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Business

Counting on insurers

by Thomas Schellen May 1, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Arab Re

Sourcing of regional reinsurance is an issue of growing importance to primary insurance providers across the region, be they established companies or newcomers. For reinsurance company Arab Re, this translates directly into a substantial increase in perceived business opportunities. “I can confirm that our board has taken the decision to double our capital. This issue is now on the front burner,” deputy general manager of Arab Re and current ranking executive, Tayseer Treky, tells EXECUTIVE. He expects the capital increase to be completed before the end of the year.

Established in 1972 upon direct recommendation by the General Arab Insurance Federation, Arab Re’s capital had last been increased in 1998, from $12.3 million to the current $25 million. From its inception, the firm’s mission was directed specifically at assisting insurers in markets across the region and run Arab reinsurance pools. With greater integration of Arab markets on the horizon, the firm feels that it is time to assume a bigger role. “We are the Pan-Arab reinsurance company par excellence,” Treky claims. “We are an ambitious company but we are also aware of the limitations of our size and from market conditions. Our policy has always been gradualist.”

In terms of immediate expectations, the firm’s outlook actually projects rather steep growth. After gross premium income rose from $17.9 million in 2002 to $20.7 million in 2003, Arab Re’s anticipation for 2004 is a near 50% increase in premiums, to $30 million. For 2005, the company expects a further increase to $35 million.

Arab Re’s premium income originates to 92% from the region, with the remainder generated in Asia and Africa. Lebanon is the number one market for the Beirut-based firm, accounting for 16% of premium income, followed by Egypt (13%), Libya (12%) and the United Arab Emirates (10.5%). “The degree of our presence in different Arab insurance markets is determined by our marketing orientation and also by the existence of our shareholders in different markets,” says Treky, “We tend to be stronger where we have shareholders.” The company’s shareholder base includes 55 entities from 16 countries, mainly insurance and reinsurance companies but also some public and private sector banks. The largest equity stake by a single shareholder does not exceed 12%. Following a three-year period where the company saw its premium income drop annually between 1997 and 2000, Arab Re benefited from the changed reinsurance world, post the September 11 terror attacks. Some European and international reinsurers lost parts or all of their enthusiasm for doing business in Arab countries. And like many in the hardening global market, insurers from across the region encountered harsher conditions and stricter limits from their international reinsurance partners. While acknowledging that September 11 triggered a wave of changes in the relations between regional insurers and international reinsurance firms, Treky sees the changes as rooted in factors that came into play considerably before the fateful day. “Arab Re anticipated well ahead of 9/11 that smaller Arab companies would one day face difficulties with their reinsurers, due to economies of scale. The concentration and mergers in the global insurance industry in the 1990s made the average sized Arab company probably less attractive,” he says. “We have long been telling our clients not to put all their eggs into the basket of international reinsurers, because a day would come when the need for regional reinsurance would be greater.”

With WTO membership impending for an increasing number of Arab countries and liberalization of – thus far – closed insurance markets looming, the managers in Arab Re’s executive offices in downtown Beirut see not challenges but substantial new opportunities in the opening of more Arab markets to more players. In Libya, for example, where two new insurance companies are under formation, the persons driving the process of establishing these firms are, in Treky’s words, “old good friends of Arab Re.” Because of its low insurance density and penetration, Syria would be a promising market even if the insurance regime were to prevail as it is, Treky says. “If, however, the Syrian insurance market opens up and more opportunities come into the picture, the pace will be much faster and growth will be greater.” Also in Iraq, once the country returns to normalcy and security, the insurance market is, in his opinion, bound to grow very quickly and perhaps recover its grandeur as the Arab world’s biggest and best developed one. Arab Re has major shareholders in these two countries, which leads the manager to expect that in the hoped for business growth there, the company “will enjoy the support of many friends we have.” As good connections, vital as the are, cannot substitute crucial skills, Arab Re is focusing in practical preparations for its future on developing their human resources in a two-pronged approach of training their existing employees and seeking to hire new additional staff with significant experience in reinsurance from within the region.

The future of Arab insurance markets may at last favor the fulfilling of the vision that guided the creation of Arab Re over three decades back but that was blocked for the longest time by regional strife. Today, Arab Re believes that after the hard school of corporate survival under the worst circumstances imaginable, future business obstacles could not cause more than a light hiccup for this reinsurance company.

Medgulf

He who wants to play in the big leagues has to live by big-league rules and must be willing to compete on every ground. The Mediterranean & Gulf Insurance and Reinsurance Company – known in the market as Medgulf – abides by these terms. It employs the business logic that permanent growth is an absolute obligation for a company that aspires to reach market leadership and stay in that coveted position.

“In life and business, you never want to stop, because if you do, you don’t expand anymore,” says Michel Abou Jamra, Medgulf’s executive vice president. “And if you don’t expand, somebody else will.” The company’s ascendance over the past decade and their long-term plans match this disposition. Although displaying a single corporate identity, Medgulf actually is a group comprising two separate companies, an anonymous shareholding company (sal) in Lebanon and an offshore exempt company (ec) in Bahrain, which was established in 1995 for conducting business in Saudi Arabia. Both companies achieved rapid growth and are today holding claims to being the largest private sector insurance operator working in Saudi Arabia and the leading non-life insurer in Lebanon. After receiving license approval by the Bahraini central bank, Medgulf earlier this year entered Bahrain directly as their third market. And having every intent to acquire the stature of true regional insurer, Medgulf executive management confesses as their strategic aim to establish a presence in the majority of Arab countries.

However, the company does not rush in implementation of the far-reaching ambitions by seeking a fast geographical rollout. “It is not important to pretend being a regional player but it is important to do things needed to become effective as regional player,” Abou Jamra says.

“We are looking to expand quite soon into the UAE and have further expansion projects. But we do it in phases, digesting every move before making the next one,” elaborates Faysal Malak, the company’s executive in charge of bancassurance and communications. According to the company’s annual report, Kuwait and Oman are further targets for expansion in the near to mid term. Medgulf can certainly be expected to have the staying power for regional deployment, thanks to being backed by two of the strongest financial private sector groups in the region, Prince Walid Bin Talal’s Kingdom Holding and the Saudi Oger/Groupe Méditerranée of Lebanese tycoon Rafik Hariri. Medgulf chairman Lutfi Zein is the third main shareholder. The group’s financial acumen is reflected in multiple capital increases that the shareholders injected into the two companies over the past three years, bringing capital in Lebanon from $8.5 million in 2000 to over $13 million in 2002, and raising it from $15 million in 2001 to $ 33.3 million in 2003 for the Saudi arm.

Results for 2003 were good in both markets, Abou Jamra tells EXECUTIVE. Premium income for the group reached around $135 million, up from $120 million in the previous year. Shareholder equity climbed to $57 million. Through subsidiary company Addison-Bradley, Medgulf is also active in Jordan, the UAE and UK.

Although the operation in Saudi Arabia achieved the higher premium income between the two group companies, the number of individual policies written in Lebanon was six to seven times larger, according to Abou Jamra. “The market structures are not the same. In Saudi Arabia, we have much more corporate business and fewer private clients. Driving license insurance is the single main retail product with premium turnover there,” says Malak. “However, after new regulations come into force in Saudi Arabia and the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council] countries, the situation might change and offer better prospects for individual sales.” Economic conditions in the Gulf countries are definitely influencing residents and nationals to view insurance with greater interest, agrees Abou Jamra. “In earlier years, employers in GCC countries provided ample packages to their expatriate workforce but under a more competitive labor market today, nationals and foreign employees alike seek out insurance companies for the benefits they offer,” he says.

The increasing adaptation of Gulf economies to international business and banking practices – such as requiring insurance as precondition for issuing a letter of credit – also help in widening the reach of insurance in the region, and the emergence of regional enterprises with employees in numerous Arab countries is creating new demand for services of insurers that are present across markets, say the two executives. Seeing this new Arab insurance environment taking shape, the Medgulf Insurance Group is enforced in their perspective that continued growth into a major international player is the way to secure their ambitions for Arab market leadership. The firm’s management culture is geared toward accommodating this. “We are working in a team with a diversified cultural background of people living in different Arab countries. All our management and middle management are ready to move to any market, and task forces can be formed wherever needed,” says Abou Jamra, adding that in the creation of this unified culture, the Medgulf main base in Lebanon plays a crucial role.

