



MOROCCO

The Moroccan equity market rallied strongly in
September, drawing strength from reports of oil and gas
discoveries in the kingdom. The findings, which are
expected to dramatically change the face of the
Moroccan economy, would help to lessen the country’s
heavy dependence on the agricultural sector and make of
Morocco a net exporter of oil in a few years. Blue chip
stocks across the board reacted positively to the news and
investors’ enthusiasm was apparent in the substantial
increase in trading volumes.
Egypt

Sentiment was mostly positive in Egypt; however, the stock
exchange failed to uphold some gains realized in the month
of August with most blue chips witnessing consolidation.
Among the most demanded stocks were CIB, MobiNil and
OT, which together captured the bulk of trading activity.
Despite signs of improving domestic conditions, particularly
on the macro level, the market remains clouded by
uncertainty and tight liquidity condition. Nevertheless, investors
are bracing for the partial privatization of Telecom Egypt,
which is anticipated by the end of the year. The offering,
which will also include a GDR, is expected to rejuvenate
activity on the local bourse
JORDAN

Mixed semi-annual results for most listed concerns on the
Amman Stock Exchange kept sentiment subdued, with
the index hovering below the 140-psychological level.
Losses remain concentrated in the industrial and the
banking sectors, and to some extent, in the services sector.
Foreign investors continued to shun the market with
their sell orders outnumbering buy orders by JD5.9 million
in the first eight months of 2000. Accordingly, the
share of non-Jordanians in the listed companies stood at
41. 9% of market capitalization at the end of August, out
of which 36% is held by Arab investors and 5.9% by
non-Arab investors.
External debt under control in the Arab region
Successful debt management policies
have enabled several Arab countries
to reduce their external debt over the
past few years, most notably Egypt,
Morocco and Algeria. On the other hand,
other Arab countries, such as Lebanon,
Tunisia, Qatar and Oman, have been
accumulating higher levels of external
indebtedness. Among the indebted Arab
countries, Qatar and Jordan exhibited the
highest levels of external debt as a percentage
of GDP. at around 98% in 1999 for
both countries, while Oman and Egypt
enjoy the lowest levels, at 29% and 32%
respectively. Total external debt for the
eight Arab countries surveyed declined
from$118 billion in 1996to$113.8 billion
in 1997, but rose again in the following
two years toreach$117.9billion in 1999.
Those Arab countries that have a history
of debt rescheduling and those with a
high external debt burden will find it difficult
to attract foreign investment.
Capital always goes to those countries
who live up to their commitments and
where the risk of non-payment is low.
Besides, servicing large external debt eats
up a good portion of a country’s export
revenues, adds to its external imbalances
and puts pressure on the country’s foreign
reserves and its monetary stability.
Following the Gulf War in 1990, all of
Egypt’s debt to Arab creditors was cancelled,
as well as military debt owed to the
US, in recognition of the country’s support
to the UN coalition formed to liberate
Kuwait. This was followed by the cancellation
of half of the net present value of
the debt owed to the Paris Club ($22 billion)
and the rescheduling of the remaining
balance. As a result, foreign debt
declined from more than $46 billion in
1986 to about $28.2 billion in 1998/99,
representing 32% of GDP. Debt structure
is favorable and debt service/ exports
at less that 10% in 1999.
Lebanon’s external debt is expected to
rise in the foreseeable future as the government
gradually replaces part of the
expensive domestic debt, which stood at
a high of 126% of GDP at the end of
1999, with relatively cheaper dollar dominated
borrowing. Lebanon
tapped international markets in
September 1994 with the launch of its first
Eurobond, providing the government
with access to non-resident Lebanese,
Arab and foreign capital. Following a
series of Eurobonds, external debt rose
from a low of $772 million in 1994 to
$5,538 million in December 1999, representing
only 35% of the GDP and 25% of
the total debt outstanding. At the end of
June this year, the Lebanese Government
successfully issued a five-year Eurobond
for $500 million and is planning to issue
$500 million worth of 20-year
Eurobonds in the coming few months.
Total outstanding external debt of
Jordan at the end of 1999 stood at
JD5,186 million (US$7,312 million), or
98% of GDP, down from JD 6,052.5 million
(US$9,121 million) in 1990. By July
2000, total external debt dropped to
JD4,874 million (US$6,872 million).
Jordan• s largest creditors are the industrial
countries with whom the government is
negotiating debt rescheduling and debt forgiveness
agreements, and swapping some debt into local investment.
This should help reduce the country’s
debt burden, and with higher
growth in GDP this year, debt to
GDP ratio should drop below 90%.
Qatar’s LNG investment program,
financed by a huge stock of
external debt, led to the reversal of …_
the country’s position from a net
creditor up until 1994, to a net
debtor starting from 1995. The
country’s external debt (including
government guaranteed debt and
QGPC debt) reached $11.2 billion in
1999, accounting for 98% of GDP.
A new $500 million sovereign loan will be
launched this month, coming at the heels
of Qatar’s second Eurobond issue, which
in mid-June raised $1.4 billion. Debt
ratios are expected to improve beyond
the year 2000 on the back of sustainable
economic growth driven by growing natural
gas exports and higher oil revenues.
Total external debt in Tunisia stood at an
estimated $13 billion last year, equivalent
to 62% of GDP. The country’s external
indebtedness is manageable in light of
Tunisia’s easy access to external borrowing
and international bond markets. In
Morocco, prudent external borrowing
and active debt management policy has
substantially reduced the country’s external
debt from a peak of 130% of GDP in
1985 to $19.2 billion or 54% of GDP in
1999. The stock of external debt in
Algeria has declined from a peak of
$34.4 billion in 1996 to an estimated
$29.7 billion in 1999, equivalent to
62.1 % of GDP, and is further expected to
fall to $28. 7 billion by the end of the year.
It is imperative for the indebted Arab
countries to take all possible measures to
reduce their debt burden. Buying one’s
debt from the world’s secondary market at
a fraction of the nominal value and using
privatization proceeds to retire existing
debt are well-known measures for the countries of the region to follow

