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Money Matters

by Executive Editors October 16, 2000
written by Executive Editors
October 16, 2000 0 comments
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Money Matters

Regional Markets

by Executive Editors October 16, 2000
written by Executive Editors

MOROCCO

The Moroccan equity market rallied strongly in

September, drawing strength from reports of oil and gas

discoveries in the kingdom. The findings, which are

expected to dramatically change the face of the

Moroccan economy, would help to lessen the country’s

heavy dependence on the agricultural sector and make of

Morocco a net exporter of oil in a few years. Blue chip

stocks across the board reacted positively to the news and

investors’ enthusiasm was apparent in the substantial

increase in trading volumes.

Egypt

Sentiment was mostly positive in Egypt; however, the stock

exchange failed to uphold some gains realized in the month

of August with most blue chips witnessing consolidation.

Among the most demanded stocks were CIB, MobiNil and

OT, which together captured the bulk of trading activity.

Despite signs of improving domestic conditions, particularly

on the macro level, the market remains clouded by

uncertainty and tight liquidity condition. Nevertheless, investors

are bracing for the partial privatization of Telecom Egypt,

which is anticipated by the end of the year. The offering,

which will also include a GDR, is expected to rejuvenate

activity on the local bourse

JORDAN

Mixed semi-annual results for most listed concerns on the

Amman Stock Exchange kept sentiment subdued, with

the index hovering below the 140-psychological level.

Losses remain concentrated in the industrial and the

banking sectors, and to some extent, in the services sector.

Foreign investors continued to shun the market with

their sell orders outnumbering buy orders by JD5.9 million

in the first eight months of 2000. Accordingly, the

share of non-Jordanians in the listed companies stood at

41. 9% of market capitalization at the end of August, out

of which 36% is held by Arab investors and 5.9% by

non-Arab investors.

External debt under control in the Arab region

Successful debt management policies

have enabled several Arab countries

to reduce their external debt over the

past few years, most notably Egypt,

Morocco and Algeria. On the other hand,

other Arab countries, such as Lebanon,

Tunisia, Qatar and Oman, have been

accumulating higher levels of external

indebtedness. Among the indebted Arab

countries, Qatar and Jordan exhibited the

highest levels of external debt as a percentage

of GDP. at around 98% in 1999 for

both countries, while Oman and Egypt

enjoy the lowest levels, at 29% and 32%

respectively. Total external debt for the

eight Arab countries surveyed declined

from$118 billion in 1996to$113.8 billion

in 1997, but rose again in the following

two years toreach$117.9billion in 1999.

Those Arab countries that have a history

of debt rescheduling and those with a

high external debt burden will find it difficult

to attract foreign investment.

Capital always goes to those countries

who live up to their commitments and

where the risk of non-payment is low.

Besides, servicing large external debt eats

up a good portion of a country’s export

revenues, adds to its external imbalances

and puts pressure on the country’s foreign

reserves and its monetary stability.

Following the Gulf War in 1990, all of

Egypt’s debt to Arab creditors was cancelled,

as well as military debt owed to the

US, in recognition of the country’s support

to the UN coalition formed to liberate

Kuwait. This was followed by the cancellation

of half of the net present value of

the debt owed to the Paris Club ($22 billion)

and the rescheduling of the remaining

balance. As a result, foreign debt

declined from more than $46 billion in

1986 to about $28.2 billion in 1998/99,

representing 32% of GDP. Debt structure

is favorable and debt service/ exports

at less that 10% in 1999.

Lebanon’s external debt is expected to

rise in the foreseeable future as the government

gradually replaces part of the

expensive domestic debt, which stood at

a high of 126% of GDP at the end of

1999, with relatively cheaper dollar dominated

borrowing. Lebanon

tapped international markets in

September 1994 with the launch of its first

Eurobond, providing the government

with access to non-resident Lebanese,

Arab and foreign capital. Following a

series of Eurobonds, external debt rose

from a low of $772 million in 1994 to

$5,538 million in December 1999, representing

only 35% of the GDP and 25% of

the total debt outstanding. At the end of

June this year, the Lebanese Government

successfully issued a five-year Eurobond

for $500 million and is planning to issue

$500 million worth of 20-year

Eurobonds in the coming few months.

Total outstanding external debt of

Jordan at the end of 1999 stood at

JD5,186 million (US$7,312 million), or

98% of GDP, down from JD 6,052.5 million

(US$9,121 million) in 1990. By July

2000, total external debt dropped to

JD4,874 million (US$6,872 million).

Jordan• s largest creditors are the industrial

countries with whom the government is

negotiating debt rescheduling and debt forgiveness

agreements, and swapping some debt into local investment.

This should help reduce the country’s

debt burden, and with higher

growth in GDP this year, debt to

GDP ratio should drop below 90%.

Qatar’s LNG investment program,

financed by a huge stock of

external debt, led to the reversal of …_

the country’s position from a net

creditor up until 1994, to a net

debtor starting from 1995. The

country’s external debt (including

government guaranteed debt and

QGPC debt) reached $11.2 billion in

1999, accounting for 98% of GDP.

 A new $500 million sovereign loan will be

launched this month, coming at the heels

of Qatar’s second Eurobond issue, which

in mid-June raised $1.4 billion. Debt

ratios are expected to improve beyond

the year 2000 on the back of sustainable

economic growth driven by growing natural

gas exports and higher oil revenues.

Total external debt in Tunisia stood at an

estimated $13 billion last year, equivalent

to 62% of GDP. The country’s external

indebtedness is manageable in light of

Tunisia’s easy access to external borrowing

and international bond markets. In

Morocco, prudent external borrowing

and active debt management policy has

substantially reduced the country’s external

debt from a peak of 130% of GDP in

1985 to $19.2 billion or 54% of GDP in

1999. The stock of external debt in

Algeria has declined from a peak of

$34.4 billion in 1996 to an estimated

$29.7 billion in 1999, equivalent to

62.1 % of GDP, and is further expected to

fall to $28. 7 billion by the end of the year.

It is imperative for the indebted Arab

countries to take all possible measures to

reduce their debt burden. Buying one’s

debt from the world’s secondary market at

a fraction of the nominal value and using

privatization proceeds to retire existing

debt are well-known measures for the countries of the region to follow

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Money Matters

No surprise here

by Executive Editors October 16, 2000
written by Executive Editors

After months of warnings, Standard &

Poor’s downgraded Lebanon’s sovereign

credit rating saying that the government

had failed to take measures to

stem the ballooning public debt, expected y

to reach 140% of GDP by year-end. The

credit rating was pushed down one notch,

from BB- to B+, making it more expensive

to borrow on international markets.