Arabia

Their name is tradition in the Middle Eastern insurance business. Commemorating their 60th anniversary this year, Arabia Insurance has sold policies in Arab countries already before some of them had gained their independence. The firm’s fortunes since its establishment in mandate-era Jerusalem in 1944 read as a corporate diary of exposure to changing political conditions and ideological risks, and of sustaining business throughout. With operations in seven markets – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and home base Lebanon – Arabia Insurance remains active in a larger number of Arab countries than most competitors. The company’s strategic growth focus for the foreseeable future, however, is on two markets where Arabia is active today and two others to which the firm wants to return after a long enforced absence. “We are shooting for market share in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, and ultimately in Syria and Iraq,” the general manager of Arabia Insurance, Fady Shammas, tells EXECUTIVE. With the news of the release of Saudi Arabia’s insurance law just out, Shammas leaves no doubt that the kingdom is the most titillating market for the company at this point. “It tops the list in terms of our involvement in the region. We will consolidate and create a joint company in Saudi Arabia,” he says. “If medical and some other insurance covers are made compulsory, market potential could go from $1 billion in annual premiums to $5 billion within the next few years.” Arabia’s plan is to form a company involving several partners, probably including other insurance operators and a major bank. If negotiations among the prospective partners work out, the firm would enter the Saudi market as an insurance and reinsurance firm, with a mandatory minimum capital of $53.33 million. The business vision would entail competing for all public tenders – especially the energy and airline ones – and, for acceleration of retail business, engage in bancassurance as a distribution channel from day one of operations. Arabia’s confidence of being able to rise high in the kingdom’s insurance market is based, in good part, on the company’s knowledge of the Saudi market. By 2003, it had generated 19% of their business in the kingdom, although it had to operate their seven branches under the same hand knit setup as other private sector insurers, necessitated by the impossibility to register and run a regular insurance company in Saudi Arabia until the passing of the country’s new insurance law.

For their corporate structure, this meant the firm established an offshore Bahraini company as operator of the Saudi business called, Arabia Insurance International, while Beirut headquartered Arabia Insurance Company coordinated activities in the firm’s five other GCC markets, including Bahrain, and Lebanon. Consolidated unaudited figures for the two entities in the Arabia Insurance group for 2003 showed total assets of 260 billion LL, continuing a steady increase since a new management team took the reigns in 1999. Capital is an unchanged LL51 billion, and total equity without provisions reached $75 million. From non-life business alone, the company expects to realize a net profit of $8 million for 2003, an increase of 40% over 2002. The life division, in which Arabia launched a new concept in 2002 with aggressive ambitions for growth across its geographical markets, also realized good results for 2003 and improved its share in Arabia’s total gross premiums from 6% to 8%. As one of the first companies to participate in interactive ratings with regional ratings agency, i.e. Muhanna, Arabia was rated A for 2001, and the rating was confirmed for 2002. The largest shareholder in Arabia Insurance is leading regional banking group, Arab Bank. In line with a policy to close branches that have not been profitable for seven consecutive years and show no sign of better prospects, Arabia last year shut down one branch in the UAE and one in Saudi Arabia, out of its total network of over 30 branches and agencies. Reconfirming the company’s strategic commitment to Lebanon through opening two new branches, Arabia is raising the count to five active branches nationwide this year, plus five life agencies and one general agency. Syria and Iraq are the markets where Arabia has intense long-term ambitions in a combination of historic affinity, sense of mission, and business expectations. “We are very attached to these countries,” Shammas says, “and it is in our mission statement to export insurance knowledge to these markets.” The proper timing to emerge on the Iraqi market is still difficult to determine for now, but as to Syria, Arabia already conducted a proprietary feasibility study, which the company holds under close wraps. As soon as the legal path is cleared, the insurer intends to move full speed ahead, Shammas confirms. “Hopefully, we will be the first private sector insurance company to newly incorporate in Syria.”

Commercial

There are myths to be dispelled also when it comes to working in several Arab markets, and the most notable of these myths may well be the assumption that cross border activities are only for big companies. For Commercial Insurance, a seasoned Lebanese operator with over four decades of accumulated expertise, the decisive factors for regional activities by an insurer are having the requisite skills and finding the right partners. “There is no minimum size needed for being able to venture into new markets,” says Max Zaccar, the chairman of Commercial. “To be a good insurer, you first need a good team, which we are proven to have and are improving upon. Then you need the professional approach, for which we have been recognized for the last 42 years by our clients, by our market, and by our reinsurers.”

For not counting among the country’s market-dominant top ten insurers, Commercial – which achieved an income of just under $6 million in gross premiums in 2002 – has a track record of versatility and wide competency. Medical and motor covers provided the primary sources of income, but the firm is also regarded as specialist in marine insurance and has a small portfolio in term life policies. Strong client orientation motivated the insurer to be a by local industry standards very early implementer of a round-the-clock customer help line and develop group insurance solutions offering schools easy term life covers that safeguard the education of children in case of parental death. Despite losing a prominent corporate account in 2003, Commercial achieved a 25% increase in profits. “To us, this is confirmation of the way we do our business. It allows us to think that we can invest,” says Zaccar. Market conditions permitting, management harbors strong expectations to realize much growth in Lebanon over the coming years – but the company does not wait for “better days” to arrive before making new moves. Management took on 10 new trainees, equivalent to a quarter of their workforce; it partnered with a university, NDU, in a research and instruction project; and it offered staff members options of continued training at the company’s expense. These measures create a noticeable cost burden, which Zaccar accepts as a price for better productivity. “We are in a period of investing and saying to the market and our people that we are committed to the future,” he says. “Since the end of 2003, the entire company is changing attitudes. We are becoming more aggressive, more aware and more present.” It seems natural that a company engaged in an internal renewal cycle would not treat geographic expansion into new countries as a main concern. But Commercial has indeed made contacts with Iraq, from where it is awaiting feedback, and also explored possibilities in an African country. While Gulf and North African insurance markets are in his view heavily covered, Zaccar would see opportunities in these countries as well as in Libya and Syria. The trigger to make Commercial pursue new opportunities abroad would be interest from potential partners in a target country or from an international insurer seeking after a Lebanese partner for establishing a platform to enter this and regional markets. It would be an attractive proposition to Zaccar. “If partners from an Arab country would seek our professional partnership, we would be most interested, and also if we happen to be approached by an international player” he says and would not be deterred by questions over majority or minority shareholding. “We could be the leaven in any partnership. We are professional insurers. If we are thrown into a market, whatever the shareholding, we can produce results.”

The people of Commercial Insurance appear to believe in themselves, and accept challenges. They’d better. After all, the company just designed a new motto to express their corporate identity: ‘live boldly.’

May 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Bank of Beirut: Going steady

by Thomas Schellen April 3, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Following a very satisfactory 2003 for the country’s major banks, the outlook for the sector in 2004 is guarded but not downcast, said Salim Sfeir, chairman and general manager of Bank of Beirut.

Each and every bank in the sector’s leading stratum could outdo their expectations on the results they realized in 2003, Sfeir told EXECUTIVE. “Talking about 2004 and 2005 is a big question, because markets are slightly down and political uncertainties are still high,” he said. “But nevertheless, our financial forecast for the end of the year is not pessimistic. We look forward to having a smooth year, financially speaking.” Similar to other alpha group banks – the institutions at the top of the national banking hierarchy, with assets of more than $1 billion apiece – Bank of Beirut can point to exponential growth in the reconstruction years, both in size and range of activities. Today ranked sixth by assets and seventh in terms of tier-one capital among Lebanon’s banks, its evolution and performance appears archetypical for the fortunes of the sector’s better-achieving agents.

Entering the 90s as a very small player, Bank of Beirut ventured onto an ambitious path of expansion after installing a new management in 1993. Four years later, it was Lebanon’s third bank to go public, and in 1998, a merger with Transorient Bank completed the foundation that enabled Bank of Beirut to scale the $1 billion assets hurdle. In 2002, the bank made further headlines by acquiring Beirut Riyad Bank in a second large merger move, which contributed to a 2002 increase in assets by over 58% and boosted the branch network to over 40 domestic outlets and a subsidiary in London. The bank also established an international banking unit in Cyprus, adding to its representative office in Dubai at the seat of its strategic shareholder, Emirates Bank International. In parallel, Bank of Beirut in 2002 and 2003 undertook a number of measures to increase its tier-one and tier-two capital, including issuance of $55 million in preferred shares. It enlarged its product and services portfolio through creating new funds, retail and bancassurance products along with installation of a call center and an electronic banking operation. Perhaps more tiring than anticipated, the acquisition of Beirut Riyad Bank and integration of its labor force and customer base “was not an easy meal to digest”, Sfeir concedes, even as he maintains that the bank mastered the merger “in an excellent way. I don’t think it could have been done in a better way.” The bank’s underlying message seems to say that their growth expectations are far from exhausted but under national economic conditions, the next development cycle could be some time away.

