaurant owners. According to Ariss, the new draft law has deleted what he said were “all constraints,” while simplifying numerous legal and administrative formalities and, significantly, adding many new concepts that are well-established worldwide – including time-sharing leasing and franchising.

“The aim of the proposed law,” said Ariss, “is to protect all tourism investments in order to attract additional investors, whether local, regional or international.” If this can be accomplished, and if demand expands with increased tourism and, hopefully, an improving economy, what can indeed be sometimes characterized as Lebanon’s commercial precipice may just be avoided all together. Just in case though, restaurant franchises like Kabab-Ji, Crepaway and C&G are still hedging their bets, focusing on growth outside of the country. “You know, I think Syria is a virgin market,” said Daccache. “I think Jordan is a virgin market, so there is room for new concepts, new ideas … Syria is now changing the financial rules. I believe that by next year all of these Lebanese chains will begin to open [there].”

With seven C&G franchises located in five countries across the region and a pending deal in the UK, and four Crepaway’s in the Middle East, with another in Qatar set to open next month, Khoueiri’s trip to the US comes at a high-point for Lebanese restaurant franchises – a point which many hope will only be encouraged by the international success of Kabab-Ji and others.

CashUnited

In Lebanon, CashUnited has turned the sometimes lucrative art of transferring money around the world into, well, money. Acting as the US-based MoneyGram’s exclusive agent in the country, CashUnited is now set to expand its franchise operations to other countries in the region.

“MoneyGram allows individuals to transfer money worldwide within minutes without the need of a bank account,” said CashUnited’s general manager, Philippe Dagher. “Our service is available in Lebanon through 130 agent locations in all the country’s regions.” According to Dagher, the “war on terror” and the new procedures which his company has had to comply with “have been implemented … [but] it hasn’t affected our business.”

Nor has the US brand name either. In fact, “business partners and customers usually conceive American companies as reliable and international,” explained Dagher.

As for future growth: “The need for immediate cash transfers is constantly increasing … so we forecast a constant yearly growth of 30%,” he said.

June 1, 2004 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Real Estate

Beirut’s sore thumb is 30

by Peter Speetjens June 1, 2004
written by Peter Speetjens

Thirty years ago, the Murr Tower was a metaphor for promise-filled Lebanon. The brothers’ dream was to build, through their construction company La Liberal, Beirut’s first mixed use development, symbolizing the capital’s position as the region’s leading business and banking hub. The 40-storey giant was to host 34 floors of some 300m2 offices, 2,500 m2 of shopping space and a restaurant on top, which could be reached by an exterior panoramic elevator or helicopter. The building’s four underground floors were reserved for a 500-seat-cinema and 600 parking places. The total cost of Murr Tower, including the price of land, amounted to some $15 million.

“I was against the whole design from the start,” says Gabriel Murr, sitting in his offices in the old MTV building. “I favored a wider, 20-storey building,” he added. “I thought the [300m2] offices were too small for foreign companies, the vertical circulation was insufficient and there was not enough parking. My brother [ex-interior minister, Michel Murr] preferred a high-rise. He was La Liberal’s majority shareholder and so he had the final say.”

The tower’s foundations were laid in late 1974 and construction started just before the outbreak of the civil war in April 1975. “We worked according to the “slid and slide” method, which allowed us to build about one floor or three meters a day,” said Murr. “When the war started, 28 of the 40 floors planned had been completed.”

Despite the fighting during the initial years of the war, La Liberal managed to finish the building’s main structure and the Murr brothers remained optimistic that their vision would see the light.

Even in the spring of 1977, Michel Murr estimated in an interview with AN NAHAR that the damage to the building was as little as LL100,000 [then roughly $230,000], and said: “If the situation continues to improve, construction will be over in a year’s time.”

It was not to be. When heavy fighting erupted again, construction was indefinitely halted in February 1978 and the Murr Tower became a feared sniper’s nest with an arc of fire of some two kilometers.

In 1994, Solidere bought Murr Tower, and earmarked it as one of the pillars of its master plan to renovate and reconstruct the Beirut Central District (BCD). “Solidere offered $12 million worth of Solidere shares for the building,” said Gabriel Murr, “after which Hariri paid my brother another $3 million in cash.” Since then, Michel Murr has publicly claimed the building is still his. Gabriel Murr said this has more to do with the performance of Solidere shares (which dropped from a high of $14 in 1998 to a low of $4 in 2002. Today, they have rallied and current shares are valued at around $7) than anything else. Both brothers expected to make a killing, but, Gabriel Murr, sold before the bottom dropped out of them. His brother held on as the price plummeted. Having bought the Murr Tower, Solidere had two options: to finish the building or to demolish it and start from scratch. Civil engineer Fadi Madhoun, the former manager of Solidere’s Real Estate Development Division, was responsible for the building. “If finished in 1975,” said Madhoun, who left Solidere in 1999 for An Nasser Engineering Services, “Murr Tower would have had a ‘wow’ effect. But when we bought it in 1994, it absolutely did not.” Furthermore, Madhoun cited a 1975 study by French firm Socotec that showed that Murr Tower suffered from a stability problem and required strengthening with two seven-meter-long concrete beams. “In my opinion, the Murr family should be very happy with the price it received, because the design was outdated and construction had several structural problems,” he added. “In 1994,” Madhoun continued, “it would have cost Solidere some $16 million to complete the building. Yet it was not a viable option to put it on the market. At that point, I would say the wisest, most logical and most economic solution was to demolish the building. However, from a political point of view that was not an option.”