After months of warnings, Standard &
Poor’s downgraded Lebanon’s sovereign
credit rating saying that the government
had failed to take measures to
stem the ballooning public debt, expected y
to reach 140% of GDP by year-end. The
credit rating was pushed down one notch,
from BB- to B+, making it more expensive
to borrow on international markets.
S&P said it was also unlikely that the
government would reach its deficit target of
15.5% of GDP. Also listed was the government’s
failure to capitalize on the $2.7
billion offer made by the two cellular companies
to buy GSM licenses. As well parliament’s
failure to approve a draft value added
tax (VAT) law before the elections
would likely lead to a delay in the implementation
of VAT, originally scheduled for
next year. S&P also expressed doubts that
the new government, expected to take
office in November, would be able to make
much headway in tackling the deteriorating
financial situation this year. Both
Lebanon’s current and previous credit ratings
are considered below the minimum
investment grade level of BBB-.
A second jolt came from Moody’s, which
last month put Lebanon’s BI domestic currency
debt rating on credit watch. It also cited
the growing public debt as reason for alarm.
Green light
The Central Bank has approved the
merger of Banque Libanaise pour le
Commerce (BLC) and the United Bank of
Lebanon (UBL) four months after a major
scandal threatened to derail the deal. The
approval came after Safi Harb, former
UBL chairman, and Jean Felix
Aboujaoude, BLC’s former general manager,
agreed to pay back nearly $40 million
of questionable loans to themselves and
close family members.
The new bank, named BLC, elected
Chafic Moharram as its chairman and general
manager and now ranks among the
country’s ten largest banks with assets of
$1.5 billion. Harb and Aboujaoude were
forced to relinquish their shares before the
deal could go through, leaving
Mohammad Safadi, a wealthy Lebanese
businessman, the majority shareholder in
the new bank with a 56% stake. Moharram
has said that the bank plans to boost efficiency
and cut costs, including layoffs of
10% to 12% of its 750 employees.
The merger closes a tumultuous chapter
in Lebanon’s banking history. In mid-
1999, an attempted merger between BLC
and Byblos Bank fell through over what
Byblos said were bad debts held by BLC.
Since 1997, BLC’s Beirut listed shares
have more than halved to around $10. Its latest
available results show a loss of $5.4 million
in 1998, after registering profits of
$13.7 million in 1997. “I think things are
stabilizing,” says Jean Riachi, chairman
and general manager of Financial Funds
Advisors. ” Things look good.”
The up-market pays
Societe des Grands Hotels du Liban
(SOHL), owner of Vendome and
Phoenicia hotels, came out with 1999 earnings
of $1.43 million, an 84% increase
from 1998 at $776,833. It is expecting bigger
profit gains this year, as high as $10 million.
The catalyst is Phoenicia, which
opened last March. With a focus on quality
and having the largest conference room in
Lebanon, Inter-Continental targets corporate
clients. Along with Vendome still maintaining
a high occupancy rate, averaging
77% through August, according to Noha
Saliba, Phoenicia’s PR manager, bookings
in the new hotel have exceeded expectations,
averaging 50% between April and August.
She also believes that the coming months
will bring on a surge. “Our conference
room is fully booked and in October and
November our occupancy will reach 80%,”
says Saliba. SGHL’s shares have settled
around $5.
No looking back
Credit Libanais is still showing an
impressive profit performance. Since
the central bank cut it loose in 1997, its earnings
growth has been on a tear. After earnings
jumped 52.5% last year, its pre-tax profits
climbed 29.5% to $12.4 million in the first half
of 2<XX> compared to the same period last year.
Net interest income increased 18.8% and fee based
income rose 15.4%. According to Elie
Abimrad, the bank’s financial controller,
although one major contributor to the rise in
profits came from maintaining healthy yields
in liquid assets, Credit Libanais benefited
from its focus on expanding on retail banking.
Retail lending has grown, pulling in higher
yields, and more products and services have
been launched so far this year.
Credit Libanais may be catching up with
the big banks. Although Banque du Liban
et d’Outre-Mer (BLOM), Byblos Bank
and Banque Audi have much higher profits,
Credit Libanais’s profit growth surpassed
them. BLOM’s growth increased
14.6%, while Byblos and Audi’s dropped
-0.1 % and -11 %. Though Credit
Libanais’s figures are based on pre-tax
data, net profit growth is still expected to
come in higher than the top banks.
Bond bombshell
A dollar-denominated eurobond issue
aimed largely at US institutional
investors has been put on hold indefinitely
until a new government is named. “It was
ill-conceived to think you could sell a 20-
year bond to Americans without the new
government in place and its policies clear,”
says an analyst about die timing of
the initial announcement for the issue just
before the elections.
Part of the aim of such an issue would be
to lengthen the maturity of the debt. It
would come at a higher premium compared
to previous issues, though still
below what it would cost Lebanon’s
peers, according to the analyst: “It still
would have ended up being mostly in the
hands of Lebanese banks, if not on the
primary market then eventually on the
secondary market.”
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and Credit
Suisse First Boston, who were supposed to
lead manage the issue, subsequently handled
$450 million in three-year eurobonds.
Of these, 80% were taken up by Lebanese
banks, 15% by European investors and 5%
by Gulf investors.
Getting dragged down …
Standard & Poor’ s recent downgrade of
Lebanon’s sovereign rating has also
pulled down the credit ratings of three of the
country’s largest banks. Banque Audi,
Banque de la Mediterranee and Banque du
Liban et d Outre-Mer (BLOM) saw their ratings
go from BB- down to B+, the same as
Lebanon. S&P cited the banks’ heavy
holdings of government T-bills as the primary
reason for the downgrade. “Banks
are a major source of government financing,
holding 75% of outstanding treasury bills in
1999,” said S&P. But, according to one
analyst, “Unless the banks are going to
issue new debt, it won’t have any effect.”
… again and again
A s a consequence of the further deterioration
of the operating environment
in Lebanon, Moody’s Investors Service
changed its outlook on Banque Audi’s
financial strength rating from positive to
stable. This put the financial institution on
par with Byblos Bank and Banque du Liban
et d’Outre Mer. “This does not directly
reflect a drop in Banque Audi’s rating,”
says Nabil Chaya, head of capital markets at
Audi. “As the sovereign ceiling is lowered,
Banque Audi’s rating is adjusted accordingly
due to the increased vulnerability of the
bank’s financial strength in the face of a
weakened operating environment.”
Trading places
The Arab Stock Exchange Union has
been transferred to Beirut from Cairo
after a 19-year exile due to the civil war.
‘This will send a signal to the rest of the
world of the reliability of the Lebanese capital
markets,” says Fadi Khalaf, chairman of the
Beirut Stock Exchange. He says that despite
the incentives offered, including tax exemptions
and the cooperation of the BSE, the
decision to transfer the headquarters was
based on the federation’s recognition of the
great potential of Lebanon’s capital markets.
“The trust the federation has shown in making
this move isn’t to be taken lightly,” he says.
The Arab Clearing House, responsible for
clearing stock trades in the region, is next in
line to settle in Lebanon once its members provide
the $5 million in capital. “Within six
months, we expect Arab stock exchanges to be
linked together through one website,” continues
Khalaf. “And eventually the site will
allow online trading.”
Confusion reigns
There has been some confusion over the
price of Casino du Liban’s shares
recently. Though frequently quoted at
$200, the actual price fluctuated around
$150, which Fidus rated as a good buy. AlMustaqbal
newspaper put the price as low
as $100, based on one investor selling
1,400 shares, just over 0.1 % of the casino’s
720,000 shares.
“If anything has caused a drop in share
price, the more likely culprit is the ongoing
attempt by board members to oust chairman
Elie Ghorayeb,” says a casino official.
Ghorayeb has been at odds with the
board’s 11 members, mostly over the $23
million in outstanding taxes, which
finance minister Georges Conn is claiming
on slot machines from 1997 up to 1999.
Ghorayeb claims that these have always
been tax exempt and has appealed to the
Shura council.
Ghorayeb’s restructuring program is also
causing conflict: The staff was reduced by
100 and contracts with service providers
were renegotiated. “Renegotiating alone
cut down expenses by $5.4 million,” says
Joseph Araiji, responsible for press relations
for the casino. The gambling house has
settled its $23 million debt in record time.
In the first half of 2000, pre-tax profits
were $10.3 million compared to $7.3 million
for the same period last year.
Barely holding on
The market value of Lebanon
Holdings, the only closed-end fund
listed on the Beirut Stock Exchange,
dropped 9.2% during the first six months of
2000, from $39.9 million to $36.3 million.
“If you look at the holdings, you see that it’s
mainly due to a drop in all shares on the
BSE,” says one analyst. The fund’s shares
last traded at $5.33 three months ago.
Earlier, Lebanon Holdings bought back
300,000 shares in an attempt to boost the
market value.
I t seems Nasser Saidi means business after all. Back in May 1999,
when the new insurance law was finally passed in parliament,
many wondered if it would be enforced. Meeting the new minimum
capital requirement of $1 .5 million, up from $200,000, and
depositing $3.3 million in order to sell premiums for all lines of insurance
wouldn’t be easy. But then again that was the intention all along.
By demanding a high capital, the ministry of trade and economy
would force financially weaker firms to merge to meet the requirements.
Otherwise, they would have to shut down and leave the sector
to those with the financial backbone to remain solvent.