Bank of Beirut has, so far, navigated 2004 with care – a mood primarily reflective of what management regards as ‘politically generated’ constraints on local and regional affairs encumbering the investment climate. The bank is party to a widespread sentiment that – positive impact of Paris II notwithstanding – the Lebanese political decision makers still need to fulfill their duty of facilitating macro-economic conditions more conducive for attracting investments. The lack of action on the government’s part has led the banking industry in general, and Bank of Beirut in particular, to declare itself apolitical. This does not mean that the bank would wait for political improvements before continuing their quest to innovate. Recent new products include a competitively priced account with revolving credit for salaried employees and a new lira-denominated housing loan. The bank’s current emphasis on housing loans took off with a product designed especially for Lebanese expatriates, who sought to establish a personal property bridgehead in their home country. As the interest rate environment on the lira has improved and lira products are more feasible than before, lira loans are a logical new product that many banks would follow Bank of Beirut in devising, Sfeir said. “The lira loan is another product. We are not highlighting the lira but promoting higher usage since interest rates have fallen to levels making it mandatory to start planning in this direction.” Like a dollar-denominated domestic housing loan introduced last year, the lira loan offers regressive interest rates.

In continued pursuit of its strategy to offer funds products attractive to small and large investors, the bank last year collaborated with First National Bank (FNB) in the creation of two new funds, the Beirut Global Income Fund in July and the Beirut Lira Fund in October. “Small investors took part in the funds and saw high returns,” Sfeir said. “Investors are well informed today, and expect returns that are higher than what they can gain elsewhere. As long as we are providing those returns, we are reaching our target.” According to Sfeir, the funds collaboration between Bank of Beirut and FNB was to the mutual benefit of both institutions. Could this development indicate a stronger partnership in the making, or perhaps another merger prospect? Not in the current situation, where the law and regulations supporting bank merger activities with central bank soft loans haven’t been renewed. “There is no merger law now; it would be a waste of time to get excited,” he said. “With a merger law, it would be a new opportunity.”

Profitability before size and profit optimization at lowest possible risk levels make for two fundamentals in the Bank of Beirut strategy, translating into an unhurried pace in the bank’s continued ambition for an increased role in regional markets. Together with its partner, Emirates Bank, the institution has applied for a license to establish a presence in Syria. It is also approaching the Nigerian market through a rep office project in Lagos, and – for the longer term – contemplates its entry into Iraq. In Sfeir’s view, international expansion is no easy fix and offshore markets poise high risks for Lebanese banks that venture there. They have to calculate a high costs of funds based on the interest rates paid to depositors, and offshore clients accepting those rates would not be likely to be a model for creditworthiness. “Whoever is going to borrow at our own rates will be a risky partner, on whom we have no control,” Sfeir said, “and this I don’t recommend at all to my people.” He accepts only the top five banks in the country as a peer group for Bank of Beirut and sees the optimal size of the Lebanese banking sector as containing no more than 12 or 13 banks. But domestic size ranking was never a concern of the bank, Sfeir said. “We never looked at other parties, the market and colleagues. Our policy is to compete against ourselves. To be much better than we have been.” The bank has a young labor force – the average age is below 40-years-old – and Sfeir prioritizes in-house training and continued education over hiring new staff. The priorities for the current period in the Bank of Beirut evolution are “to maintain the quality of our service and products,” he continued, “and improve the quality of our people through adequate education programs. This will reflect on our results.” The executive admonishes the existence of unprofessional banking practices that extend even into the ranks of the alpha group – but nonetheless appears less concerned about sector-specific problems than about the performance of the public sector leadership. “Lebanese bankers are good bankers,” he said, “I didn’t say that the Lebanese politicians are good politicians.”

The one internal snag factor that Sfeir identified for his institution – which adopts the motto ‘banking beyond borders’ – would be, “shyness.” “Every time when we are shy, we fail.” Extending an invitation to everyone to get closer to Bank of Beirut, the tough talking banker shows a softer side. “We are opening our doors to accommodate the public with a big smiling heart.”

April 3, 2004 0 comments
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Negative growth

by Dania Saadi April 1, 2004
written by Dania Saadi

Lebanon’s agricultural sector has seen better days. Between 1979 and 1981, the labor force of the agricultural sector accounted for 14% of the total labor force, based on the figures of the United Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). This dwindled to 3% by 2001. In 1961, Lebanon’s Gross National Agricultural Production stood at LL300 million ($900 million, $1= three pounds), according to statistics compiled by the Lebanese Center for Agricultural Research and Studies. Four decades later, this figure has hardly budged, settling in 2002 at LL1.5 trillion ($1 billion).

“Up until, 1918, Lebanon used to provide the French city of Lyon, with half of its silk threads,” said Riad Saade, the center’s director. “In 1936, the French region of Roquefort used to import half of the raw cheese processed in the caves (bearing its name) from Lebanon.”

The decline in Lebanon’s agricultural output took place during the civil war, but it has been exacerbated in peacetime. The loss of agricultural land to the haphazard construction boom of the 1990’s, competition in the key export markets in the Arab World and the government’s focus on investments put the agricultural sector on the back burner. There have been half-hearted attempts, by successive governments to rehabilitate the sector but the only visible evidence of government backing are random subsides dished out at various times to farmers.

In 2001, the farmers raised an outcry and some replanted illicit crops to protest government inaction toward their plight, which left them trampling surplus produce on the streets. The government responded by allocating LL50 billion ($33 million) for an export subsidy program dubbed Export Plus, which gave farmers cash for exporting quality goods to markets around the world.

In 2004, the government and parliament is scrambling again to save the agricultural sector by extending new subsidies to apples and partially re-instating subsidies to sugar beet farmers to appease would-be voters in a decisive election year.

“Unfortunately, successive Lebanese governments have looked at the agriculture sector from a social rather than a socio-economic point of view,” said Raphael Debbane, head of the agricultural committee of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Lebanon. “Tobacco subsidies are pure social help whereby the government buys the crops and throws it away because it cannot sell them on the world market on account of their poor quality. Now they have renewed sugar subsidies in a non-professional way and the main reason for that is socio-political.”

Against this government backing to the agriculture sector, the private sector is finding it harder to compete in the local and international markets, where subsidies are given to farmers on a different basis. “If the subsidies are stopped in developing countries, farmers will suffer but they will survive,” said Imad Bsat, owner of B-fresh agricultural company. “If Export Plus ends, nobody will enforce standards and the sector will collapse.”

IDAL helps farmers sell their quality goods, but it does not tell them what type of crops to plant or what kind of crops are wanted by consumers in world markets. “Technically, Export Plus is a success but economically it is a big failure,” said Saade. “The problem is not money. Export Plus is only one ring in a chain. Other rings are needed.”

The other rings of the chain start with orienting farmers on what to plant according to market demands and what types of products to export. The next chain consists of extending technology to farmers to improve their crops and introduce new varieties through government backed research and financial credit. The final chain is marketing, which is what IDAL handles now, said Saade.

“Under Export Plus, farmers exported some 350,000 tons in 2003, which is equivalent to the amount of citrus Lebanon used to export in the 1970’s and 1980’s,” said Bsat. His family used to own Safa Citrus, one of the country’s largest fruit exporters that shut down in the 1990’s. “The government is spending millions of dollars on subsidizing crops when it should be using this money to fund research and help farmers develop new varieties,” said Bsat.

Agricultural engineers say Lebanon’s farmers are unable to adapt to the new agricultural modes, which rely extensively on technology and marketing. “It is a vicious cycle,” said Debbane. “Lebanese farmers have to get know-how and expertise from outside, which means importing technology at a cost. But if you don’t have money, consequently you have no money to invest in new varieties.”
 

The odds are stacked against the farmers’ development. Their production costs are significantly higher than their neighboring countries. They once had a monopoly over the Arab markets, but their rising costs and competition from cheaper produce have forced them to lose their edge in their prime markets. Neighboring Arab countries are swamping the Lebanese market with cheap produce while closing their doors to Lebanese produce, which have been hurt by badly negotiated agricultural agreements. Farmers often cite the agreements with Syria, Jordan and Egypt as disastrous and some are even calling for the suspension of Lebanon’s membership to the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement, which is due to enter into force in 2005.

