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Economics & Policy

Collective solidarity: An overlooked marker of economic health

by Marie Murray & Aline Nassar January 7, 2025
written by Marie Murray & Aline Nassar

A hard look at Lebanon through an economist’s lens would reveal that the national outlook is dismal, the damages accrued during the latest war are staggering, and the political future of the country is fragile and indeterminate. Thankfully, there are plenty of other lenses through which to view a country and its people, and these various angles can illuminate even economic truths that may be overlooked by global economic assessors such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund.  If economics can be boiled down to people’s behavior around material wealth, production, and consumption, Lebanon shows high levels of strength and a remarkable capacity for collective economic support.

Amid the devastation wrought by the past year of war, Lebanon has demonstrated—once again, as after the Beirut blast and in other periods of catastrophe—its singular capacity for a nearly nation-wide mustering of support and show of solidarity. Despite facing relentless attacks on its infrastructure, the country’s citizens, organizations, and private and public sector institutions mobilized to address the escalating crisis in a collective humanitarian response.

Lebanese healthcare workers have continued their lifesaving efforts despite being under direct threat. Hospitals and clinics have been targeted in multiple airstrikes, forcing medical staff to operate in perilous conditions. Field hospitals have been established in makeshift locations to ensure emergency care reaches the injured, even in areas where former medical facilities have been destroyed.

Ambulance crews and first responders have risked their lives to rescue civilians trapped under the rubble, often venturing into areas still under attack while knowing that medical personnel and facilities became deliberate targets during the war. Reports detail instances of paramedics working without pause despite the bombing of ambulances, medical centers, and civil defense centers. The Lebanese Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations, of diverse secular, religious, and sectarian backgrounds, have played a critical role, coordinating these rescue missions and providing essential medical supplies amid shortages. In total, at least 241 medical workers were killed while on duty during the conflict.

Lebanon’s food aid response has been prodigious, with local organizations, municipalities, and international aid groups mobilizing to deliver over 50,000 tons of food supplies to displaced families, as reported by the Lebanese Food Bank in December 2024. According to Caritas Lebanon, a Catholic aid organization, volunteer-run kitchens in Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli prepared 20,000 meals on a daily basis for displaced families. The scale of both the need and the response has been so immense that figures are difficult to quantify. In the private sector, local farmers and industry operators have contributed to nationwide efforts and created networks of support and resource-sharing platforms, pooling and lending resources to ensure basic needs are met and to keep economic activity afloat.

With upwards of a million people displaced during the height of the conflict, Lebanon transformed around 1200 of its public schools into shelters to provide immediate refuge, turning classrooms, playgrounds and public halls into havens from violence. According to UNHCR, shelters in Beirut alone housed over 10,000 people, with churches and mosques opening their doors and serving as focal points for aid distribution. Many local NGOs appealed to the Lebanese diaspora for donations, and in some cases, Lebanese expats organized fundraising channels.

Lebanon’s strong interdependent network of formal organizations and informal familial or community structures that serve as a safety net in lieu of public sector support does not factor into economic assessments conducted by organizations such as the World Bank. It is, however, Lebanon’s surprisingly sturdy lifeboat that steers the country through repeated storms. But lifeboats, however dependable, are not meant to do all the heavy lifting; it is imperative that Lebanon get its proverbial ship in order if the country is to have any chance at making it through future storms alive.

January 7, 2025 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyEducationEducation plan

Educated in War and Peace

by Thomas Schellen January 3, 2025
written by Thomas Schellen

It is self-explanatory that the war on Lebanon has affected extant education systems badly. For different providers in the country’s fragmented educational landscape – one that has long been flagged for “co-existence of multiple systems with sharply different quality levels” (2015 World Bank Lebanon systematic country diagnostic), the 2024-25 academic year was disrupted just as it was about to start or had barely begun.

Under the initial conflict shock, institutions at all levels of formal education were mandated by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) to temporarily suspend operations from the first day of intensification of enemy attacks on September 23. An emergency response plan with a projected funding need of $25 million was devised by the ministry with UNESCO collaboration and presented on October 15 to international donors. The plan determined November 4 as the revised start of the academic year. Depending on circumstances, however, the closures of educational institutions extended for varying periods; for a few and privileged learners, schools opened in mid October but for many, access to education was periled deep into November.

With official estimates of affected students and teachers across Lebanon in the middle of the conflict exceeding 500,000 and 45,000, respectively, private primary and secondary schools from the first day saw irredeemable impacts of teachers being displaced and students being traumatized; public schools additionally were turned into shelters. Pupils were divided among the few with calm and relative safe remote learning environments and the technical means – devices and connectivity – to utilize online learning versus all the others who were displaced and/or disrupted on multiple vectors in their learning journey. 

Tertiary education institutions, at least those in the top tier of private universities, fared not totally as bad as other schools. Remote access to classes was easier to manage for universities than for schools. However, universities were in no way spared the traumas of losing students to war. Consequently, some lecturers were traveling and so were some students.

Care for the mental stability and health of students, lecturers, and staff became top priorities. Mental health support and provision of psycho-social services were entwined with material aid deliveries in a flood of volunteer aid that involved school managers and staff, nonprofit organizations, educators and learners on all levels. 

A critical assessment of the education emergency response mechanism by think tank The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies notes that previous experiences of education shocks, including wars, have not led to adoption of a law for education management in times of crisis. For analyst Carlos Naffah, the shock of the latest war underscores that this failing needs urgently to be remedied. He writes that “a draft law on education in emergencies” must be developed by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education and other stakeholders.  

Known and unknown quantities

Estimates of the conflict’s economic cost and recovery cost dimensions in education are far more elusive than those of sectors in economic life where impacts are immediate and visible or can be projected over months and years instead of having to be calculated in decades. A material war impact analysis in the World Bank Interim Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA), published in mid-November, apportioned to the education sector economic losses of $215 million from October 7, 2023 to Sep 27, 2024.

These losses were described as tuition losses at private schools (92 percent of assumed losses, mainly in the first term of the current academic year) and cost of temporary schooling arrangements, a ballpark estimate of $75 per learner for roughly half of the report’s estimated 450,000 displaced students during the fall term of 2024. Irrespective of the fragility of estimates constructed under duress of an at the time unended conflict, the combined amount of tuition and operational losses is a paltry projection equivalent to 4 percent of the World Bank’s entire (also by definition incomplete) economic loss estimates for Lebanon that according to DaLA stood at $5.1 billion for the assessed period  (in addition to $3.4 billion in estimated damages, which is the immediate and blatant visible impact).

Notably, DaLA provided no estimate on damages to schools during the war because of few such reports having been received. But even with the caveats of covering only the first week of full Israeli aggression and not imagining future losses of earning power, the $215 million economic losses estimate for education appears at best rudimentary. This is not only because losses were estimated at a time when the end of the open war was not yet is sight but also in the sense that the estimate does neither hint at the dimensions of long-term impacts on the provision of more egalitarian education and creation of vital human capital (which in some other World Bank papers had been described as the country’s greatest asset when human capital is contextualized with natural, financial, and physical or constructed capital) nor addresses with a single word the value, quantity, and quality of the contributions which educational entities make to Lebanese GDP. 

Lastly, notwithstanding the DaLA’s cautionary statement that economic losses are to be expected over many coming years in the education sector due to lost future earnings and development impact but are outside of its scope of war impact assessment, the paltry $215 million partial estimate of economic losses in education pales possibly even more when compared to 12-month economic losses in agriculture and commerce ($1.13 billion to Sep 27 and $1.67 billion to Oct 27, respectively) and damages in the property realm (82 percent of the total damages estimate as of Oct 27).

Towering contradictions cast their shadows over future education

The challenge of valuing Lebanese education economically is juxtaposed with the high value that society attributes to education, as shown in private households’ strong funding allocation to their children’s education despite a comparatively low return on human capital in the Lebanese economy. The contradictions that are embedded into the private financing environment of schooling are moreover exacerbated by the weakness of local research into the sector’s economic importance.

Paucity of data on the direct, indirect, and induced GDP contributions of Lebanon’s primary, secondary, and tertiary education providers is endemic. Some promising but isolated studies, such as the Lebanese American University’s 2017 investigation of LAU’s economic contributions at Beirut and Byblos campuses, have yet to be followed and widened. Plus, the shock of becoming victims of asymmetrical conflict escalations has not been conducive for researching far-flung implications of war on Lebanese education.

Still, preliminary analyses or “rapid assessment” exercises were attempted already during the time of high conflicts and displacement. For example, a stakeholder survey of 18 local nonprofit organizations in the education field was conducted by humanitarian and development sector-focused consultancy 360 Consulting, and commissioned by NGO Lebanese International Financial Executives (LIFE). 360 Consulting found, to no sentient stakeholder’s shock, that “the Ministry of Education and Higher Education faces challenges in ensuring quality education for all students, especially displaced ones.”

The stakeholder consultations further revealed that “a wide range of initiatives” had emerged within a few weeks from the start of open warfare and sought to reach displaced students through flexible learning approaches and offer psycho-social support but were handicapped by operational barriers and absence of stakeholder trust in the Lebanese government. According to the consultants, urgent needs and long-term needs have to be addressed in equal measure, from short-term financing, technical and mental health support to ramping up the involvement of communities in education and the ongoing investment in capacity building of teachers. 

Beginning with a comment in the World Bank DaLa and a reference in the above cited paper by 360 Consulting, it is widely recognized that the war shock has disrupted Lebanese education stakeholders, recipients and providers, at a time of historic fragility.

Economic restraints had already been weighing on public schools and teacher salaries in the early 2010s when spatial crowding of classrooms and challenges of addressing the schooling needs of refugee children were reflected in diverging school achievements as described in international assessments.

Farther along the same worrying trend of widening inequalities, the just published 2024 World Bank systematic country diagnostic – an analytical exercise that is a prerequisite for a presentation of a country partnership framework (CPF) to the World Bank board – cites PISA outcomes of 2018 and 19 for documenting the juxtaposition of a few high-performing schools with many low-performing schools, as well as huge downside gaps equal to more than six years of education attainment in reading scores between highest and lowest scoring schools.

All indications since point to further weakening equality in an already unequal system. Pandemic lockdowns and then the economic meltdown’s cost pressures culminated in the war of 2024 as the peak of problems that forced schools to hike tuition and parents to switch schools or even forego enrolling their children in schools that were acceptable.

