Q&A Joseph Al Assad

by Thomas Schellen December 12, 2024

written by Thomas Schellen

To say that energy was a problematic sector from beginning of the Lebanese post-conflict reconstruction in 1992 to the end of the financial inflows-fueled, corrupt cronyism system in the country, is more than an understatement. The sector can be described as a detrimentally subsidized sinkhole of state funds, catastrophically mismanaged public utility, and theme of one internationally flagged need and sabotaged development strategy after the other. The underdeveloped energy sector, dilapidated systems of electricity generation and transmission, and dysfunctional monopoly utility Electricite du Liban combined into the moraine of policy debris obstructed economic potentials and resulted in widespread energy poverty in Lebanon. In Executive’s investigation of damages, needs, and potentials of economic sectors with members of the Lebanese Private Sector Network, we sat down with Joseph Assad, Lebanese and regional energy expert and dean of the engineering department at USEK. He took us on a perforce tour of personal insights that are based on his advisory experiences at the Lebanese Center for Energy Conservation (LCEC) and the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) from 2010 to 2017 and his consulting work with international agencies on energy policies and projects in more than a dozen countries.

Can we have hope for energy sovereignty after all the years of stuttering and delayed adoption of renewables and attempted electricity solutions within a regionally integrated power framework – or is energy sovereignty today still a pipedream, more than three years after the severe electricity crisis that was part of the economic meltdown of Lebanon?

JA: You need to look at this issue from several points of view. On the policy level, we are still at the same position. De facto, however, many things have changed due to the [economic] crisis. The boom of solar [photovoltaic] systems has happened in Lebanon because of the crisis. Whether this boom led to [installation of] 1,200 or 800 or 1,500 megawatts, that is a big share of solar PV in Lebanon. A big share of electricity is now being generated locally, and this contributes to what we call energy security. Another factor that has contributed to the energy security is on the demand side [of the equation].

How so?

Demand dropped because of three reasons, the first being the most obvious in the increase of electricity prices. People now have to account for the electricity bill at the end of the month and thus are looking more and more into how to save energy. The second thing is that some people cannot afford electricity anymore. They have been cutting down on their vital electricity needs. The third one is the [drop in power consumption] because of the blackouts that we witnessed in the previous period and that are disappearing more and more right now. I am talking about the total blackouts when electricity needs were covered neither by generators nor by EDL.

The third [demand reduction element] has disappeared, the second one should disappear [as people’s access to vital energy] should return with the adjustment of the economy. But the first one will remain, because it is an awareness change and behavioral change reducing electricity demand. What does this mean? We are demanding less electricity and are producing more electricity locally, which means that we are increasing our energy security and energy sovereignty.

What else is required to actually have energy sovereignty? Is it correct to say that energy security could be improved by acquisition of electricity and the resources to produce it from outside the country while energy sovereignty requires local production?

On that level of energy sovereignty, it means that we need natural gas resources. Hopefully when we tap into our gas resources, if any [viable ones are found], we will have full energy sovereignty. Renewables and hydro, which are the only [domestic] sources that we have today, cannot provide full energy sovereignty. Otherwise we need to import fuel, which makes us face two problems, one is the weight on our national debt [that will be imposed by fuel payments] and our sensitivity to the fluctuations in international oil prices, and secondly the political dimension of importing oil.

As to the factors contributing to the reduction of energy demand, did improvement of energy efficiencies play a role that was in addition to behavior changes because of higher cost?

That happened automatically. On the policy level, I was personally responsible for drafting the chapter in the NEEAP II (four-year National Energy Efficiency Action Plan published in March 2016) for Lebanon where I produced a chapter on energy efficiency measures in the [Engineering, Procurement, and Construction] sector. I was personally involved in drafting this chapter of the energy efficiency law. It was not implemented due to the crisis. Within the NEEAP we had chapters addressing energy efficiency in all sectors. But what we lack in Lebanon is not policy but implementation. For the last three or four years there has been a law pending in the Lebanese parliament, the energy efficiency law.

And yet I have encountered inefficient electricity installations in some public buildings, where I saw over-sized and non-divisible power generation facilities in state-owned venues in Beirut.

The private sector is for sure far ahead of the public sector in the area of energy efficiency. They main problem in the public sector is funds. I know from my work that after the Beirut blast there has been a large package of funds to solarize public institutions, for example a World Bank program for the Lebanese University and initiatives with [German] agencies KFW and GTZ and also with other institutions from Japan. Public hospitals, public schools, Lebanese University, Lebanese Armed Forces, and also at different ministries, in all of them you will find a very good solarization rate that has been installed. In the coming year there will be projects for the Palaces of Justice and the administrative buildings of governorates, implemented by UNDP with what I think is EU funding.

There is, however, a huge problem of [doing things] the Lebanese way where “bigger is better” where I will get a two or three times larger generator when I need one of 100 kWh capacity. This is knowing that underloading a generator will consume more fuel and that a bigger generator will consume more fuel than a small one. So in 95 percent of institutions in Lebanon, you find that their diesel generator is over-seized, because they took a bigger generator under considerations that they would grow. [Before], there would be many Lebanese people who would prefer to have a larger generator just in order to have the peace of mind of always have enough power, rather than making savings on fuel. Today it is different. Today we need to consider energy efficiency as we are back to financial reality. There are many examples for low cost, no cost operational efficiency measures.

Is this rational trend toward higher energy efficiency progressing in the best possible way, or is the country still in a worst-possible scenario of implementation?

The [reality] is something in-between but I think if it is institutionalized and legalized, it will be much better. Now it makes sense financially and it is the best time to implement energy efficiency in Lebanon.

But are there government incentives such as tax holidays or investment support for energy efficiency measures?

No need to go there. I am quoting one of my two German energy gurus who used to say that the cleanest and cheapest kilowatt-hour that you can produce, is the one that you do not consume. Let us begin there and then we can discuss other issues.

There have been ideas and proposals of utility scale solar farms that were born in the 2010s and tendered later in the past decade but then stopped still before the implementation stage in 2019 and 20. When I recently searched the website of LCEC for information relating to these solar farm tenders, I encountered a stakeholder assessment document by the World Bank. It seemed to imply a need to engage in further consultations with stakeholders from municipalities and civil society in communities in the Bekaa that were recently in the news not for their agricultural or other economic capacities. What is the state of developing utility-scale solar PV and power purchase agreements (PPAs)?

I will update you on this but let me first remark that the private sector in Lebanon has demanded its own energy sovereignty from the government. This was one of the main drivers of the solar boom. On one side there was the residential aspect that was driven both by desire for energy security and, later on, also by energy efficiency. But when you look at the demand from the industrial and commercial, or C&I sector, it was pure energy sovereignty where a lot of people were saying, ‘we do not want to wait for the government anymore but take things into our own hands’. And I was just notified that six out of 11 PPAs were already sold to private sector partners. There is a big appetite from private sector players who want to invest on their own, and the only issue today why we are not implementing the 11 PPA contracts that were signed, is the financing.

In this regard, the Stakeholder Assessment document by the World Bank said that you must complete the stakeholder assessment process before you can receive finance.

That applies if you aim for international financing. But what we are seeing now in Lebanon is that [private sector entrepreneurs] are not going for any external financing. They are people who are going for the PPAs because they want to themselves invest in solar farms. So what we are seeing today is an internal appetite of the private sector to invest in the public sector. This is a good sign: the private sector is coming back and taking part in the solution for the public sector.

What you say now reminds me of civil society actions in some areas of Beirut when private initiatives started in late 2021 connecting streetlights to generators in neighborhoods or even people’s buildings, so that all people in the neighborhood could walk in more light and thus greater safety.

And now those types of initiatives are going to the next level. Now they are going to the level of, let’s say, 15 megawatts of solar farms that will be feeding into the grid, as part of the private sector investing into the public sector.

Would that require the issuance of very clear further regulations as far as provision and pricing, public private partnerships (PPP), and all that?

The price [for electricity purchases from private providers by the state utility] was set within the PPA and it is very competitive, I think, when you compare it to the cost of production in Lebanon and taking into consideration all the risks. I am not a legal expert on the matters of PPP and PPAs. From my understanding from the legal experts, the only issue is in the financing. If you have the financing, you can start the works and it is no secret that several PPAs were bought – [purchase of two contracts by shipping giant] CMA-CGM is already public and they have stated that they will start implementing. I think there is something pending with Total [Energies and QatarEnergy]. However, I know that there also are others.

Are there fully Lebanese investors that have acquired PPA contracts? If so, does the Lebanese Private sector network have a stake or function in such initiatives?

Yes, that is the case and many of the people, or at least a couple of them, who are holding PPAs, are members of LPSN.

What about the requirement of stakeholder assessments or other political barriers that might stand in the way of international finance, such as through World Bank packages, when we talk about municipalities where allegiances have been with the political Hezbollah?

I cannot talk for the World Bank but on the Lebanese level, the only requirement would be the social and environmental impact assessment, which has its own criteria and could be run through local authorities and municipalities but also through local NGOs and local representation. I do not know if the World Bank has other requirements which would apply if the World Bank is financing, which, however is not the case in the moment. I think since we have appetite from the private sector in financing that size of solar relays, I would keep the World Bank off those projects and focus on having that aspect of sovereignty within the financing of those PPAs and bring in the World Bank for the larger ones where you might need all the processes and procedures that the World Bank applies.

Do you have any information on the damages on the energy sector from the two months of open war?

I know that there was a huge impact in the south – and I know less from the Bekaa – on the solar systems that were specifically installed for solar[-powered] pumping. These systems, which were already financed by international donors, will have to be restored and we will need a lot of support to rebuild them. As we do not have access to all the regions yet, it is too early to undertake a formal assessment of damages.

As far as economic losses in electricity and renewable operations over the past months, could these be of lower significance? It seems that operational provision and access to electricity in 2024 was, despite the war better than in 2023 or 22?

This is for the simple reason of having parts of the country that were totally depopulated, which meant that we had less electrical load and it was moved to other regions that felt a slight amelioration because they had more hours of electricity. We will not have any international financing in the sector without a macroeconomic solution, except for those small PPAs where you can find a private investor that can invest 6, 7, or 8 million USD to build a solar farm. However, if we talk about large scale farms and projects of $100 or 150 million, we need external finance from international financial institutions, and those will not come without a macroeconomic solution, which was delayed by the war.

So in your analysis, new financing will be delayed because of the conflict?

Yes, war is the enemy of attracting investments. However, we have seen resilience within the Lebanese population – but is that resilience enough to attract direct buyers? But on a brighter side, what we hope for, even if I am not sure that this can be said about any war, is that this war will be a start of a new era of ending conflicts and seeing less conflicts within the region. From that point of view, we maybe getting closer to having the IFIs and external investors return to Lebanon. If on the other hand [the next phase in the Lebanese situation] is a remake of what happened in 2006, it will be delaying much. Under the more optimistic view, one of the points that we need to discuss when we talk about the role of the private sector, is the decentralized renewable energy (DRE) law.

Is the DRE law’s power wheeling part working, meaning the ability of private producers of electricity to transport the power over the grid from where they can conveniently produce it to where they need it, under the law that was adopted in Parliament at the end of 2023?

No, power wheeling is not working. However, what is working, are private to private power purchase agreements and I am happy to announce that we signed the fist PPA at USEK with a company of the private sector in Lebanon, which will be investing in installing a solar system on the roof of our parking [area]. We will have a contract where we [as USEK] buy electricity for ten years and after ten years, the system will become ours. This model can represent a very important opportunity for the private sector to invest locally. It is an investment opportunity and I know that there are companies working on that aspect. I know of one or two that are the most mature, but I cannot name.

Any industrialist whom you approach in Lebanon and ask him what the first pain in the neck is to him, he will say energy. If you them tell them ‘do not invest yourself in installing a solar farm but leave this to us and we will sell you electricity cheaper than what it costs you on your generator while you invest in your own business’, they will be very happy.

In areas of renewable energy usage other than operating manufacturing plants and processing plants, is it feasible for a transportation provider to have a solar array powering a central charging station for battery-energized buses or delivery vehicles?

Why not. We can think about a lot. However, for the public transportation sector I have cleaner models. From my point of view, hydrogen is much better for the buses when compared with installing solar farms to charge the buses and all that.