“All hell is going to break loose once GAFTA is implemented,” said Bsat, who develops his own varieties of fruits and sells them to supermarkets. “We are already facing stiff competition from their produce now and it will only become harder to sell our produce once the markets open further under GAFTA and the World Trade Organization.”

Waddah Fakhri, head of the Southern Farmers’ Association, wants the government to suspend Lebanon’s membership in GAFTA until farmers are ready to compete with goods from the Arab World. “The government has negotiated trade agreements without consulting farmers, who bear higher production costs than neighboring countries and lack the standards needed to export,” said Waddah.

One sector that is set to suffer from the government’s negotiating blunders is the flower industry. Under Lebanon’s Association Agreement with the European Union, tariffs on flowers were fixed at 30% and are set to go down further once Lebanon’s five-year grace period for lowering tariffs on European imports is over. The whole problem started when the government in 2000 slashed tariffs on flowers from 105% to 30% while it was negotiating with the EU. Following lobbying by Lebanon’s flower growers, the government agreed to raise it again to 70%, but it was too late; the Europeans had agreed on 30% and were sticking to it.

“Our sector suffers from government apathy and inconsistent policies toward the agriculture sector,” said Rania Younes, the owner of several nurseries in Lebanon. “Lebanon has human resources and the know-how to compete. We do not need mass agricultural areas to export. We can plant specialized products from small pieces of land.”

Besides the European Agreement, Lebanon’s flower sector is already suffering from a special agreement with Saudi Arabia, which is exporting flowers to Lebanon at minimal tariffs, she added. With only a few good trade agreements, Lebanese farmers require marketing cash to venture into new markets. Outside Export Plus, there is hardly any cash for marketing. “With a 0.4% budget out of the total government budget there is not much we can do,” said Louis Lahoud, director general at the agricultural ministry. “But we are working on a development plan for the agricultural sector to which the government has allocated LL5 billion ($3.3 million).”

Agriculturists agree that the government should start to control the sector by regulating standards and resolving the pricing anarchy in the domestic market that drove agriculturalists to seek price stability of supermarkets, despite stiff competition. “If we are able to regulate standards and prices in the domestic market, it would be much easier to do the same for our exports,” said Bsat.

Agriculturalists also want the ministry of agriculture to direct farmers to plant crops that could be used by the industrial sector. “A potentially successful road for developing the Lebanese agriculture sector is agro-industry,” said Debbane. “The government can develop Export Plus into a scheme inclusive of the agro-industry and a scheme for renewing orchards to introduce new varieties.”

According to Debbane, donors, who have pooled millions of dollars into agricultural projects that were doomed for failure due to political intervention or government inaction, need to divert the funds to the private sector. “Donors helping Lebanon develop its agriculture sector should pass this money to the private sector because the institutions of the Lebanese government have proved to be inefficient.”

THE ISRAELI EXAMPLE

Farmers and agricultural engineers point to the example of Israel, a country whose agricultural space and climate is similar but less diverse than Lebanon, but whose export potential has been propelled by staunch government backing. Similar to Lebanon, Israel’s agricultural land was being eaten away by a construction boom, declining number of farmers and a strain on its limited water resources, which had to be used to irrigate extensive desert land that Lebanon does not have. That did not stop the Israeli government from forging ahead in the 1990’s with an aggressive marketing campaign and research.


“When Israeli farmers wanted to introduce a new variety of grapes into England, the government spent $1 to $2 million on the marketing campaign,” said agricultural engineer Imad Bsat. Israel in the 1960’s was primarily known for the famous Jaffa oranges, but in the 1990’s its agricultural landscape changed. Instead of planting just citrus products, the Israeli government heavily invested into research, prodding its traditional farmers in the kibbutzes to adopt new agricultural products.

Currently, Israel’s exports around $200 million a year in flowers – a third of its fresh agricultural exports – an amount equivalent to Lebanon’s annual agro-industrial exports. “Each day an El Al plane leaves Tel Aviv and lands in Holland, the world’s flower market, carrying fresh flowers,” said economist Riad Saade. “Flowers are an example of a high-value added industry that can be easily developed in Lebanon.”

Lebanon’s flower exports in 2003 were around $300,000, based on customs figures. According to the Israeli government, it provides nearly 40% of Europe’s off-season fruit and vegetable market, and ranks second only to Holland in European flower sales. Israel’s fresh and processed agricultural exports stood at $1 billion in 2002. Nearly 60% of its exports were fresh produce, mainly headed to Europe, based on the figures of the Israeli ministry of agriculture. Israel does not only export agricultural produce, its also exports around $1 billion in agricultural technology each year.

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Lending a hand to farmers

by Thomas Schellen April 1, 2004
written by Thomas Schellen

Abi Habib: `Our loans are convenient, because they are cheap… and long term`

In making agriculture more sustainable in recent years, the availability of financing options has seen some important improvements. The number of loans to the agro sector has mushroomed in the last two years, especially through loans granted under the Kafalat loan guarantee program.

Lebanese farmers and small agricultural enterprises commonly encountered problems in accessing loans at commercial banks, whose focus of business would rarely include agriculture and whose branch networks were concentrated away from rural areas. Agriculturalists on their part were often reluctant to seek bank loans, which carried high interest charges and requirements to post land as collateral, a stipulation which the small land owners and family farmers viewed as running contrary to their traditions.

This placed agriculturalists in a situation where sponsored programs were most appropriate to their needs. One type of such finance vehicle is micro finance, which fundamentally aims at enabling poor people to realize their potential for economic productivity. The tool to achieve this is provision of micro credits with strict repayment discipline, modeled after a development concept popularized over the last two decades through the collateral-free lending activities of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Over 20 foreign and domestic NGOs have involved themselves since the mid 1990s in managing the provision of such loans to Lebanese individuals and small enterprises, in many instances with an emphasis on serving specific communities or geographic regions.

An UNDP country survey from 1997 found that the concept encountered a notable amount of skepticism at that time, but a 2002 paper for a World Bank development debate drew a more promising picture on the potential of micro finance for Lebanon. Presently, accumulated NGO-driven micro lending activities with a ceiling of $5,000 per loan are estimated to stand at a level of around $30 million. As charities, micro finance NGOs are dependent on donor contributions. Except for micro lending initiatives within general lending by commercial banks, the activity is yet to be regulated, making it difficult to analyze the overall scope, distribution and performance. “Some of the NGOs have become more productive, others less,” said economist Joey Ghaleb, who co-authored the 2002 paper.

Experts said that new dynamics would enter this realm and boost the micro finance volume when the central bank implements a planned framework, under which banks will be allowed to utilize a portion of their statutory reserves for advancing funds to micro lending. For the time being, the Kafalat program remains the best non-commercial loan. Kafalat is the loan guarantee corporation whose shareholders are the National Institute for the Guarantee of Deposits and 50 commercial banks. The company was established in 1999 and its portfolio of loan guarantees has seen a tremendous increase from mid 2002, to reach a total amount of $199.2 million at the end of February 2004. With 1,355 loans, agriculture accounted for almost half of all guarantees awarded.

“Our loans are convenient, because they are cheap and more importantly, they are long-term,” said Kafalat chairman, Khater Abi Habib. Loans benefiting from the scheme, under which Kafalat guarantees 75% of principal and interest up to a ceiling of $200,000, can go a long way to help farmers restructure their activities, or enter new activities on land that had been under-exploited.

As it does not stipulate a minimum loan amount, the scheme could also be accessible to clients whose needs are in the range of micro finance. Kafalat as a rule processes loan guarantee requests within three weeks. A characteristic of the program suited to the needs of small businesses, and farmers in particular, is the low reliance on real estate collateral. “With the presence of our guarantees,” Abi Habib said, “it has not become totally easy but much easier.”

While not designed to finance major agro-industrial projects, the scheme allows the infusion of larger amounts into agro-industry through the nation’s industrial lending program. “I saw a number of agro-industrial concerns financed by central bank-subsidized loans creating sure markets for agriculturalists as suppliers of raw materials,” said Abi Habib, “and those agriculturalists are in turn being financed by banks on basis of the strength of the purchase contracts given to them by agro-industrialists, plus the strength of market developments and guarantees given by Kafalat.”

