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Business

Q&A: Khalil Daoud, director LibanPost

by Executive Contributor April 1, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

Why did the original LibanPost fold at the end of 2001?

The investors were upset at the slowness with which the agreement signed with the ministry of telecommunications was being implemented.

What was the state of the company when you took over?

There wasn’t a clear sense of direction. There wasn’t a clear vision.

What have you done since then?

We have improved quality, separated customer service and sales from distribution, renovated post offices and introduced a wide array of retail products – prepaid phone and internet cards, fuel coupons, newspapers magazines and maps, screensavers, stamps. We have also introduced a number of services, to make people’s lives easier. These include fax and photocopy facilities, as well as passport and residency renewal, military service postponement, and university degree certification services. We are trying to make LibanPost a serious intermediary between citizens and the various government departments, while making money along the way – because we are not a charity. We are a ‘front office’ for the government. Finally, we have invested in our 600 employees and in technology. We have invested about $1 million in computerizing the post offices. And recently, I received a telephone call from Fadi Abboud, head of the Lebanese Industrialists’ Association, asking me what we can do for Lebanon’s industrialists.

How serious are you about quality?

We are very serious about it. We have quality controllers who do nothing else all day long but ensure that the mail is delivered on time and that we don’t have issues with customers. We have a 24-hour National Control Center and a daily 9:30am meeting, during which we deal with any ‘incidents’ over the previous 24 hours. Any necessary amendments are made. We don’t hesitate to take drastic measures against our employees, if necessary.

What are your future plans?

In the near future we will be offering over-the-counter insurance products at our post offices – for cars, personal accident, things that are not complicated to sell and do not require medical exams. We just signed an agreement with the ministry of interior relating to the annual roadworthiness check, the renewal of drivers’ licenses, car registration etc. In addition, we plan to introduce two or three other services which should be announced soon. A few days ago, we established a new department within the company. It is responsible for printing, folding, and inserting into envelopes any publications. These are then immediately distributed. It is part of our plan to offer ‘complete solutions.’ We have reached an agreement with the ministry of telecommunications and the telephone company Ogero, under which we will print and distribute telephone bills. We hope this will prompt other utility companies and financial institutions, including insurance companies, to follow suit.

How much has LibanPost invested in these initiatives?

The printing and distribution initiative alone is worth $1 million. Along with the $1 million for the computerization initiative, that already makes $2 million in a year. That is significant. And it doesn’t include other things like digital map systems, which we are going to invest in. That is another couple of hundred thousand dollars.

What problems do you face?

Firstly, is very difficult to operate in a country that doesn’t have a proper addressing system. Secondly, many buildings do not have separate mailboxes for separate tenants. For LibanPost, this is catastrophic. The time wasted because of this is phenomenal. Mailmen have to knock on doors to deliver letters. Sometimes, it takes them 45 minutes to complete delivery to one building alone. Thirdly, not everyone knows of our services, and even if they do, they have to be induced to try them. We have an issue with the way we are communicating with the public and are in the process of addressing it.We can do better. We are finalizing a marketing and media program worth 2.5% of our projected turnover this year. I would like our media costs to one day reach 3%.

What is your projected turnover?

That’s not public information – several million dollars.

What were revenues for 2003?

They were 15% higher than for 2002, and revenues for 2002 were 12% higher than for 2001. And 2004 is planned to be 16% higher than 2003.

How about profits?

Our plan was to break even in 2004. We almost did that in 2003, so we’re slightly ahead of schedule. We now envisage a profit for 2004 – about 2.5% of revenues.

What influence does the government have?

All pricing is controlled by the government. We have some concerns about this. I understand that given the current economic environment the government wants to keep mail prices as low as possible. But from a private business perspective we don’t share those concerns. Also, LibanPost was supposed to be working in a monopolistic environment. Unfortunately, there are local Lebanese courier companies operating without licenses. They are competing with LibanPost in the profitable areas. It’s unfair.

Is there any theft of the contents of parcels opened by the authorities?

None at all.

April 1, 2004 1 comment
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Business

Making a meal of it

by Executive Contributor April 1, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

Chateau Ksara

Chateau Ksara, Lebanon’s biggest and oldest winery (it has been making wine in the Bekaa since 1857) boasts a 35% market share, producing nearly two million bottles each year with revenues of around $6.5 million.

Managing director, Charles Ghostine has just returned from Pro Wein, the premiere German wine fair held every year in Düsseldorf. Ksara is an energetic exhibitor on the international stage, regularly attending the major wine fairs in London, Bordeaux, and Verona as well as Düsseldorf. “We need to be there. If we don’t show up it might send the wrong message to the market,” said Ghostine. “We don’t go expecting to take big orders. We go show our face,” he explained.

Much has been said lately about the potential of Lebanese wine: that it can compete with the very best of the New World producers and that it should position itself as a boutique product. While other producers may be tempted to hit the volume market, Ksara will not skimp on the final product. The winery harvests nearly 2000 tons of grapes from its 300 hectares, an average of nearly seven tons of grapes per hectare (Chateau Ksara, the winery’s flagship wine, is made from the oldest vines, which yield just five tons per hectare). “Some wine regions will obtain yields of as much as 14 tons per hectare,” said Ghostine. “We will not do this.” Although Lebanon’s wine sector has enjoyed significant growth in recent years, until the mid-90s it was a market dominated by a triumvirate of Chateaux Musar, Ksara and Kefraya. Since then, old names – Nakad and Tourelles – are mounting a comeback, while a handful of newcomers, notably Massaya, Wardy, and Clos St Thomas, have made their presence felt with exciting and affordable new wines in eye catching bottles. This increased supply and variety coincided nicely with a change in tastes. The Lebanese have been drinking more wine and local consumption is increasing by around 10% each year. For the record, the Lebanese consumed three million bottles in 2003. Of that number, roughly 1.2 million were imported – 89% from France. This mini-revolution forced Ksara to defend its position in the local market. “The challenge for us was to maintain our market share,” said Ghostine. “In the early 90s, we were producing 1.2 million bottles now we are hitting 1.8 million.”

Brand loyalty among local drinkers has Ksara in good stead and, despite increased competition, it has been able to meet the increased demand and can claim a 35% market share. With Kefraya not far behind in second place, many new labels have been forced to penetrate overseas markets. Much of this success lies in the performance of one wine: the Reserve de Couvent, Ksara’s mid-priced red, which is still a massive performer among local drinkers. “In the restaurants, the Reserve is king,” said Ghostine. “It offers the best quality to price ratio. It is the backbone of the company and we are pushing it very hard both here and abroad, where we send 60% of the 530,000 bottles of Reserve we make each year.”

Ksara exports 49% of its wine, mainly to France, which takes around 250,000 bottles. (Lebanon exported 1.8 million bottles in 2003, roughly 30% of total production). In 2003, Ksara appointed Hallgarten, the specialist fine wine company, to be its UK agent and Verbruggen to distribute in Belgium.

Finally, the company has invested $200,000 to enhance its hospitality profile at its Bekaa winery. Ghostine explained that, despite being one of the early advocates of a structured wine tourism program, the Ksara board made a decision not to go for a full-out F&B operation like those at Massaya and Kefraya. “We receive around 40,000 guests a year, who visit our famous caves and tour the winery,” he explained. “Now we will be offering cheeses and other snacks with our wines, but we are first and foremost wine makers.”
 

