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Economics & Policy

Executive Insight – OIF

by Fabio Scacciavillani April 3, 2011
written by Fabio Scacciavillani

 

For those eager to engage in predictions as to where the events that have rocked North Africa, the Middle East and beyond will lead, it would be wise to remember that these are uncharted political waters, and the long wave of repercussions will run for decades as the old post-colonial order crumbles.

Our perceptions and expectations are somewhat distorted by history books that condense in a few pages an account of events that took years to develop and fully come to fruition. Even upheavals which some of us witnessed during our lifetimes leave memories that focus on the climax and exclude the lull. So when our internal equilibrium is shaken, we unrealistically expect a swift ending.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact started with Gorbachev’s ascent and perestroika, then the break-up throughout Eastern Europe and finally the indelible image of Yeltsin on a tank declaring the end of the Empire. But it took several years. And the aftermath was not a smooth transition, but years of hyperinflation, mass unemployment, subsidy cuts, institution building, uprooting of state monopolies and judicial reforms.

In essence, historical processes so profound to reshape entire continents often follow a “drunkard’s walk” — two steps forward, one step back and maybe a few sideways. The vicissitudes of the “Arab Spring” will likely follow such a pattern. Hence in the months and years to come we will need a framework to evaluate the direction, the pattern and the likely outcome of this process. As economic exclusion leads to the mounting resentment that caused the turmoil, fiscal interests and redistribution will be dominant factors in shaping the course of history.

The convulsions have been especially acute in countries which depend on earnings from renting energy commodities (and also tourism). Rents provide the state with a cache of resources, but little incentive to build modern institutional capital, a pre-condition for social and material advancement. When governments can obtain conspicuous resources without having to resort to taxation it is hard for them to resist the temptation to eschew checks and balances; officials feel immune to scrutiny, deeming a partial distribution of these resources to powerful interest groups sufficient to retain power.

In the long run, the lack of modern public institutionsa trophies the ability of a society to progress, wastes the energies of the youth, spreads bitterness and often spurs a withdrawal toward tribal or sectarian splits. Resources are rarely eternal and in any case their size tends to shrink relative to the growing population. Unless the revenues are invested to diversify the economy into new sectors and enlarge the pie for all, eventually hand outs alone will not be enough ensure decent living standards.

Protests and riots should be interpreted not only by a call for redistribution but also for a social contract which fosters economic inclusion, upward social mobility and betterment opportunities. Unfortunately, this transformation cannot be delivered overnight and so the undercurrent of unrest will not abate instantly.

Still, it is a very positive sign that at least in the Gulf Cooperation Council the rulers have grasped what is at stake and have launched the so-called ‘Gulf Marshall Plan.’

One hopes that it will constitute the first step in a new economic strategy which desists from adding cadres to an already bloated and often utterly inefficient bureaucracy and focuses on skill creation and entrepreneurial talent. Likewise, one hopes that awareness spreads among decision makers that political survival is not only a matter of throwing a few handouts around, but devising a set of rules hinging on rights and not on privileges, on fairness and not on proximity to elites, on competence and not on favors. It will be a long road because it will clash with entrenched bad habits and long-established traditions — a good reason not to delay the journey and stick to newfound determination.

 

Fabio Scacciavillani is chief economist at the OmanInvestment Fund

April 3, 2011 0 comments
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Finance

Harvesting higher prices

by Vanessa Khalil April 3, 2011
written by Vanessa Khalil

If anything can be reliably forecast amid the growing upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa, it is the direction of global food prices. They have currently settled at record highs and are certain to increase in the future.

According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), an index of 55 food commodities rose 2.2 percent in February, the eighth consecutive month that food prices have increased and a record high since 1990. FAO’s cereal price index, which includes main food staples such as wheat, rice and maize rose 3.7 percent in the same month, the highest increase in one month since July 2008. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund’s statement that “the world may need to get used to higher food prices” did little to downplay concerns about further price increases. Soaring food prices were among the factors playing into the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia,  further unrest elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa is only helping to push these prices upward. Sifting through the wider implications of the unrest, among other factors, is crucial in understanding the current world food situation and to get a sense of what is to come.

What goes up…

Food is not the only commodity that’s getting more expensive; one side effect of the “Arab Spring” has been the recent crude oil price-jump to more than $100 per barrel, which will likely serve only to drive up food prices even higher.  

Crops were among the commodities that beat stocks, bonds and the dollar in gains for a third straight month. “Probably the most important implication of this oil shock is on financial markets,” said Abdolreza Abbassian, senior economist at FAO.

If oil supply disruption concerns persist, food prices will continue to set records. Uprisings in Libya have already led the African nation to halt its production of 1.6 million barrels per day. Saudi officials’ statements that the country would compensate for Libya’s oil shortfalls calmed markets to some extent but the price impact was limited on fears that Saudi Arabia might exhaust its spare capacity.

“The problem is that transportation costs are up, which trickles down to food prices”, said Simon Neaime, section chief of economic analysis at the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA).

For grain producers, the oil shock automatically implies higher costs of production. According to a recent report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, energy accounts for over one-third of grain production cost.

On the macro-economic level, however, it is tightened supply and unforeseen demand that moves food prices upward. The first three months of 2011 saw MENA governments hoarding staple crops in bulk in anticipation of the trouble ahead. In February 2011, the Egyptian government bought 175,000 tons of wheat from the United States and Australia, while Saudi Arabia stockpiled a year’s worth of wheat.

Yet the MENA’s frantic purchases to boost stockpiles had a one-time impact on the market. “All that these countries did was stay on the safe side rather than wait a month or two when food prices would be much higher, or when they [might not] have governments,” FAO’s Abbassian said.  

Currency exchange rates are also contributing to high food prices, specifically for imports in the MENA region. “Another factor we are talking about here is the euro,” said ESCWA’s Neaime, who adds that the euro won’t be going down anytime soon. “Many North African countries trade mostly with the [Eurozone]. Whenever the euro is appreciating, they are importing inflation.”

