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Feature

A cruel, hot summer

by Executive Editors September 23, 2010
written by Executive Editors

Like the wise farmer who knows disaster can and does strike, no matter how carefully he cultivates his harvest, policy makers at the Kremlin must be shaking their heads at how badly their well-laid plans have gone arwy.

Moscow had sown all the seeds a country should need to achieve a greater share of the global grain export market in recent years, having overhauled its agricultural industry and boosted sector investment. The result had been a near doubling of wheat exports between 2005 and 2009, from 10 million to 18 million tons, with Russia’s biggest export markets including Egypt, Turkey, Syria and Iran.

This amounted to Russia last year cornering 14 percent of global market share — a number that is precipitously set to plummet in 2010 from the disastrous interventions of Mother Nature and rising temperatures.

The wildfires raging across Russia this summer have destroyed as much as 25 percent of Russia’s wheat crop, with widespread drought diminishing yields of surviving fields. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) issued a revised forecast predicting that by year’s end the crop will shrink to 45 million tons from 2009’s 60 million.

In response, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin at the beginning of last month imposed a moratorium on grain exports for the rest of the year to protect domestic supplies and stave off inflation in the price of local foodstuffs. Russians consumed 42 million tons of wheat in 2009 — slightly less than the total expected crop this year, helping to explain the export ban.

Yet the move surprised many international observers, who expected Russian leaders to continue to complete export sales by tapping into government inventories, as moves to restrict trade can damage a country’s reputation as a reliable exporter. 

Futures contracts for wheat were dipping to nine-month lows in early June, trading at $4.30 per bushel — some $158 per ton — on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), effectively the world benchmark for wheat prices. Prices rose quickly as the Russian fires spread and reports emerged that other major wheat producing countries — such as Canada and the Ukraine — were also facing crops losses. Wheat spiked following Putin’s announcement, reaching near $285 on the CBOT [See graph page 24].

Abdolreza Abbassian, senior grains economist at the United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization, told international press on August 6 that: “a situation which was not serious has now become serious.”

A New York-based commodity, who was not authorized to speak to the media, told Executive that wheat “futures have been very volatile recently,” adding, “they made new highs right after the Russian export ban… but have come off [those highs].”

As Executive went to print at the end of August, the CBOT’s price-per-ton was about $243.

Production vs consumption of wheat (millions of tons)

Construction                Production
Source: USDA, (Qatar wheat data not covered)

Imports vs exports of wheat (millions of tons)

Imports 2009               Exports 2009
Source: USDA, (Qatar wheat data not covered)

Last time around

In 2007, an unusually volatile spate of natural disasters beginning in the summer caused widespread crop damage across the globe. This, coupled with rapidly rising fuel prices, spurred sharp inflation in foodstuffs globally. The price of wheat tripled on world markets, leading to social unrest and violence in many developing countries,  including Egypt, where rioters clashed with police when bread prices doubled.

This international food crisis revealed the interconnectivity of the modern world’s food and commodities markets, and exposed how dependent many countries are on these markets for their political and social stability.  

Russia’s sudden wheat export ban will force the Egyptian government to fork out $877 million extra to secure new supplies

Russian wheat in the Middle East

Egypt, as the world’s largest importer of wheat, has been particularly affected by Moscow’s export ban. The country’s total wheat consumption was 17 million tons in 2009, vastly outstripping domestic wheat production of 8 million — meaning Cairo must import the difference. The Egyptian government has said Russia’s sudden halt to wheat exports will force it to fork out $877 million to secure new supplies [For more see story on page 26].

Neighboring Jordan has taken steps to shore up its domestic stores of wheat last month, floating a tender for 100,000 tons, which was filled by Germany at a cost of $328 per ton on August 13. However, the increased price of wheat is not expected to cause a corresponding price uptick in Jordan’s bread market because of government flour subsidies, which cost Amman some $169 million in 2009.

“Despite the rise in international wheat prices, which will increase the cost of the government bread subsidy, we will continue supporting bread with the same mechanism,” said Amer Hadidi, the Jordanian Minister of Industry and Trade, to the Jordan Times. 

Syria and Lebanon will also have to import significant amounts of wheat this year. The effects of the Russian wildfires have combined with a ‘wheat rust’ fungicide epidemic, which has affected Syria particularly badly. According to the USDA, “the concentration of rust-affected crops is the highest in north-east Syria and southern and south-east Turkey, where the governments reported outbreaks in the prime wheat growing regions.” 

Syria imported 2 million tons of wheat this past year, which is its third consecutive year as a net importer after years of drought.

Wheat Futures US cents/bushel

Source: USDA

GCC prepared and spared

Gulf States appear to be better equipped to manage the price spikes and supply shortages, with Saudi Arabia intending to wait another five months before issuing its next wheat tender. The kingdom is betting that wheat prices will drop in the interim period and that it won’t have to pay the current, inflated price. 

Speaking to Reuters, Waleed el-Khereiji, director general of the Saudi Grain Silos and Flour Mills Organization said: “I don’t foresee a crisis, or a crisis similar to what happened in 2007 and the prices now are still below their level in 2007.” 

Saudi stores of wheat are enough to meet domestic needs until April 2011; not counting another 200,000 tons of wheat that will be delivered in September. The kingdom imported just under 2 million tons of wheat in 2009, none of which originated in Russia.

The United Arab Emirates also appears to be minimally affected by the inferno that burned across the Russian heartland.