When Executive talked to the largest Lebanon-based solar PV and renewable energy companies back in 2021, they were doing most or almost all of their profits outside of Lebanon, in Middle Eastern and African markets. Are these companies involved in the PPA deals that you mentioned?

It is a point of pride for the energy sector in Lebanon that companies that were groomed in Lebanon are working in the whole region. But these are not the same companies that we are talking about here. It is about project financing. We are talking about companies that are being created to finance those people that install solar for third-party private sector companies. It is the private [sector] financing the private to install for the private.

But do we have the needed companies with enough capacities to serve this demand?

Yes, and much more. Having worked with them from different perspective, [namely] from the public and the private sector perspective and now as customer representative for my university, I can say that the renewable energy [Engineering, Procurement, and Construction] EPC companies in Lebanon are very competitive and have the right know-how to install the systems, especially when we are talking private to private sector projects of below 1.5 megawatt, which cover 90 percent of the needs in Lebanon. For those system sizes, we have the world’s best companies to install them.

As you mentioned, gas reserves and also using fossil resources is crucial for energy sovereignty of Lebanon. We have had many speculations, rumors, and political expectations throughout the 2010s and even after the crash of the local subsidies. Is this debate of resources more rational today?

Once we have proven resources – and as I scientist I cannot state my conviction but I can say that we have a very good probability for those reserves, putting it into a more scientific framework, it will be a game changer for the energy sector. I think the Lebanese private sector will have a huge role to play on that level, not only on level of license holders but also in the huge marker of services that need to be provided to those companies.

Will the world around us let us explore our resources in peace?

At the start of my course in each semester, I present a slide of proven energy resources in the world and another slide where I present the political tensions in the world. And when I overlay these two maps, there usually is 80 to 85 percent accuracy of overlay. In previous times it was water and today one of the main reasons of war are energy resources. However, I am personally optimistic because I know that our country will survive because it has already survived many similar, bigger and smaller conflicts and turmoil as we are facing now.

Another chapter that we need to address is hydrogen. Hydrogen is now being pumped to Europe from North Africa. But there is also a big potential for hydrogen production elsewhere in the region, especially places with natural gas pipelines passing through. Because you can mix.

Would the hydrogen production be utilizing solar-thermal?

There are several ways. What is called green hydrogen is produced by using renewable energy and electrolysis of water but there is also potential for blue hydrogen where there are oil reserves. Natural gas from oil reserves can be used to produce blue hydrogen instead of flaring it. It can also be pumped. Hydrogen is the energy vector of tomorrow. It is a vector, not a source because it can be used to shift energy from point a to point b in geography but also from point a to point b in time.

Is Lebanon politically and technically cognizant of this opportunity?

Lebanon is one of the first countries to have a hydrogen strategy. I myself developed that strategy on behalf of GIZ. So I think we are well positioned, but we are not ready yet. We are on the right track but need to accelerate and this acceleration would depend on [collaboration].

The LPSN has stipulated the need for an internationally financed, Marshall-type plan for Lebanon. Should there be a budget allocation to energy in a Marshall type plan and how much in percentage terms of a plan should be dedicated to energy sector development?

I cannot give you a number but I think that energy should be the main focus of any future plans within Lebanon, because it is at the same time one of the main enablers of the Lebanese economy and also in itself is becoming a sector of the economy. I don’t know how many sectors were producing $5 billion per year during the last period. This was the private power generation sector that was achieving a turnover of four to five billion dollars per year. If this sector is institutionalized and opened to private sector, you open an economical sector that will be running billions – nobody has the exact numbers – at the same time as the billions of EDL. The energy sector should not only be an enabler but also a producer and economic sector in itself.

December 12, 2024 0 comments

Real estate in the interim: Resettling and reconstruction

by Sherine Najdi December 11, 2024

written by Sherine Najdi

This article is part of ongoing Executive coverage with members of the Lebanese Private Sector Network on sectoral impacts of and responses to the 70-day September 2024 war on Lebanon.

In the wake of devastating strikes that have turned bustling neighborhoods into craters and thriving homes, enterprises, and shops into rubble, the future of housing and real estate in Lebanon requires a major focus on reconstruction with a forward-thinking eye for sound and environmentally tenable urban development and planning. From rural homes and farms to multi-family high-rises in Beirut, the scars of destruction are everywhere, leaving questions about recovery, stability, funding for repair and reconstruction. Larger questions of what comes next for the country’s urban and residential landscapes are fraught, given the shaky state of the 60-day ceasefire and Lebanon’s central positioning between one hostile neighbor to the south and another north-western border neighbor currently experiencing massive upheaval with international powers eager to reshape the country according to their interests.

In this interview, Mireille Korab, Director/Head of Business Development at FFA Real Estate who is a leading figure in Lebanon’s real estate sector, discusses the profound challenges and opportunities that define the industry amidst a backdrop of war, economic instability, and political uncertainty. Over the years, the sector has faced a cascade of disruptions—from a slowdown in 2015 to the halt of subsidized loans in 2017, and the compounded impacts of the 2019 financial crisis. These longstanding issues have been further strained by the recent war, which has brought many planned projects to a standstill.

Korab explores how the market has adapted, highlighting the resilience of developers and the strategic moves of buyers with high purchasing power. Despite the setbacks, she identifies silver linings and investment opportunities, emphasizing the sector’s potential as Lebanon moves toward stability. The conversation delves into the critical role of reconstruction and urban planning, advocating for sustainable development and strategic collaboration between the private and public sectors.

While the real estate market is in flux, Korab’s insights shed light on the path forward, underscoring the readiness of the private sector to contribute to rebuilding efforts and seize future opportunities in Lebanon’s evolving landscape.

Executive: Are there any ongoing real estate purchases despite the war?

Korab: Yes, but only in isolated cases. Before the war, a lot of developers were starting to plan new projects and were advertising a few new developments. Everything stopped, even though in the areas that were not affected directly by the strikes, there were people interested in buying. Wealthier individuals with high purchasing power seized opportunities to buy properties in unaffected areas. However, this was not reflective of a healthy market, not a full-fledged market but more of one-off transactions.

Definitely, we saw a huge rise in the rental prices, because a lot of people were leaving Beirut, leaving other areas closer to the strikes, and we had a surge in the rental prices. This is not healthy because there was limited availability yet a lot of demand, and also a discrepancy between the pricing and the purchasing power. So, again, we were in a very unstable situation for the past 60 days, 66 days. And now everything is on hold, waiting for the ceasefire to be permanent because it’s just a halt now.

So, there are no new projects at the moment. The new projects will start after January, hopefully, once everything is settled and a new president is elected, only then will the market go back to running smoothly.

Executive: What types of properties were most in demand during this time?

Korab: Luxury properties, such as villas in mountainous regions and chalets near the beach, attracted buyers looking for long-term investments. However, these were limited to high-end markets.

Executive: Is this a good time to invest in real estate?

Korab: Yes. Property prices are discounted by 25-30 percent and are expected to rise once stability returns, particularly after a ceasefire and political resolution. It’s a good time to buy. It’s a buyer’s market; it’s not a seller’s market.

Executive: Do you foresee significant investment opportunities post-war?

Korab: if the ceasefire is permanent, we will witness good days ahead in the sector. The reconstruction phase will bring immense opportunities, especially with international support. However, this requires political stability and proper urban planning.

Executive: What are the plans for reconstruction and urban development?

Korab: You have more than 100,000 units destroyed. The focus should be on sustainable and planned reconstruction, avoiding mistakes of the past. There’s a push for creating green areas and adhering to modern urban planning standards to ensure a better future.

Executive: How involved is the private sector in reconstruction planning?

Korab: The private sector is ready to collaborate with the government to contribute to reconstruction efforts. Real estate developers are advocating for a seat at the planning table to ensure effective and sustainable rebuilding. I’m the vice president of the Real Estate Developers Association and we are demanding proper urban planning on the government’s part. We [the private sector] know how to tackle the reconstruction. So we are demanding a seat in the process of reconstruction. And we will be there hand in hand to help the public sector to have it as it should be.

Executive: What are your expectations for the market once stability is restored?

Korab: Prices will likely return to their 2015 levels and continue to rise. Rental prices, which surged during the war, will also stabilize as displaced individuals return to their homes.

Executive: Do you have any final thoughts or advice?

Korab: It’s always a good time to invest in Lebanon’s real estate market, particularly now with favorable prices. The sector has resilient potential and will thrive with proper planning and political stability.

December 11, 2024 0 comments

Education Education Education plan Special education

The Multifaceted Role of the COO in Steering Lebanese Tertiary Education Through Crisis and Beyond

by Youssef Bassim December 11, 2024

written by Youssef Bassim

As the Chief Operating Officer (COO) at the University of Balamand, my role has extended far beyond the conventional boundaries of operational management, particularly in the context of Lebanon’s prolonged crisis. Over the past five years, Lebanon has seen economic turmoil, political instability, a global pandemic, and most recently a war. Overseeing comprehensive crisis management and strategic oversight involves a proactive and multifaceted approach to navigating uncertainties and ensuring stability. This responsibility is particularly crucial in a context like Lebanon, where educational institutions face ongoing economic, political, and societal challenges.

Crisis Preparedness and Response

Effective crisis management required a well-prepared response mechanism tailored to the unique risks faced by the institution. Crisis response planning was developed and regularly updated to address potential scenarios such as political unrest, economic instability, health emergencies, and natural disasters. This plan includes clear protocols for communication, decision-making, and logistical arrangements to ensure continuity of operations.

Maintaining a resilient infrastructure was the key to minimizing disruptions during crisis. Ensuring robust IT infrastructure capable of supporting remote operations was crucial, especially for continuity in academic delivery, along with strengthening cybersecurity measures to protect sensitive information and prevent data breaches.

Physical infrastructure readiness was observed by overseeing the maintenance and upgrading of physical facilities to ensure they are secure and adaptable to various needs during a crisis. This included ensuring that buildings are structurally sound, energy systems are reliable, and emergency supplies are readily available.

Supply chain management was maintained by implementing strategies to stabilize the supply chain for critical resources such as laboratory equipment, medical supplies, and food services. This involved diversifying suppliers and maintaining strategic reserves of essential items to mitigate the impact of supply disruptions.

Health and Safety Protocols

Ensuring the health and safety of the university community during crisis is a primary responsibility. In an environment such as Lebanon’s, where various crises—war being the latest most devastating one—can impact operations, robust health and safety protocols are vital.

Comprehensive health guidelines addressing everything from emergency medical responses to disease prevention, were created following international best practices and local health regulations.

Psychological support and mental health services were enforced by expanding the availability of mental health services to address the increased stress and anxiety caused by the war. This included providing access to counseling services—including services supporting those directly affected by traumatic events—mental health workshops, and support groups that assist students and staff in managing their mental well-being.

Health surveillance systems were implemented to monitor the well-being of the campus community. These systems can track the incidence of illnesses, allowing for timely interventions when unusual patterns are detected. Regularly assessing campus facilities by checking ventilation systems, water supply, cleanliness, and waste disposal methods helped prevent environmental health risks.

Establishing strong partnerships with local health authorities and our hospitals network was needed to ensure coordinated responses to health emergencies. These collaborations will provide the university with access to additional medical resources and expertise, enhancing the overall effectiveness of health protocols.

Collaborating on public health campaigns that promote health awareness among students and staff was performed. These campaigns can focus on vaccination, disease prevention, and healthy lifestyle choices, contributing to a healthier campus environment.

Prioritizing health and safety helped the university to maintain a secure and supportive environment that is conducive to learning and working, even in the face of significant challenges. By implementing robust preparedness plans, maintaining resilient infrastructure and ensuring the health and safety of the community, the COO ensures that the university is not only prepared to handle current challenges but is also well-positioned to thrive in the future.

Operational and Strategic Framework Enhancements

As COO, enhancing the operational frameworks involves strategic oversight across several key departments, each integral to maintaining robust operations and ensuring the institution’s resilience in times of crisis. In the Information Technology (IT) department, my role involves directing efforts to bolster our digital infrastructure which is crucial for supporting hybrid learning models and remote operations. This encompasses expanding our Learning Management Systems (LMS) to facilitate seamless online education and enhancing cybersecurity measures to safeguard sensitive university data against potential cyber threats, particularly vital during crisis when reliance on digital platforms increases. Similarly, managing the Human Resources (HR) department is crucial for ensuring effective recruitment, retention, and development of faculty and staff.

