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GCC

Sector set for expansion

by Executive Staff February 8, 2007
written by Executive Staff

It has been a busy few weeks for Kuwait’s telecommunications sector, with the country’s existing mobile phone network operators announcing ambitious expansion plans overseas, while facing the prospect of a new rival in the domestic market.

Kuwait’s mobile phone market is set for a major upheaval after the government announced on Dec. 17, 2006 that it would allow a third license to join Mobile Telecommunications Company (MTC) and the Wataniya Telecom Company.

Decision comes from political pressure

The decision by the Kuwaiti cabinet to back the proposal for a third operator came after considerable pressure from the opposition, which had long contended that the establishing of Wataniya in 1999 had not done enough to boost competition in the telecoms market.

Under the cabinet’s proposal, 60% of shares in the new firm will be available to the public, 24% to state-owned authorities including a pension fund and an investment body and the other 16% to a core local or international investor. The government had rejected a bill tabled by the opposition earlier this year to set up a third operator but appears to have accepted both the economic viability of a new venture and the public pressure for a wider range of options.

The third license has been something of a political football in Kuwaiti politics, with the government contending that it was a matter for the cabinet to decide on while the opposition-dominated National Assembly took the position that it was a legislative issue.

Speaking on December 10, before the cabinet formally approved the proposal for the new network, Communications Minister Maasouma al-Mubarak said that while the government was not opposed to issuing a third license, or more if needed, any such company would be set up through the ministry of commerce and industry and not through mechanisms established by the assembly.

The government firmly believes that establishing companies is the sole jurisdiction of the government and not the legislative power, she said.

Regulation required

Al-Mubarak also said that the government was looking to establish a communications commission to regulate the telecom market, a step that would, to some degree, allay opposition concerns over a lack of competition and ensure transparency.

Whenever the new company becomes operational, it will face fierce competition in the tight Kuwaiti market. The country already has one of the highest levels of penetration in the world, with 2.5 million of Kuwait’s population of 3 million currently subscribing to either MTC or Wataniya.

Though Kuwait’s two domestic mobile phone firms may be facing additional competition at home, the threat hasn’t fazed either MTC or Wataniya. Both have recently announced new plans to expand their already sizeable international operations.

On Dec. 17, MTC announced that it was considering placing a bid for Paktel, Pakistan’s fifth-largest mobile phone company, after the operator’s Luxembourg-based owner Millicom made public plans to bow out of the Pakistani telecoms sector. If the sale goes through, it would give MTC a further 1.5 million subscribers to those it has in its 20 existing overseas operations and allow it to access a rapidly growing market.

Only days before, the international arm of rival Wataniya signed an agreement with the Palestine Investment Fund (PIF) to set up a new mobile phone company in the Palestinian territories. The deal will see the Kuwaiti company manage the operation and hold 40% of the new firm’s shares, with the PIF having another 30% and the remaining slice being offered to the Palestinian public through an initial public offering (IPO).

In September, the Palestinian government’s Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology awarded Wataniya the tender to establish the second mobile phone network after the company submitted a bid of $179 million for the rights.

The expansion into the Palestinian market will further consolidate Wataniya’s overseas holdings, with the company also operating in northern Iraq, Tunisia and Algeria.

News of the shareholders agreement came only a day after the Kuwait Projects Company announced that it was considering selling its 24.9% stake in Wataniya, with the proposed move being linked to the general downturn in the region’s stock markets.

February 8, 2007 0 comments
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GCC

Oman working to broaden economy with push in tourism sector

by Executive Staff February 8, 2007
written by Executive Staff

As is the case with most of the states in the Gulf region, Oman is actively working to broaden the base of its economy and to provide employment opportunities to its expanding local workforce. One sector that has been identified as having great potential is that of tourism, an industry that Oman is particularly well positioned to foster.

Slow out of the blocks

In some ways, Oman has been slow out of the blocks in the race to promote itself as a holiday destination, with a separate Ministry of Tourism only established in 2004. That said, the Sultanate already had in place a sound tourism infrastructure and has fast become a serious rival to other Gulf states, such as the UAE, that have also seen tourism as a viable option for their economies.

Market analysts are predicting the Omani economy to expand by 5.9% in 2007, following 5% growth last year, placing it just behind Qatar and the UAE and well ahead of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Contributing to the solid growth rates in 2006 and 2007, the tourism sector grew by 16% in 2006 and looks set for a bumper year in 2007.

Oman’s tourism sector launched itself into 2007 on a high, fuelled by strong bookings through the Eid al Adha break, with hotels and resorts reporting a 90% occupancy rate during the holiday.

