Companies & Strategies

Deyaar Development – Markus Giebel (Q&A)

by Executive Staff
written by Executive Staff

Markus Giebel is the chief executive officer at Deyaar Development PJSC, one of the region’s biggest real estate companies. Executive Magazine had the pleasure of sitting with Giebel as Deyaar unveiled the recently completed project at Saifi Village II, which is comprised of 72 upscale apartments and penthouses and is located in the Beirut City Center master development.

E This is not the first time you invest in Lebanon. What makes this country, in your opinion, a good destination for real estate investment?
It is the first project that we have completed in Lebanon. Other than that we have a total investment of $200 million in the country. But the first project we completed is the Saifi II, which is a $100 million project. The sad portion of it is that many things got destroyed, and someone had to rebuild it. So there is an intrinsic and real need for real estate. It is a privilege actually to be one of the people who can rebuild, and Solidere does a wonderful job. To be a partner with Solidere and a part of the rebuilding is something anybody can be proud of. The second thing is that if you look at the financial crisis, Lebanon became one of the most attractive places. So historically there is an intrinsic need and if you are looking forward, this country looks very strong. We have real GDP growth, a real growth of 1.6 percent positive. The world is 1.9 percent negative. So there is something which is very intriguing. For us as a developer, we develop in developing countries. There is a developing element of this country so there is an incentive that we like.

E So you think that Lebanon has good market fundamentals?
There are many fundamentals. We come from Dubai; many people from our part of the world love the place here. So there are many people who enjoy the countryside, the people, the food. So there are these elements; the other element is that there is a real demand for real estate.

E The project is 100 percent sold. Who are the people who bought in? Lebanese mostly or foreigners?
There is a complete mix. There is a vacation element of it. People would come a month or two per year. And there is also real demand from Lebanon. Many of them are also Lebanese expatriates. That is exactly one of the areas we cater to. Starting with the new project, there are three elements. There is the vacation element, the expat element, and there is the extrinsic element. That is what makes Lebanon so thriving.

E Which market segment does the project target? What is the price range?
It is an upper-scale development; there is a luxury element to it. There are some penthouses which are pure luxury, and there are also higher mid-end affordable elements in it. It is mid-high. But the penthouses are high-end. The price range doesn’t help you much, because we launched the project in 2007, and prices in 2007 were very different than 2009. In these three years the prices went up. So anyone who bought with us when we launched is a very happy person. People who bought now have higher prices. There is a tremendous increase in prices.

E What added value does the project have? Why should someone buy into this project and not in another project?
If you look at the project, there are many added values. First, there is the master developer Solidere. The company itself brings credibility to any project. And Solidere does a wonderful job. Second, the location of the project. It is overlooking the sea. Another added benefit is the proximity: in five minutes you are everywhere. So there are many elements. But again when you buy a property, it is a very personal thing. For some people, things are very important but I think for most of the people the elements we have covered in our development are appealing. If you like to be in Beirut and you want to have something calm, close to everything, overlooking the ocean, in a master development from a well-known name, then we have a good product.

E At the World Economic Forum this year, you said you will shift focus to emerging markets — is this a part of it?
What happened is that with the crisis, many people have to rethink. We are very strong in Dubai. We have a very strong foundation there. What we do is a pitch-and-catch strategy. We take the best practices we developed in Dubai and they are pitched out into different countries. For example in Lebanon someone catches our best practices and localizes them and implements them. That makes us a little bit stronger than other people because we have this strong foundation. So that is our strategy all along. And we will focus on emerging markets. Why emerging? Because there is no value added in developed countries. What value added do I have in New York? We really go into countries where we can add value, and the developing countries. Lebanon is a different case because in one sense it is developed, and in the other sense it is still in need for some rebuilding and some assistance. So Lebanon is in a very special situation. But we do believe we can deliver a lot of value to the country.

E Are you planning any future investments in Lebanon?
We are now looking. With the first project we were really happy. You always test the market with the first project. If it doesn’t go very well, you reconsider. But the first project went very well, which makes it very easy to go to the next step. We are actively looking for many reasons. One, we know the country much better, we found strong partners and we have a very positive first experience so, yes, we would like to. We look more to our partner  Solidere. It is not an exclusive partnership, but a very strong partnership.

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Lebanon

Architecture – Project Lebanon 2009

by Executive Staff
written by Executive Staff

Project Lebanon 2009 opened its doors again this year at BIEL Exhibition Center to gather local and international engineers, architects, building materials specialists, investors and other key market players under one roof. Exhibitors came from Italy, Germany, France, Iraq, Switzerland and other countries looking to establish partnerships and enter the Lebanese and regional markets.

“Lebanon is back in business,” said Fadi Jreissati, vice president of operations at IFP Group, Project Lebanon’s organizers. The event’s packed parking lots, entrance queues and the rush on the stands were proof that Jreissati was right.

“We have an 80 percent increase in size,” he said. “We have sold every single meter we have, and if we had known that elections would not have a negative effect on the exhibition, we would have opened the whole tent.”
The fact that the exhibition takes place in June has not helped it much recently. Last year, the conflict in May crippled the show and the parliamentary election this year also made some exhibitors shy away.
“We had a very bad edition last year; the conflict in May affected us very badly,” said Jreissati. “[This year] there are a lot of people who were afraid and did not participate.”