Fickle weather also remains a long-term driving force behind high food prices. Russia’s ban on grain exports that had started in summer 2010might be extended until year-end 2011. Climate threats are also a factor for 2011; at a March conference on Near East, FAO raised concerns of drought, floods and soil degradation in the region. Meanwhile, the La Nina weather pattern is forecasted to lead to heavier rainfall in the northern United States and Canada, possibly washing out harvests and tightening supplies on corn andwheat.

Weather aside, Japan’s triple disaster is also curbing food supply. The 8.9 magnitude earthquake and the tsunami that followed destroyed close to 20 percent of the agricultural and food industry in Northeast Japan. Meanwhile, the nuclear crisis that resulted from Japan’s Fukushima reactor meltdowns led to food restrictions on Japanese exports. The US, Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong banned food imports from some regions of the country after high levels of radioactive iodine were detected in some samples.  

…Must come down?

Among the downward price pressures on food are the expectations that spring wheat crops will boost supply. “Wheat is one crop that is easier to predict right now because plantings have just taken place this spring. We do see a strong expansion,” Abbassian said. Likewise, the US Department of Agriculture’s “Supply/Demand” March report forecasts world wheat crop to reach 668 million tons for 2011-2012, up 21 million tons on the yearearlier.

Cereal production

As supply increases, the stockpile in the MENA region could damper demand, namely in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. “That could take away some of the spring and summer purchases and correct prices,” said Abbassian.

 Meanwhile, some experts in the foodstuffs industry exporting to Gulf Cooperation Council countries expect lower demand through the rest of the spring, as a wait-and-see mood prevails among consumers and government buyers.  

Preemptive government subsidies in the MENA may also hold down prices consumers pay on the shelf. As an example, the United Arab Emirates recently agreed with the Union Cooperative Society supermarket chain to reduce prices, mainly on rice and bread, back to their 2004 figures starting this April and running until year’s end.

“Higher prices now pressure macroeconomics rather than consumers who are poor and still receiving subsidies. OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] can afford to help consumers,” Abbassian said. But Neaime has his doubts about less wealthy Middle Eastern countries following the trend. “Countries like Lebanon and Egypt don’t have enough fiscal space to deal with price shocks and subsidies. They have their debts and deficits to worry about,” he said.

Growing pains

But, natural disasters and political turmoil are pieces of a much bigger mosaic. The world’s population is growing at an alarming rate, and resources are getting scarcer. “It’ll take a lot to feed nine billion people in the future,” said Neaime. The IMF asserted that record food prices would persist in line with economic growth and rising living standards.

The pain will be felt especially by the poor, particularly in Africa’s most impoverished countries. According to Neaime, despite economic progress in the developing world, the benefits have not been distributed throughout.

“Economies are growing and so is GDP [gross domestic product] but nothing is happening on a social level,” said Neaime. This means severe repercussions for those who can’t afford food at the current price levels, let alone at future ones. “If you are poor, then that 50 or 60 percent of your income will suddenly not be enough,” added Abbassian.

The repercussions of rising food rises are that they tend to foster greater general social inequity and instability, given that the poor are less able to afford their daily bread while the wealthy cash in on rising food prices through investing in commodities. This often leads to further price hikes and the perpetuation of a cycle that becomes more unpleasant and unsustainable the longer it persists; in the absence of a global calamity to stunt future growth prospects in emerging economies, food price increases seem all but foretold.

So, while the unrest sweeping the MENA region came unexpectedly to many, the unrest down the road, both here and beyond, should not.

April 3, 2011 0 comments
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Finance

Executive Insight – Only real demand counts

by Bertrand Carlier April 3, 2011
written by Bertrand Carlier

Behind the current short-term fluctuations linked to shifting growth prospects lies a powerful uptrend in commodity prices. A deep-seated change in lifestyles in emerging countries is creating new needs in a self-sustaining process that generates ever more demand.

At its latest plenary session at the beginning of March, China’s National Assembly confirmed the direction in which markets are moving: industrial metal prices are likely to continue a rally that started a decade ago.

Nobody can or should invest in commodities unless they are convinced of the potential demand for capital goods and infrastructure needed to underpin endogenous economic growth, as opposed to export-driven expansion alone.

According to the Appliance Manufacturers and China Building Association, copper consumption already amounts to 41 kilograms per home. Looking at China’s 12th five-year plan, the proportion of the country’s population living in urban areas will expand from 47.5 percent today to 51.5 percent in 2015; this urbanization will require tens of thousands of kilometers of railways, roads and piping. It will also require new power stations to meet energy demand, and copper and copper derivatives will be needed here as well. 

Whatever the sector, requirements are staggering and the figures speak for themselves. According to the International Copper Study Group, China accounted for 7.87 million tons of the 22 million tons of copper used worldwide in 2009. By comparison, Western Europe, the planet’s second-largest consumer, accounted for “only” 3.13 million tonnes. A few figures from the production side put this trend in perspective: Escondida, the biggest copper mine in Chile, can produce a maximum 1.3 million tonnes per year, and 1.09 million tonnes were actually extracted in 2010. Chile’s total output increased 0.5 percent last year.

Urbanization & income, country comparisons

The 8 percent increase seen in world demand in 2010 should be compared with a 4 percent increase in output. “Shortfall” is a euphemism, and prices are bound to rise further even without consideration of strategic stocking. Having surged to almost $10,200 per ton, copper prices are now fluctuating just above the $9,000 mark. This level looks attractive in the long term.

The emerging-country demand argument may be a cliché, but it represents the stark reality of the situation, especially given China’s latest development plans. Identifying demand factors is the best means of evaluating changes in prices.

Cashing in on calamity

Since February 15, 2011, issues relating to world growth have weighed on all commodity prices. The Japanese disaster has followed instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), clouding the prospects for activity and fuelling price volatility. Yet while instability effectively creates a tax on consumption via crowding-out effects, Japan’s predicament actually strengthens the upswing in commodity prices. After all, reconstruction efforts will require purchases of copper over and above the country’s 1.22-million-ton consumption in 2010. Short-term volatility should not mask a long-term trend bolstered by rising demand for a product of limited supply.

