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Economics & PolicyICT infrastructureLeadersTelecom

Virtual lights against a tide of darkness

by Executive Editors June 2, 2022
written by Executive Editors

If owning Lebanon’s digital future was the objective of a massively multiplayer online game, the MMO design could easily be for a win-lose contest where one winner could walk away with some virtual trophy and be rewarded some non-fungible token (NFT) or an amount in stablecoin. But the reality of Lebanese telecommunications is not a political game, multiplayer or otherwise – despite it having appeared as such over the years. The impact of telecommunications and the wider ICT sector on the real economy and the well-being of society is such that it is paramount to change the telecom game from a lose-lose past into a win-win future. 


 

With many contradictory elements and an ironic political twist at the end of its long first round, the economic and social telecommunications narrative meanders madly from the activation of mobile telephony as a phenomenally productive infrastructure innovation and landmark for the attraction of large syndicated finance in the mid-to-late 1990s to the day of October 17, 2019, when another attempted exploitation of telecom for state tax income triggered the people’s thawra as a national moment of constructive and peaceful rage.

The sadly ironic twist of the latter unjust taxation attempt is that the outrage over it might have translated into a broad economic good – had such vigorous and inclusive public protests been happening back in the days of 1998, 2000, or 2002, when Lebanon had a substantial regional edge as an early adapter of mobile telephony and information and communication technology (ICT). The edge is a memory, but the digital story with its enormous economic upside potential is as important, or more important, for Lebanon today as it was in the early GSM days.

What do the Lebanese people receive in return for tax? Inadequate state services, creaking infrastructure, and the same old faces.

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What is this telecommunications tale as of spring 2022? One way to approach it would be to think of three fields of force or axes of gravity that pull on the sector. One such force field is what non-economic psychologists call the people’s “coping mechanisms” during a crisis, the second source of gravity is the behavior of the dominant institutions and the leaders behind those institutions, and the third fundamental force in play is the tremendous pull of digital economic growth that makes it imperative to implement a telecommunications strategy as the foundation of developing the digital future.

The market’s balancing power

The first force field is being constituted by the economic coping mechanism of the market, specifically taking the case of the handset market. This aspect of the communications sphere seems to exert itself rather well through the instrument of the significantly informal market, albeit within the limitation and overall manner of market forces, meaning this largely self-adjusting platform is neither inherently social nor moral, but practical. It primarily involves individual participants, such as the millions of phone users and the many small retail device sellers.

Consumers have been adjusting their telecom-related purchase choices to their continued communication needs while commanding increasingly few financial resources in cash or credit. With cash as an almost singular purchasing tool at the disposal of this market, distributors/retailers would bring new types of budget market handsets and adjust their ancillary offerings.

Since 2020, the handset market has been exposed to minimal adulteration by state intrusions such as indirect taxes – effectively diminished during the crisis – or the realization of higher customs levies. The handset market appeared to find a new equilibrium informally as the crisis subjected it to the forces of demand and supply in a pure way.

The potentially devastating gravity of old institutions  

Similar to the effective absence of tax distortions in the handset market, state interference in the operational side of telecommunications was inactive during the crisis. Likely due to political reticence, the sector applied the official pre-crisis exchange rate and thus had a reprieve from the madness of arbitrary multiple exchange rate issuances until the 2022 parliamentary elections (which is the time of this writing). 

With fee collections being implemented at the official exchange rate, communication costs of the population during the crisis were beholden to a level that stood out as an island of affordability and good value for money on the consumer side. In parallel, it placed the aggregating figurative and literal burdens of “keeping the lights on” to the state-owned providers. 

For example, this inequitable situation is reflected in the growing inefficiency of customer care service deliveries by the duopoly of mobile operators Alfa and Touch. Still, if Executive’s experience with the operators’ communication departments is symptomatic, it also is responsible for a general deterioration in their corporate cultures. 

In any case, the political fears that underlie the state’s hesitancy to adjust tariffs have increasingly become juxtaposed with the need to increase the short-term revenues from the sector and offset the incompletely covered operating costs of the state assets in the telecommunications sector.

As the deep plunge in revenue per user from the maximum extraction model used before the crisis has, of course, not been sustainable, today, the need for tariff adjustments appears to loom ahead as a precarious balancing act. In finding such required balance, the relevant institutions – by default distrusted in the politically contaminated telecommunications sector – will have to address the risk of operational breakdowns due to exhaustion of resources on the one hand and the risk of widespread unrest up to the level of street confrontations in response to placing yet another cost burden on the people for whom their phone and internet usage are both a vital economic enabler and the only remaining means of preserving their mental health and social ties.

How this, under prevailing ownership and decision-making processes, deeply political problems will be approached after the elections is of paramount importance – but so far, long on vague promises, fears, and badly deficient information. The numbers of a more than five-fold increase in lira terms seem hackneyed, in the best-case lacking finesse and, in the worst, void of elements that would make for a good transitional plan. Executive calls for extreme transparency and multi-stakeholder communication in the urgently needed devising and implementation of such a plan.

While not the only need of Lebanon, and perhaps not even the most pressing or fundamental one in the immediate crisis, an indisputably needed step forward is to initiate a new round of digital economic development. And it is feasible and required to activate this development as soon as possible. As experts invested in the sector show in conversations with Executive, they have a strong understanding of the factors that caused the malfunctioning of the erstwhile mobile telecom miracle of the 1990s, of the current financial limitations, and the overall direction that the sector needs to take.

In this latter regard, the recovery of telecom is an interconnected story where the best chances of breaking the destructive patterns of the past can be gained when everything is constructively connected to everything: ethical standards and best practices, industry, tech entrepreneurship, innovation, design, civil society, legislation, policy-making and enforcement, and even the dreaded craft of day-to-day politics.

At the core will have to be partnerships, and it seems that the best bets would be public-private partnerships (PPPs) with large strategic partner companies. In the views of the experts, there are good chances to forge such partnerships with regional or multi-national telecom powerhouses with brand values in the billions of dollars – notably, more than one regional player has matured to such a level, as assessed by brand studies – and negotiation power that no Lebanese state could ever achieve because of the market’s small size. 

These new-generation PPPs, however, will have to be what Lebanese PPP expert Ziad Hayek calls “true partnerships” that are constructed not as alternative procurement contracts but as frameworks of mutual obligations and benefits in the face of radical uncertainties as well as significant societal and economic risks, from pandemics to tech innovation shocks.

The other vital ingredient will be the human element. Cost it what it may, we need to retain not only our experienced engineers but also our customer care teams, we need to invest in educating new tech and managerial talent, and build trust in leaders with the skill and authority to negotiate public telecommunication goods in the interest of the country. 

It will not be easy to negotiate good deals for Lebanon in the years to come. But seeing many capable persons in the telecommunications sector and ICT industry, among potential investors, academia, civil society, and even politicians, this magazine is of the opinion that the moment has come – and the last good chance it may be – where a diverse people who are determined and professional optimists could forge a win-win telecommunications path. Hopefully, it would enable digital potential in anything from e-government and online procurement to the global and local productivity gains hidden in the digital future. 

June 2, 2022 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyICT infrastructureOverviewSpecial ReportTelecom

Desperate bid for a profitable future

by Thomas Schellen June 1, 2022
written by Thomas Schellen

On a sunny morning in spring 2022, confusion reigns for but a moment. Executive has an appointment to interview Imad Kreidieh, the chairman and general director (CDG) of state-owned enterprise (SOE). Still, the company’s gates are closed and plastered with snap labor strike announcements. However, a brief conversation through the closed gate’s metal bars later, and we can enter via a broad and uninvitingly bare courtyard into the telecommunications infrastructure operator’s and services provider’s sprawling administrative complex. 

Walking into the building, a visitor with some background in navigating public offices and varied ministries in Beirut will quickly feel ‘at home’ – if one can ever develop any homey feelings in a structure that seems to have been designed in the past century for signaling the greater glory of a mighty state to its anonymous supplicants. The setup is admin-perfect for echoing those ‘wells of silence’ that people easily stumble into when trying to communicate with their state: you pass an empty reception desk in a mentally chilling, sub-utilitarian foyer, ride in elevators that are adorned with large, albeit in one case cracked, mirrors, and then proceed along lengthy CCTV camera-embellished hallways – a common hallmark of local edifices of government bureaucracy. 

One can only imagine how the corridors might look bursting with human activity (on non-strike days?), but the first individuals to greet visitors today are the obliging personnel at the security station in front of the executive suite on the head office’s upper floor. Then a surprise: instead of the micro-culture-shock-inducing contrast that one commonly suffers when stepping from the average government ministry’s drab corridors into the ostentatious offices of the respective minister, the vestibule and office of Ogero’s CDG exudes a cool corporate air, type top-management utility. 

Instead of the one of over-the-top luxury of your average political dragon’s lair, the place feels more functional than representative, with an atmosphere just on the accommodating side of austere. Also, verbally, with Kreidieh’s first comments on his employees’ strike expressing explicit support for their action, the conversation starts with an encouraging vibe of realism.

Ogero, the oldest state-controlled corporate unit in the byzantine telecommunications mosaic of Lebanon, thus presents itself as a suitable waypoint on the quest to unravel the dystopian mysteries of a sector that has for three decades been key to many ups and downs of the Lebanese economy while situated on the frontlines of policy conflicts and shrouded in allegations of corrupt shenanigans and brutally counterproductive political influences.  

Institutional memories 

As Lebanon is moving toward (or at least hoped to get to) the end of its crisis of everything, one hypothetical economic value proposition of the telecommunications sector can be shouted out loudly as conditio sine qua non, an indispensable condition: a prosperous future is unimaginable without vital knowledge economy inputs and digitization. However theoretical a multi-year vision of digital GDP improvement for Lebanon might be, and to what degrees such ideas and realities might diverge in the end, a competitive telecommunications industry and solid, multi-faceted communications infrastructures are by the wisdom of international economists and local telecom experts both decisive and irreplaceable for a productive economy in Lebanon’s future. 

But can Lebanon rebuild technical capacities that have recently been tethering on steep funding cliffs or ever hope to recoup a comparative regional telecom edge that the country has not held for over 20 years? On operational grounds, the current picture is as dismal as one can imagine, judging by the many worrisome developments that Ogero’s Kreidieh, along with civil society advocates, and this year also, the minister of telecommunications, have been sharing in interviews and social media messages over the past two years.   

Among these well-publicized headaches are, for example, Ogero’s pain of losing qualified engineers and the SOE’s inability to resolve the financial struggles of its employees who, according to Kreidieh strive, despite their woefully insufficient remunerations, to provide the last reasonably stable and affordable bright spot in the lives of their compatriots, acceptable internet access. To other day-to-day worries, Kreidieh also can talk in detail about the high frequency of thefts of cabling and infrastructure components by possibly desperate but certainly not public-minded crooks, the constant need to find fuel for running Ogero’s nodes, and the ridiculousness of the fact that less than $20 million dollars could equip all of the networks with renewable energy by the installation of photovoltaics. 

Beyond the operational struggles and the fiscal incapacitation of having nowhere near the needed 2022 funding allocated to Ogero for OPEX (Kreidieh cites a hard ceiling of $2 million, a fraction compared to the 2019 operations and maintenance budget of $42 million), let alone CAPEX (zero in 2022 versus $20 million in 2019), however, loom two existential questions which existentially concern telecommunications, all connectivity, the information technology industry, and the entire future of Lebanon. 

First question: can past telecommunications policies and practices in the government-controlled sector teach us lessons to lead the country into a profitable digital future? 

The second question concerns the value proposition of the digital future and, as such, is a tripartite question: what value proposition would be currently adequate when trying to monetize the financially dysfunctional telecommunications industry of Lebanon as a public asset; how and how fast can this industry be capitalized for public economic good and profitability; and how important will this asset be in the context of a new and more digital economy on the condition that it is properly positioned and managed? 

Those who do not learn 

The first question has a short answer and a longish one in the opinion of every industry stakeholder and telecommunications expert whom Executive approached during our inquiry into the value of this public asset. The short answer is yes; the past political mistakes regarding telecommunications are apparent, and repetition can be avoided. The longer answer expands on the short one by insisting that policymakers repent for, henceforth shun, and by all means swear off ever thinking again about short-term revenue and public coffers when dealing with telecom. 

The decisive no-go term is “cash cow.” 

“Many people used to believe that the telecommunications sector is a cash cow for the government,” laments, for example, politician Ghassan Hasbani. Before entering the political field, Hasbani, a former deputy prime minister of Lebanon, had held consulting roles and senior corporate positions with several regionally essential telecommunications operators in the 1990s and 2000s. According to him, the cash cow approach meant that mobile telephony earnings were “wrongly applied as a tax revenue rather than being used as an economic driver.”

By Kreidieh’s judgment, freely expressed with choice words such as “insane” and “completely stupid” to describe past and recent handling of the telecom industry as a tool of extractive economic and fiscal behavior, the cash cow treatment of telecommunications could not have been more misguided. 

Under a virtuous strategy, the unexpectedly strong cash flows generated from mobile telephony operations in the early years “would have been invested to a large extent into improving the quality of service with innovative products and services. This would have engaged the economy into a positive loop. But instead of investing and promoting a proper environment for startups and companies to grow, we considered the telco sector as a cash cow and started financing the rest of the administration through monies that were generated by the telco sector,” Kreidieh says. 

To him, the trajectories of the past twenty years are blatantly clear: worse decisions were being piled upon bad ones. The vicious cycle commenced when the government canceled 10-year build-operate-transfer contracts and prematurely retook control of the mobile operator duopoly in the early 2000s. 

In the following period, attempts at privatization of the mobile operators through license auction in the mid-2000s could have created “a totally different situation than what we find ourselves in today,” Kreidieh says, and a window for competition and the blossoming of a different ecosystem could have been opened. “There is no doubt in my mind that privatization would have transformed the telecommunications sector into a very serious economic leverage for the whole country. It has been the case in all different countries where economies grow with the help of technologies.”

This chance was missed, however, and so were opportunities to bring order to the opaquely government-run affairs of telecommunications in the later 2000s and early 2010s. Owing to political obstruction, the institutional launch of the regulator, years delayed, was rendered meaningless. Likewise, plans to break up the operator duopoly and incite competition through the creation and partial flotation of a third operator, Liban Telecom, under the inclusion of Ogero as an awardee of the third license, did not come to fruition. 

“The creation of the regulatory authority was a second chance after the misery that took place when the government decided to claim back the two privately owned [mobile] operators LibanCell and Cellis. The Lebanese administration obviously again missed that opportunity to set up a proper environment to develop the telecommunications industry,” Kreidieh opines and concludes, “In a summary, we missed (our chance) when the administration claimed back the operators, missed it again when failing to implement and put in place a regulatory authority and we missed a third opportunity which was the implementation of [telecommunications] Law 431 and creation of a third mobile operator.”

A better framework

Plotting the missed takeoff points along a cognitive timeline makes it evident that the telecommunications’ protracted government ownership and value-extraction was a grave error. Can privatization and public-private partnership (PPP) reopen the door of digital opportunity and innovation that the country needs? 