This year’s highlight

For the first time, Project Lebanon is hosting the “Sustainability Week” which includes a series of conferences tackling the issues of green building, sustainable architecture, water and energy conservation, as well as recycling and saving resources. A green pavilion is also included where companies either have new technologies to introduce or are offering consulting services to help implement green initiatives in new and existing buildings.
Since Lebanon is still taking its first steps toward achieving sustainability, the green pavilion at the exhibition attracted considerable attention. Most companies started working in the green field only recently, since this technology was prohibitively expensive to import and the Lebanese market was not welcoming to the idea.

Project Lebanon attendance

  2008 2009 % increase
Number of exhibitors 220 350 59
Number of national pavilions 4 9 125
Number of countries participating 11 23 109

Source: IFP Group

“We started two year ago,” said Mohammed Nasser, electric and power engineer at Somiral Energy, an importer of solar panels. “Before, it was too expensive and not very available. Now, it is more affordable.”
Another company, Schneider Electric, also started working on providing energy efficienct solutions for its customers in the last 24 months, by introducing electrical devices that consume less electricity or switch off automatically in order to save power, and other new technologies. By using these energy-saving products, industries can save up to 20 percent on electricity, while residential houses can save from 10 to 40 percent.
“We are in a world where we have a challenge,” said Julien Feghali, chairman and general manager of Schneider Electric East Mediterranean (SEEM), the Lebanese subsidiary of Schneider Electric. “We want to protect our environment and we have very tough objectives.”

Feghali explained that his company is currently getting positive feedback in Lebanon, which would not have been expected two to three years ago, because the concept was still new. Schneider is also working with the Ministry of Energy and Water, the Lebanese Order of Engineers and the Électricité du  Liban to implement these solutions on the national level.
“The order of engineers has to play their role in terms of standardization. Sometimes you have to [implement] rules and regulations. We should work in the same [way] in Lebanon,” Feghali said.
Jad Bsaibes is a project engineer at Energy Efficiency Group (EEG), a Lebanon-based firm that offers consultancy services for existing buildings in order to find ways to save energy. He said many in Lebanon are open to receiving green technologies and services, but there are still some engineers who do not collaborate.

“Some work with us, and others don’t,” said Bsaibes, whose company is currently working on buildings such as Intercontinental Phoenicia Hotel and Studio Vision.
Michel Tannous, president of Entech Coatings, relocated his company from Canada to Lebanon six months ago, finding the country and the region offered a good opportunity to introduce his new coating technology. With a 25-year guarantee, Tannous explains that his new Entech Coatings Product would keep a building nicely painted for a long time while isolating the outside heat or cold, thus saving a large amount of energy used for heating or cooling.
“Everyone is excited and wants the product,” he said.

It’s not only private companies that were advocating for the use of  green technologies at Project Lebanon, but also Lebanese nongovernmental organizations. For example, the Lebanese Solar Energy Society (LSES) was established in 1980 and aims to convince people to use solar and renewable energy. Other NGOs present at the exhibition were the Lebanon Green Building Council, and the Lebanese Association for Energy Saving and for Environment.
Even though private companies and NGOs are doing their part, there is no doubt that the path to sustainability will be hard, especially due to the lack of regulations backing these initiatives.
“The hardness softens when there is commitment,” said Dr. Sadek Owainati, co-founder of the Emirates Green Building Council. “It is not a one day, but a long-term commitment. It is not one group, but everybody.”

Owainati also emphasized the need to have a national strategy which is realistic and achievable. He also expressed his concern on the lack of urban planning in the city.
From this year on, Sustainability Week and the Green Pavilion will be a integral part of the Project Lebanon exhibition.
“It is definitely not the last time… It is a great start for us and a big success,” said Jreissati from IFP.
“We did a lot and we invested a lot in [Project Lebanon]” he added. “Everybody is so happy, and we are still at the beginning [in terms of] potential. There is so much to do, the event will still grow.”

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Capitalist Culture

Politics – Obama in Cairo

by Michael Young
written by Michael Young

Barack Obama’s speech in Cairo last month provoked mixed reviews. Some said the US president spent too much time apologizing for American behavior in the Middle East; others said his words were just that, words, needing implementation. The only consensus reached was that Obama had been eloquent, but that somehow reminded us of the old Monty Python sketch where a game contestant fails to summarize Proust in 15 seconds, earning the consolatory words: “A good try though and very nice posture.”

Where Obama came up short most flagrantly was in his inability to define a clear position on political freedom, and how to advance it in the Middle East. In fact the president seemed to want to have his cake and eat it too. For example, in referring to the war in Iraq, Obama stated: “Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq was a war of choice that provoked strong differences in my country and around the world. Although I believe that the Iraqi people are ultimately better off without the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, I also believe that events in Iraq have reminded America of the need to use diplomacy and build international consensus to resolve our problems whenever possible.”

Indeed. But if Iraqis are “ultimately” better off without Saddam Hussein, what does that tell us about US policy when it comes to supporting Middle Eastern democracy and human rights? After all, neither diplomacy nor an international consensus would have ever freed Iraqis from being under Saddam’s thumb. So did the US do the right thing in getting rid of the Baath regime by force? Obama avoided addressing that prickly question.