According to a report issued by the Department of Analysis and Business Information, 89 percent of the UAE’s wheat imports originate in Canada, Germany, Australia and Argentina. Russia by contrast, provides only 2 percent of the total.

“I don’t foresee a crisis, or a crisis similar to what happened in 2007 and the prices now are still below their level in 2007” 

The next harvest

Fortunately, there is some optimism that a good wheat harvest in other parts of the world will make up for the damage caused by the loss of Russia’s crop.

The USDA has reported that North Africa produced 20.2 million tons of wheat in the  2009-2010 season, up from 14.4 million tons the previous year. Factoring in Russia’s harvest failure, the USDA forecast for the 2010-2011 global wheat supply was only slightly adjusted from 676 million tons to 651 million tons, as other countries are stepping in to close the supply gap left by the Russians, led by the United States and Australia.

The prospect of Russia being forced to import grain from other countries over the next year, however, caused price volatility toward the end of August, with Dow Jones Newswires reporting Moscow may import up to four million tons of various grains through the 2011 harvest season.

Speculators are also adding momentum to the price swings and were a major factor in the steep rise in prices seen in the past month, according to Makram Makarem, senior financial consultant at FFA Private Bank in Lebanon

“This up-move [of prices] is led by investors buying back their short positions after Russia banned grain exports, as well as speculators and hedge fund managers wanting to ride the wave,” said Makarem to Executive.

He pointed out that people should keep things in perspective, however, when making comparisons to price hikes that caused the 2007-2008 food crisis.

“We need to note that wheat reached a high of $13.34 per bushel in February 2008 after a much steeper increase in price,” remarked Makarem, while the highest prices peaked last month was $7.75 per bushel.

September 23, 2010 0 comments
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Feature

Withering fields of green

by Executive Editors September 23, 2010
written by Executive Editors

Mohamad Ajami’s 65 beehives overlook the pastoral idyll of the Litani River Valley, with Jebel El Sheikh looming in the distance and Beaufort Castle laying to the right. Last year Ajami’s business was flourishing; he had a bumper honey harvest, generating 650 kilos. He was optimistic that this year would be even better, purchasing extra hives and equipment in anticipation of producing one ton of honey. At $25 for a 900-gram jar, Ajami should have netted more than $25,000.

But three months ago he started realizing all was not well. The winds had been continuously blowing from the east, dry, desert winds instead of the westerly winds that provide the right moisture and dew for flora to thrive, and for the bees to pollinate and produce nectar. Ajami also noticed that the bees were not breeding, meaning he could not artificially swarm them and build up the number of colonies to allow him to have more hives.

“That was when I realized something wasn’t right,” he said. “And while the summer flowers did come, there were no forager bees in the hives. Something did not encourage them to generate honey, something — beyond my understanding — that is beyond normal events.”

When it came to harvesting, Ajami’s suspicions turned out to be even more warranted than he had thought: “I only generated 50 kilos. It was not a harvest, it is solely for family consumption this year,” he said.

Ajami’s experience is not an exception; beekeepers throughout Lebanon have had a bad season, with rough estimates — in lieu of official statistics — of a 50 percent decline in production from an annual average of 200 tons. For Wadih Yazbek, a beekeeper and equipment distributor in Beirut, hardware sales are down 60 to 70 percent, indicative of the overall decline in the honey sector. “Beekeepers aren’t needing the extra hives and secondly, with not a lot of honey, keepers are not keen on purchasing new extractors or filters,” said Yazbek.

It is not just honey production that has been affected by the unusual weather patterns Lebanon has witnessed over the past year. Abnormal precipitation in the winter and spring — on average the same quantity but occurring over half the number of days — and a heat wave in prime harvesting time has also hit other agricultural sectors.

“We’ve had a lot of problems this year, particularly with grapes, olives, vegetables, apples and potatoes”

Leaner times

The United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Foreign Agriculture Service estimates Lebanon will produce 100,000 tons of wheat this year, a 23 percent drop from the 130,000 tons grown in 2009. Green leafed vegetables have been frazzled by the sun, and fruits are ripening earlier than usual. “We’ve had a lot of problems this year, particularly with grapes, olives, vegetables, apples and potatoes,” said Elia Choueiri, head of the department of plant protection at the Agriculture Ministry’s Lebanese Agricultural Research Institute (LARI) at the Tal Amara Station in the Bekaa valley.

In some areas the olive harvest is down between 30 and 50 percent, particularly in areas where olives trees were not irrigated or had supplemental irrigation. At two major vineyards in the Bekaa some 70 percent of the grapes were lost, while vineyards at higher elevations have also been affected, particularly white grapes.

“The heat wave had an impact on the physiological status of the vine: a rapid increase of alcohol content because of the increased sugar content in grapes over a very short period,” said Carlos Adem, president of the Syndicate of Wines and Spirits. “In general, the year 2010 will not be one of the great vintages, like 2003 for example.”

In the north, trees have brought forth fruit but not enough leaves, due to it not getting cold enough over the winter. Japanese plums are down 40 percent and forest fires have also wrought damage.

“Each plant has a life cycle, but they are flowering before time, so the life-cycle is shorter. It’s because of climatic change,” said Roula Faris, Middle East representative of the Research Institute of Organic Agriculture. “Leafed vegetables and herbs have flowered early due to the temperature, and they are unmarketable.”

While the Bekaa has had temperatures this summer of up to 45 degrees, in the country’s mountainous regions — where a significant amount of produce is grown, whether fruit trees or in greenhouses — temperatures have soared to unprecedented levels.