Additionally, overseeing the construction and maintenance department involves ensuring the timely completion of capital projects and the regular upkeep of existing facilities. Strategic planning in this area addresses the growing needs of the university while ensuring sustainability and compliance with safety standards, which are paramount during crises that can impact physical infrastructure. Leading the procurement department involves navigating the complexities of acquiring goods and services that meet our quality standards and cost-efficiency, while ensuring that operations remain uninterrupted, and resources are readily available. Lastly, supervising campus services ensures that all aspects of campus operations, from security to transportation and fleet management, run smoothly.

Academic and Administrative Innovation

Innovation in academic delivery and administrative operations is essential to maintaining the relevance and competitiveness of our educational offerings, particularly in times of crisis. By working closely with academic leaders to continuously adapt our curriculum, we ensure it meets the evolving needs of the job market and aligns with both local and international standards, making our students well-prepared even in unstable times. These strategic innovations in curriculum and operations are vital for ensuring that the university can swiftly adapt and respond to crisis, maintaining continuity in education and administrative functions without sacrificing quality or security.

Community Support and Outreach Programs

The university’s engagement with the local community is a critical aspect of our operations, extending well beyond the academic sphere. As COO, I actively oversee various outreach initiatives. Civic engagement projects, such as the Balamand Civil Society Support Project, are designed to address specific community needs including health, education, and economic development, and have been crucial in providing aid to families affected by the local crisis. Recently, this project has been instrumental in supporting displaced citizens due to the current conflict, providing not just educational support but also essential medical aid, clothing, and food. This comprehensive support enhances our responsiveness to community emergencies. Additionally, fostering volunteering and service-learning programs encourages both students and staff to engage in activities that benefit the local community. These programs not only address immediate community needs but also instill a strong sense of civic responsibility and ethical leadership in our students.

Strategic Partnerships and Collaborations

Building and maintaining strategic partnerships are essential for amplifying the impact of our academic programs and research initiatives, particularly in strengthening our crisis management capabilities. Industry partnerships with local and international businesses ensure that our academic programs are closely aligned with market needs, thereby enhancing the employability of our graduates and providing them with practical experiences through joint research projects, internships, and co-op opportunities. Additionally, engaging with government bodies and NGOs not only helps influence public policy and secure funding for critical projects but also enhances our capacity to contribute to educational reforms and regional development efforts. These strategic relationships are pivotal in enabling the university to respond effectively to crisis, ensuring continuity in education and research, and supporting community and national resilience.

Public Policy Influence and Advocacy

The International Forum on Lebanon Revival Plan “From Myth to Reality,” hosted under the leadership of Dr. Elias Warrak, President of the University of Balamand, is set to address the significant challenges facing Lebanon’s economic, higher education, and healthcare sectors. The forum aims to transition from idealistic visions to practical solutions, bringing together keynote speakers and panelists from diverse backgrounds to propose viable strategies for national recovery. This initiative is part of the University of Balamand’s ongoing commitment to influencing public policy and enhancing community welfare. By actively participating in such policy advisory panels and hosting influential forums, the university bridges the gap between academia, industry, and policymakers, fostering discussions that lead to actionable insights and robust policy reforms. This engagement is crucial for effective crisis management, ensuring the institution is both a contributor to and leader in national efforts to stabilize and revitalize Lebanon, supporting the broader community in times of need.

Alumni Engagement

Maintaining a robust alumni network is crucial for fostering enduring relationships that benefit both the University of Balamand and its graduates, playing a key role in crisis management and resilience. We actively develop alumni networks and associations that facilitate ongoing engagement through various channels, including events, newsletters, and social platforms. Additionally, we offer a range of lifelong learning opportunities and professional development courses to our alumni, ensuring that they remain connected to the university and continue to advance in their careers.

Futureproofing the Institution

Looking towards the future, the following strategic planning and sustainability initiatives are critical.

Long-Term Strategic Planning: engaging in detailed scenario planning and developing long-term strategies that anticipate future challenges and opportunities in higher education.

Innovation in Education: championing the adoption of new technologies and teaching methodologies that position the university as a leader in educational innovation.

Sustainability Initiatives: Leading efforts to ensure that all university operations are environmentally sustainable and economically viable, preparing the institution to meet future educational demands and societal challenges.

The role of the university COO at a university during times of major upheaval is both diverse and dynamic. It involves not only navigating the university through immediate challenges but also strategically positioning it for future success. By overseeing critical operational departments, enhancing academic and administrative frameworks, and fostering community engagement, the COO ensures that the university remains a beacon of stability, innovation, and growth. As we continue to adapt and evolve, our focus remains steadfast on delivering an education that is not only comprehensive and inclusive but also transformative, preparing our students to be resilient leaders in an ever-changing world.

December 11, 2024 0 comments

Q&A

Staying alive: The juggling act of the healthcare sector

by Sherine Najdi December 9, 2024

written by Sherine Najdi

The healthcare sector in Lebanon has faced exceptional operational challenges over the past year as the Israel-Hezbollah war escalated in the south and the Bekaa before Israel began its bombardment of districts across Lebanon in September. Following the halting (or at least the significant reduction) of the Israeli aggression against Lebanon on November 26^th, 2024, multiple sectors are facing repercussions in different aspects: operations, finance, and maintaining personnel while bolstering morale. Impacts on the healthcare sector were grievous in the victimization of first responders and primary healthcare centers.

According to the World Health Organization, the conflict impacts of the past 14 months especially the period from late September to late November affected 158 healthcare facilities, predominantly through aerial attacks. Between October 7^th, 2023, and November 26^th, 2024, 241 health workers were killed and 292 injured while on duty. Hospitals in safe areas were spared damage but all operational tertiary facilities in the healthcare sector were inundated with patients while at the same time facing shortages and supply bottlenecks —yet maintaining operations, nonetheless.

Executive’s interview with Roula Zahar, deputy general director at Mount Lebanon Hospital University Medical Center (MLHUMC), delves into the difficulties encountered by healthcare institutions, ranging from operational disruptions and resource shortages to financial instability and the implications of a liberalized healthcare system.

Executive: Can you tell me a bit about the challenges you’ve faced?

Zahar: It was very difficult. We had bad times. The anxiety was overwhelming, and the situation created challenges in so many ways. But we managed to adapt and keep going.

Executive: How has the crisis impacted hospital operations?

Zahar: Operations weren’t exactly halted. The work itself remained consistent in terms of delivering services, but we had to adapt significantly. Some of our staff lost their homes or couldn’t travel, so they stayed at the hospital. We provided them with food and accommodation, which allowed us to continue operating. It was challenging, but we managed.

Executive: What about staffing? Were there notable challenges in maintaining or regaining personnel?

Zahar: Absolutely. Some physicians left during the crisis, and while a few have returned, there’s always uncertainty about whether they’ll stay long-term. Retaining staff has been a significant challenge, along with addressing the issues of resources and medication. Thankfully, we didn’t face critical shortages, but there was always the fear of running out.

Executive: Did you face difficulties in obtaining specialized equipment or materials?

Zahar: Then there were various challenges regarding medication and resources. particularly with importing isotopes, chemicals, and advanced medical equipment. It remains a major challenge to access specialized treatments and materials, and this issue persists. We didn’t run out of any specific medication, but there were rumors that we might face shortages. Fortunately, that didn’t happen, but there was always this uncertainty: will we have enough medication?

Executive: What about patients’ financial situations? How has that affected your operations?

Zahar: That’s been one of the biggest challenges. Many patients can’t pay their bills, especially those without insurance. We had to seek help from organizations, but the assistance wasn’t structured well. The absence of support from the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) is a major problem, as [the fund’s financial allocations] are not covering much for patients. Insurers, too, aren’t cooperating adequately in terms of pricing.

Executive: Has the government provided any help during this time?

Zahar: In specific cases, yes, but not enough. For example, they covered half of the costs for [procedures related to] the ‘pagers’ incident [Israel’s detonation of pagers and walkie-talkies belonging to members of Hezbollah on September 17-18 that resulted in at least 35 deaths, including at least two deaths of young children, and over 3,000 injuries], but the overall support remains inadequate. The NSSF is supposed to play a critical role, but it’s falling short in covering patients’ needs.

Executive: Given the financial difficulties, is the sustainability of hospitals at risk?

Zahar: Yes, to some extent. The greater risk lies in the inability to renew or maintain equipment. Operating costs are lower than the initial capital needed to establish a hospital, but equipment renewal is expensive. Without proper cash flow or financing, maintaining quality care will become increasingly difficult.

Executive: Lebanon’s healthcare system is known for its decentralized and liberal structure. Do you think this has been an advantage or a disadvantage?

Zahar: It’s both. On one hand, the liberal system meant we had more equipment than necessary, which allowed us to avoid long waiting times for procedures like MRIs. In Europe, you might wait six months for an MRI; in Lebanon, it can be done in days. However, this system has its costs, as hospitals need to recover investments, which can drive up prices.

Executive: Do you believe there should be more government regulation in the healthcare sector?

Zahar: Regulation is necessary but should be minimal. The healthcare sector is not like other industries. I believe in a liberal approach and support the private sector, but excessive regulation could harm the system’s efficiency.

Executive: Do you anticipate repercussions for hospitals [because of the war] even after the ceasefire?

Zahar: There is always fear, but the private sector adapts quickly. During the war, private hospitals stepped in to provide care when public hospitals couldn’t. The Ministry of Health has acknowledged our efforts. Still, we need to prepare for potential future challenges.

Executive: Will hospitals start implementing contingency plans for such situations?

Zahar: We already have contingency plans since people’s lives depend on our work. However, my main concern is maintaining quality care with reduced financing. If costs are blindly cut, the sector will face serious problems.

Executive: Will staff reductions or salary cuts be necessary to maintain financial stability?

Zahar: We hope not. Instead, we aim to increase revenue by relying more on government and insurance payments rather than out-of-pocket payments from patients.

Executive: Are there any strategies to increase revenues while maintaining accessibility?

Zahar: Yes, we’re advocating for better insurance coverage and support from the government and NSSF. We’re also exploring low-cost insurance schemes and collaborations with NGOs to help cover costs for patients.

Executive: Are NGOs playing a significant role in supporting healthcare institutions?

Zahar: Yes, many NGOs are helping individuals by covering costs for patients. Some hospitals also receive direct donations [from NGOs], but this is not the case for all hospitals.

Executive: Do you have any final thoughts or comments?

Zahar: It’s been a very tough time [for the duration of the current war] but we continue to adapt and do our best for our patients and staff.

December 9, 2024 0 comments

Education plan Employee Development

Lebanon Works: A launch pad for relief and revitalization

by Sherine Najdi December 4, 2024

written by Sherine Najdi

This article is part of ongoing Executive coverage with members of the Lebanese Private Sector Network on sectoral impacts of and responses to the 70-day September 2024 war on Lebanon. At the time of this inquiry, the Israeli aggression was still destroying homes, villages, lives, and livelihoods. This interview took place on November 20^th, after a night of heavy bombardment throughout Lebanon and carpet bombing of Beirut and five days before a 60-day ceasefire was agreed upon.

Surviving a war is not only a matter of physical safety and stability but also of sustainability and continuity—employment, education, and relief. There is a conventional understanding that conflict not only causes an increase in unemployment rates and a decrease in education pursual, but also that high unemployment rates can foster an environment conducive to further conflict. As increasing attacks threaten the security of homes, workplaces, and schools, and force the displacement of around a fourth of the population, people focus their resources and energy on surviving on a day-to-day basis. While preliminary estimates of livelihood impacts project increases in formal-sector unemployment that would boost the number of affected individuals and families by several percentage points (from an already high base) by end of 2024, detriments to the mental health of children, education attainment of primary and secondary school-age youth, and employment prospects of young adults present multi-decade challenges. At this moment, it seems that the youth of Lebanon are left to struggle throughout and in the aftermath of this war; their futures are put on hold and unaddressed.