Copper use by region in 2009 (millions of tons)

Copper use by country 2009

In terms of the upheaval currently rocking the MENA region, the outcome is uncertain due to the social factors that are contributing to these crises. The movement of revolt, which derived its power from the ever-widening gaps within these societies, has taken a turn that could threaten stability across the region. None of the main producers has been affected for the time being. The action taken by the Gulf Cooperation Council and conciliatory gestures in the form of handouts are sure signs that the regimes in place are feeling the pressure and acknowledging the risk of social unrest.

Copper use by business sector and region in 2009

The increase in real demand masks a political dimension, too. Just imagine the social unrest if, for  want of basic materials, China fails to deliver the 38 million new homes it has promised under the current five-year plan. Access to such resources is vital and readily explains Chinese and Indian commodity-related acquisitions and equity stakes.

That said, premia for high-probability events are rising, as the case of the insurance market shows. Soaring oil prices against a backdrop of instability in the Middle East and North Africa are a salutary reminder of that fact. In an inversion of the usual relationship on the commodity markets, volatility recently rose in line with a sharp increase in crude oil prices. This insurance premium is apparently $10-$15 per barrel, a stark pointer toward geopolitical uncertainty.

The synchronization of growth cycles is reflected in a combined surge in energy demand. As with copper, the factors driving up energy prices depend above all on growth. Commodity prices are often set by marginal demand, with the disappearance of a few hundred barrels of oil per day out of a total of around 87.5 million barrels consumed per day triggering immediate price adjustments to the upside, with the size of the move depending on the quality of the oil concerned. 

The 2008 crisis probably boosted awareness among major consumers such as India and China that they have to invest if their populations are to benefit from endemic growth. In the present recovery phase, demand for commodities is now increasing among the major developed countries. This amounts to a long-term demand shock in the context of insufficient pre-crisis investment, compounded recently by geopolitical risk.

This is an explosive mixture that is likely to drive commodity prices higher still, amid heightened volatility that reflects wavering growth expectations.

 

Bertrand Carlier is the manager of Bel Air Fixed Income & Commodity Funds at Credit Agricole Suisse

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No queen for the tribes

by Peter Speetjens April 3, 2011
written by Peter Speetjens

 

 

These are not the easiest of days for Jordan‘s King Abdullah II. The “Arab Spring” has reached Amman and is putting his throne under pressure from two sides. Every Friday, which has been dubbed the national “day of rage,” thousands of leftists and Islamists of mainly Palestinian descent take to the streets to demand political reform. On the other side of the spectrum, the Jordanian tribes have grown ever more vocal in their demands to curb the growing Palestinian influence in the country.

The focal point of their criticism has been none other than Queen Rania, herself of Palestinian descent. In February, 36 tribal representatives sent an open letter to the king in which they accused his wife of “building power centers for her interests that go against what Jordanians and Hashemites have agreed on in governing, and [she] is a danger to the nation, the structure of the state and the political structure of the throne.”

The letter furthermore criticized her frequent presence in the international media, and even accused her of having registered former tribal land in the name of her family. The letter hit the country like a bomb. After all, it is by law forbidden to criticize any member of the royal family. Yet the royal court could do little against the signatories, as they represented some of the country’s largest tribes, including the Bani Sakhr, which in early March blocked the airport road in protest against the state’s ongoing confiscation of tribal lands.

The royal court did act, however, when Agence France Presse Bureau Chief Randa Habib dared share fragments of the letter with an international audience. Habib had to bear the brunt of the royal anger. The court threatened to sue both her and the press agency for “slander,” as she had referred to “tribal leaders,” when in fact they were only representatives. Habib was also fired as columnist for the state-owned daily The Jordan Times.

Among the signatories was the well-known right-wing dissident and former Member of Parliament Ahmad Ouweidi Abbadi, the chairman of the Jordan National Movement, who in 2007 was sentenced to two years in jail for accusing former Interior Minister Eid el-Fayez of corruption. According to him, the “true” Jordanians are today second-class citizens within their own country.

While some of letter’s accusations seem exaggerated, the fundamental sentiment behind the criticism is shared by a considerable part of the population and touches upon the very essence and split nature of Jordan. The country’s original inhabitants mainly consist of tribal Bedouins. It was only after the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the 1967 Six-Day war that hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees entered the kingdom.

Many received passports and, on paper at least, are today full-fledged Jordanians. Some 1.2 million among them, however, only have a residency permit. The tribes are extremely worried that the royal court aims to offer them the Jordanian nationality. “King Abdullah must choose: Rania or the throne,” Abbadi told me bluntly. “If she will not disappear we will sooner or later have a civil war.” Harsh words from a bitter man, yet Abbadi is not alone. Some analysts have described the current tense situation as “a Black September without arms,” referring to the 1970 fighting between the PLO and King Hussein’s troops.

Former general Ali Habashneh, the widely respected chairman of the National Committee for Retired Servicemen (NCRS), did not sign the petition. Nor did he accuse Queen Rania of improper behavior or transaction. However, he too believes she has too much of a say at the Royal Court. As early as May 1, 2009, Habashneh offered the King, on behalf of the NCRS, a petition expressing the organization’s concerns. On March 15 this year NCRS again made headlines by publicly claiming that the royal court over the past decade has issued some 130,000 passports to Palestinian refugees.

Habashneh furthermore accused the government of being “weak” in the face of “United States and Israeli pressures to settle Palestinian refugees in Jordan.” According to him, Israel’s right-wing government has killed the idea of an independent Palestinian state, with the (financial) help of Washington, by turning Jordan into Palestine.  In this scenario, he warned, the Black September without arms would likely begin to gather weapons.

Peter Speetjens is a Beirut-based journalist

 

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Resistance on the high seas

by Nicholas Blanford April 3, 2011
written by Nicholas Blanford

The stakes are growing in the looming confrontation between Lebanon and Israel over the suspected existence of massive fossil fuel deposits in the eastern Mediterranean. The delight in Israel at the recent discovery of two large gas fields off its northern coastline has given way to concerns that it could provide the pretext for a new war with Hezbollah.