Historically, Lebanese annual state expenditure on education has been eclipsed by private tuition spending, which was strongly reflected in knowledge attainment advantages in private schools. However, the onset of the economic crisis years in 2019-20 saw the ratio of private school attendance drop five percentage points and losses in effective years of learning per student have mounted in the two following years.

Combined with the deterioration of governmental financing and institutional guidance capacities due to erosion of fiscal revenues and public sector human capital, the pre-crisis inequality in the education sector is by many indicators on the increase. The World Bank’s latest Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) warns for example that the human capital index ranking of Lebanon has fallen below world average and suboptimal human capital generation of Lebanon today could cost the country hundreds of millions of dollars annually “in the coming decades”.

Shattered hopes for the current academic year

When Executive started inquiring about expectations for the coming academic year in the summer, educators and school administrators were just beginning to hope that the 2024-25 academic year would bring a gradual recovery of lost quality and peaceful learning after a period of intense pressures. This hope was shattered at least in the short term and pushed aside by the prospect of further losses in effective learning years by students of all cohorts.

Nonetheless, the war shock of victimization felt all across society’s multiple education systems enforces the realization that the stretched fabric of the Lebanese education sector is woven not so much in the way of an organized system of state-funded institutions with government-designed curricula and uniform pedagogic aims but rather comprised of a myriad of aspirations of diverse stakeholders.

On the upside of the dismal lens of education goals related to social justice, the response to the war shock suffered by all strata in society has thus inversely become a renewed testimony to educational aspirations even as the public sector constraints appear more severe than ever.

Defying defeatism

Like the education institutions that exist in Lebanon in large diversity, the societal investments into the next generation span from profoundly religious to convinced secular. They entail voluntary and non-tax based financial support efforts consisting of remittances to extended family members as well as fundraising contributions.

The human energy behind people-power efforts to keep the torches of education burning brightly is all the more visible against the darkness of the war, albeit with the strong caveat that no amount of private interest and volunteer giving can substitute for state capacity and public policy. As such, the citizen-driven education support is neither conducive to quantitative analysis nor appears geared toward a universal education model of egalitarian dreams. What makes it important, is the intensity and quality of grass-roots familial support efforts, the determination of civil networks that are mostly away from the limelight, and positive views on Lebanese education held by stakeholders. 

When asked about the value that they attribute to and have personally derived from their education journeys in periods that were never entirely unscathed by external disruptions, leading members of non-governmental network Lebanese International Financial Executives  – archetypal members of the successful Lebanese diaspora – respond unequivocally that the secrets that made them succeed as entrepreneurs in foreign economic environments were to a large part comprised of the education and values they had been imbued with in their home country.

“When you are [living in] the diaspora, you feel that this is really what made you,” says Zeina Farhat, managing director of LIFE, attributing the successes of Lebanese like herself to a combination of personal upbringing, and a large contribution of their families’ investments into their higher education. “That is key to who we have become,” she says and affirms, “We who are supporting education in Lebanon have a very positive perception of the level of education that we have in the country.”

Not at all a statistic

The truth of the Lebanese education sector, as far as one can claim for truth to be a valid human construct, is in a huge diversity of stories that in many instances show the polar opposites of being faced with extreme circumstances caused by both systemic and unforeseeable issues on one hand and celebrating a uniquely human aspiration and love for knowledge on the other. These are stories that journalism can only capture in the tiniest dosages of serendipitous encounter.

Hala and Wajdi are middle-aged educators and colleagues to one another. I meet them by coincidence in an urban intermediate school in Beirut. As teachers, they are the first people you expect to meet in a school, and I am glad to learn that they work as education professionals imparting on their early-teen pupils knowledge in the oft-lauded STEM realm, biology and physics. Their names can be interpreted as the Arabic terms standing for beauty and passion.

But the encounter with Hala and Wajdi today, a Thursday in the first half of November, in a narrow hallway set up as makeshift teachers’ lounge, comes with two incredible twists.

Firstly, their students are not in their classrooms but attend remotely and the two teachers say that they have recently started conducting virtual lessons. About one week after the – by war and displacement deferred – beginning of the academic year 2024-25 on November 4, both science teachers started conducting online lessons. Neither has access to laptop computers – Wajdi’s machine was destroyed in an airstrike – and so they teach from their mobile phones.

Their students are attending class from home, or from refugee shelters where they have been forced to live as internally displaced people (IDPs) after their hometowns and villages have been targeted by aerial destruction. Many students at best have access only to low-end smartphones, or not even those. As many of her pupils lack devices or connectivity to such a large degree, she has resorted to sending them pdf images of lesson materials, not files, Hala tells Executive.

In the second twist of vicious fate forced upon them by Israel’s war on Lebanon, both teachers have no choice but to conduct virtual classes despite the evident paucity of online classrooms under such circumstances. That is because it is not only their students who are unable to come to class. The two teachers, and their families, are refugees themselves, forced to shelter as displaced people in their own workplace. Their own high school and university-age children have taken refuge in their textbooks but having no laptop computers, they cannot follow classes themselves, even online.

Still, they consider themselves comparatively lucky and would not want to be moved to the uncertain environment of another shelter, such as a container village. During their stay at the school and counting among the 20 percent of internally displaced refugees who were quickly registered with the UNHCR, the school’s director, supported by Hala, Wajdi, and others, succeeded in keeping order among the 37 families with a total of 125 members who were sheltering in the facility. All were well provided with essentials such as meals, water, and electricity, but deprived of specific supplies for individual medical needs and elements that are bare necessities for a normal life of dignity. And yet they self-organize their existence in a shelter of the greatest order, mutual support, good cheer, and with moments of laughter. 

Built upon such excellent personal experiences, it seems that education support is woven into the organizational DNA of LIFE. Although or perhaps exactly because it presents a larger spectrum of financial experience and business minds than some other advocacy-for-change agents in Lebanese civil society, LIFE from inception in 2009, “was born with the willingness of investing in education,” Farhat elaborates.

According to her, the NGO was conceived 15 years ago in the realm of financial expertise, where Lebanese born achievers are dispersed all over the world. The founding idea was seeking to bring structure into the Lebanese diaspora through its professional network but from the moment of its formation, LIFE began engaging in education grants for deserving students and employment support of grantees as the organization’s first fundraising focus and “other mission” than strengthening its own network. “Prosperity and social mobility are at the core of what we are doing. [Our currently] 1,400 members around the world are contributing to education of human capital as the only asset that we have in Lebanon,” Farhat says.

Lara Koro, the organization’s director of Nurture, adds that the LIFE scholarship program is distinguished by “the way that we want to nurture and empower the future generation and provide them with access to education and employability.” Farhat and Koro explain that the worsening condition of the Lebanese economic fabric motivated LIFE in 2019 to redirect its scholarship focus away from students who enrolled in post-graduate programs at prestigious international universities and henceforth allocate 80 percent of its education budget to students based in Lebanon.

Since its inception, the scholarship program has invested $16.5 million in education. It supported more than 1100 individuals and the pool of supported students has grown from a mere two students in the first iteration to several hundred in each academic year, Koro says, adding how the ethos of the LIFE network extends into its scholarship program: “by supporting students, we will have them support other students in the future.”

“We have grown seven-fold in the last three to four years and have a pool of over 400 students for this [academic] year of 2024-25, of whom 75 percent are based in Lebanon“, she adds. According to Koro, the program has resulted in ca 200 new graduates annually, in Lebanon and abroad, in each of the past few years. “Seventy-five percent of the students who are graduating [locally] with support by LIFE are finding opportunities in Lebanon,” Farhat emphasizes. According to a media statement, the fundraising efforts of 2024 yielded $2.1 million for education, with 432 beneficiaries. Additionally, a Lebanese Education Emergency Fund was launched in partnership with US-based NGO LebNet.

While a prominent one, the example of LIFE’s dedication to education made in Lebanon is only one image in the multi-faceted picture of civil society support for education and this picture in turn is only one stone in the mosaic of a society that is deeply attached to their identities, to which education is a historic value-added. In the people’s show of resilience through solidarity and their open defiance of the inhumane victimization of normal villages, which hundreds of thousands have demonstrated through immediate mass returns to their battered hometowns and villages after November 26 of this year, the ten weeks of war and invasion have reinforced the mental idea or utopia of Lebanon.

The astounding scope and width of the solidary efforts made during the open war cannot be adequately captured through anecdotal journalism or a bird’s eye analytical lens. Macroeconomic and political contexts in the region, under assumptions of which the viability of scenarios for Lebanon has been circumscribed, have been thrown into the grinder of conflict politics. The 2024 SCD paper acknowledged the two overarching constraints, the second and constant of which was the “turbulent regional and international environment” (the other was “institutional paralysis” – in 2015, this constraint was fashionably labeled “elite capture”).

This fundamentally external constraint of regional conflicts has become a black hole for any planning and modeling of realistic regional futures, let alone Lebanese ones, which means that this country is once again exiled into a wasteland of merely imagined economic opportunities and reforms. Neither a “muddling through” nor a “recovery” scenario – the two options envisioned in the production of the 2024 World Bank systematic country diagnostic – is a plausible recipe for addressing the confluence of new challenges that will determine the framework of Lebanese needs and development priorities over the coming five years.

As a sector whose constraints are co-determined by the region’s proneness for conflict, the evidence of the past in conjunction with a look at the state’s financial and human resources suggests that the fiscal and operational obstacles to education reform in Lebanon will be enlarged beyond their already overpowering intensity of the past five years. However, at the same time education will be further heightened in importance for private households and stakeholders in almost all productive sectors.

On the bottom line of the equation, advantages of those with a top-level education will be at least as impressive as they were in the decades of reconstruction and development after 1990, yet egalitarian education ideals may be pushed back farther versus human capital generation that, in a Middle Eastern post-conflict environment, might effectively be empowering a reliable regional development elite that is rooted in Lebanon.

January 3, 2025 0 comments
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Brand VoiceLife

by Philip Morris Management Services December 30, 2024
written by Philip Morris Management Services

Many find the smell of cigarette smoke unpleasant as it lingers in the air or sticks to clothing and hair. It can be off-putting for the ones we love, but switching to a smoke-free product can make a big difference.

If you want to keep those you care about close, surround them with love – not cigarette smoke.