An alternative had to be found and the call went out for solutions. Renowned British architect Norman Foster suggested to keep Murr Tower as a core embodied in a shell-like structure, thereby enlarging floor space up to 1,000 m2. The spectacular glass building was to have a curved roof and a dozen high-speed exterior elevators. But Foster refused to work within Solidere’s budget, so in came Canadian firm WZMH, with a worldwide reputation for high rises. The concept remained the same: to keep the old Murr Tower as a backbone in a predominantly glass tower. The only design change was to include interior, as opposed to exterior, elevators. Dubbed the Beirut Trade Center (BTC), an officially registered trademark, the new $200 million tower was to be 40 floors high, increasing from 100 meters in height to 150 meters. The twenty-four floors of office space would be enlarged by a meter or so, there would be a double floored roof top restaurant and covered 70,000 m2 of BUA, of which 30,000 would be underground. According to a 1996 brochure announcing the project: “The existing Murr Tower has been a symbol of the Lebanese war…. The BTC will be a landmark development emphasizing a visual symbol for new Beirut and expressing the rebirth of the city as an international and commercial center.” And so, for years, a 30-meter-long poster hung on Murr Tower, visually announcing the project. According to Madhoun it was “the second largest poster in the world.” However, after years of stormy weather, the poster withered away and, it seems, so did the development plan for the concrete monstrosity.

“We had all the necessary permits,” Madhoun said. “We even obtained an adjustment on the permit to implode Murr Tower and construct a completely new inner frame. In 1998, we were on the verge of starting construction, but then the elections took place.”

The new Hoss government embarked on a campaign to curb public spending and nearly all Solidere projects were put on hold. Since 1998, nothing has changed and it’s not clear what the future will bring. According to Solidere spokesman Nabil Rached, there is no need to comment on Murr Tower “as there’s nothing new to say.” One of the main obstacles in completing Murr Tower is the myriad of problems facing Solidere. According to one source within the company, even if the funds were available, the original permits were valid for only a limited period and the bureaucratic procedures would have to start all over again if the project were pursued anew – and there just isn’t the demand for the size of offices offered. “The BTC design is still up-to-date,” said Madhoun, “while only a few office blocks in downtown are up to international standard, such as the Atrium, An Nahar and ESCWA building. The problem is demand. In 1998, we had a guarantee that the Banque Societe General would take 10 floors, while Solidere would move its headquarters there. Today, I don’t know if there are any clients. Maybe Solidere should consider residential use.”

Gabriel Murr, however, can’t wait till the day Murr Tower is demolished. “As an engineer I’d say destroy it. It’s easy, cheap and gives you the freedom to create something new.” Adding with a smile: “MTV bought the exclusive rights on the implosion.” Local real estate consultant Michael Dunn has a crystal clear opinion about the future of Murr Tower. “It’s old, outdated, ugly, and it has a negative impact on its direct surroundings,” he said. “It’s no longer a prime location either. It’s in fact located in the worst of four Solidere corners. I’d say demolish it.” According to Dunn, imploding the building and getting rid of the debris costs some $100,000 and will take up to six months. And what then? “In Lebanon, too many people dream of the past,” said Murr. “The past is over – Beirut is not Dubai. I say demolish it, turn it into a park and upgrade all surrounding properties.” A 1975 brochure praising the state-of-the-art design of the building emphasized the tower would, as well as having “an international telephone center and telex standard [sic],” be equipped with, “an electronically working lift to avoid any delays.” Thirty years is a long time to wait.

June 1, 2004 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Economics & Policy

Safe from harm?

by Faysal Badran May 1, 2004
written by Faysal Badran

Is Lebanon a genuine emerging economy? If so, how has the country been able to escape unscathed through the domino-like collapse of new entrants into the global financial architecture. After the implosion of several Asian “tiger” economies and the more recent Russian debt crisis, it seemed that the Lebanese bubble would burst. The common reflections on Lebanon as a potential ground were driven by fears over the fiscal imbalance and the stagnating macro economy. The emerging economies are in a sense the periphery in the global financial structure, and as the “hot” money (mainly composed of hedge funds and short term punters) flowed from the center to the periphery, many of the emerging countries witnessed a period of over investment. The excess inflows within a weak regulatory environment exposed certain vulnerabilities that highlighted a divide between both monetary and real factors. Once the short-term money flows reversed, the countries were left to pick up the pieces of fickle foreign hot money. The once revered Asian tiger countries eventually trumped their ability to siphon in short-term money.