K-Sun

Fruit juice and fresh-cut produce manufacturer K-Sun is an example of a firm that has restructured production and creation of new market segments. But even with adherence to innovative practices in agro-industry, the company is expecting real profitability out of its $2 million factory only from exports. “The Lebanese market is not big enough for such investments,” said general manager Mazen Kassem. “We couldn’t recoup our investments from the Lebanese market, and never thought we would.” The export revenue should begin to flow this year, as K-Sun recently reached an agreement to deliver packaged fruit juice to France beginning this month. K-Sun first brought their fresh juice to market in late 1996, seeking to dominate the domestic market’s premium segment with 65 juices and a mix of varieties. Turnover of the product line in its first month was precisely $83. A first challenge was changing consumer habits, as people in Lebanon thought fresh juice was something they squeezed at home. “It took time to educate consumers,” said Kassem. The project took off as a sideline of a larger business growing fruits and vegetables, which the Kassem family had been running for some 50 years. When they decided to launch K-Sun, the initial business plan entailed a nationwide retail network of 18 shops in a vertically integrated operation from grower to home consumer. A central aim was to eliminate middlemen from their trade in fruits and vegetables. The value-added products, juice and fresh-cuts, emerged as an afterthought. In terms of product lines, market realities led K-Sun onto a different path of making most their revenue from juices –mostly orange juice and lemonade – and supplying first and foremost hospitality enterprises. At more than $1 million annually, fresh juice accounts for 50% to 55% of K-Sun turnover, according to Kassem, and the firm is the leading supplier to restaurants, hotels and delivery food specialists. A company-owned store in Hamra is the base for K-Sun’s distribution network, which relies on a modest fleet of one truck and several delivery vehicles.

The evolution of K-Sun was not simple, mostly because of shrinking purchase power and growing competition. Some competitors introduced pasteurized juices roughly at the same time as K-Sun, which also had to contend with the increasing domestic manufacture of reconstituted juices as well as juice drinks and watery nectars. One (now defunct) competing product used K-Sun look-alike bottles and although they were trademark protected, seeking legal recourse would have been lengthy and costly. Additional hurdles included inflexible customs practices and nitpicking officials, not to mention the absence of government support. Despite the obstacles, K-Sun in 2001 obtained a new factory and a high-tech machine that allows non-thermal processing of fruit juices at a capacity of 15,000 liters per day. This equipment treats foodstuffs with ultra-high pressure, which is proven to eliminate pathogens and foliage organisms without the side effects of pasteurization. As a result, K-Sun juices increased their guaranteed shelf life from five to 21 days. The company also expanded into the manufacture of fresh-cut foods, marketing popular salads and vegetables in ready-to-eat portions.

Although K-Sun built their factory to European standards and with exports in mind, Kassem said entering Europe “hasn’t been easy.” The firm encountered difficulties ranging from acquiring a distributor to finding transportation. No air carrier offers refrigerated flights from Beirut to Paris, for instance, so K-Sun took to routing their first deliveries to France through Luxembourg. With a foot in the French market, K-Sun hopes for profitable times. At 80,000 liters per month, the target for the first year agreement means a tripling of current production, Kassem said. The company aims to reach further European countries, such as the United Kingdom and Germany. K-Sun is also in the process of implementing distribution of its juices to the Gulf, and the company eyes growth of its fresh-cut lines in the domestic market (including manufacture for private labels) and in exports to regional markets, such as Cyprus and Jordan.

Dairiday

Mohamad Gandour, president of Gandour’s The Dairy, established his company in the mid-nineties when he decided to revive an ancestral farm and make it the cornerstone of a dairy enterprise. He began in 1996 by transforming the farm into a dairy operation and acquiring over 200 high-yield Holstein milk cows. In 1997, Gandour established a modern, two-block long, dairy factory in the industrial area of Kfarchima. Networks for milk collection from the corporate farm and independent subcontractors, and distribution of fresh milk and cheese products were set up. By May 1998, Gandour dairy products – fresh milk, cheeses, and fermented products – poured into the market under the brand name Dairiday.

The company allocated $600,000 over the first two years to develop the Dairiday brand identity. All in all, investments amounted to over $7 million, which the company could finance to less than one third with a government-subsidized loan. The remainder was sourced from private equity and high-interest commercial loans, Gandour told EXECUTIVE.

Since its debut, the Dairiday brand has been fighting battles brought on by recession and insufficient regulations. In the milk market, consumer habits, lack of knowledge and above all, price barriers have kept the share of fresh milk down. “I thought that every family of four would consume at least one liter of milk per day,” Gandour said, “and perhaps they do, but it is powdered milk.” The powdered competition retails at a third to a quarter of the price of fresh milk. With all their production capacities, The Dairy’s fresh milk has thus been forced to compete for a sliver of the market “that is 5% to 8% of total consumption in liquid milk in Lebanon.” In cheeses and fermented products, the company has to hold their ground against unlicensed operators who, said Gandour, have “no overheads, no distribution costs, and no marketing costs.” From 1998, he was involved in persistent appeals to the ministry of economy and trade and its consumer protection unit, to oblige Lebanese producers of LABAN, LABNEH, cheeses and related goods to comply with standards on packaging and food safety. “Nothing has been done,” said the entrepreneur. The problem of unsanitary conditions in predominantly unlicensed bulk production of fermented dairy goods was brought to public attention last year by agricultural minister Ali Hassan Khalil. Instead of helping, the official outrage only pushed Dairiday sales down by 13% to 14% over two months, which forced The Dairy to run TV advertisements, reassuring their customers that their product is trustworthy. In spite of the verbal commotion, the unlicensed operators are populating the market as they did before, maintained Gandour, and enforcement of regulations never happened. The problems, which Gandour shares with his licensed competitors, have one common denominator: consumer education. Campaigns promoting the health benefits of fresh milk and the importance of food quality and food safety are amiss in Lebanon. If licensed milk producers would collaborate in their efforts, they could stage such campaigns to increase awareness. Another option would be public sector participation in such campaigns. However, Gandour is more optimistic about the possibility of achieving the former. Without strong prospects for short-term improvements, The Dairy has turned to a marketing partnership with the region’s largest dairy manufacturer, Saudi-based Almarai. Under their agreement, the Lebanese company has added Almarai UHT milk to its portfolio and will also begin distributing Almarai cheeses. In the longer term, The Dairy aims to also partner in production terms with the Saudi company, for local distribution under their brand.

With an upswing in sales, the struggling dairy company could be amortized within two to three years. But for now, Gandour is looking for viable markets outside Lebanon, with Syria being the only lucrative option. “We hope that one day, Syrian consumers will have access to Lebanese milk.”

Shuman

Horrific stories that often come out about Lebanon’s slaughterhouses do not usually give the meat and poultry industry in Lebanon a good name. Producers often have to work doubly hard convincing consumers their animals are fed healthy food and not just dried up carcasses. So far, three poultry companies have managed to carve their brands in the consumer consciousness: Hawa chicken, Tanmia and Shuman. Forty-nine-year-old Shuman chicken is no newcomer to the poultry market, which has flourished the past decade after the government slapped a near-ban on fresh poultry imports in the mid-1990s to protect the industry. “Poultry prices have been dropping ever since the government imposed the ban,” said Nabil Shuman, who has taken over the business of selling chicken from his deceased father. “This is a perfect study of how a government can protect an industry, that later develops, experiences a price decline and attracts investments.”