Oman has joined the regional mania for building whole self-contained metropolises from the ground up, with the announcement of the Blue City project on the coastal region at Al Sawadi. The project, with a total budget estimated at between $15 to $20 billion, will include more than 200 villas, some 5000 apartments, four hotels, golf courses and retail centers.

According to Renny Borhan, senior vice president of Hill International, the US construction firm that won a six-year contract in early January to provide technical advisory and oversight services for the project, the new mega development will be a significant boost to the Omani tourism industry. “The Blue City development will make the country of Oman a major destination in the Middle East,” Borhan said.

Tourism as a cure for unemployment

Oman’s government has identified the labor-intensive tourism sector as a way of relieving the growing unemployment problem. The 2007 budget unveiled by Economy Minister Ahmed bin Abdulnabi Macki on January 7 included a number of large ticket items to boost tourism-related infrastructure. Foremost among these are funding for further improvements to the Muscat Seeb International Airport, as well as consultancy studies for the construction of two new airports. Other general infrastructure projects, including major highway links and water, wastewater processing and electricity upgrades will all have a positive effect on the country’s tourism sector.

In addition, the state has provided the required land and a soft loan of $7.75 million to assist in the development of a golf course, a residential complex and hotels close to Muscat. On January 6, the Oman Arab Bank and Bank Dhofar signed an agreement to finance the residential phase of the project, which has already seen the completion of a series of high-end villas and apartments that will cater to the region’s golf lovers and those from further afield. The course will be fully grassed during 2007 and brought up to international standards, another step in Oman’s campaign to increase its share of the tourism market in the Gulf.

However, while Oman has seen a flourishing of tourism developments in recent years, with many lavish new projects either on the drawing board or set to start construction in 2007, the country has also somewhat sought to distance itself from the luxury brand holidays offered by its neighbors. Omani tourism operators, encouraged by the government, are looking to cash in not only on the sun and fun aspects of tourism but there has also been a strong emphasis on adventure tourism including diving, safaris, off-road driving, trekking, camping and mountain climbing.

February 8, 2007 0 comments
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GCC

Regional stock storms

by Executive Staff February 8, 2007
written by Executive Staff

Despite the market volatility throughout the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region, the Muscat Securities Market (MSM) has experienced overall growth of 12% in 2006.

In a report issued in August, Merrill Lynch named Oman as one of the top four most attractive markets in the Middle East and North Africa region. The other countries named in the report were Egypt, Bahrain and Kuwait.

Neighboring markets in the Gulf slumped from record highs earlier last year. In Saudi Arabia, the downturn came after three years of growth.

Ahmed Saleh al-Marhoon, the director general of the MSM, said that what happened this year was unprecedented in the region. The unrealistic index increases were bound to lead to a correction, which is what started happening in late February 2006.

In Saudi Arabia, the Tadawul All Share Index grew almost eightfold between March 2003 and February 2006. By late November, the Tadawul was operating 49% lower than the same period during the previous year. Meanwhile, the Dubai Financial Market had fallen 64% and Doha 42% over the same period.

MSM sees realistic increase

Comparatively, the MSM did not suffer from such a slump. “If you trace the movements, you will see a realistic increase reflecting real economic growth,” al-Marhoon said.

A small dip was recorded from March through the summer and al-Marhoon explained this as normal market behavior. “The MSM is not immune to sentiments in the region,” he added.

A limitation for attracting investors to the MSM, despite its stability, is its size. The market has about 140 listed companies of which about 40 actually get traded. The Bank Sohar initial public offering (IPO) was the only IPO released on the market in 2006.

Earlier in January, Bank Sohar released the $51.9 million IPO, which represents 40% of the total paid up capital, the minimum required to be listed on the MSM as decided by the regulator, the IPO oversubscribed by six times.

The market wants more IPOs

Al-Marhoon said that the market would like to see more IPOs, as a way to enrich it and attract more investors.

A number of other IPOs were expected last year, notably through government privatization. However, these have been delayed. Al-Marhoon said the government was still committed to privatization but procedural matters had to be dealt with.

Meanwhile, Galfar Engineering and Contracting, the sultanate’s largest private construction company, announced last July that it would go public by November, but this was delayed until 2007. The company is expected to release $130 million, said Mohammed Ali, the managing director of Galfar.

Al-Marhoon said that most IPOs expected over the next few years would come from some of the new tourism developments and oil related industries.

The MSM has also identified the large family businesses and groups that are active in the private sector, which as of yet have tended not to go public.