Since then a wave of reform has washed through the sector, with
the number of companies unable to stay afloat gradually rising.
Insurers that didn’t already have these funds in place were given
until last June to come up with the first half of the difference needed
in order to meet the new requirements and June 2001 to come
up with the remainder. But even the first installment proved too
much for many. When the law was first issued, many expected that
the number of insurers would be reduced by at least a third. Now
that prediction is being realized.
When EXECUTIVE went to print – some firms are still under study –
29 insurers were involved in the initial shakeout. Of these, 13 had
Their licenses revoked, five merged with other firms, three transferred
their portfolios to other companies, two stopped operating, while six
more requested that their own licenses be revoked. Still others are in
the process of merging and several have been referred to the public prosecutor’s
office for not complying with current laws.
But is the new insurance law a good one? “I consider this law better
than the old one,” says Abraham Matossian, chairman of AlMashrek
and the Lebanese Insurance Companies’ Association
(ACAL). “But I believe we can do better.” Strict requirements on solvency
are essential. More than once we’ve seen companies that fell in
the maw of insolvency, like Income, Mesir, and Phoenix, and left trusting
clients stranded. The number of insurers is also too high for
Lebanon’s small market-around 75 for a population of3.5 million.
With a population of 60 million, Egypt has about ten insurance firm
Nonetheless, the stricter regulations are considered extreme by
some. “If a company has a good solvency ratio and is adequately supported
by credible reinsurers, the blocked capital wouldn’t be necessary,”
says Zareh Basmadjian, chairman of Oriental Insurance, whose
portfolio of $ l.2 million in 1999 was transferred to Al-Mashrek.
And he’s not alone. Chehade Raad, chairman of Kafra Insurance and
Reinsurance, believes that problems arise not from a comparatively
Low capital but from not reinsuring properly. According to Matossian,
“If an insurer is adequately reinsured, he will not need to liquidate his
assets. This happens with large companies in Europe, which were forced
to liquidate stock they’d been holding for a century to meet liabilities.
The risk in Lebanon is much less if things are done properly.”
Critics of the new law also suggest that capital requirements
should actually be based on the size of a company’s portfolio with
adjustments made as business grows. Basmadjian believes a capital
of $1.5 million might be necessary for insurers with large portfolios,
but not for small companies. “Each firm should have been
studied and a raise in their capital should have been required
based on its solvency and the size of its portfolios,” he says.
If a company could comply with the required capital, does it
make more sense to do so or to pull out? Companies with several
shareholders might consider injecting additional funds or bringing
in new shareholders as a good idea. Considering the relatively
small amount each shareholder has invested and how profits are divided,
boosting the capital may be the easiest and best option. Middle
East Assurance and Reinsurance Co (MEARCO), which had a capital
of $400,000, has done just that. With over a dozen shareholders,
many of them brokers, the company found it more convenient to comply
with the law’s requirements. “We paid up $550,000, the first half
on the due date, and will cover the rest by June 200 I,” says Rached
Rached, MEARCO’s chairman.
But what of those who have a majority stake in their own company,
in the case of Basmadjian 75%?
“The $1.5 million in capital I’m
required to put up could be better
invested in other ventures,” he
says. With returns of just 12% a
year, he would make $135,000:
“I’m not making that much in the
insurance business,” he says. All
this without yet considering the
necessary deposits, a total of $3 .3
million to operate in all lines of
insurance. For an individual, letting
that kind of money sit idle
isn’t too appealing.