S&P said it was also unlikely that the

government would reach its deficit target of

15.5% of GDP. Also listed was the government’s

failure to capitalize on the $2.7

billion offer made by the two cellular companies

to buy GSM licenses. As well parliament’s

failure to approve a draft value added

tax (VAT) law before the elections

would likely lead to a delay in the implementation

of VAT, originally scheduled for

next year. S&P also expressed doubts that

the new government, expected to take

office in November, would be able to make

much headway in tackling the deteriorating

financial situation this year. Both

Lebanon’s current and previous credit ratings

are considered below the minimum

investment grade level of BBB-.

A second jolt came from Moody’s, which

last month put Lebanon’s BI domestic currency

debt rating on credit watch. It also cited

the growing public debt as reason for alarm.

Green light

The Central Bank has approved the

merger of Banque Libanaise pour le

Commerce (BLC) and the United Bank of

Lebanon (UBL) four months after a major

scandal threatened to derail the deal. The

approval came after Safi Harb, former

UBL chairman, and Jean Felix

Aboujaoude, BLC’s former general manager,

agreed to pay back nearly $40 million

of questionable loans to themselves and

close family members.

The new bank, named BLC, elected

Chafic Moharram as its chairman and general

manager and now ranks among the

country’s ten largest banks with assets of

$1.5 billion. Harb and Aboujaoude were

forced to relinquish their shares before the

deal could go through, leaving

Mohammad Safadi, a wealthy Lebanese

businessman, the majority shareholder in

the new bank with a 56% stake. Moharram

has said that the bank plans to boost efficiency

and cut costs, including layoffs of

10% to 12% of its 750 employees.

The merger closes a tumultuous chapter

in Lebanon’s banking history. In mid-

1999, an attempted merger between BLC

and Byblos Bank fell through over what

Byblos said were bad debts held by BLC.

Since 1997, BLC’s Beirut listed shares

have more than halved to around $10. Its latest

available results show a loss of $5.4 million

in 1998, after registering profits of

$13.7 million in 1997. “I think things are

stabilizing,” says Jean Riachi, chairman

and general manager of Financial Funds

Advisors. ” Things look good.”

The up-market pays

Societe des Grands Hotels du Liban

(SOHL), owner of Vendome and

Phoenicia hotels, came out with 1999 earnings

of $1.43 million, an 84% increase

from 1998 at $776,833. It is expecting bigger

profit gains this year, as high as $10 million.

The catalyst is Phoenicia, which

opened last March. With a focus on quality

and having the largest conference room in

Lebanon, Inter-Continental targets corporate

clients. Along with Vendome still maintaining

a high occupancy rate, averaging

77% through August, according to Noha

Saliba, Phoenicia’s PR manager, bookings

in the new hotel have exceeded expectations,

averaging 50% between April and August.

She also believes that the coming months

will bring on a surge. “Our conference

room is fully booked and in October and

November our occupancy will reach 80%,”

says Saliba. SGHL’s shares have settled

around $5.

No looking back

Credit Libanais is still showing an

impressive profit performance. Since

the central bank cut it loose in 1997, its earnings

growth has been on a tear. After earnings

jumped 52.5% last year, its pre-tax profits

climbed 29.5% to $12.4 million in the first half

of 2<XX> compared to the same period last year.

Net interest income increased 18.8% and fee based

income rose 15.4%. According to Elie

Abimrad, the bank’s financial controller,

although one major contributor to the rise in

profits came from maintaining healthy yields

in liquid assets, Credit Libanais benefited

from its focus on expanding on retail banking.

Retail lending has grown, pulling in higher

yields, and more products and services have

been launched so far this year.

Credit Libanais may be catching up with

the big banks. Although Banque du Liban

et d’Outre-Mer (BLOM), Byblos Bank

and Banque Audi have much higher profits,

Credit Libanais’s profit growth surpassed

them. BLOM’s growth increased

14.6%, while Byblos and Audi’s dropped

-0.1 % and -11 %. Though Credit

Libanais’s figures are based on pre-tax

data, net profit growth is still expected to

come in higher than the top banks.

Bond bombshell

A dollar-denominated eurobond issue

aimed largely at US institutional

investors has been put on hold indefinitely

until a new government is named. “It was

ill-conceived to think you could sell a 20-

year bond to Americans without the new

government in place and its policies clear,”

says an analyst about die timing of

the initial announcement for the issue just

before the elections.

Part of the aim of such an issue would be

to lengthen the maturity of the debt. It

would come at a higher premium compared

to previous issues, though still

below what it would cost Lebanon’s

peers, according to the analyst: “It still

would have ended up being mostly in the

hands of Lebanese banks, if not on the

primary market then eventually on the

secondary market.”

Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and Credit

Suisse First Boston, who were supposed to

lead manage the issue, subsequently handled

$450 million in three-year eurobonds.

Of these, 80% were taken up by Lebanese

banks, 15% by European investors and 5%

by Gulf investors.

Getting dragged down …

Standard & Poor’ s recent downgrade of

Lebanon’s sovereign rating has also

pulled down the credit ratings of three of the

country’s largest banks. Banque Audi,

Banque de la Mediterranee and Banque du

Liban et d Outre-Mer (BLOM) saw their ratings

go from BB- down to B+, the same as

Lebanon. S&P cited the banks’ heavy

holdings of government T-bills as the primary

reason for the downgrade. “Banks

are a major source of government financing,

holding 75% of outstanding treasury bills in

1999,” said S&P. But, according to one

analyst, “Unless the banks are going to

issue new debt, it won’t have any effect.”

… again and again

A s a consequence of the further deterioration

of the operating environment

in Lebanon, Moody’s Investors Service

changed its outlook on Banque Audi’s

financial strength rating from positive to

stable. This put the financial institution on

par with Byblos Bank and Banque du Liban

et d’Outre Mer. “This does not directly

reflect a drop in Banque Audi’s rating,”

says Nabil Chaya, head of capital markets at

Audi. “As the sovereign ceiling is lowered,

Banque Audi’s rating is adjusted accordingly

due to the increased vulnerability of the

bank’s financial strength in the face of a

weakened operating environment.”

Trading places

The Arab Stock Exchange Union has

been transferred to Beirut from Cairo

after a 19-year exile due to the civil war.

‘This will send a signal to the rest of the

world of the reliability of the Lebanese capital

markets,” says Fadi Khalaf, chairman of the

Beirut Stock Exchange. He says that despite

the incentives offered, including tax exemptions

and the cooperation of the BSE, the

decision to transfer the headquarters was

based on the federation’s recognition of the

great potential of Lebanon’s capital markets.

“The trust the federation has shown in making

this move isn’t to be taken lightly,” he says.