Quitting tobacco and nicotine altogether is the best choice a smoker can make, but many don’t. Products like nicotine pouches, snus, heated tobacco, and e-cigarettes deliver nicotine in different ways, without burning. When there’s no burning, there’s no smoke for you or those around you.

But as well as being the more considerate choice, smoke-free alternatives are designed to give smokers a better alternative than continuing to smoke.

Kiss Cigarettes Goodbye

Harmful chemicals are released at high levels when tobacco is burnt. These are known to be the main cause of smoking-related diseases like lung cancer. But smoke-free products are free of smoke, which means they can produce considerably lower levels of harmful chemicals.

Of course, they’re not risk-free and contain nicotine, which is addictive, but the reduction in harmful chemicals makes them a far better choice for adults than continuing to smoke.

Smoke-free products exist to give smokers who don’t quit a better choice. If you want to make a positive change for yourself and those around you, learn more about smoke-free alternatives.

Brought to you by Philip Morris Management Services – Lebanon.

December 30, 2024 0 comments
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BankingBanking & FinanceBusiness

Banking on reform: Amending our banks to support reconstruction

by Mounir Rached December 27, 2024
written by Mounir Rached

In the aftermath of Lebanon’s devastating financial and socio-economic crisis, the reconstruction of the banking sector and restoration of macroeconomic stability demand urgent and sophisticated interventions. This crisis, characterized by the collapse of depositor confidence, war-induced infrastructural devastation, and institutional dysfunction, requires a systematic resolution of the deposit crisis as the cornerstone of a broader recovery framework.

Efforts by Banque du Liban, the central bank of Lebanon, have provided limited liquidity through initiatives such as Circulars 158 and 166, the first issued in June 2021 / updated in November 2023, the second issued in February 2024 and amended in October. This is an approach grossly insufficient to meet the urgent economic and social needs of the population. The government’s handling of dollar-denominated deposits has exacerbated the situation through measures that are legally and ethically indefensible. These include writing off up to 90 percent of deposits by transferring them to phantom entities, converting them into non-performing sovereign bonds, or exchanging them for Lebanese pounds at egregiously undervalued rates. Such mechanisms have irrevocably damaged public trust in the financial sector and further eroded confidence in state institutions. Despite objections from Lebanon’s state legislative council, key parliamentary blocs, and depositors themselves, these measures persist, highlighting the government’s reluctance to confront the structural dimensions of the crisis.

A sustainable resolution necessitates the comprehensive restructuring of the relationship between the central bank, banks, and the government at large. The integrity of deposits must be preserved on commercial banks’ balance sheets alongside corresponding liabilities, namely, the deposits held by commercial banks on behalf of their clients at the central bank. The outright cancellation of these deposits not only lacks legal justification but also risks compounding the central bank’s fiscal and operational challenges. Retaining these obligations within the central bank’s balance sheet ensures transparency and aligns with the broader framework for crisis resolution. Moreover, arguments positing that these liabilities obstruct monetary policy are unsubstantiated; on the contrary, the annulment of these obligations would expose the institution to further legal scrutiny without yielding any operational advantage.

One pragmatic intervention to address liquidity constraints is reducing the excessive unjustifiable reserve requirements on foreign currency holdings imposed on Lebanese banks. At present, these reserves total $10.7 billion—a figure among the highest globally. Reducing the reserve ratio to the international average of 2 percent would unlock approximately $9 billion in liquidity, which could be distributed to depositors as an initial repayment of 10 percent of their frozen accounts. This measure would provide immediate relief and constitute a pivotal step toward restoring confidence in the banking system.

In addition to releasing mandatory reserves, the central bank holds approximately $25 billion in gold reserves, a critical asset accumulated through decades of depositor contributions. Allocating half of this reserve—approximately $12.5 billion—to provide supplementary liquidity for banks could further alleviate the deposit crisis. Together, these actions could return approximately 24 percent of frozen deposits to account holders. This dual approach is supported by Lebanon’s legal framework; Article 75 of the Code of Money and Credit explicitly permits the central bank to leverage gold reserves to stabilize liquidity, contingent on coordination with the Ministry of Finance.

The reluctance to utilize gold reserves reflects a misinterpretation of their role within monetary policy. Gold, as a universally liquid asset, can be readily traded in global financial markets. Contrary to conventional objections, deploying a portion of these reserves is not only legally permissible but also economically prudent, particularly in the context of Lebanon’s acute financial crisis.

However, technical solutions alone cannot restore depositor confidence. Fundamental reforms to monetary governance are imperative to address the systemic issues underlying the crisis. A critical step is the abolition of Lebanon’s outdated dual multiple exchange rate system, which perpetuates economic distortions. The adoption of a fully liberalized exchange rate is essential to fostering market equilibrium and avoiding the recurrence of monetary instability. While the current exchange rate stability is attributable to fiscal discipline, it remains tenuous in the absence of structural reforms.

Another priority is addressing Lebanon’s placement on international “grey lists” for financial compliance deficiencies. Restrictions on capital outflows have curtailed the immediate risk of systemic flight, but long-term credibility hinges on transparent reforms that align with global financial standards. Encouragingly, a significant proportion of newly injected liquidity is likely to circulate domestically, addressing pressing consumer needs rather than exacerbating external imbalances.

The central bank’s primary mandate must be reoriented toward managing domestic liquidity, enforcing stringent regulatory oversight, and promoting macroeconomic stability. Its role is not to generate high returns but to safeguard public welfare and rebuild trust in the financial system. Current practices, such as the limited withdrawals allowed under Circulars 158 and 166, are grossly inadequate and contravene legal and ethical standards. The ongoing freeze of deposits without interest violates fundamental principles and the Code of Money and Credit.

Lebanon’s recovery depends on decisive actions to resolve the banking crisis and reestablish public confidence. These include returning liquidity to depositors, reforming exchange rate mechanisms, and responsibly leveraging gold reserves. Such measures, when combined with robust regulatory oversight and a commitment to institutional transparency, can set the stage for comprehensive economic recovery. The banking sector’s stabilization is not merely a technical challenge but a moral and strategic imperative for Lebanon’s broader reconstruction and sustainable development.

December 27, 2024 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyTransport

A sector in motion

by Thomas Schellen December 23, 2024
written by Thomas Schellen

Transport leaders aspire to transform vital sector

The formal economic sector of transportation and logistics in Lebanon presents itself to the observer with two vividly contrasting faces. One face of Lebanese transport is the sad face of a sorely under-achieving economic sector hindered by high prevalence of informality and poor regulations. At the same time, the sector presents a hopeful and smiling face, with the character of a fascinatingly simple, easy to access, very low-tech mobility behavior app, that could quickly be accelerated into a vital engine of national economic enablement and growth.

Fundamentally, however, the baseline of all modes of transport in the country are overdue for change. It is not for no reason that the last 20 years have seen multiple civil society organizations advocate for better and safer streets (examples 1996-founded YASA and 2006-founded Kunhadi) and that international funders and donors repeatedly offered assisting in urban transport plans and bus programs (despite such schemes, also repeatedly, being aborted), or that the Executive economic road map for a better Lebanon already years ago compiled 16 (today still mostly outstanding) expert recommendations for strategizing transport. Even the country’s lawmakers over a decade ago saw reason to adopt a new national (and in some regions partially adhered to) traffic law.

Although no runways at Rafik Hariri International Airport and no major bridges or roadways were destroyed in the recent severe episode of Israeli military aggressions, it cannot surprise that transport and logistics enterprises suffered massively during the war, as the managing directors of two leading companies in the sector, express shipper Aramex and ground transport operator Ahdab Commuting and Trading Company (ACTC), tell Executive.

But true to the adage that an opportunity is hidden even in the worst crisis, Assaad Sebaaly, general manager of Aramex Lebanon, and Aoni Ahdab, general manager of ACTC, are optimistic. Being both members of the Lebanese Private Sector Network (LPSN) but active in distinct areas of mobility,they share the view that the current inflection point at the (hopefully definitive) tail-end of the war of 2024 accentuates the sector’s innovation potential for a profitable and equitable transformation.

“I have presented two budgets for 2025 to our board, a good and a worst-case scenario. I am fully confident that we will be able to go to the normal scenario and move with our budget as we used to do,” says Sebaaly.

“I have always been a realist but as Assaad says, this is the first time that we actually feel that something is changing,” chimes in Ahdab. He qualifies the positive scenario as simply the only one that can be worked towards because the sole other, non-positive alternative would signify complete disintegration of the nation’s fabric, something that is counterintuitive and in contradiction to the historic record of Lebanon’s ability to withstand recurring winds of ill fortune.  

Accounting for high and unrecoverable economic losses

Given how the strategies of the recent Israeli intrusions were focused on deeply destroying narrow targets, the broad area of transport was among the sectors in the Lebanese economy that were impacted economically but not hit as horribly by physical war damages in the September to November 2024 period.

This notably was in contrast to the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah where Beirut airport and essential road infrastructure were targeted from the first day of IDF air attacks under the devastatingly prevalent (and still threatening) “bomb Lebanon into the stone age” Israeli mentalities.

Both sides of the sector, interurban and intra-urban passenger transport on one hand and express shipping and package deliveries of commercial goods on the other hand, have been greatly harmed by direct economic losses and foregone revenues. 

Damages from destruction of transportation infrastructure and facilities, “were not too heavy but the impact was extremely heavy,” says Sebaaly. New bottlenecks in air freight due to the sudden pausing of Beirut services by 16 of 17 airlines made MEA stand out as the one operator that withstood the pressure.

At the same time, however, this thrust into a monopolistic situation translated into shocks of higher air freight cost and lower capacity – two very dangerous poisons for an express shipper and freight forwarder competing with tight margins in the globally integrated realm of running supply chains. This meant that from one day to the next “we had a serious problem as to availability of space for shipping necessary items to traders in Lebanon; the consumers were suffering, [and] we were suffering,” Sebaaly adds.

On the domestic side of Aramex’ business, which according to him generates the Lebanon operation’s main economic sustenance, the economic shock could be quantified in percentage-wise contraction of the high-growth, business line of e-commerce deliveries. “We were growing 20 to 25 percent year over year. If I compare August 2024 to August 2023, we had growth of 25 percent. If I compare September 2024 to August 2024, I had a drop of 70 percent,” Sebaaly says. And although the end-of-year holiday season is the high time of giving, and nowadays e-commerce, it will not suffice for balancing the months of being victimized. “I have more than half a million dollars in losses in two months. There is no way you can recover them as the losses are huge,” he adds.