Today, Lebanon slaughters about 60 million chickens per year, the bulk of these are raised on farms owned by the three biggest chicken companies. “In the 1950’s, we were producing 20 chickens a day, now we are producing 5,000,” said Shuman. “Back then, there was only one supermarket and only one restaurant was buying packaged fresh chicken.”

Shuman also credits his company with pioneering the packaging of chickens. “We were the first company to process ready-to-cook chicken breasts. In 1995, we were the first to manufacture chicken nuggets and breaded products in Lebanon.”

In order to remain an effective player in the market, Shuman explained their use of a vertical integration strategy. “We control everything from A to Z: we own our farms and slaughterhouses, breed our own chickens, have our own distribution networks and own processing plants for chicken nuggets. This allows us to control quality of the end-product.”

For this reason, Shuman chickens are pricier than their rivals and quite less spread. But the company has been able to compete in the market following the entry of other big companies by maintaining its own niche. “We only have 5% of the $130 million poultry market in Lebanon,” said Shuman. “But we have 75% of the branded chicken in self-service sections in supermarkets.”

Unlike Tanmia and Hawa chicken, Shuman’s operations are not widespread. Tanmia’s processed products and Hawa chicken’s outlets dot nearly every main area in Beirut. “We have managed to remain profitable because we chose to take a niche and develop it,” said Shuman. “In normal periods, people may tend to buy any fresh chicken, but when there is a crisis in the poultry industry they head for brands like ours.”

Despite declining chicken prices, Shuman expects his company to sell 1.6 million chickens in 2004, raking in some $5.5 million in revenue, with sales increasing by 20% a year. The company is maintaining a bullish approach to the poultry industry, mostly because of Lebanon’s flourishing supermarket outlets and the sophistication of the Lebanese consumer’s brand consciousness. “The purchasing power is not going to stay like this and it will improve in three to five years. With the development of the supermarkets, consumer habits will change.”

For now, Shuman chicken will try to reach its sales goals by importing technology, which is needed to cut production costs and help raise capacity. “Production costs in Lebanon are high and the only way to cut them down is to continually upgrade our technology,” said Shuman. “The $150 million in investments that were spent over the past decade in this sector have mainly gone into lowering costs.”
 

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Negative growth

by Dania Saadi April 1, 2004
written by Dania Saadi

Lebanon’s agricultural sector has seen better days. Between 1979 and 1981, the labor force of the agricultural sector accounted for 14% of the total labor force, based on the figures of the United Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). This dwindled to 3% by 2001. In 1961, Lebanon’s Gross National Agricultural Production stood at LL300 million ($900 million, $1= three pounds), according to statistics compiled by the Lebanese Center for Agricultural Research and Studies. Four decades later, this figure has hardly budged, settling in 2002 at LL1.5 trillion ($1 billion).

“Up until, 1918, Lebanon used to provide the French city of Lyon, with half of its silk threads,” said Riad Saade, the center’s director. “In 1936, the French region of Roquefort used to import half of the raw cheese processed in the caves (bearing its name) from Lebanon.”

The decline in Lebanon’s agricultural output took place during the civil war, but it has been exacerbated in peacetime. The loss of agricultural land to the haphazard construction boom of the 1990’s, competition in the key export markets in the Arab World and the government’s focus on investments put the agricultural sector on the back burner. There have been half-hearted attempts, by successive governments to rehabilitate the sector but the only visible evidence of government backing are random subsides dished out at various times to farmers.

In 2001, the farmers raised an outcry and some replanted illicit crops to protest government inaction toward their plight, which left them trampling surplus produce on the streets. The government responded by allocating LL50 billion ($33 million) for an export subsidy program dubbed Export Plus, which gave farmers cash for exporting quality goods to markets around the world.

In 2004, the government and parliament is scrambling again to save the agricultural sector by extending new subsidies to apples and partially re-instating subsidies to sugar beet farmers to appease would-be voters in a decisive election year.

“Unfortunately, successive Lebanese governments have looked at the agriculture sector from a social rather than a socio-economic point of view,” said Raphael Debbane, head of the agricultural committee of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Lebanon. “Tobacco subsidies are pure social help whereby the government buys the crops and throws it away because it cannot sell them on the world market on account of their poor quality. Now they have renewed sugar subsidies in a non-professional way and the main reason for that is socio-political.”

Against this government backing to the agriculture sector, the private sector is finding it harder to compete in the local and international markets, where subsidies are given to farmers on a different basis. “If the subsidies are stopped in developing countries, farmers will suffer but they will survive,” said Imad Bsat, owner of B-fresh agricultural company. “If Export Plus ends, nobody will enforce standards and the sector will collapse.”

IDAL helps farmers sell their quality goods, but it does not tell them what type of crops to plant or what kind of crops are wanted by consumers in world markets. “Technically, Export Plus is a success but economically it is a big failure,” said Saade. “The problem is not money. Export Plus is only one ring in a chain. Other rings are needed.”

The other rings of the chain start with orienting farmers on what to plant according to market demands and what types of products to export. The next chain consists of extending technology to farmers to improve their crops and introduce new varieties through government backed research and financial credit. The final chain is marketing, which is what IDAL handles now, said Saade.

“Under Export Plus, farmers exported some 350,000 tons in 2003, which is equivalent to the amount of citrus Lebanon used to export in the 1970’s and 1980’s,” said Bsat. His family used to own Safa Citrus, one of the country’s largest fruit exporters that shut down in the 1990’s. “The government is spending millions of dollars on subsidizing crops when it should be using this money to fund research and help farmers develop new varieties,” said Bsat.

Agricultural engineers say Lebanon’s farmers are unable to adapt to the new agricultural modes, which rely extensively on technology and marketing. “It is a vicious cycle,” said Debbane. “Lebanese farmers have to get know-how and expertise from outside, which means importing technology at a cost. But if you don’t have money, consequently you have no money to invest in new varieties.”
 

The odds are stacked against the farmers’ development. Their production costs are significantly higher than their neighboring countries. They once had a monopoly over the Arab markets, but their rising costs and competition from cheaper produce have forced them to lose their edge in their prime markets. Neighboring Arab countries are swamping the Lebanese market with cheap produce while closing their doors to Lebanese produce, which have been hurt by badly negotiated agricultural agreements. Farmers often cite the agreements with Syria, Jordan and Egypt as disastrous and some are even calling for the suspension of Lebanon’s membership to the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement, which is due to enter into force in 2005.

“All hell is going to break loose once GAFTA is implemented,” said Bsat, who develops his own varieties of fruits and sells them to supermarkets. “We are already facing stiff competition from their produce now and it will only become harder to sell our produce once the markets open further under GAFTA and the World Trade Organization.”

Waddah Fakhri, head of the Southern Farmers’ Association, wants the government to suspend Lebanon’s membership in GAFTA until farmers are ready to compete with goods from the Arab World. “The government has negotiated trade agreements without consulting farmers, who bear higher production costs than neighboring countries and lack the standards needed to export,” said Waddah.