Why has Lebanon been unaffected by all these global crises? After all, the fall in emerging markets is a stark reminder that economic reality, however masked by monetary factors, do come back to bite. It is important to note that during the period of euphoria, there is usually almost blind optimism and confidence in the countries’ ability to embark on reforms and policies that woo investments. The boom in Russia and South East Asia illustrates the wide held belief, strengthened by extensive research, that the economies’ fortunes will follow – a sort of “if you build it they will come” approach.

Lebanon stayed immune during these crises – from the Tequila Hangover that characterized the Mexican Peso collapse in the early to mid 90s, to the Asian, Russian, Brazilian blow-ups of the 1997 to 2002 period. The pessimists felt that the Lebanese miracle would unwind, and FOREX stability at the very least, would be in jeopardy. In fact, because Lebanon lacked the international sponsorship from an investment flow perspective, it would experience a more severe downfall. Marwan Barakat, head of research at Banque Audi, described in a recent presentation the crises factors that tend to precipitate problems as economic fundamentals, market factors, financial characteristics, and contagion variables. In Lebanon’s case, one would think that with the economy in the doldrums, the wake up call would be sharp. It is, however, on the other three fronts that Lebanon’s resilience was most prominent. Despite a costly monetary policy geared toward exchange rate stability and illiquid markets, it seems that the social benefit from maintaining the pound outweighed the risks. It also appears that the illiquidity of markets, seen in Barakat’s presentation as an element of vulnerability in other economies’ boom period, was a redeeming factor in Lebanon’s case, especially as most of the financial market transactions focused on local holders of debt and equity. The hot money never bothered with Lebanon, and this illiquidity, though a hallmark of a closed economy, contained the damage and banks rushed into lucrative but short-term Lebanese sovereign bonds. It also appears that the strength of the banking system was a pillar in this resilience. How much longer this can last with Basle II on the way is another issue. Contagion (the collapse of a nation with a large trade position that impacts directly on its trading partners) was never an issue in Lebanon as its role in trade and finance remains limited. The lack of statistics often distorts proper analyses of the situation. For instance, who knows what the real unemployment rate is? How often can one count on reliable monetary aggregate numbers, and what is the real level of consumption? As opposed to typical emerging markets, Lebanon has relied more on consumption than on investment, and while this provides temporary relief, for the economy to grow, real investment is crucial. This resilience is a rear view image of how Lebanon fared in comparison to other emerging markets. Simply put, Lebanon has not blown up perhaps because it has remained insular and closed, and relied on Lebanese and “patient” Arab money for its capital markets. But the resilience raises an important concern: the underreporting of non-performing loans. As this issue pertains to risks in China, Japan, and some of the South American economies, one cannot help but wonder how it may affect Lebanon. Non-performing loans to total loans in Lebanon are at a staggering 20%, according to Audi research figures. The policy lesson, according to Barakat, is that “banks and regulatory authorities should monitor sovereign exposure and find alternative sources of uses so as to avoid a strong correlation between sovereign and banking risks.”

Lebanon has weathered several global crises through a mix of luck and ephemeral variables. The key to maintaining the delicate balance is building confidence, which can be built only through public sector and political reform. As long as the current caretakers continue to place political bickering, personal careers, and confessional issues ahead of the economic and fiscal imperatives, the resilience of Lebanon will be an underutilized element. It is hopeful that unlike its emerging markets counterparts, Lebanon will not need an economic implosion to trigger change in the political and institutional modus vivendi. If, as Barakat put it, “credible policy response is crucial in the emerging economies’ ability to withstand shocks,” one wonders how the investing world feels about the future of a country where no clear economic plan is discernible and where any calls for “economic planning” is met with disdain.

May 1, 2004 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Economics & Policy

Audi merger sets the stage

by Nicolas Photiades May 1, 2004
written by Nicolas Photiades

The merger of Banque Audi and Banque Saradar was the best thing to happen to the Lebanese banking sector for many years and the biggest merger/acquisition since the Byblos-Banque Beyrouth pour le Commerce and Bank of Beirut-Beirut Riyad Bank deals in 1995 and 2001, respectively. Although the banking sector has been consolidating for the last ten years, albeit at a slow pace, this consolidation has mainly been characterized by acquisitions of weak smaller banks by larger institutions.

The Audi-Saradar merger, on the other hand, has produced the first really institutionalized banking group in Lebanon with very little control by one single family and the widespread dilution of responsibilities and decisions among a complementary and relatively efficient management team. With such an institutionalization of ownership, the Audi-Saradar venture is likely to have positive developments on the overall competitive environment in Lebanon. It is also expected to influence other banking groups to improve corporate governance, as well as underwriting skills and risk management. Not only will the capitalization of the new venture be improved as a result of the combination of the two equity bases, but other banks are also likely to feel the peer pressure and step up their efforts to increase shareholders’ equity as well. There will also be improved banking products available to customers, reduced related party exposure as a result of family ownership dilution, increased financial flexibility and importance vis-à-vis the regulator and enhanced shareholder value. All of which will enable the new bank to meet Basel II requirements more easily and eventually offer greater support to the Lebanese domestic economy.