Al-Marhoon said that he would like to see more family businesses go public. He said it was in their interest, as it would allow for new blood, new ideas and diversification.

February 8, 2007 0 comments
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GCC

Economic projects

by Executive Staff February 8, 2007
written by Executive Staff

On December 16, Amr al-Dabbagh, the governor of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) discussed how the kingdom’s ambitious economic cities projects would break new ground in the integration and use of information and communications technology (ICT).

Al-Dabbagh spoke during a forum entitled Intelligent Cities, held in Riyadh. The forum discussed the concept of the project and the investment opportunities associated with the cities. All are to be solely funded by the private sector but al-Dabbagh was quick to emphasize the government was offering tremendous support to the initiatives.

In addition, the head of SAGIA also announced two new cities, which would bring the total to six. Studies are underway to establish two new economic cities in the northern and eastern regions, al-Dabbagh said.

The four cities announced to date are King Abdullah Economic City in Rabigh, on the coast north of Jeddah, Prince Abdulaziz bin Mousaed’s Economic City (PABMEC) near Hail, Knowledge Economic City in al-Madinah, and Jizan Economic City. SAGIA estimates that these projects alone will attract $80 million in investment.

Liberalizing restrictive regulations

SAGIA was founded in 2000 on the back of the government’s new Foreign Investment Law which paved the way for liberalizing some of the kingdom’s traditionally restrictive regulations regarding the rights of private foreign investors. The authority has the mandate to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and increase economic diversification, particularly through knowledge-based enterprises.

The government’s economic strategy, of which SAGIA is but a part, centers on diversifying the economy. Another vital aspect is the creation of employment opportunities for the growing population—an estimated 60% are under the age of 14. Among these and other strategies there remains a strong emphasis on spreading wealth equitably throughout the kingdom.

The economic cities projects are intended to go some way in fulfilling both SAGIA’s stated objectives and the government’s broader economic vision by enabling diversification and creating jobs, as well as steering the kingdom into a prime position to compete on the global stage.

Al-Dabbagh and the other speakers emphasized that through the creation of completely new cities on Greenfield sites, a great opportunity existed to give Saudi Arabia a huge competitive advantage in terms of ICT and the benefits it can offer to business and industry. Combining the concepts of the ‘digital city,’ originally coined by the Intel Corporation, the ‘smart city’ by Cisco and the ‘internet frontier’ by Microsoft, SAGIA intends for the cities to be at the cutting edge of ICT systems, integrating all aspects of the infrastructure networks to enable transfer of information at every possible level. Attendant to this would be software and content creation opportunities.

Abdullah al-Rakhis, the chairman of Rakisa Holding, the company responsible for developing PABMEC, said the project would create a ‘silicon valley’ style area at a cost of some $22 million. This project at Hail is specifically intended to focus on ICT, taking a less prominent role in other areas. He said that the project had the potential to create some 600 jobs for women alone.

A human resource challenge

Al-Rakhis was also quick to highlight how aware of the human resource challenge his project and the broader ICT sector needed to be. “We have started to send a number of Saudis to the US, Canada, Ireland and Singapore for training on smart infrastructure facilities,” he said, speaking of the initial preparations already being made. He also spoke of the associations Rakisa Holding had already made with companies such as Cisco and Intel in terms of training.

Intel Corporation’s Chairman Craig Barrett, who was in Riyadh, unveiled a series of agreements with the Saudi government, including a commitment to train 50,000 Saudi teachers in their Intel Teach Essential Program. His comments echoed those made in a similar speech by Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates back in November. He also signed a number of commitments to spur on ICT development and train Saudis.

Also, earlier this year, fellow US firm Cisco Systems announced an investment of $300 million in the kingdom’s ICT sector when John Chambers, the president and CEO, visited the kingdom.

February 8, 2007 0 comments
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GCC

Two private air licenses

by Executive Staff February 8, 2007
written by Executive Staff

After much speculation, two private airline licenses have been awarded, heralding the beginning of a new era for aviation in Saudi Arabia.

The Supreme Economic Council, which is personally headed by King Abdullah and steers the kingdom’s economic development, decided in 2005 to liberalize the sector and allow private operators to set up and compete with the state-owned Saudi Arabian Airlines.

There were six applicants for the licenses last year, which the General Authority of Civil Aviation (GACA) whittled down to two. The successful bidders were Sama Airlines and National Air Services (NAS) both winning on a mandate to offer low cost services across the kingdom with a view to expanding outside in the future.