In this context, Executive sat down for an interview with Maissa Abou Adal Ghanem, Chief Sustainability Officer at Holdal Group, a regional beauty and cosmetics retailer, manufacturer and supplier. The conglomerate is an active member of the Lebanese Private Sector Network (LPSN) and its employment initiative Lebanon Works. According to Abou Adal, Lebanon Works, which was launched in 2022 to promote job creation, has become all the more vital as a platform. Witnessing challenges in the coordination of humanitarian aid and relief efforts in recent months, Lebanon Works added a Relief Hub connecting needs with channels of support. As Lebanon grapples with economic instability, social challenges, and widespread displacement, this collaborative initiative aims to connect resources with needs, empowering communities to rebuild and thrive. Through partnerships with private sector companies, NGOs, and other organizations, Lebanon Works tackles pressing issues such as unemployment, disrupted education, and the urgent need for basic necessities.

Executive: What is the main purpose of Lebanon Works, and how has it been affected in recent months?

Abou Adal: Lebanon Works serves as a platform that aims to drive a positive narrative and instill hope in the country by highlighting realistic ways for the economy to grow and create job opportunities.

Over the past four months, the platform has refocused its efforts to prioritize immediate relief and support due to escalating crises in Lebanon. While the original roadmap remains intact, components like crisis response and basic needs support have become a priority. We saw that there were so many needs and so many amazing enablers in Lebanon, and we said let us consolidate all and connect the dots and facilitate and streamline for anybody who needs it. We could not just pretend that someone else will fix this. We need to support each other.

Executive: How have companies under Lebanon Works coped with the current challenges?

Abou Adal: Many private sector companies involved in Lebanon Works have adapted [to the war] by reprioritizing their resources. Despite the difficult circumstances, they have managed to retain staff and maintain salaries, focusing on humanitarian, social, and environmental needs. Some companies provided shelters, healthcare and mental health support, scholarships and essential support to their employees and families. However, the long-term sustainability of these efforts remains uncertain. The problem is not the past two months. The problem is moving forward. Can we sustain it or not?

Executive: What specific initiatives have Lebanon Works launched to address the growing needs in Lebanon?

Abou Adal: Some among various initiatives are: the Lebanon Works Relief Hub launched a few days after we saw a wide escalation; it provides humanitarian support during crises; and three impactful roadshows that engaged stakeholders across Lebanon. The platform has successfully fostered partnerships to boost job growth and improve the livelihoods of the Lebanese people. The platform is an aggregator and a collaborative platform that was powered by Lebanon Works when we found that the needs were very overwhelming. It’s any form of basic needs, from the tangible to the intangible, and making sure that we are tapping into the synergies, we are connecting the pieces of the puzzle. We are streamlining, and we are focusing on collaborative efforts, instead of adding more pressure on people.

Executive: What is Lebanon Works doing to address the educational challenges caused by the crisis?

Abou Adal: Education is a core focus area. Lebanon Works is building coalitions with academic institutions, NGOs, and private sector companies to support students affected by displacement and school closures. We are working on a coalition to make sure that the number of students who have been heavily affected now, whether it’s because they’re displaced or they couldn’t go back to school, can receive education—289 children and youth who are going back to school. We’re not reinventing new ways, we’re looking at existing solutions, and existing enablers, and just building the circle and enlarging it.

Efforts include providing scholarships for primary to university students, facilitating access to formal and informal learning solutions, and equipping children with self-learning tools and devices. The goal is to ensure normality and opportunity for all children, even in the most challenging circumstances.

Executive: How does Lebanon Works tackle unemployment and labor force challenges?

Abou Adal: Lebanon Works functions as a job-matching platform, where companies can advertise openings and connect with local talent. While not all companies in Lebanon can maintain operations at full capacity, some sectors, such as construction and education, remain critical to rebuilding the nation and addressing unemployment challenges.

Executive: What is the long-term vision of Lebanon Works?

Abou Adal: The roadmap [promoted by LPSN] is not changing. Despite immediate challenges, Lebanon Works maintains a long-term vision focused on sustainable development goals for 2030. By leveraging collaborative efforts and focusing on core pillars like education, equal employment, and youth empowerment, the initiative aims to contribute to a better future for Lebanon. There is a very strong educational pillar. There is also a pillar for the youth that is powered by the youth, for the youth.

Some answers have been adjusted due to the need for clarification of the recorded answers.

December 4, 2024 0 comments

Companies & Strategies Economy

Pivots of hope and determination

by Thomas Schellen November 21, 2024

written by Thomas Schellen

Executive will be embarking on a collaborative project with LPSN to demonstrate how different sectors of the Lebanese economy are experiencing, managing, and strategizing under conditions of current war vis-a-vis interviews with LPSN members over the upcoming weeks.

The Lebanese Private Sector Network (LPSN) is pivoting. Its new agenda makes an emphatic plea in assertion of national sovereignty while at the same time staging a determined claim to be a partner of “economic diplomacy,” LPSN board members declare to Executive in a detailed online conversation.

According to LPSN President, agro-industrialist Rima Freiji, the network’s new course of action is geared for solutions and comprehensively working towards an economically sustained future as soon as possible. “It’s all about getting into the action and implementation immediately, whether on the policy front, on the international front or on the economy front.” she says.

Claiming their right to economic diplomacy, LPSN is championing the conviction that the country’s private sector needs, and deserves, a full seat at the nation’s local and international policy making tables and a strong role in the implementation of long overdue structural reforms and legal innovations.

Having formed LPSN in the midst of the economic crisis, the previous message of the organization’s founders from 2021-23, was “to save the liberal economy and free market. We now are moving into [sending a message] connected to sovereignty, stability, and prosperity,” comments Joe Ayache, the network’s vice president and communications strategist. “These are the three landmarks that we need to accomplish in order to reach the Lebanon that we all dream of having,” he adds.

A short but eventful history

Since its founding in October 2021, Freiji explains that the network’s first strategic win was achieved right after its formalization, through the identification of guiding principles. These principles also serve as ethical signposts today “in most everything,” she says.

Not only were they directing LPSN safely throughout different activities, such as the adoption of a job creation focus in 2023; they also proved invaluable when the specters of external shocks were looming larger and larger, since LPSN’s guiding principles fostered development of crisis preparedness plans and crisis management templates. According to Freiji, these freely shared, concise, LPSN-designed plans were greatly appreciated and widely used by local businesses and also emulated by crisis preparedness planners in crisis-hit foreign countries.

In 2023, LPSN’s attention zoomed in on the establishment of jobs and a labor market initiative they coined Lebanon Works. This initiative, Ayache says, is about “being positive about creating jobs in Lebanon”. As such, he describes the employment initiative as the third leg of a tripod. This structure’s first leg consists of public awareness building & advocacy, and its second leg of lobbying with politicians and pushing for stoppage of abuses of laws, taxes, and governmental powers.

Explaining the implementation of Lebanon Works, industrialist Hady Bsat says that the concept was “to create an interactive digital platform rather than an informative platform.” As such, the founding purpose of Lebanon Works was to enable employers, both members and non-members of LPSN, to communicate job opportunities as well as success stories of employment and business ventures.

“The underlying idea was to present positive news and show people that ‘Lebanon works’,” Bsat says, adding that an updated digital platform is currently being developed and will be released as a “space of spaces” for presentation of opportunities by employers. The updated Lebanon Works platform is intended to open expanded opportunities through partnerships with international and local organizations that are focusing on labor market development. (Further discussion of LPSN’s labor initiatives is one of several interview topics that Executive will cover with the network’s leading members before the end of this year.)

Also notably, an unplanned digital platform acting as “relief hub” has been enacted by LPSN as an emergency answer to the war and displacement crisis. According to Bsat, this hub is enabling initiatives for humanitarian relief and serves as platform to share incidents and responses by vetted organizations.

Centrality of the aggression-induced petition

As part of the second leg of the LPSN tripod, the network’s hue and cry for strong policy making and reform is enshrined in a new position paper that is both posted as an online petition and laid out in a parallel, more detailed document as “a call for action, a call for unity.” Related emergency demands have also been circulated by LPSN several weeks prior, in form of an “Urgent Roadmap for Stability and Recovery of Sovereignty.”

The detailed petition levels six demands. In seeking adherence to international contracts and resolutions, LPSN calls for immediate implementation of the three dated UN Security Council resolutions 1559, 1680, and 1701. Two other demands make reference to 20^th century peace building efforts, one directly by asking for “immediate reactivation” of the armistice agreement of 1949, and one indirectly by proposing an internationally led “Marshall-type plan” for Lebanon’s economic recovery.

Lastly, demands relating to Lebanese sovereignty – or what a cynical observer might see as inching, incremental steps of the hesitant Lebanese polity towards sovereignty – request Parliament to immediately and “without [further] delay” elect a president of the republic. For material protection of sovereignty, the petition demands full assumption of territorial security and control by the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Groundswell of support and a pessimist’s perspective

The shorter online version of the petition was launched at the end of the first week of November. It attracted about 1,000 votes over three days of Nov 11, 12, 13 and about 100 additional signatures in the two following days. The online petition highlights the demands for implementation of the three UNSCR resolutions, for reinstatement of the state’s governance institutions, and for the creation of economic diplomacy and work towards the Marshall plan target.

Freiji rebuts the very idea of claims that the petition and new orientation of LPSN is a pious dream of utopian immensity. For far too long, Lebanese people have been fed the lie that asking for normality is unrealistic, she argues. “We are asking for what our constitution says. We are citizens of this country, with patriotic minds, and it is very basic what we are asking for. It is not a dream and utopia.”

Nonetheless, the determined and confident tone of the petition cannot conceal the background of long policy failures and vibes of desperate wartime urgency that underpin the LPSN petition and can be perceived by skeptics as anything from blue-eyed to a desperate attempt at roping in the moon.

From the perspective of a professional pessimist on Lebanon, the economic diplomacy ambitions of LPSN might be wholly out of this world but utterly needed in their contrarian position to both the historic trajectory of the Lebanese state and the current ordeal of the polity.

In simpler words, it is nothing if not audacious and encouraging in the highest order when the petition states that “the private sector, civil society, and diaspora must lead in addressing the challenges of ineffective governance and non-state actors. By securing leadership on the economic front and a seat at the table, we can rebuild trust and partnerships with Arab and global allies.”

A context of war

This is because the context of LPSN’s new demands for sovereignty, stability, and prosperity as core aims is of course the war of Israel against Hezbollah. This war, according to endless propaganda streams issued by the Israeli government, does not aim to establish totalitarian hegemony. But from the seventh-floor vantage point of an office window looking south in Beirut’s Achrafieh district, aggressions ordered by Israeli leaders seem hellbent on achieving just that and doing so with a barrage of iron-fisted attacks that inflict economic ruin on embattled Lebanon and defy any moral, mental, and material cost even on their own population.

The assessment of any Lebanese reform and development, especially ones formulated vis-à-vis geopolitical powers that are posing in the sheepskins of global allies, is incomplete without including a note to say that every page in the Israeli playbook of warfare, intimidation, and propaganda seems written in support of an expansionary narrative. It is a narrative that contorts any ceasefire proposals into schemes of military control and intrusion that Lebanon’s combative neighbor can impose with impunity.

No to economic defeatism

Regardless of war, the merits of defining new stability and prosperity baselines for Lebanon deserve to be noted for their constructiveness and also their resilience to defeatism – including defeatism of speculative GDP impact numbers.

LPSN board members on the one hand concur that these numbers testify to unspeakable economic devastation of the workforce and job market. On the other hand, they note how the magnitudes of losses to the private sector economy as a whole are as difficult to ascertain as they are to judge for their – albeit overall highly concerning – implications on the coming two years.

Damage counts are tenuous while the attacks against Lebanon yet rage on an hourly basis. Additionally, Iman Tabbara, a LPSN founding member and the organization’s lead on policy and advocacy for economic security, points out how the pre-war disintegration of formality in the economy and the war’s high impact on the mostly informal activities in agricultural production mean that there are now two distinct local economies that have been decimated by external shocks.

Indeed, the only thing that can be ascertained from more than a decade of divergences between global-lens data and Lebanese economic coping, is that both the formal and informal economies of Lebanon have long appeared to be fraught with data uncertainties.