The Arab Clearing House, responsible for

clearing stock trades in the region, is next in

line to settle in Lebanon once its members provide

the $5 million in capital. “Within six

months, we expect Arab stock exchanges to be

linked together through one website,” continues

Khalaf. “And eventually the site will

allow online trading.”

Confusion reigns

There has been some confusion over the

price of Casino du Liban’s shares

recently. Though frequently quoted at

$200, the actual price fluctuated around

$150, which Fidus rated as a good buy. AlMustaqbal

newspaper put the price as low

as $100, based on one investor selling

1,400 shares, just over 0.1 % of the casino’s

720,000 shares.

“If anything has caused a drop in share

price, the more likely culprit is the ongoing

attempt by board members to oust chairman

Elie Ghorayeb,” says a casino official.

Ghorayeb has been at odds with the

board’s 11 members, mostly over the $23

million in outstanding taxes, which

finance minister Georges Conn is claiming

on slot machines from 1997 up to 1999.

Ghorayeb claims that these have always

been tax exempt and has appealed to the

Shura council.

Ghorayeb’s restructuring program is also

causing conflict: The staff was reduced by

100 and contracts with service providers

were renegotiated. “Renegotiating alone

cut down expenses by $5.4 million,” says

Joseph Araiji, responsible for press relations

for the casino. The gambling house has

settled its $23 million debt in record time.

In the first half of 2000, pre-tax profits

were $10.3 million compared to $7.3 million

for the same period last year.

Barely holding on

The market value of Lebanon

Holdings, the only closed-end fund

listed on the Beirut Stock Exchange,

dropped 9.2% during the first six months of

2000, from $39.9 million to $36.3 million.

“If you look at the holdings, you see that it’s

mainly due to a drop in all shares on the

BSE,” says one analyst. The fund’s shares

last traded at $5.33 three months ago.

Earlier, Lebanon Holdings bought back

300,000 shares in an attempt to boost the

market value.

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Money Matters

Do or Die

by Avo Tavoukdjian October 16, 2000
written by Avo Tavoukdjian

I t seems Nasser Saidi means business after all. Back in May 1999,

when the new insurance law was finally passed in parliament,

many wondered if it would be enforced. Meeting the new minimum

capital requirement of $1 .5 million, up from $200,000, and

depositing $3.3 million in order to sell premiums for all lines of insurance

wouldn’t be easy. But then again that was the intention all along.

By demanding a high capital, the ministry of trade and economy

would force financially weaker firms to merge to meet the requirements.

Otherwise, they would have to shut down and leave the sector

to those with the financial backbone to remain solvent.

Since then a wave of reform has washed through the sector, with

the number of companies unable to stay afloat gradually rising.

Insurers that didn’t already have these funds in place were given

until last June to come up with the first half of the difference needed

in order to meet the new requirements and June 2001 to come

up with the remainder. But even the first installment proved too

much for many. When the law was first issued, many expected that

the number of insurers would be reduced by at least a third. Now

that prediction is being realized.

When EXECUTIVE went to print – some firms are still under study –

29 insurers were involved in the initial shakeout. Of these, 13 had

Their licenses revoked, five merged with other firms, three transferred

their portfolios to other companies, two stopped operating, while six

more requested that their own licenses be revoked. Still others are in

the process of merging and several have been referred to the public prosecutor’s

office for not complying with current laws.

But is the new insurance law a good one? “I consider this law better

than the old one,” says Abraham Matossian, chairman of AlMashrek

and the Lebanese Insurance Companies’ Association

(ACAL). “But I believe we can do better.” Strict requirements on solvency

are essential. More than once we’ve seen companies that fell in

the maw of insolvency, like Income, Mesir, and Phoenix, and left trusting

clients stranded. The number of insurers is also too high for

Lebanon’s small market-around 75 for a population of3.5 million.

With a population of 60 million, Egypt has about ten insurance firm

Nonetheless, the stricter regulations are considered extreme by

some. “If a company has a good solvency ratio and is adequately supported

by credible reinsurers, the blocked capital wouldn’t be necessary,”

says Zareh Basmadjian, chairman of Oriental Insurance, whose

portfolio of $ l.2 million in 1999 was transferred to Al-Mashrek.

And he’s not alone. Chehade Raad, chairman of Kafra Insurance and

Reinsurance, believes that problems arise not from a comparatively

Low capital but from not reinsuring properly. According to Matossian,

“If an insurer is adequately reinsured, he will not need to liquidate his

assets. This happens with large companies in Europe, which were forced

to liquidate stock they’d been holding for a century to meet liabilities.

The risk in Lebanon is much less if things are done properly.”

Critics of the new law also suggest that capital requirements

should actually be based on the size of a company’s portfolio with

adjustments made as business grows. Basmadjian believes a capital

of $1.5 million might be necessary for insurers with large portfolios,

but not for small companies. “Each firm should have been

studied and a raise in their capital should have been required

based on its solvency and the size of its portfolios,” he says.

If a company could comply with the required capital, does it

make more sense to do so or to pull out? Companies with several

shareholders might consider injecting additional funds or bringing

in new shareholders as a good idea. Considering the relatively

small amount each shareholder has invested and how profits are divided,

boosting the capital may be the easiest and best option. Middle

East Assurance and Reinsurance Co (MEARCO), which had a capital

of $400,000, has done just that. With over a dozen shareholders,

many of them brokers, the company found it more convenient to comply

with the law’s requirements. “We paid up $550,000, the first half

 on the due date, and will cover the rest by June 200 I,” says Rached

Rached, MEARCO’s chairman.

But what of those who have a majority stake in their own company,

in the case of Basmadjian 75%?

“The $1.5 million in capital I’m

required to put up could be better

invested in other ventures,” he

says. With returns of just 12% a

year, he would make $135,000:

“I’m not making that much in the

insurance business,” he says. All

this without yet considering the

necessary deposits, a total of $3 .3

million to operate in all lines of

insurance. For an individual, letting

that kind of money sit idle

isn’t too appealing.

But in the end, the insurance

sector is moving toward greater

discipline – even if some are

being dragged, kicking and

screaming. The law itself is an

improvement, providing more

security for the consumer and

even for the insurer. It’s true

many of the smaller firms are

being hit hard, but adhering to a

strict regulation policy is the

ministry’s only recourse to keep

insurers in line.

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Money Matters

Continuous delays

by Peter willems October 16, 2000
written by Peter willems

Rallies at the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE) are rare. There has

been little interest In Lebanese stocks for the last two and a half

years. Trading volume dropped from $640 million in 1997 to $90

million last year. In the first eight months of 2000, it dropped

another 30% compared to the same period in 1999. One of many

complaints among stockbrokers has been the market’s antiquated

fixing system. Even though the BSE Is ready to bring In

continuous trading – a two-hour session after price fixing – the

government has been slow giving a green light. According to Fadi

Khalaf, BSE chairman, the council of ministers gave approval in

May but passed it on to the Shura council.