One sector that is set to suffer from the government’s negotiating blunders is the flower industry. Under Lebanon’s Association Agreement with the European Union, tariffs on flowers were fixed at 30% and are set to go down further once Lebanon’s five-year grace period for lowering tariffs on European imports is over. The whole problem started when the government in 2000 slashed tariffs on flowers from 105% to 30% while it was negotiating with the EU. Following lobbying by Lebanon’s flower growers, the government agreed to raise it again to 70%, but it was too late; the Europeans had agreed on 30% and were sticking to it.

“Our sector suffers from government apathy and inconsistent policies toward the agriculture sector,” said Rania Younes, the owner of several nurseries in Lebanon. “Lebanon has human resources and the know-how to compete. We do not need mass agricultural areas to export. We can plant specialized products from small pieces of land.”

Besides the European Agreement, Lebanon’s flower sector is already suffering from a special agreement with Saudi Arabia, which is exporting flowers to Lebanon at minimal tariffs, she added. With only a few good trade agreements, Lebanese farmers require marketing cash to venture into new markets. Outside Export Plus, there is hardly any cash for marketing. “With a 0.4% budget out of the total government budget there is not much we can do,” said Louis Lahoud, director general at the agricultural ministry. “But we are working on a development plan for the agricultural sector to which the government has allocated LL5 billion ($3.3 million).”

Agriculturists agree that the government should start to control the sector by regulating standards and resolving the pricing anarchy in the domestic market that drove agriculturalists to seek price stability of supermarkets, despite stiff competition. “If we are able to regulate standards and prices in the domestic market, it would be much easier to do the same for our exports,” said Bsat.

Agriculturalists also want the ministry of agriculture to direct farmers to plant crops that could be used by the industrial sector. “A potentially successful road for developing the Lebanese agriculture sector is agro-industry,” said Debbane. “The government can develop Export Plus into a scheme inclusive of the agro-industry and a scheme for renewing orchards to introduce new varieties.”

According to Debbane, donors, who have pooled millions of dollars into agricultural projects that were doomed for failure due to political intervention or government inaction, need to divert the funds to the private sector. “Donors helping Lebanon develop its agriculture sector should pass this money to the private sector because the institutions of the Lebanese government have proved to be inefficient.”

THE ISRAELI EXAMPLE

Farmers and agricultural engineers point to the example of Israel, a country whose agricultural space and climate is similar but less diverse than Lebanon, but whose export potential has been propelled by staunch government backing. Similar to Lebanon, Israel’s agricultural land was being eaten away by a construction boom, declining number of farmers and a strain on its limited water resources, which had to be used to irrigate extensive desert land that Lebanon does not have. That did not stop the Israeli government from forging ahead in the 1990’s with an aggressive marketing campaign and research.


“When Israeli farmers wanted to introduce a new variety of grapes into England, the government spent $1 to $2 million on the marketing campaign,” said agricultural engineer Imad Bsat. Israel in the 1960’s was primarily known for the famous Jaffa oranges, but in the 1990’s its agricultural landscape changed. Instead of planting just citrus products, the Israeli government heavily invested into research, prodding its traditional farmers in the kibbutzes to adopt new agricultural products.

Currently, Israel’s exports around $200 million a year in flowers – a third of its fresh agricultural exports – an amount equivalent to Lebanon’s annual agro-industrial exports. “Each day an El Al plane leaves Tel Aviv and lands in Holland, the world’s flower market, carrying fresh flowers,” said economist Riad Saade. “Flowers are an example of a high-value added industry that can be easily developed in Lebanon.”

Lebanon’s flower exports in 2003 were around $300,000, based on customs figures. According to the Israeli government, it provides nearly 40% of Europe’s off-season fruit and vegetable market, and ranks second only to Holland in European flower sales. Israel’s fresh and processed agricultural exports stood at $1 billion in 2002. Nearly 60% of its exports were fresh produce, mainly headed to Europe, based on the figures of the Israeli ministry of agriculture. Israel does not only export agricultural produce, its also exports around $1 billion in agricultural technology each year.

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Q&A V5 Project

by RabihIbrahim April 1, 2004
written by RabihIbrahim

The latest mall to emerge on the Beirut scene is V5, to be constructed in Verdun and completed in early 2007. The joint venture between United Real Estate Company of Kuwait and Horizon Development Company of Lebanon will cost about $180 million and consist of a total built-up area (BUA) of approximately 148,000 m2 on an 18,000m2 plot of land. As well as an international department store, retail outlets, and a supermarket, other features will include various eateries, a cinema complex, a parking lot for 2,000 cars and furnished apartments with an estimated BUA of 7,600 m2. Future hopes for the center are already optimistic: total retail sales are expected to reach around $200 million by 2010. EXECUTIVE spoke to Afeef Makkawi, Horizon

April 1, 2004 0 comments
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The Buzz

Objects of Desire

by Michael Karam March 3, 2004
written by Michael Karam

Bentley makes its move


Saad and Trad have been blowing their trumpet about the new Bentley Continental GT. And why not? There are few names in motoring that match the romance, elegance and sheer brute force served up by Bentley. Today, Bentley is owned by those nice people at VW, who have been selling Bentley since January 2003. The Germans are at pains to point out that the car is still a wholesome bastion of all things British and admittedly the Bentley Continental GT is all car. Forget the walnut and leather (although it’s difficult), it’s the mechanics that will really blow your mind. The 6-liter, yes 6-liter, engine can do 0-60 mph in 4.7 seconds, with a top speed of 198 mph (that’s 318 km/h to you foreign chaps). Fast enough? If you want one, it will set you back £145,000 (plus VAT and registration) but there is a two-year waiting list. “We expect it to do well,” said Michel Trad. “Rather like what the S-Type did for Jaguar.”

When Bentley and Rolls Royce were made by the same people, there was a saying that Bentleys were meant to be driven, while Rolls Royces were meant to be driven in. They knew what they were talking about back then.

A Kind of Blue

Staying with objects of desire, those of you who ever wondered why Johnny Walker Blue Label was so ridiculously expensive, should have gone along to the Phoenicia Intercontinental last month to hear Ian Williams wax lyrical about the Cardow distillery’s finest. Created in the 1990s, on the back of demand for super luxury blends and malt whiskies with unpronounceable names – especially from wealthy Japanese executives who have a habit of getting excited about Western luxury goods – it has become synonymous with extravagance, luxury and mystique and, in some cases, international intrigue (it was allegedly Saddam Hussein’s whisky of choice). However, Williams, a distiller by profession, was in Lebanon to dispel some of the myths surrounding what is essentially nothing more than a magnificent whisky. “When we created Blue Label back in 1993 we wanted a blend that would hark back to the days when whiskies had that unique heavy Victorian style,” he said. He went on to explain that unlike Black Label, which is a blend of 40 whiskies, Blue Label is made of 15, but, according to Williams, they are chosen with care. “We have 7 million casks of maturing whiskies at the Johnny walker distillery and every now and then we get one that achieves something special. These, as well as our stock of rare whiskies, often from distilleries that no longer exist, are put aside for Blue Label.”

But does it taste any good? Williams suggests a mouth of iced water before every glug of “Blue” to clean the palate, but in all honesty this can become a bit of a performance after a while. Price aside there is no doubting Blue Label’s pedigree; it really is an outstanding whisky, but like the great malts, it is so potent and rich in flavor – nose, palate and length are all rampant with peat, oak, fruits and spices – that it has moved beyond the normal confines of whisky and into the realm of the great brandies. As such, it is probably best drunk after a meal – Williams even suggests drinking it from a brandy glass. To add ice is to miss the point and so the only real debate is whether or not to add water. There is no doubt, Blue Label is a fabulous whisky, but at $150/bottle, you had better start saving.