At least in the framework sense, there is some prospect of investment and development by a new competition law, Amine Salam, the minister of economy and trade, tells Executive. According to Salam, this law, the concept of which has been bandied around unsuccessfully for twenty years, has been highlighted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a critical piece of legislation for invigorating the future economy of Lebanon. 

Salam says that the new law comprises two competition-enhancing aspects: the abolition of state protectionism of exclusive agencies and lifting restraints in the public sector. “Some people thought the law would only be about removing constraints of exclusive agencies from the private sector. This is one [part of it], but the more important aspect of this legislation is that for the first time in more than 55 years, we have opened the public sector to private investment,” he boasts. 

Elaborating further, he emphasizes: “This law opens up the entire public sector for FDI. Anyone, foreign or local investors or a joint venture between a foreign and local investor, can now apply and co-invest together to do a telecom project or an energy project. They can start a new airline or open a new casino, [or] go into a water desalination project.”

But no ready mold 

Yet, legislative innovation and leveling of the competitive arena would be a long shot to expect a short and straight path to successful telecom privatization or any PPP wins today. Even the theory of telecom privatization under a PPP model – without even venturing into the nitty-gritty of negotiations, valuations, and building of contractual trust – does not lend itself to a straightforward application under present circumstances, says Ziyad Hayek, international PPP consultant and the former secretary-general of Lebanon’s Higher Council for Privatization and PPP (HCP). 

While he asserts that the existing PPP law of 2016 is sufficient to manage a partnership process and also agrees that the telecom sector is a rare area where privatization would make sense, he points to a strong semblance between the current situation and a post-conflict environment where there is “no financials, no clarity, nothing to base anything on” from a valuation and project perspective. 

“A decision to privatize the sector under these economic circumstances is nonsense. We would not get enough for what we have,” concurs Kreidieh. 

Given that there is no clarity even on the degree to which international accounting standards are applied in the country, “everything related to financial statements and accounting today in Lebanon is just a matter of opinion,” Hayek tells Executive. He goes on to warn that conflicts would be programmed if a license auction under a conventional telecom privatization strategy were attempted.

“If the government were to auction a license without having a base of calculating value, they would be making a big mistake. If the price paid for a license turns out to be too low, the government is going to regret [issuing the license] as it will be bad for the country. If the price is too high, the government’s problems will be with the company that bought the license,” Hayek says, advising that the tendering terms for telco PPP packages would need to be invented from scratch and fine-tuned in direct negotiations with the prospective private sector participants to make sure that the terms of the agreement are acceptable to both sides.

The obfuscation of value, the unknown when, and the why not now

Hasbani agrees that a proper assessment of the telecom sector is not feasible as “the net present value of the company’s returns could generate in the coming 20 years is very low because of the current situation.” He, therefore, argues against an immediate attempt to privatize in favor of a two-phased approach of corporatization followed by privatization. Adding a political economy angle to the question, he frames his vision for the telecommunications sector in the context of the big dispute over state debts and depositors’ compensation.

“The first things to do post-election are to start implementing law 431, start unbundling the structure [of the sector], create Liban Telecom as a stand-alone corporatized entity for the fixed operations with published financials, [and put] the regulatory authority into a proper position so that it starts covering its own costs from license fees, [by way of] issuing licenses to the two mobile operators and the fixed operator,” he says. 

In a second implementation phase, he advocates for “gradual privatization and handover of some of the value to the Lebanese public who lost money in the banks.” This would require the government to list telecommunications entities, provide a stable stock price environment, and allocate shares, albeit with initial selling restrictions, to depositors to compensate for their losses in the banks. 

Once the share values of the state assets turned listed companies claw back some of the ground lost in the economic crisis, the sale of shares would be allowed, Hasbani says, adding that an international strategic investor in the telco assets could become at first a partial owner of the listed entities and later on be obliged to offer buying shares from compensated depositors if these want to cash out their holdings.  

Overall, the main objective in the governmental telecommunications strategy should neither be revenue generation with the state as operator and ultimate beneficiary – a path that long was heading towards diminishing revenues due to mismanagement – nor the achievement of high receipts in a privatization of the sector. Instead, “privatization will be about improving the service, lowering the cost burden, shifting it away from the government and enhancing the economic benefits of telecommunications through price competition,” Hasbani insists. 

The privatization chorus’ subtly diverging tunes and challenges 

Like Hasbani and Kreidieh, civil society representative Albert Konstanian sees privatization as the right path for a reversal of the cash cow approach and the activation of the telecom industry under a competition and innovation enhancement formula. This focus would treat telecom privatization as a sectorial play, not a financial one, he believes, meaning that “revenue for the government is not really an objective because the selling price today would be the net present value of the future cash flow and no investor is stupid enough to overpay.”

Having researched a study on SOEs and their valuations in late 2019 unfair use of publicly available data and acknowledging that his estimations of SOE valuations at the time are far from helpful today, he regards privatization as a no-brainer for some SOEs (such as the state carrier MEA and Casino du Liban), as totally non-sensical for others – namely the utilities and transportation. But in a third category, among which he sees the telecom entities, privatization is prudent if strong regulation underpin it, publicly determining strategies, and powerful, independent regulatory institutions. 

On such grounds, privatization would not only be the best but practically the only sentient choice for telecommunications as a fast-moving industry where innovation plays a central role and best practices have been established around the world. “Telecom is not meant to be run by the government. It should definitely be privatized, but there are many preparatory steps. For me, the objective of privatization is first to boost investment and second to enhance competition. Those are the two main objectives,” he emphasizes. 

Despite strongly favoring privatization as the final objective, Kostanian takes the same view as his political and industrial peers to not rush into the process. Specifically, he regards it as untimely before the sharp decline in monthly revenue per user – which he estimates as having fallen from $18 to $20 before the crisis, to the neighborhood of $3 or $4 – is halted and an upward RPU trajectory initiated. In other preparatory requirements for telecom privatization, he sees a need for reorganizing the sector structurally. In his opinion, distinctions between operators of mobile and fixed networks and separate data services providers are a legacy of the 20th century and are not appropriate anymore because these realms have converged.

A phase-wise transformation and privatization emerge as a consensus view of the experts that divulged their telecom visions to Executive – but that does not mean that this transition will be free of hurdles and divergent options. Kostanian, for example, sees the 2002 telecommunications law 431 as requiring a revision and significant update. In contrast, Kreidieh and Hasbani see it as basically still ready to deploy out of the box – the latter being extremely mindful of the law’s tortuous and lengthy adoption process in its original iteration and arguing that only a few technical terms in the text would need to be updated.

Under phased privatization, the near-term management of the infrastructure is the retention of state ownership, reduction of infrastructure costs by consolidation, and the provision of this infrastructure to corporatized operators under a wholesale concept. However, albeit designed to be temporary, this concept could be applied in different ways and could have a bad ending in the pitfalls of monopolistic behavior. 

Hasbani says he has confidence that prominent strategic players would not be deterred by Lebanon’s old track record of breaking its BOT contracts and would instead be enticed by today’s exceedingly rare opportunity to acquire an existing mobile network from a state-owner. According to him, privately held telecom assets will typically be put on the market when they are not doing well, but state-owned networks in a privatization deal are tasty morsels. “The upscale and delta of improvement is usually much bigger when buying a state-owned entity.” An additional benefit of enrolling a larger international player with extensive market power – much more market power than the Lebanese state could muster as the owner of a relatively small network – as a strategic partner would be able to implement infrastructure investments at a lower cost. 

Nonetheless, there is a great deal of uncertainty about every financing aspect throughout the coming year, and this uncertainty casts doubts on the likelihood of much-needed investments. Financial experts, telecom stakeholders and international observers invested in the Lebanese case declaring in unison that the time for privatization by sale is not now because no fair valuation is possible. However, the sector’s current valuation question is a delay factor, not a deal-breaker. A long-term view is of value in countering negative expectations rooted in the experience of high inflation and extreme volatility of the currency.

“The problem is not the currency but the other risks. Once Lebanon can stabilize the currency at any level, and issue reliable regulations, making sure that there is a stable and independent TRA that allows the investor to know what they get into, the next step is having a judiciary system that protects them; all this reduces investment risk. Once all this is in place, the Lebanese telecom market still has great growth potential,” Hasbani says. 

Whether this potential is viewed through the narrow lens of the ICT industry’s role – where Hasbani estimates that the direct GDP contribution of ICT could be in the two to three percent range five years from today – or through wider lenses under which Kreidieh envisions that the contribution to GDP from digitally-enabled telecommunication services should be between 8 and 13 percent of GDP after five years, or an even more engulfing view under which in a Lebanese knowledge society and e-government enabled polity (e-government development still being the ardent wish of technology stakeholders from the ICT industry chief lobbyist Camille Moukarzel to a host of corruption fighters and civil society advocates of transparency) everything is connected to everything in terms of econometrics and telecommunications is the tech backbone of a massive, long-term digital upside and an immeasurable but dominant slice of overall societal income and wealth.  

In this context, it also is worth noting what Kreidieh says about the most significant danger to the sector, the value of human capital, and having a solid vision. On the one hand, he is openly more fearful of losing people than of seeing the daily deterioration of Ogero’s material assets.  “Physical assets are easily replaceable. But whenever you lose a good engineer, you have lost him for good. This is more serious and why I consider the brain drain as the most imminent danger for the telecommunications sector in Lebanon,” he says, but juxtaposes this on the other hand by emphasizing strong existing opportunities such as the provision of cloud services and having the company become a payment solutions provider, emulating successes of African regional telecom heavyweight MTN as an enabler of banking services or even the Chinese model of WeChat. 

“There is always something to be done in the telecommunications industry. There is always hope, and the salvation of Lebanon is technology, the brains that go with it, and telecommunications,” he enthuses, all the while acknowledging how being optimistic in all circumstances is a Lebanese business stereotype. Nonetheless, he says it with verve. “We have a chance, but we need decision-makers with vision and guts to make it happen.”  

June 1, 2022 0 comments
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AnalysisEconomics & Policy

Sparks of long-term green viability and proper enterprise responsibility

by Thomas Schellen May 30, 2022
written by Thomas Schellen

The secret of a viable capitalist approach to macroeconomics may lie less in redistributive intervention or stimulus of consumption but in aligning the private greed in productive ways with a public good. This is the idea of having a more productive economy while also salvaging and defending core public goods: the climate and the environment (in terms of clawing back some of the vast losses that industrial man has incurred in comparison to the pre-industrial age); social balance (within the margins of a democratic society that aims for providing the maximum of opportunities while it allows for inequality on basic of individual merit); and optimal (read still opaque but more transparent and accountable than last year) governance of enterprises, whether they are state owned, publicly listed, or privately held (but most of all publicly listed ones).


 

Under the indisputable need of climate and environmental health, social balance, and better governance, Lebanese private sector businesses are being offered a new double incentive: They have a chance at gaining hard cash in form of investments or improved investability while they also would reinvent themselves for ruddy economic health by moving toward “green,” or climate goal-compliant, projects and practices and by adopting environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards. 

The mental key to this sustainability migration of Lebanese enterprises is the “power of profit and markets” that drives capitalist innovation, says Yara Daou, who is attached to the Ministry of Environment (MoE) and represents (around a few institutional corners) the United Nations’ Green Climate Fund (GCF) in Lebanon as the national technical coordinator for GCF readiness. To her, this power is stronger than the function of government policy in fostering economic behavior change, and thus able to play a pivotal role in making the economy more compliant and future-proof after it emerges from the country’s economic misery.  

“At the end of this crisis, there is going to be an opportunity to reconstruct and rebuild correctly, taking sustainable development and green economic growth into consideration,” Daou enthuses about an alleged building-back-better type opportunity that is hidden in the economic pain of Lebanon. 

An economic crisis labelled as one of the world’s worst in 150 years, record-breaking inflation, and a collapsed currency. Documenting and exposing state flaws is more important than ever before.

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She explains that the GCF is the globally largest fund dedicated to climate challenges and supports funding and technical readiness for projects that help countries to mitigate climate impacts or adapt to them. “[The GCF’s] main objective is to mobilize climate finance flows toward developing countries to address mitigation or reduction of emissions and also to adaptations, so adapting to the negative impacts of climate change,” Daou tells Executive. 

“There are opportunities for Lebanon to tap into climate funds that will help solve electricity, transport, health and food security problems,” she elaborates during a visit to the magazine’ offices together with her colleague Nay Karam, private sector consultant for the GCF in Lebanon.

According to Daou and Karam, the GCF framework can accommodate funding of projects in eight eligible realms, including renewable energy/energy efficiency, infrastructure, livelihoods, green buildings, health, transport, forests, and ecosystems. “We are moving forward from the classic sectorial approach to encompass livelihoods and infrastructure, not just focus on energy and transport. We are trying to promote more comprehensive and integrative approaches to concepts,” Karam explains. 

The overall GCF framework originated with commitments made at time of the 2010 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Cancun. The active work of the current GCF representatives in Lebanon, having commenced in 2021, has just entered the stage of building greater awareness on climate finance among local businesses. 

“We are currently engaging in dialog and we are constructing a database of potential private sector stakeholders who might engage in such projects. Almost every business will be impacted sooner or later by climate change. The idea that we want the Lebanese private sector to start examining is that if you engage in climate change as private sector, it is not an environmental burden or CSR or similar but really makes business sense,” Daou reiterates. 

For this purpose, a first GCF dialog meeting with the private sector was organized in April in collaboration between the GCF team, agencies under the USAID umbrella, and consultancy Capital Concept, the founding CEO of which, Yasser Akkaoui, is also editor-in-chief of Executive. The kickoff dialog event was attended by ranking public figures such as Nasser Yassin, the minister of environment, and Charles Arbid, the head of the economic and social council of Lebanon (Ecosoc). Also present were agents of funding interests and international financial institutions (IFIs) as well as the usual faces representing private sector interest groups and forward-thinking business organizations.    

According to Karam and Daou, the groundwork laid by the GCF team in conjunction with the Ministry of the Environment over the past two years was anchored on the role of the central bank of Lebanon, Banque du Liban, as the natural partner in making all banks apply climate change criteria in their loan and financing procedures. 

“Before the crisis, the only candidate for being an accredited GCF entity in Lebanon with an existing track record was the central bank and we were hoping to work with the central bank. Now is not the right time for [further talks on this level] but if you install government procurement procedures as well as climate proofing procedures at the central bank in order to avoid having to do the checks at the scale of the project, the biggest chunk of the problem [in achieving GCF eligibility] has gone,” Daou says, before voicing the expectation that the alignment of banks with climate finance standards could be returned to the sector’s agenda in context of an IMF agreement.  

In other collaborations to date, local GCF efforts involved interactions with civil society and academia. Universities and scholars are to date the GCF team’s “biggest resource” in Lebanon as they are strongly involved in seeking ways out of the country’s misery, Daou explains, and civil society organizations (CSOs) and think tanks provide insights in people’s needs and enact groundswell communication on the concepts and agenda of GCF. “We are relying on them the most for the country program, the plan that we are drawing up and coordinating at the MoE to submit to the GCF,” Karam says.  