As medium-term facilities, the low-interest seven-year loans with a one-year grace period are suited to the needs of most agriculturalists. One sub sector of agriculture to which the parameters of Kafalat loan guarantees are less well suited, however, is tree farming. To start operation of an orchard, a farmer needs finance facilities that are repayable over 12 to 15 years, with a three-year grace period. For this, Kafalat guarantees are inadequate and a source of long-term funding would be needed, with possible sponsors including Lebanon’s usual partners in lending and aid programs, such as the World Bank, EU and their affiliated finance institutions.

The loan guarantee company is engaged in continuous efforts to inform its client base of existing or potential small and medium entrepreneurs. “The best marketing is for us to be in the midst of our potential users,” said Abi Habib, “the north is our weakest market, and that’s why the largest portion of our visits and activities is now to the north.”

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Q&A Samih Barbir

by Executive Contributor April 1, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

Lebanon’s Investment Development Authority, IDAL, figures twofold in the task of promoting the national agriculture and agro-industry sectors. Under the 2001 investment law 360, the agency offers incentives to investments into strategic sectors of the economy, including agriculture and agro-industry. For the past three years, the IDAL mandate also extended to supporting agricultural exports through the Export Plus program offering farmers transportation subsidies and quality certification for produce. In February 2004, IDAL and the nation’s agro-industrialists signed a collaboration for an Agro Market Access Program (Agromap). EXECUTIVE talked to IDAL chairman and managing director, Samih Barbir, about the agency’s achievements and plans in relation to the agro sector.

Where does IDAL set its priorities in supporting agriculture and agro-industry?

In Lebanon, we don’t have large volumes in agricultural production. Therefore, our main priority is quality. The successful experience of Export Plus of having two international firms implementing quality control has proven to be a very important factor in marketing Lebanese agricultural products abroad.

When you discuss Export Plus as a success story, where are the highlights, and what are the areas still in need for development?

The level of success is simply the fact that we witnessed an increase in our exports. In the first year, it was a big increase of 15%, in the second year, 5%, and last year, it was stabilizing. But one has to look at it in a different way. Before the launch of Export Plus, we were on a downward slope. Exports were dropping and the whole sector was suffering a lot, due to many problems. Maintaining a stable level of approximately 360,000 tons in exports per year is a success in itself. We experienced some additional difficulties, such as some bad weather hitting Lebanon over the last two years, the devaluation of the currency in Turkey and the war in Iraq, all of which affected our export markets.

In your statistics, 99% of agricultural exports went to GCC countries, plus Syria and Jordan. What can IDAL do to improve agro exports across other markets?

The GCC are the natural market. The Iraqi market is a new one that we are trying to enter right now. But our main objective is to enter European markets. We are doing a lot of contact work with all the embassies here, especially Eastern European ones. As a first target, we are trying to enter those countries that have the least obstacles.

Your 2003 report states that about 5% of agricultural products destined for exports to Arab countries were rejected in quality inspections. Would the same quality requirements apply to produce destined for Europe?

Exports to Europe would have to meet higher and different quality requirements. They have some very strict controls on pesticide residues and other issues that are not required by Arab countries. That is why we have to inform those farmers prior to starting to control their products.

On the other side of the coin, IDAL has the mission to draw in investments. How is this progressing as far as attracting agricultural investors?

We offer the same incentives to projects in all the sectors listed in the [Investment Development] law, as are tourism, ICT, agro-industry, industry in general and agriculture. The only difference is that agricultural projects have the lowest minimum investment requirements to qualify for incentives.

How have agricultural and agro-industry projects fared in terms of attracting investors?

We have two agro-industry projects that are being processed under the one-stop-shop service. The law is still relatively new and the incentives are new. It takes some time to let people know about it. We are planning to do a campaign by the middle of this year, to promote those incentives. But definitely, compared to tourism, it is still very shy.

Can you name an amount for the value of one of those two projects, to give an idea of the magnitude?

The project that has progressed further is for $4.3 million. Don’t expect to get big figures in this industry.

How much funding for agricultural export promotion do you have at your disposal?

The Export Plus program was approved for LL100 billion spread over the four years, 2001 to 2004.

How much have you dispersed to date?

A bit less than LL30 billion each year. We can handle the program until the end of this year. We might need some more [funding] but there is no problem in that. Theoretically, it should be covered.

Under the new Agromap project, you are sponsoring participation of Lebanese exhibitors in trade shows in Beirut, Paris, and New York. How does this interlace with the promotion of agricultural exports under Export Plus, where you described the strongest markets and prospects as being in the Gulf and Eastern Europe?

With Agromap, we are targeting a different sector, agro-industry, and are promoting Lebanese agro-industry products. We are doing this as a pilot project in 2004 and I wanted to reach the Arab, European and North American markets, to see what the impact would be. We will evaluate each event right afterwards and depending on those three events, we could consider going into another round with a bigger budget in 2005.

Did you allocate equally to each fair, Horeca in Beirut, the Fancy Food Show in New York, and Sial in Paris?

Between the US and France, there will be equal space. Lebanon will be bigger. Here, much more people will come because they do not have the transportation issue. Horeca also accounts for biggest amount in the budget.

How was the response from the industry?

The first results are very good. For Horeca, we have about 35 industrialists and for the Fancy Food Show about 15. We are over-subscribed but I wouldn’t call that a problem. We will have the luxury to choose the best products to represent Lebanon abroad.

What will you provide to the companies that qualify for participation?

We will have a Lebanese pavilion, and we will cover 100% of the rent and the stand decorations. Exhibitors will have to cover their transportation and other costs.
 

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Moneyed marriage

by Tony Hchaime April 1, 2004
written by Tony Hchaime

Following the failed merger talks between Banque Audi and Banque Libano-Francaise in 2002, few anticipated the announcement of last month’s $159 million merger acquisition of Banque Audi and Banque Saradar. Moreover, such a merger differs significantly from the type of consolidation sought by the central bank, namely a consolidation of the smaller, less efficient, banks in the country. Nevertheless, the announcement of the Audi-Saradar merger took the market by surprise at first, only to make significant sense as details of the transaction began to trickle down to the market.

The deal ($100 million in cash and $59 million in shares), will lead to the creation of the largest banking group in the country and have significant implications on a number of levels related to the banks themselves, the banking sector locally and regionally, and Lebanon’s economy.

Banks in Lebanon have been facing a growingly competitive domestic environment over the past few years, not to mention the significant difficulties such banks are facing when attempting to venture into Arab markets. Lebanese banks lack the scale, efficiencies, and branding to establish a strong presence on the turf of banks like Saudi American Bank, National Bank of Kuwait and Arab Bank, among others. In that regard, the sheer scale of the combined Audi-Saradar entity provides the group with the cornerstone upon which to build a regional platform. With total combined assets in excess of $9 billion ($12 billion including fiduciary deposits, security accounts, and assets under management), the group begins to close the gap with the likes of Arab Bank, whose assets at year-end 2003 reached almost $24 billion.

There are also a number of financial, human, and commercial synergies that underline the drivers of the transaction. Both banks achieved significant growth rates over the past few years, with Banque Audi’s total asset and deposit growth reaching 38% and 42% respectively in 2003. In parallel, Banque Saradar’s total assets and deposits increased by 11% and 13% respectively over the same period. With such growth rates achieved individually, the now combined entity is likely to generate additional growth, and further widen the gap with other leading banks in the country.

Prior to the merger, Banque Audi benefited from a strong grip on the retail commercial banking market in Lebanon, gaining significant ground on retail-oriented competitors, including large banks, such as Byblos and Bank of Beirut, in addition to medium-sized retail banks, such as Al Mawarid. Saradar, on the other hand, benefited from a strong grip on the private banking and investment banking market in Lebanon, while lacking the retail aspect of commercial banking. With the consolidation of both banks into one entity, they have successfully created one banking corporation that can provide the full range of services, targeting both retail consumers and those seeking personalized private banking services. In that regard, the new entity might introduce a new competitive spirit to a sector in which few banks can efficiently provide a full range of financial services. However, customers of smaller banks in Lebanon typically favor such small-sized institutions because they offer a more personalized banking approach. As such, they would be less at risk than larger institutions – with the latter perhaps seeking to engage in M&A activities – seeking complimenting banks to merge with, in an effort to ward off any erosion of their market shares.