“For the first time in Lebanon, even the mountains are hotter than the coast,” revealed Faris. On top of all this, phytoplasma diseases have affected stone fruits such as peaches and almonds, killing more than 100,000 trees within three years. LARI’s Choueiri said: “We have tested over 100 insects to find the pathogen, but don’t know what kind of insect is spreading the disease… Also, due to the hot weather, the activity of these insects is higher, and we’ve seen large infections of peach trees in the south and the Bekaa. The diffusion is getting higher year after year.”

So far this year, LARI has recorded a further 40,000 trees in the south affected by the phytoplasma which, curiously, on a regional basis is only affecting Lebanon and Iran.

If the government subsidizes wheat it will come at a heavy cost. The alternative is potential rioting if bread prices spike

Give them bread

The extent of losses in the agricultural sector will not be fully known until harvesting is finished and all the data is collated. While early indications imply it has been a bad year, it has not been a total disaster, with some regions affected far more than others.

Lebanon has not experienced the drought that neighboring Syria has gone through over the past five years, which has hit agricultural output hard and affected the livelihoods of more than one million people. But the reduced yields have coincided with poor crops globally, particularly in fire-ravaged Russia, which has driven up global wheat prices, and the disastrous flooding in Pakistan, which has reduced rice cultivation [see story on page 32].

As global food prices are on an upward curve, Lebanon is sure to be affected. The country imports some 70 percent of the food it consumes, according to the United Nations’ Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). Indeed, with wheat production in Lebanon down 42 percent, the government banned exports at the beginning of August, preventing a ship loaded with 4,000 tons of grain at the Beirut port from setting sail.

Lebanon imports some 400,000 tons of wheat per year, and the government went to the international markets to purchase an immediate 50,000 tons last month, either for strategic reserves or to regulate domestic wheat and flour prices.

“With wheat prices at today’s level, around $320 for a ton, flour should be around $450 per ton or more but the ceiling for bread prices was set [by the government] at a maximum of $320 for a ton of bread,” said Arslan Sinno of Dora Flour Mills and president of the Syndicate of Agrifood Traders. “Someone must pay the difference, certainly not the millers, nor the bakers, so either the consumer by liberalizing the price of bread — which may increase the pack price from LL 1500 ($1) to maybe LL1800 ($1.20) or LL2000 ($1.33) — or the state by subsidizing the wheat by about $200 per ton.”

If the government subsidizes wheat it will come at a heavy cost to the state’s coffers. The alternative is higher costs for the Lebanese populace and potential rioting if bread prices do spike, as happened in Beirut in January 2008, when rumors spread that prices were to rise.

Agriculture could generate $3.5 billion if there was sufficient infrastructure investment

The new agricultural plan

The agricultural sector as a whole in Lebanon is underinvested, which has only compounded the losses caused by the topsy-turvy weather this year. According to the Lebanese Farmers Syndicate, agriculture generated some $1.5 billion in gross revenues in 2009, but could generate $3.5 billion if there was sufficient infrastructure investment.

According to research at the American University of Beirut (AUB),  some 50 percent of rural families rely on agro-food production. AUB also said that around 20 to 25 percent of the country’s workforce is employed in agriculture, although the Ministry of Agriculture puts this figure at nine percent. Either way, climatic change clearly poses a threat to agriculture’s potential and therefore to the income generation of a good swathe of the populace.

This importance finally seems to be coming to the forefront in politics, with Agriculture Minister Hussein Hajj Hassan releasing a four-year plan to address the sector’s core problems.

“As of this year, the agriculture ministry has started to be more active,” said LARI’s Choueiri, adding that LARI has taken on a further 70 staff to improve research. “If you compared 10 years ago to today, our work has improved incredibly.”

Implementing reforms requires data, which is currently sorely lacking; the last census on the agricultural sector was in 1988. FAO is carrying out a new census for the whole country, slated for release in October. “We’ve a horizontal project for synergy between all the ministries for efficiently developing the agricultural sector to help realize its potential,” said Ali Moumen, FAO’s representative in Lebanon.

LARI and the Ministry of Agriculture have implemented a strategy to boost and retain production levels. “We are working on new varieties that support dry climatic conditions, such as introducing new apple varieties at an altitude of 700 meters instead of the old varieties of the Bekaa,” said Choueiri.

Farmers are being given codes for identification purposes in the event of disease, nurseries are being monitored, workshops are being held on growing techniques and pesticide use, and a forecast service by LARI kicked off this year that sends text messages to farmers about disease and climatic change.

Organic agriculture, although very much in its nascence, is also improving, with the number of hectares rising from 250 to 2,465, and organic farmers increasing from 17 to 331 since 2000. “Organic agriculture can reduce global warming as there is lower water usage, it increases biodiversity and improves soil fertility,” said Faris.

Improvements in the sector will certainly help offset climatic change, but for the immediate year ahead, much will depend on future temperatures and whether precipitation is better spread and rainwater retained.

“If this year there is again hot weather over the winter period, it will be a big problem for apples, pears and cherries,” said Choueiri.

While the proactive approach of the ministry may offer room for cautious optimism — though very much weather dependent — many agriculturalists will be feeling the sting this winter.

For beekeeper Mohamad Ajami, the income he planned to live off has disappeared.

“I am really concerned about saving the bees for a harvest next year. Adding insult to injury, my whole land was burned as it was so dry and someone must have flicked a lit cigarette,” he said. “My focus was this line of work, but I’ll have to do something else to survive the rest of the year.”