This fuzziness permeated Obama’s later discussion of democracy in the region. The president pointed out: “So let me be clear: no system of government can or should be imposed upon one nation by any other.” But then he went on to say that this view did not lessen his commitment to governments that reflect the will of the people. Except that “America does not presume to know what is best for everyone.”
But hadn’t Obama just presumed to know that the Iraq war was beneficial for the Iraqi people, since he felt that they are better off without Saddam? Aren’t Iraqis better off without Saddam because the new system they now live under was imposed on them by an American led-invasion? And weren’t Obama’s bromides in favor of democracy and democratization not also statements implying that he presumed to know what was best for everyone?

If so, then why did the US president not just come out and state the obvious: that democracy, openness and pluralism are indeed better for all states, as is respect for human rights. Why did Obama prefer to avoid rocking the boat when it came to autocratic regimes in the region? Not a word was uttered on actual cases of human rights abuses, whether in Egypt, the country hosting him, or in any other part of the Middle East. Clearly, the president, for all his high-flying rhetoric, preferred to fall back on the aversion of political realists to involving the US in the region’s domestic affairs.
Equally interesting was what the president had to say about the Christian Maronite and Coptic minorities.
“Among some Muslims, there is a disturbing tendency to measure one’s own faith by the rejection of another’s,” he said. “The richness of religious diversity must be upheld — whether it is for Maronites in Lebanon or the Copts in Egypt.”

This advice Obama placed under the rubric of “religious freedom.” This was strange, because the problem of minorities in the Arab world is usually more a political than a religious one. What the Copts would like more of is political power, not the freedom to exercise their religion. As for the Maronites, their sense of decline is attached not to the fact that they cannot practice their religion, but that they feel their political power is waning. 
All this leads to a disconcerting conclusion that Obama has few coherent views of political freedom in the Middle East. He overemphasized religion while underemphasizing how the US might address political matters, such as what to do about dictatorial regimes. He also failed to address the absence of democracy in the Middle East in illegitimate states that fail to fulfill the aspirations of their citizens; or what to do about minorities denied political power, both Muslim and non-Muslim.

Obama submerged his Cairo speech in the holy water of religion, but it is freedom, the failure of the Arab state, and the lack of accountability of regional regimes that are more central to the dilemmas the Middle East faces today. In one word, it is about politics, and on this Obama was too busy being polite to his listeners to raise the difficult questions he promised to raise at the start of what, in retrospect, sounded like a puzzling homily.
(Editor’s note: A version of this article first appeared on Harvard’s Middle East Strategy blog)

Michael Young

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Lebanon

Environment – A carbon-neutral car dealer

by Executive Staff
written by Executive Staff

The Rasamny Younis Motor Company S.A.L (RYMCO) is taking steps to become the country’s most environmentally friendly automotive dealer. In May the company announced it will attempt to reduce its carbon footprint by reducing the amount of emissions it produces as it imports, distributes and sells cars, and by off-setting its remaining emissions.

EcoSecurities is the UK-based company working with RYMCO to identify and offset the auto dealer’s carbon emissions, which they will do through a local company, Sustainable Environmental Solutions (SES). SES will help RYMCO determine how greenhouse gases can be offset with what are known as Verified Emission Reduction units (VERs).

The first step to carbon neutrality is to determine the current emissions produced by RYMCO through its electricity usage, the diesel fuel used by the back-up generator, the staff’s international travel and the company’s own car fleet, said Rachel Mountain, head of global marketing at EcoSecurities.

Where emissions cannot be reduced by RYMCO, they will be off-set by EcoSecurities purchasing VERs on the company’s behalf.
In a voluntary carbon market, VERs are produced by companies who take action to reduce green house gases — by creating solar, wind, biomass or hydroelectric projects — and they are then sold to companies like RYMCO who want to reduce their carbon footprint.
“A VER has the equivalent of 1 ton of CO2 that is generated from the implementation of project(s) that has actually reduced greenhouse gas emissions,” Mountain said.

A VER is not a carbon credit that can then be traded by RYMCO but a mechanism by which EcoSecurities can verify that the auto dealer is carbon neutral — meaning the number of VERs equals the amount of emissions it produces. This certification can then be renewed on a yearly basis. RYMCO is taking the carbon reduction steps because of the nature of the auto industry, said Blanche Baz, public relations advisor for RYMCO.

“Being part of the automobile industry mandates that we take a responsible role for devising strategies to reduce CO2 emissions through increased energy and fuel efficiency,” wrote Charbel Abi Ghanem, RYMCO’s marketing manager, in a press release.
“Though our contribution is considered minute… we are confident that if more companies realize the impact simple measures such as these could have on reducing the harm to our environment, perhaps more of them will apply voluntary emission reduction.”

The corporate shift on the environment

“Environmental sensitivity is taking hold here,” said Sami Nader, economist and professor at Beirut’s St. Joseph University.
Given Lebanon’s fraught political structure, Nader believes companies benefit economically from demonstrating their environmental credentials as it is an issue that appeals across sectarian lines.
“Supporting the green cause does not involve taking any risks,” he said, adding that the message appeals particularly to younger consumers.
The power of the environmental pull is also recognized by the advertising industry, Nader said, which encourages companies to use their environmental credentials to shape their message.
Among the first organizations to approach carbon neutrality in Lebanon were the local offices of international banks, which recognized the appeal it would have with environmentally conscious consumers.