These productive ties notwithstanding, Daou and Karam concede that large-scale project with GCF funding potential will not be flooding across the country in any great waves. As experiences from developing economies around the world have shown, the processes of winning GCF funding are stuffed with data requirements and preconditions that have established them as the bureaucratic antithesis of intuitive. More specifically in the case of Lebanon, the potential for large-scale infrastructure projects with deep, paradigm-shift producing impact, is not large in a country of Lebanon’s small size, and secondly, there is presently scarce interest of IFIs into being involved with any project under auspices of the government of Lebanon. 

Karam and Daou thus see projects in the size of $10 to $15 million as the most promising for the time being. These projects could qualify for GCF support and might also get GCF grant funding for a notable percentage of the project cost, in which case the percentage of grant-based co-finance by GCF can be “high” since the risk appetite of GCF is higher than that of other investors. “This is window that is open now, at time when banks and insurances are absent from risk market,” Karam says.   

Another, more indirect but at the same time more tangible project for future-proofing Lebanese enterprises relates to ESG certification. It goes by the name of Lebanon Environmental, Social and Governance Stewardship Program. Like the GCF dialog with the private sector, it was launched with nice fanfare and a modicum of pomp and circumstance (if you enjoy Lebanese canapés) in spring of 2022. 

Moreover, it again brought together, for a launch event, the same future oriented players as the earlier GCF dialog, namely Lebanese ministers (of economy and environment), agents of USAID, Akkaoui of Capital Concept, and financing and private sector luminaries, albeit in the charming outdoor setting of the courtyard at Musee Sursock.  

According to its official media release, this project is “the first of its kind in the Middle East and North Africa region.” Designed to support upwards of 100 Lebanese corporations and small and medium enterprises in adopting internationally accepted environmental, social, and governance practices, it has a one-target for training and certifying SMEs which is expected to make them attractive to investors despite the unfavorable risk perception of Lebanese ventures that, in the best-case scenario, will take years to improve on a broad scale. 

As investor Romen Mathieu, managing partner of Euromena Funds and a speaker at the event, confirms to Executive, ESG training and certification is gaining in importance under global investment criteria but is an indirect advantage for companies that seek investors. “It is not directly correlated. A company that is ESG compliant to achieve financial returns because shareholders and management are conscious of many things and are organized,” says Mathieu who came to the launch with the self-chosen mission to challenge IFIs in presence so that they would establish a specific SME Lebanon fund in a range of $20 to 40 million. “Let’s start with this to get the ball rolling. They have the money and we have the framework,” he propositions as yet another viable stepping stone towards economic re-invigoration of the Lebanese private sector. 

May 30, 2022 0 comments
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AnalysisEconomics & PolicySpecial Report

A continuously battered infrastructure

by Yehia El Amine May 27, 2022
written by Yehia El Amine

Crumbling. Crippled. Delicate. These are some of the words used to describe the ailing state of Lebanon’s infrastructure for the past two years by experts, media outlets, and international and local organizations. On the operational side, telecoms in Lebanon are characterized by high usage fees and low fixed network quality. Fees for both data and voice services have sparked outrage, most notably in October 2019. While these fees have been dropping in comparison to other costs of living since the beginning of 2020, this welcome relief was attributable entirely to the depreciation of the Lebanese pound and decreeing a hike of tariffs was the last thing that the Lebanese Council of Ministers did before constitutionally reverting to a “caretaker cabinet” status after the May 2022 (yes, under the country’s convoluted state ownership of telecommunications operators, communication tariffs astoundingly are the cabinet’s business). 

This political decision on higher tariffs, however overdue for preservation of crumbling network infrastructures in the mobile and fixed-line sectors, brings back the memory that connectivity charges have long been exorbitant when compared with regional benchmarks. According to McKinsey & Company’s 2018 report detailing Lebanon’s Economic Vision, mobile data and voice levies in Lebanon were around two to three times more expensive than in Morocco and Egypt – while the country, perhaps even more shockingly, according Speedtest.net’s Global Index measured between April 2021 till April 2022, ranked 159th out of 181 assessed countries worldwide in fixed broadband speed, behind Iraq and Syria. In absolute numbers, the average fixed broadband speed, as measured, was said to be around 7.91 Mbps in Lebanon, at a time when the five top jurisdictions – notably all small, developed territories – achieved average speeds far exceeding 180 Mbps and the global average speed had risen to 63.46 Mbps as of April 2022.

A series of involuntary stress tests

It has to be noted that Lebanon did invest into upgrades of its telecommunications infrastructure especially in the 2010s – but some of these upwards developments were halted by budget constraints while still incomplete and others have been imparied due to unforeseen disruptions of society and economy. In this sense, a major surprise blow to the country’s telecom infrastructure occurred just after the Covid-19 pandemic hit in the first quarter of 2020. As the pandemic-induced lockdowns forced most of the population to shift from their usual behaviors and exclusively conduct their work, education, and entertainment online, usage pressure on the broadband infrastructure increased tremendously, as demonstrated in the government’s decision to order a doubling of internet speeds by state-owned provider Ogero. 

The forced shift to digital living and working actually can serve as an indicator of the importance of constantly maintaining and improving the national telecommunications infrastructure, and furthermore as signal that full commitments of the key telecommunications stakeholders have the potential to generate massive benefits to Lebanese society and enterprise community (which was during the evolution of the pandemic further proven by the role that internet Ogero played in the creation and implementation of the Impact e-government platform).

However, a 2022 report and survey conducted by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Arabnet, highlighted that the degradation of the Lebanese infrastructure had an overwhelming effect on local startups. The impact has been widely felt across the ecosystem, with 91.3 percent of respondents having confirmed that the decline in the quality of infrastructure services had in fact affected their productivity, with 37 percent reporting missing targets as a result.

Similarly, support services – business incubators, NGOs, education institutions, internet and banking service providers – have unanimously complained about infrastructure failings challenging their ability to operate effectively.

Thus, as dips in reliability and coverage were frequent at the height of the data explosion during the pandemic, the involuntary stress test of the broadband infrastructure unmasked weaknesses and deficiencies but also ascertained that the provision of internet connectivity, albeit realized imperfectly, is of fundamental importance for the society and economy, and that care and development of this infrastructure is therefore a primary public need.  

Due to the country’s currency collapse, the telecoms industry soon faced another internal hard blow on top of the pandemic. Staff members of Lebanon’s two mobile operators, Touch and Alfa, officially went on permanent strike, an act of objection to their salaries now being paid in Lebanese pound but provided at the official FX rate of 1,507 to the dollar while the cost of many goods and services was effectively indexed to the parallel market rate where the pound wes depreciating from one daily low to the next, which meant some salaries were merely sufficient to cover daily transportation costs to the office. 

The third punch, and what could have been the knockout one, came in the Beirut Port explosion, which, along with destroying telecom infrastructure components in the immediate urban blast zone and neighboring districts of the capital, ripped through the new headquarters of operator Touch in downtown Beirut. 

Unanswered questions still loom

Apart from noting the damages to the telecommunications infrastructure, it is worth to recall that a report by the World Bank, EU, and UN put the economic cost of the damages of the August 4, 2020 man-made catastrophe in Beirut at $3.8 to $4.6 billion, with losses to financial flows of $2.9 to $3.5 billion. On the other hand, proper assessment of the aftermath of the catastrophe and its impact on telecommunications infrastructure includes recognition of the rapid actions that were taken by several entities to ensure continued communication services to Lebanon’s busiest districts. This included operators Touch and Alfa installing makeshift base stations in the areas that would otherwise have suffered total communication breakdown and also international NGOs such as Telecoms Sans Frontier which immediately acted to provide support and assistance. Teams deployed to Beirut in collaboration with the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) rapidly restored reliable communications in the area of the disaster.

In combination, the three heavy punches inflicted upon the physical integrity, maintenance quality, and load of the telecommunications infrastructures appear so massive that a total knockout of all mobile and fixed infrastructures for data and voice communications around Beirut and the entire country has been averted under the conditions of these incidents and the epic economic crisis that has beset. Seeking to understand the current and future needs in the preservation and continued securing of telecom infrastructure, Executive over more than two months reached out incessantly to top management of operators Touch and Alfa but was only given a written response on the extent of blast damages by one operator. Interview requests and inquiries into current, pressing infrastructure issues met with polished and politically correct answers (if any) that largely obscured the current and impending challenges faced by the mobile communications sector with regard to infrastructure.

“Touch network was severely impacted in the close areas surrounding the explosion at the port, where more than five sites were completely damaged,” the operator acknowledged in an emailed statement, providing as further details that damages to 20 sites in other strongly affected areas and outages involving in excess of “40 sites in the neighboring areas” required one month of repair work that was further impeded by limited availability of spare parts and lack of funds due to budget cuts.  

Enter 2022

Against the undeniable and excessively documented reality of massive detriments that have been disabling the Lebanese economy in recent months, examples being the removal of fuel subsidies by the central bank of Lebanon, Banque du Liban, in course of 2021, skyrocketing energy costs and exorbitant inflation suffered by households, it is a no-brainer to see the country’s vital telecommunication infrastructure as having been badly, continually, and increasingly impaired.   

It is not just that internet cuts have been creeping up around the country due to insufficient amounts of diesel being at hand to run the generators that run base stations, telecommunication towers, internet switches, and the like. Imad Kreidieh, chairman and director general of Ogero, has since before the end of last year not been shy to repeatedly hit out at the Ministry of Telecommunications, alleging that political red tape was to blame for the supply delays, and threatening to resign if the situation did not improve.

At the end of 2021 and again in February of 2022, Johnny Corm, the Minister of Telecommunications, confirmed the existential struggle for fuel as being one of the sector’s big problems, as he publicly warned that network operators were unable to power critical infrastructure and that the cost of fuel, previously a mere 7 percent, has been projected as soaring to two thirds of the state-owned sector’s budget this year. 

Much publicized additional headaches about the existing infrastructure have arisen from the mundane matter of physical pilferage of copper cables and organized thieving intrusions into cable shafts. Instead of providing the vital public good of connectivity, the fruits of these intrusions end up on the black market to the great disadvantage of society. “Every day, there is a robbery, to the extent where we have asked for support from local municipalities to help safeguard the equipment; however, even they no longer have the capacity,” Corm was cited in Arabic media.

While many of these cables could be replaced, the cash-strapped telecom provider has halted preventive and significant maintenance due to its inability to acquire equipment and spare parts as they are imported from abroad using foreign currencies. “We are not doing maintenance because we do not have the funds for it,” Kreidieh told reporters.

At the opposite end of the situation, matters of infrastructure and development of new technical capacities in the ground, air, and under the sea involve investment needs for further submarine cables, possible consolidation of existing network infrastructures, and the general aspect of the ever-advancing telecommunications technology. Investment by the private sector is much needed to complement and upgrade existing infrastructures (fiber rollout, 5G, submarine cable, data centers, etc.) and increase the overall competitiveness of IT in Lebanon. 

Political and civil society stakeholders have told Executive that such investments would be both relatively easy to implement because of the country’s small size and existing hard telecommunications infrastructure and be very feasible and productive because of the positively formidable cost-benefit ratio of expanding our digital economy. It would nonetheless have been valuable to gain the insights of the long-time guardians of mobile infrastructures, operators Touch and Alfa, for assessing the current state and best path forward in this regard. As mentioned above, Executive’s attempt at obtaining interviews from the CEOs or CFOs of Alfa and Touch, however, did not meet success.  

One fact that is known is that the government’s ambitious program for complete roll-out of fiber-optic telecommunications cables around the country was only completed to a minor portion when the plug was pulled by Ogero because funds for the $300 million endeavor were no longer available. 

International telecom operators and private sector conglomerates with wide footprints are today seen as optimally prepared to fuel innovation and adopt best practices to foster and grow the local IT ecosystem, Yet, at time of this writing, much remains to be learned as to how the government will look to utilize the telecommunications industry to fuel the economy, whether it be privatization, liberalization, or continuing its cascade of milking the telecom cash cow. But as the dust settles following Lebanon’s parliamentary elections, many of the reforms required to lift the sector back on its feet can be categorized in the meantime as loading…

May 27, 2022 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyQ&A

To stay and to expand

by Thomas Schellen May 26, 2022
written by Thomas Schellen

While the attention of economic actors, policy-makers, civil society activists, most analysts, and international advisors has been, firmly and necessarily, on the vast repercussions of the Lebanese currency crash, inflation, failure to implement state and structural reforms, and counter the rising tides of inequality, unemployment, domestic violence, hunger, and other base-level wants, the strongest and most future-proof assets of Lebanon are intangible and difficult to quantify: human and social capital. These assets, however, are tied in with factors of mental health, culture, familial, communal, and societal cohesion that are under constant pressure in the crisis of everything. Education, and specifically, tertiary education and a life-long learning culture, are critical to the preservation, new initiation, and sustainable development of human capital in Lebanon after the immediate economic and social crisis. To understand how the top tier of the education system seeks to ward off further deterioration of the human capital stock and initiate new developments in providing affordable educational excellence, Executive converses with the president of the American University of Beirut, Fadlo Khouri. 

When I walked onto campus toward College Hall, I asked a random person of student age what he would ask the president of AUB if he could ask one question. His answer was: “there is nothing that I would need to ask.” One could surmise from this that either everything at AUB is good beyond question or that students have other concerns keeping them occupied and, therefore, have nothing to ask from the university’s president. Which one is it? 

I think it is not so much that everything is good but that we are in touch with the students and our community. I had eight town halls with students, faculty, and staff over a two-week period. Today I met for an hour with third-year medical students. I think they feel that we are talking to them and that we are clear. But to say that everything is good in Lebanon – or anywhere frankly – would be an overreach, it would mean that we are in Lala-land.  

In terms of Lebanon today, do you see AUB as more of an island than it always was, an island of academic bliss beyond everything that is happening in the country? 

Yes, and no. When I gave my inauguration speech now six-and-a-half years ago, I talked about AUB not erecting barriers with the rest of the country, about being more permeable, and reaching out more. We have kept that pledge and really reached out more, and this is to the credit of the community. They have been engaged socially and have been engaged from a health perspective, intellectually, and politically. At the same time, especially after we reopened on October 1 [of 2021], we have been able to provide people with a moment of peace, reflection, and a green island of sanity in a country where people for the last three years have felt an enormous amount of pressure and very little support. 

Many people today have a big question mark about the expansion of AUB. They either worry that AUB might migrate out of Lebanon or because they worry that you might become unaffordable for Lebanese students. To the best of my knowledge, when AUB celebrated its 150th anniversary back in 2016 and launched the “Boldly AUB” fundraising campaign, there was no talk of expansion. But by mid-2019, the university had evidently developed a strategy for expansion and was discussing publicly with the city Paphos in on the west side of Cyprus about developing a campus there. What happened between 2016 and 2019 in terms of determining your strategy? Were you somehow prescient or clairvoyant about the currency crash? 