March 3, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Falling on Deaf Ears?

by Michael Young March 3, 2004
written by Michael Young

In mid-February, the United States government began its latest endeavor to change hearts and minds in the Arab world, as its new Arab-language satellite news station, Al-Hurra, began broadcasting to a mostly dubious Middle East audience.

Al-Hurra, or the “free one,” is a $62 million project funded by American taxpayers that will fall under the authority of the US Broadcasting Board of Governors, a public body. It currently employs some 200 staff and will be headed by Lebanese journalist Muaffaq Harb, formerly a correspondent in Washington. Almost immediately, critics in the Middle East dismissed the station as a propaganda tool of the United States. Some observers pointed out that the station merely repeated a pattern of American public diplomacy efforts that had already been shown to fail. Indeed, the State Department last year launched a radio station, Radio Sawa, and an Arabic-language lifestyle magazine titled Hi, to offer Arabs a friendlier image of America. The magazine in particular was met with crushing indifference. In an interview last year, the US ambassador to Lebanon, Vincent Battle, fended off a skeptical interviewer: “Hi and Sawa are part of a public diplomacy campaign that is growing. There is a perceived need to increase our communications with the Arab world, and for the Arab world to increase its communications with the United States as well. We’re making efforts to do that.” He did add, however, in an implicit admission of problems with such attempts, that: “Some of those efforts are more successful than others.”

In condemnation fairly typical of that in the region, Jordanian columnist Rami Khouri thumped the chairman of a US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, who had said that “creating a credible communication channel from the United States to the Arab world is the greatest diplomacy challenge since the end of the Cold War.” Khouri responded: “Wrong again. People in Washington who think like this are offering counterproductive projects, reflecting inappropriate policies, based on inaccurate analyses, stemming from faulty diagnoses. Perhaps not since the Emperor Nero blamed the fledgling Christians for Rome’s domestic troubles … has a world power so flagrantly engaged in misguided policies that scapegoat others, instead of rationally analyzing the collective mistakes…of all concerned.”

Meanwhile, a serene Norma Pattiz of the Broadcasting Board of Governors waved all the criticism away. “People can sit there and say whatever they want before [Al-Hurra] launches … I think they may be interested in the fact that we may bring a different perspective,” she said.

The first thing that comes to mind is, why so much animosity in the Arab world against the station? After all, $62 million is fairly modest in the satellite news world, so Arab viewers won’t risk being unfairly enticed by sparkling production quality. And if viewers do find Al-Hurra objectionable, all they will have to do is switch to another channel. Surely the fact that the US government is keen to “reach out” to the Middle East, no matter how mawkish that may sound, hardly invites such annoyance.

What Al-Hurra’s critics miss is that Arabs suffer not at all from an additional station — whether it is a propaganda outlet or not. The only ones who do are US taxpayers. The real difficulty with Al-Hurra is that it is solely an American public policy liability.

There are two reasons for this, one general, the other specific. In general, there seems little reason for Americans to put money into a station over which they have no influence, which they will probably never see, or little understand if they do, and all in an enterprise that seems doomed from the start. However, making things even more absurd is that the station’s overseers, in the hope of attracting viewers, have promised to follow a balanced approach to regional politics. Al-Hurra is to be a propaganda station without propaganda. Somehow, that misses the point, doesn’t it? Not only does “being balanced” not explain why Americans should foot the bill — if the goal is to distance the station from official proselytism, why not just turn the whole thing over to the private sector? It also doesn’t explain what will make Al-Hurra different from countless other Arab satellite news stations, or those non-Arab stations freely available to viewers in the region. In other words, if the US government insists on going into the news business, it might as well use its outlet to disseminate official policy. However, to set up a station and then shy away from turning it into a mouthpiece seems a contradiction in terms.

In the end, what the US government has not considered is the market. In starting up Radio Sawa, Hi and Al-Hurra, it failed to ask whether public funding was truly necessary. Had the projects been potentially successful (and Al-Hurra may yet work), the ideas could have been sold to private-sector investors from the start. When it became clear they were not likely to be a hit, the government got involved anyway. Is that smart? Not especially. It showed the US government failed to understand the market it was supposed to appeal to. Worse, it ignored it, and now Americans are paying.

Michael Young is a contributing editor at Reason Magazine in the US.

March 3, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Q&A Said Elfakhani

by Executive Contributor March 1, 2004
written by Executive Contributor

Will those in the new Executive MBA program at AUB benefit from their investment? Who are we talking about?

We are talking about executives who hold managerial positions, have people who report to them and have budgets to run, often from tens of millions of dollar to over $100 million. Most executives in the Arab world do not necessarily have business degrees. They are technically qualified in their industries, but does the best engineer have skills in managing human resources? We are the first to know in this country that we have a huge deficiency in Lebanon in the area of human resources management. Most of the HR departments are run by people who are trained to deal with payroll issues, sick leaves, this kind of thing –rather than to manage the human capital resources in the company.

The corporate Middle East is a very peculiar business environment. How will you capture the region’s special characteristics and challenges in the program?

Most Arab companies whether in Lebanon or other countries, are family-based. This is factored into our courses through the cases that we are going to discuss. On one hand we are going to describe current practices, seeking to understand them. Then we aim to show the pros and cons of current business practices and current forms of organizations in the Arab world and try to identify the weaknesses and improve on them.

How fast do you foresee the results of the EMBA program percolating into the regional business culture?

I think of universities as kitchens for new ideas that will not necessarily be applied at the moment but hopefully in the future. Even in the West, where decisions on how to optimize your investment decisions were born, these were not practiced. It took 20 to 25 years of generating graduates at business schools and sending them to the job market so that they would convince their ‘boss with a hat’ of the methods they learned. We think that we will be able to convince the executives in our program to go to their boards of directors and present a case for the value of growth by extending beyond the traditional ways of Arab practices in business management. This is not going to be a push-button thing. Spreading this culture through our executive MBAs and our regular MBAs as well, we hope that in the next 10 or 20 years the culture of business in the area will evolve. Otherwise we will keep stagnant and not go anywhere.

How can you help the person applying for an EMBA convince their boss or board of directors to let him or her join the program and perhaps pay for it?

I stand yet to be corrected here but I doubt that any of the batch of executives already admitted to the program, got any sponsorship from any of their employers. This is really unfortunate. Trying to invest heavily into their people is still strange to the culture of many companies here. I would be happy to see companies pay their employees’ tuition on a loan basis, repayable after graduation, or share in the cost, or paying with the condition that they stay with the employer for a certain number of years after graduation. I haven’t seen that yet and I would like to help developing this.

You are substantially more expensive than other EMBA programs in Lebanon? Does your program quality justify this?

We did not at all look at current prices in other institutions when we priced our program. We didn’t look at this in the way of pricing. We looked at our MBA, how much it costs, and how much additional costs this program involves. We are talking a whole set of arrangements and different expenses, from data base costs to receiving scholars from outside. In fact, we think that this program may not break even in the beginning, and we don’t guarantee that the price will not be higher in the future.