That anxiety has hardened with the uncertainties regarding Israel’s arrangement to purchase Egyptian gas following the collapse of Hosni Mubarak’s regime and calls in Cairo to annul the agreement. The upshot is that the potential oil and gas wealth in the eastern Mediterranean could provide an economic windfall for the countries in the area — Lebanon, Israel, Syria and Cyprus — but it also represents a colossal security headache.

The two gas fields off the northern Israel coast — Tamar and Leviathan — contain an estimated 237.8 billion cubic meters and 453 billion cubic meters, respectively, sufficient to satisfy Israel’s energy needs for the next half century. Last year, the United States Geological Survey estimated that the Levantine Basin Province, which encompasses parts of Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Cyprus, could contain as much as 122 trillion cubic feet of gas and 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil.

Key to the tensions between Lebanon and Israel over the gas deposits is that their joint maritime border has never been delineated. Beirut has asked the United Nations to help mark a temporary sea boundary between Lebanon and Israel, a maritime equivalent of the “Blue Line” established by the UN in 2000, which corresponds to Lebanon’s southern land border. The UN has agreed to assist and the Israelis are studying the proposal. But the UN faces a potentially thankless task. The demarcation of the Blue Line 11 years ago was mired in mutual distrust and wrangling with neither the Lebanese nor the Israelis willing to concede an inch of territory to the other. Without goodwill from both sides, the maritime boundary could be even more difficult to define given the complicated geography of the coastline. Some have described the dispute over the gas fields along the Lebanon-Israel border as another “Shebaa Farms” — a source of manufactured tension with Israel.

But one European diplomat in Beirut said that parallels between the Shebaa Farms and the off-shore gas fields are misplaced. “Forget the Shebaa Farms,” the diplomat said, “the Lebanese are not being difficult [over the maritime boundary], because they have real economic interests here. Unless there is a pragmatic arrangement you could have a confrontation.” It is perhaps no surprise then that the sudden interest in the potential fossil fuel wealth off the Israeli and Lebanese coastline has turned the Mediterranean into a potential new theater of conflict between the Israelis and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s ability to target shipping — and possibly offshore oil and gas platforms — was demonstrated in the month-long war with Israel in 2006 when the militants came close to sinking an Israeli naval vessel with an Iranian version of the Chinese C-802 missile. Hezbollah fighters have since hinted that they have acquired larger anti-ship missiles, double the 72-mile range of the C-802 variant. Last year, Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah warned that his organization now possesses the ability to target shipping along the entire length of Israel’s coastline. In January, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the offshore gas fields as a “strategic objective that Israel’s enemies will try to undermine,” and vowed that “Israel will defend its resources.”

In February, the Israeli navy reportedly presented to the government a maritime security plan costing up to $70 million to defend the gas fields. Upping the ante even further, Nasrallah promised in March that if Israel threatens future Lebanese plans to tap its oil and gas reserves, “only the Resistance would force Israel and the world to respect Lebanon’s right.”

Then there is the recent passage of two Iranian navy vessels through the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean and the Israeli navy’s subsequent discovery in March of a smuggled consignment of arms and ammunition, including six C-704 anti-ship missiles believed destined for Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The missiles, though smaller than the C-802, could target Israeli shipping off Gaza as well as Israel’s Yam Tethys oil rig off the coast of Ashkelon. The oil and gas fields off the Lebanese and Israeli coasts look set not only to become a potential long-term source of wealth — but also a source of conflict in the years ahead.

Nicholas Blanford is the Beirut-based correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor and The Times of London

 

 

 

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Time to rethink a nuclear Middle East

by Paul Cochrane April 3, 2011
written by Paul Cochrane

Three days after an earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale critically damaged Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP), the president of South Korea and the crown prince of Abu Dhabi attended a ground-breaking ceremony of the Braka NPP in the United Arab Emirates; it is the first of four to be built under a $20 billion contract inked in 2009 between the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation and a consortium of South Korean and American companies.

The inauguration celebration could hardly have been more inopportune. In the course of a week the incident at the Fukushima NPP went from being rated four on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, “an accident with local consequences,” to level five, “an accident with wider consequences.” The Fukushima disaster is the only level five rating since the Three Mile Island meltdown in the United States in 1979. There has only been one level seven, the highest rating, in Chernobyl in 1986, which, according to research by New York’s Academy of Sciences published last year, resulted in the deaths of 985,000 people from cancer and related diseases.

The global “nuclear renaissance” touted just a few years ago seems far less secure, a fact reflected in investor sentiment: uranium prices on the spot market following the Japanese calamity plunged 27 percent to $50 per pound as countries started reconsidering the construction of new NPPs.

If there were ever a time to rethink nuclear power it is now, certainly before the dozen Middle Eastern and North African countries that have signed nuclear cooperation agreements start building NPPs. And the risks need to be seriously assessed, not just in terms of security, the logistics of storing spent fuel for thousands of years and so on, but also in terms of earthquake risk.

The Middle East is chock full of tectonic plates, with the Arabian plate in the middle flanked by the Eurasian, African and Indian plates. One of the most seismically active continental regions on earth is just across the sea from the United Arab Emirates, the Zagros Thrust in Iran. Of equal concern is the fact that modern systems to measure seismic activity have only recently been introduced in Saudi Arabia and Oman, while the UAE set one up just this year.

While there is little chance of a tsunami, an earthquake of a magnitude of 5.1 shook the emirate of Fujairah in 2002, and repeated seismic activity in the locality suggests that other, more sizable earthquakes are likely in the future. “When?” is of course the question, and the world can only hope that those building NPPs will do so with the worst-case scenario in mind; the Fukushima NPP was built at a time when the thought of it having to withstand a 9.0 magnitude earthquake was considered unlikely.