September 23, 2010 0 comments
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Editorial

The smartest solution of them all

by Yasser Akkaoui September 23, 2010
written by Yasser Akkaoui

Now that work restrictions on Lebanon’s estimated 400,000 Palestinians have been eased, though this is still a small step and should not be seen as an end to the plight of Lebanon’s Palestinian Diaspora, maybe it is time to explore what should be done with the roughly 150,000 Palestinians in Lebanon under the age of 18.

The only passport they have to escape the misery of the camps is proper healthcare and, more importantly, a decent education. But the Lebanese should not have to shoulder such an initiative alone – we were not a signatory of the Sykes Picot Agreement which, nearly a century ago, laid the foundations for the region’s current woes.

No, the world’s wealthy nations must do at least as much to ameliorate the problem as they have done to cause it, and play their part in molding the Palestinian youth into genuine global citizens. They could create 50 schools in Lebanon with around 3,000 students in each establishment. These would sharpen students’ minds 12 months of the year with sciences and arts of an authority unavailable to them through the United Nations classrooms, and empower their personalities to graduate as a generation of Palestinians who would throw off the label of global pariahs. As highly developed human beings, they would have all the necessary tools to be offered the opportunity to attend universities in London, Paris, Berlin, New York, etc.

Given the wealth of human capital this would instill, it is not inconceivable that the Lebanese would want to employ their knowledge and skills to Lebanon’s advantage; education could perhaps even be the untried key to opening doors back to Palestine. If not, then at least they can take their equity abroad.

It would be nothing short of a program for dignity, one that would cut the cycle of decades-old violence that has seen children without hope reach for the gun rather than the laptop, as they realize they are condemned to a life without pride and self-worth in the refugee camps of Lebanon.

It would also be affordable. Building schools and providing an education is relatively cheap and would produce some very high returns. Education for Palestinians is an initiative that the entire world can get behind and, once started, it might stimulate similar donations from wealthy Palestinians from within the wider diaspora. The world would be creating a cycle of prosperity rather than a cycle of misery. In the age of corporate social responsibility, the battle against carbon emissions and the era of smart solutions, surely this is the smartest solution of them all, and one that could eventually put an end to over half a century of misery.

September 23, 2010 0 comments
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Where to draw the line

by Nicholas Blanford September 3, 2010
written by Nicholas Blanford

Last month’s deadly border clash between Lebanese and Israeli troops raises a question about the curious manner in which the Blue Line — the term given to the United Nations boundary that follows the original 1923 border between Lebanon and Palestine — was delineated a decade ago. 

Other than the original 1923 border agreement, subsequently reconfirmed as the 1949 Armistice Line, the main source of data to define the line was the last border survey carried out by the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission (ILMAC) in 1949-1950. The appendices contained a list of coordinates, sketches and large-scale maps, which were used by the UN to help mark out the boundary after the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000. The process hit controversy when the UN agreed to a series of compromises that deviated the Blue Line away from the path of the original border to satisfy Israeli security interests.

One objection concerned a curious anomaly beside the kibbutz of Misgav Am. Long ago Israelis had pushed the border fence some 500 meters into Lebanon beside Misgav Am, and over the years the settlement had expanded onto Lebanese soil.  When it came time to delineate the Blue Line, the ILMAC map coordinates of the border provided by Lebanon cut through Misgav Am, leaving part of the kibbutz inside Lebanon. But ILMAC’s written description of the boundary recorded that it should run “to the west” of Misgav Am. In 1950, the written description may well have corresponded to the coordinates. But in 2000, the border identified by the ILMAC report had inched deeper into Lebanon, matching the creeping westward expansion of the kibbutz. The UN opted for the written description over the coordinates (thus sparing the evacuation of a few houses in Misgav Am) even though it clearly deviated the Blue Line away from the international boundary.

Another disputed area was a four-kilometer stretch of the border southeast of Metullah to the Hasbani River. The UN placed the Blue Line 100 meters north of the 1923 border. They appeared to have misread the 1923 boundary agreement, a point the cartographic team leader acknowledged to me in an interview in July 2000. The result, however, was that Israel was not required to pull back another 100 meters along this stretch of the frontier, allowing it to keep intact a military outpost and spare Israeli farmers from losing some apple trees.

More significantly, minor deviations spared the Israelis from having to pull back their forward outposts on the mountain peaks of the Shebaa Farms. If the Blue Line had followed the Lebanon-Syria border in this area, it would have shaved off the northern edges of three Israeli outposts, requiring the Israelis to dismantle the positions. Instead, the Blue Line loops around each IDF compound by a few dozen meters. The most bizarre deviation is at Addaisseh, the scene of the August 3 border clash. Here, the line runs for a few hundred meters just north of the main border road inside Lebanon, along which runs the fence. In other words, when Lebanese motorists drive between the villages of Addaisseh and Kfar Kila, for a part of their journey they are actually driving on the Israeli side of the Blue Line. The UN had blindly followed the ILMAC coordinates at this spot even though it was contrary to the description of the 1923 boundary, which states that the border runs on the southern side of the road. It seems, however, to have been a genuine mistake. One cartographer who worked on the Blue Line delineation blamed the anomaly on the short amount of time available to draw up the line, the inability to survey the ground (it was still under Israeli occupation at the time) and the relatively small (1:50,000) scale of the Blue Line base map.