But it is what it may do for the cause of corporate governance that is most interesting. Lebanese banks desperately need to move away from family ownership towards a wider distribution of share ownership among passive and strategic investors or shareholders. Although some banks (such as Audi-Saradar and Bank of Beirut) have already followed the institutionalization path, a large number still remains in the hands of families and family ownership throughout the world has proved to have flaws. These include the lack of adequate resources to assist a bank in times of need and the unwillingness to dilute ownership to support growth. When families are present in management, there is the risk of credit and personnel decisions not being based on merit. Business decisions are often made purely for political or social reasons rather than economic ones, whilst the risk of connected lending is high and affects the image and creditworthiness of the bank (many Lebanese banks still claim though that they prefer to lend to companies they control, since they know them better).

To be fair to some family-owned banks, many family shareholders have already demonstrated their financial support to the business by taking minimal dividends (this was a Central Bank rule during the war years) or increasing the bank’s capital. Many families have also opted for a sale or a merger when they realized that they did not have the means to inject further capital and that they were better off joining hands with larger, better-equipped banks (such as the acquisition of Crédit Commercial du Moyen Orient by Banque Audi in 1996).

Family ownership in the Arab world has a different meaning than in other regions such as Europe or North America. Arab individual owners are often very wealthy in their own right and are more than able to support their business interests. Indeed, in Lebanon, the Central Bank considers family ownership to be a positive factor as it guarantees the conservatism of each individual bank and the heavy involvement of families in the daily management of the local banks has been a major factor behind the survival of most banks during the civil war period.

But this policy has its limitations. It can give rise to serious corporate governance and succession issues, and many banks, particularly smaller ones (below the top fifteen) are still run by forceful managers/shareholders (often carrying the two contradictory and conflicting titles of general manager AND chairman), who constrain or hinder the future development of their banks and add considerable stress on the already fragile and often weak financial structure.

It would be worth noting that many larger banks (as demonstrated by the recent Audi-Saradar venture) have been busy addressing corporate governance issues by taking significant steps towards institutionalization of management decision-making. The larger banks have been proactive in this area, as reflected by the setting up at various institutions of committees and executive management teams responsible for operational and financial (but rarely for strategic) decisions on a daily basis. The Central Bank, through its Banking Control Commission (BCC) has also been busy guiding the banks in their efforts to dilute the influence of particular senior managers or shareholders influence in managing the bank.

Today, the viability of many banks in Lebanon is in doubt. Those banks that still swim against the tide of consolidation typically have a very narrow franchise base, lack the necessary technological sophistication and operational capabilities that would lead to growth and long-term profitability. Most of these banks are vulnerable to the volatile external environment and would not be able to defend their franchises in the long-run. The forthcoming Basel II regulations, which are due to be forced upon banks all over the world, will put the final nail in the coffin, as they require a significant upgrade of risk management capabilities and a change of banking culture along Western European and North American ones, which are focused on credit and other risks.

While the Audi-Saradar merger will hopefully accelerate the pace of the consolidation process within Lebanon’s banking sector, the recent decreases in interest rates on government debt securities and the squeezing of margins should also change the thinking of many bankers, as they realize that organic growth is now increasingly difficult to achieve. The changing interest rate environment is likely to push all banks to become real lending banks, more focused on risk management, greater corporate governance, and on developing a strong credit culture within each institution. Greater consolidation of the banking sector in Lebanon would result in a more efficient banking system that is less vulnerable to shocks in the economy.

A sound and dynamic banking system is key to the future prosperity of the Lebanese economy. In order to achieve this higher level of creditworthiness, Lebanese bankers need to strike a balance between risk taking – financing economic growth – and prudent investment of national savings (deposits). Success in the key areas of risk and capital management, cost control and product diversification and distribution, will distinguish the healthy and profitable banks from the rest. However, given the current skepticism among some bankers, the sector may sadly still need a certain number of high profile collapses or failures to highlight to the rest of the sector the importance of robust risk management and rigorous corporate governance. Banque Audi and Banque Saradar have spectacularly shown the way to the banking sector. Emulation should now follow, while the wait for peer failures should not be an option for most banks.

Nicolas Photiades is an independent financial adviser on financing, capital optimization, and strategy.

May 1, 2004 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
The Buzz

Developing cultural fluency

by Tommy Weir May 1, 2004
written by Tommy Weir

When you look at a full moon, what do you see? An old man’s face? A piece of cheese? A rabbit pounding rice? That’s right, in Japan this is a very common belief about the image of the moon. So, the next time you gaze at the stars and add this image to your repertoire, it is a sign that you are becoming culturally fluent.

What is cultural fluency?

Culture is usually defined as a complex mixture of societal norms that include: knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, customs, habits and many other learned patterns of behavior. Fluency is typically linked with the complex understanding of a language and all of its intricate meanings. Cultural fluency, then, is having the capacity to embrace and flow within many various cultural environments, and the ability to utilize diversity for understanding and growth.