And you want to transfer the good name recognition of AUB and the high image of your traditional MBA to your standing in executive education.

We are adding a new brand to this institution, but we are not branding ourselves against the local education market; we are branding ourselves on the international scene. If you look at EMBAs at the London School of Economics or Columbia Business School, all of the high-quality programs are above $100,000. So if you compare numbers on quality EMBAs, I think ours is at the moment among the cheapest. We priced our program as a good product at an affordable price, and we are trying to penetrate the market of quality EMBAs.

Does that mean that in the long run executives from major industrialized countries will see your EMBA as a viable option?

Given the image of Lebanon as the link between East and West, this program might fly internationally and we hope it does. Many executives in Europe, Japan and North America have business interests in the Arab world and perhaps want to know more about businesses in the Arab world. Perhaps it would appeal to them to acquire an EMBA here, mingle with people, establish contacts, business prospects for the future.

Would this also reflect positively on Lebanon’s role in the region?

Many people say today that Arab countries developed enough and know what to do, so they don’t need Lebanese anymore to link them to the West. On the surface, this is true. But when you go to the heart of things, you will find that in any business in the Gulf, there will be the Lebanese in the hierarchy, just below the Gulf person who is heading the division. There is value for this Lebanese brand.

Do you regard the wave of new universities in Lebanon as a problem?

People talk of turning Lebanon into the educational center of the Arab world. Turning Lebanon into the educational center of the region is one way to come up with a new market for Lebanon and this needs to be worked out. In this context, we don’t see the new universities as a challenge for AUB. We see them as an attraction to bring students to Lebanon. I will be more than happy to see 50 universities in this country, bringing tens of thousands of new students into the country. The School of Business at AUB is strong and wants to do its job well. We want the rest of the country to also do their jobs well and institutions to be qualified to build a reputation for Lebanon as a center for excellence in education.

MORE ABOUT THE NEW MBA PROGRAM

EXECUTIVE talked to Nadia Shuayto, the program’s coordinator, about its goals in building upon business culture in the Middle East

How did you structure the program?

The program uses a theme-based approach. For instance Fundamentals and Analytics is the theme for the first semester. Participants will earn credits but we decided to deliver the content in a modular format. Rather than giving separate courses on financial management or financial accounting, we decided to have two modules within the theme, and called them ‘soft skills’ and ‘hard skills.’

How long is the program?

The participant is expected to finish the entire Executive MBA program within 18 months. Courses will be given every three weeks for three days, and on very rare occasions, four days. Our target is not just the Lebanese executive; it is the executive from any country in the region. Thus we decided to organize our courses for Thursday, Friday and Saturday, because Thursday and Friday mark the weekend in many countries in the region.

What corporate experience is required for the Executive MBA?

A quality program begins with the participants. We are being very selective and strict on admission. You must have a minimum of seven to eight years of management experience to enter the program. Were equally scrupulous in your selection of faculty?

We are also very selective in our faculty about who will be teaching in the program and we will have many guest speakers from the industry who will talk about their experiences. Some of our keynote speakers are world-renowned authors, coming from Ivy League schools.

What do you expect graduates to take home from this program?

We want to train people to focus on the human aspect of management rather than just focusing on the financial bottom line. With our program we are going to create a well-rounded leader that will become a change agent. As change agents, the graduates of our program will go back to their companies and develop their employees as well. A lot of Middle Eastern executives fear delegating, they fear empowerment. We want to take that fear away from them. We don’t just want leadership at the top – we want an environment of leadership throughout the organization. Our focus is really on human development. Once the human develops, the corporation develops.

The Executive MBA program at AUB is available to participants who qualify by their academic and managerial background. Class size is restricted to 24 persons and the courses for the first class started on February 26, 2004. Cost of the 44-credit program is $600 per credit, or approximately $30,000 for tuition, books and materials. English proficiency is a must.

 

March 1, 2004 0 comments
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Business

Breadwinners: Pain d’Or’s golden touch

by Anthony Mills March 1, 2004
written by Anthony Mills

Pain d’Or, the Lebanese bread, pastry, and confectionery manufacturers are investing $20 million into a new Saudi Arabian operation, which the company hopes will eventually lead to a multinational status. The new company, which will open in a year, will incorporate Pain d’Or’s full production, sales points and delivery network concept as Pain d’Or’s whole Lebanon range of products will be on offer in the Kingdom. “Saudi Arabia is the biggest economy in the Middle East. That is why we started our expansion there,” said manager Hachem el Koussa. “We will probably open in [the Saudi capital] Riyadh,” said Koussa. “It is central. The government is based there and the buying power is strongest there. But we plan to gradually cover the whole of the Kingdom.” In parallel to the international ventures, Pain d’Or is continuing to expand nationally, in particular into regions of the country in which it does not yet have a presence.

Pain D’Or’s story began almost 20 years ago, when in war-ravaged Beirut of 1986, bread deliverymen braved Beirut’s Green Line on a daily basis to ensure that customers got their bread.

“Today, Pain d’Or is a household name,” said Koussa, whose family company, the Malco Group (previously the Malco Trading Co) was founded by Hachem’s father and his three brothers four years earlier in 1982. Originally, the company specialized in restaurants, but the war-related instability prompted Malco Trading to branch out. Enter Pain d’Or with bread and pastries in 1986 (as well as Fantasia, the snack food company, in 1992).Today, the Malco Group manages three companies: the Malco Manufacturing and Distribution Company (MMD), HMDR – which is responsible for Pain d’Or production and sales – and the original Malco Trading Co. – which deals with the Malco Group’s restaurant interests, Horseshoe and Abu Nuwass. Pain d’Or was born, explained Koussa, out of his father’s empathy with the plight of a people suffering because of the war. In 1986, as inflation skyrocketed, vast swaths of the Lebanese population found themselves impoverished. The situation was particularly grim for children, Koussa recalled. “It was a new kind of war – economic war,” he said. “Our aim, in launching Pain d’Or, was to help ourselves, and the Lebanese people. We thought: if children can’t buy chocolate, let’s create something they can buy instead. And we invented the Pain au Lait.”

The war had also rendered movement around Beirut, and Lebanon in general, hazardous, so Pain d’Or created a unique distribution network. “Customers couldn’t come to us. We said: Ok, if they can’t come to us, why don’t we go to them? In this way, they were able to make hamburgers at home, with buns, without venturing out into the streets.”

The fledgling enterprise didn’t allow the East-West division of Beirut to stand in its way. “We refused to divide the country ourselves,” declared Koussa. “We went everywhere. It was dangerous for our workers, of course. But Pain d’Or was for everyone. We made this our slogan. It was our duty.”

Initially, Pain d’Or only produced and distributed. It had no outlets. The first shop opened on Corniche al-Mazraa in 1988, when its range was restricted to eight items, compared to the 300 it offers today.

Other companies were already producing many of the products offered by Pain d’Or, but Pain d’Or pegged its distinctiveness on the unification of a whole range of diverse, not necessarily unique, items under one brand name. “There has always been competition with respect to individual items,” Koussa acknowledged. “However, Pain d’Or combined many lines of production under one umbrella. Maybe there is a lot of competition with regard to bread, sweets, or donuts, but we unified everything in one establishment. Our strategy was: be different.”