Riyadh-based NAS is one of the best known regional private aviation operators in the kingdom, which has one of the highest appetites for private air travel in the world. Ali al-Naqbi, Chairman of the Middle East Business Aviation Association, recently said that the business aviation sector in Saudi Arabia accounted for 50% of the total for the whole region—a market he estimated would be worth $800 million by 2012.

NAS has developed NetJets, a fractional ownership and leasing program in the kingdom and also operates evacuation services for oil companies operating in remote locations, along with other bespoke services.

Founded in 1999 and focussing on top-end private aviation, NAS’s board announced last April at a shareholders’ meeting that it intended to increase the paid up capital to $266.7 million through a 30% equity sale to Abraaj Nas Investment Co, a subsidiary of Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal’s Kingdom Holding Co. It was said at the time that this was meant to facilitate new strategic directions, which would now appear to be towards budget travel and acquiring a civil aviation license.

Getting into the low-cost market

Mohammed al-Zeer, the president of the company, recently explained to the press that the decision to break away from the top-end of the sector and enter into the low-cost carrier (LCC) market had been made after careful consideration and consultation with companies such as the British-based budget airline EasyJet. Subsequently EasyJet has announced that it has entered talks regarding franchising its brand to NAS.

The company will start its LCC services with a fleet of five single aisle planes. In December, the company announced its intention to purchase additional craft as part of a $2 billion expansion program, which would increase its entire fleet to 100 by 2010.

The other licensee Sama is similarly aiming to develop services geared towards the low cost market. Founded by Prince Bandar bin Khalid al-Faisal, who owns Investment Enterprises, it has a paid-up capital of $53 million. Other shareholders in the enterprise include some of the largest names in Saudi business such as the Dallah and Olayan Group and some wealthy individual investors.

Sama intends to begin operations flying between Dammam, where it will be based, Jeddah and Riyadh, before pushing further afield and regionally when it receives licensing from neighboring jurisdictions.

With targets similarly ambitious to those of rival NAS, Sama’s CEO, Andrew Cowen, explained to the international press, “We plan to grow our fleet from the existing four committed aircraft to around 35 by 2010.” He declined to specify the leasing company they were in talks with, but did say that the terms would be between five and seven years.

Takeoffs as yet delayed, however

It is not as yet clear when either airline will commence full operations but they are set to compete not only between themselves but also with the state incumbent, Saudi Arabian Airlines. The national carrier is undergoing a slow and reputedly painful process of privatization. One Riyadh analyst said, referring to the reported bloated bureaucracy and over-staffing, that it should benefit from the competition in the long run—whether or not this will speed up the lackluster path to privatization remains to be seen.

What is clear though is that the consumer is set to benefit with the arrival of two new operators. With 33 million passengers passing through Saudi Arabia’s 27 airports in 2006, the market is large and all indications point to further growth. International Transport Association figures released in November 2006 indicate that regional carriers experienced a 15.4% increase during the first nine months of the year.

The GACA is spending $8 billion expanding and developing the existing airports in Jeddah, Madinah and Tabuk to bring them up to international standards. There is also an additional international airport on the drawing board as part of the enormous King Abdullah Economic City development in Rabigh, on the Red Sea coast, north of Jeddah.

February 8, 2007 0 comments
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Banking & Finance

Strong regulations benefit Turkey’s bank industry

by Executive Staff February 1, 2007
written by Executive Staff

Foreign banks are continuing to show strong interest in Turkey’s banking sector, as demonstrated by the upcoming sale of state owned HalkBank and privately-held Oyak Bank. While the inflow of foreign blood over recent years has elevated the standards of the banking sector, Turkey’s bank regulator has forced local players into shape.

Since its establishment in 2000, some local bankers have lauded the independent Banking Regulation and Supervisory Agency (BDDK) for the discipline it has instilled in the sector. Non-performing loans (NPLs) have been whittled down and are not considered to pose a problem, while loan volumes—specifically retail loans and SME loans—have increased. The minimum capital adequacy ratio was recently increased from 8% to 12%. The sector is well regulated and the level of transparency and reporting mechanisms are extremely good, says Levent Celebioglu, the assistant general manager and head of the financial institutions group of TEB-BNP Paribas.