But in the end, the insurance
sector is moving toward greater
discipline – even if some are
being dragged, kicking and
screaming. The law itself is an
improvement, providing more
security for the consumer and
even for the insurer. It’s true
many of the smaller firms are
being hit hard, but adhering to a
strict regulation policy is the
ministry’s only recourse to keep
insurers in line.
Rallies at the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE) are rare. There has
been little interest In Lebanese stocks for the last two and a half
years. Trading volume dropped from $640 million in 1997 to $90
million last year. In the first eight months of 2000, it dropped
another 30% compared to the same period in 1999. One of many
complaints among stockbrokers has been the market’s antiquated
fixing system. Even though the BSE Is ready to bring In
continuous trading – a two-hour session after price fixing – the
government has been slow giving a green light. According to Fadi
Khalaf, BSE chairman, the council of ministers gave approval in
May but passed it on to the Shura council.
Is the government offering another example of taking forever
to approve a change that brings positive results? “The delay
is due to the Shura council who has sat on the decree for several
months,” says Georges Corm, minister of finance. “Now its
opinion has been given, and we hope the decision will be published
in the official gazette [in the beginning of October]. The
changes are all made, no more steps, except the signature of the
prime minister and the president.”
But allowing continuous trading in October is still an ‘if.’ A government
heading for the exit may be reluctant to make any decision.
“It’s difficult to predict,” says Khalaf. “Hopefully It will
happen soon.”
Stock of Politics
Investing in stocks is pure speculation. But for Solidere, the most
active company on the Beirut Stock Exchange (BSE), taking
up over 70% of the total market cap at around $1.26 billion,
speculation zeroes in on what happens in the world of politics.
Whenever peace negotiations in the region have picked up,
investors have pounced on Solidere shares. During elections its
shares traded on the BSE and GDRs had an impressive rally
based on anticipation of Rafic Hariri becoming the next prime minister
(see graph). “We saw something we haven’t seen in two and
a half years,” says Jean Riachi, chairman and general manager at
Financial Funds Advisors. “Lebanese people were calling to buy.
People we didn’t know came and placed orders. It reminded us of
the good old times in 1997.”
What got investors excited is clear. When Hariri ‘s stint as premier
from 1992 to 1998 ended, Solidere’s business was stopped dead.
Hariri, the founder of the real estate company responsible for
rebuilding the Beirut Central District (BCD) and believed to be the
largest shareholder, is seen as the one who can get the company back
on track. “I believe Solidere will benefit from Hariri’s return,” says
Ziad Maalouf, vice president at Middle East Capital Group.
“When he was in office, it never faced similar problems. Hariri will
grease the wheels and make things move.”
The stranglehold on Solidere has been a permit problem. Since the
current government took charge, it has been nearly impossible for the
company or developers to finish projects (see “Can’t get no satisfaction,”
June 2000). Decrees have been brought forward to solve the
slowdown. The most important one is to settle the discrepancies
between Lebanon’s old construction code and Solidere’s building
decree 4830. According to Oussama Kabbani, department manager
of urban management at Solidere, with the speed that the decree passes
from one government institution to another, it would take up to three
years for it to pass. The high council of urbanism was established early
this year to help work out discrepancies. Not only did it provide little
help, but the council expired in the first week of August.
“We can no longer get permits through that have discrepancies,” says
Kabbani. When EXECUTIVE went to print, there were 27 occupancy
permits idling and 23 construction permits collecting dust.
Also important is the decree to let Solidere develop the souks. It’s
well known that once the area is running, business in the BCD will
pick up dramatically. No surprise: The decree, in need of only a signature,
has been with the council of ministers for five months.
Most believe that if Hariri becomes prime minister he will be able
to act fast. “He’s pragmatic and he has business sense,” says
Kabbani. “If someone like him is in power, give it three months and
all decrees will be passed and all can be resolved.” Although the municipality
of Beirut is where the permits are stopped and is under the
thumb of the minister of interior – Michel Murr who has a beef with
Solidere over Murr Tower – many believe that if Hariri is in power
and there’s a council of
ministers that he can
work with, the situation
will be fixed.
According to Hani
Shammah, senior
regional analyst at
Societe Generale, the
recession, which has
the real estate sector
in a vice, will not be a
major obstacle.
“Solidere is a bit insulated from the recession. It’s the only place where there’s hope
of economic activity during recession,” says Shammah. “Plus, it’s
been on hold. It will only grow.” If Hariri is appointed prime minister,
Shammah will increase his latest projected sales and earnings
from 2001 and onward (see graph).
But Shammah argues that for the long haul, stock investors will have
to bet on another political variable: regional peace. “Today, Hariri is
a good bet. If appointed, shares will shoot up. When decrees are signed,
the permit problem is cleared up, prices will continue to move,” predicts
Shammah. “But after that they will probably level off or drift lower
until the next catalyst: a peace agreement.” He argues that Solidere’s
growth cannot be sustained on local businesses moving into BCD.
“Solidere’s upscale properties will be wonderful for a regional headquarters,
but it needs those regional factors that will beef up demand.”
But the first indicator will come this fall when the prime minister
is supposed to be appointed. The chances are good that Hariri will
take office, but it’s not certain: There are still power plays involved
(see pp. 22-25). But most stock jockeys agree: If you believe that
Hariri will soon be back at the helm and want to see your
stocks rise quickly, now is the time to bank on Solidere.
“Solidere is a stock that is very politicized,”says Maalouf,
“if Hariri returns, investors will buy into Solidere and it
will rally.”
0nly on Sunday mornings can the
thunder of horse hooves and the
cheers and moans of men be heard
rising up from the 84-year-old Beirut
Hippodrome. In stark contrast to the glamorous
Mediterranean racetrack it was before
the war, the facility today is in a sorry state.
Its concrete bleachers look like the seating
one would find in a third-rate football stadium.
The lighting for the track was blown out
during the war and never repaired.
Consequently, potentially lucrative night
races cannot be held. There are only 10% of
the number of stables today than there were
during the early 1970s. And the
Hippodrome has become a big money loser.
Between 1995 and 1997, the Association
for the Protection and Improvement of
Arabian horses (SPARCA), a non-profit
organization that has been managing the
track since the late I 960s, reported a loss of
about $700,000 from the facility,
which has yearly revenues of about $14 million.
Weekly losses on races alone total roughly
$20,000 on revenues of $210,000. SPAR CA
blames the war for many of the racetrack’s
ailments. With fewer stables and less horses,
races can only be held once a week, limiting
revenues. And with finite resources,
SPARCA says that it cannot market the
races properly. The organization also complains
that the taxes it pays are too high.
While 72% of the bets are distributed
among the winners, trainers and jockeys,
14% goes to the ministry of finance, 2.24%
goes to the municipality, which owns the
track, and SPARCA gets 11. 76% for managing
the facility. “Our percentage cut