A glance at a small country’s war exposure through the lens of economic data

On top of that pit of data uncertainty, under which the informal branch of the Lebanese economy is by its definition too opaque in usual times, the precariousness of data is disruptive to even preliminary assessment in the current scenario of extreme stress.

Additionally, from the vantage point of small economies situated in the obscure cracks and crannies of international economic flows, top-down global reports on geoeconomic and national trends cannot but be noted for high margins of error. These international assessment models are geared towards large economies and are to very large extents based on discussions with governmental entities, central bankers, and such.

Lastly and most disturbingly, the GDP impacts of external aggression on Palestine to the point of economic destruction were not included even in the regional and sub-regional economic assessments by any Bretton Woods entity. This absence was most devastatingly evident in recent GDP projections for the MENA region despite the year-long evisceration of Gaza.

The absence of economic markers that elucidate the atrocity of war as means of national repositioning and superiority of one people over the other further accentuates the grimness of undeniable warfare devastation of the Lebanese economy. Despite this impossible context, LPSN show determination of moving forward with their role in rebuilding the economic and societal fabric from the first moment after it becomes feasible to do so.

The new role of the private sector

LPSN’s response was a broad pivot from an economic-industrial focus on job creation and preservation to a broader sovereign and societal pledge of support. However, the decisive core is perhaps the sub-pivot to, and assertion of, economic diplomacy under the aim of repositioning Lebanon as a forward and upward moving emerging market, becoming once again a reliable and responsible international partner in Arab and global contexts.

The dual goal of supporting sovereignty and claiming economic diplomacy that powers LPSN on its path may not be entirely impervious to elements of contradiction. Historically, critics have disdained the viability of participatory economic democracy as viable against dangers of conflicted interests.

Freji’s argument, however, is that LPSN’s demands are thrice valid and justified. “It is very difficult to argue against our position because it is based on our constitution and it is based on what every citizen wants. It thirdly is based on improving the livelihood of the citizen,” she tells Executive.

Viewed in Lebanese context, it becomes clear that LPSN’s current demands are not just economic stakeholders’ response to war. They are based on the determination to overcome the paralysis of the Lebanese polity and economy that has been caused by the dysfunctionality of the secto-political system. This system of governance has been encroaching since the 1990s and escalated into a financial implosion and economic meltdown in the early 2020s.

Regarding prospective activities over the remainder of 2024, communication strategist Ayache says that LPSN will focus on building momentum around its message of sovereignty, stability, and prosperity and the demands outlined in the petition of November. Plans for a third annual event have been pushed from this month into the first quarter of 2025, he clarifies.

In LPSN’s organizational DNA, constructive approaches – specifically the inaugural emphasis on corporate ethics and business values as well as the 2023 focus on job creation and employment security – appear implicit to the private sector network’s resilience since its establishment, notwithstanding several LPSN board members’ dislike for the word resilience.

November 21, 2024 0 comments

Agriculture Analysis Analysis Analysis

From Struggle to Strength: Lebanon’s Agro-entrepreneurs in Uncertain Times

by Sherine Najdi November 18, 2024

written by Sherine Najdi

The war on Lebanon, while selective and impacting some sectors less than others, has left no sector untouched. Niche businesses in the real economy — those small, specialized enterprises that often represent the heart of the community — are more vulnerable than large enterprises. And previously rising agro-entrepreneurs – ventures which in the 2010s were nurtured as startups and who were the darlings of external funders during the economic crisis of the past five years, are among the hardest hit. Take for example a niche venture that debuted seven years ago.

“The Good Thymes started with a simple focus on zaatar, but it became more than just a product line—it’s a connection to our culture,” says Fady Aziz, founder of The Good Thymes, a Lebanese agricultural company with a focus on producing all things Zaatar. The digitally savvy venture has grown to the level of operating a proprietary retail outlet in the vicinity of a premier shopping mall. In recent weeks, Aziz tells Executive, the company’s birthplace and home base in South Lebanon was forced to close, operations and even stock had to be relocated, and sales in the short term came crashing down by double-digit percentages.

Whereas economic numbers and the fate of agro-entrepreneurs and the entire agro-food sector remain violently in flux and the fortunes or misfortunes of individual enterprises are uncertain and varied, it is plain to see from the market that some niche brands, including local dairy, legume, and juice processors with dedicated followings among consumers, have vanished from store shelves within days of the current conflict. Other Lebanese agro-food brands are hanging on and even maintaining their export capabilities.

The context of agro-food entrepreneurship in Lebanon, and all agricultural producers, is defined by a long-term dependency on food imports, against which background agro-producers in recent years were impacted heavily in the first phase of sharp GDP contraction in 2020 and 21 but seemed to recover relatively well from 2022 and faster than sectors in the services economy. Today all businesses in the agricultural value chain, from artisanal producers to large agro-food processors, face an uphill battle as they navigate supply chain disruptions, financial instability, and infrastructure challenges in an increasingly volatile environment.

Yet, amid these difficulties, Lebanon’s niche businesses are adapting innovatively and uncovering unexpected opportunities to sustain themselves, such as pivoting to digital channels, strengthening ties with the diaspora, and embracing locally sourced materials. “Since 2019, Lebanon has faced one crisis after another. We’ve survived multiple economic shocks, and it’s no longer just about running a business—it’s about finding ways to keep going in the face of everything,” says Samer Tutunji, founder of Eshmoon Holistics, a brand of natural and organic agricultural products.

Capitalizing on deep roots

Niche businesses in Lebanon often operate within unique cultural and regional contexts, focusing on traditional Lebanese products, artisanal crafts, and specialty foods. A common thread amongst them is a vision of preserving the country’s heritage through their production. “We are deeply tied to the land and the farmers we work with. It’s not just about producing food; it’s about sustaining a tradition that’s been passed down through generations,” says Fady Daw, founder of Adonis Valley, a high-quality certified organic food producer. Like The Good Thymes’ focus on heritage of zaatar, Adonis Valley is rooted in Lebanon’s agricultural traditions, sourcing ingredients directly from local farmers to produce organic, specialty foods. Eshmoon Holistics, named after the mythical hunter who represents healing in Canaanite lore,offers a wide variety of creative plays on chocolates, jams, and spreads. The common element in diverse agro-entrepreneurship businesses is how they seek to capitalize on providing consumers with unique yet homegrown products while also emphasizing their support of rural communities by partnering with local artisans and producers.

In course of the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel which began in October 2023 and saw unilateral escalation by Israel in September 2024, The Good Thymes, Eshmoon, and Adonis Valley have each faced disruptions due to instability in their production areas. In Kfarhouna, a town in the Jezzine district of southern Lebanon where The Good Thymes previously operated, escalating violence forced Aziz to close his facility and relocate stock to safer locations, relying on friends’ facilities to continue production. “We were forced to shut down our main facility in Kfarhouna when the conflict escalated. A missile struck near our farm, and we had no choice but to move everything” says Aziz. Daw of Adonis Valley notes that logistical interruptions have hindered his ability to source raw materials from farmers, affecting production continuity.

Moreover, these businesses started facing financial constraints—for many niche businesses, the cost of maintaining operations has soared. Aziz describes how The Good Thymes kept prices stable despite increased costs in a hope to retain customer loyalty. According to Tutunji, import-related delays have strained finances at Eshmoon, with international suppliers hesitant to work with Lebanese businesses in times of towering uncertainty.

Putting the above experiences of war-induced financial constraint into sectoral perspective is Marc Bou Zeidan, executive director of Qoot Cluster, a Lebanese agri-food innovation cluster. “The constant threat of disruption has put our agri-food producers in a position where proactive risk management is essential,” he tells Executive. According to a survey of 70 Qoot members conducted at the beginning of November, 98 percent were affected directly or indirectly by the crisis. Indirect impacts reported by 68 percent of respondents included one or several factors, namely disruptions in cash flow, access to markets, and supply chains.

Bou Zeidan emphasizes the breadth of impacts that was shown by the survey of Qoot members as their business operations were interrupted due to safety concerns and due to impacts on production sites, storage facilities, and transportation. “Damage to power and water supply, as well as losses from data infrastructure, have hit 6 percent of businesses, though many more face infrastructure challenges”, he adds.

Another common challenge for companies is the major impact on the workforce— businesses must contend with risks to employee safety, reduced employee productivity and low morale, and reduced ability to maintain financial obligations towards employees. All of the businesses interviewed had to make difficult staffing decisions, as many employees were displaced from their villages.

Daw shares that Adonis Valley had to make a focused shift to prioritize support for employees. “The instability disrupted our supply chain and left some of our employees displaced. Production has become unpredictable, and we’re constantly adapting to keep things running, even if it means lower margins and added costs.” Others, like Daw, are trying their best to maintain employee morale, working persistently on keeping them motivated, unwilling to let go of their loyal personnel,” In these times, we need to hold onto our team and keep them motivated as best as we can,” says Daw. QOOT mentions that infrastructure damage—ranging from production sites to power and water supply—has made employee safety and business continuity challenging.

I get by with a little help from my friends

Adaptation requires creativity and good connections, and luckily, Lebanese niche businesses face no short supply of either. In response to multi-faceted hurdles that prevent business-as-usual operations, Lebanon’s niche businesses are resorting to new sources and unorthodox ways to maintain their operations.

Among the companies Executive talked with, Aziz transformed The Good Thymes’ production approach by collaborating with friends who own facilities in safer areas, even transporting products informally to continue operations. “To keep going, we relocated our stock to safe storage and found friends willing to lend their facilities for production. We even started smuggling our stock in taxis just to make it work. It’s been all about improvisation and resilience.” Aziz furthermore maintains a focus on innovation, creating unique products like zaatar-infused ice cream and jams to diversify his offerings.

Even though production facilities of Eshmoun Holistics are not located in areas obstructed or targeted by air strikes, the company according to Tutunji must make adjustments to maintain production as usual—especially because of overseas suppliers’ distrust in Lebanese businesses making timely payments, and the obstacles this creates to imports. Eshmoon additionally shifted their focus to research and development (R&D) to create new revenue streams.

Daw says that the situation has forced them to rethink their suppliers and ingredient sources—thinking about sustainability in the long run. Adopting strategies similar to his agro-entrepreneurial peers, Daw says he has been exploring ways to adapt, rethinking contingency plans to stabilize Adonis Valley’s supply chain and address fluctuating market demand.

Both Aziz and Daw urge the local community to be their support and their lifeboat in this dire economic storm. They ask the people to choose local products to “Keep Lebanon’s flavors alive” to allow them to keep their doors open and “Ensure that Lebanon’s unique spirit endures,” says Daw. While they make necessary pivots in order to survive — mainly online —, the most effective solution is, for them, the people’s support.

Qoot’s Bou Zeidan iterates this call for a “buy local” approach, emphasizing that community involvement is vital for these businesses’ survival. To mitigate the risks, Bou Zeidan emphasizes the importance of diversifying suppliers and investing in local resources where possible. He recommends that agri-food producers build relationships with alternative suppliers and create backup plans for critical aspects of production.

Role of government and international aid

With little to no support from the government or international organizations, niche businesses are forced to rely on their funds, resources, and wits. Aziz says, “Our businesses are a lifeline for local farmers and workers, but we’re left to face these challenges largely on our own,” implying that many businesses operate independent from outside help. Tutunji says that his company is constantly finding ways to keep their operations moving, not willing to wait for aid anymore.

Aziz considers expanding The Good Thymes outside of Lebanon, seeking ways to protect the venture from further loss and business complications by proactively appealing to the Lebanese diaspora market. “We’re considering expanding online to reach the Lebanese diaspora. There’s a strong community abroad that values our products and wants to support us, even if they can’t be here in person,” he says.

However, Bou Zeidan’s insights highlight the importance of government and international support for Lebanon’s agri-food sector at large. He notes that “both private and public sectors must work together to create a robust safety net for our producers,” and shares how Qoot has successfully lobbied for local products to be included in international food aid. This initiative allows Lebanese products to be part of food boxes distributed to displaced communities, giving local producers a stable revenue stream at no cost to the recipients, he explains.