No, I wish we had more of earlier indications about the collapse of the currency. But we could see just from the increased need for financial assistance of our students, and also some of our staff who were [increasingly] needy, that the country by 2018 was deteriorating economically. This became clear to me in late 2018 when the president of Saint Joseph [University] and I [were comparing notes]. Both of us were recognizing increased requests for financial aid and support. Actually though, that [recognition of the economic deterioration] has nothing to do with the strategy for expanding abroad. The financial crisis may have accelerated it but it didn’t give us the idea and didn’t drive it. 

We talked in January 2016 about the fact that AUB’s battle was not just about being more excellent, but whether we would become more economically or intellectually elite. To be more intellectually elite, we needed to expand our horizons and reach [a larger number of] bright people who deserved an AUB education. Part of this was twin or satellite campuses abroad and more of a broad band of online activities and collaborations. And as beautiful as the campus is, it is limited in space. So as far back as late December 2016, we were already exploring sites [for expansion]; I spent between Christmas and New Year in Oman to explore that possibility. 

The reason why we become more overt in 2019 was that the board – having passed the campus master plan so that people knew that we were going to concentrate on what I call the mother ship, the campus here in Beirut – we started to [work on] a strategic plan through 2030.  One of the key goals of that was to become more diverse, not just with regard to our offerings to students from across the economic spectrum, but targeting to have one third to 40 percent of our students being international by 2030. We were planning to extend our reach in recognizing both our physical limit – for our campus we had projections to get to 12,000 students by 2030 but it was clear by 2019 when we had 9,400 students, we were jam-packed on campus – but also find ways how we could attract students and achieve greater balance. We increasingly recognized that there was a tremendous interest from students and parents in getting an AUB education, but there was a ceiling to the number of parents who were willing to send their kids to Lebanon. 

Was there a regional politics component to AUB’s impression that there already pre-2018 was a reticence of parents in some Arab countries to send their children to Beirut?

No question. A reticence of not just some Arab countries that had long relied on AUB to educate its leaders, but if we are candid, also reticence among Americans, some European countries, such that, even though we had students from 96 different countries at the beginning of 2019, we were seeing that we hit a plateau. We were reaching out and people were excited to come here but there was always the question: is Lebanon safe? We believe to this day that this concern is somewhat exaggerated. However, that impression that it is not safe and not stable enough, exists, if we are honest, among parents, even among the Lebanese, Palestinian, Syrian, Jordanian, Iraqi diaspora and this is an impediment to our bringing in enough students to the university system.

Revising growth targets

You mentioned a target of 12,000 students for 2030. How much was your annual rate of growth on the historic trajectory of the last 20 or 30 years? 

By the end of the civil war, AUB had downsized to 3,500 – 4,000 students, which some would argue was just below the natural capacity of this campus. The campus can probably handle five to six thousand comfortably. The previous administration, of President Peter Dorman, increased [student numbers] at a rate between 2008 and 2015 that was far more assertive than what we did [afterwards]. We slowed down the growth [in the number of] undergraduates and lowered the annual tuition increase to the lowest it had been in more than a decade, at three percent. We also tried to be deliberate in the graduate programs and the professional programs, so we were slowly growing the undergraduate program over the four years before the things started to deteriorate here in the country. In total numbers, we grew at less than one thousand students over those four years, and much of that growth was in the Masters and PhD Programs. We slightly increased the medical program by about 10 students per year – between five and ten on average. And we slowly added to selective undergraduate programs, like industrial engineering, which is our most in-demand undergraduate program, psychology, and other areas. Now, given the number of people who left especially as a consequence of August 4 [2020 Beirut Port explosion], we are about at the same size, students and staff that we were at in 2011. We are down to about 8,000 students. Faculty and staff have similarly receded. [This reflects] how people started to leave Lebanon in 2019 in a move that was accelerating in 2020 and now continues, with no obvious political and economic solution in sight.

So, after you had been managing your growth strategically over decades, 2020 and 2021 were both regressive in terms of AUB’s total numbers? 

Summer and fall 2020 was by far the worst. Remember the explosion happened one month before we bring students in, so in addition to a dramatic decline in the number of incoming students, by almost 900, we lost almost 400 continuing students. 2021 was a much better year for us. We lost very few continuing students. The number of students who came in, without any drop in [admission] standards, rose by almost 500. So, we made up half the difference of what we lost [in the previous year]. Also, this year looks like a very good crop. We will know for sure in August and September, once people will know what they want to do, [and] what they can pay, but more importantly what shape the country is in. 

If we take the strategic growth component of the plan until 2030, including the future expansions in Paphos and another location, what total number in your student body do you aim at and how many of them would be Lebanese and study on the Beirut parent campus? 

Our target [to launch everything] may have shifted closer to 2033, since we are now building a physical campus in Cyprus. Ideally, by 2033, we [are projecting] to have 7,500 to no more than 8,000 students here, at least 2,000 students in Cyprus and potentially 2,000 or more students at a third location, whether Dubai or elsewhere. Plus, one of our key goals now is to substantially increase our online learners where the hope is that by 2033 we will have two to three times as many online learners as we do resident students. With this, we could have another 25 to 30 thousand that are exclusively online. These are not all degrees, they are diplomas, certificates, micro-credentials, there may be seniors or teens who are taking courses – and some of them for free – who are learning from AUB or joining the AUB community. 

Did the pandemic experience boost your strategy component of expanding AUB’s online presence? 

It did. From our perspective, we were already seeing signs, shortly after I arrived, that the concept that you go to school and attend three or two intensive lectures a week and your output is exams only, does not play to the broad strength that we have, [which is] that our student body and faculty go out and make a difference in Lebanon and beyond. We want to integrate experiential learning, online learning, and didactic classroom learning into a more evolved form of what we are offering. 

A call to excellence in academics, teaching, and service 

Certainly, the question over the future of education in Lebanon is more than the question how things will develop after the current crisis and how much AUB will be charging in tuition in years to come. In your view of AUB as hub of education and center of excellence in the Middle East, will you still hope to educate all the elites, the corporate heads, and the leaders from all over the region, or where will your main impact be? 

One thing I am very proud of is that over the last seven years we have almost quadrupled the number of people who come to AUB and have a fully free education, including some support for room and board. We were less than 450 [fully supported students] and are up to close to 1,800. We always want to educate people, support people to come here, and transform into future leaders. But higher education is more than four years of college or medical school or a masters at university or five years of PhD. It is also about the fact that most of us are now interested in being life-long learners, whether online or in person. 

If we are talking about leaders, leaders are born and made. Some come here early in life and others may join a program that will culminate in an intensive experience on campus or [by] interacting with others. So, if you are asking me if AUB will continue to educate the leaders of the region, I certainly hope so. I do hope we play a role in lifting the quality of higher education across Lebanon and the region. 

Do I understand from this that you would reject the notion that the university would have a few students as fig leaves of need while actually practicing a paradigm of meritocracy in the sense of philosopher and political ethicist Michael Sandel and his critique of universities creating a “tyranny of merit” in the top-heavy society of new entitlements of the powerful and rich? 

It is not what we are seeking. One of the things that you can argue that AUB has been too successful at, is creating wealth. That great universities do very well in creating wealth [but] does that wealth reduce disparities and lead to more societal balance? So far, the answer is no. I am a scientist and have to talk about what I observe. I am not against the creation of wealth, far from it, but in the region, not just Lebanon but Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine – what are the countries that can say they are better off than they were 20 or 30 years ago? It is very hard to make that case for the countries of the Levant and much of the region over the last three, four decades. 

The fact that we as AUB provide such a disproportionate amount of Lebanon’s high-impact publications and citations speaks to an imbalance not just in society but in higher education. There are two ways of looking at this. From a selfish perspective, I could say it is good that we are that much better than the others, but in the long term this is bad, because it means that the education sector as a whole is unbalanced and unstable. Competition is good for individuals and for universities, and that is why we cooperate very closely especially with Saint Joseph, LAU, and others, increasingly with Beirut Arab University and Lebanese University, to try to lift up the sector. The sector needs to be focused not just on the individual but also on society. 

If I take this issue to the level of what choices academics, whose reputation and standing in life increasingly depends on being peer reviewed and published, have and how they are chosen as faculty members by universities, would you seek to steer against being more ivory tower and research than teaching and interacting with students and society? If you were, for example, the governor of world education in an Orwellian sense, would you say that faculty members of universities should be chosen not on basis of citations and peer reviewed studies that they churn out on annual terms but on how much society benefits from them? 

First, I have to thank you for this idea for my next job. Governor of global higher education for the world could be an attractive job. The bottom line is that we reinstituted tenure because we wanted to be clear with the faculty and the board and the community that it is not about the number of papers or how many medals you get but if you are asking beneficial questions to science, to mankind. The question is: does excellence in scholarship come at the detriment of teaching and service? In my opinion, it should not. 

Does it?

I think we are doing a good job in preventing this. To be promoted [at AUB] with or without tenure, your scholarship is one of the ifs, not the most important leg of the tripod, but if your teaching and service are deficient, you will not be tenured, you will not be promoted. 

You have to be a gifted and generous teacher, I have seen faculty over the years, here and at my previous institutions, who are gifted but ungenerous teachers. They will not take on graduate students unless it is to their own benefit. They give the course, but nothing more. Or they don’t serve the community. The message has to be very clear from all of us in leadership, and from the board, that we expect excellence in scholarship but not at the cost of teaching or service. 

[Under increasing pressure of commercializing research such as advanced gene editing,] ethics are under-emphasized. This is one reason why under the provost leadership we finally revised our general education curriculum, which everyone has to take. There is an ethics component right upfront now. We want the students to understand the implications of their actions.  

Does this focus on ethical components also include the increased teaching of ESG standards?

Ethical components such as environmental, social, and governance standards are likely to be more manifest in the professional schools, business, and engineering. There is an ethics component [to the general education curriculum] but that is not quite ESG. But yes, those components will be added in the professional schools. And they are going to be more necessary because the questions are harder. Ethical choices that seemed more straight forward 15 or 25 years ago, are more complex now. 

The cost of it all

At this point I need to ask you about tuition and what the future is for those families that stay and include students that are right now enrolled or who still want to enroll their children at AUB and wonder how they can pay. The perception is that from next year there will be more hard currency payment that is required and that will put people under stress. How do you manage this scenario? 

It is a fair question and everyone asks it. In the bottom line, it starts with the basic tenet that we are extremely motivated for students to come here and [complete their education], once they are here. In the university, much of the way in which we retain our self-respect and get up in the morning with enthusiasm to do good, is by taking in students, inculcating them in the unique experience of this particular university, and graduating them better off than where they were when they started.

[Being] by some measure the premiere university in this particular region, we have a very diverse student population. Some are students of whom both parents, whether they are Lebanese, Palestinian, or Syrian, are earning their revenues here and have no access to their income. We are not asking those people to go and knock off a bank, and it would be useless anyway because I suspect that the banks are mostly empty. Yet, we estimate that between 50 and 60 percent of our students have parents or guardians who are abroad and earning hard currency, and have for the last few years have been paying a fee that is not closely appropriate to the quality of education that they get. 

We lost $134.4 million in the two last years, and we are not a wealthy university. We can’t keep burning cash. We reconcile it by saying that over the next two to three years we will [need to gradually achieve] 100 percent dollar-based tuition. To continue, we need those who can pay, pay in full. And yet, if people are from this society and their parents or guardians have net income under $100,000 and live and work here, then they will have a subsidy for the next two years and more and more financial aid. Our goal is to increase financial aid so that we are more inclusive but to put more responsibility on those who earn their revenues abroad. Because this is only fair and just. 

You were saying that you estimate 50 to 60 percent of the student population to benefit from income that is generated outside of Lebanon. How did you assess this? 

We have this based on a number of data, travel, revenues, and statements. What we have asked our students, and we have been very transparent, but insisted on transparency in return, was ‘will you be eligible for more support? We will help you to finish but you have to tell us the truth. Not telling the truth now will have consequences. If you misrepresent the data when you apply for this financial aid, 40 to 100 percent, that could come at a cost of not just finishing and getting your degree but even having a transcript released to transfer.’ 

In a country that has zero transparency and accountability in government circles, we have to be transparent and accountable. And we have to be precise. We believe in our community and believe that the vast majority of people will tell the truth and not risk their education [by giving false statements about their financial situation]. Even if more people will need more financial aid, we are willing to go further into the red. But, and this is what our students also asked for overwhelmingly, [our decision is] to not provide financial support across the board but give it to the people who really need it. We even had people step up and say ‘we are not going to apply for financial aid. I am going to explain to my parents why they should pay in full.’ 

Will the existence of a twin university structure between Paphos and Beirut make it possible for students to switch between campuses at the same price or will there be a price differential? 

The idea is that by 2025 we will have a common price across all the campuses. We don’t want there to be AUB A and AUB A Prime. We hope that, at that point, students will be able to rotate, preferably not alone but as groups. We are optimistic that working with the mayor of Paphos and the government of Cyprus [will facilitate the establishment of links between] the airports in Paphos and here in Beirut and there will be able to have low-cost direct flights. 

There is further an understated opportunity that we will be a fully European university within a year or two, and we can apply for EU grants and do exchange of scholars not just here with ourselves but with top European universities as well as top American universities. I believe this is very important for Lebanon and not just for AUB, because I have long said that Lebanon is a vital interest for Europe not just for the refugee issue. As Tunisia is back in trouble, Lebanon, for all its chaos, is the only inclusive democracy in the region. Israel is not an inclusive democracy. It is inclusive if you are a certain religion or ethnicity. In this, there is a vested interest for Europe in the success of the Lebanese project. 

It has historically not always been easy to attract top qualified faculty to AUB because of competition by cash-rich universities elsewhere and because of the exaggerated risk perception of living in Beirut that you mentioned earlier in this conversation. In addition to such barriers, there has been a brain drain of faculty in the crisis. Will it be easier to find and attract rare academic talent to AUB after the expansion to Cyprus? Would that mean that Cyprus will be one tier above in terms of quality of faculty? 

As difficult as things are here, we have retained the overwhelming majority of the top tier of the faculty. Between those who stayed and those who have gone and come back from their leaves and decided to stay, I would say we have retained between 80 and 83 percent of our academic superstars and stars. That is not to say that we haven’t lost excellent people but we continue to attract people to stay because of AUB. And the quality of faculty, their ability to publish to a higher per-faculty impact than any other university in the region with a fraction of the resources they would get in the Gulf or in Turkey or elsewhere, is remarkable. 

Is it correct that in terms of research grants, you will have access to EU pots after the expansion to Cyprus, funding pools that are not accessible from the outside of the EU?