Regulatory scheme praised, but doubts remain

While the majority of market observers praise Turkey’s regulatory authority, others take a more qualified stance. The BDDK’s interventionist approach could be dangerous. Having broader and more sophisticated regulatory parameters—as for instance in Europe—is safer as it means that the entire sector will not suffer should the regulatory authority make a miscalculation or misjudgment, said a foreign bank executive. Control of interest rates on credit cards has also been a source of complaint for some in the sector, limiting returns and business expansion. This is not to deny that the regulatory authority’s more accommodating approach on card interest rates has offset much sector-wide disgruntlement, resulting in a broader consensus between the regulator and regulated. Restricted consumer credit though is still raised as an issue by some insiders. Limiting the total amount of credit available to each person protects those banks that already have customers. The emphasis rather should be on educating consumers on how to avoid debt, according to the observer. Providing safeguards against debt, regulatory fans retort, is the safest track.

Yet, the BDDK’s strong mandate as a hands-on regulator should be placed in the context of Turkey’s turbulent economic past, when stringent regulation of the banking sector was clearly lacking. Many observers blame the 2001 financial crisis on the lax banking safeguards of the time. While 85 banks were operating in Turkey in 2000, the number decreased to 51 by 2005 following liquidations, mergers and acquisitions.

An evolving industry

The industry has evolved since the BDDK emerged as regulator but risks nonetheless remain. A recent report by international ratings agency Fitch Ratings underlined that Turkish banks needed to closely monitor asset quality, diversify earnings and improve efficiency as the sector experiences rapid growth in loans and ever increasing competition from constituent players. In November, BDDK head Tevfik Bilgin also warned that money from deposits alone was currently not sufficient to fund the banks, with foreign borrowing filling the gap.

Foreign banks shrug at such concerns. The banking asset to GDP ratio Turkey is approximately 85 to 87% in 2006, whereas for the EU 15 members it is 280%, or 110% for the EU 25 members, said Celebioglu, pointing to the scope for growth in the Turkish market. Likewise, Bilgin underlined the fact that the market was potentially worth between $700 billion and $800 billion, as opposed to the $323.03 billion registered towards the end of 2006. Turkey had previously lived in a high inflation environment with high interest rates, which forced consumers to hold back on spending. But the tide has shifted, with consumers showing greater confidence on the back of the government’s economic policies.

Meanwhile, the sector as a whole will continue to benefit from the entry of foreign players. The total foreign shareholding at Turkish banks is expected to reach 18% of total paid-in capital by the end of the year, according to the 2006 Fitch report.

February 1, 2007 0 comments
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Capitalist Culture

A step back for freedom? US must choose

by Michael Young February 1, 2007
written by Michael Young

Amid all the hoopla over how the United States should conduct its war in Iraq, very little attention has been paid to what looked like a good idea when President George W. Bush first sought to justify his invasion of Iraq: the spread of democracy to the people of the Middle East.

Indeed, in recent weeks some American pundits and former officials have taken a decidedly dim view of US ambitions in the region. For example, in a much-listened-to radio program, Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former State Department official, pointed out that democracy should not be an American priority. More generally, Haass has been peddling a pessimistic line on American power, arguing in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs magazine that the end of US dominance in the Middle East had arrived. “[B]y tying down a huge portion of the US military, the war has reduced US leverage worldwide. It is one of history’s ironies that the first war in Iraq, a war of necessity, marked the beginning of the American era in the Middle East and the second Iraq war, a war of choice, has precipitated its end.”

Haass is a political ‘realist,’ one whose approach to foreign affairs is defined by advancing American interests rather than defending values. Realism was for a long time the foundation of US policy in the Middle East, and justified Washington’s interactions with despotic regimes; that is until Bush complicated matters by placing democracy at the heart of his regional agenda, even as he continued to uphold good relations with dictators in Arab countries from the Gulf to the Atlantic.

‘Realists’ on the upswing, but they’re still on the wrong track

Haass is not the only realist to take such a jaundiced view of democratization. In summer 2004, Brent Scowcroft, national security advisor to former President George H.W. Bush, had this to say to a reporter from the New York Observer: “It’s not that I don’t believe Iraq is capable of democracy. But the notion that within every human being beats this primeval instinct for democracy has not ever been demonstrated to me.” That Scowcroft and his onetime boss had sponsored a policy in the Middle East that granted America’s despotic comrades wide latitude to suffocate any “primeval instinct for democracy” was left unmentioned.

The question today, however, is whether the US has the same option as it once did to ignore the abuses carried out by its Arab allies—in effect to ignore a capitalist culture of free minds and free markets. The Middle East is changing, and while despotism endures, the alternative to despotism is far clearer today than it was when people like Haass and Scowcroft were at the helm. Against the dictators stand angry Islamists—themselves as undemocratic, if not more so, than the men in power, and often far more destructive. In other words, reheated realism is not really an option anymore in the shadow of the 9/11 attacks, when it has become quite obvious that despotism only makes violent Islamism stronger.