Is the government offering another example of taking forever

to approve a change that brings positive results? “The delay

is due to the Shura council who has sat on the decree for several

months,” says Georges Corm, minister of finance. “Now its

opinion has been given, and we hope the decision will be published

in the official gazette [in the beginning of October]. The

changes are all made, no more steps, except the signature of the

prime minister and the president.”

But allowing continuous trading in October is still an ‘if.’ A government

heading for the exit may be reluctant to make any decision.

“It’s difficult to predict,” says Khalaf. “Hopefully It will

happen soon.”

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Money Matters

Taking

by Peter willems October 16, 2000
written by Peter willems

Stock of Politics

Investing in stocks is pure speculation. But for Solidere, the most

active company on the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE), taking

up over 70% of the total market cap at around $1.26 billion,

speculation zeroes in on what happens in the world of politics.

Whenever peace negotiations in the region have picked up,

investors have pounced on Solidere shares. During elections its

shares traded on the BSE and GDRs had an impressive rally

based on anticipation of Rafic Hariri becoming the next prime minister

(see graph). “We saw something we haven’t seen in two and

a half years,” says Jean Riachi, chairman and general manager at

Financial Funds Advisors. “Lebanese people were calling to buy.

People we didn’t know came and placed orders. It reminded us of

the good old times in 1997.”

What got investors excited is clear. When Hariri ‘s stint as premier

from 1992 to 1998 ended, Solidere’s business was stopped dead.

Hariri, the founder of the real estate company responsible for

rebuilding the Beirut Central District (BCD) and believed to be the

largest shareholder, is seen as the one who can get the company back

on track. “I believe Solidere will benefit from Hariri’s return,” says

Ziad Maalouf, vice president at Middle East Capital Group.

“When he was in office, it never faced similar problems. Hariri will

grease the wheels and make things move.”

The stranglehold on Solidere has been a permit problem. Since the

current government took charge, it has been nearly impossible for the

company or developers to finish projects (see “Can’t get no satisfaction,”

June 2000). Decrees have been brought forward to solve the

slowdown. The most important one is to settle the discrepancies

between Lebanon’s old construction code and Solidere’s building

decree 4830. According to Oussama Kabbani, department manager

of urban management at Solidere, with the speed that the decree passes

from one government institution to another, it would take up to three

years for it to pass. The high council of urbanism was established early

this year to help work out discrepancies. Not only did it provide little

help, but the council expired in the first week of August.

“We can no longer get permits through that have discrepancies,” says

Kabbani. When EXECUTIVE went to print, there were 27 occupancy

permits idling and 23 construction permits collecting dust.

Also important is the decree to let Solidere develop the souks. It’s

well known that once the area is running, business in the BCD will

pick up dramatically. No surprise: The decree, in need of only a signature,

has been with the council of ministers for five months.

Most believe that if Hariri becomes prime minister he will be able

to act fast. “He’s pragmatic and he has business sense,” says

Kabbani. “If someone like him is in power, give it three months and

all decrees will be passed and all can be resolved.” Although the municipality

of Beirut is where the permits are stopped and is under the

thumb of the minister of interior – Michel Murr who has a beef with

Solidere over Murr Tower – many believe that if Hariri is in power

and there’s a council of

ministers that he can

work with, the situation

will be fixed.

According to Hani

Shammah, senior

regional analyst at

Societe Generale, the

recession, which has

the real estate sector

in a vice, will not be a

major obstacle.

“Solidere is a bit insulated from the recession. It’s the only place where there’s hope

of economic activity during recession,” says Shammah. “Plus, it’s

been on hold. It will only grow.” If Hariri is appointed prime minister,

Shammah will increase his latest projected sales and earnings

from 2001 and onward (see graph).

But Shammah argues that for the long haul, stock investors will have

to bet on another political variable: regional peace. “Today, Hariri is

a good bet. If appointed, shares will shoot up. When decrees are signed,

the permit problem is cleared up, prices will continue to move,” predicts

Shammah. “But after that they will probably level off or drift lower

until the next catalyst: a peace agreement.” He argues that Solidere’s

growth cannot be sustained on local businesses moving into BCD.

“Solidere’s upscale properties will be wonderful for a regional headquarters,

but it needs those regional factors that will beef up demand.”

But the first indicator will come this fall when the prime minister

is supposed to be appointed. The chances are good that Hariri will

take office, but it’s not certain: There are still power plays involved

(see pp. 22-25). But most stock jockeys agree: If you believe that

Hariri will soon be back at the helm and want to see your

stocks rise quickly, now is the time to bank on Solidere.

“Solidere is a stock that is very politicized,”says Maalouf,

“if  Hariri returns, investors will buy into Solidere and it

will rally.”

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Feature

A long shot

by Hadi khatib October 15, 2000
written by Hadi khatib

0nly on Sunday mornings can the

thunder of horse hooves and the

cheers and moans of men be heard

rising up from the 84-year-old Beirut

Hippodrome. In stark contrast to the glamorous

Mediterranean racetrack it was before

the war, the facility today is in a sorry state.

Its concrete bleachers look like the seating

one would find in a third-rate football stadium.

The lighting for the track was blown out

during the war and never repaired.

Consequently, potentially lucrative night

races cannot be held. There are only 10% of

the number of stables today than there were

during the early 1970s. And the

Hippodrome has become a big money loser.

Between 1995 and 1997, the Association

for the Protection and Improvement of

Arabian horses (SPARCA), a non-profit

organization that has been managing the

track since the late I 960s, reported a loss of

about $700,000 from the facility,

which has yearly revenues of about $14 million.

Weekly losses on races alone total roughly

$20,000 on revenues of $210,000. SPAR CA

blames the war for many of the racetrack’s

ailments. With fewer stables and less horses,

races can only be held once a week, limiting

revenues. And with finite resources,

SPARCA says that it cannot market the

races properly. The organization also complains

that the taxes it pays are too high.

While 72% of the bets are distributed

among the winners, trainers and jockeys,

14% goes to the ministry of finance, 2.24%

goes to the municipality, which owns the

track, and SPARCA gets 11. 76% for managing

the facility. “Our percentage cut

comes to about $1.5 million a year. That’s

not enough to cover the costs of maintenance,

employees, and to make improvements

at the same time,” says Nabil de

Freije, SPARCA’s president.

