The Islamic banking sector’s phenomenal growth in recent years has not been universally welcomed. Among some powerful and influential circles in the West, particularly the United States, there is an assumed association between the increased financial capacity of sharia-compliant financial institutions — with the roughly $500 billion in wealth currently under sharia-compliant management expected to grow to $2.8 trillion by 2015 — and an increased ability for those who follow radical interpretations of Islam to fund terrorist operations.
In April 2008 the Center for Security Policy (CSP) — a Washington, D.C. based organization describing itself as specializing in identifying policies, actions, and resources “vital to American security” — launched a national campaign to counter what the group describes as the “serious risks” sharia-compliant finance poses for US financial institutions “and the national security of the United States of America.” In CSP literature its President, Frank Gaffney, warned that “US financial institutions and businesses engaged in sharia-compliant finance may have criminal and civil exposure on the grounds of securities fraud, consumer fraud, racketeering, antitrust violations, material support for terrorism and aiding and abetting sedition.”
Among CSP directors, advisers and staff are R. James Woolsey, former head of the CIA, former and current congressmen and senators, high-level staffers at the White House, the Defense Department and Congress and numerous other US government departments, while during the past several months CSP said it briefed the U.S. Treasury, members of Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission, law enforcement personnel and others on its legal memorandum regarding sharia-compliant finance.
Analyzing the risk
Is sharia financing such a threat to West? Are mechanisms within the Islamic banking system any more at risk of being used to finance terrorism than conventional banking methods?
“The easiest way in which a terrorist group can move funds around is through the conventional banking system,” said Ganesh Sahathevan. The Australia-based counter-terrorism financing expert has researched extensively the support structures of terrorist groups in Southeast Asia and their links to Jihadist networks globally, and explained that services conventional banks have developed to better serve customers — correspondence banking, internet banking, Automated Teller Machines (ATM) able to access funds through worldwide banking networks, etc. — are conveniences that make the work of terrorism financiers easier as well.
He pointed to the example of Saudi millionaire Yassin al-Qadi, who Sahathevan has been tracking for several years and who is also a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” according to the U.S. Treasury, for his financing of al-Qaeda and other extremist Islamic groups.
“Two companies within his group — a futures trading company and a stock broking company — had wire arrangements with Clearstream Banking of Luxembourg,” explained Sahathevan. “There’s no evidence that money had been transferred, but had Yassin al-Qadi wanted to transfer money through to anyone in any part of the world, he could have easily used these two entities, and no one would have known because no one would have been looking.”
Another example he gave is of Malaysian-owned MBF Bank located in Tonga — a tiny South Pacific island — with only two known overseas branches in Rangoon, Myanmar (Burma) and Pyongyang, North Korea. MBF Bank also happens to have a correspondence banking arrangement with Bank of Wachovia in the US. “So it becomes extremely easy for someone in Pyongyang or Myanmar to circumvent all sanctions — deposit the money in Myanmar, and through Tonga, it gets transfer to the banking system in mainland US. And who would know? It would be simply lost in the daily transactions.”
Where Islamic banks may have a greater propensity for facilitating the financing of terrorist groups comes at the level of ownership, said Sahathevan, as “an Islamic bank is more often than not owned by Muslim shareholders who have a desire to promote Islamic banking as a form of Dawa [the prorogation and promotion of Islam].” And among those who believe in the promotion of the Islamic way, there are some for whom this may also include Jihadist leanings, “so then a bank in the ownership of shareholders who already have that inclination, it becomes an obvious tool through which to move funds through the international banking system [for terrorism financing].”
According to Jean-Charles Brisard, an international expert on terrorism financing, a characteristic unique to Islamic banking often cited as a means used to finance international terrorist operations is zakat. He described it in a report prepared for the UN Security Council as “a legal alms-giving required as one of the five pillars of Islam on current assets and other income… [and] takes three forms, depending on its recipients: feesabeelillah (in the way of Allah), lil Fuqara (for the poor) and lil Masakeen (for the needy).”
The first form of zakat — feesabeelillah — is money spent in fighting for the cause of God (jihad), where jihad can mean struggling for personal purification (i.e. becoming a better Muslim), social betterment, or armed struggle — i.e. “Holy war” — actual physical combat waged in self defense or in fighting oppression.
“There is a clear distinction between the Koran’s concept of a defensive Jihad and the usurped form of offensive Jihad developed by several scholars [mostly followers of the Wahabbism doctrine of Islam]… justifying zakat for un-legitimate violence against peaceful nations,” noted Brisard.