comes to about $1.5 million a year. That’s
not enough to cover the costs of maintenance,
employees, and to make improvements
at the same time,” says Nabil de
Freije, SPARCA’s president.
But most problematic is that nearly
$800,000 in bets are lost each week to illegal
bookies – called paroli – and the police
have done virtually nothing to stop them,
according to SPARCA. Unlike the
Hippodrome, which pays winners $1 for
every $1 bet, bookies pay $1 for every 60
cents. But the paroli don’t pay track maintenance
fees or taxes. A person betting with
the paroli doesn’t even have to attend the
races, avoiding the track entry fee. What’s
more, the bookies are able to extend credit
lines, while bettors at the track must pay
cash. “If the government stopped the
paroli, our revenues would increase dramatically,”
says de Freije. Many public
officials sympathize with SPARCA. “The
government should fight illegal betting to
improve our income,” says Abdel Munim
Ariss, mayor of Beirut.
But not everyone is convinced that the
racetrack’s problems are the result of factors
outside SPARCA’s control. The paroli,
after all, have been around since the 1920s,
and they didn’t keep the Hippodrome from
generating a healthy income during its
heyday. “In all parts of the world, illegal
bookmaking is synonymous with gambling,
especially horse racing. You can’t stop
it, and it represents only part of the problem
here,” says Faisal Abou Hassan, a horse
breeder and trainer. Some bookies claim that
they’re actually money generators for the
Hippodrome. According to one, if many
clients are betting on a particular horse,
and the odds on that horse are low, a bookie
will bet his own money at the
Hippodrome in order to narrow the odds and
reduce his liability. “If it w-+1sn’t for the
paroli, the Hippodrome would go bankrupt.
Two-thirds of its income is from the
bets we place. They would beg us to continue
if we stopped,” he says.
According to SPARCA’s critics, bad management
is the root of the problem. The organization
has been accused of everything
from failing to abide by its contract to mismanaging
racetrack funds. Its members are
blamed for failing to pay the proper rental fees
on stables. Despite complaints about high
taxes, over the last three years the association
has been granted a series of exonerations
and deferments. Total taxes owed reached
$1.06 million by the end of 1999 and still
haven’t been paid. The most recent reprieve
came with a decision of the council of ministers
last year to give SPARCA a 50% tax
deferment, reducing the amount paid to the
ministry of finance from 14% to 7%.
As early as February 1999, Ariss
described the old contract with SPARCA as
unsound. Even Mohamed Kabbani, currently
a de: Freije ally, has said that the
Hippodrome should be managed as a
build-operate-transfer (BOT) contract. In a
press conference two years ago, he said
SPAR CA shouldn’t be allowed to bid on the
BOT until its taxes were paid in full. In fairness,
SPARCA has made some improvements
to the Hippodrome. A computerized
betting system was installed about a year
ago and 12 legal off-track betting centers
were recently opened. But most of
these improvements came after years
of promises and delays.
In January 1998, the government
and the municipality of Beirut decided
to change things. Rather than continue
with SPARCA, they opted for a BOT
arrangement. Private companies
would be allowed to bid for the rights
to manage the Hippodrome for 15 to 20
years, and the company would be
expected to make major renovations to
tum the facility into a high-caliber
racetrack. The council for development
and reconstruction (CDR) drew
up a contract, the municipality
approved it and a consultancy firm
called DG Jones was assigned to study
the bids and assess the qualifications of
bidders. Last March, the municipality
sent a letter to Yakoub Sarraf, Beirut’s
administrator, requesting that he
approve the plan. More than $15,000
was set aside to publish the tender in local
and international newspapers.
SPARCA is today one of the staunchest
critics of a BOT, but it was one of the first to
suggest the idea. In a letter dated October
29, 1997 to then prime minister Rafic Hariri,
Pierre Pharaon, SPARCA’s president at the
time, submitted preliminary plans for a $24
million renovation of the Hippodrome. They
included improvements to the racetrack’s
infrastructure, the installation of a computerized
betting system, the building of an equestrian
club and the opening of 40 new offices
for legal off-track betting. The letter suggested
that SPARCA carry out the project and that
it would need a few years of tax breaks to pay
for the renovations. But if the government did
not opt for SPARCA, Pharaon suggested the
project could be tendered as a BOT.
SPARCA was not the only organization
with ambitious plans. Hippodrome de Beirut
Investissement (HBI), a company formed in
1998 by a group of Lebanese and European
investors, stepped forward with a proposal of
its own. It also had plans for a $24 million renovation
of the facility. But unlike SPARCA,
HBI was not asking for tax breaks or a crackdown
on the paroli. But things did not go quite
as planned for HBI. “As we were waiting to
submit our bid, things got complicated,” says
Louis Maaroui, HBI’s general manager.
“Beirut’s administrator (Sarraf) did not sign the
OK to proceed, and we were later shocked to
find out that Corm had other ideas.”
The government decided to put the BOT
idea on hold and extend SPARCA’s contract
for another three years. Rather than the $24
million renovation plan, the ministry of
finance prepared a scaled-down $4.2 million
scheme that SPARCA would be responsible
for implementing. According to Ariss, the
Hippodrome cannot be turned into a BOT
until the relevant privatization law, currently
being studied in parliament, is passed. But
several public facilities are currently operating
under BOT contracts. For example, the
airport parking lot, which is managed by the
Kuwaiti company Mohammed Abdul
Mohsen Al-Khorafi & Sons.
“We want the BOT but we didn’t want to
create a void while the [privatization] law
was being drafted. [Later] we will evaluate
the contract and its result to determine if we
continue with SPARCA or not,” says Ariss.
In the meantime, the government has
agreed to grant SPAR CA $10.7 million
worth of tax credits for the renovations. It
has also agreed to incur the projected losses
of $1.2 million during those three years,
which SPARCA has agreed to pay back later.
And since the revenue projections
in the contract are for six years,
SPARCA could easily make the case for a
further three-year extension of its contract.
The $24 million renovation plans had to be
scrapped because they were too ambitious,
says Corm, adding that SPARCA would have
difficulty in securing financing for the
scheme. “Small is beautiful. We know the
results with big international projects. Look at
what happened with Solidere, the economy
paid a big price,” he says. And what about HBI
and its plans? ‘The French company came to
us unofficially. But when asked to provide us
a feasibility study, they gave us bits and
pieces of information and we didn’t take
them seriously,” says Farid Meshaka, Corm’s
advisor. According to Maaraoui, HBI could
not divulge a detailed feasibility study before
submitting its sealed bid because there was a
risk that the study would be leaked to competitors.
But, he says, the company’s intentions
were explained to Meshaka in detail.
The rehabilitation plans are directed
toward improving the Hippodrome’s infrastructure.
According to the ministry of
finance, the improvements should boost the
racetrack’s revenues from $13 million to $78
million within six years. During the same
period, SPARCA’s turnover would increase
from $2.5 million to $8.6 million with the government’s
share jumping to $26 million and
the municipality’s to $10 million. De Freije is
happy with the new arrangement. “BOTs
don’t work,” he says. ‘Those people are here
for one reason only: to make the most money
they can and leave. Bettors will lose trust,
knowing that it isn’t a non-profit organization
running the racetrack.”