On the commercial front, both banks’ commercial strategies highly compliment each other. Banque Audi is highly aggressive on retail banking, dishing out new products for end consumers almost on a monthly basis, coupled with a range of insurance services through its Libano-Arabe subsidiary. Banque Saradar is more private banking oriented, with efforts to target the high-income high-net-worth individuals and groups in Lebanon and abroad. In that regard, the banks compliment each other in such a way as to target the totality of the market, from the low-income retail customer to the high-net-worth Lebanese and Arab individuals.

Moreover, both banks’ organization and personnel structures are highly synergistic, sharing many similarities in their overall culture and management approach. Such synergies were emphasized by Raymond Audi’s statement that “[the] two banks share the same values within an overall corporate culture based on integrity, transparency, innovation and quality.”

As per the terms of the merger, the Saradar shareholders will receive shares amounting to about 9% of the combined entity. As such, the new merged bank will benefit from a strong shareholder base, combining prominent Lebanese shareholders with well-connected high profile Gulf-based shareholders. In that regard, Banque Audi has historically sought to acquire certain institutions to benefit from their well-established regional shareholders, as was the case with the acquisition of Lebanon Invest.


It should be clearly outlined, however, that the Audi-Saradar merger is not limited to the banks themselves, as it has significant implications on the banking sector in Lebanon, the region, and the Lebanese economy.

The primary implications are certainly on Banks Audi and Saradar themselves. However, such implications are likely to coincide with the factors that drove the banks to merge in the first place. As such, the implications are likely to be mostly of a positive nature, capitalizing on the synergies between the banks. The combined efforts of Audi and Saradar are likely to further boost growth in deposits, loans, and overall assets, and are thus likely to further reinforce their position as the largest banking group in Lebanon.

Now we should see other big banks such as BLOM look at alternative routes to preserve its position in the Lebanese and regional market. Industry experts indicate that a drastic strategic change, although perhaps necessary, may not fit as well within BLOM’s culture. In fact, despite its scale, BLOM remains a “family-business,” much less institutionalized than Audi and Saradar. At Audi, the bank’s management consists of a team of professionals from various backgrounds, which have no major shareholdings in the bank. At BLOM, the bank’s management is tightly in the hands of Saad Azhari, vice chairman, and son of the bank’s founder and major shareholders. In this regard, BLOM may be less willing to open up its capital to other institutions or investors. Nevertheless, certain market developments that may endanger the bank’s position in the market may finally drive the Azharis to succumb to pressures and engage in the M&A route.

The word on the street is that the Audi-Saradar merger is the necessary trigger to the much-awaited wave of consolidation in the Lebanese banking sector. Essentially, this would be true if the proper drivers behind the transaction are clearly communicated to the market as incentives for others to follow suit. Moreover, the synergies between Audi and Saradar may not be so evident to other banking institutions in the country. Nevertheless, many banks in Lebanon realize the eventual necessity of consolidation, as they face the competitive risks brought forward by local and regional large-scale banks. In that regard, they are also heavily supported by the central bank, which is favoring consolidation in an effort to reduce the fragmentation in the sector and improve efficiencies. It is likely, however, that other banks will closely watch Audi’s ability to successfully consolidate its operations with Saradar as a precedent to taking any such actions themselves.

It was clearly articulated by the chairmen of both Audi and Saradar that combining the two entities significantly enhances their chances of successfully expanding regionally. This would certainly make sense given the necessities required to establish a presence in Arab markets. The GCC banking environment is highly competitive, requiring aggressive marketing, scale, advanced IT systems, a full range of banking and financial services, professionalism and efficiencies. While some Lebanese banks may achieve some of these characteristics, none actually benefit from the combination of such parameters, certainly not to the scale required by sophisticated Arab investors. Eventually, however, Lebanese banks will have to make some defensive move to defend even their local market shares, as the large-scale Arab banks have been somewhat successful in venturing in the Lebanese market, and many have been able to carve themselves a significant market share locally.

On a more general note, the Lebanese economy stands to be greatly affected by such a consolidation in the sector. In the short-term, the economy may be ill-affected by the higher degree of unemployment that typically results from consolidations. On a longer term basis, larger, stronger and more efficient financial institutions offering a full range of financial services, up to international standards, may allow the country to regain its role as a regional financial hub – a role taken away by Bahrain and Dubai.
Tony Hchaime is an investment banker at the Middle-East Capital group (MECG).

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Sphere of influence

by Michael Young April 1, 2004
written by Michael Young

In mid-February, the London-based daily Al-Hayat published an Arabic version of a US working paper that was to be presented to the G-8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia, from June 8 to 10. The paper, which was prepared “for G-8 Sherpas,” or senior advisors, outlined what the Americans have called the Greater Middle East Partnership (GME). The aim of the US is to see the GME project adopted by the wider G8, so that it can act as a basis to help “forge a long-term partnership with the Greater Middle East’s reform leaders and launch a coordinated response to promote political, economic, and social reform in the region.” In mid-March,New York Times reported that the document would not be presented the Sea Island summit after all. However, a senior US official privately noted this was incorrect, and that what may change is the way the document’s ideas are proposed: rather than be submitted unilaterally as G8 policy, it may be presented, more diplomatically, as a response to Arab requests. The three broad guidelines of future G8 action, according to the document, are the promotion of democracy and good governance, the building of a knowledge society, and the expansion of economic opportunities.

In early March, in the run-up to Arab League summit in Tunis at the end of the month, there was considerable criticism directed against GME in the Arab world. Arab states were divided into three groups on how to respond to the initiative, with one group supporting a dialogue on it, a second advocating caution, and a third calling for outright rejection for what was deemed meddling in Arab affairs. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, for example, declared: “We should not give others the opportunity to map out our future, define our course, or work on reforming us. We must take the initiative ourselves.” Sheikh Khalifa Bin Salman Al Khalifa of Bahrain noted that “imposition of any foreign view point separately is not in the interests of countries of the region.”

In a commentary in the English-language Al-Ahram Weekly, Egyptian commentator Mohamed Sid-Ahmad spoke for many Arabs when he noted that affirmation of a “greater Middle East,” by expanding the geographical boundaries of the region, “dilutes the importance of the Palestinian problem and demotes it from its central position on the political stage of the Middle East to a marginal position as just one of several ‘hot’ issues plaguing a much wider region.”

However, even a cursory reading of the US working paper shows it to be a remarkably satisfying wish list of reform for the region, with many of its principles already being applied through bilateral programs. Nor were the framers intimidated by the unilateralist preferences dominating in some quarters in Washington. Aside from relying heavily on the UNDP’s Arab Human Development Report of 2002, which was written exclusively by Arabs, the document emphasized that “genuine reform in the GME must be driven internally” through the civil societies of the region. In other words, the G-8, if the GME project is agreed, has the potential to be a hybrid Marshall Plan and Helsinki process for the Middle East. So, why is there such animosity toward it in the Arab world and Iran? The easy answer is that no leader wants the West to advance social, political and economic processes that will undeniably erode their own power. As the halting reform efforts in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria have proven, change is only acceptable when it can ensure, or enhance, the authority of existing regimes. From the perspective of most Arab populations, however, bona fide reform must imply a possible change of leadership. Another fear in the region, as Sid-Ahmad suggested, is that GME would simply detract from the centrality of the Palestinian problem. While no one would quibble with the necessity to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the insistence on using it as a benchmark to judge GME carries with it a high price tag. For one thing, Middle East reform must not be held hostage to a conflict most states in the region cannot control; for another, true regional reform would, one assumes, positively affect the behavior of Israelis and Palestinians as much as it would that of surrounding states.

However, there is a more fundamental reason for the regional animosity to GME, and it comes from the two very different philosophies defining state-to-state relations – one prevailing in the Middle East, the other in the West. In the past decade or so, the concept of state sovereignty has been recast in the West, so that states can no longer hide behind it to shield their more harmful policies. Whether due to humanitarian intervention, international efforts to curtail war crimes, regional cooperation projects, or the expanded role of the UN, state boundaries are eroding at breakneck speed. Even American neo-conservatives are, above all else, enemies of sovereignty as a barrier to the dissemination of Western, or indeed American, values.

This is alien to the Middle East, where brutish regimes have always received a free ride (including from the US) on the grounds that outsiders had no right to interfere in their affairs. What emerged was a conspiracy of silence, as all were complicit in the nasty order of things. However, GME – much like the Euro-Med partnership agreements or the US Middle East Partnership Initiative – is a reaffirmation that what is bad for the Middle East can also, ultimately, be bad for the rest of the world. That was the message of September 11, and the inability of the region to fully gauge the importance of that day is why so many have trouble understanding the importance of GME, as well as the West’s commitment to regional reform.