At ACTC, the impact on business according to Ahdab was not as easy to quantify but assuredly heavy. Economic impacts were largely because of overheads, given that the war hit the company shortly after assumption of new bus operations when there was no expectation of profits yet. “We launched a bus project in July, with a plan to have all new bus lines operational by end of September to mid October 2024. The project entails 93 buses operating across 11 lines ”, Ahdab says, adding that seven of these eleven lines were forcibly delayed by the war.

Moreover, because of the war holding customer attention in its grip and because of ACTC’s almost 70 percent reduced presence of buses on the streets and highways, marketing campaigns had to be postponed. “Our overheads today are the overheads required to run all 90 buses but actual operation is currently about 25 buses,” he adds while declining to provide financial investment details and further expectations related to the bus project’s business plan.

Besides the need to maintain overheads and forced delay in implementing key components in ACTC business plan, the already operating lines were confronted with sudden spikes in traffic and expensive road congestions due to displacement of people onto roads that were already difficult to navigate for larger vehicles. 

Assembly and delivery of food aid packages under contracts with aid organizations and UN agencies is another ACTC activity where war-induced security protocols and increased costs of transport to villages in areas under threat were felt as doubling or tripling of each dollar consumed by transportation. Ahdab notes that the cost for a typical aid package could under the conflict impact balloon from $50 to about $75 due to a combination of increases in cost in imported foods, some price  gouging by dealers in locally sourced commodity foods, and cost increases in shipping and delivery.   

Economics of transport:
A people-driven and chronically dichotomous sector


Successful couriers are practically invisible individuals. They ideally make both their scheduled and sudden appointments on time and are in and out of an assigned client site with electronically signed delivery and pickup statements while the manager in charge calmly sips her coffee.

Yet these background actors or better stagehands of economic performance are the people that remain most essential even in the day of digitizing transport and futuristic delivery modes. However, since the age-old activity of transporting things to market and people to destinations started to grow into vast and sophisticated industries of logistics and transport in the early 20th century (the world’s number one logistics provider was founded in 1907, other giants of today have joined the global flock in the sixties and seventies), this all-encompassing services sector’s human agents are not always – but all too often – faced with humble career and development options, and/or lack of financial and professional appreciation.

This truth was thrown into sharp relief a few years ago, at time of the global coronavirus surge and panic. Frontline workers, including bus drivers and delivery drivers, were suddenly noticed, by politicians from New Zealand to Bavaria, as “heroes.” In Lebanon, the impact of Covid 19 on transport and logistics was strong enough to kick e-commerce, a forward looking but in local culture hitherto much rejected segment of trade, into high-growth mode.

The Covid 19 impact on frontline work did not come with the effect that those customer-facing and essential employees were no longer overworked and under-payed. But at least Big Tech companies, management and human resource consulting companies and tech startups began rolling out specialized apps and programs for the strengthening of frontline workers’ – some call them deskless workers under a cognitively negative definition of what they do not sit at – workplace integration, role,  recognition and rewards.

Just as the individual people in transport are essential but often unnoticed cogs in the economic machine, successful logistics providers are companies that often quietly solve transportation issues before they become costly business disruptions. On the passenger transit side of the sector, successful modes and operators of public transport attract little attention in smooth day-to-day provision of vital mobility services, making headlines only at time of fee increases, operational disruptions, or strikes.

Logistics costs by some estimates make up around 13 percent of a country’s economy on average but can vary between 8 and 25 percent, indicating that the necessary element of logistics produces jobs and incomes for direct stakeholders and is foundational to economic growth.

Inversely, in absence of constant efficiency monitoring and improvements, the economic activity of transportation creates huge and wasteful economic losses and blinding environmental costs. Insufficiency and breakdown of transport, whether because of absent modes and missed development or because of wasteful and excessive expansion, can ruin a commercial civilization.

This notwithstanding, the logistics and transport sector is often badly underestimated in its importance for the functioning of the globalized and increasingly digitized economies of nations. In Lebanon, the transport and logistics industry was described by the Central Administration of Statistics as contributing less than three percent to national GDP in 2019, with data for the sector apparently not reported since.

Hidden dimensions of transport

From a more macro-oriented perspective, no estimates on the dimension of economic losses in transportation have been offered in reports such as the World Bank’s mid-November preliminary damage and loss assessment paper. This DaLA report, however, notes that supply chain disruptions contributed to the 12-month economic loss estimates in “commerce”, which are $1.67 billion (22 percent of estimated losses across the entire economy) in the period from Oct 8, 2023 to Oct 27, 2024.

Both interviewees tell Executive that they have no knowledge of any recent assessment of the contribution brought by transportation and logistics to the national GDP tally. Dating from a near-mythical past six years ago, when the per capita GDP was widely cited as above $9,650 in nominal terms, a fact sheet on the investment promotion site IDAL attributes 2.9 percent GDP share to “transport”. This is a very low value for a normal, functioning economy and might in the Lebanese case be correlated to vague sector definitions and imperfect data acquisition from market actors.

Yet another crucial market determinant appears to be the prevalence of informality in this economic activity. It is at best guesswork how heavily the detriments of inefficiency, informality, illegality, or even criminal activity – Sebaaly points to the existence of fraudulent competitors who after a short period of operations abscond with revenues from delivery work they had won by underbidding legitimate operators with cut-throat prices – constrain the economic contribution of transport to the formal economy and hinder adoption of cleaner and more efficient modes of transport.

In a very quick calculation of informality impact on Aramex top line revenue, Sebaaly says, “I am losing 3.6 million dollars per year due to informality.” This is on basis of 200,000 delivered packages per month (according to him accounting for almost half of the Lebanese express shipment market) for which the company was forced by illicit competition to undercharge $1.5/package. Versus a fair price of $4.5 in the Lebanese market, selling at $3 “is a complete loss to us,” he sighs.

Uncertain but bright future

In spite of entrenched systemic barriers that have been accentuated by the recent war but also have other roots, the two interviewees speak emphatically about the value that their sector has added and can further add to the Lebanese economy.  

According to Sebaaly, the importance of logistics operations and specifically regional player Aramex was highlighted by the pre-war crises of the past five years. During the combination crisis of anemic banking and coronavirus pandemic, it was express shippers who delivered essential medications to hospitals, secured the circulation of goods between stores and consumers, and facilitated access to money for small and medium enterprises, he reckons. 

“The whole economy was up and running due to us,” he says, and warns, “if we, all the logistics companies, were to go on strike now and stopped importing and distributing, you would have no economy.” Growth of express shipping in the years that followed upon the Covid 19 panic, was exceptional. Specifically, e-commerce deliveries were kick-started by the pandemic lockdowns in Lebanon, he notes, with immense benefits to the digitized economy.

During the years from 2019 – universally known in the Lebanese economy as one-of-a-kind disaster experience – Aramex “grew from 180 employees five years ago to 330 employees today. We used to deliver 30,000 packages per month and now we deliver 200,000 packages per month,” Sebaaly boasts with the professional pride and natural marketer bite of an advanced-through-the -ranks executive, which actually is a sort of hallmark of globally successful courier enterprises.

The increase in logistics activity was sector-wide, he points out: “From 2019 until August 2024, the [shipment] numbers all over the market have doubled, or more. What is today 420,000  to 440,000 package deliveries [in the Lebanese market] each month, used a few years ago to be 150,000,” he adds.   

For Ahdab, whose contribution to the innovator ranks in Lebanese transport apparently testifies to the DNA of a 21st century tech entrepreneur, the path forward will have to be defined by technology and rule of law. In the latter respect, this begins with the basics of legal compliance such as making sure that drivers have licenses but no criminal record and their vehicles operate legally. Emphasizing the virtues of LAF veterans in disciplined operational environments, he evidently sees ACTC’s future in the best possible hues. All the while he also concedes that profit is not expected in the first stage of the venture but says revenue is increasing steadily.

According to him ACTC won its public bus line contract inclusive of being given a diesel-powered and somewhat aged vehicle fleet but has gone beyond what is required under their operator contract with the Lebanese state in terms of investing in technology for the monitoring, passenger safety, and traceability of the buses. “What we are trying to do is offer a modernized version of the model that you find when you travel to any city in Europe or developed country,” Ahdab says.

In the long term, he aims for 70 percent of profits to come from ticket sales and 30 percent from selling non-digital advertising space on and in the vehicles. The work force is to grow with time from nearly 80 today to 350 employees when all bus lines are in full operation. The buses are supposed to as soon as possible run on clearly defined lines with designated bus stops, tracked by an app that shows commuters in real time where their bus is, and a bouquet of numerous ticketing options. Ahdab expresses confidence that “once all of this is implemented, people will start relying on the bus and this will start increasing footfall on the bus.”

Well over a century of urban rapid transit systems in Europe shows that getting buses right and making individual mobility addicts switch to sharing is not an easy endeavor and behavior change. Improving urban productivity and the environment by reducing commuter logjams and turning SUV lovers into bus seat huggers is nonetheless a no brainer. According to international public transport strategists, five elements form the matrix of usefulness and popular acceptance of urban transit systems: affordability, ease of access, frequency, reliability, and safety.

The interplay of factors is crucial and, one believes, personal. Affordability, while important, was not the sole decisive factor in satisfaction of urbanites with public transport in 83 cities, including national capitals, across Europe and Turkey in a EU commissioned and recently published “Survey on the Quality of Life in European Cities, 2023”.

Urban mobility was a major point of inquiry in the survey, which, perhaps instructively, showed that the world’s (by several surveys) supposedly most livable urban locale is also the European capital with the highest rate of satisfaction with public transport (Vienna, 91 percent), although the study’s highest rate of daily public transport users (70 percent) is found in Prague, which ranks fourth in the urban transport satisfaction list but in some urbanity tables is a mid-ranked European capital for liveability.

Satisfaction and use rate seen in other Mediterranean cities such as Nicosia (44 percent satisfaction rate but only 16 percent daily use rate), or perhaps the EU survey’s spatial extremes Istanbul (16 million inhabitants) and La Valletta (6,000) might be more realistic examples of satisfactory public transport for Beirut urbanites. In any case, “as the perception of public transport being ‘safe’, ‘easy to get on’, ‘reliable’ and ‘frequent’ increases, overall satisfaction rises significantly”, noted a Euronews Next analysis of the EU urban living study.