But most problematic is that nearly

$800,000 in bets are lost each week to illegal

bookies – called paroli – and the police

have done virtually nothing to stop them,

according to SPARCA. Unlike the

Hippodrome, which pays winners $1 for

every $1 bet, bookies pay $1 for every 60

cents. But the paroli don’t pay track maintenance

fees or taxes. A person betting with

the paroli doesn’t even have to attend the

races, avoiding the track entry fee. What’s

more, the bookies are able to extend credit

lines, while bettors at the track must pay

cash. “If the government stopped the

paroli, our revenues would increase dramatically,”

says de Freije. Many public

officials sympathize with SPARCA. “The

government should fight illegal betting to

improve our income,” says Abdel Munim

Ariss, mayor of Beirut.

But not everyone is convinced that the

racetrack’s problems are the result of factors

outside SPARCA’s control. The paroli,

after all, have been around since the 1920s,

and they didn’t keep the Hippodrome from

generating a healthy income during its

heyday. “In all parts of the world, illegal

bookmaking is synonymous with gambling,

especially horse racing. You can’t stop

it, and it represents only part of the problem

here,” says Faisal Abou Hassan, a horse

breeder and trainer. Some bookies claim that

they’re actually money generators for the

Hippodrome. According to one, if many

clients are betting on a particular horse,

and the odds on that horse are low, a bookie

will bet his own money at the

Hippodrome in order to narrow the odds and

reduce his liability. “If it w-+1sn’t for the

paroli, the Hippodrome would go bankrupt.

Two-thirds of its income is from the

bets we place. They would beg us to continue

if we stopped,” he says.

According to SPARCA’s critics, bad management

is the root of the problem. The organization

has been accused of everything

from failing to abide by its contract to mismanaging

racetrack funds. Its members are

blamed for failing to pay the proper rental fees

on stables. Despite complaints about high

taxes, over the last three years the association

has been granted a series of exonerations

and deferments. Total taxes owed reached

$1.06 million by the end of 1999 and still

haven’t been paid. The most recent reprieve

came with a decision of the council of ministers

last year to give SPARCA a 50% tax

deferment, reducing the amount paid to the

ministry of finance from 14% to 7%.

As early as February 1999, Ariss

described the old contract with SPARCA as

unsound. Even Mohamed Kabbani, currently

a de: Freije ally, has said that the

Hippodrome should be managed as a

build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract. In a

press conference two years ago, he said

SPAR CA shouldn’t be allowed to bid on the

BOT until its taxes were paid in full. In fairness,

SPARCA has made some improvements

to the Hippodrome. A computerized

betting system was installed about a year

ago and 12 legal off-track betting centers

were recently opened. But most of

these improvements came after years

of promises and delays.

In January 1998, the government

and the municipality of Beirut decided

to change things. Rather than continue

with SPARCA, they opted for a BOT

arrangement. Private companies

would be allowed to bid for the rights

to manage the Hippodrome for 15 to 20

years, and the company would be

expected to make major renovations to

tum the facility into a high-caliber

racetrack. The council for development

and reconstruction (CDR) drew

up a contract, the municipality

approved it and a consultancy firm

called DG Jones was assigned to study

the bids and assess the qualifications of

bidders. Last March, the municipality

sent a letter to Yakoub Sarraf, Beirut’s

administrator, requesting that he

approve the plan. More than $15,000

was set aside to publish the tender in local

and international newspapers.

SPARCA is today one of the staunchest

critics of a BOT, but it was one of the first to

suggest the idea. In a letter dated October

29, 1997 to then prime minister Rafic Hariri,

Pierre Pharaon, SPARCA’s president at the

time, submitted preliminary plans for a $24

million renovation of the Hippodrome. They

included improvements to the racetrack’s

infrastructure, the installation of a computerized

betting system, the building of an equestrian

club and the opening of 40 new offices

for legal off-track betting. The letter suggested

that SPARCA carry out the project and that

it would need a few years of tax breaks to pay

for the renovations. But if the government did

not opt for SPARCA, Pharaon suggested the

project could be tendered as a BOT.

SPARCA was not the only organization

with ambitious plans. Hippodrome de Beirut

Investissement (HBI), a company formed in

1998 by a group of Lebanese and European

investors, stepped forward with a proposal of

its own. It also had plans for a $24 million renovation

of the facility. But unlike SPARCA,

HBI was not asking for tax breaks or a crackdown

on the paroli. But things did not go quite

as planned for HBI. “As we were waiting to

submit our bid, things got complicated,” says

Louis Maaroui, HBI’s general manager.

“Beirut’s administrator (Sarraf) did not sign the

OK to proceed, and we were later shocked to

find out that Corm had other ideas.”

The government decided to put the BOT

idea on hold and extend SPARCA’s contract

for another three years. Rather than the $24

million renovation plan, the ministry of

finance prepared a scaled-down $4.2 million

scheme that SPARCA would be responsible

for implementing. According to Ariss, the

Hippodrome cannot be turned into a BOT

until the relevant privatization law, currently

being studied in parliament, is passed. But

several public facilities are currently operating

under BOT contracts. For example, the

airport parking lot, which is managed by the

Kuwaiti company Mohammed Abdul

Mohsen Al-Khorafi & Sons.

“We want the BOT but we didn’t want to

create a void while the [privatization] law

was being drafted. [Later] we will evaluate

the contract and its result to determine if we

continue with SPARCA or not,” says Ariss.

In the meantime, the government has

agreed to grant SPAR CA $10.7 million

worth of tax credits for the renovations. It

has also agreed to incur the projected losses

of $1.2 million during those three years,

which SPARCA has agreed to pay back later.

And since the revenue projections

in the contract are for six years,

SPARCA could easily make the case for a

further three-year extension of its contract.

The $24 million renovation plans had to be

scrapped because they were too ambitious,

says Corm, adding that SPARCA would have

difficulty in securing financing for the

scheme. “Small is beautiful. We know the

results with big international projects. Look at

what happened with Solidere, the economy

paid a big price,” he says. And what about HBI

and its plans? ‘The French company came to

us unofficially. But when asked to provide us

a feasibility study, they gave us bits and

pieces of information and we didn’t take

them seriously,” says Farid Meshaka, Corm’s

advisor. According to Maaraoui, HBI could

not divulge a detailed feasibility study before

submitting its sealed bid because there was a

risk that the study would be leaked to competitors.

But, he says, the company’s intentions

were explained to Meshaka in detail.

The rehabilitation plans are directed

toward improving the Hippodrome’s infrastructure.

According to the ministry of

finance, the improvements should boost the

racetrack’s revenues from $13 million to $78

million within six years. During the same

period, SPARCA’s turnover would increase

from $2.5 million to $8.6 million with the government’s

share jumping to $26 million and

the municipality’s to $10 million. De Freije is

happy with the new arrangement. “BOTs

don’t work,” he says. ‘Those people are here

for one reason only: to make the most money

they can and leave. Bettors will lose trust,

knowing that it isn’t a non-profit organization

running the racetrack.”