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Q&A: Freddie Baz

by Executive Staff April 1, 2004
written by Executive Staff

How long were the two banks involved in negotiations before signing the agreement to form a single group?

The two banks have had a long proactive relationship. Every now and then we sat together on the managerial level and assessed the situation of the banking industry in Lebanon and the consolidation process. In this favorable environment, more direct talks started two to three months ago but as one issue among several in our meetings. After negotiations started in serious, the whole process didn’t take more than one month.

Then it was a smooth procedure?

It was a very smooth procedure. The two parties are really open minded and not driven by any subjective considerations, which normally present an important obstacle for merger operations. There was never any ego dimension. Issues came up in a healthy way and never generated emotional attitudes or structural obstacles.

Will you form a group of banks or a single bank?

When Banque Audi becomes the sole shareholder of Saradar, Saradar shareholders will change part of their shares into Audi shares, and therefore will become shareholders of Banque Audi. We call the new entity that is emerging, the Audi-Saradar group, which, however, is not a legal concept. From an accounting standpoint, Banque Audi is the holding company where all the accounts of all the subsidiaries will be consolidated.

Under perspective of management culture and operational environment, would you describe the deal more as a merger or more as an acquisition?

In a merger, one institution absorbs another institution, which is not the case here. Both banks are keeping their legal status. As Banque Audi is paying partly in cash and partly in new Audi shares to be issued exclusively to Saradar shareholders, you can consider the cash configuration as an acquisition and the share configuration as a merger. But the spirit of the negotiations was the most important element, and the spirit was the spirit of a rapprochement of two banking groups into one mega group, which is Audi-Saradar. It is really a rapprochement between two banks, creating huge synergies at different levels: human, managerial, franchises, commercial, financial and so forth.

Is the absence of the merger law going to affect the process?

The scheme that I was describing by definition does not get any benefits from the merger law. Even if the law were in place, we would not have been granted any soft loan, because both entities are still operating and no license will be given back to the central bank.

Was size ever a consideration in the discussions?

Size has never been a target for us. Banque Audi’s target has always been to be among the best banks in Lebanon, not the biggest bank of Lebanon. However, when you reach the high quality level, which we believe we have reached over the last three years, your customer base obviously expands, and size follows.

Is your key strategic aim domestic or regional?

Both are related. You cannot expand beyond your national boundaries if you haven’t reached a mass in the domestic market. It is surprising that a country like Lebanon, which has developed its banking industry to 3.5 times the level of GDP, couldn’t build private entities with a size that would allow them to compete with regional banks. If two, three or four major banking groups in Lebanon materialize, and if each of those banks have a size similar to the top two or three in some countries in the region, we have a lot of chances to gain market shares in those markets.

Will financial firm Lebanon Invest be taken out of the market?

Who said that? By definition, if a merger or acquisition results in having three of four insurance companies or investment companies, the healthiest solution is to consolidate internally. But for the time being I cannot say that we have decided to liquidate this or merge that. Without going more into specifics, I can say we are in the process of reassessing all subsidiaries in order to generate the highest financial synergies.

But is it correct to say that Saradar Investment House will be absorbed into Audi Investment Bank?

If you believe in internal consolidation, by definition you have to consider it internally. For the time being there are no schemes at all for any of those entities. Starting with the signatures under the merger-acquisition agreement, we are becoming one entity. In each single entity, the best people have to manage the business, and in each subsidiary, the best people will get the responsibilities warranted by their expertise. I do not comment on these issues now because the steering committee has been assigned. It will assess the real values in each business. There are no preset positions.

How long do you estimate the steering committee to have to work on these assessments?

The committee’s role is to ensure the rapprochement’s best and optimal conditions to assure the interests of the new shareholders, which represent the old shareholders of both entities. It is a matter of not just assessing material things. In view of our size, it should take a minimum of two months or perhaps three.

In any merger, people in the involved companies have concerns over their jobs. Did you discuss any redundancies?

No. Since these entities will operate under their actual status, there is definitely room for all the people working for the group. The business synergies resulting from the rapprochement will probably create need for further jobs in the group.

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Revitalizing banking

by Tony Hchaime April 1, 2004
written by Tony Hchaime

Despite its proud regional reputation, Lebanon’s banking sector has faced a number of hurdles in the past few years. Strong regional competition, stemming from the spawning of a number of large-scale Arab banks – mainly in the Gulf – have created obstacles for a sector seeking expansion, while a high level of liquidity, a large number of small-scale, inefficient banks, and an overcapacity of banking institutions for a country of Lebanon’s size have not helped the sector.

The central bank, in close conjunction with the Association of Lebanese Banks, has been working hard to overhaul the banking sector and allow it to regain its regional competitive advantages. One initiative was the unprecedented move in late February by the central bank to amend two laws – 1998’s law number 7055 and 1999’s law number 7274 – allowing Lebanese banks to lend to non-residents and invest in foreign debt securities respectively.

The amendments to law number 7055 would allow any Lebanese bank to extend loans to non-residents up to an amount of 5% of its equity per borrower. The total loans to non-residents, however, may not exceed an aggregate amount of 25% of the bank’s equity. This compares to a ceiling of 20% per resident borrower.

Prior the amendment to law number 7274, banks were restricted to securities issued by the governments of no more than 10 nations, including the US, Japan, and certain European countries. The new changes allow Lebanese banks to invest in any foreign debt security, be it sovereign or corporate, as long as the security is rated BBB or higher by any of the internationally recognized rating agencies, such as Standards and Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s.

The moves are being highly debated in Lebanese financial circles, as they constitute a major turnaround in the policies of central bank governor Riad Salameh, who was traditionally set on maintaining a high level of liquidity in the banking sector in Lebanon, and ensuring that such liquidity remains within the country’s borders (a policy that was underpinned by the two original laws). As such the central bank’s change in direction raises questions as to the motives behind the amendments to the laws.

The banking sector in Lebanon has grown substantially over the past few years, with growth in assets and deposits witnessing a compounded average annual growth of 15% each between 2000 and 2004. Following the events of September 11, and the subsequent so-called US-led war on terror, Arab funds have been flowing into Lebanese banks, increasing liquidity. Salameh has estimated the excess liquidity in the Lebanese banking sector at the beginning of 2004 at almost $5 billion.

On the other hand, Lebanon’s investment environment, although witnessing significant growth in certain sectors is relatively small, compared to the level of funds available for investments. Despite the lower interest rate environment, deposit rates on foreign currency deposits remain in excess of 4% among the large Lebanese banks, and may be even higher for long-term, large deposits. With such developments occurring rapidly, Lebanese banks faced problems in securing high-yielding uses of funds. A globally low interest rate environment, a limited investment climate in Lebanon, and a high risk surrounding Lebanese government bonds, might have made it difficult for Lebanese banks to achieve enough returns on all the excess liquidity to justify paying such interest rates on deposits.

In a pre-emptive move, the central bank allowed Lebanese banks to seek alternative investments for their funds, albeit in a highly selective and restricted manner, aimed at maintaining the sector’s image of safety and high liquidity. The market for such investments may be lucrative. However, the rapid growth of infrastructure-related projects in the region requires a massive amount of debt financing by regional banks. Infrastructure projects are spawning in the Gulf and Africa, in such sectors as power-generation, water desalination, and others. To this day, the long-term financing required by such projects has been restricted to international banks and major Arab (non-Lebanese) banks. Such projects present attractive lending opportunities for Lebanese banks enjoying high levels of liquidity. In fact, such projects typically enjoy a high level of safety and cash flow predictability, as they are often guaranteed by government organizations or international insurance coverage policies offered by such institutions as the World Bank affiliated Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).

In such a sense, the Lebanese banking sector stands to greatly benefit from such opportunities. On the profitability front, Lebanese banks may substantially widen their interest margins, achieving higher returns on loans to non-resident companies in the region. Such returns would compare favorably to the low-yield deposits by Lebanese banks at foreign financial institutions. Moreover, such moves by Lebanese banks would significantly improve their efforts to expand regionally and compete with major Arab banks. While Lebanese banks have been historically successful in attracting Arab funds, their abilities to invest funds outside Lebanon have been highly restricted by the central bank’s regulations. The recent amendments would certainly allow Lebanese banks to aggressively expand geographically.