For Lebanon – once Beiruti and Tripolitan naysayers are proven wrong by the new bus lines’ consistent operation and clean rides – Ahdab says, “we will ideally be able to trade buses in and shift gradually to either fully electrical or at least hybrid buses, in order to have less consumption and more green public transport. This is the next big step for me.”

From Sebaaly’s perspective on the logistics path to the near future, rule of law is just as crucial as for Ahdab, and has also to be flanked by permitting the deployment of new technologies that have not yet been accepted for corporate use. However, tech innovation and deployment for Sebaaly have to go hand in hand with clear application of laws securing market justice. “Drone deliveries are very important for us to scale up and will make things much cheaper and easier for consumers. At the same time, I cannot keep competing with companies that use Syrian drivers who are not registered, not paying taxes, and not paying NSSF, while I find myself having huge overheads and making huge tax payments to the government,” he insists. “It is paramount to regulate the market and every company that is working in his or my business,” he repeats.

As to the current difference between open war and absence of such, he saw the numbers change instantaneously after the ceasefire. “It is very simple to see the number of packages that [Aramex Lebanon] delivers every day. Two days ago [on Nov 26], it was one number, yesterday it was a different number, and today another one. And the increase was more than 40 or 50 percent,” he tells Executive in our interview about 63 hours into the official ceasefire period. “If we feel that stability over the next 60 days or the coming period is for real, then yes, I have a lot of projects and investments that we are working on and I can be sure that the business is going to grow,” he enthuses.

No fear, nor viable room for ambiguity 

The world may or may not be nearing the end of the era of the automobile and fossil fuel dependency. But what, absent of a geo-civilizational demise, is not in sight – is an end to the epoch of consumer choice and mobility. It to the contrary is likely to expand further not only in the coming five years. In plain terms, the epoch that relies on transport and logistics will by all historic trendlines continue to accumulate performance data on an upwards trajectory, under the incredibly resilient “more” paradigms of human wants and satisfaction of desires.

The trade and logistics enablers of “more” are people, economic logic, proven technology, tech innovation, and regulations / policies. Economic logic is closely correlated with financing and overheads of logistics. Regulations open or close windows to improved supply chain efficiency. New technology leads to both the path of creative destruction where old leaders are challenged by innovators, and the avenue to higher competitiveness.

Traffic needs to digitize. From the smallest taxi artist to the largest fleet managers, operators need to accept safer and cleaner technologies; all individual traffic participants need to embrace responsible conduct and help implement change to the long unanswered realities of a country with a low-grade public transport system, undisciplined and counterproductive traffic standards and behaviors.

While all of these and more mobility insights are of great consequence for the next phase of economic democracy in this country, it probably cannot be helped even with strong long-term planning and strenuous mid-term efforts that Lebanon will continue for quite some time to suffer countless mobility bottlenecks due to geography and road conditions. But what can be changed – and would be ludicrous not to change asap – is that Lebanon is a realm with very narrow social mobility spheres and behaviorally impaired physical mobility space whose population is drowning in its infatuation with showy, loud, wasteful and inefficient vehicles that are either environmental hazards, or irresponsibly operated, or dangerously ill-maintained, or all of the above.

Lastly, the fortune of the whole region remains shrouded in uncertainty and neither the damage count nor the political consequences and staying power of new economic democratization are clear. However, it is undeniable that, just as the future economy of Lebanon is currently being filtered by the latest war, it will be further and more deeply redefined by the region’s sure-to-arrive fundamental changes. By current perspectives, transport could become one of the sectors that emerge better from this brutal inflection period.

December 23, 2024 0 comments
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AgricultureIndustry & AgricultureQ&A

Returning to poisoned lands: A Q&A with Nadine Khoury on Agriculture and Agri-Food in Lebanon

by Sherine Najdi December 19, 2024
written by Sherine Najdi

Lebanon, a nation of green mountains and deep agricultural roots, now faces yet another pivotal moment. The war, which many hope is over despite the daily presence of IDF drones, the intermittent roar of fighter jets in the skies above, and the occasional airstrikes in the south—has scarred and quite literally poisoned its fields, leaving behind scorched olive trees and broken livelihoods. Lebanon’s agricultural sector, which dates back to Phoenician times specifically in wine-making and shepherding, has more recently faced challenges ranging from soil erosion and inadequate irrigation to issues such as job preservation, competitiveness and quality. The latest devastating hits to the agricultural sector from almost 11 months of cross-border conflict that escalated into open war in mid-September, have not yet been fully accounted for. Amid the destruction, the 60-day ceasefire, currently about halfway through its fragile course, offers the sense that getting back to work and rebuilding is possible. Industry leaders like Nadine Khoury, Chief Operating Officer at Quinta Group, are strategizing about how to move forward, transforming despair into opportunity, and ensuring that Lebanon’s agricultural heritage is not lost to the ashes of war.  In this critical and fragile moment for Lebanon, Khoury shares her insights on the recovery efforts, the current state of farmers and producers, and the innovative strategies being employed to ensure sustainability and growth.

Executive: During the conflict, Lebanon’s agricultural sector was significantly impacted. Could you describe what happened?

Khoury: Sure. During the war, especially in the south, 12 percent of the olive trees—about 65,000 trees—were destroyed. According to the World Bank, we lost around $58 million. And when I say this, it’s not just the trees—we couldn’t harvest the olives, we couldn’t produce the olive oil. All of these issues, together with the destruction of the trees added to the setbacks.

Executive: What about after the ceasefire? How did the farmers react?

Khoury: Right after the ceasefire, farmers started going back to their lands. They immediately began placing orders for seeds, fertilizers, and seedlings. In the Bekaa Valley, for instance, activity resumed, but not at full capacity—maybe around 60 percent. The areas affected by phosphorus are still unusable, so there’s no farming there yet.

Executive: What kind of economic toll has this taken on farmers and producers?

Khoury: It’s been severe. This isn’t just about food security; it’s about the economic impact. Farmers—this is their only livelihood. They don’t have any other income. Some are looking at renting fields in other areas or trying to make the most of what’s left, but it’s tough.

Executive: Is there any help being provided to them?

Khoury: Yes, some NGOs and donors are stepping in, like USAID. They’re providing support, but it’s still not enough to meet the scale of the needs.

 

Executive: And how about the agri-food sector? How have they been managing?

Khoury: It’s been challenging. Some producers managed to relocate their equipment and warehouses, especially in the Bekaa. But in the south, they couldn’t return. For example, this year’s olive oil production was completely missed. They’re now waiting for next year.

Executive: Are there any plans to incorporate sustainable practices?

Khoury: Yes, definitely. Farmers are increasingly using more sustainable systems. For example, in Akkar, we’ve started rainwater harvesting projects for greenhouses. These help conserve water and energy. Climate change is a real threat, so we’re also looking at more efficient irrigation methods.

Executive: What steps are being taken to stabilize agriculture?

Khoury: One of the main strategies is contract farming. This creates a direct link between farmers and agri-food producers, guaranteeing a market for specific crops. It’s already working well for poultry and potatoes, and we’re looking to expand it, especially for smaller farmers.

Executive: Has this already started?

Khoury: Yes, we have a project with the International Labour Organization (ILO). We’re helping farmers understand how contract farming can provide stability, especially in these uncertain times.

Executive: What are some of the other major challenges you’re facing?

Khoury: Labor is a big one. Many Syrians, who form the backbone of our agricultural workforce, are either leaving or demanding higher wages. Lebanese workers don’t generally take on agricultural roles because they lack the technical skills. On top of that, global supply chain disruptions are increasing the cost and delivery time for things like fertilizers and seeds.

Executive: Do you think the sector can recover?

Khoury: If we can maintain stability, yes. Lebanon has the potential to regain its position as a key agricultural and agri-food supplier. We’ve already seen positive responses at international exhibitions, like SIAL in Paris, where Lebanese products drew a lot of interest.

Executive: Any final thoughts?

Khoury: Let’s end on a positive note. If stability holds, Lebanon can rebuild its agricultural sector. We’ve always been known for our creativity and resilience, and I believe those qualities will help us overcome these challenges and thrive again.

December 19, 2024 0 comments
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Brand VoiceLife

by Philip Morris Management Services December 19, 2024
written by Philip Morris Management Services

Whether yours is a generously sized garden or a petite patio, tending to our outdoor spaces can provide us with some much-needed calm and tranquillity while balancing our busy schedules.

As any keen gardener knows, a verdant space that’s full of life starts from the ground up: good soil is the key to nurture your seedlings into a lush display of flowers and healthy leaves. Good soil contains a wealth of life, in fact, one gram (approximately a quarter of a tablespoon) of soil can contain up to 10 billion organisms.

In a truly beautiful cycle, decomposing matter from past plant life is what fuels the next season of growth. In a bid to be more sustainable, green-fingered folk swear by composting their organic kitchen and garden waste that helps them supercharge their gardens.

Composting is a conscious choice for a multitude of reasons. It’s beneficial for plants, but also for the wider environment. It helps reduce communal waste and in turn, contributes to reducing methane and carbon dioxide emissions from waste treatment. Additionally, soil that has been treated with compost needs less irrigation and no synthetic fertilizer.

Composting is also a far better option than burning leaves and garden waste. When we burn garden waste, we not only sacrifice the nutrient value but also create smoke. The smell is unpleasant for us and for our neighbours besides that burning any organic material produces many harmful and potentially harmful chemicals, whether it’s in the garden or elsewhere.

The best choice is always never to start or to quit cigarettes and nicotine altogether, but the reality is that many don’t. For those who would otherwise continue to smoke, smoke-free alternatives that don’t burn tobacco can significantly reduce harm by eliminating the burning process. These products are not risk-free and deliver nicotine, which is addictive, but they are a better choice than continued smoking.

Gardening is many things to many people. For some it’s about finding a sense of calm

in nature, for others it’s a chance to admire something they’ve grown on their own.

For any gardener who smokes, however, there are always better alternatives to burning.

You may not be aware, but this also applies to the burning of tobacco in cigarettes.