Nonsense says Maaraoui. HBI would run

the Hippodrome better than SPARCA

because if it doesn’t, its investors wouldn’t

make money, he explained. The lure of

profits would be the incentive to do a good

job. And making the track a financial success

requires gaining the trust of bettors.

“This new document is a scandal,” says

Maaraoui. “The system that’s in place now

will encourage even more illegal betting.”

He’s skeptical that the government will be

able to generate the projected revenues from

such a small investment. HBI, he says, forecasted

that its $24 million renovation plan

would boost annual revenues to just $50

million. “For 30 years SPAR CA lost money.

But instead of giving someone else a chance

to make money, the government is repeating

the same mistake; only this time it’s giving

the association more money than before,” he

says. “We hope the new government will

reconsider its position and abide by the

decrees. But I’m not sure how patient my

investors will be.”

Other options

A new location

Horse breeder Faisal Abou Hassan thinks that no matter who runs it, the current

Hippodrome is doomed to mediocrity. Having a world class racetrack will require building

new facilities in a different location, he argues, as the Hippodrome’s 220,000m2 is not sufficient.

He proposes building a new 500,000m2 to 700,000m2 racetrack on the outskirts of

Beirut, suggesting his own 400,000m2 plot of land in Choweifat or reclaiming land by the airport,

which would give ships easy access to the track. He estimates the project would cost

$350 million to $500 million, while investors could be found in the Gulf, where most of the

region’s racehorse owners live. Due to high temperatures, they can only run their horses for

four or five months. “We have the best weather year-round. They would love to come here

for the remaining seven or eight months,” says Abou Hassan. He adds that large international

racetracks make money because of the big cash prizes, reaching $6 million a race. This money

can be invested in horse breeding and training. The prize money generated at the

Hippodrome, which has about 800 stables, is not enough to cover the $8,000 it costs horse

owners to maintain their animals. A future racetrack would need at least 2,500 stables, both

a grass and sand track, a swimming pool for training the horses and a veterinary hospital.

A park

Greenline, an organization dedicated to the conservation and creation of green areas,

has been campaigning to turn the Hippodrome into a park. “We thought that the

matter would take a couple of months,” says Salman Abbas, secretary general of

Greenline. Beirut has just 0.8m2 of green space per person. “The world standard is 40m2

and anything below 20m2 creates a health danger,” says Abbas. “I’m only asking to give

every 1,000 citizens as much green space as one horse takes. Is that too much to ask?”

Unfortunately for Greenline, the municipality’s answer was yes. The racetrack brings

in too much money to turn it into a park. But the municipality did decide to dedicate

65,000m2 of the existing 220.000m2 as a public green area.

A grand prix race circuit

K haled Altaki, a local businessman, wants to turn the Hippodrome into a Grand Prix

race circuit. Altaki’s idea is certainly not new. Five years ago, he gained notoriety

for designing the Beirut Hariri Circuit, which ran along the Corniche, in the hopes of hosting

a Formula One race. That idea was later scrapped. But Altaki never gave up on the

dream of Michael Schumacher zipping his Ferrari through Beirut. The new Victory Circuit

of Beirut would be a 3.1 -kilometer course with construction costs estimated at $20 million.

But that’s less than the expected $38.5 million in revenue that Altaki says a Formula

One race would bring in. A Formula Three race would generate $7.5 million.

Altakl has one condition: “I will only do this if the Hippodrome moves to another location.

I’m not here to deprive people of their horse racing.”

Either way, Altaki has some competitors. The government has formed a committee

with plans of hosting a Formula One race in the streets of downtown.

October 15, 2000 0 comments
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Cover story

Candidates in the running

by Executive Editors October 15, 2000
written by Executive Editors

EXECUTIVE asked four of the top analysts on Lebanese politics their opinion on who is most

likely to be the next prime minister and how qualified each candidate is. Here are the results

Rafic Hariri

• “The only obstacle is his bad relations

with the president. If everything is left

to go as it should then it will be Hariri

as prime minister. It seems the Syrians are trying now,

through some consultations with the president, to find consensus.

If they don’t succeed, the choice will be between

Mikati and Kassar.”

Sarkis Naoum, political commentator for An-Nahar newspaper

• “Hariri has certain priorities. His first is to have more or less

the government of his choice. He wants to control the ministers,

especially the minister of finance. If he cannot get this,

he will prefer not to be the prime minister. This could be difficult;

Lahoud doesn’t want to give him a blank cheque.

There will be heavy negotiations until the appointment. Hariri

has a much better chance than Mikati. He created a solid

power base since 1992.”

Michael Young, political analyst with the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies

• “He is the person most likely to become prime minister.

However electoral alliances don’t necessarily translate into

parliamentary blocks. In principle if parliament nominates

Hariri then the president should nominate him as prime

minister. But if the president bypasses the parliamentary nomination

then parliament only has recourse when there’s a vote

of confidence in the new government. In the meantime,

alliances can shift.

If Hariri is nominated it depends on how he forms government:

as a sort of administration where he has free reign to design

policy or as a government of national unity. The latter would

be a recipe for paralysis, where the whole political system is

embodied in the government and the cabinet doesn’t have the

executive power. Only if you have executive power can you

be held accountable. Hariri is certainly the man with the

international contacts and the drive to get Lebanon out of this

mess and restore confidence in the economy.”

Nadim Shehadi, director of the Centre for Lebanese Studies at Oxford University

• “If Hariri is not forming the cabinet, he will be represented.

With any of the candidates we will be facing the same problems

that we have today – a stagnant economy, a ballooning

debt, etc. With Hariri, we will face a second problem, namely

his poor relationship with the president.”

Farid Khazen, head of AUB‘s political science department

Najib Mikati

“Mikati could be the compromise

candidate, especially if he’s favored by

Syria. And his profile fits into the new

regional mode of having the young

generation that wants reform and will

fight corruption.

He’s certainly qualified for the job. He’s

politically clean and popular, he’s not

seen as tainted by political corruption in the country.

It would be the image of a clean start, which is positive.

I think he has a good chance of being appointed and a

good chance of being successful given that image. Lebanon

is ready for a new image, not connected to the old system.” N. Shehadi

Mikati is the next choice. He has a good chance if Hariri

and Lahoud’s bottom lines are far apart. If Lahoud and

Hariri are in the mood to compromise, Mikati’s chances will

go down.

Mikati’s ability is not known. He’s completely unknown.