Opportunities amid crisis

Amidst these challenges, some unexpected opportunities have emerged, such as The Good Thymes’ potential expansion to a diaspora market eager to support Lebanese businesses and enjoy products from their besieged homeland. As the crisis has made imports more costly and unpredictable, businesses are exploring new local sourcing options, which could lead to more sustainable and self-reliant operations. With a significant drop in in-person sales, The Good Thymes and Adonis Valley are looking into digital platforms to reach customers, offering a new way to engage with both local and international audiences. Bou Zeidan also suggests that the current crisis can prompt agri-food producers to turn to export markets more aggressively, particularly by targeting the Lebanese diaspora and Middle Eastern markets. With many niche businesses exploring digital transformation, the diaspora presents a promising audience that values Lebanese goods and offers a relatively stable customer base. “Lebanon’s agri-food products have a strong reputation abroad. Leveraging this to build an international presence can offer businesses a lifeline in difficult times,” says Bou Zeidan.

Eshmoon’s Tutunji is viewing the current moment with surprising optimism: “Crisis has always been part of our reality here, so we see it as both high risk and high opportunity. Crises force us to innovate. We switched focus to research and development, creating new products and exploring different ways to connect with our customers. This has led to new ideas that we might not have pursued otherwise.” Lebanese businesses’ unfettered resilience and their strong curbing of the urge to give up have become hallmarks of the country’s entrepreneurship.

Bou Zeidan and Qoot Cluster have been advocating for Lebanese products to be included in international aid boxes distributed to displaced communities. “We don’t want to see imported goods in these boxes; we want Lebanese products supporting our communities,” he says. This lobbying has led to a budget specifically for food boxes sourced entirely from Qoot Cluster members, strengthening the foothold of local businesses in community support.

Constant crisis mode?

From both an outsider and insider perspective, the Lebanese economy appears to be subject to repeated and increasingly catastrophic hits in the last five years. For both Lebanese individuals and companies that have not fled the country, the inclination to normalize shocks is a way to survive, albeit a costly one.

In early December 2023, International SOS (a health and security service firm) released a Risk Outlook Report for 2024 which stated that 80 percent of surveyed global risk professionals predicted that employee burnout would have a significant impact on businesses in 2024 due to a “global permacrisis”, but only 41 percent said that companies are equipped to deal with it. Given Lebanon’s tumultuous past five years, one could argue that Lebanese businesses are both some of the most heavily impacted by burnout and also the most well-equipped to deal with it. According to Tutunji, “Lebanon’s businesses are in constant crisis mode, but that’s given us a kind of resilience. We’re not asking to be seen as victims; instead, we want our community and customers to see the value in supporting local businesses that are working to sustain Lebanon’s heritage and economy.”

With or without the perception of victimhood, there is no denying that a continuously escalating war will create more and more victims, and if unstopped, may quite literally burn out even the most determined.

November 18, 2024 0 comments

Q&A Q&A Q&A Q&A

Questing for homegrown civil solidarity

by Thomas Schellen November 13, 2024

written by Thomas Schellen

When explosions were triggered in pockets of alleged Hezbollah operatives on September 17 and 18 and when Israeli airplanes started bombing Lebanese targets while their Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was showing to the United Nations General Assembly what he thought of the UN’s vociferous political theater and diplomatic rituals in the name of peace, triggering a wave of fear and displacement north of their border, some civil society organizations around Lebanon leapt into unprecedented and intuitive action.

”On September 23, I think it was a Monday, we decided to use the money from the concert,” Dahlia Dagher, president of Stouh Beirut Association tells Executive about the organization’s pivot to immediately assisting displaced Lebanese with humanitarian materials and away from the final hustle of ticket sales in preparing for a charity event scheduled for September 27 at the prestigious Casino du Liban.

“After the pagers [have been exploding], it was a very dangerous phase and I did not ask if I need to continue or if I need to [reimburse tickets]. We decided ‘khalas’ (stop what we have been doing). I called a group of ladies and told them that we have too much displacement going on. So we need to prepare aid boxes and I need you to help us right now. Everybody came here and we started to work. It was like an avalanche,” Dagher says.

Concert plans – previously cast as single charity event titled Ya Habibi Ya Janoub or for the love of the south – were rescheduled and repurposed, with ad-hoc addition of two diaspora concerts in Paris and Geneva, to garner support for displaced persons under the slogan of love for all of Lebanon. Equally remarkably, Stouh Beirut Association, which boasted on its Facebook page that it was created in 2017 on basis of having helped “more than 50 families” through five successful telethons over the previous years, stepped into accelerated humanitarian action. According to Dagher it was ahead of others in this, such as being “the first association to go to [the southern Lebanese border village of] Rmaich with a large aid truck, which was organized with the Lebanese Armed Forces”.

Capturing this emergence as a quantifiable expression of aid to displaced people, Stouh Beirut Association, between September 24 and October 30, 2024, provided support to 20,687 persons all across Lebanon, says Rosy Haddad, the association’s business development manager. According to published records, aid over this period included nearly 20,000 food parcels, 15,890 hot meals, 1,500 units of baby formula, 5,709 mattresses, 3,846 blankets, 4,370 hygiene kits, and 1,393 packs of essential medicines, among other supplies from apples and drinking water packs to toys and clothing. On the human investment side, the association according to Haddad received 134 volunteering applications over the same period.

Reveals of contradictory human capacities

The current reality of Lebanon reinforces several insights into the human capacities of good and evil. Being faced with invasion, occupation, and overwhelming violence firstly brings out an old truth that in this world region has never receded into the far distance: every humanitarian crisis is an emergency that should have never happened – especially when occurring as man-made atrocities in pointless wars. From a second, correlated perspective, every disaster produced or aggravated by members of the human species is a calamity the magnitude of which could have been mitigated, at least to an extent, through better crisis management preparedness.

A third insight into the evil of human destructiveness is that it does not help to try and measure it, or its impacts. Every humanitarian catastrophe inflicts pain and suffering beyond useful comparison. That is to say that in the case of Lebanon with its cyclical recurrence of externally or internally inflicted adversities and accumulation of hardships in the past decade, inundation with daily casualty numbers and sensational stories of suffering runs great danger of deteriorating into a, from a humanitarian angle, a mind-numbing account of institutional or media voyeurism – a potentially vain endeavor with dwindling effectiveness and by itself nil value for improving anything.

In an economic side-glance, it is even from macro- and micro-economic perspectives pointless to apply a preliminary or a comparative approach to the statistics of destruction and pain. Assessing the human harm of the current war is a grim duty that becomes all the more difficult the longer the war is raging. Comparing crises with very distinct characteristics and military damages inflicted upon Lebanon, namely the ongoing assault from Israel’s instigation of undeclared open war in late September of 2024 to the end of last month, with the 34-day military conflagration of July-August 2006, is not useful even for a comprehensive account of damages and post-conflict reconstruction needs.

The counterpoint of constructive good

One observation that points to the best upside human potential in the middle of the pain, is the rapid, highly enthusiastic escalation of volunteerism and humanitarian aid provision by local organizations of all origins and identities in a crisis that is superseding and eclipsing several socioeconomic meltdowns. The outpouring of Lebanese solidarity despite an epic recession being on its way in the economy is not at all new in terms of its spontaneity – the flooding of devasted streets with aid givers immediately after the Beirut Port explosion of August 4, 2020, is an inerasable memory for many residents of the affected neighborhoods. The scale and social dimensions of the 2024 war impact on civilians of all identities, however, potentially transforms the volunteerism into a cultural taskforce of nation building and inclusiveness.

The positive jolt of seeing volunteerism in action – one that perhaps even constitutes a valid answer to this human predilection with bad and worse news –is deepened from knowing the humanly incomprehensible data points of nearly 16,000 reported Lebanese casualties in just under thirteen months of conflict between Oct 7, 2023 and October 30, 2024.

The impression on the irreplaceable value of spontaneous volunteerism is further magnified by understanding that those injured and dead – in their overwhelming majority civilians, including 1,351 children according to the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) – are the premier victims of an undeniably disproportionate aggression against Lebanese civilians. The bulk of victims that have been dehumanized and collateralized are tens of thousands of families and hundred of thousands of individuals in an imperfect official count of internal refugees (IDPs) that escalated from 211,300 as of September 27, 2024, to more than 842,600 reported IDPs by end of last month.

Not just some globalized civil society agent

In the well-oiled humanitarian economics of first-world markets, the human impulse of providing help and/or leaping into immediate volunteer action, is commonly channeled into financial giving to top-tier charities and international, non-governmental institutions (iNGOs). They have stolid and storied popular reputations that precede them in sudden shocks of earthquakes, floods, and famines; they have proven capacities of moving large aid shipments; they are certified as transparent and professional in their emergency responses; and they are very well known to their state partners and UN agencies.

Comparable state-backed structures in the humanitarian sector of Lebanon, as much as they exist, have either been developed in rudimentary / fragmented ways during Lebanon’s post-conflict reconstruction period after 1992, or they have been degraded because of outmigration of qualified personnel, loss of equipment and rolling stock due to lacking maintenance, and erosion of salaries and operating budgets. Not to forget the impact of the society’s perennial scourges of shameless cronyism and corruption.

It is against this backdrop that the annals of Lebanese volunteerism become astounding stories full of national importance, solidarity and surprise, but also narratives that warrant much further investigation of local non-profit organizations and their perceptions. A point of note, and doubt, in this regard is the common emphasis on inclusiveness among non-profit organizations that have been competing for local or international recognition and all-important foreign funding support since the late 2000s.

Whatever their chosen identity and moniker, no charity, NGO or CSO would ever portray themselves as anything but transparent and free from communal partisanship – but such declarations would be met with distrust in a country notorious for its deep cronyism and fake political promises. This skepticism is endemic in Lebanon. However, the huge gap between claims and perceptions on true civil society motives and drivers is not observed only in Lebanon but rather can serve as a reminder that the narrative of global civil society is anything but comprehensive or quick and easy to categorize through the notorious simplifications of journalism.

The story of Stouh Beirut’s leap into humanitarian aid activities for internal refugees and displaced families that are victims of Israeli aggression, can be read as one example for the complexity and convention-defying reality of human solidarity in the multi-religious Eastern Mediterranean polity and very small modern country of Lebanon.

Rising above mundane bindings?

Stouh Beirut, or surfaces of Beirut, started out rather mundanely as television program covering cultural, political and artistic news and events from around the Arab world. It launched its first humanitarian project as a telethon in 2013, some time after having debuted as a weekly talk show – and this to its detractors is a key item of note – on Lebanese broadcaster OTV, a station known for its affiliation with the “Aounist” movement, or Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) political party.

The FPM has at its core the political dynasty established in the civil war days of the late 20^th century by Michel Aoun, the erstwhile army leader who was handed the custodianship of the country in 1989, was forced out after a year, spent 15 years in French exile, returned as top political contender and was President from 2016 to 22. Aoun and his son-in-law and political heir as head of the FPM party, Gebran Bassil, have over more than a decade been some of the most polarizing figures in the immensely controversial Lebanese political establishment.

While not avoiding the issue of her professional link and use of OTV studios for producing her telethons, (which she attributes to an advantageous agreement on her costs of facilities), Stouh’s Dagher presents the creation narrative of Stouh Beirut as humanitarian organization as something far removed from politics. She does so with the verve of a seasoned media producer and exuding the passion of an activist in carefully chosen attire of a humanitarian worker. She had a personal eureka moment for a Christmas season telethon while watching such an event during a family visit to France. She tells Executive: “I had the idea to have people of every different mindset and political color, whether Muslim or Christian, join on one stage to help five persons, one person from each region in Lebanon like the south, north, [and] the Bekaa. This is how we started.”

A pattern of an annual telethon was established with annually increasing charitable donations by the telethon’s captive audience, in conjunction with a mid-yearly follow-up campaign of presenting testimonials as well as financial reports. There was no large single giver or sponsoring entity, she says, but rather an increasing flow of donations ranging from single dollars to about one thousand dollars.

Further points on the journey included incorporation as a non-profit association under Lebanese law and – in an effort to mitigate the impact of the 2019 crisis on the financial system – a parallel non-profit in France. Following years of the telethon entailed a focus on persons in urgent need of lifesaving medical procedures, sometimes outside of Lebanon, that in some cases would cost more than a hundred thousand dollars.

The organization’s explosive emergence on the scene of mass assistance to displaced persons in Lebanon marks thus another surprising pivot and reinvention. It has its special cultural accent through the creation and expansion of musical performance aiming to simultaneously express patriotic passions and appeal to generosity of domestic and diaspora donors and their perhaps elusive friends.