As for the Addaisseh incident, the initial question in the wake of the deadly firefight which left two Lebanese soldiers, a Lebanese journalist and an Israeli officer dead was on which side of the Blue Line lay the tree that the Israeli soldiers wanted to prune. The UN confirmed that the tree was on the Israeli side. But what no one has mentioned publicly, either through ignorance or discretion, is that even the Lebanese soldiers shooting at the Israelis were on the Israeli side of the Blue Line, thanks to the idiosyncrasies of the delineation process 10 years earlier.

NICHOLAS BLANFORD is the Beirut-based correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor and The Times of London

September 3, 2010 0 comments
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What lies beneath

by Paul Cochrane September 3, 2010
written by Paul Cochrane

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is fortunate to be able to tap the majority of its oil onshore and in shallow coastal waters. That’s meant a minimal need for deepwater drilling and its associated risks, exemplified by the disastrous BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico that saw some five million barrels of crude spew out of the Macondo well over the course of three months.

But with oil fields maturing in North Africa, oil companies are exploring for black gold at ever-deeper depths in the Mediterranean Sea. In Libya, for example, the colossal Gulf of Sirte basin extends to depths 2,000 meters below sea level — that’s some 500 meters deeper than the Macondo well. Deepwater drilling is already underway in the territorial waters of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.

Yet it was only when the tarnished British oil company BP announced in the wake of the Gulf of Mexico spill that it is to start exploration off the Libyan coast that Mediterranean states and environmental groups took note of the potential dangers, calling for a moratorium on deepwater drilling. Italy has been the most vocal in calling for a unified strategy for the Mediterranean, what with the Sirte basin only some 500 kilometers from its territory. The Italian foreign minister suggested deepwater drilling should be referred to the Union for the Mediterranean, but this body of European Union and littoral states has essentially been a white elephant thus far, initially beset by problems within the EU and stymied by the Israeli-Arab conflict. The need for a common front on deepwater drilling is a pressing one. An oil spill in the Mediterranean would be a disaster on par if not more calamitous than in the Gulf of Mexico, given the size of the sea and the 21 countries it borders. As the recent BP spill has shown, oil companies and governments are not prepared for when accidents occur.

Libya, according to the United Nations, does not yet have a national contingency plan for an oil spill, while Italian budget cuts have hampered the country’s response effectiveness. The rest of the Med is equally ill-equipped to cope with a major oil spill. With so many countries involved a unified front is unlikely, but pressure could be brought to bear on oil companies with deepwater drilling operations to hold off until the BP spill in the Gulf of Mexico has been fully investigated, as the United States and Norway have done. Indeed, BP appears to have caved to pressure, delaying the launch of deepwater operations in Libya.

But deepwater drilling is also in the cards for the Red Sea, and over in the Persian Gulf more than 1,600 offshore wells — albeit in much shallower waters — have been drilled in the past decade, according to Energyfiles. A consolidated stance on offshore drilling for the whole MENA region is clearly needed, which could be spearheaded by the Arab League and then developed in coordination with the EU and other neighbors.

While many want deepwater drilling banned outright, as long as the planet relies on oil-powered economies, we arguably have little choice but to take the oil wherever it may be found. Indeed, over the past 15 years, deepwater drilling has sourced some 60 billion barrels of oil, according to Deutsche Bank, and will account for 10 percent of global oil production between 2008 and 2015. 

Deepwater drilling should be viewed in light of the pros and cons. Sure, income is generated, but an oil spill would cost billions to clean up and have untold costs on the fishing industry and the Mediterranean’s top earner, tourism. Ten percent of global oil production coming from deepwater drilling is significant, but alternative energies could offset this, such as the solar power projects underway in Morocco.

Countries embarking on offshore drilling, particularly in deep waters, need to weigh up these upsides and downsides. In any event, energy producing states and oil companies should set up a multi-billion dollar contingency fund for any potential spill in the MENA region. With so much money being made off energy, protecting the environment should be considered an operational cost.  This makes even more sense when you consider that demands on MENA oil production are set to increase to offset lost output in the oil-drenched Gulf of Mexico.

PAUL COCHRANE is the Middle East correspondent for International News Services

September 3, 2010 0 comments
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Yes is a four-letter word

by Peter Grimsditch September 3, 2010
written by Peter Grimsditch

Campaigning for this month’s referendum on constitutional reform in Turkey has not only aroused the expected political passions, but also reduced an Istanbul bride to tears on her wedding day.

If the proposals are approved, Parliament for the first time will be involved in appointing members of the Constitutional Court. Three of the 17 members would be elected by a parliamentary majority, effectively allowing the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to select candidates.

The AKP sees the Constitutional Court as an elitist, undemocratic hangover from the days of military coups. The party’s spokesmen say that reforms will modernize the judicial system and bring the country into line with European Union recommendations. Anything that helps Turkey’s tortuous accession to the EU must be a good thing, they argue. Well, not quite, according to referendum opponents, who come from almost every quarter except the AKP.

Kemal K?l?çdaro?lu, leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), argues that a two-thirds majority should be mandated since this would broaden the parliamentary views required to elect a member of the court. He is also concerned that the opportunity has been missed to remove the Minister of Justice from the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, which would emphasize the separation of powers between politicians and the judiciary.

But more important than any high-flown political philosophy is one of few things shared by both the AKP and the CHP — deep mutual mistrust. The AKP could correctly point to the use of the Constitutional Court by the opposition as a tool to stymie moves that it doesn’t like but is unable to stop through democratic parliamentary means, such as the election of President Abdullah Gül. The opposition, meanwhile, suspects the AKP of having ulterior motives.