We will. And we are also looking at mobility. We want some of these faculty to find where is the best location for them to have their base but still teach [in Beirut]. If you can argue that it takes you two-and-a-half hours to commute between Beirut and Tripoli, and I have faculty who live in Tripoli, ideally, without too much security taking a couple of extra hours, we can talk about going twice a week from the campus in Beirut to Paphos in also two-and-a-half or three hours. We are hiring all the faculty out of the mothership. Some faculty will eventually migrate the epicenter of their research, teaching and service to Paphos, with the majority here, and some will go to the Gulf. But it will be one university system and it will be stronger because it is one university system. And some of the research that we have has its particular focus here but the relevance is global. 

How much does AUB contribute to the Lebanese economy, and what do you see as the role of higher education in Lebanon today and five years from now? 

In 2019, the total of Lebanese expenses and revenues was in the $40 plus billion and AUB’s all-in income was about $600 million – that is about 1.5 percent of the entire revenues and expenses in the country. For one small university, that is a lot. Revenues between the university and the hospital, were $610 million, [counting in] all physician fees. This [total income] is now down 70 percent to [less than] $200 million. But Lebanon’s delta spend is down to $10 to 11 billion, and our economic role is still proportionally as important as before. We also still keep hiring people, and we provide certainty. So, our economic footprint is much more than 1.5 percent [of the economic output]. [In terms of producing employment], just as with scientific and cultural impact, our impact is disproportionate. Think of the number of CEOs and vice-presidents and drivers of economy and innovators whose background is here. 

Think, also, of the cultural impact. There are some things that are hard to calculate but when an AUB graduate, Ali Cherri (a Lebanon-born, forty-something years old artist who was awarded as promising young participant in the ongoing 2022 exhibition The Milk of Dreams, ed.) wins the silver lion at the Venice Biennale, [and] when President Biden appoints a two-time AUB graduate, Bechara Choucair, as head of the US vaccine distribution network (serving in the capacity of the White House vaccination coordinator for one year between 2020 and 21, ed.) that tells you of the impact of the university and also reflects positively on Lebanon. I would argue that this university in particular, and Saint Joseph, are the reason why Lebanon stays on people’s minds. Our economic and cultural impact, our ability to provide some certainty in an extremely unstable environment: that keeps people here. 

To verify the academic offerings of AUB Mediteraneo in Paphos, is it true that there will be two Masters and seven BA programs? 

The plan is to launch seven bachelors and a few masters and general education within two years. We are probably going to launch five of the seven bachelors in the first year and then add a couple more, these bachelors are in three colleges, arts and sciences, engineering, and architecture and business. There is discussion of a health and medicine component, which would follow. These are the initial projections. 

To correlate this number of programs in percentage terms, how many bachelors and master’s programs do you have in Beirut?

I can’t even begin to count. I estimate that we have more than 60 Masters Programs that are currently active, one MD Program, 13 currently enrolled PhD Programs, and for undergraduates, I estimate that we have close to 40, talking about the minors and the majors, so between 30 and 40.  

And the budget for the initial construction of the Paphos campus is 29 million euros on 10,000 square meters? 

29 million euros is right in the first phase. The total project is about 43 million euros [investment] over five to six years by 2027/28, and the total [of area to be built upon] in Paphos is about 16,000 square meters in the two phases. In the first phase it will be between nine and 10 [thousand square meters] and in the second phase is on an additional 7,000 square meters. There will be significant financial aid budgets and, of course, the vast majority of the financial aid will have to be dedicated to this far more challenged population here, but with time, we see that equilibrating. 

Statement in commemoration of Shireen Abu Akleh 

Executive Magazine, joining the sad duty of global and regional media of acknowledging the killing of Palestinian-American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh on May 11, 2022, by a bullet in Jenin, Palestine, applauds the initiative of the American University of Beirut and the Yafa Foundation to create the Shireen Abu Akleh Memorial Scholarship. Whereas journalists in all countries bear countless daily risks in pursuit of accurate and unbiased reporting, the slaying of Abu Akleh stands out as a possible war crime that highlights the urgency of violence against journalists. The ceaseless struggles for dominance and long absence of peace in our region make it an issue of highest priority to equip the region’s rising generation of reporters with the mental and professional fortitude of world-class journalism. Executive affirms its readiness to support the Shireen Abu Akleh Memorial Scholarship by offering internships, workshops and lecture contributions. 

May 26, 2022 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyICT infrastructureQ&ASpecial ReportTelecom

Factoring in the regulator

by Diala Ghalayini May 16, 2022
written by Diala Ghalayini

Creating and empowering an independent, strong, fair, transparent, and accountable regulatory and supervisory institution is, by experience of virtually all countries with a thriving telecommunications sector, indispensable for the development of a viable sector. To assess the need for a revived regulator in the context of enabling the telecom sector to be a, or even, the spearhead of economic development, Executive had a virtual sit-down with Kamal Shehadi. Shehadi is not only an expert on regional telecom operations; he was the chairman of Lebanon’s telecom regulatory institution in the first years after its formation. 

By Executive’s reckoning, the once-promising national telecom regulator has fallen into deep dormancy. How do you, as its first chairman, today evaluate the role of Lebanon’s telecommunications regulatory authority, the TRA? Do you agree that the entire telecommunications and ICT sector has been stagnant or in a state of arrested development for too many years, and how, in your opinion, could the sector, and the TRA be revived?

I will start with the second part of the question; how do you revive the telecom industry and the ICT industry in general? Here, I want to focus on two different related issues. First, [inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]the telecom industry in Lebanon is in dire need of new and large investments, new management, a competitive market structure, and the ability to draw on international networks that promote innovation. [/inlinetweet]This is something that cannot happen with the current market structure. So, we need to work on reviving the telecom industry, which requires injecting private investments [into existing operators] and allowing [strategic buyers] to bid for large percentages [of ownership] with a controlling stake in each [existing or newly formed telecom operator]. 

Today, the entire telecom industry in Lebanon is generating no more than $100 million of revenue for the government. This is down from a high of $1.2 billion, only three years ago. [Networks] cannot continue for much longer. To [engender investments into the networks] you need to have a different market structure, the government monopoly over mobile services as well as fixed [network] has to be ended immediately. That’s the only hope [for reaching] a vibrant, dynamic telecom industry.

And if I may add a note of caution, no one should be advocating [for] the privatization of the mobile or telecom industries in Lebanon on the basis of how much revenues they would generate, because that’s no longer the issue. Today, it is about the survival of the industry which can only be secured with a huge injection of capital into these companies and their networks, along with, of course, reforming the market structure taking it from a monopoly to a competitive one. 

There is another industry you’ve mentioned, which has always been important, even 15 years ago, when I [assumed office] as Chairman of the TRA in 2007. This is the ICT industry or the digital or tech industry as it is called today. Tech has always been the promise of a country [brimming] with talent such as Lebanon. [Actually, this potential for creating jobs and generating profits for the country is] the reason I went into telecom [and] into the TRA. [However, today] the tech industry is in need of attention and nurturing. But it also needs to be given a chance to thrive. It is one of the few promising industries in Lebanon today, and I don’t see anyone focusing on this industry on the policy side. To answer the first part of your question, the TRA, having an independent Telecom Regulatory Authority is an instrument, and a necessary one, to achieve the objectives that I mentioned earlier about a competitive telecom industry and vibrant technology industry. 

You’ve mentioned privatization. If it were to happen, how would it change the current telecom reality or the value proposition and economic impact of the state-owned telecom sector?

Reforms to the telecom industry, whether through privatization and, of course, transformation into a competitive market cannot be an isolated initiative. And by itself, it will not really change the dynamic of the overall economy. There has to be a restructuring of both the banking and public sectors. And above all, there must be a restoration of balance between the external and internal [sides] of the economy. The equilibrium [of the internal and external balance of trade and payments] is necessary [to address the] foreign currency problem. 

Reforms to the telecom industry can contribute to [creating such equilibrium] because it [can bring] hundreds of millions of dollars, and maybe a couple of billions of dollars as investments into the country over a number of years. I’m not saying [that reform of the telecom sector would be about the price or about] money going to the Treasury. [The issue is] no longer about getting money for the Treasury. Anyone who argues that privatization should happen because it will help close the budget gap, the debt gap, or the debt service gap, I think is losing the plot. 

[inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]Privatization is important because this is one of the most important industries in the real economy. [/inlinetweet]Telecom and digital [developments] necessitate investments, opening up to the rest of the world, bringing in international expertise, [in order to elevate] Lebanon back to a level where it used to be: a leader in the [regional] telecom space. 

If new license bids were to be made, can you take me through what you visualize would be the process of negotiation and vetting?

The priority today should be to privatize the three networks that exist, two mobile and one fixed… Concurrent with privatization, there’s got to be an auction of licenses, and the use of the frequencies over the next 15 years or so. The only way to achieve privatization as the sale of operations is to move away from [the government’s telecom] monopoly. [On this condition], I think all three [operators] could be privatized with a single auction. It has to be done in a way that with each winning bid, the investing company [is awarded] a license and the network that they have been [bidding on]. Law 431 is clear that the terms of that license have to be defined by the TRA, and then submitted to and approved by the Council of Ministers. [Whereas] those licenses have to be issued by the Council of Ministers, only the TRA has the legal mandate today to draft those conditions.

But in that regard, would the TRA have to be revised or updated either in matters of the law, human capital, or its mandate? Would the TRA, as it is situated today, be ready to issue all the required documents and launch the whole process for creating a new type of public-private partnership in telecom?

The TRA board definitely has to be appointed and given time to bring in new blood and strengthen the team. Do we need to make changes to the law [to be able to launch tenders for licenses]? Given that time is of the essence, [the answer is] no, we don’t. Would it be good to make changes to the law? Of course. We started drafting this law, and I worked on it as an expert consultant, beginning in 1999. After the law was enacted [in 2002], the decrees were issued years later, and the TRA was appointed in January 2007. This leads me to think that if we were to tinker with the law, it’s going to take another year or two. So can we do it? Yes, the TRA needs time to get ready, the TRA needs time for the board to be appointed and prepare the work, and the Higher Council for Privatization will need to get its act together. There’s a lot of work to be done there. We’re talking about months and months of diligent work. But getting it ready, yes, if there’s a team that’s dedicated, given the proper environment, this is a matter of a few months, not years.

Given that according to the new competition law, policing of anti-competitive behavior falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy and Trade, will exclusive dealership rights be affected in the telecommunications sector?

There is an issue of commercial law and there’s a competition law that’s been [held up] for years that deals with this matter. Now, in terms of the telecom industry, there are no exclusive agency or exclusive dealership rights. All of these rights, these distribution rights, wholesale and retail, are contracts that can be negotiated. The telecom industry, I think, is not the focus of the exclusive agency discussion. 

How will issuing licenses evolve, considering emerging technologies such as FinTech, 5G, and such?

First, the license should not specify what can and cannot be done in terms of new services, because the services you mentioned, from FinTech to health tech, to artificial intelligence, and the use of machine learning, all are not regulated [by the TRA]. This is except for data privacy, which is a very important component of the regulatory structure. Licenses, according to Lebanese law, have to authorize the construction and the investment in networks, the sale of mobile and fixed services, and the commercialization of these networks. The law today does not allow [the TRA] to regulate all the other services that you mentioned, from FinTech to others. However, these would be regulated today by the sector regulator. So if it’s FinTech, there could be and there are regulations that the central bank of Lebanon issues; if it is health tech, there will be other regulations that maybe the Ministry of Public Health [could co-determine]. 

But in the bottom line, this [provision of services] is not for the TRA or for the ministry of telecom to regulate, except from the one perspective of data privacy and data security. I am in favor of very strict data privacy and security legislation and regulation; there must be an empowered authority to enforce these regulations. A data privacy law has been approved by parliament; it’s not ideal, but it meets 80 to 90 percent of the requirements. It is not quite aligned with the GDPR, [the General Data Protection Regulation of 2016] which is the European standard, but it’s close enough [to protect data privacy] until we can amend and improve this law.

In addition to the GDPR regulation, the European Commission recently has been moving forward on a digital markets act (DMA) that is designed to curtail the data exploitation and market power of online behemoths. This act, similar to GDPR, is expected to have global implications. But in the Middle East, we are still very far from achieving GDPR. How can we close this mental gap between a very fast-moving knowledge industry where digital services are the future, and regional mindsets, which seem stuck in a previous era?

This gap is today even more shocking than it was 15 years ago when it already existed. If I were speaking to Lebanon-based businesses that have digital ambitions and ambitions to sell and market their services in Europe or to European citizens, I would advise them to make sure that they are compliant with GDPR and all [other] European legislation.

If we take into consideration the demographic and geographical size of Lebanon, how many telecom players do you think the market can absorb?

This is a very difficult question because Lebanon is a small market. The important thing is to have competition. Now, [inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]the law is clear that there have to be at least three mobile operators and I think that [three operators] are the maximum we can take.[/inlinetweet] [At issue] is not just the market size, it’s about the distribution of spectrum. Because the more you divide the spectrum between different players, the higher the cost of coverage, unless you do what some people are advocating [for], which is [selective coverage], ‘give me some spectrum, and I will cover whoever I want to cover in any area that I want to cover.’ It doesn’t work that way. 

When you have public telecom licenses, for example as a mobile operator, you have coverage obligations. To provide this coverage of most of the territory, [operators] need to have enough spectrum. And as we move from one level of technology to another, from 3G to 4G, we require a lot more spectrum. From 4G to 5G, we’re gonna need a whole lot more spectrum. Then, once you set that threshold high enough, you must make sure that you are creating an industry that is competitive, but at the same time able to sustain itself. [You cannot allow things to] degenerate into a situation where you have small players that [exist] just because they have a license to access spectrum, but are unable to survive, invest, and innovate. Thus we have a big issue with the market structure. In terms of public telecoms, I think three is the maximum number; in terms of other providers like data providers, you could have an additional small number of those.

Do you specifically mean DSPs when referring to other providers?  

Yes. what’s called [data services providers and internet services providers] DSPs and ISPs. By the way, I think that the whole category has to be revised. In the Lebanese market, ISPs and DSPs are one and the same, which duplicates the structure, duplicates their cost. The issue is how do DSPs survive? This is a very important question for a regulator to answer; how do these data providers survive in an environment where mobile operators offer broadband with 4G and later maybe higher speeds, [such as] 5G? Are they able to compete with them? Or do they simply become resellers? These are questions that the regulator has to think about and provide a solution that is approved by the Council of Ministers because, in it, there’s the structure of the industry. 

While researching this special report, we spoke to several people who were advocating bundling the infrastructure and keeping it under the government while letting the TRA license the service layer. According to those ideas, a state-owned provider would wholesale the infrastructure services and in this way make sure that the cost of the infrastructure is reduced. Is that something you see as viable? 

I will need to look at [such proposals to evaluate them] but I can tell you one thing; it is foolish for anyone to imagine that the public sector in Lebanon for the next five to twenty years will have any funds to invest in anything other than what is socially urgent, [such as] social services, education, and healthcare. [The state] cannot be spending whatever they have in an area where the private sector can invest and can invest better.