HSBC became Lebanon’s first carbon-neutral bank in 2005 and has continued to raise awareness of climate change, and its green friendly policies, by sponsoring the April HSBC Earth Race.
Bank Med has peppered billboards throughout the country with its own ‘happy planet’ environmental campaign, which features a sapling growing from a pile of money.
Foreign governments have also gotten in on the act. The British Embassy will work with Lebanese municipal governments to help reduce their carbon foot print.
This year the embassy will begin collaborating with EcoSecurities to reduce carbon emissions in three municipalities in South Lebanon, Mount Lebanon and Beirut.

Offsetting or opting out?

Environmentalists are concerned that the practice of offsetting emissions is an inefficient substitute for companies substantially reducing their own emissions.
The practice of offsetting emissions by purchasing carbon credits is popular among companies, and countries who are trying to reduce their emissions in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol.

The environmental benefit of the practice, however, remains unclear.
“Off-setting so far has been a failure,” said Arab Climate Campaign head Wael Hmaidan.
More than 50 percent of global offsetting projects have failed to produce expected emission reductions, Hmaidan said.

“The best thing [RYMCO] could do is  stop selling 4x4s and go to hybrid or small emission [producing] cars,” he said, acknowledging that this may run counter to the company’s economic interests.
“Off-setting as a concept should not be perceived as a solution, as it is not,” he said. “But it is a step in the right direction.”

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Walid the weathervane

by Nicholas Blanford
written by Nicholas Blanford

At a Washington Institute for Near East Policy conference in October 2007, Walid Jumblatt was asked by Dennis Ross, now Barack Obama’s point man on Iran, what Washington could do for Lebanon. Jumblatt, with a twinkle in his eye, replied: “If you could send some car bombs to Damascus, why not?”

The audience, few of them sympathetic to the Syrian regime, greeted Jumblatt’s comment with delighted laughter and prolonged applause.
Jumblatt, understanding his audience well, continued: Hezbollah is a “brigade or division of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards that occupy half of Lebanon, paralyzing the economy and facilitating Syrian efforts to kill us.”
It was vintage Jumblatt. Well, 2007 vintage anyway.


Among the leaders of March 14, Jumblatt, the “weathervane,” has typically been first to react to the changing climate: in the past 12 months, he has forged a rapprochement with his traditional Druze rival Talal Arslan in the wake of the May 2008 fighting, toned down his anti-Syrian rhetoric and more recently spoke of Hezbollah’s weapons in the context of a national defense policy.
It culminated in mid-June with a long-awaited meeting with Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, in which the two discussed the need for a comprehensive reconciliation in the country.
The spirit of goodwill settling on Lebanon in the aftermath of the June 7 election largely derives from the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Syria in recent months, as both back rival political camps in Lebanon.
Vituperative rhetoric has been scaled down in the Syrian and Saudi media and there have been several low-profile diplomatic exchanges between Damascus and Riyadh.
If the Saudi-Syrian detente holds, it could spell a period of political calm in Lebanon, allowing for a relatively smooth transition from Fouad Siniora’s outgoing government to the new one, likely headed by Saad Hariri. The opposition could well forego their demand for a one-third veto-wielding share in the next government in exchange for guarantees by Hariri on key issues, chiefly Hezbollah’s arms. Hariri has said the fate of Hezbollah’s arms should be left to the national dialogue sessions, where the subject doubtless will be buried.


All this comes at the end of an eight-month wait-and-see period during which several elections, parliamentary and presidential, have been conducted. But the results of those elections have been something of a mixed bag.


The first was the election of Barack Obama as the new United States president. Obama, facing the immediate challenges of a global financial crisis and two wars, initially was not expected to focus much effort on the Middle East. But he has confounded expectations by emphasizing the importance of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. In his recent address to the Arab world in Cairo he spoke at length on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, he did not mention Syria once, indicating where his preference for progress lies. Indeed, the appointment of Jeffrey Feltman, who was US ambassador to Beirut during the Lebanese-Syrian crisis in 2005, as his main interlocutor with the Syrians was a signal in itself. Yes, Obama is willing to explore dialogue with Syria, but the administration is under no illusions about its success.


But Obama also has to contend with a right-wing government in Israel under the premiership of Benjamin Netanyahu, who took office in March. Netanyahu’s fragile coalition is dependent on the support of hardliners, such as his foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman. The initial test of Obama’s resolve, to many Arabs, lies in his ability to freeze Israeli settlement building on occupied Palestinian territory, and not to allow Netanyahu to fudge the issue with excuses about “natural growth.”


The third key election was in Lebanon, where the continuation of the status quo was confirmed by the March 14 coalition’s victory. Developments in Lebanon tend to be corollaries of developments elsewhere in the region, which is why the outcome of the Iranian presidential election, the last of the big four, is so important.
If Mir Hussein Moussavi had been elected president, it is unlikely that there would have been any significant changes to Iranian foreign policy, especially regarding the Arab world, support for anti-Israel groups and pursuing the nuclear program. The differences between the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and his reformist challenger were over domestic policies. The importance of the result was one of perception rather than substance.