That message has yet to sink in among the halls of government and Congress in Washington, where the failure of one foreign policy school tends to mechanically lead to embrace of the other. Because the neoconservatives who gave ideological sustenance to Bush’s Middle Eastern policies after 2001 are said to have failed, the pendulum has shifted back to the realists. The fact is, however, that both sides are guilty of failure in the region. The neocons wanted grand change, but all they have ceded us until now is instability; the realists pray at the altar of stability, but left behind a Middle East with an anti-Americanism that made possible the attacks against New York and Washington. Neither side has offered a convincing template for a new US approach to the region.

However, the neocons did hand us something genuinely new in their defense, hypocritical or sincere, of democracy and human rights. For the US to give up on these values or practices is not only impossible at this stage (since, for all his faults, Bush has imperceptibly welded those concepts into the edifice of Middle Eastern thinking), it is also bad politics. Human rights and democracy are powerful ideas that, when properly defended, give the US considerable leverage in the Arab world. No sensible state surrenders a good thing, even if that means it has to reshape and refine an agenda to convince the agnostics or detractors.

Not many Arabs are willing to give the US the benefit of the doubt on democracy. But no one is particularly eager to be indefinitely ruled by the tyrants who hold sway in the region either. There is room in that gap for a liberal American approach to the region, one that first advances then defends democracy where possible. The approach might be haphazard, deliberate, and contradictory, but a return to a past of benign neglect for human rights in the Middle East is neither feasible nor defensible.

 

February 1, 2007 0 comments
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Even big powers want friends

by Lee Smith February 1, 2007
written by Lee Smith

A friend at the State Department relates a meeting he had recently with a high-level official from a one-time Soviet satellite state, one in fact where the US waged a major, and very unsuccessful, war. But with the Cold War over and the US having won it, this nation, like most others, wants a deal with Washington.

“We are looking for a Category One relationship,” the official told my friend. “But there’s no such thing as ‘Category One,’” the man from State explained. “Washington doesn’t work like that.” My friend continued: “The United States has bilateral relationships with a number of different countries and explores various ways of strengthening ties.” “Ah, OK,” the foreign official said, indicating that he fully understood. “But we want a Category One relationship—just like Israel!”

Israel is perhaps the US’s most famous—and most controversial—ally, but it is hardly the most privileged one. After all, Washington’s most enduring alliance is its “special relationship” with the United Kingdom, which partly explains why Tony Blair was one of the few European leaders to stick his neck out on behalf of the Bush administration and join the coalition of the willing.

The fact is that Washington has plenty of friends the world over—including the Middle East, though many of them think it best to play down their relationship with the Great Satan. For instance, the centerpiece of US-Middle East policy for the last 60 years has been the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, home to the world’s largest known reserves of oil. And the US taxpayer keeps the Bahrain-based 5th Fleet afloat to make sure that Gulf Arab energy stays readily available, a boon to the US and Khaliji kings and sheikhs alike, as well as markets around the world.

The White House stands with the Seniora government not just because Lebanon is a front, among many others, to advance democracy and fight Iran’s project in the region, but because Washington believes business is good for America and Beirut believes doing business is good. Egypt is another regional ally, the second largest recipient of US aid, getting $2 billion a year, partly as a bribe to maintain its peace treaty with Israel, but also because the US thinks it wise to be on good terms with the most populous Arab state. Indeed, the US spends loads of cash on its friends in the Middle East, including non-Hamas Palestinian institutions, and has free-trade agreements with a host of nations here, like Morocco and Oman.

Washington is not friendly with the Jewish state instead of the Arabs, but in addition to them.

The fact is that the US does not see the world as a zero-sum equation. The United States is perhaps unique in history among all Great Powers insofar as its default strategy is not “divide and conquer”; nor, unlike many other actors, does Washington typically seek to destabilize other states to knock rivals and friends off kilter. Rather, the US usually seeks to keep the peace around the globe and maintain the balance of power by using local actors. And this brings us back to Israel.

It is true that the United States was the second nation in the world to recognize the State of Israel (the USSR was first), but the relationship didn’t kick into high gear until later. After the Arabs’ catastrophic 1967 defeat, Washington recognized that the Jewish state could be a useful ally against the Soviets’ Arab proxies. But it was the 1973 October War that really cemented the US-Israeli alliance.