Developing cultural fluency is essential for any global leader. As more and more organizations expand across national borders, leaders will need to widen their views on competition and national behaviors. To survive in the worldwide business environment, we will need to pay just as much attention to differences as similarities, and be willing to accept a wide number of business methods. On many occasions, we have heard managers complain about diverse working environments. One leader even claimed that “one of the most difficult challenges we [as a company] face is working in a culturally diverse business environment.” The point is to recognize that diversity can be an advantage if understood and managed properly. The advantages of utilizing diversity include:

· competitive new product development

· expanded acceptance of new ideas

· ability to recognize new perspectives

· more comprehensive communication skills

· an increase in the ability to cooperate.

Effective global managers assume difference until similarity is proven instead of assuming similarity until difference is proven. In the end, bridging cultural gaps is about communication and building relationships beyond the safety zone of similarity. Developing a diverse list of business contacts that you can rely on for information and ideas is essential.

One important component of cultural fluency is that you must limit your own cultural blind spots. In many cases, what we perceive to be the “right way” may just be a habit. Questioning our own cultural baggage is paramount because it allows us to add new information to a limited vocabulary. Some important tips to consider when experiencing different business cultures include:

· Don’t make assumptions about a person based on where they come from. · Understand that cultures change and are dynamic. Business practices you experienced in China in the early 90’s are very different today. · Try not to take things personally if someone from a different cultural does something that you consider “rude.” This was evident during a conference in the UK, where businesspeople from the Middle East, Europe, and the Asian Pacific were in attendance. A tense moment erupted when a colleague from the Gulf wrote his phone number on a business card from a potential Japanese business partner. For the Japanese, writing on a business card is tantamount to committing a serious crime because they view them as an extension of the person giving the card and expect they be handled with care.

Finding common starting points are also important and can make a big difference in the impression that you set for yourself and your company. Below are three basic issues, however, there are many more.

Low- and high-context communication

In low-context communication, most of the message will be explicit and named in words, while in high-context communication, the message will be implicit and will rely on the context surrounding it. High-context cultures will rely on physical setting, shared beliefs, norms and values to extend understanding. Non-verbal cues are very important, and messages will not be spelled out. Cultures from the South and East tend towards the high-context category, whereas cultures from the West are considered to be mostly low-context. A classic example of the confusion is the experience of a German businessman who came to Lebanon (a high-context setting) for an important meeting. He was told to go to the company’s office that was 200 meters west of Cola. When he asked a shop person what Cola was he was told it was the Coca Cola plant. When he called his prospective Lebanese business partner from Choueifat, the Lebanese businessman explained that the office was 200 meters from the old Coca Cola plant, which was now a busy roundabout in Beirut. The Lebanese residents had a contextual understanding of the term and this was very different from the low-context specific directions the German expected.

Role identity (individual and group)

This starting point relates to the ways that we think of ourselves as part of our department, company and even family. Men and women raised in the Eastern and Southern hemispheres are taught that being a part of a circle of relations is of essential importance. They are rewarded for obedience, cooperation, respect for elders and abiding by family traditions and values. People from the West will most likely have an individualist starting point. Meaning that they see the person as independent, self-directed and autonomous. Children raised in this type of culture are rewarded for personal initiative, achievement and taking responsibility for personal choices and development. Individualist starting point

-achievement is linked to personal goal setting and action.

-accountability rests ultimately with the individual and he/she must make decisions accordingly.

-people are understood to have equality of opportunity and are able to make their own independent personal choices.

Group starting point

-maintaining harmony and group solidarity is important, and one person’s decision should not interrupt that.

-choices and decisions are made in consultation with many overlapping layers of interests and people.

-people’s decisions reflect on their group membership, and he/she is held accountable to the group.

-people accept hierarchy and direction from those they deem to be of a higher status.

Time

Of all the sources of miscommunication in the global business environment, this must be the one that causes the most problems. In the Western mind, time is quantitative, measured, and utilizing it productively is of strategic importance. Phrases like “time is money” and “time is of the essence” are commonly heard in North American and European cities. In the Eastern and Southern hemispheres, time is more elastic and feels somewhat unlimited, which makes keeping fixed appointments seem almost impossible. Several years back, a North American businessman experienced this firsthand in Brazi when he set a seminar for 7:30 PM. Everything seemed to be fine until 7:30 PM came and no one showed up. The team thought this was a complete failure. But after one and half hours, nearly 700 people showed. For the most part, people will take precedence over the schedule.

Whether your work is global or local, the reference points and behaviors involved in developing cultural fluency are similar: listen and ask questions for verification, understand that the other person’s view and starting point may be very different from yours, and accept the limitations of your on view and method of working.

Be the Best!

Tommy Crumrine and Christine Weir are from the Beirut-based CrumrineWeir, the global leadership experts.

May 1, 2004 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Real Estate

Market trends

by Anthony Mills May 1, 2004
written by Anthony Mills

While new, high-end residential developments continue to define the current residential market, the bulk of Lebanon’s residential real estate sector is marked by illiquidity and inflexible prices because of many owners’ reluctance to sell and an unwillingness to accept professional valuations.