When a cigarette is lit, over 6000 chemicals are released, many of them considered by experts to be harmful. Inhaling these high levels of harmful chemicals with cigarette smoke is the primary cause of smoking-related diseases.

Avoiding burning is a better choice

  • Burning garden waste is a missed opportunity to make use of the nutrients in compost, and creates harmful smoke.
  • Composting is a good alternative to utilise organic garden and kitchen waste.
  • Compost provides nutrients for plants in the coming seasons.
  • Compost helps reduce communal waste that ends up in landfills.

Burning organic materials produces smoke

  • A burning cigarette releases 1000s of chemicals, many are harmful.
  • Never starting or quitting tobacco and nicotine products entirely is the best choice.
  • The best choice for adult smokers is to quit entirely.
  • For those who don’t quit, smoke-free alternatives that do not burn tobacco, whilst not risk free and addictive, represent a much better choice than continuing to smoke cigarettes.

For more information about smoke-free alternatives, please visit our website.

Brought to you by Philip Morris Management Services – Lebanon.

December 19, 2024 0 comments
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Economics & PolicyEnergy

Q&A Joseph Al Assad

by Thomas Schellen December 12, 2024
written by Thomas Schellen

To say that energy was a problematic sector from beginning of the Lebanese post-conflict reconstruction in 1992 to the end of the financial inflows-fueled, corrupt cronyism system in the country, is more than an understatement. The sector can be described as a detrimentally subsidized sinkhole of state funds, catastrophically mismanaged public utility, and theme of one internationally flagged need and sabotaged development strategy after the other. The underdeveloped energy sector, dilapidated systems of electricity generation and transmission, and dysfunctional monopoly utility Electricite du Liban combined into the moraine of policy debris obstructed economic potentials and resulted in widespread energy poverty in Lebanon. In Executive’s investigation of damages, needs, and potentials of economic sectors with members of the Lebanese Private Sector Network, we sat down with Joseph Assad, Lebanese and regional energy expert and dean of the engineering department at USEK. He took us on a perforce tour of personal insights that are based on his advisory experiences at the Lebanese Center for Energy Conservation (LCEC) and the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) from 2010 to 2017 and his consulting work with international agencies on energy policies and projects in more than a dozen countries.

Can we have hope for energy sovereignty after all the years of stuttering and delayed adoption of renewables and attempted electricity solutions within a regionally integrated power framework – or is energy sovereignty today still a pipedream, more than three years after the severe electricity crisis that was part of the economic meltdown of Lebanon?

JA: You need to look at this issue from several points of view. On the policy level, we are still at the same position. De facto, however, many things have changed due to the [economic] crisis. The boom of solar [photovoltaic] systems has happened in Lebanon because of the crisis. Whether this boom led to [installation of] 1,200 or 800 or 1,500 megawatts, that is a big share of solar PV in Lebanon. A big share of electricity is now being generated locally, and this contributes to what we call energy security. Another factor that has contributed to the energy security is on the demand side [of the equation].

How so?

Demand dropped because of three reasons, the first being the most obvious in the increase of electricity prices. People now have to account for the electricity bill at the end of the month and thus are looking more and more into how to save energy. The second thing is that some people cannot afford electricity anymore. They have been cutting down on their vital electricity needs. The third one is the [drop in power consumption] because of the blackouts that we witnessed in the previous period and that are disappearing more and more right now. I am talking about the total blackouts when electricity needs were covered neither by generators nor by EDL.

The third [demand reduction element] has disappeared, the second one should disappear [as people’s access to vital energy] should return with the adjustment of the economy. But the first one will remain, because it is an awareness change and behavioral change reducing electricity demand. What does this mean? We are demanding less electricity and are producing more electricity locally, which means that we are increasing our energy security and energy sovereignty.

What else is required to actually have energy sovereignty? Is it correct to say that energy security could be improved by acquisition of electricity and the resources to produce it from outside the country while energy sovereignty requires local production?

On that level of energy sovereignty, it means that we need natural gas resources. Hopefully when we tap into our gas resources, if any [viable ones are found], we will have full energy sovereignty. Renewables and hydro, which are the only [domestic] sources that we have today, cannot provide full energy sovereignty. Otherwise we need to import fuel, which makes us face two problems, one is the weight on our national debt [that will be imposed by fuel payments] and our sensitivity to the fluctuations in international oil prices, and secondly the political dimension of importing oil. 

As to the factors contributing to the reduction of energy demand, did improvement of energy efficiencies play a role that was in addition to behavior changes because of higher cost?

That happened automatically. On the policy level, I was personally responsible for drafting the chapter in the NEEAP II (four-year National Energy Efficiency Action Plan published in March 2016) for Lebanon where I produced a chapter on energy efficiency measures in the [Engineering, Procurement, and Construction] sector. I was personally involved in drafting this chapter of the energy efficiency law. It was not implemented due to the crisis. Within the NEEAP we had chapters addressing energy efficiency in all sectors. But what we lack in Lebanon is not policy but implementation. For the last three or four years there has been a law pending in the Lebanese parliament, the energy efficiency law.

And yet I have encountered inefficient electricity installations in some public buildings, where I saw over-sized and non-divisible power generation facilities in state-owned venues in Beirut.

The private sector is for sure far ahead of the public sector in the area of energy efficiency. They main problem in the public sector is funds. I know from my work that after the Beirut blast there has been a large package of funds to solarize public institutions, for example a World Bank program for the Lebanese University and initiatives with [German] agencies KFW and GTZ and also with other institutions from Japan. Public hospitals, public schools, Lebanese University, Lebanese Armed Forces, and also at different ministries, in all of them you will find a very good solarization rate that has been installed. In the coming year there will be projects for the Palaces of Justice and the administrative buildings of governorates, implemented by UNDP with what I think is EU funding.

There is, however, a huge problem of [doing things] the Lebanese way where “bigger is better” where I will get a two or three times larger generator when I need one of 100 kWh capacity. This is knowing that underloading a generator will consume more fuel and that a bigger generator will consume more fuel than a small one. So in 95 percent of institutions in Lebanon, you find that their diesel generator is over-seized, because they took a bigger generator under considerations that they would grow. [Before], there would be many Lebanese people who would prefer to have a larger generator just in order to have the peace of mind of always have enough power, rather than making savings on fuel. Today it is different. Today we need to consider energy efficiency as we are back to financial reality. There are many examples for low cost, no cost operational efficiency measures.

Is this rational trend toward higher energy efficiency progressing in the best possible way, or is the country still in a worst-possible scenario of implementation?

The [reality] is something in-between but I think if it is institutionalized and legalized, it will be much better. Now it makes sense financially and it is the best time to implement energy efficiency in Lebanon.

But are there government incentives such as tax holidays or investment support for energy efficiency measures?

No need to go there. I am quoting one of my two German energy gurus who used to say that the cleanest and cheapest kilowatt-hour that you can produce, is the one that you do not consume. Let us begin there and then we can discuss other issues.

There have been ideas and proposals of utility scale solar farms that were born in the 2010s and tendered later in the past decade but then stopped still before the implementation stage in 2019 and 20. When I recently searched the website of LCEC for information relating to these solar farm tenders, I encountered a stakeholder assessment document by the World Bank. It seemed to imply a need to engage in further consultations with stakeholders from municipalities and civil society in communities in the Bekaa that were recently in the news not for their agricultural or other economic capacities. What is the state of developing utility-scale solar PV and power purchase agreements (PPAs)?

I will update you on this but let me first remark that the private sector in Lebanon has demanded its own energy sovereignty from the government. This was one of the main drivers of the solar boom. On one side there was the residential aspect that was driven both by desire for energy security and, later on, also by energy efficiency. But when you look at the demand from the industrial and commercial, or C&I sector, it was pure energy sovereignty where a lot of people were saying, ‘we do not want to wait for the government anymore but take things into our own hands’. And I was just notified that six out of 11 PPAs were already sold to private sector partners. There is a big appetite from private sector players who want to invest on their own, and the only issue today why we are not implementing the 11 PPA contracts that were signed, is the financing.

In this regard, the Stakeholder Assessment document by the World Bank said that you must complete the stakeholder assessment process before you can receive finance.

That applies if you aim for international financing. But what we are seeing now in Lebanon is that [private sector entrepreneurs] are not going for any external financing. They are people who are going for the PPAs because they want to themselves invest in solar farms. So what we are seeing today is an internal appetite of the private sector to invest in the public sector. This is a good sign: the private sector is coming back and taking part in the solution for the public sector.

What you say now reminds me of civil society actions in some areas of Beirut when private initiatives started in late 2021 connecting streetlights to generators in neighborhoods or even people’s buildings, so that all people in the neighborhood could walk in more light and thus greater safety.

And now those types of initiatives are going to the next level. Now they are going to the level of, let’s say, 15 megawatts of solar farms that will be feeding into the grid, as part of the private sector investing into the public sector.

Would that require the issuance of very clear further regulations as far as provision and pricing, public private partnerships (PPP), and all that?

The price [for electricity purchases from private providers by the state utility] was set within the PPA and it is very competitive, I think, when you compare it to the cost of production in Lebanon and taking into consideration all the risks. I am not a legal expert on the matters of PPP and PPAs. From my understanding from the legal experts, the only issue is in the financing. If you have the financing, you can start the works and it is no secret that several PPAs were bought – [purchase of two contracts by shipping giant] CMA-CGM is already public and they have stated that they will start implementing. I think there is something pending with Total [Energies and QatarEnergy]. However, I know that there also are others.

Are there fully Lebanese investors that have acquired PPA contracts? If so, does the Lebanese Private sector network have a stake or function in such initiatives?

Yes, that is the case and many of the people, or at least a couple of them, who are holding PPAs, are members of LPSN.

What about the requirement of stakeholder assessments or other political barriers that might stand in the way of international finance, such as through World Bank packages, when we talk about municipalities where allegiances have been with the political Hezbollah?

I cannot talk for the World Bank but on the Lebanese level, the only requirement would be the social and environmental impact assessment, which has its own criteria and could be run through local authorities and municipalities but also through local NGOs and local representation. I do not know if the World Bank has other requirements which would apply if the World Bank is financing, which, however is not the case in the moment. I think since we have appetite from the private sector in financing that size of solar relays, I would keep the World Bank off those projects and focus on having that aspect of sovereignty within the financing of those PPAs and bring in the World Bank for the larger ones where you might need all the processes and procedures that the World Bank applies.