Zakat past to present
Before Islamic banking, zakat would typically have been collected by the local imam or mosque, said Sahathevan. Given their localized base, these amounts of money remained relatively limited, and would typically be used towards local projects such as schools or orphanages, though small amounts could have ended up supporting violent Jihad.
“Once you have a banking system feeding into zakat, then it becomes quite different, because there you’re talking of a very large sums of money… feeding into zakat, and then the zakat can be distributed by that very same banking network,” explained Sahathevan, pointing out that once the money leaves the banking system through distribution to charities — which can then distribute it to other charities both locally and internationally — it becomes nearly impossible to trace. Should money originally earmarked for buying Qur’ans or building religious schools in Pakistan be diverted once it arrives to an al-Qaeda training camp across the border in Afghanistan, no one would be the wiser.
In Saudi Arabia alone, where zakat is enforced by law and levied much like a general taxation across the entire economy, figures from the early 2000s estimated total zakat funds even then at $10 billion annually. While the vast majority of this was undoubtedly spent in benevolent pursuits, it takes only an extremely small percentage of $10 billion to fund a major terrorist organization, as Brisard estimated pre-9/11 al-Qaeda revenue at $50 million annually — of which, interestingly enough, 90% was spent on organizational infrastructure, such as communication, networks, training facilities and protection, while only 10% was spent on operations, such as day-to-day money, terrorists attacks planning and execution.
According to the US Department of State, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks American authorities have initiated a broad range of measures to counter terrorism financing including: designating some 400 individuals as “linked to terrorism” and freezing their US-based assets, passing counter-terrorism financing legislation at home and prompting the UN to adopt the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; pushing the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body consisting of 32 countries, the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council to expand and revise its mandate to
include counter-terrorism financing, while pushing for the formation of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA-FATF) in 2005 — consisting of the 320-member Union of Arab Banks and governments across the Arab world.
By many accounts however these efforts, among others, have done staggeringly little to stem the flow of funds to terrorist groups.
“It is continuing unabated,” said Sahathevan. “No doubt people are more aware of it, there’s more discussion about it, more regulations, and certainly there have been some convictions in some places… but by and large it continues unabated.”
Lax regulation
Brisard said that the “MENA-FATF initiative has proven efficient in identifying the legal and structural weaknesses in the fight against terrorism financing. But many countries… still lack proper regulations and tools, as recently pointed out by the FATF.” He noted a number of Gulf countries have not ratified the UN anti-terrorism financing convention, while other 87 countries still had not criminalized terrorism financing by the end of 2007.
In particular Brisard named Kuwait, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as countries that “have failed to take legal action to prevent the misuse of charitable and other nonprofit entities that can be used as conduits for the financing of terrorism, while weak implementation of regulations is a cause of concern as to the potential for the financing of terrorism through the misuse of charities.” An example of this Brisard pointed to is the Saudi High Commission for Charities, announced in 2002 to oversee Saudi charities with foreign operations, yet six years on it is still to be formally established.
“At the same time, countries such as the UAE, have taken several important regulatory and conventional steps with the banking sector that obviously go in the right direction,” he adds.
Among the other difficulties in cracking down on terrorism financiers is the ability they have developed, especially in the case of al-Qaeda, to make and move money through legitimate, recognized financial institutions and businesses to fund illegal activities. This largely distinguishes terrorism financing from money laundering, where money is made through illegal means, then moved through businesses and financial institutions — both legitimate and fraudulent — to make the money appear “clean” for use in the normal economy.
And perhaps therein lies part of the reactionism motivating groups like the CSP against sharia-compliant financing and Islamic banking: not only have the huge amounts of resources poured into counter-terrorism financing efforts since 9/11 been relatively ineffective, but terrorist networks are showing incredible aptitude at using the same capitalist structures America and the West were build on to fund Jihad against the West.
“By integrating themselves into the Western financial structure, proponents of this doctrine can essentially shield from regulatory mechanisms the transfer of millions of dollars in zakat, or charity payments, from wealthy Middle Eastern radicals to violent and/or subversive organizations in Europe and the United States,” wrote the CSP November 2007 in literature from it’s Sharia Risk Project. The CSP followed that statement with one that highlighted what may be the fear at the group’s core: “Advocates of sharia’s financing believe that they may have found an indirect way to begin imposing their obscurantist code upon the free peoples of the world.”