The US would have preferred to seek engagement with an Iranian government led by a reformist president, rather than someone distinctly lacking in diplomatic tact and widely vilified as a “Holocaust denier.” Ahmadinejad’s re-election will do little to ease the phobias of the Arab Gulf states toward their powerful Iranian neighbor.
So, a US administration committed to an Israeli-Palestinian breakthrough; a right-wing Israeli government squirming to maintain US goodwill while making no meaningful concessions to its Arab neighbors; no change in a Lebanon that is hoping for a period of stability; and an Iran, troubled by internal dissent, but still led by a president who relishes his image of defiance and obduracy.
How will this play out? Perhaps, we should keep an eye on Jumblatt for early hints.

Nicholas Blanford is the Beirut-based correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor and The Times of London

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Money Matters

IPO Watch – The Saudi vanguard

by Executive Staff
written by Executive Staff

The initial public offering market in June witnessed a continued pickup in activity following an apparent restoration of risk appetite on the part of investors, but IPO announcements were mostly dominated by Saudi companies. The Saudi Capital Market Authority appears to be resigning to IPO pipeline pressure, driven in part by the success of recent offerings such as Weqaya Takaful Insurance and Reinsurance Company’s IPO, which was three times covered.

Weqaya’s shares, which debuted on the Saudi exchange on June 20, soared 288% with heavy volume to $10.36, from an offering price of $2.67.
The largest IPO announcement of the month came from Saudi Steel Pipe, which plans to sell 16 million shares or 31.4% of the company in an IPO scheduled between June 27 and July 3. With shares offered at a price of $6.68 per share, Saudi Steel Pipe expects to raise $107 million, valuing the company at $340 million. GIB Financial Services is the share sale’s lead manager and will have the option to allocate up to 50% of the shares to individual investors, leaving the rest to the institutional buy-side.

Three local insurance companies also received approval from the Capital Market Authority to raise a combined $51.2 million through share offerings. The three insurers — General Cooperative Insurance, Global Cooperative Insurance and Buruj Cooperative Insurance — will offer 40%, 30% and 40% of their shares respectively for $2.67 each. IPO activity in the Saudi kingdom included the approval of Saudi Petrochem’s planned offering of 50% of its shares, and Al Khuraif Group’s announcement that it plans to offer some of its shares, or those of one of its units, to the public.

Saudi Al Mouwasat Medical Services said it plans to sell 7.5 million shares or 30% of the company in an IPO from August 15 to August 21, while healthcare and pharmaceutical company Banaja Holdings will also launch an IPO as it proceeds with its restructuring plans. Furthermore, the Aramco-Total $9.6 billion joint venture in Saudi Arabia, named Satorp, said it plans to sell off 25% of its shares in the refinery in the fourth quarter of 2010.

Still, IPO buzz was not limited to Saudi Arabia. Albaraka, Bahrain’s largest Islamic Bank, announced plans to list its shares on the Damascus Stock Exchange (DSE) by August, comforted by the 15% increase in the Syrian International Islamic Bank’s (SIIB) shares on their first trading day on June 4. Bank of Alexandria, a unit of Intesa Sanpaolo SpA, said it was holding talks with the Egyptian government to sell the state’s 20% stake in an initial public offering worth more than $300 million. The Qatari government also said it expects to take the Qatar Exchange public in the near future, while Dubai-based Noor Islamic Bank said it may offer part of the company to the public within three to four years.

Despite improving market sentiment, several public offerings were delayed until the effects of the global economic crisis have waned. Scotland-based oil and gas engineering firm Proclad Group said it has postponed the planned offering of 30% of the company on the Dubai Financial Market by almost two years to 2013. Burooj Properties, which is fully owned by Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, also pushed its IPO date from 2010 to 2011 or later, citing the financial crisis as the reason behind the decision. Improving market conditions will also set the date for an IPO by Emirates Steel Industries, a unit of Abu Dhabi Basic Industries, which tied its public offering to the presence of suitable market conditions within one to two years.

In summary, the IPO pipeline remains flooded with delayed offerings pending clearer signs of a fundamental and sustainable recovery in credit flows and economic growth. Still, with Saudi Arabia leading the way in the number and size of public offerings, it is very likely that a cohesion effect could take hold and drive near-term IPO activity. In a new era of lower leverage and limited bank financing, acquisitions and expansion plans will rely in part on capital raised from share offerings. Therefore, IPOs will continue to take advantage of the relative stability in equity markets seen in the last few months, as well as strong investor demand for newly-listed shares. 

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A government under the gun

by Thanassis Cambanis
written by Thanassis Cambanis

March 14 can claim a major — and unexpected — victory at the polls, but they’ll have to pay close attention to Lebanon’s real balance of power if they want to avoid miscalculation and overreach. The pathology of sectarianism and Hezbollah’s entrenched military power place far more serious constraints on the prospect for changing Lebanon than electoral politics do.

The results of the June 7 ballot are just one of many factors that determine what Saad Hariri’s coalition can and cannot achieve — maybe even one of the smaller factors. The biggest, on the contrary, is the old rule of force: Hezbollah’s militia.


If the Party of God perceives a threat to the autonomy of its militia, it will do anything, including a military takeover of Beirut, to neutralize the perceived threat. Hezbollah did so in May 2008, and has made clear it would do so again, regardless of the political fallout or cost to the resistance’s legitimacy among Lebanese. It’s also worth keeping in mind that about 850,000 Lebanese voted for Hezbollah and its allies, significantly more than the 720,000 who voted for March 14. Only sectarian gerrymandering translates that popular vote into a parliamentary majority for Saad Hariri’s coalition.