Braka was chosen as the site for the UAE’s first NPP as it is “an area with a very low probability of earthquakes — what is called low seismicity,” Ambassador Hamad al-Kaabi, UAE Permanent Representative to the IAEA, told the press after the Fukushima disaster. Yet it is not just unexpected earthquakes that are a concern when it comes to nuclear power. Transparency has been a major issue in the nuclear industry globally; in a 2008 US diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks, a Japanese politician said the country’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the department responsible for nuclear energy, has been “covering up nuclear accidents and obscuring the true costs and problems associated with the nuclear industry.”

The UAE hardly has a sterling reputation for transparency and accountability — think back to how the Dubai debt imbroglio was handled in 2009. If the Japanese, with 54 nuclear reactors, cannot be relied upon to be transparent, can we be sure the UAE will be?

Let us hope the UAE’s decision to go ahead with nuclear power, just as news of Fukushima’s fallout was dominating headlines, will not be retold through history as the epitomic example of a warning unheeded.

 

Paul Cochrane is the Middle East correspondent for International News Services

 

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Dialogue of the deaf

by Peter Grimsditch April 3, 2011
written by Peter Grimsditch

 

 

The clash between journalists and the establishment in Turkey has descended into a dialogue of the deaf. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is noted for its dedicated acquiescence to George W. Bush’s philosophy that the press is either “for us, or against us.” On the other side of this Mexican standoff is an equally dedicated press — though printing credible stories with detailed evidence to support the narrative is not necessarily part of that dedication.

As the battle now stands, dozens of journalists are in jail, accused of taking part in a vast conspiracy — dubbed the Ergenekon case — to overthrow the government. The mere fact that they have been accused is enough for organizations like Amnesty International to declare that the government is guilty of a low blow and is intent on curbing press freedom; the possibility that some of them may actually have something to answer for does not arise.

An impartial referee would do well to remember that the accused are journalists, not paragons of virtue who can do no wrong. In March the government introduced a draft bill purportedly to protect journalists from prosecution over articles related to judicial investigations. Foul play again, according to Ercan Ipekçi, a spokesman for the Freedom for Journalists Platform, who says the law would effectively ban journalists from reporting on judicial investigations altogether. Well, not quite. 

The preamble to the draft law talks of a “clarification about the circumstances in which reporting on investigations would break the law,” meaning press campaigns demanding the release of suspects detained by the police would be illegal.

“This is a retreat from the current situation and is thus unacceptable,” said Ipekçi. Journalists might not like to admit it, but it is not their function to represent a defendant or to put up the arguments of a lawyer seeking a dismissal of the charges, in this or any other case.

Turkish journalists ought to have no interest in prejudicing the cases of those under arrest, so why would they want to try a case in print ahead of an actual hearing? Whether or not journalists should divulge early on the discovery of supposedly manufactured evidence underpinning the charges is a moot point; in a well-ordered system there is recourse for lawyers to present such findings to a judge for a timely ruling on alleged skulduggery by the police or prosecutors.

The Turkish judicial system is in a state of flux and reform, however, and defense lawyers in the Ergenekon case have not been able to follow this path. Even if the journalists do provide the only forum in which to raise issues of official impropriety, they do not earn many plaudits for persistence. Among the failings of a press that, with exceptions, frequently prevents detail from getting in the way of telling a good story, is that it has yet to learn the virtues of doggedly pursuing its investigations until it gets a result.

There have been many stories in the past few months alleging faked “evidence” adduced against some of the Ergenekon suspects. Yet once the initial flurry of excitement inherent in exposing such alleged corruption had subsided, there were few attempts to follow up and force the issue to a conclusion. Yesterday’s good story is tomorrow’s lining on the floor of the birdcage.

There may well be serious doubts about the freedom of the press in Turkey — certainly the AKP in general, and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in particular, are very sensitive to criticism and shower the press with a confetti of writs — but interfering in judicial trials is not the battleground on which to fight.

The answer is that if a complementary set of laws safeguarding defendants’ rights were in place, these questions of interfering in the judicial process wouldn’t arise. In the developed world, for the most part, there is a time limit for detaining suspects without charging them and subsequently providing defense lawyers with copies of the evidence against those who do face trial. But in Turkey, under certain circumstances, a suspect can be held in jail for up to 10 years without facing a charge. 

The government’s real sin may be its procrastination in reforming a judicial system still emerging from the dark ages. Instead of introducing contempt of court legislation, it might be better engaged in creating a judicial system that ought not to be held in contempt.

Peter Grimsditch is Executive’s Istanbul correspondent

 

 

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Returning to tyranny

by Samer Muscati April 3, 2011
written by Samer Muscati

Eight years have passed since the United States-led invasion ended Saddam Hussein’s totalitarian reign and promised Iraq a democratically elected alternative respectful of its citizens’ rights.

Today, Iraqis are still waiting. The country is at a crossroads: either Iraq will embrace due process and take human rights protection seriously or it will risk reverting back to a police state. Recent developments are ominous.

Protests sweeping the Middle East have motivated thousands of Iraqis from all walks of life to demonstrate in cities across the country. They are making more modest demands than their regime-change-seeking neighbors; for now, they are content in calling for an end to a chronic lack of basic services and widespread corruption. But the democratically elected Iraqi government has reacted to these protests in much the same way as its despotic counterparts around the region.

While authorities in Erbil and Baghdad profess the right of citizens to take to the streets, in practice both governments have brutally suppressed protesters and journalists covering the events. Since February 16 security forces have killed at least 17 protesters across Iraq and injured more than 250. Thugs acting with tacit official approval stabbed peaceful protesters in Baghdad, while their Sulaymaniyah counterparts beat demonstrators and set their tents on fire. Security forces and their proxies in Kurdistan and Baghdad have raided media outlets and the offices of a prominent press freedom group, confiscating or destroying equipment and documents. They have attacked, arrested and threatened dozens of journalists, smashed cameras and confiscated memory cards.