Nonsense says Maaraoui. HBI would run
the Hippodrome better than SPARCA
because if it doesn’t, its investors wouldn’t
make money, he explained. The lure of
profits would be the incentive to do a good
job. And making the track a financial success
requires gaining the trust of bettors.
“This new document is a scandal,” says
Maaraoui. “The system that’s in place now
will encourage even more illegal betting.”
He’s skeptical that the government will be
able to generate the projected revenues from
such a small investment. HBI, he says, forecasted
that its $24 million renovation plan
would boost annual revenues to just $50
million. “For 30 years SPAR CA lost money.
But instead of giving someone else a chance
to make money, the government is repeating
the same mistake; only this time it’s giving
the association more money than before,” he
says. “We hope the new government will
reconsider its position and abide by the
decrees. But I’m not sure how patient my
investors will be.”
Other options
A new location

Horse breeder Faisal Abou Hassan thinks that no matter who runs it, the current
Hippodrome is doomed to mediocrity. Having a world class racetrack will require building
new facilities in a different location, he argues, as the Hippodrome’s 220,000m2 is not sufficient.
He proposes building a new 500,000m2 to 700,000m2 racetrack on the outskirts of
Beirut, suggesting his own 400,000m2 plot of land in Choweifat or reclaiming land by the airport,
which would give ships easy access to the track. He estimates the project would cost
$350 million to $500 million, while investors could be found in the Gulf, where most of the
region’s racehorse owners live. Due to high temperatures, they can only run their horses for
four or five months. “We have the best weather year-round. They would love to come here
for the remaining seven or eight months,” says Abou Hassan. He adds that large international
racetracks make money because of the big cash prizes, reaching $6 million a race. This money
can be invested in horse breeding and training. The prize money generated at the
Hippodrome, which has about 800 stables, is not enough to cover the $8,000 it costs horse
owners to maintain their animals. A future racetrack would need at least 2,500 stables, both
a grass and sand track, a swimming pool for training the horses and a veterinary hospital.
A park
Greenline, an organization dedicated to the conservation and creation of green areas,
has been campaigning to turn the Hippodrome into a park. “We thought that the
matter would take a couple of months,” says Salman Abbas, secretary general of
Greenline. Beirut has just 0.8m2 of green space per person. “The world standard is 40m2
and anything below 20m2 creates a health danger,” says Abbas. “I’m only asking to give
every 1,000 citizens as much green space as one horse takes. Is that too much to ask?”
Unfortunately for Greenline, the municipality’s answer was yes. The racetrack brings
in too much money to turn it into a park. But the municipality did decide to dedicate
65,000m2 of the existing 220.000m2 as a public green area.
A grand prix race circuit
K haled Altaki, a local businessman, wants to turn the Hippodrome into a Grand Prix
race circuit. Altaki’s idea is certainly not new. Five years ago, he gained notoriety
for designing the Beirut Hariri Circuit, which ran along the Corniche, in the hopes of hosting
a Formula One race. That idea was later scrapped. But Altaki never gave up on the
dream of Michael Schumacher zipping his Ferrari through Beirut. The new Victory Circuit
of Beirut would be a 3.1 -kilometer course with construction costs estimated at $20 million.
But that’s less than the expected $38.5 million in revenue that Altaki says a Formula
One race would bring in. A Formula Three race would generate $7.5 million.
Altakl has one condition: “I will only do this if the Hippodrome moves to another location.
I’m not here to deprive people of their horse racing.”
Either way, Altaki has some competitors. The government has formed a committee
with plans of hosting a Formula One race in the streets of downtown.
EXECUTIVE asked four of the top analysts on Lebanese politics their opinion on who is most
likely to be the next prime minister and how qualified each candidate is. Here are the results
Rafic Hariri

• “The only obstacle is his bad relations
with the president. If everything is left
to go as it should then it will be Hariri
as prime minister. It seems the Syrians are trying now,
through some consultations with the president, to find consensus.
If they don’t succeed, the choice will be between
Mikati and Kassar.”
Sarkis Naoum, political commentator for An-Nahar newspaper
• “Hariri has certain priorities. His first is to have more or less
the government of his choice. He wants to control the ministers,
especially the minister of finance. If he cannot get this,
he will prefer not to be the prime minister. This could be difficult;
Lahoud doesn’t want to give him a blank cheque.
There will be heavy negotiations until the appointment. Hariri
has a much better chance than Mikati. He created a solid
power base since 1992.”
Michael Young, political analyst with the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies
• “He is the person most likely to become prime minister.
However electoral alliances don’t necessarily translate into
parliamentary blocks. In principle if parliament nominates
Hariri then the president should nominate him as prime
minister. But if the president bypasses the parliamentary nomination
then parliament only has recourse when there’s a vote
of confidence in the new government. In the meantime,
alliances can shift.
If Hariri is nominated it depends on how he forms government:
as a sort of administration where he has free reign to design
policy or as a government of national unity. The latter would
be a recipe for paralysis, where the whole political system is
embodied in the government and the cabinet doesn’t have the
executive power. Only if you have executive power can you
be held accountable. Hariri is certainly the man with the
international contacts and the drive to get Lebanon out of this
mess and restore confidence in the economy.”
Nadim Shehadi, director of the Centre for Lebanese Studies at Oxford University
• “If Hariri is not forming the cabinet, he will be represented.
With any of the candidates we will be facing the same problems
that we have today – a stagnant economy, a ballooning
debt, etc. With Hariri, we will face a second problem, namely
his poor relationship with the president.”
Farid Khazen, head of AUB‘s political science department
Najib Mikati

“Mikati could be the compromise
candidate, especially if he’s favored by
Syria. And his profile fits into the new
regional mode of having the young
generation that wants reform and will
fight corruption.
He’s certainly qualified for the job. He’s
politically clean and popular, he’s not
seen as tainted by political corruption in the country.
It would be the image of a clean start, which is positive.
I think he has a good chance of being appointed and a
good chance of being successful given that image. Lebanon
is ready for a new image, not connected to the old system.” N. Shehadi
Mikati is the next choice. He has a good chance if Hariri
and Lahoud’s bottom lines are far apart. If Lahoud and
Hariri are in the mood to compromise, Mikati’s chances will
go down.
Mikati’s ability is not known. He’s completely unknown.
He’s done well to forward his own name, but nothing indicates
that he’ll be a good prime minister. He’s been a good businessman,
but you can’t judge him on having been the minister
of public works. He doesn’t have a solid power base.”
M. Young
• “Mikati is a newcomer, but he has done well as a minister.
At the same time, he has a close relationship with Syria.”
F. Khazen
Adnan Kassar