It remains to be seen, however, if such changes by the central bank are a precursor to more liberalization in the sector in the near future. Banking experts fail to see any other major changes in the near-term, unless drastic changes in market conditions necessitate it. After all, changes in market conditions such as the sudden increase in excess liquidity, and the lack of investment opportunities in Lebanon were potentially the main drive behind the central bank’s move to liberalize foreign lending and investment.

On the other hand, the central bank’s attention is likely to turn to a consolidation of the sector in the near term. The recently announced merger between Banque Audi and Banque Saradar has triggered much speculation as to the possibility of the merger becoming the first of a series of such activities, aimed at consolidating the highly fragmented banking sector. While the central bank governor has yet to approve the Audi-Saradar alliance, such moves have been historically encouraged by the central bank. This latest development may be used by the governor as a launching pad to entice other players in the sector to follow suit, or face the risk of being dwarfed by the scale of local and regional market leaders.

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Trouble with stocks

by Nicolas Photiades April 1, 2004
written by Nicolas Photiades

The re-opening of the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE) in 1996 offered local businesses the means to raise equity funding to finance restructuring and development plans, as well as expansion strategies. It also coincided nicely with the rise in emerging market equities, and the initial listings of Lebanese companies and banks, such as Solidere, Banque Audi and Bank of Beirut, met with immediate and substantial rises in stock prices.

However, for the past six years, the BSE has been a thorough disappointment – a condition partly explained by global factors affecting emerging and other Arab markets. Last year, while many Arab stock markets experienced growth of between 20% and 70% in 2003, the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE) experienced none. It has been plagued by illiquidity and tiny total market capitalization, which by mid-February 2004 amounted to around $1.7 billion (including over-the-counter stocks, such as Société des Grands Hotels du Liban [SGHL], the Casino du Liban and the ABC). Some stocks can now spend an entire week without any trading, while it is not unusual to see that one or two stocks can account for 100% of daily trading. In the “boom” years Solidere’s market capitalization alone used to reach $1.7 billion.

Lebanon’s depressed economic environment and the consequently low credit rating of the country (B- by Standard & Poor’s) are no doubt the overriding reasons behind the BSE’s stagnation. A stable economic and, more importantly, political environment is key and has been the key driver behind the relative success of the Amman Stock Exchange, which now boasts more than 100 listed companies.

There are, however, other factors. While an uncertain geopolitical situation has constantly driven away local and international investors, the absence of a domestic Capital Markets Authority, an equivalent of the US’ Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has had a greater effect on dampening the enthusiasm and appetite of local, regional and international investors. Were the government to have set up a local Capital Markets Authority simultaneously with the re-opening of the BSE, a significantly larger number of quality investors, with a greater focus on transparency and proper regulation, would have been attracted by Lebanese listed stocks.

The government’s “generous” fiscal policy of the mid-1990s, which meant that interest rates on Lebanese pound deposits and Treasury bills were significantly high – at one point, T-bills paid interest rates reaching the 45% mark – turned domestic investors’ funds and savings towards bank deposits and debt instruments, and away from domestic shares. The Solidere shares suffered particularly as a result. The high interest rate structure on deposits and debt securities contributed significantly in the premature end of an equity investing culture in Lebanon.

The lack of diverse BSE stocks also contributed significantly towards its demise. The listing of real estate, cement companies and banks was not enough in terms of diversification, with domestic and international investors requiring a wider choice of sector stocks in order to efficiently diversify their investment portfolio. A stock exchange must reflect the diversification of its local economy, and clearly this was not the case for the BSE. Foreign investors assumed that the Lebanese economy had very little scope for diversification and decided to reduce their exposure to Lebanon. In comparison, the Amman Stock Exchange is much more diversified and includes a large number of stocks emanating from different sectors. Banks there account for a significant portion of the exchange’s market capitalization, particularly the Arab Bank, which is regarded as one of the few international pan-Arab institutions. In contrast, Solidere, the BSE’s largest stock, is domestically focused and carries less importance in relation to the economy than a bank.

Company managers in Lebanon never really realized that the basis for efficient financial and operating management consists of diversifying funding and financing expansion mainly with equity. Today, companies are stuck in a situation where their cash flow is completely or significantly absorbed by debt servicing, and capital stock cannot be increased, as their creditworthiness and capitalization levels are negatively affected. Strong financial fundamentals and an apparently solid creditworthiness are essential for a successful public share offering as credit risk forms an essential part of the equity investment decision.

The limited number of investment banks and specialized finance companies in Lebanon, acting as intermediaries between the stock exchange and companies, was also a reason behind the current lack of development of the BSE. The lack of market makers has led to a secondary market illiquidity and the immediate loss of value of initial public offerings. The Gulf countries, on the other hand, have more developed brokerage and finance company sectors, which make markets on a much larger panoply of stocks and other securities.

The capital structure of the majority of Lebanese institutions, which is based on family ownership and control, has been a major factor behind the under-development of the BSE. Family owners find it very difficult to concede part of their controlling stake to new shareholders, which are generally regarded as an outside threat to their total management control. Moreover, the local mentality has always focused on long-term banking relations rather than stock exchange listings, as the latter means a more stringent reporting discipline that family owners are generally unwilling to comply with. This state of play compares unfavorably with both Cairo and Amman, where transparency is a must and companies are more institutionalized.

This lack of desire to obtain a listing could be solved partly with governmental fiscal incentives that might encourage companies to list. Even though the government has already reduced the dividend tax from 10% to 5% for listed companies, this measure is still insufficient and should be compounded with other fiscal incentives. What would the treasury gain from an active BSE? Well, more income from taxes on trading and capital gains, as well as the development of local capital markets, which is crucial in providing local institutions with greater financial flexibility or with an ability to tap diversified funding sources.

A lackluster privatization program, which under any circumstances should have boosted the BSE exponentially, is regarded as another major reason for the loss of interest for Lebanese listed stocks. Although there is a current will to put privatization back on track, it comes way too late for the BSE, which could have benefited significantly from a few privatizations back in 1996-1997, when emerging market shares were in very high demand by international investors (eg, the success of the Banque Audi and BLOM GDRs during that period). Were one or two public companies to have been privatized in 1996, the BSE would have reached a strong momentum, which would have been more difficult to break in times of crisis, such as during the 1998 Russian/Asian crises. The collapse of Asian and Russian stocks in 1998 sent all emerging markets into a tailspin plunge. All Arab stock markets, which were just re-emerging after years of deep sleep (mainly in Lebanon, Egypt, and other North African countries), were significantly affected by this shock. The more recent Nasdaq debacle and corporate scandals in the US have also virtually killed off any remaining interest for stock exchange activities among Lebanese investors, who are buying stocks but to a much lesser extent than pre-2001. A significant number got burned very seriously after being badly advised by Lebanese brokers and private bankers.

The recession experienced by the Lebanese economy since 1998, and the political volatility of the last few years, contributed significantly towards the disappearance of international investor interest in Lebanese equities and the lack of faith and disheartening of local investors.

What is currently needed is above all an efficient and transparent government policy towards the domestic stock market and the development of domestic capital markets (including debt capital markets). The recent implementation of a sophisticated quotation system is a step in the right direction, but remains insufficient. Lebanon still has an inadequate regulatory framework as compared to Amman or Cairo, and has no capital markets authority to regulate capital markets as a whole. The establishment of such an authority has never been more necessary.

The acceleration and greater transparency of the privatization program and process, as well as the decrease in interest rates on the Lebanese pound, are also regarded as key factors towards the development of the BSE. The latter is a vital channel towards equity funding, and will be needed at one stage in the future, particularly by local banks, as some of them will have to increase their capital following the implementation of Basel II guidelines.

The Lebanese government’s role is crucial in the sense that it should make clear to the international investor community, through a series of continuous road shows in major cities, of its commitment to reforms and economic recovery. Investors need constant reassurance about a country’s future economic plans and have to feel comfortable with the level of transparency. The slightest doubt about the disclosure of economic plans would generally drive down any market in the world.

Finally, Lebanese banks, which claim to have developed investment banking activities, could have a major role to play in the future development of the BSE. These banks could offer advisory services to their corporate borrowers, encouraging them to follow a better and healthier financial and operational strategy. Equity financing, particularly as regards to new projects and expansion, forms the basis of corporate creditworthiness for any institution, and the revival of the BSE can only facilitate a move towards better credit quality and more efficient management.

Nicolas Photiades is managing director of Orion Financial Solutions. He is advisor to the Lebanese banking sector on securitization and structured financing.

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