The 1973 oil embargo keyed in on the Americans’ Achilles Heel—their dependence on Gulf energy sources. In turn, Washington took advantage of the Arabs’ glaring weakness—their fanatical hatred of Israel. By arming Israel to the teeth so that the Arabs had little real hope in driving the Jews into the sea, the US ensured that if the Arabs wanted concessions from Israel they would have to go through Washington to get them, thereby securing the Americans’ position as the region’s prime mover. In lesser hands, the “Peace Process” may seem a maudlin exercise in fruitless diplomacy, but it is a masterstroke of realpolitik—one however that has probably outlived its usefulness with a Hamas government in power and Israel coming off of two wars along pre-67 borders this past summer.

All this has thrown a number of US policymakers and other experts into a state of confusion. Pity poor James Baker and his stillborn Iraq Study Group report. And then there’s sorely confused ex-President Jimmy Carter, who owes his place in history to the Israeli-Egyptian peace deal and yet whose new book now describes Israel as an apartheid state. No one however has misunderstood the principles of American foreign policy as dramatically as the authors of “The Israel Lobby,” Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer. In following the Aljazeera line, and recommending that dumping Israel will lessen anti-American terrorism, they have posited a superpower without a spine. Imagine if during the midst of “the Troubles,” the Irish Republican Army had targeted the US for its alliance with the UK—would any serious analyst argue that Washington drop the Brits because of it?

Great Powers, as we have seen, make all sorts of alliances for all sorts of reasons; however, they are no longer Great Powers once they begin to accept terms dictated to them by terrorist gangs.

LEE SMITHis a Hudson Institute visiting fellow and reporter on Middle East affairs 

February 1, 2007 0 comments
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Government vague on Paris III

by Michael Karam February 1, 2007
written by Michael Karam

If I appear vague, forgive me, but looking at the document the Lebanese government was supposed to show the assembled international donors in Paris, a group that included sovereign governments, the IMF, the World Bank and other supranational institutions, one can only have a deep feeling that it was published half-cocked. Based on this, we were lucky to get the money.

The contents are undeveloped and some important parts of the economic and social reform program appear blurred and unconvincing, leaving the reader with the nagging feeling that the government is too fearful to upset certain political parties or even entire communities.

There is also a significant lack of any data projecting anticipated future economic performance. Parameters are limited in number and, wheere they do exist, they are insufficiently substantiated. Moreover, there is no executive summary that clearly itemizes the reform program.

The reader reads on and on and never sees any clear-cut proposal on how to reform the country as a whole. Instead, the reform program seems to be: Yes, we need a capital markets authority, to reduce interest rates, etc. But we never find out what is the end game.

So what does it say? The privatization section is limited, includes no details and is by and large superficial. Privatization is the key issue for donors like the World Bank and the IMF, who have insisted on it as a condition for the Paris I and II conferences. It’s as if the government has not yet learned that it needs to take the bull by the horns on the privatization issue and elaborate the privatization program in the future. Securitization is only briefly mentioned yet it is a crucial part of the process. The document does not say what will be privatized, how it will be privatized and how long the process will take. In short, the government appears not to want to commit itself.

And still the fluff appears. Governance and good practice measures are not comprehensive. These are major issues in Lebanon and although the will to tackle them is apparent in the document, the method is not clearly laid out. Transparency of the non-banking sector is not really mentioned, neither are the ways as to how it is going to be tackled. There is no description of the corporate sector’s physiognomy.

The banking section is supremely lightweight when it should have been a major focus for the government. Basel II should have been be mentioned, as should the plans to make Lebanese banks compliant and the problems of raising capital to achieve this compliance. All this would facilitate arguments with donors.

There is also no clear explanation as to how the government is going to push banks to become intermediaries in government paper and the central bank’s latest measures are nowhere to be seen. One wonders whether the BDL and the Ministry of Finance even liaised on this report.

There is an absolute need to create (or reactivate) a small claims tribunal. There are lots of private entrepreneurs in Lebanon who don’t get paid by their customers and the law is too slow and weak to enforce their claim expeditiously. This should be included in the governance and best practice section. Delays in claim payments are plaguing the economy and are slowing down GDP growth and private consumption. Given the entrepreneurial nature of the Lebanese and their economy, an efficient small claims tribunal can only contribute towards GDP growth.

The document does not mention in any detail how the government intends to develop new franchises and create diversity for the economy. This is a part the donors would be really interested in. Raising taxes and VAT (to 12% by 2008 and to 15% by 2010) is merely a partial solution to increase government revenues, and the government does not even attempt to propose innovative ways to increase revenues without affecting the purchasing power of the population. The document’s plan to increase and diversify government revenues and reduce the budget deficit is incomplete, scattered and, yes, once again, blurred.