The AKP controls parliament and the presidency, leaving only the Constitutional Court free from its direct influence. In 2008, the court considered imposing a five-year exclusion from politics of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an, Gül and around 70 AKP members of parliament for Islamic activity incompatible with the constitution. The verdict was little more than a finger-wagging but it increased the AKP’s mistrust of the court, whose membership it now wants to broaden.

Voters are split down the middle. An opinion poll last month said 50.9 percent are opposed to the reforms, with 49.1 percent in favor — a marginal increase in the ‘anti’ vote from a poll conducted in July.

The referendum will be a harbinger for next year’s parliamentary polls, so winning has a huge secondary significance. But, according to Hurriyet Daily News, that clearly was not on the mind of Fatma Ormanc? last month. Despite being head of the AKP’s Women’s Branch in Beykoz, a district of Istanbul, Ormanc? was on a day off from politics when local mayor Yücel Çelikbilek performed her son’s wedding ceremony.

Çelikbilek, also an AKP supporter, received the traditional three replies of “evet” (yes) from the bride and groom, before adding: “I expect you to say ‘yes’ on September 12, too.” The bride’s father squared up to the mayor to complain about turning his daughter’s wedding into a political meeting. At one point, wedding guests intervened to keep the dispute from escalating into a fight. Even Ormanc? was not happy with the mayor’s political ad lib (she was also furious with the behavior of her son’s new father-in-law.)

The near-brawl in Beykoz followed a more peaceful nuptial political stunt 24 hours earlier in the distinctly secular confines of Izmir on the Aegean coast. Ediz Tat?, son of a local CHP mayor, and his bride, Vildan Sever, opted to say ‘I accept’ instead of the ‘evet’ increasingly visible on AKP supporters’ baseball caps.

Deniz Baykal, former head of the CHP and a fierce advocate of a ‘no’ vote, praised the couple’s refusal to say ‘yes’, even to each other.

A lawyer said the ceremony was binding as no law dictates brides and grooms must use the word “evet”. ?lkhan Elçin was quoted in Hurriyet as saying: “Marriage depends on being in front of a registrar, signing the book and expressing that you want to marry in an open way that everyone can understand.”

Marriages may be agreed to in an “open way that everyone can understand,” but that’s more than can be said for the upcoming referendum.

PETER GRIMSDITCH is Executive’s

Istanbul correspondent

September 3, 2010 0 comments
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India opens up to Iran

by Gareth Smith September 3, 2010
written by Gareth Smith

As President Barack Obama struggles for direction in Afghanistan, the prospect of reconciliation between the United States-backed government of Hamid Karzai and Taliban members has concentrated minds not just in Pakistan, which backs the idea, but also in Tehran and New Delhi. Iran’s deputy foreign minister, visiting New Delhi in early August said the two countries’ views on Afghanistan were “close.”

India is skeptical over Tehran’s desire to phase out US-led Western troops, but both countries want a stable, strong government in Kabul that can contain the Taliban. Iran and India have been wary of Sunni militants in Afghanistan since the US and its Saudi and Pakistani allies fostered a “holy war” against Soviet secularism in the 1980s. But Iranian ministerial visits to India in July and August focused not just on cooperation over Afghanistan, but on also improving economic links.

Iran and India have complimentary energy interests: India, which hopes for a sustained 8 to 10 percent growth despite meager energy resources, has long eyed Iran’s substantial oil and gas reserves — each the world’s second largest. It already imports around 14 percent of its crude from Iran, worth $11 billion annually. Such signs of trade and partnership go down like a lead balloon in Washington, which is pushing for greater isolation of Iran over its nuclear program. Back in 2006, Washington warned it would end nuclear co-operation with India if New Delhi did not vote in the International Atomic Energy Agency to refer Iran to the United Nations Security Council.  Since then, India has reluctantly followed the US lead, despite domestic criticism. Pressure from Washington has intensified under Obama, but so has Indian disquiet.

 Anticipating the latest US sanctions targeting gasoline supplies to Iran, the Indian private sector group Reliance Industries ended sales last year. But this summer New Delhi resumed talks with Tehran over the ambitious “peace pipeline.”  This project had been bantered about for the past decade, though India had dragged its feet under US pressure, pricing disagreements and worries over the transit route through Pakistan. In March the project morphed into an Iranian-Pakistani pipeline scheduled to pump at least 7.7 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas each year from 2015 to 2040. Renewed talks to extend the pipeline to India show New Delhi is still hungry for what Iran claims would be 55 bcm of natural gas annually.

In return, Iran wants Indian investment in its vast but undeveloped South Pars gas field, and has targeted the state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh (OVL) and the privately owned Hinduja group. Short of capital thanks to Western sanctions, Tehran needs some $200 billion to increase gas production from 0.6 bcm per day to 1 bcm by 2014. In August Iran stressed its desire to boost bilateral trade between the two countries from its current $15 billion, emphasizing India’s role in developing Chabahar port in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province, which New Delhi sees as a major trade route that bypasses Pakistan into Afghanistan and central Asia. Iran seeks to raise the port’s annual capacity from two million to 12 million tons.

Chabahar is probably now the litmus test of Indian-Iranian relations, as Tehran may link Indian participation to wider co-operation. New Delhi has already helped finance a highway from Chabahar to Milak, on the Afghan border, where there is a crossing to Zaranj, in Afghanistan, to which India has laid a 213-km road from Dilaram, a major Afghan transport hub.