Media workers are unsafe even away from the protests. After the nationwide February 25 protests, security forces arrested four journalists at a Baghdad restaurant, blindfolded and beat them and threatened them with torture during their subsequent interrogation. This latest crackdown does not come as a surprise to many Iraqis, especially minority groups and detainees, whose rights are routinely violated with impunity.

Iraq has made some progress by pulling itself away from the widespread civil strife that engulfed the country in 2006 and 2007. But there has been a price for this success: the central and regional governments have consolidated their power and rejected challenges to their authority, often with violence.

As journalists try to cover daily news of any kind they find themselves contending with emboldened Iraqi and Kurdish security forces and their image-conscious central and regional political leaders. The journalists face harassment, intimidation, arrest and often physical assault by state or political party security forces, and senior politicians are quick to sue journalists and their publications over unflattering articles. Impunity for some of the worst crimes have become all too common and cover-ups the norm.

Secret prisons are back

In February, Human Rights Watch uncovered a secret detention site in Baghdad, run by elite security forces answering to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s military office. At two other Baghdad facilities over the past year, forces belonging to two brigades outside the Defense Ministry’s chain of command have tortured, with complete impunity, detainees accused of terrorism. The prime minister also directly controls the Counter-Terrorism Service, which is subject to neither ministerial nor legislative oversight.

Iraqi authorities should hold these security forces accountable, along with the commanders who gave the orders or who looked away from the abuses their subalterns were committing. Iraqi leaders owe it to their citizens, who have endured enormous trauma through decades of political strife, wars, tyranny, sanctions and corruption that have destroyed much of their faith in effective governance. The United States and the United Kingdom claim to have created a society based on the rule of law and respect for human rights, while training security forces to respect those basic rights. But the response of those forces to recent demonstrations shows a different reality. Fundamental change is needed.

Iraq’s long transition to a democratic society largely depends on whether its central and regional governments will take actions matching their rhetoric and end the environment of impunity, protect human rights and hold accountable those who violate them.

 

Samer Muscati is a Middle East and North Africa researcher for Human Rights Watch

 

April 3, 2011 0 comments
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Calming Bahrain’s two seas

by Mohamed El-Moctar April 3, 2011
written by Mohamed El-Moctar

 

 

The military intervention in Bahrain by the Gulf Cooperation Council is most likely to further divide the country along sectarian lines and force the Bahraini crisis to spill over to the rest of the region. We have already heard the echoes from Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere. The GCC military intervention is likely to be remembered as a miscalculated step, and it might bring about the very results that it is trying to prevent: the legitimizing of Iranian interference, the transformation of the Bahraini crisis from a political to a geopolitical problem, from a local disagreement to a regional standoff. Most immediately, the GCC interference is widening the gap between Bahraini Sunnis and Shia. 

Every Arab dictator has said that his country is not Tunisia, or Egypt. These declarations have in some cases proved self-delusions, as we have seen in Libya and Yemen. In Bahrain, however, the argument seems to be true. The sectarian divide has made the Bahrainis’ appeal for political reform risky and unpredictable. Unlike the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions that brought people from the entire social spectrum together against the dictatorship, the Bahraini ‘revolution’ was born divisive.

While the Shia majority is determined more than ever to have more political and social equality, the Sunnis are adopting the monarchy as their political capital and their ultimate shield against potential Shia hegemony. Both sides have a legitimate point: the Bahraini Shia deserve long due equity, while the fear on the part of Bahraini Sunnis is grounded in the misfortunes of the Iraqi Sunnis. The GCC countries would have done better by facilitating a political compromise in Bahrain that provides more fairness to the Shia without victimizing the Sunnis.

Neither a genuine democracy with this deep a sectarian divide nor a British-style monarchy is possible, so long as the Sunnis fear that their hegemony will be replaced by one of a Shia variety. What is feasible in the short term is some sort of power sharing agreement and greater social justice. Bahrain can follow the Lebanese constitutional model, without necessarily making it constitutional: A Shia prime minister, for example, working side-by-side with the Sunni king, a more inclusive government that gives the Shia half of the cabinet, an elected parliament and so on. Moreover, affirmative action measures in the poor Shia areas are a must. These are possible steps that would defuse the unrest in Bahrain in the short term, and open the door for a constitutional monarchy in the long term.

The worst scenario is to make Bahrain a battlefield between Iran and Saudi Arabia — two countries divided by deep ideological hatred and geopolitical competition. There have been news reports on a discreet Turkish effort to solve the crisis in Bahrain. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan’s recent allusions to Bahrain in his speeches support the credibility of these reports. If this Turkish initiative is confirmed it would indeed be good news. Turkey has strong relations with the main regional and international players on the Bahraini scene: Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States, and the Turks can be seen as honest brokers by the Bahraini Sunni and Shia alike.

Among the GCC countries, Qatar is also very active diplomatically, and not divided along a Sunni-Shia line. Like the Turks, the Qataris’ strong relation with Americans, Saudis and Iranians — even with Lebanon’s Hezbollah — is leverage that can allow them to play a constructive role in Bahrain. A Qatari-Turkish initiative that brings regional and international players on board can save Bahrain from its deep crisis. But this effort must be founded on the fact that change in Bahrain is inevitable.

Two principles should rule this change: offering the Bahraini Shia a fair share of the political capital and economic welfare, and reassuring the Bahraini Sunnis that they will not be victims of the coming change in the way the Iraqi Sunnis were following the American-led invasion. With these two principles in mind, the future of Bahrain can be built on a solid foundation, without sectarian fractures and foreign interferences.   

Mohamed El-Moctar is a research coordinator at the Qatar Foundation

 

 

April 3, 2011 0 comments
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Economics & Policy

Pricey prospect for pipe dreams

by Sami Halabi April 3, 2011
written by Sami Halabi

The rectangular glass walls of Fathi Chatila’s office inHamra make visitors feel much like they are in an aquarium without water; perhaps that is appropriate for a hydro-geologist concerned with Lebanon’swater woes. Chatila, also the editor-in-chief of Arab Water World magazine, has been leading a campaign aimed at changing the heavily-indebted Lebanese government’s expensive water ways since 1996. His efforts thus far have been somewhat in vain; since the 1970s, the focus in upgrading Lebanon’s decrepit water infrastructure has been on large-scale projects that require more long-term funding, not less.