Votes do matter, but brute power matters more. Hezbollah won’t shirk from a confrontation, and it doesn’t have to worry about losing popularity and legitimacy so long as it commands the nearly undivided loyalty of the Lebanese Shiites in the Bekaa Valley, southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs. The principle factor that could reduce Hezbollah’s power is Iran. For decades, the Islamic Republic has given Hezbollah a generous operating budget and a steady flow of military training and material, allowing the Party of God to build its own state and act independently of the normal constraints on a Lebanese political party. If Iran cut a grand bargain with the United States (or if Syria, which controls the flow of weapons to Hezbollah, makes a deal with Israel), Hezbollah could suddenly find itself defanged, or at the very least, boxed in.


By a similar token, Hariri and his allies draw considerable power from their links to outside powers — in particular the United States and Saudi Arabia. Neither of March 14’s patrons has demonstrated anything like Iran’s staying power and commitment to its client, in terms of military aid or consistent political cover. In Washington’s case, the sponsorship is particularly shaky; most Lebanese are convinced that anytime Lebanon’s interests conflict with Israel’s, there’s no question that Washington will side with Tel Aviv.


Whatever government emerges from the elections, it’s hard to imagine any substantial effort to disarm Hezbollah, although calls to do so will come from some quarters. The cries for “change and reform” notwithstanding, Lebanon’s political classes of all stripes have far too much vested in a system of patronage and corruption, and it will likely survive unscathed. Finally, it’s nearly impossible to imagine Lebanon’s arcane political system being revamped, with its guarantees of certain powers for certain sects regardless of their actual share of Lebanon’s population. Hence a shrinking Christian minority will wield more government power than a Muslim population twice its size, and the Shiites — Lebanon’s largest group by far — will still be relegated, at least in name, to the most marginal government posts.


The March 14 forces can claim a victory at the polls but they’d be hard pressed to claim a mandate. They won the support of the Sunni, the Druze and around half of the Christians, largely by convincing voters that the other side was worse — not by mobilizing support for a set of political goals. That lack of momentum makes it hard for March 14 to do more than govern in the middle, in pursuit of incremental change, as it has since 2005. Any attempt to radically reshape Lebanese politics, for example by disarming Hezbollah and seeking a peace treaty with Israel, would meet an intransigent and powerful Hezbollah, which at least in the short term will retain the power to bring the Lebanese state to its knees by force, if it so chooses.


When the dust settles, everyone will talk about a “new phase.” Hezbollah politicians already were speaking quietly, before the elections, about a conciliatory approach. Ali Fayyad, just elected to parliament after 14 years at the helm of Hezbollah’s think tank, said his party now had to hunker down and work out the details of its political platform, eschewing confrontation.
“Politics has its own logic,” he said sitting on the porch of his home in Taibe. “When we were a small militant resistance group, we had other issues. We are now the biggest political party and player, with strategic effects in half the region. We will never achieve political reform by civil war or by hegemony.”
Rest assured though that until something radical and unexpected shifts in the regional dynamic, Lebanon will see small changes rather than big ones, and as usual, they’ll be decided by a small group of men sitting around a table — and not at the ballot box.

Thanassis Cambanis is a journalist writing a book about Hezbollah

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Iran‘s inclement election

by Gareth Smith
written by Gareth Smith

The re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the subsequent violence in Tehran deepens the challenges facing American President Barack Obama in his desire for engagement with Iran.


Ahmadinejad does not control Iranian foreign policy, but he will probably have a stronger voice in a leadership group where Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, is pre-eminent.


The stiff reaction from the authorities to the demonstrations reflects a real fear among Iranian conservatives, especially in the Revolutionary Guards, that the “green wave” offered by Mir Hussein Moussavi, Ahmadinejad’s main challenger, was an attempt to repeat the “orange revolution” of 2004 in Ukraine.


While Ayatollah Khamenei in March held out the possibility of talks with the United States, he stressed the need for the US to “change its behavior.” Iran is in a strong position, say state newspapers and state officials, and the US is stuck in a quagmire.


“The Americans have made lots of mistakes [and]… they need Iran to save them,” opined Kayhan, the leading conservative daily, in April. “They have tried and examined all possible ways and eventually found no solutions. That is why, now, they have no other choice but to turn to Iran.”


In private, some Iranian politicians acknowledge that the US’ formidable military power means things are not quite that simple. Hence, while Iran’s political class — including Moussavi and Ahmadinejad — share a commitment to the country’s nuclear program and its “right” to be treated as an international power, there are important differences over talks with the US.


In the recent election campaign, Ahmadinejad slammed his predecessors for the 2003-2005 talks with the European Union under which Iran suspended uranium enrichment as a “goodwill gesture,” even though the move was endorsed by Ayatollah Khamenei. Kayhan editor Hossein Shariatmadari has consistently argued against talking to the US, even though the supreme leader has accepted the possibility.
In any case, the fractures in the political class do not suggest the Iranians will readily focus on negotiations. Iran is not China, where uniformity can be readily imposed.