Thanks to Pain d’Or, people no longer had to queue in bread lines, or purchase from what Koussa called, “unhygienic shops.” Most different of all, though, was the fact that Pain d’Or did not immediately produce Arabic bread. At the time, the Arabic bread flour available did not, Koussa claimed, meet Pain d’Or’s hygiene and overall quality specifications. In 1992, Pain d’Or developed a strategy, which it hoped would allow it to compete with emerging investor blocs. It began to open outlets across the country, to bring its products closer to the consumer. Today, there are 18 Pain d’Or shops throughout Lebanon, of which six are in Beirut. The company intensified its diversification efforts, while simultaneously attempting to raise consumer awareness. “Previously,” Koussa explained, “if a customer wanted any type of French bread, they would say: give me French bread. Now they specify what they want, but this has taken us more than 10 years.”

The path to customer enlightenment was painstakingly slow but meticulously planned. “We didn’t introduce real French bread right away,” confessed Koussa. “European people like to chew. They like to eat hard bread. Americans don’t. They like to eat soft bread. Lebanese people like to eat soft bread. If we had given them hard bread straightaway, we would have had a problem. We slowly made some of the bread harder. Now, the Lebanese eat hard bread as well as soft bread,” he said. It was hard going at times, but Pain d’Or effectively pioneered the introduction of European-style bread to Lebanon, thus creating a whole new market, which eventually became saturated in the 1990s. “It was useless to compete,” said Koussa. “It was better to create a new market and that was why we expanded our range.” Today, though, neither Pain d’Or’s ‘broad variety under one umbrella’ trademark nor its array of European-style breads is unique, Pain d’Or remains the market leader, with an annual turnover of between $10 million and $15 million a year, and employs over 500 staff. The business has been dealt a tremendous blow by Lebanon’s economic and financial crisis, in particular by the introduction of Value Added Tax (VAT) in 2002. “Especially with our kind of products, which are not cheap, we could not introduce VAT without having a conflict with our customers,” Koussa recalled. “2002 was a disaster for us. Many of our customers refused to pay the VAT. They didn’t understand it.” In the interest of preserving its client base, Pain d’Or often paid VAT out of its own pocket. In so doing, it lost $2-3 million and saw its profit for 2002 wiped out.

In 2003, the company puts its shoulder to the yoke, armed with a strategy designed to help it recoup its losses. Essentially, it distributed its overheads across a broader, more diversified base by introducing a host of new products and establishing more outlets, and by increasing distribution. It also spent 6% to 10 % of its budget on advertising, especially with brochures and flyers, and on marketing its ‘healthy bread’ concept. These measures ensured that Pain d’Or revenues, helped by extra tourists, grew by 15% to 20% in 2003.

March 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Spike in the Euro

by Faysal Badran March 1, 2004
written by Faysal Badran

Back in January 2002, we analyzed the fate of the euro in this section, looking at its performance since its launch and placing the technical framework for what appeared to be a move up, destined to hit the $1.17-$1.20 area. As is often the case in the currency markets, the euro has not only overshot on the upside, but has clearly been on an uninterrupted rampage against all currencies reaching 1.2950 against the US dollar. This has been the result of a confluence of factors. While it is entertaining to look at the factors, we should keep in mind that the strength of the euro is more attributable to a weakness in the US dollar, both market driven and policy driven than any convincing fundamental strength in the European economy, either nominally or on a relative basis. The fact that global central banks, especially in Asia have been replenishing their non-dollar reserves as the euro has gained adopters, has exacerbated the trend. The US has basically “allowed” the dollar to drift lower, only paying lip service to calls by European business leaders to stabilize it, primarily because it represents a clear edge for American companies and does in effect reduce the value of US debt, held by foreigners. This is a gross oversimplification, as the currency markets are pretty much driven by demand and supply, and as the US economy has grown, it has sucked in more imports as added fuel to the currency’s gains. Though it is the author’s view that the rise of the euro is nearly over, let us look at its effects, anecdotal and fundamental, on the economies of Lebanon and the region.

For Lebanon, the euro’s move has caused several punctual trends to amplify, as if the conditions of the economy weren’t tough enough. Europe is Lebanon’s largest trading partner, as imports into Lebanon from the key European countries (Italy, France and Germany) account for 29% of total imports. It is not surprising that the euro’s 35% appreciation against the dollar, in a highly dollarized environment, has been felt in many sectors – most acutely in automobiles, but also in food and apparel. Already hit by a weak domestic economy, and the accompanying drop in the purchasing power of households, European goods have added a further burden. The price jump of products originating in Europe has caused some spectacular price changes in cars and even shampoos, causing shifts away from them towards Asian and US goods. It is too early to gauge the full impact, but in the contracting area for instance, there is talk of a 25% to 40% jump in construction costs, in part attributed to the roaring euro. To be fair, the prices of dollar-priced materials associated with building also played a role, as steel, cement and copper prices rose considerably in a matter of months. Copper, for instance, has doubled since the month of September.

While one cannot yet speak of durable changes in consumer behavior towards European products, it is clear from speaking to retailers and traders, that the rise, if it were to last, could rebalance the local product distribution in favor of non-European products. For businesses importing European products, the hit to the bottom line has been felt, as they are unable to pass on the full euro rise, and thus feel the pinch to their volume growth and eventually, bottom line. Clearly the banks here have a greater role to play in developing hedging ideas for their customers, who rely on imports that are not priced in dollars. As always, most banks, mesmerized by their favorite client – the state – are not innovating when it comes to guiding their clients through the vagaries of currency fluctuation. They are left to figure out how to protect themselves, largely on their own.

While products and services have clearly suffered, there is a more intangible aspect to the euro’s (and to a lesser extent the sterling’s) rise – which is the general impoverishment of Lebanon and the region. For the oil states for instance, who ought to be enjoying the fruits of a $35/barrel oil price, and are hit with a collapse of their own currencies that remain for the most part pegged to the US dollar – this is an offsetting factor. As more money, post-September 11 trends, has remained in local currencies, the reverse wealth effect is clear, and it has translated into a paradigm shift, at least for now, in tourism. And the winner has been, to a large extent Lebanon. As many Gulf Arabs shun Europe due to the increased cost of a week in France, Italy and Spain, they have opted for vacationing in Lebanon, a more easily absorbed “dollar for dollar” holiday. Intuitively, one would hope that industries such as wine and olive oil would be clear winners of the current environment.

As long as the region thinks in dollars, and calculates its net worth in dollars, large swings in foreign currency will have an impact – but quite frankly, it is hardly the most crucial problem at present for the region, which suffers from deeper structural weaknesses. Still, a spike in the euro has added complexity to doing business and buying goods. It is likely that if, and when the euro deflates, (I happen to think it will toward $1.10), the pressures on retail trade will subside, and the ability of the author to purchase his dream German automobile may improve. The move of the euro has undoubtedly reflected the fragility of a region linked almost umbilically to the US dollar, as reserves are revalued in terms of their global worth, and households reassess their appetite for cherished European goods. It is also worth noting that the shift of preference by some Arab shoppers toward European products in the context of the unpopular war in Iraq has been dealt a severe blow.

 

March 1, 2004 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Waiting for BASEL II

by Nicolas Photiades March 1, 2004
written by Nicolas Photiades

The Basel II Capital Accord, the set of rules issued by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in 1999 to establish new regulations for banks world-wide, aims to encourage the development of better risk management by banks. Additionally it aims to add momentum to consolidation in the banking sector, change the shape of the credit curve through credit related differentiation in risk weightings, and strengthen incentives for banks and corporate borrowers to maintain and improve their own credit quality.