Ordinarily, donors are in no mood to fill in the blanks. They want to see a more detailed analysis of the economic and social dynamic, as well as details on how these problems are going to be sorted. We can conclude therefore that the government relied more on its pals in the international community—French President Jacques Chirac and the majority of the European Union—to convince them to hand over the money and that the Paris III document appeared to have been drafted for cosmetic purposes only.

Michael Karam is the managing editor of EXEVUTIVE

February 1, 2007 0 comments
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Abizaid: the Mad Arab who disagreed with the President

by Claude Salhani February 1, 2007
written by Claude Salhani

Gen. John P. Abizaid, the most senior military officer of Arab descent to serve in the US armed forces, disagreed with President Bush over the president’s Iraq strategy—and he is out.

On Dec. 20, 2006, the Pentagon announced that Abizaid, an American of Lebanese origin, would step down from his position as Commander of CENTCOM (US Central Command) and retire in March 2007. Abizaid said he would have liked to retire later but that these decisions are never made alone, a subtle way of saying he was pushed. “At the Pentagon, the knives are inserted so slowly that they are hard to notice,” said one long-timePentagon observer.

Abizaid, who as a cadet at West Point was nick named the “Mad Arab,” is considered a no-nonsense man, someone who is not afraid to speak his mind or to take the initiative. During the 1983 invasion of Grenada, Abizaid and his unit jumped from a helicopter onto a landing strip. Under fire from Cuban troops and lacking proper armor, Abizaid ordered one of his Rangers to drive a bulldozer toward the Cubans as he advanced behind it—a scene reenacted in Clint Eastwood’s 1986 film, “Heartbreak Ridge.”

But acts of derring-do aside, he was a realist, one who dared oppose the White House over Bush’s surge of US forces in Iraq. “You have to internationalize the problem,” Abizaid said. “You have to attack it diplomatically, geo-strategically. You just can’t apply a microscope on a particular problem in downtown Baghdad and a particular problem in downtown Kabul and say that somehow or another, if you throw enough military forces at it, that you are going to solve the broader issues in the region of extremism.”

The problem is that his opinions clashed with those of the White House. Abizaid was the first officer to officially call the fighting in Iraq a guerrilla war, despite denials from the White House and the Pentagon. He was the first to raise the alarm that sectarian violence was spreading. Abizaid saw the rising civil war in Iraq as replacing terrorism as the biggest threat to Iraq’s stability. He was the first to tell Congress that Iraq faced the risk of slipping into civil war.

Abizaid opposed Bush’s troop surge on the grounds that he felt the answer to Iraq’s problems lay more in a political settlement than in escalating the conflict. Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, told the general during a heated debate, “I’m of course disappointed that basically you’re advocating the status quo here today, which I think the American people in the last election said is not an acceptable condition.”

Abizaid also coined the phrase “the long war” to describe the challenges in fighting radical Islamist terrorism. He believed the United States is not properly organized to face the emerging threat of Islamist terrorism head-on. “I think our structures for 21st century security challenges need to adapt to this type of an enemy,” he said. “The 21st century really requires that we figure out how to get economic, diplomatic, political and military elements of power synchronized and coordinated against specific problems wherever they exist.”

He was the first to publicly say that a solution in Iraq required talks with Iran and Syria. The dispute over the increase of troop levels brought out in the open the schism between the uniforms and the suits. Testifying before a Senate committee on Nov. 15, Abizaid said, “I do not believe that more American troops right now is the solution to the problem. I believe that the troop levels need to stay where they are.”

Abizaid predicted that the insurgencies in the four Sunni provinces in northern and central Iraq will be there for the foreseeable future (a view that goes against President Bush’s hopes that by deploying an additional 21,500 soldiers and Marines, the insurgency may be somehow contained) and believes that the U.S.’s primary enemy in Iraq is al-Qaeda, whose plan is to keep casualties in the media until the American public becomes convinced that victory is impossible and leaves the region.

“When you take a look at the reach of the extremism as exemplified by al-Qaeda, it’s not just in Afghanistan, it’s not just in Iraq—it’s in Pakistan, it’s in Saudi Arabia, it’s in Great Britain, it’s in Spain,” he said. “It attacked the United States. It is organized in the virtual world in a way that is very unique, very modern, very dangerous.”

But then what does he know? He’s just a mad Arab, isn’t he?

CLAUDE SALHANI is an international editor and political analyst at United Press International (UPI)

February 1, 2007 0 comments
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