For a fiscally stable country this is a viable option, but Lebanon is anything but; it currently maintains a public debt around one-and-a-half times its annual economic output. The country loses 1.8 percent of its gross domestic product — or around $433 million — per year from the cost of inaction on water infrastructure, according to the World Bank. That figure doesn’t include the estimated $87 million spent annually by the Lebanese on private water due to the lack of a clean and reliable supply at the tap. Despite these financial burdens, the most recent plan to improve Lebanon’s water distribution capabilities, which appears close to adoption, is by no means an exception to the rule of expensive tastes.

In December of last year the World Bank gave its first nod of approval to Lebanon’s water sector regarding what those at the bank call the Greater Beirut Water Supply Project (GBWSP), also known as the Awali Project.

Ultimately, the project plans to provide constant water supply to Baabda, Aley, parts of Metn and the Mount Lebanon region, as well as to an estimated 350,000 low-income residents of Southern Beirut’s suburbs. The total cost of the project would come to approximately $370 million, of which the World Bank would put up $200 million in loans, the Beirut and Mount Lebanon Water Establishment (BMLWE) some $140 million and the Lebanese government the rest.

In a country where the areas outside the capital city are often neglected by public services — such as proper roads and electricity — water infrastructure is the rural revenge on city folk. On average, residents of the city suffer the most during the summer season, when average water supply reaches just three hours per day, if that. The water deficit in 2008 was measured at between 40 to 50 million cubic meters (MCM) per year by the Councilfor Development and Reconstruction (CDR), a financially autonomous public institution, accountable only to the cabinet, which plans and implements development projects. Furthermore, the BMLWE estimates that by 2025 the deficit will rise to 100 MCM.

In the short term, the GBWSP seeks to provide 24-hour supply to the areas that have suffered most. The project plans to take 50 MCM of water from the Qaraoun reservoir in the Western Bekaa — one of only two surface water storage structures built in the country since the 1960s — fed by the Litani River. The water will then be rerouted to the Awali river, treated and then conveyed to Greater Beirut, where, according the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW), a new network is currently being built that will distribute it to consumers whose homes are to be fitted with new meters.

In total, 200,000 new meters will be installed as part of a pilot project to reshape Lebanon’s water tariff structure. Currently, households are charged a flat fee depending on location (from $156.5 in Beirut and Mount Lebanon to $117.4 in the Bekaa). This will give way to a volume trictariff in these areas, initially at a rate of $0.39 per cubic meter of water, before increasing to a level that allows water establishments to break even in their operational and maintenance costs, according to the MoEW’s draft National Water Sector Strategy. It should be noted that none of this will be possible without a cabinet decision to change tariffs and, as of Executive going to press, no cabinet had been formed.

Hitch in the road

The GBWSP seemed to be going smoothly until last month when the World Bank announced that it would “expand a study already in process on water quality issues to cover water availability and costs,” after a report was submitted to the bank’s board of executive directors by the Inspection Panel, a “bottom-up” accountability and recourse mechanism of the World Bank that allows residents to file complaints to the board. It was hydro-geologist Chatila who authored the initial 21-page complaint signed by around 50 residents of Greater Beirut and submitted to the panel last November under the title, “Presenting a Much Better Project: Damour Dam.”

“If they accept the panel’s report or not, there is a crime that is going to happen against the residents of Beirut and the country,” says Chatila, in reference to the GBWSP. “It makes no sense that the water of the Damour River, [which] is just a short distance from Beirut and is clean and cheaper, is not brought to the city.”

Chatila has been lobbying the government to implement the proposed Damour river dam since 1996, he says, when he conducted his own study on the feasibility of placing a dam some two kilometers east of the juncture where the Damour meets the Al Hammam River, which he then submitted to the relevant water authorities.

The idea of using the water in the Damour River to supply Greater Beirut was first rejected in 1970 when the Lebanese cabinet decided instead on the plan that has since  become the GBWSP, which would operate from April to October: the dry season. The decision came as a result of studies carried out by the Ministry of Energy and Water and the Litani River Authority, which stated that only 5 MCM (as opposed to Qaraoun’s 50 MCM) could be stored by a dam on the Damour River and called for the idea to be scrapped.

Again in 1998 the Ministry of Energy and Water reaffirmed this position in a letter sent to Chatila stating that after consulting with international experts, including those from Électricité de France and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). It stated that “the geological formations are highly fissured and the solutions are very expensive and complicated, and even impossible, hence we decided to neglect it.”

After following up on the matter with FAO hydro-geologist Alain Guerre, Chatila claims he was told that the studies were only done at a location in the Beiteddine village of Al Samkaniyeh, not at the location much further downstream where he had performed his own research. Despite this, Chatila says he managed to lobby the cabinet, which eventually issued a decree on September 1, 1999, to compile the conditions for carrying out a feasibility study at the Damour river and to launch a tender a month later.

On September 8 the cabinet asked the CDR to commission Guerre and Chatila to work on the project. Chatila then claims that on September 25 Guerre received a phone call from Lebanon informing him that his life would be in danger if he came to Beirut. Guerre then sent an email to Chatila saying he would not be able to come to Lebanon for personal reasons. Guerre did not respond to a request to comment for this story.  

Later that same September, CDR commissioned Peter Rae of Harza Engineering, now Montgomery Watson Harza (MWH), to carry out a preliminary report, which was submitted in November 1999 and stated that a dam on the Damour river could store 63 MCM at a cost of $90 million, or 90 MCM at a cost $140 million, but two years would be needed for complete feasibility to be covered. According to Chatila, the CDR called in another firm by the name of Water Engineering, which considered the geological formations in the Damour River and the hydro-geological conditions prevailing in the area “ideal” for the formation of a reservoir.

Another CDR-commissioned study was then performed by Harza Engineering, which found that a 60 MCM dam was technically feasible.  In 2005, a war of words erupted in the press between Chatila and then president of the CDR Al Fadel Shalak, after which Chatila claimed he was physically forced out of the CDR offices.