Although most large Western banks regard the Basle II Capital Accord compliance targets as simply an “officialization” of their practices over the last decade, Lebanese banks are yet ill-prepared to meet them. They are not alone in their anguish, as most Asian, African and emerging market banks, as well as some smaller US and European banks, consider the forthcoming regulations to be impossible to meet, and are contemplating an increasingly uncertain future.

Such anxiety is easily understood, as there are still several factors that are inhibiting the development of risk management cultures and processes. Indeed, Lebanese banks still have a weaker connection between risk management and corporate strategy than their Western peers, there is a lower level of risk management review at the board level, as well as a weaker link between management performance and risk management effectiveness. They also lack the appropriate historical data to develop and support their internal models. The culture – whereby a banker’s performance is determined by his ability to raise deposits and generate revenues – is clearly insufficient and cannot be developed quickly enough to embody credit risk consciousness. Some banks in Lebanon do not realize that one miscalculation of credit, market or operational risk can have dire consequences on already limited capital.

The Basel II Accord requires banks to generate a healthy and recurrent return out of a carefully planned risk portfolio. The difficult environment provided by the Lebanese economy has affected their ability for efficient diversification. They all offer the same traditional services and have not shown imagination in activity and product diversification. Moreover, loan data collection, which constitutes an imperative part of Basel II’s directives (very useful for calculating probabilities of default, exposure at default, etc.), has always been the weakest aspect of most Lebanese banks. Some of the larger banks have only recently started to build up a data warehouse, whereas Basel II requires banks to have a minimum of five years’ data in order to be able to develop an internal rating system.

The gathering of qualitative data assumes greater importance in Lebanon than in Europe for example. Financial accounts do not necessarily show the real picture and Lebanese banks have to show extra care in gathering non-financial data that could at some point prove to be instrumental in the lending decision. Lebanese banks also present some weaknesses in terms of credit analysis capabilities. Indeed, credit analysis methodologies are seldom developed, and risk mitigation techniques remain basic. For example, most banks have not yet developed advanced skills such as transferring risk by way of securitization, (although to be fair, the legal environment in that context has not been developed as yet), seeking new risk mitigating skills by using collateral that is not correlated to the loan itself, and creating liquidity in the credit market.

With Basel II, Lebanese banks will no longer be able to follow the safe but undifferentiated strategy of accepting a given level of market pricing, holding all assets underwritten and not differentiating their risk portfolio sufficiently. They will have to run their business and develop their lending according to economic considerations and view shareholder value as a key driver, rather than just abiding by regulatory standards. Banks in Lebanon will also have to learn to live with capital volatility, update their risk models to take into account extreme economic conditions such as those that now prevail in the country, and strive for improved data for their risk management systems.

Failure to develop these capabilities could result in credit crunches, as banks would choose to stop lending if risk models provide inaccurate assessments, creating as a result a real economic crisis that would impact negatively on small and medium size enterprises and individual borrowers. A credit crunch is the last thing a fragile Lebanese economy needs at the moment, and the banks carry a heavy responsibility. There must be a will to transform the Lebanese banking sector into a sophisticated lending machine, rather than just a deposit bank-system, with the sole purpose of financing the government through treasury bond subscriptions.

Certain medium and small-sized banks could be faced with no alternative but to withdraw from certain activities, such as corporate lending, which they cannot develop according to Basel II guidelines, due to a lack of resources. The shunning of some commercial or investment banking activities could be harmful to the domestic economy, which is already in dire need of financing diversification. Moreover, the contraction in the activities of a certain number of banks could lead to a frenzy of bank sales and mergers. Indeed, around 40 banks are not expected to be able to implement the Basel II guidelines, and will be hurrying up to sell their franchise, to larger domestic, regional or international banks. Such a clogging up of merger and acquisition activity could lead to significantly depressed prices for the sellers, and could in turn harm depositors’ confidence in the banking sector.

As for banks willing to implement the Basel II Accord and hence be competitive on a global, or at least a regional basis, they will inevitably need to increase their capital at one stage. Although current capitalization levels for the larger banks appear more than comfortable at the moment – with capital adequacy ratios exceeding the 20% mark – the application of Basel II rules as they appear today is likely to reduce such ratios to levels below 8%, which is the current regulatory minimum for banks world-wide. (Banque du Liban currently imposes a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 12%). This possible outcome would force banks to seek additional capital, which can normally be obtained through the capital markets. However, the local equity market is illiquid, there is no appetite from retail investors for domestic shares, and the trend for emerging market share offerings has been dead and buried for a very long time. On the other hand, domestic banks could increase their capital through organic growth, although this requires time and the maintenance of profitability at current levels, or they could have existing shareholders or new strategic investors inject fresh capital.

In any case, there is no turning back now. Basel II is expected to be imposed by the beginning of 2007 – for banks in G10 countries – and Lebanese banks will have no choice but to either take the challenge of Western peer pressure and be compliant with the guidelines – or become smaller niche players. Embracing the challenge of Basel II can only be beneficial to Lebanese banks, and could ultimately prove to be a major factor towards a potentially significant economic recovery.

Nicolas Photiades is managing director of Orion Financial Solutions. He is an advisor to the Lebanese banking sector on securitization and structured financing.

BASEL II EXPLAINED

Under the accord, a new set of risk ratings for borrowers determine the capital a bank needs to approve loans

The Basel II Capital Accord is a set of new capital rules for banks worldwide. The idea is that the riskier the loan portfolio or assets, the more capital a bank needs to hold. Basel I established minimum capital requirements for lending based on a definition of regulatory capital, and a measure of risk exposure and rules specifying the level of capital in relation to those risks. Under Basel II, the definitions of regulatory capital and the level of capital (8%) in relation to risk exposures are unchanged. The main changes relate to the measures of risk exposure, and within this, the focus on credit risk exposure, on which the proposed risk weightings are based. Measurements for market and operational risk are still being discussed.

Basel II gives a great deal of importance to credit ratings, which will determine the risk weighting on an asset and hence the amount of capital needed. For example, if a borrower is rated B (below investment grade) internally or externally, then it will have a risk weighting of 150%, but if it was rated AA, then the risk weighting would be 20%. Of course, all risk exposures have to be classified into categories, with each one subject to specific risk inputs, weights and minimum requirements. Under Basel I, the risk weightings had less differentiation and were divided into only four categories (0%, 20%, 50% and 100%). Under Basel II there is a multitude of risk weightings, which are determined by external ratings or a bank’s internal rating system.

Example: Under Basel I, a corporate borrower would obtain a risk weighting of 100%, regardless of its rating. If this corporate borrower took a loan of US$10 million, then the bank would have to set aside US$800,000 of capital (100% x 8% = 8%, ® 8% x US$10 million = US$800,000).

Under Basel II, the risk weighting on the same corporate borrower would depend on its rating. If the bank has an internal rating system, and rates this corporate A, then the risk weighting would be 50%. Therefore, a US$10 million exposure on this borrower would require capital of US$400,000 (50% x 8% = 4%, ® 4% x US$10 million = US$400,000).

 

March 1, 2004 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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