India is keen to develop the potential of this route. There is even speculation over an undersea gas pipeline to India, bypassing Pakistan, to supply Iranian and Turkmen gas.  Fresh Indian investment into Iran may irritate the US, but New Delhi cannot ignore new trade patterns in central Asia that are giving China access to Siberian timber, Mongolian iron ore, Kazakh oil, Turkmen natural gas and Afghan copper through roads, railways, pipelines and the Pakistani deep-sea port of Gwadar.

Gwadar, constructed with Chinese assistance and just 72 kilometers from the Iranian border, gives Beijing an economic edge over India and a military vantage point to monitor the US navy in the Persian Gulf and the Indian navy in the Arabian Sea.

Without access to Iranian and Turkmen gas, India will be short of energy. Hence New Delhi has reiterated its support for diplomacy over Tehran’s nuclear program. How all this squares with tighter US sanctions — much less US or Israeli air-strikes — remains to be seen.

GARETH SMYTH is the former Tehran correspondent for the Financial Times

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Society

Risk it

by Emma Cosgrove September 3, 2010
written by Emma Cosgrove

Beirut has the unique ability to bend, shape and mold brand identity to fit its flamboyant clientele. When Hermes opened it doors in Beirut Souks, the brand’s tradition and timelessness suggested that it might not be as susceptible to the same affection for flash to which so many fall prey. But, once again, the city proved that few are immune to its call to opulent arms.

Never mind that the abounding platform stilettos sunk straight into the grassy sod laid especially for the opening on Hermes’s corner of Marfaa Street. Never mind that the generator powering the crane swinging an angelic dancer above the crowd was so loud that it drowned out the music played for the spectacle. And never mind that the restricted entrance and exit, due to Prime Minster Hariri’s presence, meant that the tree-enclosed soiree was packed like a can of extremely expensive sardines.

The July 30 opening of the Hermes boutique was an example of brazen one-upmanship that we all should have expected.

But the sheer scale of it all, the extravagance, the excess, and the obvious staggering cost begs the question: what happens after the party? When the guests have gone and Hermes’s executives go home to Paris, who will be minding the store and what happens if the worst comes around to downtown Beirut again?

Why would Hermes, and all the other luxury brands invading downtown of late, take the risk of having to close a store if Lebanon’s cancerous instability comes out of remission?

They do it because the risk is not their’s to take.

Most of Beirut’s monobrand luxury boutiques are franchises, Hermes included. This means the location, and entire inventory of the store, is financed by the local franchise partner. Every item is bought and paid for before it hits the floor, which is why many developing markets, often being franchise-heavy, feature products at a significant mark-up.

So if any of downtown’s gleaming luxury palaces were forced to close their doors, it is local companies who would lose, with the brand escaping conflict with nothing more than a PR scratch. This is not to say that the embarrassment and public relations snafu of closing a store means nothing to an industry whose value is rooted in image. Luxury brands care what happens to their products, and especially their name.

On the day of the opening, Hermes International Chief Executive Officer Patrick Thomas told Executive that he chose Galop SAL as Hermes’s franchise partner out of many interested parties for its “long term” vision and singular focus. Michele Garzouzi, Galop’s president, said that she was not interested in offering, as many regional luxury franchises do, a smattering of trendy items and iconic pieces. She offered the full line and it nearly sold out in the first weekend.

And though her savvy buying strategy and dedication to Hermes — Galop’s only luxury brand — is proof of her long-term thinking, she has no contingency plan for Hermes’s fate if a conflict should crop up.

“You cannot plan for it really,” said Garzouzi. “When you have such an unstable situation you can’t really have a ‘Plan B’.”

Garzouzi is not alone in knocking on wood and hoping for the best; everyone hopes Lebanon will have no need for contingencies. But frankly, we should all stop being so grateful that these luxury titans are opening in our tailor-made shopping havens. We’re spending the money and taking all the risk, so bring on the absurdly extravagant parties downtown — we’ve earned them.

 

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Society

The East Moves West

by Paul Cochrane September 3, 2010
written by Paul Cochrane

Labeling this region as the “Middle East” or the lesser used “Near East,” is standard practice in the West, but the region can equally be called “West Asia,” the opposite end of a vast landmass that spreads from Vladivostok and Shanghai all the way to the Bosporus and the Suez Canal. This designation makes sense given the area’s historic ties and the ancient Silk Road trading routes.

Today there is a new Silk Road, with flourishing two-way traffic between the rest of Asia and the continent’s eastern end, particularly Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Iran. In Geoffrey Kemp’s book “The East Moves West,” he sets out the case for this burgeoning relationship and where it is likely to go. Kemp, an American foreign-affairs think-tank director, adeptly steers the reader through the ties that bind Asia together, from the geo-strategic importance of Central Asia to the big players: China, India, Pakistan, Japan and South Korea, covering economics, energy, politics, military ties and infrastructure projects. 

It is a relationship that is clearly centered on energy supplies, with some 40 percent of China’s oil coming from the GCC, India receiving 45 percent of its oil from the Middle East, and Japan reliant on the region for 90 percent of its oil. Such reliance on the region’s resources has resulted in mutual dependence.

With Eastern economies in ascendancy while the West hobbles along, this relationship is set to flourish, with significant economic and political ramifications. Energy dependence on Iran, for instance, has been crucial in allowing Tehran to survive the economic sanctions imposed by America and Europe to curb its nuclear program.