Do you have any information on the damages on the energy sector from the two months of open war?

I know that there was a huge impact in the south – and I know less from the Bekaa – on the solar systems that were specifically installed for solar[-powered] pumping. These systems, which were already financed by international donors, will have to be restored and we will need a lot of support to rebuild them. As we do not have access to all the regions yet, it is too early to undertake a formal assessment of damages.

As far as economic losses in electricity and renewable operations over the past months, could these be of lower significance? It seems that operational provision and access to electricity in 2024 was, despite the war better than in 2023 or 22?

This is for the simple reason of having parts of the country that were totally depopulated, which meant that we had less electrical load and it was moved to other regions that felt a slight amelioration because they had more hours of electricity. We will not have any international financing in the sector without a macroeconomic solution, except for those small PPAs where you can find a private investor that can invest 6, 7, or 8 million USD to build a solar farm. However, if we talk about large scale farms and projects of $100 or 150 million, we need external finance from international financial institutions, and those will not come without a macroeconomic solution, which was delayed by the war.

So in your analysis, new financing will be delayed because of the conflict?

Yes, war is the enemy of attracting investments. However, we have seen resilience within the Lebanese population – but is that resilience enough to attract direct buyers? But on a brighter side, what we hope for, even if I am not sure that this can be said about any war, is that this war will be a start of a new era of ending conflicts and seeing less conflicts within the region. From that point of view, we maybe getting closer to having the IFIs and external investors return to Lebanon. If on the other hand [the next phase in the Lebanese situation] is a remake of what happened in 2006, it will be delaying much. Under the more optimistic view, one of the points that we need to discuss when we talk about the role of the private sector, is the decentralized renewable energy (DRE) law.

Is the DRE law’s power wheeling part working, meaning the ability of private producers of electricity to transport the power over the grid from where they can conveniently produce it to where they need it, under the law that was adopted in Parliament at the end of 2023?

No, power wheeling is not working. However, what is working, are private to private power purchase agreements and I am happy to announce that we signed the fist PPA at USEK with a company of the private sector in Lebanon, which will be investing in installing a solar system on the roof of our parking [area]. We will have a contract where we [as USEK] buy electricity for ten years and after ten years, the system will become ours. This model can represent a very important opportunity for the private sector to invest locally. It is an investment opportunity and I know that there are companies working on that aspect. I know of one or two that are the most mature, but I cannot name.

Any industrialist whom you approach in Lebanon and ask him what the first pain in the neck is to him, he will say energy. If you them tell them ‘do not invest yourself in installing a solar farm but leave this to us and we will sell you electricity cheaper than what it costs you on your generator while you invest in your own business’, they will be very happy.

In areas of renewable energy usage other than operating manufacturing plants and processing plants, is it feasible for a transportation provider to have a solar array powering a central charging station for battery-energized buses or delivery vehicles?

Why not. We can think about a lot. However, for the public transportation sector I have cleaner models. From my point of view, hydrogen is much better for the buses when compared with installing solar farms to charge the buses and all that.

When Executive talked to the largest Lebanon-based solar PV and renewable energy companies  back in 2021, they were doing most or almost all of their profits outside of Lebanon, in Middle Eastern and African markets. Are these companies involved in the PPA deals that you mentioned? 

It is a point of pride for the energy sector in Lebanon that companies that were groomed in Lebanon are working in the whole region. But these are not the same companies that we are talking about here. It is about project financing. We are talking about companies that are being created to finance those people that install solar for third-party private sector companies. It is the private [sector] financing the private to install for the private.

But do we have the needed companies with enough capacities to serve this demand?

Yes, and much more. Having worked with them from different perspective, [namely] from the public and the private sector perspective and now as customer representative for my university, I can say that the renewable energy [Engineering, Procurement, and Construction] EPC companies in Lebanon are very competitive and have the right know-how to install the systems, especially when we are talking private to private sector projects of below 1.5 megawatt, which cover 90 percent of the needs in Lebanon. For those system sizes, we have the world’s best companies to install them.

As you mentioned, gas reserves and also using fossil resources is crucial for energy sovereignty of Lebanon. We have had many speculations, rumors, and political expectations throughout the 2010s and even after the crash of the local subsidies. Is this debate of resources more rational today?

Once we have proven resources – and as I scientist I cannot state my conviction but I can say that we have a very good probability for those reserves, putting it into a more scientific framework, it will be a game changer for the energy sector. I think the Lebanese private sector will have a huge role to play on that level, not only on level of license holders but also in the huge marker of services that need to be provided to those companies.

Will the world around us let us explore our resources in peace?

At the start of my course in each semester, I present a slide of proven energy resources in the world and another slide where I present the political tensions in the world. And when I overlay these two maps, there usually is 80 to 85 percent accuracy of overlay. In previous times it was water and today one of the main reasons of war are energy resources. However, I am personally optimistic because I know that our country will survive because it has already survived many similar, bigger and smaller conflicts and turmoil as we are facing now.

Another chapter that we need to address is hydrogen. Hydrogen is now being pumped to Europe from North Africa.  But there is also a big potential for hydrogen production elsewhere in the region, especially places with natural gas pipelines passing through. Because you can mix.

Would the hydrogen production be utilizing solar-thermal?

There are several ways. What is called green hydrogen is produced by using renewable energy and electrolysis of water but there is also potential for blue hydrogen where there are oil reserves. Natural gas from oil reserves can be used to produce blue hydrogen instead of flaring it. It can also be pumped. Hydrogen is the energy vector of tomorrow. It is a vector, not a source because it can be used to shift energy from point a to point b in geography but also from point a to point b in time.

Is Lebanon politically and technically cognizant of this opportunity?

Lebanon is one of the first countries to have a hydrogen strategy. I myself developed that strategy on behalf of GIZ. So I think we are well positioned, but we are not ready yet. We are on the right track but need to accelerate and this acceleration would depend on [collaboration].

The LPSN has stipulated the need for an internationally financed, Marshall-type plan for Lebanon. Should there be a budget allocation to energy in a Marshall type plan and how much in percentage terms of a plan should be dedicated to energy sector development?

I cannot give you a number but I think that energy should be the main focus of any future plans within Lebanon, because it is at the same time one of the main enablers of the Lebanese economy and also in itself is becoming a sector of the economy. I don’t know how many sectors were producing $5 billion per year during the last period. This was the private power generation sector that was achieving a turnover of four to five billion dollars per year. If this sector is institutionalized and opened to private sector, you open an economical sector that will be running billions – nobody has the exact numbers – at the same time as the billions of EDL. The energy sector should not only be an enabler but also a producer and economic sector in itself.

December 12, 2024 0 comments
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Real estateReal estateReal Estate

Real estate in the interim: Resettling and reconstruction

by Sherine Najdi December 11, 2024
written by Sherine Najdi

This article is part of ongoing Executive coverage with members of the Lebanese Private Sector Network on sectoral impacts of and responses to the 70-day September 2024 war on Lebanon.

In the wake of devastating strikes that have turned bustling neighborhoods into craters and thriving homes, enterprises, and shops into rubble, the future of housing and real estate in Lebanon requires a major focus on reconstruction with a forward-thinking eye for sound and environmentally tenable urban development and planning. From rural homes and farms to multi-family high-rises in Beirut, the scars of destruction are everywhere, leaving questions about recovery, stability, funding for repair and reconstruction. Larger questions of what comes next for the country’s urban and residential landscapes are fraught, given the shaky state of the 60-day ceasefire and Lebanon’s central positioning between one hostile neighbor to the south and another north-western border neighbor currently experiencing massive upheaval with international powers eager to reshape the country according to their interests.

In this interview, Mireille Korab, Director/Head of Business Development at FFA Real Estate who is a leading figure in Lebanon’s real estate sector, discusses the profound challenges and opportunities that define the industry amidst a backdrop of war, economic instability, and political uncertainty. Over the years, the sector has faced a cascade of disruptions—from a slowdown in 2015 to the halt of subsidized loans in 2017, and the compounded impacts of the 2019 financial crisis. These longstanding issues have been further strained by the recent war, which has brought many planned projects to a standstill.

Korab explores how the market has adapted, highlighting the resilience of developers and the strategic moves of buyers with high purchasing power. Despite the setbacks, she identifies silver linings and investment opportunities, emphasizing the sector’s potential as Lebanon moves toward stability. The conversation delves into the critical role of reconstruction and urban planning, advocating for sustainable development and strategic collaboration between the private and public sectors.

While the real estate market is in flux, Korab’s insights shed light on the path forward, underscoring the readiness of the private sector to contribute to rebuilding efforts and seize future opportunities in Lebanon’s evolving landscape.

Executive: Are there any ongoing real estate purchases despite the war?


Korab: Yes, but only in isolated cases. Before the war, a lot of developers were starting to plan new projects and were advertising a few new developments. Everything stopped, even though in the areas that were not affected directly by the strikes, there were people interested in buying. Wealthier individuals with high purchasing power seized opportunities to buy properties in unaffected areas. However, this was not reflective of a healthy market, not a full-fledged market but more of one-off transactions.

Definitely, we saw a huge rise in the rental prices, because a lot of people were leaving Beirut, leaving other areas closer to the strikes, and we had a surge in the rental prices. This is not healthy because there was limited availability yet a lot of demand, and also a discrepancy between the pricing and the purchasing power. So, again, we were in a very unstable situation for the past 60 days, 66 days. And now everything is on hold, waiting for the ceasefire to be permanent because it’s just a halt now.

So, there are no new projects at the moment. The new projects will start after January, hopefully, once everything is settled and a new president is elected, only then will the market go back to running smoothly.

Executive: What types of properties were most in demand during this time?


Korab: Luxury properties, such as villas in mountainous regions and chalets near the beach, attracted buyers looking for long-term investments. However, these were limited to high-end markets.

Executive: Is this a good time to invest in real estate?


Korab: Yes. Property prices are discounted by 25-30 percent and are expected to rise once stability returns, particularly after a ceasefire and political resolution. It’s a good time to buy. It’s a buyer’s market; it’s not a seller’s market.

Executive: Do you foresee significant investment opportunities post-war?


Korab: if the ceasefire is permanent, we will witness good days ahead in the sector. The reconstruction phase will bring immense opportunities, especially with international support. However, this requires political stability and proper urban planning.