The wide coalition against Ahmadinejad has taken shape since about 2006. It has included both Moussavi and Mehdi Karrubi, the former speaker also defeated in the presidential election. But it has also involved the former reformist president, Mohammad Khatami, and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who heads two important state bodies, the Experts Assembly and the Expediency Council.


This “coalition of the concerned” came together through fear that President Ahmadinejad’s bellicose rhetoric was damaging Iran’s international position, no matter how popular it was across the Islamic world. Tougher sanctions, the president’s critics have argued, compound the damage done by Ahmadinejad’s reflationary economics.


The coalition helped shape the political agenda, to the extent that conservatives like Ali Larijani, the parliamentary speaker, and Mohsen Rezaei, the former Revolutionary Guards commander, called for a national unity government.


Moussavi ran for president with a skillful pitch for the middle ground, a “third way” promising adherence to principles (the conservatives call themselves “principle-ists”) as well as judicious reform. But the resulting melee has done anything but consolidate the middle ground.


Unfortunately for engagement prospects, many of Iran’s natural diplomats occupy the middle ground. Some are professionals, and others more or less allied to Rafsanjani, long seen as an advocate of talks with the US. Many have already been swatted by the Ahmadinejad government, beginning with his early purge of ambassadors and including spying charges in 2007 against Hossein Moussavian, the former negotiator with the European Union.


Rafsanjani remains a central target for Ahmadinejad, who came to office in 2005 attacking a man he alleges has enriched himself at the people’s expense. Ahmadinejad has consistently attacked the “oil mafia,” and, in the recent televised election debate with Moussavi, tried to link him to Rafsanjani in the hope this would weaken his support.


In seeking an interlocutor in Tehran, the US has long known it must talk to Ayatollah Khamenei, but president Obama can hardly relish dealing with an Iranian leader facing an internal crisis and possible power struggle.
And if that weren’t enough, opponents of engaging Iran in Israel and the West now have fresh wind in their sails.


US neo-conservatives have rushed to back “democracy protests” in Iran — which they say are a post hoc vindication of the George W. Bush strategy of spreading democracy — and to demand further ostracizing of Iran.
In Israel, the Netanyahu government is stepping up its argument that Iran is such an urgent military threat and that tackling it dwarfs such minor matters as Jewish settlements and blockaded Gazans.


John Bolton, the former US ambassador to the United Nations,  now at the right-wing American Enterprise Institute, has gone further, arguing that an Israeli strike on Iran “could well turn Iran’s diverse population against an oppressive regime.”


No wonder the neo-cons are cock-a-hoop. Events in Tehran not only make it harder for Obama to win the argument for engagement. They make it harder for engagement to succeed.

Gareth Smyth is the former Financial Times correspondent in Tehran

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Iraq’s vertigo

by Ranj Alaaldin
written by Ranj Alaaldin

Amidst the ongoing tumultuous events in the Middle East, Iraq has recently attracted little coverage within the international news media and, save for some macabre event like a mass casualty suicide bomber attack or the capture and murder of foreign hostages, rarely features on our television screens.

Yet, a recent surge in terrorist attacks manifestly suggests that taking Iraq off the radar may turn out to be a reckless and complacent endeavor. The bomb in Baghdad’s Sadr City at the end of June which killed more than 70 people exemplifies the threat. Therefore, a number of key areas must therefore be re-visited and assessed to determine where Iraq’s future lies.


The so far intermittent, but increasingly frequent attacks, should serve to provide a stark warning that leaving Iraq’s still nascent security and democratic institutions to fend for themselves in the drawdown of foreign troops could prove to have unexpected consequences. A surge in attacks could prolong the presence of foreign troops, preserving a status quo of violence and uncertainty, with serious ramifications for foreign powers with vested stakes in the country, and in an increasingly volatile region as well.


But the drawdown of British and American troops suggests Iraqis are capable of governing independently. Despite the aforementioned security threats, Iraqi security forces have proved their merits on previous occasions and, critically, have the respect of the population. Operation Charge of Knights in 2008 rid resource-rich Basra of Shia militias operating under the direction of radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, while elections went ahead in January without disruption and, more importantly, under the supervision of the Iraqi army, rather than American forces. Moreover, civilian casualties are down in Iraq by more than 70 percent in comparison with previous years.


Improving security becomes futile, however, in the absence of political reconciliation between Iraq’s myriad of ethnic and sectarian groups.
Of pressing concern are relations between the Kurds in the north and the federal government in Baghdad. Both continue to stand eyeball to eyeball over unresolved matters that have left the country in a state of paralysis. Iraq has yet to pass the hydrocarbons law as a result of disputes between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad over who has the right to control and manage the country’s array of resources. As a result, huge reserves of gas and oil — Iraq has a 119 billion-barrel oil reserve, making it the third largest in the world — remain unexploited and deprived of the foreign investment needed to repair and upgrade a decaying oil infrastructure.


In addition, observers are concerned about a looming power struggle. For example, along with the Kurds, the Sunni political parties are becoming increasingly wary of a more powerful Shia-dominated Baghdad government, which they fear will serve to their disadvantage should American troops leave the country completely. Prime Minister Maliki recently added to such worries when he suggested that political consensus should be sacrificed for majority rule.