Hope springs eternal even when faced with a phalanx of destructive evils. Lebanon, by the combined force of its recent and new adversities, is internally confronted with new social realities and with irrefutable needs of tackling entrenched social barriers. Diverse, often faith-based and locally rooted charities can be found aplenty in Lebanon. They are essential as institutions serving humanitarian survival needs in the current onslaught and its aftermath. But they also are potent chambers of societal coalescence, given that economic integration and productive inclusivity are the imperatives for building livelihoods and sustenance for the day after all international aid budgets and humanitarian volunteer efforts have run their course. Stouh Beirut appears to be an entrepreneurial outlier among a plethora of locally formed civil society outlets of volunteerism and it will be compelling to see whether the declarations and practice of non-sectarian inclusivity will hold in five or ten years.

November 13, 2024 0 comments

Analysis Disaster Risk Management Economics & Policy

Coordinating relief: Support Lebanon’s urgent humanitarian needs

by Maureen Philippon November 8, 2024

written by Maureen Philippon

Lebanon is in the midst of an unprecedented displacement crisis as Israeli attacks continue unabated. I say unprecedented not only because of the sheer number of people forced from their home – more than 872,000 displaced inside Lebanon as of this writing, including 400,000 children, and a further 400,000 people who have fled to Syria – but also because of the scale of destruction, loss and suffering that have come with this displacement.

The fact that this humanitarian calamity takes place in a relatively small country against the backdrop of a major economic crisis is hardly fathomable. The struggles of Lebanon’s displaced are not limited to physical displacement but extend to loss of livelihood, separation from family, and the scarcity of basic resources. People I have spoken with reported feeling alienated and treated as second-class citizens within their own country, adding to the emotional toll of their experiences.

“It is hard for us to live in these conditions. In my hometown, I used to regularly gather clothes for donations. Now, we are the ones receiving the country’s central region of Mount Lebanon, told me.

Challenges faced by affected communities

Safety concerns and trauma weigh heavily on these communities. For families forced into overcrowded emergency shelters, safety and privacy are often compromised. About 22 percent of displaced people are in the thousand designated emergency shelters, made available by the Government. These are mostly schools, which were never meant to accommodate families round the clock.

Many displaced people are forced to live in cramped, makeshift conditions without basic amenities such as clean water, proper sanitation, or consistent heating. In makeshift shelters – such as abandoned buildings, public parks, or even tents, and also to a lesser extent in the designated shelters maintaining good hygiene is a challenge, which can have serious health consequences.

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) supports more than 80 of these schools which have been designated as emergency shelters, adding bathrooms, portable showers and partitions in classrooms-cum-bedrooms. We are providing soap, shampoo and cleaning products in the distribution to the shelter. Families like Nahida’s, a 38-year-old Lebanese mother of three children, recounted the loss of routine and dignity in temporary accommodations, far from the comfort and security of her home.

One quarter of those displaced have moved into rented homes or are staying in hotels, others rely on the generosity of friends and relatives, often in overcrowded homes. However, some people have taken advantage of the situation – in many cities, rent prices have soared. In Saida, a small flat that would go for 150 USD is now rented for 450 USD. The proportion is about the same in Beirut, where a studio that could be found for 300 USD is now 800 USD.

For those without these options, makeshift shelters like unfinished buildings, tents, and even parks have become temporary homes, especially for non-Lebanese people facing added challenges in accessing official shelters. I met Samer, 15, at one of the schools in Chouf district who says: “Our humble home feels like a castle compared to our situation here. We are about 24 people living in one room, and my aunt with a disability struggles to adapt.”

With winter around the corner here, displaced people have started to wonder how they will keep themselves warm. It is a concern for everyone, but more acutely for people who found refuge in higher altitude, and for people who live in derelict buildings. NRC plans to improve insulation and distribute warm blankets for people in shelters. NRC has also provided cash to vulnerable families so that they can address the priorities they identified to improve their living conditions.

The impact on children is also significant. The sounds of explosions, sonic booms, and warplanes overhead have become an unsettling new normal, leaving many struggling to sleep and make sense of why they had to leave their homes. Their daily routines have been disrupted – they are no longer able to see their friends, play in familiar streets, or attend school – leaving them feeling isolated and disoriented. “Children are resilient; they play and make new friends, but they still ask me if our home is safe and if we can go back,” a displaced parents told our team.

Ensuring access to education for all children, be they displaced or attending schools that have become shelters, is another high priority. Many organisations, including NRC, are working closely with the Ministry of Education to plan ahead. Especially after the recent traumatic events that displaced children have been through, it is vital for their well-being to make sure they can do what children are meant to do –drawing and singing. They should not, like the children I saw in Saida, be covering their ears with their hands when a plane hovers above their head.

The role of humanitarian organisations in crisis response

The joint flash appeal of the UN and Lebanese government for 426 million USD for three months to scale up the humanitarian response is only 17 percent funded at the time of this writing. Each humanitarian sector has developed plans and priorities in close coordination with the Minister of Environment, which leads the Crisis Response on behalf of the government and the relevant line ministries. Several tools have been developed to map out needs across the country and allow a prioritisation of the most urgent ones.

Access to many areas in Lebanon remains challenging due to security risks, particularly in southern Lebanon and regions like Baalbek, a city in the Beqaa valley east of the Litani river that hosts some of the world’s largest Roman temples and Hermel, a district in northern Lebanon that borders Syria. NRC was forced to postpone sending several trucks to Baalbek and Ersal last week as it was planned after the intense attacks, and that visit was no longer deemed safe. We cannot put our teams at risk. Delays in aid delivery to conflict zones leave vulnerable groups – including children, the elderly, and those with medical needs – at a greater risk amid worsening conditions.

Displaced communities should receive equal care and opportunities regardless of nationality. Yet, for many vulnerable groups – particularly non-Lebanese residents, refugees, and marginalised communities – barriers persist. NRC have spoken with Syrian families turned away from collective shelters designated for displaced individuals, as some local authorities or host communities restricted access based on nationality. This exclusion has forced many Syrians to seek refuge in informal, often unsafe, shelters like unfurnished buildings, parks, or open spaces, exposing them to harsh conditions and greater health risks. Some had to stay put under the bombardment.

Strengthening the institutional capabilities of local authorities and central ministries will enable them to better manage and respond to this crisis, ensuring displaced communities have uninterrupted access to essential services like shelter, education, and livelihood. This should be part of a joint effort, where resources are met with an actual plan and intention to deliver the most efficient response. While everybody has been shocked by the scale of the crisis, it is time to carefully arbitrage resources and best placed systems to respond. Accountability to donors, be they States or generous individuals is paramount, just like we also owe accountability to people who suffer, making sure we prioritise the most vulnerable with the support they find the most suited.

Our goal is to support the displaced in reclaiming their lives and accessing dignified shelter and basic services. Donors, humanitarian organizations, and the Lebanese government must work together to maintain a response grounded in compassion and efficiency.

November 8, 2024 0 comments

Q&A

Q&A with Philippe Lazzarini

by Thomas Schellen October 30, 2024

written by Thomas Schellen

In light of Israel’s decision to ban UNRWA when Palestinians are most in need of the organization’s support and are subjected to increasingly catastrophic violations, we invite you to revisit our 2020 Q&A with UNRWA Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini

Human catastrophes are inextricably interconnected to each other through the basic sharing of suffering and human compassion. The Palestinian
catastrophe in this sense can neither be ignored nor excised from the intensity of the Lebanese experience. To gain a perspective on the Palestinian dimension of the crisis in Lebanon, and on the magnitude of the suffering of the Palestinian population in the Near East this year, Executive sat down with Philippe Lazzarini, the commissioner-general of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).

You have just completed your first official visit to Lebanon since you were appointed to the post of UNRWA commissioner-general. I understand that your schedule in Beirut was overwhelming.

It indeed was overwhelming because I did not come only as the new [commissioner general] but also as a former [national resident], knowing a lot of people in Beirut. With all what has happened, there was obviously a need to meet as many people as possible.

As perhaps the highest-profile practitioner of development aid with experience in Lebanon in the past six years, my first question is in this context of poverty and the need for development. Given your recent visit in this September of 2020, are we in hell, are we heading to hell, or will we be able to redeem something?

I feel that [you in Lebanon] will be the only ones able to answer this larger question. But it is true that I left Lebanon six months ago and I was shocked to see how people have changed, how their optimism has disappeared [and] how people were more in disbelief and in despair. I have not met anyone who expressed a glimpse of optimism for the near future. This is not the Lebanon that I have experienced over the last five years. Indeed, if you look at all the events that have taken place in the last year, from the financial collapse to the economic crisis and the political stalling, and after that the blast, which seems to be the outcome of a criminal negligence and criminal corruption at every level, this has been the [straw breaking] the camel’s back.

Most of the people who I met during my stay, were talking about leaving the country if they can or could, and also talking with some colleagues from embassies, it seems that today you have an important brain drain which has been accelerated. It was already the case when I was in the country because of the difficulties of graduates to find jobs in the country, but it seems that even those who were in the country and had a job, are now looking to leave Beirut, so it was not the same soul or spirit anymore. Something was broken. I was very shocked to find that I did not have any professional or private meeting that ended with the belief that things in the near future will or can improve. Despite this, I have witnessed extraordinary individual initiative of solidarity among the people. This is among the people, but what I could feel is the total absence of any expectation on what the state could deliver to the people. This has certainly contributed to the moroseness of the mood in Beirut.

Indeed, it seems that nobody is expecting anything positive in terms of either the leadership or in terms of revising the system. But still, could one say that the people here have a human capacity that might translate into something positive and surprising?

A general observation: the notion of “social contract” in Lebanon has been extremely loose over several decades, I would say, definitely since the beginning of the civil war. This has gone as far as that everything has been privatized in the country and nothing has been expected from the state in terms of services. Education has been privatized, health has been privatized, water and electricity, everything has at a given point been privatized in the country. Thus, there were very low expectations from the state in the country. If you look also at Lebanese everywhere in the world, they brilliantly succeed elsewhere. But in the context of Lebanon, they are not the same anymore. I would agree with you that the entrepreneurial spirit of the Lebanese is very well alive but the problem is that the context of Lebanon is not conducive for this to fully succeed. This is the reason why successful Lebanese are tempted to make their careers outside of the country.

Some years ago you authored a piece where you said that if this country collapses, the only model of tolerant coexistence in the Middle East would be lost. What do you see today as the outcome if Lebanon, as a state, were no longer viable?

This is a difficult geopolitical question, but as the country is now celebrating its 100th anniversary, and more than ever, 100 years [after its founding], you have a very deep communal divide which is completely paralyzing the country. This is the reason why there is a political stalemate, why it is all so difficult to form a government today. Because of the sectarian way of doing business in the country. What will the country look like if the Lebanese fail today? I think it will go through even more difficulties and more despair.

Time today is of the essence, the country is on its knees, there are almost no economic opportunities anymore, and it requires a government focusing on and prioritizing socioeconomic issues, but for that, you need to reform the system. For the time that I have been in Lebanon, in almost all my meetings, I was asking the decision makers: where is the sense of urgency? While we see month after month and year after year, the debt increasing and the country nearing the financial and economic collapse, why is there not more of a sense of urgency to reform? To reform the public sector and improve the perception of corruption as the country ranks very badly on the Corruption Perception Index, if I remember well in 137th place, at the time.

There were a number of low-hanging fruits, such as electricity reform where everybody knew exactly what needs to be undertaken and which would have saved the state billions of dollar and despite that, nothing has been undertaken. Also one would have believed that after the blast – the worst-ever blast besides an atomic blast in an urban setting – this would finally [result in change] but now we are one-and-a-half months later, and we are back to the same way of doing business which prevailed in the country [previously]. [If] with all these external shocks, reform does not happen, I do not see how the country can bounce [back] for the time being. It might have to dive deeper before it will really bounce [back].