Executive: What are the plans for reconstruction and urban development?


Korab: You have more than 100,000 units destroyed. The focus should be on sustainable and planned reconstruction, avoiding mistakes of the past. There’s a push for creating green areas and adhering to modern urban planning standards to ensure a better future.

Executive: How involved is the private sector in reconstruction planning?


Korab: The private sector is ready to collaborate with the government to contribute to reconstruction efforts. Real estate developers are advocating for a seat at the planning table to ensure effective and sustainable rebuilding. I’m the vice president of the Real Estate Developers Association and we are demanding proper urban planning on the government’s part. We [the private sector] know how to tackle the reconstruction. So we are demanding a seat in the process of reconstruction. And we will be there hand in hand to help the public sector to have it as it should be.

 

Executive: What are your expectations for the market once stability is restored?


Korab: Prices will likely return to their 2015 levels and continue to rise. Rental prices, which surged during the war, will also stabilize as displaced individuals return to their homes.

Executive: Do you have any final thoughts or advice?


Korab: It’s always a good time to invest in Lebanon’s real estate market, particularly now with favorable prices. The sector has resilient potential and will thrive with proper planning and political stability.

December 11, 2024 0 comments
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EducationEducationEducation planSpecial education

The Multifaceted Role of the COO in Steering Lebanese Tertiary Education Through Crisis and Beyond

by Youssef Bassim December 11, 2024
written by Youssef Bassim

As the Chief Operating Officer (COO) at the University of Balamand, my role has extended far beyond the conventional boundaries of operational management, particularly in the context of Lebanon’s prolonged crisis. Over the past five years, Lebanon has seen economic turmoil, political instability, a global pandemic, and most recently a war. Overseeing comprehensive crisis management and strategic oversight involves a proactive and multifaceted approach to navigating uncertainties and ensuring stability. This responsibility is particularly crucial in a context like Lebanon, where educational institutions face ongoing economic, political, and societal challenges.

Crisis Preparedness and Response

Effective crisis management required a well-prepared response mechanism tailored to the unique risks faced by the institution. Crisis response planning was developed and regularly updated to address potential scenarios such as political unrest, economic instability, health emergencies, and natural disasters. This plan includes clear protocols for communication, decision-making, and logistical arrangements to ensure continuity of operations.

Maintaining a resilient infrastructure was the key to minimizing disruptions during crisis. Ensuring robust IT infrastructure capable of supporting remote operations was crucial, especially for continuity in academic delivery, along with strengthening cybersecurity measures to protect sensitive information and prevent data breaches.

Physical infrastructure readiness was observed by overseeing the maintenance and upgrading of physical facilities to ensure they are secure and adaptable to various needs during a crisis. This included ensuring that buildings are structurally sound, energy systems are reliable, and emergency supplies are readily available.

Supply chain management was maintained by implementing strategies to stabilize the supply chain for critical resources such as laboratory equipment, medical supplies, and food services. This involved diversifying suppliers and maintaining strategic reserves of essential items to mitigate the impact of supply disruptions.

Health and Safety Protocols

Ensuring the health and safety of the university community during crisis is a primary responsibility. In an environment such as Lebanon’s, where various crises—war being the latest most devastating one—can impact operations, robust health and safety protocols are vital.

Comprehensive health guidelines addressing everything from emergency medical responses to disease prevention, were created following international best practices and local health regulations.

Psychological support and mental health services were enforced by expanding the availability of mental health services to address the increased stress and anxiety caused by the war. This included providing access to counseling services—including services supporting those directly affected by traumatic events—mental health workshops, and support groups that assist students and staff in managing their mental well-being. 

Health surveillance systems were implemented to monitor the well-being of the campus community. These systems can track the incidence of illnesses, allowing for timely interventions when unusual patterns are detected. Regularly assessing campus facilities by checking ventilation systems, water supply, cleanliness, and waste disposal methods helped prevent environmental health risks.

Establishing strong partnerships with local health authorities and our hospitals network was needed to ensure coordinated responses to health emergencies. These collaborations will provide the university with access to additional medical resources and expertise, enhancing the overall effectiveness of health protocols.

Collaborating on public health campaigns that promote health awareness among students and staff was performed. These campaigns can focus on vaccination, disease prevention, and healthy lifestyle choices, contributing to a healthier campus environment.

Prioritizing health and safety helped the university to maintain a secure and supportive environment that is conducive to learning and working, even in the face of significant challenges. By implementing robust preparedness plans, maintaining resilient infrastructure and ensuring the health and safety of the community, the COO ensures that the university is not only prepared to handle current challenges but is also well-positioned to thrive in the future.

Operational and Strategic Framework Enhancements

As COO, enhancing the operational frameworks involves strategic oversight across several key departments, each integral to maintaining robust operations and ensuring the institution’s resilience in times of crisis. In the Information Technology (IT) department, my role involves directing efforts to bolster our digital infrastructure which is crucial for supporting hybrid learning models and remote operations. This encompasses expanding our Learning Management Systems (LMS) to facilitate seamless online education and enhancing cybersecurity measures to safeguard sensitive university data against potential cyber threats, particularly vital during crisis when reliance on digital platforms increases. Similarly, managing the Human Resources (HR) department is crucial for ensuring effective recruitment, retention, and development of faculty and staff.

Additionally, overseeing the construction and maintenance department involves ensuring the timely completion of capital projects and the regular upkeep of existing facilities. Strategic planning in this area addresses the growing needs of the university while ensuring sustainability and compliance with safety standards, which are paramount during crises that can impact physical infrastructure. Leading the procurement department involves navigating the complexities of acquiring goods and services that meet our quality standards and cost-efficiency, while ensuring that operations remain uninterrupted, and resources are readily available. Lastly, supervising campus services ensures that all aspects of campus operations, from security to transportation and fleet management, run smoothly.

Academic and Administrative Innovation

Innovation in academic delivery and administrative operations is essential to maintaining the relevance and competitiveness of our educational offerings, particularly in times of crisis. By working closely with academic leaders to continuously adapt our curriculum, we ensure it meets the evolving needs of the job market and aligns with both local and international standards, making our students well-prepared even in unstable times. These strategic innovations in curriculum and operations are vital for ensuring that the university can swiftly adapt and respond to crisis, maintaining continuity in education and administrative functions without sacrificing quality or security.

Community Support and Outreach Programs

The university’s engagement with the local community is a critical aspect of our operations, extending well beyond the academic sphere. As COO, I actively oversee various outreach initiatives. Civic engagement projects, such as the Balamand Civil Society Support Project, are designed to address specific community needs including health, education, and economic development, and have been crucial in providing aid to families affected by the local crisis. Recently, this project has been instrumental in supporting displaced citizens due to the current conflict, providing not just educational support but also essential medical aid, clothing, and food. This comprehensive support enhances our responsiveness to community emergencies. Additionally, fostering volunteering and service-learning programs encourages both students and staff to engage in activities that benefit the local community. These programs not only address immediate community needs but also instill a strong sense of civic responsibility and ethical leadership in our students.

Strategic Partnerships and Collaborations

Building and maintaining strategic partnerships are essential for amplifying the impact of our academic programs and research initiatives, particularly in strengthening our crisis management capabilities. Industry partnerships with local and international businesses ensure that our academic programs are closely aligned with market needs, thereby enhancing the employability of our graduates and providing them with practical experiences through joint research projects, internships, and co-op opportunities.  Additionally, engaging with government bodies and NGOs not only helps influence public policy and secure funding for critical projects but also enhances our capacity to contribute to educational reforms and regional development efforts. These strategic relationships are pivotal in enabling the university to respond effectively to crisis, ensuring continuity in education and research, and supporting community and national resilience.

Public Policy Influence and Advocacy

The International Forum on Lebanon Revival Plan “From Myth to Reality,” hosted under the leadership of Dr. Elias Warrak, President of the University of Balamand, is set to address the significant challenges facing Lebanon’s economic, higher education, and healthcare sectors. The forum aims to transition from idealistic visions to practical solutions, bringing together keynote speakers and panelists from diverse backgrounds to propose viable strategies for national recovery. This initiative is part of the University of Balamand’s ongoing commitment to influencing public policy and enhancing community welfare. By actively participating in such policy advisory panels and hosting influential forums, the university bridges the gap between academia, industry, and policymakers, fostering discussions that lead to actionable insights and robust policy reforms. This engagement is crucial for effective crisis management, ensuring the institution is both a contributor to and leader in national efforts to stabilize and revitalize Lebanon, supporting the broader community in times of need.

Alumni Engagement

Maintaining a robust alumni network is crucial for fostering enduring relationships that benefit both the University of Balamand and its graduates, playing a key role in crisis management and resilience. We actively develop alumni networks and associations that facilitate ongoing engagement through various channels, including events, newsletters, and social platforms. Additionally, we offer a range of lifelong learning opportunities and professional development courses to our alumni, ensuring that they remain connected to the university and continue to advance in their careers.

Futureproofing the Institution

Looking towards the future, the following strategic planning and sustainability initiatives are critical.

Long-Term Strategic Planning: engaging in detailed scenario planning and developing long-term strategies that anticipate future challenges and opportunities in higher education.

Innovation in Education: championing the adoption of new technologies and teaching methodologies that position the university as a leader in educational innovation.

Sustainability Initiatives: Leading efforts to ensure that all university operations are environmentally sustainable and economically viable, preparing the institution to meet future educational demands and societal challenges.

The role of the university COO at a university during times of major upheaval is both diverse and dynamic. It involves not only navigating the university through immediate challenges but also strategically positioning it for future success. By overseeing critical operational departments, enhancing academic and administrative frameworks, and fostering community engagement, the COO ensures that the university remains a beacon of stability, innovation, and growth. As we continue to adapt and evolve, our focus remains steadfast on delivering an education that is not only comprehensive and inclusive but also transformative, preparing our students to be resilient leaders in an ever-changing world.

December 11, 2024 0 comments
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Since its first edition emerged on the newsstands in 1999, Executive Magazine has been dedicated to providing its readers with the most up-to-date local and regional business news. Executive is a monthly business magazine that offers readers in-depth analyses on the Lebanese world of commerce, covering all the major sectors – from banking, finance, and insurance to technology, tourism, hospitality, media, and retail.

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