He’s done well to forward his own name, but nothing indicates

that he’ll be a good prime minister. He’s been a good businessman,

but you can’t judge him on having been the minister

of public works. He doesn’t have a solid power base.”

M. Young

• “Mikati is a newcomer, but he has done well as a minister.

At the same time, he has a close relationship with Syria.”

F. Khazen

Adnan Kassar

• “He’s not a politician. He’s a

banker. What kind of government

will he lead?”

M. Young

“I’m not so sure about his

nomination. The positive angle

is that it would represent a larger

role for the private sector. This is

a good position to start from for strengthening the private sector and reforming the public

sector to fit the demands of the private sector. And he’s also

not a politician in the classical sense, and therefore not subject

to political pressures.”

N. Shehadi

• “Kassar is a businessman. He is seen as neutral. But without

political support, he can do nothing.”

F. Khazen

Candidate X

• “Surprises are expected in this country, but I don’t think that

this is the time for surprises.”

S. Naoum

• “I don’t see anybody coming out of the woodwork.”

• “I cannot see who. Can’t say who.”

M. Young

October 15, 2000 0 comments
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Cover story

This is it

by Robert Tuttle & Kirsten Vance October 15, 2000
written by Robert Tuttle & Kirsten Vance

Salim Hoss, his face filled with a look of rejection, conceded

defeat even before the final election results were in. A five-time

head of government, Hoss was the first Lebanese prime minister

ever to lose his seat in parliament, and defeated by a large margin.

On the other side of West Beirut, at the Koraytem palace, the

mood was decidedly different. A festive Rafic Hariri could be seen

kissing babies, shaking hands and sharing laughs with his allies in

victory. The victory was an unprecedented landslide. After two years

of desperation and hopelessness, the message was clear. The

Lebanese population was fed up; people wanted to hope again. “The

people of the nation began to feel that this is a very impotent government,”

says Marwan Iskandar, an economist. “This kind of

atmosphere without a doubt encourages people to call on Hariri.”

With his clean sweep in Beirut and strong showing by allies

around the country, it looks as though Hariri will become the next

prime minister, although it’s still not guaranteed. Regardless, a new

government is on its way. Expectations are high and the challenge

of turning the dire economy around is daunting. Can it deliver?

The incoming government will have to defuse an economy that

has become a ticking time bomb. The debt has now reached about

$23.5 billion – a dangerously high 140% of GDP. The deficit

increased to more than 51 % in the first eight months of 2000, much

higher than the 42% for the same period of last year, and the

target of 37.3% for the year will undoubtedly

be missed. Most economists predict zero

growth for the year. Some 450 jobs have

been lost per month in the last year, according

to Bank of Beirut and the Arab

Countries. No wonder so many are leaving

Lebanon. The outgoing government has

left the economy in a much worse condition

than when it took office two years ago.

Up to now, Lebanon has been riding this

out in relative isolation. But the secret is

out, and the message is loud and clear. “I

think everyone realizes we are on the

verge of economic collapse,” says Farid

Khazen, head of AUB’s political science

department. As predicted, Standard &

Poor’s (S&P) downgraded Lebanon’s sovereign

rating and warned that more could

come if the situation doesn’t improve (see

box). On top of the deteriorating fiscal situation,

S&P was not impressed by the

government’s failure to pocket $2.7 billion

from the cellular companies for licenses and

by parliament’s inability to pass the VAT

draft law. In early September Moody’s put

Lebanon’s sovereign rating under.review

for possible downgrade. The donor conference

for the South, scheduled for

October, has been put off indefinitely due

to a lack of interest. According to

Iskandar, Lebanon can ill afford to ignore

the warning signals from abroad:

“Lebanon is coming under international

scrutiny and can no longer disregard it,

especially since the country might be a

member of the WTO in a few years. If

they do it’s like committing suicide.”

Analysts agree that the incoming government

must move quickly. “We can no longer

postpone difficult debt management decisions.

We can’t survive with the trend of the

fiscal situation. It’s unsustainable,” says

Marwan Barakat, head of research at

Banque Audi. “The new government will

either give confidence or not give confidence;

there’s no middle ground.” The place

to start is in undoing the Hoss administration’s

biggest blunder: mend relations with Cellis

and LibanCell and convert their contracts

into licenses. That would bring a quick infusion

to the state’s empty coffers and lay the

groundwork for future licenses and more

cash. Next up: With the general privatization

law on the books, the sell-off of state assets

should get under way. Complete the necessary

preparations and move on privatizing the

telecom – 25% of the fixed network is

expected to be the first on the block.

From its inception, the new government

must inspire confidence. “Investor confidence

was dented in the last two years,” says

Nadim Shehadi, director of the Centre for

Lebanese Studies at Oxford University. “A

change of government always attracts attention,

so its signals must inspire confidence.

They need to make investors feel that people

are helping them

rather than the contrary.”

And confidence is key in attracting investment, both foreign

and local.Kamal Shehadi, an

economist, emphasizes

that the new government must have a

vision and immediately set an agenda

with both short-

term targets that

help gain momentum and long-term

reforms. That is indeed a tall

order. Is there anyone who could possibly pull it off?

Most analysts say that

Hariri is the best option. “Name someone

other than Hariri and the country will probably

not even do a semi-takeoff,” says one

political analyst. “Mikati is the only other

choice – a semi-credible candidate.” The

country is in a kind of hiatus until the

prime minister is chosen by parliament,

while deals may be struck and alliances

can shift. Meantime, President Emile

Lahoud – who has been a big disappointment

for many – still has his say in the

matter. And with relations between Hariri

and Lahoud anything but friendly, it’s

understood that the former prime minister

would never accept to be as docile as Hoss.

Then there’s the Syrian equation. The

neighbors appear to have stayed clear, or at

least played a lesser role than usual in the

recent parliamentary elections. There’s

speculation that could signal non-involvement

by the Syrians in selecting the prime

minister. But they could dictate their wishes.

Najib Mikati, the current minister of

transport and public works, is close to the

Syrians but has said he doesn’t want the job.

Adnan Kassar, chairman of Fransabank

and head of the International Chamber of

Commerce, is another name being

bandied about (see box),

Hariri’s past record is certainly not free of

blemishes. The current debt comes to you

largely thanks to Hariri and his propensity

for big construction projects at any cost.

Large deficits were par for the course. “The

economy will collapse if we get. the same

Hariri policies,” says Kbazen. By the time

he left office in late fall of 1998, the recession

had already begun. His Saudi way of

doing business doesn’t appeal to everyone.

Critics dislike him for his favoritism,

cronyism and conflicts of interest.

On the flip side, his presence is believed

to inspire confidence. “Who Hariri is will

bring confidence first and foremost,” says

one analyst. His contacts and pro-business

approach are expected to have a greater

possibility of attracting foreign investments.