• “He’s not a politician. He’s a
banker. What kind of government
will he lead?”
M. Young
“I’m not so sure about his
nomination. The positive angle
is that it would represent a larger
role for the private sector. This is
a good position to start from for strengthening the private sector and reforming the public
sector to fit the demands of the private sector. And he’s also
not a politician in the classical sense, and therefore not subject
to political pressures.”
N. Shehadi
• “Kassar is a businessman. He is seen as neutral. But without
political support, he can do nothing.”
F. Khazen
Candidate X
• “Surprises are expected in this country, but I don’t think that
this is the time for surprises.”
S. Naoum
• “I don’t see anybody coming out of the woodwork.”
• “I cannot see who. Can’t say who.”
M. Young
Salim Hoss, his face filled with a look of rejection, conceded
defeat even before the final election results were in. A five-time
head of government, Hoss was the first Lebanese prime minister
ever to lose his seat in parliament, and defeated by a large margin.
On the other side of West Beirut, at the Koraytem palace, the
mood was decidedly different. A festive Rafic Hariri could be seen
kissing babies, shaking hands and sharing laughs with his allies in
victory. The victory was an unprecedented landslide. After two years
of desperation and hopelessness, the message was clear. The
Lebanese population was fed up; people wanted to hope again. “The
people of the nation began to feel that this is a very impotent government,”
says Marwan Iskandar, an economist. “This kind of
atmosphere without a doubt encourages people to call on Hariri.”
With his clean sweep in Beirut and strong showing by allies
around the country, it looks as though Hariri will become the next
prime minister, although it’s still not guaranteed. Regardless, a new
government is on its way. Expectations are high and the challenge
of turning the dire economy around is daunting. Can it deliver?
The incoming government will have to defuse an economy that
has become a ticking time bomb. The debt has now reached about
$23.5 billion – a dangerously high 140% of GDP. The deficit
increased to more than 51 % in the first eight months of 2000, much
higher than the 42% for the same period of last year, and the
target of 37.3% for the year will undoubtedly
be missed. Most economists predict zero
growth for the year. Some 450 jobs have
been lost per month in the last year, according
to Bank of Beirut and the Arab
Countries. No wonder so many are leaving
Lebanon. The outgoing government has
left the economy in a much worse condition
than when it took office two years ago.
Up to now, Lebanon has been riding this
out in relative isolation. But the secret is
out, and the message is loud and clear. “I
think everyone realizes we are on the
verge of economic collapse,” says Farid
Khazen, head of AUB’s political science
department. As predicted, Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) downgraded Lebanon’s sovereign
rating and warned that more could
come if the situation doesn’t improve (see
box). On top of the deteriorating fiscal situation,
S&P was not impressed by the
government’s failure to pocket $2.7 billion
from the cellular companies for licenses and
by parliament’s inability to pass the VAT
draft law. In early September Moody’s put
Lebanon’s sovereign rating under.review
for possible downgrade. The donor conference
for the South, scheduled for
October, has been put off indefinitely due
to a lack of interest. According to
Iskandar, Lebanon can ill afford to ignore
the warning signals from abroad:
“Lebanon is coming under international
scrutiny and can no longer disregard it,
especially since the country might be a
member of the WTO in a few years. If
they do it’s like committing suicide.”
Analysts agree that the incoming government
must move quickly. “We can no longer
postpone difficult debt management decisions.
We can’t survive with the trend of the
fiscal situation. It’s unsustainable,” says
Marwan Barakat, head of research at
Banque Audi. “The new government will
either give confidence or not give confidence;
there’s no middle ground.” The place
to start is in undoing the Hoss administration’s
biggest blunder: mend relations with Cellis
and LibanCell and convert their contracts
into licenses. That would bring a quick infusion
to the state’s empty coffers and lay the
groundwork for future licenses and more
cash. Next up: With the general privatization
law on the books, the sell-off of state assets
should get under way. Complete the necessary
preparations and move on privatizing the
telecom – 25% of the fixed network is
expected to be the first on the block.
From its inception, the new government
must inspire confidence. “Investor confidence
was dented in the last two years,” says
Nadim Shehadi, director of the Centre for
Lebanese Studies at Oxford University. “A
change of government always attracts attention,
so its signals must inspire confidence.
They need to make investors feel that people
are helping them
rather than the contrary.”
And confidence is key in attracting investment, both foreign
and local.Kamal Shehadi, an
economist, emphasizes
that the new government must have a
vision and immediately set an agenda
with both short-
term targets that
help gain momentum and long-term
reforms. That is indeed a tall
order. Is there anyone who could possibly pull it off?
Most analysts say that
Hariri is the best option. “Name someone
other than Hariri and the country will probably
not even do a semi-takeoff,” says one
political analyst. “Mikati is the only other
choice – a semi-credible candidate.” The
country is in a kind of hiatus until the
prime minister is chosen by parliament,
while deals may be struck and alliances
can shift. Meantime, President Emile
Lahoud – who has been a big disappointment
for many – still has his say in the
matter. And with relations between Hariri
and Lahoud anything but friendly, it’s
understood that the former prime minister
would never accept to be as docile as Hoss.
Then there’s the Syrian equation. The
neighbors appear to have stayed clear, or at
least played a lesser role than usual in the
recent parliamentary elections. There’s
speculation that could signal non-involvement
by the Syrians in selecting the prime
minister. But they could dictate their wishes.
Najib Mikati, the current minister of
transport and public works, is close to the
Syrians but has said he doesn’t want the job.