The big question, as Kemp sees it, is whether Eastern Asia’s role in the region will grow beyond the traditional buyer-seller relationship. Economically, it has started to change over the past five years, with Asian countries inking contracts worth $500 billion for infrastructure projects in the Middle East, while the GCC has invested more than $250 billion in East and South East Asia. Both East and West Asia want more.

Iran and Saudi Arabia have adopted a “look east” approach for market growth, while New Delhi considers the GCC, to quote India’s former commerce minister, “as part and parcel of India’s economic neighborhood.” The statistics only reinforce this. For India, the economic relationship with the GCC is more important than with the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the United States, totaling $86.9 billion (excluding oil) in 2008-2009.

The UAE is India’s jewel in the GCC crown, the country’s second biggest export destination and the Emirates’ largest importer, accounting for a third of its trade in the Middle East. With Indians making up 33 percent of the UAE’s population and 50 percent of its workforce (of which 25 percent are unskilled workers, 50 percent semi-skilled and 25 percent professionals), it’s no wonder the UAE labor minister said in 2007: “God forbid something happens between us and India and they say, ‘Please, we want all our Indians to go home’… our airports would shut down, our streets, construction…”

With the US flailing in Iraq and Afghanistan and its credibility shot in much of Asia, East Asia seems set to be the new player at the table. But so far the Asian nations have largely refrained from the political arena of the region’s western extremity.

As Kemp notes: “How long they can sustain their hands-off approach is questionable if…they get drawn into the messiness of Middle East politics at a time when the US becomes disillusioned by the burdens of hegemony.”

There are a lot of “ifs” in the book, but given all the certainties proclaimed by Washington of late in its future prognosis for the region, Kemp refreshingly gives plenty of room for thought about the potentials of the new Silk Road.

 

 

September 3, 2010 0 comments
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Putting the ‘sport‘ back into SUV

by Executive Staff September 3, 2010
written by Executive Staff

Ever since the Porsche Cayenne debuted in 2003, it has faced a tough question: how to hold its niche in the luxury SUV market without jeopardizing the character of the Porsche brand.

Most critics and drivers agree that in terms of drivability and comfort, the Cayenne succeeded in meeting the public’s expectations. But seven years later, even though the Cayenne is now one of the company’s top-selling vehicles it still stands out as something of an anomaly in the Porsche family — like the one black sheep in a herd — and the company is looking for ways to bring it deeper into the fold. The new generation of Cayennes that entered the market this summer shows how Porsche plans to streamline this transition.

The bodywork of the Cayenne and Cayenne S Tiptronic, Cayenne Turbo, Cayenne Diesel and Cayenne S Hybrid all show noticeable development and look more in line with the Panamera — Porsche’s first four-door luxury Sedan — than their progenitors in the Cayenne line. The bodywork has taken a more forward-leaning, muscular design, incorporating elements of a sports car into what has otherwise been a utilitarian vehicle. 

But the changes to this new generation of Cayennes are not just cosmetic — far from it, in fact. The specs for the new Cayenne read like a user’s manual for the Hadron Collider: “Tiptronic S automatic transmission,” “Auto Start Stop,” “recuperation of the on-board network” and “variable overrun cut-off” are but a few of the highfalutin features the Cayenne boasts.

So what does this complex jargon mean when it comes to performance? In industry terms, 23 percent higher fuel efficiency than that of earlier generations of Cayennes. To put it colloquially: more bang for your buck. Like a lot of auto manufacturers these days, Porsche has enrolled itself in a serious weight-loss regime. They’re trimming excess mass wherever it can be found, shifting to lighter-weight materials — carbon fiber in particular — and pioneering intelligent technology to capture energy, conserve expenditure and transfer power to rechargeable sources. That process has shaved the new generation of Cayennes down by almost 200 kilos.

Easy on the gas

Fuel economy is particularly an issue as Europe prepares to begin enforcing stringent CO2 emissions caps and the United States mulls over its own fuel economy standards. Porsche’s response to this is the upcoming Cayenne S. Hybrid, the company’s first fusion gas-electric vehicle. In terms of mechanics, the company had been at pains to draw attention to its Tiptronic 8-Speed Automatic transmission, available in two of the new Cayenne models. The tiptronic transmission operates in generally the same manner as an ordinary automatic transmission, but offers the driver a manual override feature to force-change gears on their own. This gives the driver control over faster acceleration, engine breaking, gear holding going in and out of curves, downshifting before passing or early upshifting for cruising. Veteran Porsche drivers may wonder why the new Cayennes don’t include the dual-clutch transmission of the Carrera and Panamera, which has proven a favorite feature among drivers; the company claims that the dual clutch module does not fit size-wise with the Cayenne’s mechanical make-up.

Tardis effect

The new Cayennes are only slightly larger, but there’s a noticeable difference in space from inside the vehicle. A number of subtle interior adjustments, including a slight tip to the angle of the passenger seats, gives a little more legroom in the already ample interior.

Do the new generations fundamentally redefine the model’s personality? No, probably not. But they do suggest a clear direction that the Cayenne, and Porsche in general, is taking. The new line is increasingly efficient, and has taken notes from other Porsches from both ends of the spectrum, adding subtly to drivability, luxury and power. While priority has clearly been given to a higher standard of fuel economy, it is also clear that Porsche doesn’t want to lose touch with its sports car roots, and is moving forward with a clear vision of a unified image for all its cars, whether they be SUV, sedan or sport.

 

September 3, 2010 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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