In 2007 the CDR again asked Liban Consult to carry out feasibility studies on building a dam at the Damour River. Liban Consult announced in 2009 that it was possible to store 42 MCM for a cost of $90 million. “I will not question the results of the studies reached by Liban Consult for the Damour Dam, although I know that such results were pre-determined by CDR even before the feasibility studies took place,” reads the complaint letter authored by Chatila. “I will nevertheless accept all that has been mentioned by Liban Consult… although this study does not reflect the real storage conditions at the Damour river… The dam site I have located… will store over 90 MCM at a very low rate.” The CDR, the World Bank and Montgomery Watson Harza did not respond to repeated requests for comment.

“Damour is a viable option to look at and I don’t think it has been given a chance,” says Nadim Farajallah, professor of hydrology and water resources at the American University of Beirut (AUB).

What now?

Despite the fact that a cabinet decision to conduct a full feasibility study has been overlooked for years, the Damour dam project has not been written off entirely, as it was in the 1970s. The dam was included in the government’s 10-year water storage project, which expired last year, and the MoEW’s current draft National Water Sector Strategy, at a cost of $150 million to store 39 MCM. As for the GBWSP, the MoEW, which is tasked with executing the project, does not seem fazed by the latest concerns raised by the World Bank’s top decision-makers. 

“There are no implications on the project; as far as we are concerned we are moving and there is a board decision to grant this money,” says Randa Nimer, advisor to the Minister of Energy and Water. “If they decide to stop the funding, then fine, we will find another donor. At the end of the day let’s agree on one thing, this is not charity; we are paying interest.”

According to Nimer, the reason the ministry is pressing ahead is that, despite what potential other options such as Damour might hold, the GBWSP is the only project for Beirut that is ready to go; the potential alternatives don’t havea final design or funding lined up. “For Damour, the World Bank wanted a sophisticated environmental assessment, and it was not ready and would take at least a year.”

Initially, the ministry was looking at integrating the Damour project with the GBWSP but found that there would be no place to treatthe Damour water before it converged with water from Lake Qaraoun, which wouldalready be treated at Ouardaniyeh, explains Nimer. “With Damour you need to have your conveyor with raw water, treat it somewhere near Hazmieh and then distribute,” she says. As a result the projects will have to be done separately.

Nimer says she “refuses” to accept the premise that Damour should be compared to the GBWSP because, at the end of the day, Beirut will need the GBWSP, the Damour dam, as well as dams at Bisri and Janah, so whether the cost per cubic meter for one is greater than the other should not be a major concern [see table].

Moreover, she explains that the conveyor being built for the GBWSP will have a capacity of 150 MCM to take water from the planned Bisri dam, and adds that Damour is planning to be integrated with the Janah dam, which will bring somewhere from 30 to 40 MCM on its own. “If I need water for Beirut, from Awali, Damour and Bisri, you cannot tell me Damour is $2 [per cubic meter(CM)] and Awali is $3 [per CM], so don’t do Awali,” she says hypothetically. All of them are projects that the MoEW is “going to implement in the next five to 10 years so [let’s] not compare prices between these. This is what is available and what I can do to bring water to Beirut.”

Not just cost

But the objections of Chatila and the Greater Beirut residents do not stop at merely cost and timing. Many of the opponents of the GBWSP cite the historically bad water quality of Qaraoun reservoir and the upper Litani River as the main reason they do not want the water. Residents around the Qaraoun in the West Bekaa have refused to use its water, opting instead to spend some $50 million under the auspices of the Council for the South, another public, financially autonomous body, to bring water from the low-lying Zarqa spring to their areas.

Arif Dia, professor of hydrobiology at the Lebanese University and a specialist in water contamination, has conducted studies on the Qaraoun, Litani, Awali and Damour rivers. He confirms that the waters of the Qaraoun are problematic. “I did a biological study and really life cannot exist in the Qaraoun. It’s scary how dirty it is,” he says. “The Damour’s water is safer for sure. Between all of the rivers it’s the best.”

Chatila claims that the water from the Qaraoun contains trace elements and heavy metal remnants of carcinogenic minerals such as zinc and lead bromide, which cannot be treated. However, both Dia and AUB’s Farajallah deny this.  “You can remove anything from water; they drink from the Thames, don’t they?” said Farajallah. “But the more you treat the more you pay. If you have the money you have the solution.”

Dia adds: “You need advanced technology, and I doubt that this exists in Lebanon… You know, these issues need a lot of care and are delicate and I am doubtful we have the capability.”

According to Nimer, beginning in April of last year the ministry began conducting weekly tests on the water at several locations of the project, including the Qaraoun reservoir for 11 months, and cross-checked these results with those from the Litani River Authority once a month. “The result is that the water is good and does not contain carcinogenic materials,” she said.“When the panel came and started raising the issue of water quality because [of] Chatila… the World Bank requested that we conduct further analysis… We had a team who went there, collected samples and sent them to the environmentl aboratory of AUB,” she added, saying that the samples would be ready by the end of March and others would be taken a month later to cross check. “That will be it because with the heavy metals you don’t do tests regularly, because either you have them or you don’t. I am not paying any more money on that issue.”

Whether or not the water is suitable for consumption or cost-effective treatment is one thing, but what’s certain is that the organs of the Lebanese government have not been able to identify the most cost-effective methods of managing the country’s water, in this case or in any other.

As a result the people have suffered, while millions of dollars have been paid to consultants for projects that were never started. Whether the GBWSP will suffer the same fate is a question of both time and money, but it alone will by no means solve the country’s chronic water problems.

For that to happen, Lebanon will need a cabinet to make a decision to pass a national water sector strategy, and it will have to stay in office long enough to implement it with its associated laws. Given the track record of ineffective cabinets and parliaments, the ambitions of the Lebanese water sector could very well end up washed out to sea, just like the valuable water in its rivers.

April 3, 2011 0 comments
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