[Secondly], I think it is reasonable [to aim for] a third [operator] as a competitor, but even that is going to be a stretch. I don’t think a third mobile operator in most countries makes a profit. That is not to say that we shouldn’t have a third one, it may be useful for competitive dynamics. Lebanon needs a huge inflow of foreign direct investment and this can only happen if these large industries are opened up for private investment or Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). PPP still is the most promising avenue and not just on a national level, [but also] on a municipal level, [since it] is the most promising avenue to attract investments and wealth found outside the country. 

Indeed, the proposals that the state should hold on to ownership of the infrastructure that this ownership should be retained ‘for the time being’ and also mentioned co-investment and PPP options. 

When you put the qualifier ‘for the time being,’ the question becomes what you mean. Is ‘the time being’ one, two, or five years? I agree that [temporary state ownership of the infrastructure is called for], but having said that, I am not talking about ‘the time being’ [in a non-specific way]. I am saying that if we are thinking six months to a year down the road when genuine reforms are being implemented, [the question needs to be solved] if this industry should remain in public hands. Should there be one single network [infrastructure]? [On this,] I can tell you that there is not one experience from around the world where a single wholesale network has proven to be a viable option. 

Lebanon is in dire need of regulatory competency and ethical regulatory institutions, which mandates putting a high priority on staffing the TRA with the most knowledgeable experts that can be found. How can we incentivize our expatriate experts in telecommunications, such as yourself, for example, to accept positions on the TRA?

The answer to your question is that I have seen in the last two years, especially since the October demonstrations, a huge outpouring of commitment and goodwill from younger generations and interest in public issues, in policy issues. Those of us who were in Lebanon in the 90s and early 2000s, all shared a concern that there weren’t enough smart young people being attracted to public service. Today I’m comforted because I saw over the last few years how people were engaging with the country and saying ‘this is my country, I want to improve the situation in Lebanon; I want to take care of those in poor areas, I want to provide coverage.’ 

When given the right opportunity, there are many talented Lebanese women and men who would be willing to roll up their sleeves and get to work in public service. But you have to provide them with the political environment that starts with a parliament pushing for reforms, and a government implementing them. Unless this happens, you’re not going to attract talent. No one wants to waste their time for a title or to have a position in the public sector. 

May 16, 2022 0 comments
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AnalysisEconomics & PolicyICT infrastructureSpecial ReportTelecom

The humbler but vital handset

by Ghadi El Khoury May 11, 2022
written by Ghadi El Khoury

The past two years have seen a shift in buyer preferences in the Lebanese handset market. Anecdotal indicators – in absence of trustworthy statistics – show that residents are resorting to longer device usage before buying a replacement handset, and opt for seeking to repair malfunctioning but still serviceable smartphones. 

When buying a new smartphone, they have been down-shifting from flagship and high-end models to perhaps less sleek, less powerful, and less glittery but utilitarian devices, seemingly infusing moments of rational choices into the country’s previous culture of business glitterati and at-any-price buyers of the latest ICT gadgets. 

Thus, where once the latest iPhone and Samsung Galaxy flagship (great for the casual show-off) was considered a reputational necessity and the, mostly bygone, bling brand Vertu glowed in a few select showrooms, there appears today to only be subdued hampering for the global top brands’ latest flagship models by the few that have intact purchasing power. 

[inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]For the vast majority of Lebanon’s four-plus million mobile phone users, the game has turned into a cost-conscious hunt for new down-market smartphone makers[/inlinetweet] and, at best, their plastic flagships, many with names that the image-conscious Lebanese buyer in the past might not even have cared to know the correct pronunciation of.   

It is not quite clear how the overall burdens of communication costs, which have for many years been exorbitant in terms of government levies that were more or less poorly camouflaged as mobile phone and data connectivity charges, will develop once the government gets serious about telecommunications sector reforms (see overview story), adjusting the telecommunications charges. 

But for the time being, the handset market exhibits a new equilibrium that is reflective of people’s applied coping strategies in the Lebanese electronics market, which like all markets of imported durable consumer goods, has long had to contend with Lebanon’s comparably small size and communal fragmentation, along with being plagued with exclusive dealership and import rights. 

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The latter barrier is rooted in a legal decree issued in 1967, which allowed importers of durable consumer goods such as electronics to assert exclusive agency rights in the Lebanese territory. The Lebanese parliament voted in early 2022 in favor of a new competition law that according to Amine Salam, the minister of economy and trade, abolishes legal backing of exclusive dealership privileges in connection with opening the entire private and public sector to competition. 

“This law, according to various studies, will affect pricing in Lebanon by decreasing prices up to 40 percent. Once the competition law is in full execution, you will definitely see between 20 and 40 percent decreases in prices of goods and services where the problem was in the past that a few business tycoons were controlling markets with pricing and distribution,” he tells Executive.  

On the hardware side, from computers to smartphones, the market practices have long circumvented some of the restraints that exclusive agencies posed more strongly in other import segments. “The market is free for all; you will find four importers for HP, three for Lenovo, and nearly six for Apple products,” says Bernard Feghali, owner, and operator of specialty electronics shop EnterSpace in Jbeil. He describes [inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]the ability to import computer products as a matter of a small operator’s network, with the main shared denominator of taxes and import duties affecting all resellers. [/inlinetweet]

“Independent businesses can import any brand provided the supplier abroad can cover their needs,” says Fouad Karam, owner of Mass Electronics, a radio, and cellphone business also located in Jbeil. According to him, manufacturers that have entered partnerships with Lebanese distributors may exclusively deal with those local channel partners, but third-party resellers, namely in the GCC, are allowed to act as wholesalers for retailers in Lebanon.  

Whereas the state’s control over telecommunications operators has been undeniable since before the first two build-operate-transfer contracts were signed in 1994, the handset market has by comparison been freewheeling. The bypassing of exclusive agencies in the mobile phone market in this sense was mirrored by the fact that governmental efforts to curb the wild flows of smartphones and portables into the Lebanese market during the 2010s have not lasted long. 

In an attempt to force official declarations and registrations with tax authorities on inflows of mobile handsets, the Ministry of Telecommunications in 2013 decreed that phones would not be logged into the country’s two mobile networks if there was no record of import duty having been paid by an importer or even the end-user. All mobile phone users in Lebanon received alerts demanding payment of import duties and registering their phones’ International Mobile Equipment Identity, or IMEI, a unique phone identifier code, with the telecom’s ministry within 60 days of its activation on Lebanese networks. 

This decision was canceled in 2016, before being reintroduced in 2017 by then Minister Jamal Jarrah, whose ministry awarded the IMEI registration contract to Immobiles, a private enterprise. 

In the Lebanon Economic Vision (LEV) document – which by some was praised as a holy writ for the Lebanese economy and to others was a notorious and wasted expenditure – by international consultancy McKinsey, the telecoms sector’s contribution to Lebanon’s GDP was cited as amounting to $1.3 billion in 2017, or 12 percent, up from $0.9 billion in 2006. However, the 2006 figure represented a higher share of GDP, at 19 percent. 

Data on the real performance of the telecommunications industry to GDP in the crisis years from 2019 onward have not been reliably assessed or communicated to the public but have by consensus of telecom and financial experts dwindled. Operators and officials have since the start of 2022 lamented publicly that the sector has not only become unprofitable for the state as its ultimate beneficiary, owing to the continued “official lira rate” (1,500 LBP to 1 USD) indexation of tariffs in customer invoices but also threatened with breakdowns due to inability to pay for fuel for the generators powering its substations or replace stolen cables and fix broken equipment.  

The best that one might say on the basis of observations of heavy marketing of mobile handsets in the leading e-commerce marketplaces and the consistent presence of small smartphone retailers and repair places around the country is that the sector remains active in retail and aftermarket support, but apparently showing varying degrees of strength depending on the client base. 

Both Karam and Feghali said they maintain consistent sales of new phones, particularly high-end products, to clients who have financial inflows from abroad, usually from expatriate family relations.  Additionally, [inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]handset and device vendors can tap into the purchasing power of young professionals who stay in Lebanon but derive their income from working remotely for international companies or clients in the diaspora.  [/inlinetweet]

Owing almost entirely to the sharp fluctuations in the overall vastly deteriorating foreign exchange rate, local market prices have, according to Feghali, undergone large swings with intermittent down phases. By comparison to the impact of currency fluctuations, international supply chain issues and escalating global shipping costs have been minor factors that weighed on the local market, he added, attributing the relative insignificance of these global price drivers to the fact that phone importers had seen lavish profits in the past. Thus, they were able to absorb regular swings in their cost base and could adjust their pricing to the market’s diminished purchasing power in the recent past while retaining their margins. 

Numerous entry-level brands have newly entered the Lebanese market in the past two years and have in Feghali’s view been essential in this process of aligning handset market realities with the shrinking purchase power of consumers who ever-increasingly depend on mobile communication when facing near-catastrophic hikes in transportation costs and general living expenses. 

Several brands that entered the market from East Asia, namely China, and gained market prominence in the past two years since the crisis are Vivo, Oppo, Honor, and Tecno – in comparison to those who entered pre-crisis such as Huawei – brought extremely competitive prices and bundle deals. Covering market demand with models carrying a $100 price tag, such as Vivo, or $130 in the case of Oppo, address the large and highly price-sensitive segment of utility-first phone users. And while legacy manufacturers retain their share of the market, resellers are seeing manufacturers like Xiaomi offer some higher-end models which retail at little more than half the price of the big-mane flagship phones of Samsung and Apple that generally start around the 900$ mark.  

In Feghali’s opinion, this is not an indicator that the market shares will shift in the longer term towards the cheaper newcomers.  “The market is always rolling, there’s consistent demand as clients depend on technology the same way everyone depends on a pharmacy,” he says, adding that phone buyers generally tend to switch to higher quality alternatives over the long run and that phone sellers in Lebanon will regularly adjust their prices in accordance with fluctuating prices offered by their international suppliers and also in accordance to issues of a handset’s origin and taxation. 

With import taxes and telecom provider service rates at the time of this writing still being calculated at the “official” FX rate, and thus providing consumers with affordable services packages by operators and also bringing new handsets into easier financial reach, the market is faced with an immense risk of new price shocks in case of resetting of either importation levies, mobile communication tariffs, or a further deteriorating currency.  

On the upside, the market for telecommunications devices has benefited in the past two years from the restrictions and behavior changes enforced by the pandemic. “COVID-19 gave us a bump, but mainly through parents who could afford to purchase a tablet and allow their children to pursue their education remotely,” says phone retailer Karam. 

Feghali notes that aftermarket support is functioning well but can be hampered by a lack of standardization for importing specific replacement parts such as batteries. “While many importers are bringing in low-quality products to cover the market’s needs, [Original Equipment Manufacturer] support is limited to larger market players, with support limited over a set period,” he says. For Karam, households and small businesses alike also face uncertainty because of the extent of what is a poorly regulated market for telecom devices. Opening a shop that offers to repair smartphones and portable devices does not require much capital or technical expertise. “Anyone can do it, but few can do it right, particularly when it comes to bringing quality OEM or near OEM products,” he says. Karam similarly points out that the market is being exposed to flying vendors who would descend on his shop with travel bags full of displays, batteries, and accessories, with little regulation affecting the way people do business.

May 11, 2022 0 comments
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CommentEconomics & PolicySpecial ReportTelecom

Rebuilding the knowledge economy

by Rudy Shoushany May 6, 2022
written by Rudy Shoushany

In Lebanon, the under-provisioning of infrastructure has created gaps in services delivery, hence exacerbating productivity, and putting the country on a lower growth trajectory. Lebanon does lag behind in providing vital basic services, among them telecommunication.

While other middle-income countries are evolving, Lebanon is falling behind them when it comes to its telecommunication sector. In this country, the telecom sector is heavily set back by low service quality, high cost to consumers, and weak regulatory governance.

According to the World Economic Forum, Lebanon ranked 95 out of 141 countries in ICT adoption in 2019. Whereas it was ranked 161 out of 177 countries in terms of broadband connection speed for the year 2020, according to the Speedtest Global Index – which ranks countries according to their internet speeds monthly.

Lebanon’s Great Depression

Amid its worst economic crisis to date, Lebanon is facing dangerous depletion of its resources, including human capital with brain drain, hence creating – among others – an economic loss for the country. Despite this depression, one could identify that very limited policy responses had been taken by governmental authorities to reverse the further sinking of the country.

Since the uprising and the revolution in 2019, Lebanon has faced a multi-tiered, MEGA economic/financial crisis, COVID-19 pandemic challenges, and a devastating explosion of Beirut Port. These compounded crises are severe and long-lasting and led to the halting of any development in the country and an estimated drop in real GDP by more than 30-40 percent.

In addition to the recent burden on Lebanese communities and businesses, we emphasize that this started from a weak and disadvantageous national infrastructure. Even if Lebanon had been the first Arab country to introduce the internet, unfortunately, it is considered among the last, to provide High-speed Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL) and fiber-optic services. [inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]It is only in 2017, that the Ministry of Telecom signed a memorandum of understanding with the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CYTA) to increase Lebanon’s share of the submarine cable Alexandros from 310 to 1,920 gigabytes per second (GB/s).[/inlinetweet] By boosting the telecom cable’s capacity, the local users had been provided access to international servers at high speed.

Was this initiative enough to strengthen the national telecom sector? Did this initiative or any other related project prove to be a sustainable backbone for this sector? Was it fulfilled completely as per the adopted plans? Was it implemented appropriately, transparently, and upon international standards?

It is time, at this stage, to look forward and seek opportunities and compounded elements to regain macro-financial stability for Lebanon.        

Telecommunications: An Economic Trigger

While there is a consensus among key stakeholders on the importance of the telecommunication sector and its relevance to the financial sector’s recovery, this sector is still not thoroughly considered a key economic trigger for initial investments and contributions to job creation and recovery.

Immediate transparency initiatives and policy and regulatory changes are required allowing the telecom sector to improve the performance of the various economic sectors while curbing expenditures in the long run. [inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]Lebanon needs urgent investment in this sector, hence minimizing or even preventing additional immigration of human capital, and creating new job opportunities.[/inlinetweet]

The startup ecosystem in Lebanon is one of the essential bridging elements, which would support the telecom sector to rise. But this ecosystem had been facing a tremendous burden in an aftermath of the economic crisis. According to Middle East Venture Partners MEVP, the number of Lebanese operational startups before the crisis began in 2019 was 25. This number has fallen to 15, while 7 of those are struggling to remain afloat.

A Digital Golden Ticket

Lebanon has a golden ticket and chance to bounce back its economy by reinforcing and strengthening its telecommunication sector and incorporating it into the digital economy. Thus, boosting the creation of opportunities and jobs for the local ICT, startups, and tech freelancers to position Lebanon as a Tech Hub in today’s Gig Economy and contribute around 20-30 percent to the local GDP, hence reaching 7-10 billion USD by 2025 and possibly more. The creativity that exists in the Lebanese startup community, is a foundation stone to achieving the above-aimed growth.