However, a drop in interest rates, prompting investors – notably, Gulf Arabs and Lebanese expats – to turn their attention to real estate, has offset many of these hidebound attitudes. This trend is not only reflected in the heightened development activity along the West Beirut and Solidere seafront, where multi-million dollar apartments are selling well, but in areas hitherto unfancied by foreign Arab nationals, such as Ashrafieh and Gemaizeh. The “local” market is characterized by affordable new build at $500 per m2 plus “old” properties that can be refurbished at the tenants’ leisure. But it is the latter sector that brokers often find difficulties in achieving sales when faced with the ingrown Lebanese unwillingness to acknowledge the need for cash. Brokers also complain that potential vendors are susceptible to the ill-informed views of real estate “amateurs” who assure them their property is worth more than the broker has quoted. “We tell people what the real value of their property is. They either like it, or they don’t like it. That’s their problem, not ours,” stated Joe C. Kanaan, president of Sodeco Gestion real estate consultants. Raja Makarem of RAMCO real estate consultants, said: “The Lebanese always overvalue their property. The greatest difficulty is convincing them of its real value. They treat property as a matter of honor. That’s why they don’t like to say that they want to sell. This makes the property more difficult to market.”

But how do local buyers choose where they live? Do they, like their counterparts in the West, use the usual criteria – proximity to schools, shops, etc? “They don’t think that way,” said Patrick Geammal, chairman and managing director of Ascot real estate brokers. “They think more about area and who is going to be their neighbor, about the reputation of the building they are going to live in (directly linked to who lives in it) than where they are going to send their kids to school – they don’t give a damn about that.” Other brokers underline the value attached to a sea view. The Lebanese often choose a residence close to that of their parents and usually remain in areas with which they identify religiously, although brokers say that at the upper end of the market – often characterized by educated, well-traveled Lebanese – this is changing. The Solidere district is cited as an example of residential sectarian blending. “I see some movement from West Beirut to Ashrafieh, to Gemaizeh,” said Karim Ibrahim, managing partner of the development firm Constructa. “But, I don’t see it the other way around,” he added, “I don’t see anyone from Ashrafieh buying an apartment in Hamra.” In general, Ashrafieh remains predominantly Christian, while West Beirut continues to be associated with Muslims. In another development, brokers say they are witnessing many Lebanese from the northern suburbs, such as Kaslik and Jounieh, choosing to buy in Beirut. If this turns out to be more than a mere blip on the graph, it will be a welcome reversal, as many residents of the Kesrwan region have been reluctant to return to or move to a capital many still associate with the war.

But it’s the foreign money that is today driving the market. According to Geammal, 60% to 70% of current apartment purchases in the Solidere district can be attributed to Gulf Arabs. In Ain Mreisseh, Verdun and Ramlet al-Baida, the figure drops to 40%, but demand still exceeds supply in the most popular, high-end neighborhoods, brokers say. And while most Lebanese view real estate as a life investment, Gulf Arabs see their Lebanese homes as more of a commodity, an attitude that may breathe some dynamism into the local residential market. Elsewhere, Gulf nationals are seeking to buy beyond their traditional areas. Although they have yet to populate the Christian Kesrwan area and the Metn in the same way they have in the Mount Lebanon resorts of Bhamdoun and Aley, more and more Gulf Arabs are choosing to live in Ashrafieh and Gemaizeh, where they are attracted by lower prices. They now account for 10% to 15% of sales in these neighborhoods.

According to Kanaan, such Gulf buyers want to distance themselves from other, more typical GCC nationals. “They are not like the Gulf Arabs who come to Lebanon only to smoke NARGILEHS and drink sodas downtown. These guys appreciate a more refined lifestyle. They integrate. Of course, if someone arrives in Ashrafieh with four wives veiled from head to foot and an army of Sri Lankan maids, people will not appreciate it.” Brokers admit that many Lebanese buyers of upscale apartments in Ashrafieh now ask them if any Arabs live in the building. “We tell them yes but that they are not like the rest,” quipped one broker with a shrug. “They don’t want to be sharing buildings with most of Riyadh.”

Many residents, and of course developers, welcome the inflow of Gulf money. Brokers say it is good for the market. “It’s fantastic,” said Makarem. “I am very happy to see it. It’s very healthy. It proves we’ve got over the war effect.” But he added: “I wish we could see more Christians buying houses in West Beirut.”

Some professionals contend that biased brokers are hindering the trend by not showing Gulf Arab buyers apartments in Christian neighborhoods, and playing down the attributes of these districts. “They are very badly advised,” said Geammal. “Brokers try to convince them that people of their religion should live in Ramlet al-Baida, not in Ashrafieh. But there are opportunities today in Ashrafieh, Saife and Gemmaizeh that they are not being shown.”