Turning to the situation of the Palestinian population in Lebanon and the Palestinians in general, the economic shortfall in the UNRWA budget was mentioned by you in one interview during your visit. A message that has been iterated several times since earlier in 2020 by the organization’s representatives on various levels. It seems that
institutionally, you are almost in the position of a precariat
in an informal economic setting that lives from one month to the next, but despite that, you are functioning as an institution that gives aid and keeps people in their livelihoods. What is your expectation for UNRWA funding and for the impact of Covid-19 on the Palestinian economy?

Let me make a few comments before I comment on the financial situation of UNRWA. What I met in the camps [during the visit to Beirut in September 2020] was a very high level of despair, a high level of hopelessness. Basically, when we talk about the increase of poverty in Lebanon, this is amplified in the Palestinian camps. So when we hear that by World Bank estimation 50 percent of the Lebanese population is living below the poverty line, this percentage goes up to 90 percent in the Palestinian camp, and as you know, the Palestinians in Lebanon also do not have equal access to the job market, to land and property and hence have socioeconomically been discriminated. Clearly, what happened over the last year in the economic and financial collapse is complicated by the impact of Covid-19 – which by the way goes beyond the health hazard into triggering an additional level of misery. I keep saying that what we should fear the most in our days with the Covid-19 is a pandemic of abject poverty. Abject poverty has now become a reality in the camps to the extent that if you talk to people in the camp, most of the time they will tell you, “I prefer to take the risk of getting Covid-19 over taking the daily risk of not having food for my children.” This has become the reality in the camp.

As UNRWA we are providing quasi-state services to the Palestinians. Our mandate is to provide education to the Palestinian refugees, to provide access to health services, and also provide relief to the poorest among the poor as minimum social safety net. With all that happened in the country, expectations are rising that UNRWA delivers even more, especially more when it comes to social safety net. Those people just do not have income anymore – the majority of people in the camp are daily workers and they do not have the minimum income they used to have. So they turn to UNRWA, like the Lebanese challenge their governments. This is taking place at a time when UNRWA experienced a financial crisis which is not new, it started five years ago and takes place at a time when people expect UNRWA to deliver more. And, the countries supporting UNRWA are also experiencing their own financial crises. Most of the countries supporting us are entering into economic recessions, which makes the environment much more difficult to deal with.

Having said that, as you were referencing the month-to-month financial situation, this is because UNRWA has two problems. The first is a constant cash flow crisis – we are constantly on the edge of a cash crash – because of the lack of liquidities. We are an organization of about 30,000 staff between Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, West-Bank and Gaza; we are an organization that has a budget of more than 1 billion dollars because of all the services that we are providing. But in terms of cash flow, we never have more than a few weeks. This is highly unnerving and this is the reason why you might have heard many times already in the past that we are always on the edge of ceasing payment of salaries or ceasing services. This needs to be addressed and is an issue that I brought to the table with [UN] member states, telling them, “You gave us a multi-year mandate and we are highly predictable in the services we are delivering – we know already today what our budget will be next year and the year after, so you should be also more predictable in your contributions so that we can manage the cash flow better”. That is number one.

On September 14 2020, Mr. Philippe Lazzarini, accompanied by the Director of UNRWA Affairs in Lebanon, Mr. Claudio Cordone, visited the isolation center and the UNRWA clinic in El Buss camp, where he was briefed on the health services that Palestine refugees continued to receive under new measures and procedures because of the COVID-19 pandemic. © 2020 UNRWA Photo by Abeer Nouf

Number two is that we have a discrepancy between yearly contributions for our mandated activities and the resources that are made available. We have also a mismatch between the political mandate and the expectation of what we have to deliver with the resources that are made available. This is an issue that I am also trying to address with the member states, to make sure that they walk the talk if they ask us to deliver education to half a million Palestinian refugee girls and boys, and that we need the necessary resources for this. That is where we are today. I am very worried about the level of despair in the Palestinian camps and this is also why I have asked donors and member states to make sure that we continue to remain a source of predictability and stability in a highly unstable and unpredictable region.

In a discussion held a few years ago at the American University of Beirut (AUB), a comment of yours on longer term humanitarian emergencies was that ,“the more protracted the situation is, and the less jobs are… available from the market, the more human assistance becomes a social safety net of people”. Then, you remarked that to make humanitarian assistance sustainable in the longterm from short-term money, was a challenge that you did not see the answer to yet. Now, you are dealing with the same sort of challenge on a much bigger level than at the time. Were you able to make progress towards finding a formula of solving this quagmire?

My comment at the time was on the Syrian refugees in the country, where we are basically now dealing with a more protracted situation, and the assistance to the population was being provided through a limited resource, and the more protracted [the situation was], the less was made available as there were competing emergencies elsewhere in the world. The question was, if these people are not economically integrated and go back to their country of origin, who will be in charge in the longer term to provide the assistance, which is comparable to a social safety net for a vulnerable population? I don’t think we have found the answer yet today. It is always a struggle within this humanitarian-government nexus.

But if I look today at how to ensure sustainable livelihood for the refugees, that can be done by helping them access the job market. If they cannot [access a labor market], then one of the important tools at their disposal today is micro-credit. Within UNRWA we do have a micro-credit fund which I have asked to be reinforced in order to better deal with the economic impact of Covid-19… Having said that, there is still no mechanism substituting for the short-term humanitarian funding to ensure welfare and assistance in the long-term for this kind of population, especially refugee population.

Would this micro-credit fund be instituted here and be accessible from Lebanon, given the central bank’s prerogatives in managing and licensing micro-credit and micro-finance institutions (MFIs)?

We are looking at bringing back micro-credit in Lebanon, so we have indeed discussions with the central bank regulatory authority. We have already micro-credit activity in Palestine, the West-Bank, East Jerusalem, Jordan, and we had it also in Syria. It is true that Lebanon was lagging behind but we are looking today at how we can resume or initiate micro-credit also in Lebanon to make sure that Palestinian refugees also have access to this additional tool.

As some see it, poverty can be defined as a choice that society makes; but it seems not to be the right choice. In the Palestinian scenario, could the wrong choices that have entrenched poverty among Palestinian groups be turned into productive power via humanitarianism? Research into international responses to war, disaster and other humanitarian emergencies, has shown tremendous growth of the humanitarian market, highlighted a few years ago as
“humanitarian economics” by Swiss economist Gilles Carbonnier.
Do you think that this rise of humanitarian economics could offer a way forward for better management of the Palestinian issue and poverty in this group?

I was a student together with Gilles Carbonnier in university and I heard him talk about [his] book [at AUB’s Issam Fares Institute], but I have not read the book, so I know of the book but not in all detail. Is poverty the outcome of the choice of society? You do not decide to have poverty, but
depending on the nature of the society that you decide to have, the social contract you decide to have, you will have a level of poverty, this is the way he wanted to frame it. Today, the new framework that is being put in
place to address poverty is the agenda 2030 and the [social development goals], which is today the most ambitious anti-poverty agenda ever adopted by member states. The question is what kind of additional avenue these SDGs are providing and the real questions is not what are the additional avenues, but what will in the future be the funding model to ensure that we are reaching these goals – because we are talking about trillions of dollars to be invested on quasi a yearly basis. This can only be addressed if you have a combination of macroeconomic policies and financial instruments that are accessible to the most vulnerable. This must be complemented also by access to socioeconomic rights starting with education. I don’t know what Gilles had in mind at the time, [seeing that] the protracted poverty situation cannot be addressed just through the humanitarian lens, so shall we talk about humanitarian economy? There is a humanitarian industry, but is there an economy? I don’t know. This is something which could be debated. These are my thoughts in rough terms but I have not read the book precisely.

If I may cite one chapter title in Carbonnier’s book, this chapter deals with “the transformative power of humanitarian crises”. Its underlying question seems especially timely for Lebanon, given that we recently had a humanitarian crisis that can be defined as nothing other than an entirely man-made disaster, and the result of an unnatural hazard that was amplified by human stupidity and irresponsibility. In which way could, as Carbonnier is saying, humanitarian crises be “junctures that radically alter long-term economic trajectories”? Could, in other words, 2020 in context of the overall crisis in Lebanon or the global crisis impact on UNRWA, still be a pivotal point for creating a better economy?

For the time being, I do not yet see anything positive arising on the horizon. Right now we are dealing with a very difficult situation with despair and hopelessness, where the country does not seem to be in a position to offer any alternative right now because the trend is more for people towards looking to leave rather than at creating opportunities in the country. There is still no signal about a proper consensual political desire to reform the country. We are stuck for the time being. I think that the model for us, and I come back to that, is one to bridge our cash flow crisis between now and the end of the year and offer after that, a social contract to the member states and donors to have an agreed, forward-looking UNRWA, where we know in advance what services will be delivered to the Palestinian refugees
so that the Palestinian refugees can expect these services to be delivered without having to dive into the anxiety over a “yes” or “no” if these services will still be made available tomorrow or not. I think what we are trying to do here is to match the very strong political support provided to UNRWA with resources.

This region does not have efficient social safety nets. Are you the most capacious institution for health and education to be found in the Mashreq and Maghreb regions, in comparison to country-level institution of the same type? And by virtue of having functioned for 70 years in the region against all obstacles, are you a role model that other national institutions in the region could emulate?

I talk about Lebanon now because there have been many discussions about the NPTP (National Poverty Targeting Program) of the Ministry of Social Affairs in this country, and what the criterion should be to be eligible for this additional layer of a social safety net policy. Very difficult discussions have been going on, on who should be eligible, not eligible, and how should such a fund be funded. I think, indeed, that when it comes to assessing the level of vulnerabilities for people to decide on different levels to be accessible, UNRWA certainly has a lot to offer. I agree also that when it comes to social safety nets in general, this is a concept that has not been strongly developed in the region. Most of the time government responses or policies are [to provide social support] through subsidies for critical products in the daily basket.

While it most certainly can be doubted that online knowledge resources such as Wikipedia are free from agendas, distortions, and biases, I was still surprised to recently see that the online encyclopedia’s entry on UNRWA was over 20 times more verbose in the category of “criticism and controversies” than in the category of “assessment and praise”. How do you comment on this extreme discrepancy in the online perception of the work that the agency has been engaged in for seven decades?

I give you another example. If lawmakers anywhere ask a question to their government about contributions to UN agencies, there is a high likelihood that the question is on UNRWA and not any other UN agency. So the majority of questions on UN agencies will be on UNRWA and all the other agencies together will have fewer questions [asked about them] than UNRWA.

This shows that UNRWA is an organization which I would say is under political scrutiny. We are easily judged through the lens of relevancy, but not relevancy of the services that we are providing to the people, more about the fact that we are providing services to Palestinian refugees in the region. We are certainly the humanitarian agency which is most perceived through a political lens.

You thus have a lot of criticism of this nature, and after that, we should not completely underestimate the level of frustration that our beneficiaries might also have. We are providing the basics, but you know, when you live in Lebanon [as a Palestinian], and do not have access to the job market, you are discriminated [against] – where do you want to express your level of frustration?

You express it toward the organization which as a mandate to promote your rights and the rights of the Palestinian refugees. This dissatisfaction and frustration easily turns also against the organization because of the high expectation that we do deliver more. So I would say you have two types of criticisms, those coming from the detractors and also those coming from those who benefit from our assistance and would expect much more.

UNRWA’s mandate at the end of last year has been confirmed with a strong majority in the UN General Assembly until 2023. However, given that much criticism comes with an ideological angle, and that realities in the Middle East have recently been subjected to impulses of change, such as initiatives for rapprochement between Israel and some Arab countries, and new political alignments in the region and beyond, do you believe that UNRWA will still see a 75th or 80th anniversary of the organization?

Two or three comments. First, it is not a goal in itself of UNRWA to celebrate the 80th or 100th anniversary. The ultimate goal is to have a fair and lasting peace whereby Palestinian refugees can have a state that they can live in and do not rely on UNRWA anymore. That is the ultimate goal. Meanwhile, I do believe that with all the ongoing developments in the region, we more than ever need an organization like UNRWA, which continues to focus on investing into the human development of the Palestinian refugees and on promoting their socioeconomic rights in the region. I do believe that this is one of the best investments we can have when it comes to investing into future stability in the region. Will UNRWA go to the 80th anniversary?

I don’t know how things will develop in the region, but I do believe that UNRWA’s role will be critical until such a day that there is a fair and durable peace agreement, which would also benefit the Palestinian refugees.

October 30, 2024 0 comments