He is also seen as someone who can

push through the quick remedies like the cellular

licenses. Hariri, who is the founder and

believed to be one of the largest shareholders

in Solidere, could probably solve the permit

problem and get the Beirut Central

District project back on track.

But that’s the easy part. Success over the

long haul will require bigger and more

important changes to reinvent Lebanon.

And this is where things get difficult. Legal

and administrative reform should be at the

top of the agenda, along with further privatization

of state-run entities. These are

things that are needed to make Lebanon

compatible with a 21st century economy.

Some point to the need for a peace agreement,

but peace will never be a panacea.

“Peace is not enough,” says Sarkis Naoum,

political commentator for An-Nahar newspaper.

“If we have peace and don’t reform we

will achieve nothing. We need to begin by making

achievements inside the administration,

inside the political institutions.”

Here problems come into play with the

vested interests, when decisions are made to

please certain politicians and their fiefdoms

and not to serve the interests of the

nation. Economist Sarni Atallah explains

that the Taif accord shifted executive

power from the president to the council of

ministers, a body whose lack of unity renders

decision-making difficult.

“Motivation at that level is for power, it’s not

for the interests of the nation, economic or

social,” says Atallah. “Thus the council of

ministers is unable to deal with an economic

crisis.” According to K. Shehadi,

the council of ministers is a major bottleneck.

“We have tended to centralize all

decisions at the council of ministers -even

the most mundane decision has to go to the

council of ministers for approval,” he says.

“A country in the 21st century cannot continue

to be as centralized as our political

government. It is stifling to the economy and

is completely antithetical to the most common

norms of public administration.”

The sectarian divide that is pervasive

throughout the government and determines

who fills a position is conducive to inefficiencies

and creates discord. “Our system is

based on the consensus of three presidents –

the president, the speaker of the parliament and

the prime minister, each representing a community

as well as a certain political weight in

parliament,” says K. Shehadi. “There’s no

transparency and anyone of them can block

something that’s good for the country simply

because he’s got other demands, sometimes

very selfish, and he’s bargaining with the

other two.” Sarkis advocates abolishing the

system based on confessionalism.

Be it the army, Middle East Airlines or another state entity, Lahoud, Nabih Berri,

Walid Jumblatt and others will have to

accept cutbacks such as layoffs and an end

to kickbacks that keep their protectorates

happy and their power base safe. It goes

without saying that their Syrian backing is

vital, and the level of neighborly interference

in the future will go a long way in determining

what changes can be made.

So while many are optimistic that Hariri

can provide the band-aids for the short-term,

there is doubt whether he or anyone

else can make the difficult long-term

changes that would affect the sway of

those in power. But changes are precisely

what’s needed to create a more workable

government. Without that, long-term sustainable

growth for the economy will

remain a dream.

October 15, 2000 0 comments
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Best Sellers

A business guide for the new millennium,

by Natacha Tohme October 15, 2000
written by Natacha Tohme

Fouad Fares spent 18 years with PC

Group, where he worked his way up

the corporate ladder, learning a thing

or two along the way. ‘The new millennium

is the era of services,” he says. In January he

established Mindsmaster, a consultancy firm

that focuses on IT auditing and consulting,

management training and quality assurance.

Fares audits companies’ IT environments

and designs solutions for them. “But I don’t

sell programs,” he says. “I tell them what’s

available for their needs.” Management

training involves auditing companies and

presenting in-house workshops on topics like

management techniques and customer care.

Mindsmaster also prepares companies for

ISO 9000 and 14000. Fares, who is a certified

lead auditor for both, says he has a unique offer

– the option to buy Quality Mapping

Solution software, which sells for $2,889.

The charge for IT and management consulting

is generally $600 a day. For ISO it’s

·$400 a day, while the cost on long-term contracts

ranges from $8,000 to $25,000.

Mindsmaster has done IT consulting for

National Shipping Company and a customer

care workshop for Skaff. He has done

a number of ISO audits and is preparing

Crown House and Crepaway for ISO 9000.

According to Rafi Semerdjian, a professor

of quality management systems, the stagnant

economy and tough competition have led to

reduced pricing for ISO consulting. “That’s

why we’re targeting markets abroad,” says

Semerdjian, who is also the director of CSP

Middle East, a big player in the field.

To raise the profile of his company, Fares

organizes ISO workshops and management

seminars. The workshops haven’t generated

profits, but Fares isn’t concerned: “It’s a marketing

tool.” He’s also involved in preparing

a campaign to highlight environmental

issues. Fares is turning Mindsmaster green –

he’s preparing it for ISO 14000. “I am setting

a policy to reduce risks on the environment.”

The initial investment into Mindsmaster

was $15,000. Because it’s a one-man show,

monthly overhead is only about $1,000,

though specialized consultants are employed

on a project-basis. To date turnover stands at

$50,000. Fares is negotiating with international

consultancy companies to enter

regional and European markets.

A photo opportunity

S even years ago Sevag Seropian started

a small photography business. He

went from wedding pictures to advertising

photography. That led to graphic

design services – a move motivated by frustration.

“If brochures weren’t good the

designers blamed it on the photos – now I have

full control of the job,” he says. In November

1999 his company, Photo & Printing

Promoters, expanded further by becoming

an advertising agency offering media booking.

The transition was the idea of executive

manager Haig Tatarian, who was hired to

take over operations when Seropian

accepted a position as in-house photographer

for a Lebanese multinational. The

new job keeps Seropian busy traveling, but

he still does photography for his own firm.

The company employs three other freelancers

– two graphic designers and a photographer.

The price per photo is usually

$100 or $150, depending on whether it’s

done in the studio or not. Other photographers,

such as Roger Moukarzel, say prices can

range from $100 to $2,000 per photo at other

outfits. Photo & Printing Promoters charges

about $1,000 to $2,000 for brochures, including

photos and graphic design (not printing).

About $100,000 has been invested into the

company. Cameras recently purchased

include a $20,000 Sinar (4X5 inch format

slides), a $10,000 Nikon FIOO 35mm (with

various lenses) and a $7,500 Marnia

(medium format slides). “If clients don’t

want to pay a lot, we use the Marnia not the

Sinar,” says Tatarian. “And the 35mm is

good for fashion photography.” Moukarzel

says he has $300,000 worth at his studio.

Photo & Printing Promoters has 30 regular

clients and does numerous single jobs.

The monthly overhead is roughly $1,000,

and annual sales are about $100,000.

Photography generates 30% of business

and 50% of profits. Graphic design services,

which increased business by 40%,

make up the rest. With over 100 advertising

agencies offering media bookings, the new

activity has yet to bring in business.

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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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