One of the major advantages of the COVID-19 pandemic is the push of the digital world and remote working in precise. The foundation of any remote work for local and international markets requires a robust and sustainable telecommunication sector. Therefore, we are to explore options and exhaust all efforts to ensure services for the local, regional, and international markets.

Stable and fast internet could bring heavy savings and enable quicker productivity growth towards becoming a real tech hub that could employ tens of thousands of employees and freelancers while pumping new foreign investments into the local economy.

Missed Opportunities to boost the local ICT, startup, and tech scene

As per Imad Kreidiye, Ogero Chairman “revenues were on the rise before the country’s financial crisis broke out in 2019, earning $450 million per year since 2017, with a 70 percent profit margin.” Whereas in 2021, revenues lost more than 90 percent of their value in two years.

While Lebanon had been diving deeper into its economic crisis, we did not see a national comprehensive and credible stabilization strategy which includes the telecom sector that would prevent a worse financial crisis and mitigate the survival of local businesses and startups.

We did not see that there is a strategy looking at the reliance on the telecom sector to empower Lebanese startups and tech companies which will surely play a big role in rebuilding the economy. For instance, let’s look at Anghami as an example of a unicorn in Lebanon that went out to public listing from the UAE, that could have potentially contributed to the reform of the economy.

If we look at other Arab states, there is no doubt that the UAE Government realized that any vision for the future would be meaningless without the integration of the fifth generation of mobile network, or 5G, because, in the future, there would be a great need for rapid transfer of data, artificial intelligence, machine learning, and other emerging technologies. As of time of writing this article, China, namely it’s largest telecoms vendor, Huawei, has begun deploying heavy R&D efforts into 6G technology.

For instance, in April 2021, Etisalat deployed a 5G network with Nokia as a key partner, providing an enhanced mobile broadband service and expanding 5G coverage and revenue opportunities. The 5G capabilities enable innovative applications, such as Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR). It also addresses Industry 4.0 opportunities to benefit enterprises from various Internet of Things (IoT) use cases in energy, healthcare, education, transportation, and entertainment, thus, generating new revenue and aiding the growth of the market.

Telecommunication and Economic Reform

[inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]We cannot claim that the path to reforms path will be easy, quick, and even straightforward, but we should push the current and upcoming government toward including the telecommunication sector in the package of the reform agenda and lobby for faster, accessible, and cheaper telecommunication. [/inlinetweet]Accordingly, if Lebanon truly paves the way toward more a sustainable sector then some key and advantageous interventions which could empower current national businesses and inspire new startups will be needed:

  • Empowering the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority TRA of Lebanon law 431 by Implementing reforms toward Privatization or Liberation of the mobile operators’ market with a clear policy thus allowing domestic and/or foreign private investors that could drive growth and lower prices. To provide Emergence of value-added services and call centers as new niche sub-sectors.
  • Establishing governorates/cazas internet hubs (PPP model) public co-working spaces with sustainable electricity (solar panels) to become an inspiration and innovation hub. For instance, the Lebanese National Library and Rashid Karami Stadium could be used as hubs, providing, internet/electricity stability helping innovation, productivity increase, and aiding in creating remote/Nomad jobs and leaving no one behind.

  • Approving IDAL’s new proposal (2020) for Lebanon Tech National Brand or Tech-Hub and new companies’ formation with tax and other incentives could boost Lebanese startups and entrepreneurs in creating new companies and possibly the next unicorn in the region.

  • Advertising Lebanon as a support and international call center especially since it is heavily based on the internet. Highlighting that Lebanese people are known for having bright minds and trilingual advantages, helping achieve the job creation revolution that is needed in the sector-specific and the economy.

  • Localizing the national data center, rather than building a new one as proposed in CEDRE Conference i.e., empower and commercialize Ogero as a national Cloud provider that is currently available, to open the possibility for more innovations for the private/public sector by being the infrastructure needed and help kick off the national digital transformation strategy.

  • Empowering the new emerging technologies IoT, Artificial intelligence, and blockchain that has big financial returns over one trillion-dollar worldwide industry that could be tapped on.

  • Encouraging and exploring additional incentives on currently successful digital opportunities such as EDTECH, health tech, and InsurTech to cater to the region, especially the Arabic language.

  • Approving and implementing the developed national digital transformation and cybersecurity strategy to provide more trust and transparency that could transform Lebanon and drive innovation in the public sector.


The upcoming government’s priorities are to integrate a digital mindset into their action plan, hence approving and issuing a set of regulatory texts which had been prepared, consulted, and ready.

Getting Lebanon out of its current economic crisis while relying only on IMF is not enough. The telecom sector powered by a digital economy could be the biggest supporter of GDP, subsequently helping the country recover at a much faster rate and be positioned on the global map for technology similar to what Cyprus has done in recent years while utilizing many of the Lebanese Resources and bright minds.

This sector remains the most promising engine and hope for national economic growth and sustainable development.

The PCA Perspective
-Thomas Schellen

In the perspective of Lebanon’s Professional Computer Association (PCA), the industry’s two main subsectors of hardware and software companies are moderately upbeat after having delivered stable or slightly growing performances in the crisis years of 2020 and 2021. “Hardware companies achieved some growth because of demand for tablets and computers used in home office work. Software companies retained their level but did not achieve growth,” PCA President Camille Moukarzel tells Executive. Sector firms applying the outsourcing destination Lebanon philosophy, companies specializing in the provision of remote IT services to client companies abroad, benefited from the boom in remote working that coincided with the growing cost competitiveness of Lebanon-based remote professionals. For 2022 to date, software and hardware companies both have recorded “moderate growth,” Moukarzel adds, attributing impulses of business optimism in the ICT sector to the currency-depreciation-based boost in competitiveness and the fact that client companies in the Arab countries entertain a positive cultural bias vis-à-vis the tri-lingual Lebanese software vendors. 

The Lebanese information technology industry, and its extended tribe, the ICT industry (IT with the added moniker of communication), has since the mid-1990s constituted a high-profile building block of the country’s digital footprint and a promise of growing digital fortunes. With an abundance of new formations of software development companies in the post-conflict reconstruction years and up to the Y2K crisis and the burst of the New Economy bubble, Lebanese ICT vendors produced software suites such as enterprise resource planning (ERP), marketing, and customer relations management (CRM), and banking and accounting ledgers that on the one hand were aligned with Arab business cultures and on the other hand benefited from the rise in regional computing needs. 

Over the course of the 2000s, the Lebanese ICT sector could draw on the increasing local supply of computer engineering and software design graduates while further diversifying and specializing. Beirut-staged ICT-centric trade shows proliferated in numbers. While no global giant by a long shot and also having to deal with the vagaries of rapidly changing regional IT markets, the local IT industry stood out in adding economic value, thereby contributing nicely to the country’s GPD growth spurt in the late 2000s. 

However, by 2016, the ICT industry as a building block of the local knowledge economy contributed no more than 3 percent to GDP, the second-lowest percentage among the Lebanon Economic Vision, or McKinsey plan, listed as 14 “productive sectors.” 

When compared to OECD averages of 6 percent ICT value-added in the early 2010s, or the up to 10-15 percent increases of employment and total factor productivity in the early 2000s by globally leading ICT growth countries, including one neighboring Lebanon, this latter-day GDP contribution of Lebanon’s ICT industry – slightly less than the sectors of agriculture and hospitality and only a third of the manufacturing industry (which the LEV authors McKinsey had decided to focus on) – appeared to indicate a loss of the sector’s economic luster. 

Specifically, the Lebanese ICT industry’s compounded annual growth rate (CAGR), which had been 12 percent between 2005 and 2010, was shown as minus 3 percent, having, according to the LEV, reversed into a contraction for the “2010 (sic) to 2016” years. This swing into negative growth was in the same direction as the swing in Lebanon’s total nominal GDP CAGR that reversed from 8 percent to a 2 percent contraction for the two periods. Still, the reversal of growth was the largest among all cited productive sectors and extremely severe by comparison to the total.  

Whether it was in an upswing or recession, the domestic IT market rarely sufficed as the mainstay of Lebanese software developers; they instead nurtured their organic development potential in the Arabic-speaking world. Notably, this location advantage of Lebanese software houses does not broadly extend to hardware companies, which according to the PCA’s Moukarzel and the industry organization’s senior advisor Hussein Ayoub, today means local, sub-regional, or in some cases regional, distributors and resellers rather than the assemblers that one could see setting up in Beirut in earlier years. 

Hardware distributors with a regional focus can still operate from Lebanon, albeit without fanfare and the blowing of PR trumpets. Still, this segment of the ICT industry appears to be impacted primarily by global industry factors such as upside and downside supply shocks. One Beirut-based distributor, for example, described, in an informal conversation with Executive, the closure of the Russian market as a shock that created oversupply and thus downward price pressure in the Middle East. 

An international market intelligence report recently seems to agree that ICT budgets in Russia and Ukraine are poised for “a steep decline and slow recovery for ICT spending” (International Data Corporation in a commercial report dated March 2022). However, according to IDC and others, there are also signals of counter pressures in ICT markets, such as pressures related to defense spending in Europe, further supply chain bottlenecks in chip production because of a shortage of rare gases used in chip making, migration of experts, and currency issues. 

On the domestic scale, the economic challenges of the past two years are juxtaposed with new opportunities. On the side of disruptions, the PCA has seen a shift from the standard business practice of software developers to having high shares of staff in Lebanon – administration and development – and partial workforces or smaller customer-facing teams in their target markets. 

Research into this company migration was scheduled for completion this spring but was stopped abruptly by the tragic death of its conductor, PCA board member Gabriel Deek, leaving the PCA saying that numbers are significant but not precisely known. Moukarzel and Ayoub tell Executive that lately, in addition to long-standing location attractions, Dubai and Paris, Cyprus, being seen as gates to European markets, and Egypt, with a population of more than 100 million and large IT projects, have been locales to which some IT developers have relocated much of their teams.

Other challenges include scavenging of Lebanese talent by international companies, the desire of frustrated professionals to work anywhere but in a capital of corruption and waste under the absence of power and water, and basic difficulties to earn a living wage without taking on remote side jobs have not eased in the slightest. Moreover, avalanches of poorly researched media stories and sensationalist rumors have continued to generate image concerns over Lebanon’s corporate ICT sector as a reliable partner for international clients. Still, the outpouring of one-sided and often incorrect narratives “has affected the reputation of the Lebanese [ICT companies] but not the Lebanese talents,” says Ayoub.

On the side of new domestic opportunities, hardware, software, and app-focused Lebanese IT companies – the latter two also on regional levels – presently have their best opportunities in education due to schools and universities’ high demand for online learning solutions. According to Moukarzel and Ayoub, the education technology subsector is the most active among several subsectors where PCA member companies are plying their business. 

Since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, the market for education solutions has seen edtech companies close the gaps created by the inability to attend classes in person, Ayoub says, adding that the field of Lebanese ed-tech startup success stories includes eFlow Education, a two-year young startup (https://www.executive-magazine.com/special-report/pure-education) that has this spring been named among the winners of a World Summit Award (WSA) for digital innovation, in the category of “quality education” (Ayoub is an investor in eFlow Education). “In other subsectors, such as e-commerce and CRM solutions, where PCA members are active, we have some startups that are branding and positioning solutions for the Middle East region and using Dubai as the hub for their activity,” he goes on to say. 

Moukarzel elaborates that the PCA promotes the endeavors of all member companies through international exposure as well as collaborations with trade attaches at several Lebanese embassies. In the arena of international trade shows, the PCA provides support to Lebanese IT companies in various subsectors of the digital economy by organizing pavilions and industry delegations, business matchings, and workshops about hardware, software, as well as consulting and services. 

The most recent PCA trade promotion activity, which Moukarzel describes as a modest success, occurred at the recently concluded Dubai 2020 World Expo. “Expo 2020 was average, not so good, and not so bad,” he acknowledges. “We kept fighting to support all the Lebanese companies by recommending their solutions and connecting them with prospective partners and clients so that they can sell their solutions in the international market through our network,” he says. 

May 6, 2022 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyQ&ASpecial Report

World Bank envisions digital miracle for MENA

by Thomas Schellen April 26, 2022
written by Thomas Schellen

A new report on the digital upside of MENA countries states that over the long run of more than the coming 20 years, “the socioeconomic upside of digitalizing the economy of countries in the Middle East and North Africa (and other low- and middle-income economies) is probably huge.

GDP per capita could rise by more than 40 percent, manufacturing revenues per unit of factors of production could rise by 37 percent, employment in manufacturing could rise by 7 percent, and tourist arrivals could rise by 70 percent, creating jobs in the hospitality sector. Long-term unemployment rates could fall to negligible levels, and female labor force participation could double to more than 40 percent (emphases added).”

Christina Wood is a senior economist in the World Bank’s Office of the Chief Economist for the Middle East and North Africa. As one of the report’s authors, she agreed to answer our questions in an electronically conducted interview.

In you research of the digital upside in MENA countries, you have diagnosed what you called a digital paradox that consists of a relative to GDP per capita, high usage of social media accounts versus a low use of digital tools to conduct payments. As you flagged this significant regional gap between usage of social media and reliance on digital payments, can you give us an idea about the size of this digital paradox in Lebanon specifically?

I can give you the data for internet use in Lebanon and also for digital payments use. [inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]The share of the population using the internet is 78 percent for Lebanon and by way of comparison, the non-high income MENA country average is 52 percent. [/inlinetweet]Lebanon is clearly over performing when compared to the MENA region’s non-high income countries. [inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]As far as digital payments is concerned, Lebanon’s percentage is 33, [meaning] 33 percent of the population over 15 years are using digital payments. [/inlinetweet]That compares with the non-GCC average of 32 [percent]. So, Lebanon is about average with developing MENA in terms of digital payments and is using [the] internet more for social media than developing MENA countries. The data that I cited is publicly available, and I am confident that the population numbers used as the denominator are acceptable numbers.  

You say in your report that the obstacles on the road to a flourishing digital economy in MENA appear to be more analog than digital. What do you mean by this?

As you are aware from [our report], adopting digital technologies has a huge payoff for the MENA region, and this will be when universal adoption is achieved. What we mean by “analog” is that investing in digital technologies [and] ICT infrastructure is not enough. Also, the supply side of the technology is not enough. What is important is that people use this technology, and use it for digital payments purposes. The demand side of the equation needs to be emphasized and people need to have trust in financial and government institutions, to make payments and be sure that their information is secure. The regulations regarding e-commerce, regarding data protection, [and] consumer protection are important, as well as the skills of the population in using digital payments to find it comfortable shifting from cash to using digital technology. So, what we mean is that[inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””] it is not just a question of investing in infrastructure but you also have to make sure that people have trust in using digital payments and have the ability and skills to operate in the digital sphere.[/inlinetweet]

You referred to three basic pillars in you report, namely one, the telecommunications infrastructure, then the trust in banks and digital payment systems, and the regulatory environment as the third. In recent reports on Lebanon, by comparison huge dimension of the economic crisis in the country is strongly noted, but the Lebanese scenario also is one where distrust in the government is depicted as exceptionally high and the distrust in the banking sector has been racing to levels that rival or surpass the distrust in the government. With these levels of distance between the people and the banks and government in mind, can Lebanon be part of the MENA digital transformation hopefuls or must it be considered a downward outlier in the foreseeable future?