Adnan Kassar, chairman of Fransabank
and head of the International Chamber of
Commerce, is another name being
bandied about (see box),
Hariri’s past record is certainly not free of
blemishes. The current debt comes to you
largely thanks to Hariri and his propensity
for big construction projects at any cost.
Large deficits were par for the course. “The
economy will collapse if we get. the same
Hariri policies,” says Kbazen. By the time
he left office in late fall of 1998, the recession
had already begun. His Saudi way of
doing business doesn’t appeal to everyone.
Critics dislike him for his favoritism,
cronyism and conflicts of interest.
On the flip side, his presence is believed
to inspire confidence. “Who Hariri is will
bring confidence first and foremost,” says
one analyst. His contacts and pro-business
approach are expected to have a greater
possibility of attracting foreign investments.
He is also seen as someone who can
push through the quick remedies like the cellular
licenses. Hariri, who is the founder and
believed to be one of the largest shareholders
in Solidere, could probably solve the permit
problem and get the Beirut Central
District project back on track.
But that’s the easy part. Success over the
long haul will require bigger and more
important changes to reinvent Lebanon.
And this is where things get difficult. Legal
and administrative reform should be at the
top of the agenda, along with further privatization
of state-run entities. These are
things that are needed to make Lebanon
compatible with a 21st century economy.
Some point to the need for a peace agreement,
but peace will never be a panacea.
“Peace is not enough,” says Sarkis Naoum,
political commentator for An-Nahar newspaper.
“If we have peace and don’t reform we
will achieve nothing. We need to begin by making
achievements inside the administration,
inside the political institutions.”

Here problems come into play with the
vested interests, when decisions are made to
please certain politicians and their fiefdoms
and not to serve the interests of the
nation. Economist Sarni Atallah explains
that the Taif accord shifted executive
power from the president to the council of
ministers, a body whose lack of unity renders
decision-making difficult.
“Motivation at that level is for power, it’s not
for the interests of the nation, economic or
social,” says Atallah. “Thus the council of
ministers is unable to deal with an economic
crisis.” According to K. Shehadi,
the council of ministers is a major bottleneck.
“We have tended to centralize all
decisions at the council of ministers -even
the most mundane decision has to go to the
council of ministers for approval,” he says.
“A country in the 21st century cannot continue
to be as centralized as our political
government. It is stifling to the economy and
is completely antithetical to the most common
norms of public administration.”
The sectarian divide that is pervasive
throughout the government and determines
who fills a position is conducive to inefficiencies
and creates discord. “Our system is
based on the consensus of three presidents –
the president, the speaker of the parliament and
the prime minister, each representing a community
as well as a certain political weight in
parliament,” says K. Shehadi. “There’s no
transparency and anyone of them can block
something that’s good for the country simply
because he’s got other demands, sometimes
very selfish, and he’s bargaining with the
other two.” Sarkis advocates abolishing the
system based on confessionalism.
Be it the army, Middle East Airlines or another state entity, Lahoud, Nabih Berri,
Walid Jumblatt and others will have to
accept cutbacks such as layoffs and an end
to kickbacks that keep their protectorates
happy and their power base safe. It goes
without saying that their Syrian backing is
vital, and the level of neighborly interference
in the future will go a long way in determining
what changes can be made.
So while many are optimistic that Hariri
can provide the band-aids for the short-term,
there is doubt whether he or anyone
else can make the difficult long-term
changes that would affect the sway of
those in power. But changes are precisely
what’s needed to create a more workable
government. Without that, long-term sustainable
growth for the economy will
remain a dream.
Fouad Fares spent 18 years with PC
Group, where he worked his way up
the corporate ladder, learning a thing
or two along the way. ‘The new millennium
is the era of services,” he says. In January he
established Mindsmaster, a consultancy firm
that focuses on IT auditing and consulting,
management training and quality assurance.
Fares audits companies’ IT environments
and designs solutions for them. “But I don’t
sell programs,” he says. “I tell them what’s
available for their needs.” Management
training involves auditing companies and
presenting in-house workshops on topics like
management techniques and customer care.
Mindsmaster also prepares companies for
ISO 9000 and 14000. Fares, who is a certified
lead auditor for both, says he has a unique offer
– the option to buy Quality Mapping
Solution software, which sells for $2,889.
The charge for IT and management consulting
is generally $600 a day. For ISO it’s
·$400 a day, while the cost on long-term contracts
ranges from $8,000 to $25,000.
Mindsmaster has done IT consulting for
National Shipping Company and a customer
care workshop for Skaff. He has done
a number of ISO audits and is preparing
Crown House and Crepaway for ISO 9000.
According to Rafi Semerdjian, a professor
of quality management systems, the stagnant
economy and tough competition have led to
reduced pricing for ISO consulting. “That’s
why we’re targeting markets abroad,” says
Semerdjian, who is also the director of CSP
Middle East, a big player in the field.
To raise the profile of his company, Fares
organizes ISO workshops and management
seminars. The workshops haven’t generated
profits, but Fares isn’t concerned: “It’s a marketing
tool.” He’s also involved in preparing
a campaign to highlight environmental
issues. Fares is turning Mindsmaster green –
he’s preparing it for ISO 14000. “I am setting
a policy to reduce risks on the environment.”
The initial investment into Mindsmaster
was $15,000. Because it’s a one-man show,
monthly overhead is only about $1,000,

though specialized consultants are employed
on a project-basis. To date turnover stands at
$50,000. Fares is negotiating with international
consultancy companies to enter
regional and European markets.
A photo opportunity

S even years ago Sevag Seropian started
a small photography business. He
went from wedding pictures to advertising
photography. That led to graphic
design services – a move motivated by frustration.
“If brochures weren’t good the
designers blamed it on the photos – now I have
full control of the job,” he says. In November
1999 his company, Photo & Printing
Promoters, expanded further by becoming
an advertising agency offering media booking.
The transition was the idea of executive
manager Haig Tatarian, who was hired to
take over operations when Seropian
accepted a position as in-house photographer
for a Lebanese multinational. The
new job keeps Seropian busy traveling, but
he still does photography for his own firm.
The company employs three other freelancers
– two graphic designers and a photographer.
The price per photo is usually
$100 or $150, depending on whether it’s
done in the studio or not. Other photographers,
such as Roger Moukarzel, say prices can
range from $100 to $2,000 per photo at other
outfits. Photo & Printing Promoters charges
about $1,000 to $2,000 for brochures, including
photos and graphic design (not printing).
About $100,000 has been invested into the
company. Cameras recently purchased
include a $20,000 Sinar (4X5 inch format
slides), a $10,000 Nikon FIOO 35mm (with
various lenses) and a $7,500 Marnia
(medium format slides). “If clients don’t
want to pay a lot, we use the Marnia not the
Sinar,” says Tatarian. “And the 35mm is
good for fashion photography.” Moukarzel
says he has $300,000 worth at his studio.
Photo & Printing Promoters has 30 regular
clients and does numerous single jobs.
The monthly overhead is roughly $1,000,
and annual sales are about $100,000.
Photography generates 30% of business
and 50% of profits. Graphic design services,
which increased business by 40%,
make up the rest. With over 100 advertising
agencies offering media bookings, the new
activity has yet to bring in business.