Finally, Brokers are divided as to whether there is a market for studio and one-bedroom apartments. “I don’t see any one- or even two-bedroom projects, especially in Beirut,” observed Ibrahim. “It’s a losing business.” Lebanese buyers, notably husbands-to-be under cultural pressure to own a home before marrying, feel they have to buy a large apartment straightaway. But many prospective husbands don’t have the funds. Marriages are postponed as a result, and the effect on a real estate sector, which clearly cannot satisfy all needs, is negative. Some real estate insiders, though, maintain that there is room in the market for high-end one-bedroom apartments, which would serve, among others, the university-enrolled sons and daughters of wealthy Lebanese as well as affluent professionals, who, for one reason or another, would like a ‘pied-a-terre’ beyond the confines of their family home. “For the moment, one-bedroom apartments are associated with low-cost, undistinguished housing. A good building, in a good area, especially Solidere, with all the amenities, would generate a lot of demand,” stated Makarem.

May 1, 2004 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
Business

Hamra in waiting

by Peter Speetjens May 1, 2004
written by Peter Speetjens

SLOW MOVERS? Some shop owners say the project has taken far too long

Despite experiencing a drop in sales revenues of up to 40%, Hamra retailers are confident that the on-going construction work and facelift will eventually help Hamra become a thriving retail area, serving Ras Beirut’s middle-market catchment.

After nearly one year of road works, the rehabilitation of Hamra Street is nearly complete. Roads have been asphalted and paved, pavements widened, trees planted and the colorful overhead jungle of electricity wires has been buried underground. The renovation effort is part of a $12 million project to rehabilitate five major streets in Beirut (including Corniche al Nahr, Monot Street and Barbour) and paid for by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Rehabilitation. The Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) had earlier appointed Dar al Handasah Nazih Taleb & Partners to design a new Street.

However, while most shopkeepers praise efforts to upgrade what was once Lebanon’s main shopping boulevard, a few claim that the project has taken too long to complete, resulting in a loss of revenues of between 15% and 40%.

“Of course we have had less customers,” said Hala Shaftary, store manager of Librarie Antoine. “For months Hamra was hardly accessible. On days when they were working in front of the shop, we hardly saw any customers. But I think we suffered less than others, as we have a lot of regular clients.” According to Librarie Antoine’s general sales manager, Emile Tyan, the 40-year-old Hamra store is the best performing of the chain’s ten outlets. He estimated a loss in sales of 15%. Elsewhere, Mohamed Bushnak, manager of Starbucks Hamra, the American coffee chain’s first branch to open in Lebanon, estimated a loss of up to 20%, blaming the lack of parking.

Ghassan Mahfouz, managing owner of Marilou Women’s Wear, estimated his losses to be some 35%. However, he did not to place all the blame for bad sales figures at the government’s doorstep. “Business has been going down since 1997, ” he shrugged. “Business was good until then,” he said, “then it went down by some 20% a year. We are in a recession and the middle class is suffering.” Some retailers are less forgiving. Most volatile among Hamra’s retailers is Georges Moujaess, who founded Roi Des Frites in 1967. The snack bar is one of the most famous fast food outlets on Hamra and is normally open till the early hours of the morning. The construction work forced Moujaess to a hang a banner reading “The King is off due to works,” in front of his closed facade for the two months he was forced to close. The closure cost him $60,000, while overall business has been hit by the lack of pedestrian traffic.

Moujaess blamed the contractors for the delay, claiming they worked slowly to earn more money and that the whole project had been flawed from the start. “They dug up the road twice. First they did the sewage and water and then they closed it. The next month they opened it again to fix the electricity.”

Aynan Bassam, secretary of the Hamra Traders Association (HTA) sympathizes but does not agree with all the complaints. He estimated the average losses of Hamra’s shopkeepers not to exceed 15%, while according to him the project has been largely executed according to plan. Currently, most of Hamra Street is open again to traffic and heavy works are only taking place in front of Hamra Cinema. The project will be completed when the Fransabank building is reached.

“The project started on May 12 and is due to be finished on June 31, which it will be,” said Bassam, who owns Al Bassam, a 650m2 ladies fashion and lingerie store in the heart of Hamra. “The contractor gave us a choice,” Bassam said. “Either to execute the works fast, which would mean the area would remain closed for several months or to do it in stages. We chose the latter.”

The main work was carried out to replace 2,000m of Hamra’s 50-year-old drainage and sewage system, which was dealing with waste and rainwater with one 6-inch pipe, which, in heavy winter rain, would flood, creating a terrible stench. Now, two wider and separate pipes take care of the effluents. The project is in anticipation of the completion of the wastewater treatment plants being built in Ouzai and Dora. The South for Construction’s project manager, Rabiah Dejhaim, said traffic would return to normal by the end of June and admitted that work may have seemed to drag on, but said this was due to special seasonal requests. “It was the HTA and others who asked us not to work during Christmas and the February shopping festival,” he said. “That’s why we closed and opened the street again, and had to ask for an extra $2 million for the total of five streets.”