While disputes have for the best part been restricted to political exchanges, uncertainty and tension are being markedly transformed into violent confrontation. The disputed territories of Mosul and Diyala, for example, still exist as terrorist hot-spots, where the last remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Iraqi insurgencies, both Sunni and Shia, remain concentrated. Continued turmoil in these provinces is already forcing American commanders to reconsider the forthcoming troop pullout from Iraq’s cities, towns and villages by June 30 to their bases, and the complete withdrawal of troops from the country by December 31, 2011.


In Kirkuk, the oil rich disputed territory, Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, which determines the status of the province — that is, whether it should be administered by the KRG or Baghdad — is yet to be implemented. The United Nations recently submitted a yet-to-be-made-public proposal to Baghdad and the KRG which outlined suggestions for remedying the problem. But continued intransigence is costing Iraqi lives, as portrayed by a recent attack which killed 73 civilians in Kirkuk.


Economic realities may, however, inject some hope. Iraq suffers from a budget deficit, and low oil prices have required the Iraqi government to slash its budget three times this year already — Iraq also depends on oil revenues to fund 90 percent of its reconstruction. Partly in response to this, the Baghdad government recently allowed Kurdish oil exports from fields administered by the KRG, suggesting that pragmatism can dictate policy more than ideology, and help pave the way toward reconciliation.


Where does Iraq stand? And where next for this country of painful paradoxes? The unavoidable reality is that the three pillars of a stable and prosperous Iraq are security, political reconciliation and the economy; still yet to be appreciated, however, is that these cannot operate independently of each other and unless equally respected and addressed, the US will find its presence prolonged and Iraq will head back to its previous state of bloody and costly degeneration.

Ranj Alaaldin is a Ph.D. candidate at the London School of Economics focusing on post-invasion Iraq

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Peace at a crossroads

by Claude Salhani
written by Claude Salhani

Propelled by United States President Barack Obama, the Middle East peace process is at an important and decisive crossroad. The next few months could see the greatest advances in the Arab-Israeli dispute since the conflict began 61 years ago. If successful, the outcome of Obama’s initiative could lead to a peaceful and permanent resolution of the Middle East crisis with the Palestinians finally having a homeland. The four thorny dossiers that have been holding up the process — the issue of final borders, the question of the Palestinian refugees’ right of return, the status of Jerusalem as capital of Israel and a future Palestinian state, as well as the security of Israel — could all be solved. That is the optimistic view.

Pulling in favor of the optimists is the gargantuan public relations campaign that was Obama’s speech to the Arab and Muslim world delivered in Cairo last month. The one important point to underscore is the announcement by the American president that solving the Middle East dispute is first and foremost in the national interest of the US. Also pulling for the optimists’ camp is George Mitchell, the US special envoy to the Middle East, who stopped in Lebanon and Syria on his recent tour of the region, where he is quietly working to move the peace process ahead. Also trying to push things forward is John Kerry who visited Syria once more.

And depending on where you stand, Jimmy Carter calling for Hamas to be recognized as a legitimate political party and removed from the State Department’s list of terror organizations, could be seen as either good or bad.
The reverse side of the coin, the pessimistic view, is that if this round of talks fails, then it could go the other way. If history is anything to go by, then there is little doubt that the next round of violence could be more explosive and more extreme. A brief scan through the history books of the last 60 odd years will back up that statement. What began as a dispute over real estate has now turned into a war of religion and some believe into a clash of civilizations. And what initially was a regional conflict has now spilled over the borders of the Middle East and onto the streets of America and Europe.

Fodder for pessimists is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s reaction to Obama’s speech, and Netanyahu’s support for policies that advocate expansion of the settlements in the West Bank, which is a non-starter for resumption of the peace process.

In between the optimists and the pessimists lies much uncertainty. Yet what is clear is that the future of the Middle East is in the hands of the region’s leaders now more than it has ever been. History will remember the legacy these leaders leave behind and it will not be kind to those who miss this opportunity. The Palestinian cause has for much too long been used and abused to justify the continued status quo in parts of the Middle East, with the aim of keeping the current regimes in power. History, however, will reserve a special place for those who will ultimately bring peace and prosperity and democracy to the people of the Middle East.

It is time for the leadership in the region to realize the precariousness in which the region finds itself today, not only when it comes to the question of war and peace, but in regards to where the region stands in education, cultural development, scientific advances, social welfare and the rights of individuals.
President Obama understands the urgency of the situation and the importance of bringing peace to the Middle East. But the task is not going to be an easy one with all sides strongly entrenched in their respective positions. The fundamental reason for the difficulty in moving ahead is due to a lack of trust that permeates both sides of the conflict. Building that trust will prove to be one of the hardest steps in bringing peace to the region. Sixty-one years of hatred will require time and effort to overcome.

Arabs and Israelis are destined to live as neighbors on the same small piece of real estate. And as neighbors they have to coexist or risk perpetuating more violence in the Levant, and guaranteeing a turbulent future for their children and grandchildren. Is that the legacy by which they want to be remembered?
The two sides have no choice but to continue to live, if not with each other, at least next to each other. One does not necessarily have to love his neighbor, but one has to learn to live with his neighbor. One important caveat: all the pushing and prodding, arm-twisting and threatening, cajoling and guarantees of the United States to bring about a settlement in the region will be impossible to achieve unless there is a strong desire amongst those concerned to solve the crisis.

Claude Salhani is the editor of the Middle East Times in Washington, DC

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