In our report, we emphasize priority areas of reform that address the issue of trust or distrust and make the population more comfortable with using digital payments. I already mentioned the regulatory framework for e-commerce transactions, to make them more secure, and then consumer and privacy protections. The other thing that the government can do to help increase the use of payments is to expand government services in the way of [digitizing] them. One example I often use are cash transfer payments. [inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]If the government is able to pay them digitally into e-wallets or mobile wallets, this will make the population more familiar with using digital payments and [rendering them] more comfortable in using them.[/inlinetweet] The other priority area of reform is with respect to the telecommunications sector, where Lebanon faces some challenges relating to this overall governance [issue]. With regard to the telecommunications sector, we emphasize that [inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]there should be competition in the telecommunications markets and there should be an independent regulatory authority. [/inlinetweet]I was very happy to see that [very recently] the Lebanese parliament was able to approve a competition policy, and not only that, that this policy would cover private sector activities as well as state-owned enterprises.

And you see this as having a positive impact on the competition environment it the telecommunications sector in Lebanon?

Right. Our research has shown that when you have both the independent regulatory authority and competition in the telecom markets at the same time, it will greatly facilitate rapid technological progress [in the telecommunications sector in general] and particularly in mobile broadband. Telecom companies will move much faster from offering lower technologies like 2G to invest and offer 3G, 4G, and then 5G. What this means is that you can [offer] greater coverage with mobile broadband services to the population, higher quality, and, as more people use mobile broadband, the cost will go down. I think that Lebanon has moved in the right direction. Of course, it is one thing to have the laws, and one must now look to the implementation. What is also important with respect to mobile money, through mobile broadband, is that it allows people to sidestep some of the constraints involved in using the traditional banking sector. There may be constraints in using the banking system as there is low trust in it.[inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””] Being able to use mobile money will allow [for] greater increase in use of digital payments without the constraints that are posed by the traditional financial [systems].[/inlinetweet]

There are elements of finance who are widely used in Lebanon today but do not constitute digital payments per se. One is the cash remittances to family members via money transfer companies and the other is increased incidence of cash disbursements to beneficiaries by international NGOs. According to what Western Union’s main local partner company OMT told us, some 220,000 Lebanese households per month received inbound money transfers in 2021, albeit mostly in cash and not at this time through digital wallets. Would you see this incidence of inbound transfers from family members or INGOs, which have been increasing at least in in terms of recipient numbers if not amounts, as something that will enhance trust in digital systems or would this be a neutral factor in your opinion?

The more the population uses digital means, the more familiar and comfortable they become in using digital payments. [inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]Digital payments provide the population with a level of security in being able to receive those remittances. [/inlinetweet]If those remittances would have to make their way to the households physically [by being carried across the border in cash], the digital way is definitely a convenience for the population and much more secure. It is a step in the right direction.

Your numbers on the projected upside of digital on the regional level sound very enthusiastic, almost sensational, as far as predicting additional GDP growth, increases in total factor productivity, and tourism arrivals all going up significantly between now and 2045 and female labor force participation rates more than doubling by virtue of digital economic transformation. Is it correct to assume that these numbers are predictions based on general trends and regional averages rather than being added up country per country?

There are global estimates that we make use of but those estimates are calibrated to MENA country-by-country specifics and then aggregated. Also, yes, those numbers look impressive. You have to recognize that you will get those huge gains if you imagine that you [achieve] universal adoption. Why are the gains so large for the developing MENA region? It is because there is a wider gap between the share of the population that uses digital right now, to where it could be, to 100 percent [universal usage]. If you look at the GCC countries, they have a much narrower gap and moving from where they are to universal offers not much more gains for them.

Talking about universal coverage still sounds a bit utopian even for some economies in the G7 club. Given overall developments and the latest political, cultural and military disruptions of the bad kind in global markets, how much do you today see it as realistic timeframe, as your study did, to achieve universal digital usage over the period between 2017 and 2045?

There is no doubt that reforms take time and that it would be challenging to get to universal adoption. But what we like to emphasize is that unless you take steps now, you will not have a chance of getting there. It is realistic to know that reforms are challenging and difficult to achieve; [in the case of Lebanon] take Lebanon’s competition policy. I understand that it has been in the making for over a decade. And reforms take time even in the most advanced countries. So, we know that reforms take time but [what] we are emphasizing is that [inlinetweet prefix=”” tweeter=”” suffix=””]it is important not just to take steps towards reform but also to ensure that you are focusing on the priority areas that will help make a difference, faster.[/inlinetweet] That is why we focus on the telecom markets and the regulatory environment to be able to increase the use of mobile broadband in particular. Continue to cover [the country] with fixed broadband but ensure that you are prioritizing coverage with mobile broadband because this will allow you to reap benefits much quicker and to overcome the challenges of traditional ways of doing things through the financial sector where there is a lot of distrust, and so on, and so forth.

Would integration of regulatory environments on the regional level and increasing integration of the GAFTA (Greater Arab Free Trade Area) help with achieving targets such as universal digital transformation better and faster or will it make no difference if countries take this road all individually?

Taking advantage of regional integration solutions is important where it is feasible. I think that this objective should remain on the table and be pursued to the extent feasible, given the context of the region and geopolitics, conflicts, etcetera. Why is regional important? You have to imagine the size of the market. Digital technologies that are general purpose technologies have greater benefits the wider they are used, and have benefits across all activities in the economy. So, the wider one is able to increase the market, the greater the gains that can be achieved. And being faster in achieving universal adoption [means that] the cost of providing those services to the population will go down, the greater the numbers that are accessing the technology.

How much would factors such as increased tourism inflows and improved total factor productivity in industry work in favor of Lebanon when comparing the small tourism market and industrial sector to the much larger markets and sectors in the North African countries that are part of developing MENA?

For the moment, we have focused on the regional averages on the full MENA level as well as the developing MENA. We have not focused on country specific improvements, though we can obtain those numbers by using our methodologies [in the future]. I cannot make comparisons, I can just make general statements which is that the greater the gap between the current level and the 100 percent [universal digital usage], the greater the gains from digitizing for the country. I am comfortable to make this general statement.

Could rivalries among Arab countries impede the regional digital integration and transformation to digital economies?

One thing I can say in that regard is that the Maghreb countries are actively pursuing regional options in ICT. It is not going to be easy [given that] countries have national regulations and that the competition is at the national level. However, those Maghreb countries recognize the benefit of regional solutions and are actively engaging in dialogue at the telecom sector level to see how to move the regional agenda forward, so that they can take advantage of a wider market that would be more efficient for the telecom companies to invest in technologies to roll out services to the broader population, services that are of higher quality, reliable, and ultimately will be more affordable for the populations to use. The Mashreq region should keep regional integration on the agenda. It is a different sub-region [of MENA] with different challenges, and more challenges, but that does not mean that the priority of reforms should not remain on the table as something to pursue when the conditions allow.

What are your future plans at the World Bank on the regional level as far as accompanying MENA countries into the digital future? Are you providing specific technical advisory services, World Bank Group project funding, or going to issue further reports like the one we now discussed, on a periodic timetable?

We have very strong teams in the Bank that are very experienced in digital transformation aspects from the infrastructure to the data side, to the consumer side, with ensuring communication among all stakeholders. I am not on the side that does technical assistance. [In the department where I work] we are doing the analytical work; we are planning to present our reports in the region at country level and to engage in dialogues.

April 26, 2022 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on Economic Policies with Lebanon for a Four-Year Extended Fund Facility

by IMF April 7, 2022
written by IMF

April 7, 2022

  • The Lebanese authorities, with IMF staff support, have formulated a comprehensive economic reform program aiming to rebuild the economy, restore financial sustainability, strengthen governance and transparency, remove impediments to job-creating growth, and increase social and reconstruction spending.
  • The agreed program is subject to IMF management and the Executive Board approval, and the Lebanese authorities have agreed to undertake several critical reforms ahead of the IMF Board meeting.
  • Financing support on highly concessional terms from Lebanon’s international partners will be essential to support the authorities’ efforts and ensure that the program is adequately financed and can meet its objectives.

Washington, DC: In response to a request by the Lebanese authorities, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission led by Mr. Ernesto Ramirez Rigo visited Beirut, Lebanon from March 28 to April 7, to discuss IMF support for Lebanon and for the authorities’ comprehensive economic reform program. At the end of the mission, Mr. Ramirez Rigo made the following statement:

“The Lebanese authorities and the IMF team have reached a staff-level agreement on comprehensive economic policies that could be supported by a 46-month Extended Fund Arrangement (EFF) with requested access of SDR 2,173.9 million (equivalent to about US$3 billion). This agreement is subject to approval by IMF management and the Executive Board, after the timely implementation of all prior actions and confirmation of international partners’ financial support. The EFF aims to support the authorities’ reform strategy to restore growth and financial sustainability, strengthen governance and transparency, and increase social and reconstruction spending. This will need to be complemented by the restructuring of external public debt that will result in sufficient creditor participation to restore debt sustainability and close financing gaps.

“Lebanon is facing an unprecedented crisis, which has led to a dramatic economic contraction and a large increase in poverty, unemployment, and emigration. This crisis is a manifestation of deep and persistent vulnerabilities generated by many years of unsustainable macroeconomic policies fueling large twin deficits (fiscal and external), support for an overvalued exchange rate and an oversized financial sector, combined with severe accountability and transparency problems and lack of structural reforms. These all came to a head in late 2019 with the acceleration of capital outflows that led to the sovereign default in March 2020, followed by a deep recession, a dramatic fall in the value of the Lebanese currency and a triple digit inflation. The crisis has been compounded by the Covid pandemic and the August 2020 port of Beirut explosion, while the war in Ukraine is exacerbating pressures on the current account and inflation and straining further food and fuel supplies. The living conditions of the population, especially the most vulnerable, have deteriorated dramatically, in part due to the lack of resources and a robust social protection network.

“The authorities recognize the urgent need to initiate a multi-pronged reform program to tackle these challenges, bring back confidence and put the economy back on a sustainable growth path, with stronger private sector activity and job creation. In this regard, their plan is based on five key pillars:

  • Restructuring the financial sector to restore banks’ viability and their ability to efficiently allocate resources to support the recovery;
  • Implementing fiscal reforms that coupled with the proposed restructuring of external public debt will ensure debt sustainability and create space to invest in social spending, reconstruction and infrastructure;
  • Reforming state-owned enterprises, particularly in the energy sector, to provide quality services without draining public resources;
  • Strengthening governance, anti-corruption, and anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) frameworks to enhance transparency and accountability, including by modernizing the central bank legal framework and governance and accountability arrangements;
  • Establishing a credible and transparent monetary and exchange rate system .

“Decisive policies and reforms in these areas, together with significant external financing, are necessary to achieve the authorities’ objectives during the coming years.

“This includes improving public finances and reducing public debt through revenue-generating and administrative reform measures to ensure a more equal and transparent distribution of the tax burden. The 2022 budget is a first critical step in this direction. It aims to achieve a primary deficit of [4] percent of GDP supported by a change in imports valuation for custom and tax purposes to be done at a unified exchange rate. This would allow for an increase in allowances to public sector employees to re-start the functioning of the public administration and for an increase in social spending, with the goal of protecting the most vulnerable. The budget deficit will be externally financed, and the practice of the central bank financing will be abolished.

“The BdL will be guided by the overarching objectives of creating the conditions for disinflation including by moving to a new monetary regime. It will focus on rebuilding its foreign currency reserves and maintaining a single market-determined exchange rate, which will help the functioning of the financial sector, contribute to a better resource allocation in the economy, and allow for the absorption of external shocks. The BdL mandate and its governance structure will be strengthened through the adoption of a wide-ranging reform of the necessary legislation.

“Health and viability of the financial sector will need to be restored for the country to be able to lift the existing uncertainty and provide conditions for strong economic growth. Total recapitalization needs in the banking system are very large, and losses will need to be recognized upfront and allocated, while protecting small depositors. An appropriate strategy has been designed, but its implementation requires a number of legislative changes to support it.

“These initial steps will be followed by other reforms. Tax policy and revenue administration reforms will broaden the tax base and strengthen revenue intake. Comprehensive plans for cost-recovery in the energy sector and the introduction of a new state-owned enterprises framework to improve their governance and oversight will help reduce hemorrhage of scarce government resources. The modernization of the public finance management framework, implementation of the recently approved procurement law, the passage of the competition law, a reform of the civil service and pension and retirement schemes will increase transparency and spending efficiency. Fiscal space created by these efforts will be used to improve social protection and equity among the Lebanese population as well as for infrastructure and human capital development. Frameworks for banking supervision, resolution AML/CFT, as well as deposit insurance and asset declaration regimes will be strengthened, and the National Anti-Corruption Commission will be fully operationalized.

“These efforts will be supplemented by reforms already under way or to be discussed with other multilateral and regional financial institutions, bringing in their critical expertise and financing, and assisting the authorities’ efforts to lay the foundations for a stronger and more sustainable economy.

“The authorities are cognizant of the challenges they face in implementing this ambitious agenda but have stressed that this reform program is critical to end the current crisis and enjoys the support of the broad political leadership. They expressed their strong commitment to carry out this reform program and sustain decisive implementation during the upcoming parliamentary and Presidential elections. The authorities are also committed to stepping up their efforts to communicate and explain their reform plans to the public.

Finally, the authorities understand the need to initiate the reforms as soon as possible, and have agreed to complete the following measures prior the IMF Board’s consideration:

  • Cabinet approval of a bank restructuring strategy that recognizes and addresses upfront the large losses in the sector, while protecting small depositors and limiting recourse to public resources.
  • Parliament approval of an appropriate emergency bank resolution legislation which is needed to implement the bank restructuring strategy and kickstart the process of restoring the financial sector to health, which is fundamental to support growth.
  • Initiation of an externally assisted bank-by-bank evaluation for the 14 largest banks by signing the terms of references with a reputable international firm.
  • Parliament approval of a reformed bank secrecy law to bring it in line with international standards to fight corruption and remove impediments to effective banking sector restructuring and supervision, tax administration, as well as detection and investigation of financial crimes, and asset recovery.
  • Completion of the special purpose audit of the BdL’s foreign asset position, to start improving the transparency of this key institution.
  • Cabinet approval of a medium-term fiscal and debt restructuring strategy, which is needed to restore debt sustainability, instill credibility in economic policies and create fiscal space for additional social and reconstruction spending.
  • Parliament approval of the 2022 budget, to start regaining fiscal accountability.
  • Unification by BdL of the exchange rates for authorized current account transactions, which is critical for boosting economic activity, restoring credibility and external viability, and will be supported by the implementation of formal capital controls.

“The IMF team is grateful to the Lebanese authorities and several civil society and private sector groups for the open and constructive discussions and their hospitality.”

April 7, 2022 0 comments
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