Still the reality is that business suffered and it wasn’t just the shops. Crowne Plaza’s Sales Manager Ziad Bassila estimated a 30% lower occupancy rate, which increased when the heavy machines reached the hotel entrance. Najib Nasser, manager of the Plaza Hotel, said: “we suffered like anyone else, as for three months we hardly had any customers.” He was nonetheless realistic about the situation. “I don’t like to point fingers,” he said. “Hamra Street is much better now. Let’s hope it will only get better in the future.”

It should. Before the war, Hamra was everything Beirut stood for. It was not just the city’s high-end shopping street, but also a place to go out and have fun. Hamra boasted no less than ten cinemas, and a string of cafes and clubs. Those who have cited the demise of the Modca Café (rented to the Vero Moda chain for $20,000 a month) as the final nail in Hamra’s cultural coffin have missed the point. The street is prime retail with rents that have still to reflect its potential. Bassam, who can remember the so-called good old days, is convinced Hamra will get back on its feet. To him, the rehabilitation of Hamra Street is but a first step. His dream is to see it turned into a pedestrian zone.

The retail experts point to the thorny issue of old rents as a factor that held up Hamra’s post-war development. “The biggest problem facing Hamra after the war was the large number of displaced people who lived in the many empty buildings,” said Raja Makarem, managing partner of Ramco Real Estate Advisers. “This gave the area a shabby, insecure feel.”

Today, the squatters have mostly left and Makarem believes that Hamra has all it takes to become a genuine highstreet and the retail backbone of the area. Crucially, he does not see either Verdun, downtown or the rise of shopping mall culture as a major threat.

According to Makarem, Hamra is affordable. Today, the average rent for new retail space is between $500-$600 per m2 a year. At Hamra’s more affordable poles, rent is even cheaper, with shops at the Sadat Street junction offered for a mere $300 per m2 a year. And it has a social fabric. “Someone coming from the mountains to Beirut will not feel comfortable in downtown, where he can’t even pay for a coffee,” said Makarem, who lives in Hamra. “Hamra is the only place that still has the fabric of old Beirut, a place where rich and poor, Christians and Muslims can meet. What used to be downtown before the war will become Hamra: the melting pot of Lebanon.”

Cliché or not, he has a point. It is a target rich environment, serving the area’s relatively affluent community, a significant percentage of whom work in or attend the Lebanese American University, the American University of Beirut and the Law Faculty of the Lebanese University. It is also close to the beach and the Downtown.

Hamra measures some 2 km2, hosting 1,000 retail outlets, 500 companies, two main hospitals, several smaller ones, 450 private clinics, 65 banks and 24 hotels, among which are the Commodore Le Meridiene, Crown Plaza and the nearby Gefinor Rotana. It has a population of 20,000 and this does not include the 13,000 students and 22,000 employees. The area has an estimated 100,000 visitors a day.

“I’ve got high hopes for Hamra,” said Makarem. “With the new city center and Verdun both targeting the upper segments of the market, Hamra is giving a chance to reposition in the middle market segment. This would entail a gradual upgrade of the street’s merchandising, and this is exactly what seems to be happening after an initial shift to the lower end of the market with the likes of Eldorado, Akil and Big Bros.”

Innovation has helped. Hamra’s cinemas although beautiful, remain unrestored since the 1970s and are not in touch with modern cinema-going trends, which dictate a ‘more screens for less seats’ policy. Today, following a $2 million renovation, the old Eldorado cinema earns its owners an annual rent of $250,000, as a 4-storey budget “department store” and one of the street’s best performers. However, the trend is mainly heading up-market and in 2003, many new outlets such as Vero Moda, Jack & Jones, Dunkin Donuts, La Senza and Librarie Orientale have opened in Hamra Street. However, apart from the Crowne Plaza much of the Taj Tower’s 5,000 m2 retail remains unoccupied.

“Of course, we have been affected by the works,” said Taj Tower owner Omar Ramadan, who is asking for an average of $625 per m2 a year for his new shops. “But we’re also in the process of refurbishing the building, as we separate the entrances of hotel and mall. Now that the street is finished we hope things will get better.”

May 1, 2004 0 comments
0 FacebookTwitterPinterestEmail
  • 1
  • …
  • 656
  • 657
  • 658
  • 659
  • 660
  • …
  • 686

Latest Cover

About us

Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

  • Donate
  • Our Purpose
  • Contact Us

Sign up for our newsletter

[contact-form-7 id=”27812″ title=”FooterSubscription”]

  • Facebook
  • Twitter
  • Instagram
  • Linkedin
  • Youtube
Executive Magazine
  • ISSUES
    • Current Issue
    • Past issues
  • BUSINESS
  • ECONOMICS & POLICY
  • OPINION
  • SPECIAL REPORTS
  • EXECUTIVE TALKS
  • MOVEMENTS
    • Change the image
    • Cannes lions
    • Transparency & accountability
    • ECONOMIC ROADMAP
    • Say No to Corruption
    • The Lebanon media development initiative
    • LPSN Policy Asks
    • Advocating the preservation of deposits
  • JOIN US
    • Join our movement
    • Attend our events
    • Receive updates
    • Connect with us
  • DONATE